THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

A REVISED TEXT

WITH INTRODUCTION ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

BY

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BOOKS I.—V.

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PREFACE.

In the work, of which this volume is an instalment, I have undertaken to reproduce in an English dress Professor Susemihl's edition of the Politics in Greek and German as issued by him, with notes explanatory of the subject-matter, in 1879. It is not, however, a simple reproduction, but a minute and scrupulous revision, the translation having been dropped and the plan of the work sensibly modified to adapt it to the wants of English students. Some changes have been made in the Introduction, to which a section has been added, though naturally the materials of this section are by no means new. The text (for which Professor Susemihl is solely responsible) has been corrected in some hundreds of places, mostly to bring it into agreement with his later edition in the Teubner series, of which a nova impressio correctior was issued in 1894, only a few months ago. The great majority of the changes which distinguish the impressio of 1894 from that of 1883 have, however, to be sought in the Corrigenda. By the simple device of a change of type it has been found possible to exhibit to the eye the effect of the numerous transpositions here recommended, and yet to retain the received order of the text for facility of reference. In the notes explanatory of the subject-matter bearing his signature Professor Susemihl has introduced comprehensive changes. No one therefore should be surprised if these notes fail to correspond in substance (as they correspond in appended number) to those of the German edition.
Where it seemed expedient, they have been supplemented from my own collections. It can be said with truth that difficulties have never been shirked, numerous as they undoubtedly are. Wherever a note grew to an inordinate length or threatened to digress from the context, it has been relegated to an excursus.

In compiling additional notes I have received the greatest stimulus and advantage from the writings and correspondence of my collaborator, whose patience and forbearance have not been exhausted in the long interval preceding publication. He has always been willing to lavish upon me every assistance from the stores of his erudition, and to aid me with the latest results of his experience and ripened judgment. Indeed, it is not too much to say that not only primarily, but in the additions of date subsequent to 1879 indirectly, this volume, and the Politics as a whole, owes far more to him than to all other sources put together. Next to him I am most indebted to Dr Henry Jackson, who has never failed to give me encouragement and assistance, and in 1880 most kindly placed at my disposal a selection of valuable notes, critical and exegetical, which are published in the course of the volume with his signature. Moreover, as in private duty bound, I acknowledge that it is to the stimulus of his inspiring lectures that I, like Dr Postgate and Mr Welldon, owe my first interest in Aristotelian studies. I have naturally endeavoured to profit by the publications of recent years, so far as they bore upon my author, and I may especially mention the contributions to the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society and Journal of Philology by Dr Jackson, Professor Ridgeway, Dr Postgate and Professor J. Cook Wilson. I have taken the liberty of consulting any materials to which I had access, such as the marginalia of the late Richard Shilleto in the Cambridge University Library, and of the late Edward Meredith Cope in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. In common with the publishers I deplore and apologise for the long delay between the announcement and the publication of this work, although this delay has enabled me to secure a collation of the oldest extant source of the text, the fragments of the Vatican palimpsest, and to incorporate in the Addenda the most import-
ant of the references to the recently discovered *Constitution of Athens*. Thus supplemented the commentary will, it is hoped, be found more adequate than any of its predecessors to our existing materials and means of information.

Some will be surprised that more attention has not been bestowed upon the superb Introduction or the full and lucid commentary upon Books I and II published by Mr W. L. Newman in 1887. The truth is that, at the time of its appearance the earlier part of this volume had been printed off, and the publishers did not see their way either to issue this part (pp. 1—460) separately, as I personally should have preferred, or to incur the heavy expense of cancelling the printed sheets. Some valuable annotations of Mr Newman’s, however, which I should have been glad to incorporate in the proper place, receive a brief recognition in the Addenda.

I have further to add that I began to print before Professor Susemihl had collected into a permanent form his first set of *Quaestiones Aristotelicae* I—VII, and that for greater clearness I refer to the invaluable pamphlet issued by him in 1886, in which the main results of the seven Quaestiones are combined, as *Quaestiones criticae collectae*, although the last word *collectae* forms no part of the title proper.

My best thanks are here duly tendered to my friends Mr William Wyse, late Professor of Greek in University College, London, for valuable suggestions and criticisms, and numerous additional references, particularly in all that bears upon Greek Antiquities; Miss Alice Zimmern, author of *Home Life of the Greeks*, Mr Hartmann W. Just, sometime scholar of C. C. C., Oxford, and Mr H. J. Wolstenholme, for timely assistance in the laborious task of translating from the German; further, to my brother-in-law, Mr T. L. Heath, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who read most of the earlier proof-sheets. Occasional notes of his and one by Mr H. W. Just bear the authors’ initials. To guard against all misapprehension I should add that the excursus on Greek Music was already printed off before the Provost of Oriel’s recent work on that subject reached me.
The want of an index, which renders this instalment of the work much less useful than it might otherwise have been, will be remedied when the remaining three books are published.

R. D. HICKS.

Trinity College, Cambridge,
Oct. 15, 1894.
ON REFERENCES TO THE *POLITICS* BY BOOKS, CHAPTERS, 
SECTIONS, PAGES.

The text of this edition with its double numbering of certain books, its double system of chapters and sections, and of marginal pages, may well perplex an unfamiliar reader unless a word or two be added as to the origin of this aggravated confusion and the various methods by which any given passage may be cited.

The manuscripts exhibit the eight books in the old order, viz. A B Γ Δ E Z Π Θ according to the left heading of each page (not in the order of this edition which is A B Γ Π Θ Δ Z E). There is no subdivision of the books in the Aldines and other early printed editions, any more than in the MSS. The Latin translations had been subdivided before this into chapters and sections, a division almost inevitable when the continuity of the text is disturbed by paraphrase and commentary. Thus the second edition of Victorius (Florence 1576) presents the text in a series of short sections, although these are never numbered or otherwise utilized for purposes of reference.

The system of chapters here adopted, as cited in the head lines and on the left hand of the pages of this volume, is that most widely known through its adoption by Immanuel Bekker in the great edition of the Berlin Academy (quarto 1831), and by Hermann Bonitz in the *Index Aristotelicus* to the same edition (1870). It may be traced back to the editions of Zwinger (1582), Sylburg (1587), Casaubon (1590). It seems that Zwinger merely modified another arrangement into chapters, derived from the Latin Aristotle (e.g. the edition of Bagolimus), and found in the third Basel edition (1550) of Conrad Gesner, also in Giphanius (1608). Sylburg (1587) and Conring (1656) give both schemes, calling Gesner’s “vulgo.” In this now obsolete arrangement Book I. made eight chapters, not thirteen, Book II., ten, not twelve, Book III., twelve, not eighteen.

The sections into which Bekker’s chapters are divided are taken from the Oxford reprint of Bekker in ten octavo volumes (1837), in which unfortunately Bekker’s pages and lines are wholly ignored. These sections have been retained in this volume because Liddell and Scott’s Greek Lexicon, and some other authorities, cite the *Politics* by them. They are numbered on the left side of the page with § prefixed.

The chapters (in Roman figures) and sections on the right side of the page are these introduced by J. Gottlob Schneider in his valuable edition of 1809. Schneider broke with all his predecessors by adopting longer chapters and fewer of them, e.g. 5 in Book I., 9 in Book II. He was followed amongst subsequent editors by Göttling
ON REFERENCES TO THE POLITICS.

(1824), Adolf Stahr (1839), Susemihl (1879): Grote in his history always cites the Politics by Schneider's edition.

But the tendency in modern times has been not to employ for citation either the sections of Bekker or the chapters and sections of Schneider, but rather the chapter, page, column, and line of the quarto of the Berlin Academy above mentioned. In this edition of all Aristotle the Politics occupies pages 1252—1342. The quarto volume is printed in double columns, cited as column a, column b. For example, 1252 a 18, 1276 b 4 (or in the Index Aristotelicus 1252 a 18, 1276 b 4) are used to denote,

the one, line 18 of the left column of page 1252, the other, line 4 of the right column of page 1276. The closer definition which this method of citation by lines secures is a great recommendation, but it is balanced by one drawback, viz. that to be quite sure of finding a passage the Berlin Aristotle is required, and after sixty years the supremacy of even this edition no longer remains unquestioned. In the present volume the pages and lines of Bekker's quarto are cited on the left hand side of the page, while in the heading over the right hand page the whole extent of the text on both left and right pages is recorded: (e.g. 1263 b 23—1264 a 4 for the text upon pp. 238 and 239 of this volume).

Lastly, there are a few writers, Bernays and Oncken among them, who prefer to quote passages by the page and line, not of the Berlin quarto, but of the octavo reprint of it issued a little later, of which a third edition came out in 1855 and a fourth edition in 1878. For comparison, this system of pages has been recorded on the right hand margin, the reference being enclosed in a bracket, thus: (p. 31).

For an example of these rival methods of citation take the sentence ἐπὶ δὲ μὴν τούτῳ ἄγνοεῖν ὦτι χρῆ προείκειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ upon p. 239 of this edition. The reference (i) in the Index Aristotelicus would be Πβ5, 1264 a 1 sq.; we prefer to cite it as (ii) Book II, c. 5 §16 (or II, 5, 16) by Bekker's chapters and sections: or dropping the book and chapter (which are really superfluous) as (iii) 1264 a 1, 2 by Bekker's pages, columns and lines. No references in this English edition are given by Schneider's chapters and sections, which were followed in Susemihl's German edition of 1879: but on that method the passage could be cited as (iv) Book II c. ii §10. Lastly, Bernays or Oncken would refer to it as (v) p. 31, 1 ff.
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CORRIGENDA.

Page 8, line 2: for M. read Isaac
P. 18, note 7, line 5: for πολιτικών read πολιτικῶν.
P. 56, line 14: for Stageira read Stagira (cp. Meisterhans² p. 43, n. 373)
P. 69, note 2, line 3: for νήμων read νήμων
1b. line 4: for πολιτείων read πολιτείων
P. 82, line 2: for ἀπορίαν read εὐπορίαν (cp. below p. 312)
P. 144, text, 1252 b 16, 17: for μάλιστα δὲ ἐοίκε κατὰ φώς
read μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φώς ἐοίκε

1b. commentary, right column, last line: for coedichc read coedichc
P. 146, critical notes, line 3: after 28 insert ἦδη]
P. 147, text, 1253 a 3: omit ἐστι
1b. critical notes, line 6: transpose
ὁ omitted by II² Bk
to precede || 3 ἐστι M⁸
That is, the ὦ omitted by II² Bk is in 1253 a 2 before ἀνθρωτος. Stöhr reads ἀνθρωτος: cp. Addenda p. 663
P. 150, crit. notes, line 5: for Quaest. Cr. III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. read Quaest. crit. coll. (Lips. 1886) p. 334 ff
1b. line 8: dele Ar.
P. 151, crit. notes, line 8: after Quaest. Cr. II. 5 f., IV. 5 f. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 336 ff
P. 153, crit. notes, line 4: after Quaest. Cr. II. 7 ff. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 339 f
P. 156, text, 1254 a 8, right margin: for (p. read (p. 6)
P. 157, text, 1254 a 27: for ἀνδρεῖα read ὑπό
1b. crit. notes, line 3: for Dittographia read Dittography
crit. notes, line 9: after ἀνδρεῖα read ΓII Bk.¹ Susem.²
P. 160, text, 1254 b 14: omit καλ
P. 161, crit. notes, line 1: after 18 insert ἐστίν]
P. 176, crit. notes, line 9: after Quaest. Cr. III. 5 ff. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 352 f
P. 178, comm. left column, line 9: for κέκτησθαι read κεκτήσθαι
P. 180, crit. notes, line 3: for ἡν read ἦν
P. 182, text, 1257 a 38: for καλ et read καθαν et
P. 183, comm. left col. line 8: for 5, read see
1b. line 9: for μετατιθέμενων read μετατιθέμενων
P. 190, comm. left col. line 7 from below: after selling insert and
CORRIGENDA.

P. 195, comm. right col. line 17: after citizens insert a comma
P. 197, text, 1259 b 32: for [kai] read kai
P. 200, text, 1260 a 30, right margin: remove 9 from line 30 to line 31
   Ib. comm. left col. line 5 from below: for μέρος read μέρος
P. 201, text, 1260 a 35, right margin: remove 10 from line 35 to line 36
P. 209, To Excursus II. also belong remarks on B. i. c. 6 in Addenda p. 672
P. 213, text, 1260 b 31: for kai ετ read καβ ετ
P. 216, comm. right col. line 14: for III. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, read III. 16 § 2, IV (VII). § 8 4,
P. 231, crit. notes, line 3: for Bk. read Bk.¹
P. 232, text, 1263 a 2: for ἐξεί, πᾶσιν read ἐξεί πᾶσιν,
P. 233, comm. right col. line 26: for 1. 126 read 1. 141 § 3
P. 234, comm. left col. line 19: for 1. 9. 9 read 1. 7. 2, 1255 b 24 f
P. 235, text, 1263 a 29: for προσεδέβουστε read προσεδέβουστος
P. 236, text, 1267 a 11: for δύναμιν read βούλοντο
P. 273, comm. left col. line 6: for II. § 9 read c. 11 § 9
P. 279, crit. notes, last line: after Ephesus insert op. c. fol. 186⁴ p. 610, 16 ft.
ed Hayduck
P. 281, comm. left col. line 5: for evidences read evidence
P. 282, text, 1269 b 18: for δει νομίζειν εἰναι read εἰναι δει νομίζειν
P. 284, comm. right col. line 12: read διασφάται
P. 287, comm. left col. line 21: for 8 § 6 read 7 § 6
P. 297, comm. left col. line 13: for p. 9 read p. 20
P. 300, comm. left col. last line: for Ottfried read Otfried
P. 301, comm. left col. line 4: for πολεμίων read πόλεων
P. 305, text, 1272 b 9: for δυναστῶν read δυνατῶν
   Ib. crit. notes, line 7: after Schneider || add δυναστῶν II¹ Susem.¹² ||
P. 306, text, 1272 b 13: for τι read τί
   Ib. text, 1272 b 23: for τοσαίδ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσαθω read εἰρήσαθω τοσαίδ' ἡμῖν
P. 312, text, 1273 b 6 (bis, line 4 and line 18): for ἀπορίαν read εὕπορίαν
   Ib. crit. notes, line 3: for 6 εὐπορίαν PII²-Ar. read
   6 ἀπορίαν ΠΜ²-Ald. Bk. Susem.¹²
P. 314, text, 1273 b 25, left margin: dele (12)
P. 317, comm. left col. line 16: dele Aristides
P. 326, line 9: for IV. 130 read IV. 180
P. 331, heading, line 13: for II. 7. 1 read II. 8. 1
P. 356, comm. left col. line 11: for βολαίαι read βόλαιαι
P. 359, text, 1275 b 17, left margin: dele (2)
P. 362, text, 1276 a 5: for φαμέν read άφαμέν
   Ib. text, 1276 a 10: read δημοκρατία (τῶτε γάρ
P. 363, text, 1276 a 13: dele * * and read συμφέρον) ἢπερ οὖν
   The parenthesis extends from 1276 a 10 (τῶτε γάρ to 1276 a 13 συμφέρον)
   Ib. text, 1276 a 14: for καὶ read [kai]
   Ib. text, 1276 a 15: omit <οῦ>
   Ib. text, 1276 a 16: for τυραννίδος. read τυραννίδος;
   Ib. crit. notes, line 3: after 14 read [kai] Niemeyer (untranslated by William)
   Ib. crit. notes, line 4: dele incorrect
   Ib. crit. notes, line 5: after Hayduck add Susem.¹²
CORRIGENDA.

P. 364, text, 1276 a 26: for τὴν read [τὴν]


CXLIII. 1891, p. 414 ||

P. 367, text, 1276 b 30: for διόπερ read διὸ
P. 370, comm. left col. last line: for διώνται read διώνται
P. 380, text, 1278 b 8: for καὶ ei read καὶ ei
P. 382, crit. notes, line 2: after (corrector) add a semicolon
P. 389, comm. right col. line 18: for VIII(V) read VIII(V)
P. 396, text, 1281 a 16: with change of punctuation read ἄστων (ἔδοξε γὰρ...δικαίως)
P. 397, text, 1281 a 35, 36: transpose φαῦλον to precede ἔχοντα and read φαῦλον ἔχοντα γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἅλλα μὴ νόμον.
P. 430, comm. left col. line 21: for ἀρχεῖν read ἀρχεῖν

Ib. line 23: for ἐπιθυμία read ἐπιθυμία
Ib. line 26: for ὀ read ὦ
P. 431, text, 1287 a 39: for πιστευθέντας read πιστεύθετας

Ib. crit. notes, line 10: after right insert a comma and read πιστευθέντας II fr.

Bk.¹ Susem.²

P. 434, comm. right col. line 7: for ευ read εὗ
P. 438, comm. left col. line 1: after turn out insert anyhow," i.e. "
P. 441, text, 1287 a 39: for πιστευθέντας read πιστεύθετας
P. 444, crit. notes, line 11: for dittographia read dittography
P. 454, line 44: for 24 read 23
P. 467, line 5 ff.: dele the sentence Again, one might have imagined...ποιμεία.

Not so.

P. 475, text, 1323 b 18: for καὶ read [καὶ]
P. 497, text, 1337 a 23: for πρὸς read [πρὸς]

Ib. crit. notes, line 2: for ντάρχοντα read ντάρχοντα
P. 503, text, 1328 a 16: for ὦ δὲ read οἶδε
P. 521, text, 1330 b 30: for πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν read μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν
P. 529, text, 1332 a 13: omit καὶ before ἀναγκαία
P. 534, comm. left col. line 14: for 1284 read 1254
P. 535, text, 1332 b 31: for τοῦτων πάντων read πάντων τοῦτων
P. 537, text, 1333 a 26: transpose ἰδρύσθαι to precede καὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος

Ib. comm. right col. line 17: for correlation read correlative
P. 540, comm. right col. line 18 f. : for VIII(V). § 10, 7 § 2 read VIII(V). 1 § 10, 7 § 4
P. 541, text, 1334 a 8: for ἀνάγαζω read ἀφάζω
P. 545, head line: for 1333 a 40 read 1334 a 40
P. 546, text, 1334 b 24: for πέφυκεν ἐγγίνοντα read ἐγγίνοντα πέφυκεν
P. 549, text, 1335 a 27: for χρόνος ὑραμένοις read ὑραμένος χρόνος
P. 559, text, 1336 b 34: for ὅσα ἀυτῶν read ἀυτῶν ὅσα
INTRODUCTION.

I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS OF THE POLITICS.

Aristotle's *Politics* has come down to us in manuscripts for the most part of the fifteenth century; there are indeed two, P² and P³ (Bekker's I²), which date from the fourteenth century, but none earlier. There is the Latin version by Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo (Leonardus Arctinus), made from the first manuscript brought into Italy from Greece in the fifteenth century, a manuscript now lost, which was probably older than the fifteenth century¹. There is further an older translation, word for word into barbarous Latin, made in the thirteenth century, before A.D. 1274², by the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke. Its lost original was a Greek codex³ which we will call Π; written, at the latest, in the early part of the thirteenth or latter part of the twelfth century, and probably of not much older date⁴. This translation⁵ primarily, together with four of the existing Greek manuscripts, three at Paris P¹−²−³, one at Milan M⁴, is now the critical basis for the text. All that the remaining manuscripts or the translation of Arctinus can claim is to supply confirmatory evidence in isolated passages: Arctinus, in particular, is much too free and arbitrary in his rendering, so that it is often impossible to infer, at least with any certainty, the reading of his Greek codex; hence many peculiarities of his translation must be passed over or regarded as merely his own conjectures.

All these sources of the text fall into two families or recensions. One of them, on the whole the better, but often the worse in particular points, seems to be derived from a codex of the sixth or seventh century, although in the quotations of single passages in Julian and even as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias the readings peculiar to this recension are partially, but only partially, found. Besides P the only manuscripts which belong, in the main, to this family are the following two:

M = Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 (in the Ambrosian Library at Milan), of the second half of the fifteenth century, much corrected by the copyist himself and in a few passages by a later hand; collated by R. Schöll and Studemund:

P1 = Parisinus 2023 (in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), written by Demetrios Chalkondylas at the end of the fifteenth century, and then much corrected with a paler ink from a manuscript of the other family. Corrections of this sort are hereafter denoted by p1, those made in the same black ink as the original text by (corr.1), corrections which do not belong to either of these classes, or at all events are not with certainty to be reckoned with one or the other, are quoted simply as (corr.). In regard to this and all the other manuscripts, it is distinctly stated when any correction stands in the margin. P1 was last collated by Dahms and Patzig.

Just as in P1 the two families are blended, so conversely traces of the better recension are met with even in some manuscripts which belong, in the main, to the other family. This is true of many corrections and most of the glosses which are found in P2, the principal manuscript of this second family; still more frequently of the readings, corrections, and variants in P4; so also of Aretinus' translation and especially of P3; to a less extent of the corrections by a later hand in some other manuscripts, and hardly ever of their original readings. The few excerpts from

1 On the one hand the commentary of the Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus (died 485) upon Plato's Republic is quoted in a gloss on VIII (v). 12, 8, which in all probability (see note 4) proceeds from this archetype: on the other, certain corruptions common to all the sources derived from this family point to the conclusion that the archetype was written in uncials (particularly III. 14 §§ 12, 13 οὐσίαν and οὐσία γιὰν οὐσίαν and οὐσία). Now uncials writing generally ceased in the eighth century. See Susemihl op. c. XIV f., XLVI f.

2 Ordinis superioris.

3 Or in its archetype, if Demetrios found the corrections which betray the second recension—in the few cases where they are written with the same ink as his original text—already made.

4 For the same glosses which in P1 can be shown to be derived from the first recension meet us again in P2, and a similar origin may be proved for others in P2 in another way. On the other hand P2 has few glosses in common with P3, and the number in P3 is but scanty, so that the second recension appears to have had only a few glosses altogether. See Susemihl op. c. VIII f., XVIII f.
Aristotle’s *Politics* in Codex Paris. 963, of the sixteenth century, are also derived from the better recension.

Subject to these exceptions, all other manuscripts but those above-mentioned are to be reckoned with the second family, the text of which may be called the vulgate. They may be further subdivided into two classes, a better and a worse, and the latter again into three different groups: an intermediate position between the two is taken up by the translation of Aretinus and in a different way by C*. A more precise statement is afforded by the following summary.

I. Better class: II*.

P* = Coislin. 161 (brought originally from Athos: now with the rest of the Coislinian collection in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), of the 14th century; Bekker’s 1b; last collated by Susemihl. The corrections and variants are written partly (1) in the same ink as the original text, partly (2) in darker ink, partly (3) in paler, yellower, partly (4) in red ink: these are indicated hereafter by (corr.1), (corr.2), (corr.3) and p, respectively: where the ink appears to be wholly different, or cannot be brought with certainty under any of these classes, the sign will be (corr.4). But all without exception, and the glosses as well, are in the same handwriting as the codex.

P* = Paris. 2026 of the beginning of the 14th century, for the greater part written by the same scribe, but finished by another hand; the oldest manuscript that we have, but not so good as P*, especially in its original form before it had been corrected by a third and later hand and thereby made still more like P* than it was at first. It is true that most of these later corrections were subsequently scratched out again or wiped off, yet even then they remain legible enough. P*, like P*, was last collated by Susemihl.

II. Worse class: II*.

1. First group.

P* = Paris. 2025 of the 15th century, much corrected but, with the exception of a single passage, only by the scribe himself, with various readings in the margin; last collated by Susemihl.

P* = Paris. 1857, written in the year 1492 in Rome by Johannes Rhosos, a priest from Crete; last collated by Patzig for the first four chapters of Book I. Statements as to the readings of this manuscript in other single passages come from Bekker, from Barthélemy St Hilaire, and in particular from Patzig.
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Q = Marcianus Venetus 200 (in the library of St Mark at Venice), also written by Johannes Rhosos, but as early as 1457: collated by Bekker for Book I, and since then afresh for the first four chapters of that book, as above, by R. Schöll and E. Rohde.

M² = Marcianus Venetus 213, of the beginning of the 15th century, collated by Bekker for I. c. I—c. 6 § 8 and again by Rohde for I. cc. 1—4.

U² = Marcianus Venetus, append. iv. 3, written in Rome in the year 1494, collated by Bekker for II. cc. i—7; III. 2 § 3 (1275 b 32—34), 14 §§ 2—10; vi (iv). 3 § 8—4 § 3, 7 § 2—8 § 4; vii (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10, and by Rohde for I. cc. 1—4.

L² = Lipsiensis (bibliothecae Paulinae) 1335, in the University library at Leipzig, of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century, most closely related to U², collated by Patzig for i. 1—4 and other single passages. We have information about readings in other parts of Books I. II. and V (viii). from Stahr and Schneider.

C⁵ denotes the codex used by Camerarius.

Ar. = Arretinus, who must have used for his translation a codex of a very peculiar kind in which the two recensions were blended. For the translation is often in remarkable agreement with the manuscripts of this group; though often, too, with the better class. Not seldom again it agrees with the first family: lastly, it here and there shows peculiarities belonging exclusively to itself which can hardly be all set down to mere conjecture or arbitrariness on the part of the translator.

2. Second group.

C¹ = Florentinus Castiglionensis (in the Laurentian library at Florence) iv. (Acquisti nuovo), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for I. 1—4; II. 1—2 § 3; vi (iv). I: in the opening chapters it is more in agreement with the better class.

Q² = Laurentianus 81, 5 (in the Laurentian library at Florence), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for I. 1—4 and single passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books II. III. VI (iv).

R² = Laurentianus 81, 6, written by Johannes Thetetalos in the year 1494 at Florence, collated by Schöll for the same opening part and for isolated passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books VII (vi). VIII (v). It bears a great resemblance to Q², particularly to the corrections of Q² in a later hand: but it has some peculiarities of its own.

S² = Laurentianus 81, 21, of the fifteenth century, written more probably before than after Q², to which it bears an extraordinary resem-
blance; collated by Bekker for Books i. iv (vii). v (viii), and again by Schöll for the first four chapters of Bk. 1, and for single passages elsewhere.

Tb = Urbinas 46 (transferred from Urbino to the Vatican library at Rome), of the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for the first three books and for Bk. v (viii), then again by Hinck for Bk. 1. i—4 and for detached passages by Schöll. It seems to be more nearly related to Vb than to Qb, Rb, Sb.

Vb = Vaticano-Palatinus 160 (transferred from the Palatine library to the Vatican), also written by Johannes Thetatalos in the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for Bks. iv (vii). vi (iv). viii (v), by Hinck for Bk. 1. i—4, and by Schöll for several single passages. The corrections by a later hand in the opening paragraph (Bk. 1. i—4) are in striking agreement with C1.

3. Third group, more nearly related to the first group, in particular to Ub L5, than to the second.

Wb = Reginensis 125 (Christinae reginae—in the Vatican library), collated by Bekker for Bk. viii (vi), by Hinck for Bk. 1. i—4, by Schöll for several single passages. This manuscript will have to be wholly neglected for the future, because, as I learn from communications made to me by Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, it is no earlier than the sixteenth or perhaps the seventeenth century, and was undoubtedly copied from the Aldine edition.

Ald. = Aldina, the first edition of Aristotle published by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1498, last collated for Bk. 1. i—4 and for numerous single passages by Susemihl.

Lastly an unique position amongst the manuscripts is taken by P5 = Paris. 1858 or Colbert. 2401, dating from the sixteenth century. On the one hand this codex must be one of the worse manuscripts of the second family, although it cannot be exclusively assigned to any one of the three groups into which they fall1. On the other hand it frequently agrees with the first family, and not seldom alone of all the manuscripts that have come down to us it agrees with the old translation of William of Moerbeke: here and there it presents single readings, good or at least deserving of attention, which are to be found nowhere else, although it may very well be that they are not derived from earlier sources, but are, wholly or in part, mere conjectures of the scribe himself or of other scholars of that time. The

1 Nor is P5 now quoted under II1 II2 or II3 in the critical notes of this edition.
manuscript now contains only Bk. viii (v). from c. 6 § 9 onwards, Bk. vii (vi). Bk. iv (vii). and Bk. v (viii), the preceding part having been torn away; the corrections are all by the scribe himself, except a few which are divided between two later hands. It was last collated by Sussemlh 1.

From all this it may be seen that, leaving out detached passages, the manuscripts collated, besides Γ M s P 1, 2, 3, 4 Ar., are:

for 1. i—4: D 6 C 1 Q M 1 Q 1 R 1 S 1 T 1 U 1 V 1 W 1 L 6 Ald.
   i. 4—6 § 8: Q M 1 S 1 T 1.
   i. 6 § 9—13 § 16 (end): Q S 1 T 1.
   i. 1, 2: C 1 Q 1 T 1 U 1.
   ii. 3—7 § 21: Q 1 T 1 U 1.
   ii. 8—iii. 3 § 3: Q 1 T 1.
   iii. 2 § 3: Q 1 T 1 U 1.
   iii. 2 § 3—14 § 1: Q 1 T 1.
   iii. 14 §§ 2—10: Q 1 T 1 U 1.
   iii. 14 § 10—18 § 2 (end): Q 1 T 1.
   iv (vii): P 6 S 1 V 1.
   v (viii): P 6 S 1 T 1.

In addition some readings of three late and bad Paris manuscripts, 2041, 2042, 2043, containing only fragments of the work, have been made known by Barthélemy St Hilaire.

Π denotes the agreement of all the manuscripts we have,
Π 1 that of all the manuscripts of the first family (or at least their first hand), including Γ,
Π 2 that of all the manuscripts of the second family (and the Aldine edition), excluding P 3,
Π 3 that of all the worse manuscripts of this second family (i.e. all the mss. known except Γ M s P 1 P 2 P 3), so far as they have been collated, and the Aldine edition.

Bas. 1, 2, 3 denotes the three Basel editions of the years 1531, 1539, 1550, the first complete editions of Aristotle published after the Aldine. Only the third is important, since in it the first use was made of the old Latin translation, and a great number of mistakes of preceding printed editions thereby corrected. The text so formed remained essentially,

1 For more precise information on all these manuscripts see Sussemlh l.c. pp. v—xxviii.
though of course with numerous alterations, the basis for succeeding editors (who consulted new manuscripts but sparingly and, if at all, for single passages only), until Göttling's time. He first used collations, but very insufficient ones, of P1,2,3,4,5 and of a few leaves of M8, which had been made by Hase; and Bekker, while completely ignoring P1,3 M8 and almost completely P4,5, founded his edition with undue arbitrary eclecticism either upon P2 (Bekker's I5) or upon that text which preceding editions had made the textus receptus. There was no collection of critical apparatus at once sufficiently complete and trustworthy before my critical edition, which rests so far as possible upon II, the consensus of the mss. of the first family, viz. Γ, M8, P1: failing that, upon P2,3. There is less need then in a work, where the basis is the same, to give more than a mere selection of the most important and valuable readings. I shall, however, quote in full those which are found in Stobaeus' extract (Ecl. eth. ii. p. 322 foll.), and in the few citations of single passages in ancient writers, as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Julian, Pseudo-Plutarch πεπλευρεόται, etc.1

But however methodically we turn to account all these authorities we only obtain a text abounding in errors and defects of every kind. Accordingly a long series of editors, translators, and commentators from Sepulveda onwards have not failed to suggest numerous emendations and attempts at emendation, of which all the more important will be found recorded in the present edition. The following is a list in chronological order of the scholars to whose conjectures an improved text is due.

Sepulveda. Latin translation; first published at Paris, 1548. 4to.
Camot. The fourth complete edition of Aristotle, Aldina minor or Camotiana; Venice, 1552. 8vo.
Vettori (Victorius). First edition of the Politics; Florence, 1552. 4: a second edition with commentary; Florence, 1576 fol. In the copy of the first edition now belonging to the Munich Library, there are marginal notes in Vettori's own handwriting, which have been used by me. Where necessary the two editions are distinguished as Vettori1, Vettori2.
Camerarius. Politicorum et Oeconomicorum Aristotelis interpretationes et explicationes; Frankfurt, 1581. 4.
Zwinger. Edition of the Politics; Basel 1582 fol.; closely following Vettori's 2nd ed.

1 Further particulars in Susemihl's larger edition as quoted above, p. XLV ff. References to these citations will be found in Clarendon type in the critical notes.
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Montecatino. Latin translation and commentary on the first three books of the Politics; Ferrara, 1587 (Bk. I), 1594 (Bk. II), 1598 (Bk. III), fol. (3 vols.). See Schneider's edition, II. p. v.
Giphanius (Van Giffen). Commentarii in politicum opus Aristotelis; Frankfurt, 1608. 8. A posthumous work: wanting the whole of Bk. V (VIII) and Bk. IV (VIII), from c. 7 § 5 to the end.
Scaliger. See Scaligerana published by Oncken in Eos 1. 1864. 410 ff.
Reiske and Gurlitt. In the addenda to Schneider's edition, II. 471 ff.
J. G. Schlosser. German translation of the Politics and Oeconomics; Lübeck and Leipzig, 1798. 8 (3 vols.). The notes appended are in every respect of great interest for the reader even now, and have proved especially valuable. The memory of this excellent man should ever be cherished in Germany.
Garve. A German translation of the Politics edited by Fülleborn; Leipzig, 1799. 1802. 8 (2 vols.).
J. G. Schneider. Edition of the Politics; Frankfurt on the Oder, 1809. 8 (2 vols.).
Göttling. Edition of the Politics; Jena, 1824. 8. To this must be added the short dissertations: Commentariolum de Arist. Politicorum loco (II. 6. 20); Jena, 1855. 4. De machæra Dolphica quae est ap. Arist. (i. 2. 3); Jena, 1858. 4. De loco quodam Arist. (i. 2. 9); Jena, 1858. 4. (In his collected writings Opusc. acad. ed. Cuno Fischer, Jena, 1869. 8. 274 ff.)

A. Stahr. Edition with German translation; Leipzig, 1839. 4. To this should be added the German trans. by C. Stahr and A. Stahr; Stuttgart, 1860. 16.
Lindau. German translation (Oels, 1843. 8), unfortunately not accessible to me for my critical edition.

Spengel. Übber die Politik des Aristoteles, in the phil. Abhandl. der Münchener Akad. v. 1 ff. Aristotelische Studien III (ib. xi. 55 ff); Munich, 1868. 4. Compare Arist. Stud. II. (ib. x. 626 ff.); Munich, 1865. 4. 44 ff.
Bojesen. Bidrag til Fortolkningen om Aristoteles's Boger om Staten; Copenhagen, 1844. 1845. 8 (Two Sorøer Programmes).

Nickes. De Aristotelis Politicorum libris; Bonn, 1851. 8 (Degree dissertation).


Rassow. Short Gymnasium-Programmes: Observationes criticae in Aristotelem, Berlin, 1858. 4. Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik; Weimar, 1864. 4. Comp. also his Emendationes Aristotelicae, Weimar, 1861. 4 (p. 10); and Beiträge zur Nikom. Ethik, Weimar, 1862. 4.


Schütz. Gymn.-Programmes: De fundamentis republicae, quae primo Politicorum libro ab Aristotele posita sunt, i. ii.; Potsdam, 1860. 4. 18 p., iii. Potsdam, 1860. 4. 12 p.


Schnitzer. Zu Arist. Pol., an article in Eos, i. 1864. 499—515. His German translation was published in the series of Osander and Schwab at Stuttgart, 1856. 16.


Büchsenschütz. An article on i. cc. 8—11 in Jahrb.f. Philol. xcvi. 1867. 477—482, 713—716.
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Chandler. Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions; London, 1866.

Madvig. Adversaria critica ad scriptores Graccos; Copenhagen, 1871. 8, 461 ff.


Bücheler. In my first critical edition and in Part I. of my Quaestiones critieae; Greifswald, 1867. 4.


Vahlen. Aristotelische Aufsätze II.; Vienna, 1872. 8; reviewed by me in Philol. Anzeiger v. 1872. 673—676; and an article on II. 5, 1264 a 1, in the Zeitschrift f. d. östr. Gymn. xxI., 1870. 828—830.

Polenaar. Degree dissertation; Tirocinia critica in Arist. Politica; Leyden, 1873. 8.

Triebcr. In communications with me by letter.


Diebitsch. Degree diss., De rerum conexus in Arist. libro de re pub.; Breslau, 1875. 8.

Heitland. Notes critical and explanatory on certain passages in Pol. I.; Cambridge, 1876. 8.


Bender. Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen; Hersfeld, 1876. 4; further in communications with me by letter.

Freudenthal. In communications with me by letter.


Postgate. Notes on the text and matter of the Politics; Cambridge, 1877. 8.

Von Kirchmann. German translation with notes; Leipzic, 1880. 8 (2 vols.).

Tegge. In oral communications to me.

J. Cook Wilson. Article in the Journal of Phil. x. 1881. 80—86.


II. The Compilation and Subsequent History of the Treatise.

In recent times critics seem more and more disposed to agree that the systematic writings of Aristotle, that is to say, most of the works that have come down to us together with others that have perished, were never actually published by their author himself. At the end of the fifteenth chapter of the Poetics he contrasts the exposition there given with that contained in his published works, to which upon certain points the student is referred, εἰρήνα γε περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδομένοις λόγοις ἴκανος, the reference being undoubtedly to one of his own dialogues, that namely On Poets. Of the works which had thus been given to the world some information may be gathered, as that they chiefly comprised popular writings like the dialogues, adapted to the intelligence of a wider public; perhaps also descriptive works on natural science, ‘histories’ of plants and animals. But not the Poetics, nor indeed any of the similar treatises strictly philosophical and systematic which make up ‘our Aristotle,’ to use Grote’s phrase: we may safely conclude that they were none of them in circulation at the time. It has indeed been doubted whether they were primarily written with a view to publication. They had their origin in the oral lectures of the Stagirite, and stood in the closest connexion with his activity as a teacher; this much is clear, but the precise nature of the connexion has been sorely disputed. The materials of these works may have been on the one hand Aristotle’s own notes; either sketches drawn up beforehand for his lectures; or, which is more likely, reproductions of them freely revised and enlarged for subsequent study in the school. Or, again, they may have been merely lecture-notes taken down by pupils at the time. The former supposition is favoured by the analogy of Aristotle’s master, Plato, who takes this view of his strictly philosophical writings in the famous passage in the Phaedrus. Nor is there any reason to distrust the evidence that shortly after his master’s

1 [What follows has been freely condensed from a paper On the composition of Aristotle’s Politics in Verhandlungen der XXX. Philologen-Versammlung, 17 ff. (Leipzig, 1876), and from the Introduction to the Poetics (Greek and German), edited by Susemihl (Leipzig, 1874 ed. 2) 1—6. It is thus mostly earlier than the discussion in the 3rd edition of Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen II ii chap. 3, 126—138, which should be compared.] See also Jahrbücher f. Phil. ciii. 1871. 122—124; Bursian’s Jahresbericht XVII. 1879. 251—254; and Zeller On the connexion of the works of Plato and Aristotle with their personal teaching in Hermes XI. 1876. 84—96.

2 15 § 12, 1454 b 17; see note (108) to Susemihl’s edition of the Poetics.

3 276 d: οὕτω τε ἐνομισματα θησαυριζόμενοι, εἰς τὸ λόγον γὰρ ἐκάθεν ἵκηνα, καὶ παντὶ τῶν ταύτων ἱκανὸν μετέωρον, 278 a: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τοις βελτίστους εἰσόνων ὑπόμυνησιν γεγονέναι.
death Theophrastos had Aristotle's autograph of the *Physics* in his possession\(^1\). Something similar may be inferred for other works if it be true that Eudemos edited the *Metaphysics*\(^2\), and that Theophrastos (probably also Eudemos) supplemented modified and commented upon the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* in writings of his own bearing the same titles\(^3\): this is at any rate precisely the relation in which the *Physics* and *Ethics* of Eudemos stood to those of his master. The writings of Aristotle then were designed to serve as aids to the further study of his pupils: they were the text-books of the Aristotelian school.

In support of the other hypothesis has been adduced a number of passages which contrast decidedly with the immediate context by unusual vivacity or sustained style, or by especially prominent allusions to an audience as if present. Here the readiest explanation is that the editors have actually made use of notes taken down by pupils. Such passages have been collected by Oncken from the *Nicomachean Ethics*\(^4\); the latter part of *Politics* IV (vii). c. 1, and the conclusion, if genuine, of *De Soph. Elench.* are further instances. It should be remembered also that in one catalogue of the Aristotelian writings the *Politics* appears as *politicó ákróasis*\(^5\), while *Φυσική ákróasis* is still the title borne by the *Physics* in our manuscripts. All these circumstances however can be satisfactorily explained in other ways, partly upon the former hypothesis, partly by assuming a merely occasional use to have been made of pupils' lecture-notes as subsidiary sources:—an assumption which it is hardly possible to disprove\(^6\).

In the Aristotelian writings we find a great diversity of treatment and language; at one time the briefest and most compressed style carried to the extreme of harshness, at another numerous needless redundancies, and often literal repetitions. The careless familiar expressions natural in oral discourse alternate with long artistic periods absolutely free from anacoluthia; at times the composition of one and the same book appears strangely unequal, as if the material which at

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4. *Staatlehre des Arist.* 1. 60 (i).


6. See the arguments advanced against Oncken by Susenohl *Jahrb. für Phil.* 1871. 122—124.
first flowed abundantly had suddenly become scanty. Such peculiarities however generally admit of more than one explanation; even where the same question is treated independently two or three times over (unless indeed one of the versions is to be regarded as the paraphrase of a Peripatetic) the inference may be either that different drafts of Aristotle's own have been incorporated side by side, or that a pupil has supplemented the notes which he had actually taken by a statement in his own words of their substance. Yet at other times the contrast is unmistakeable, as when we compare the Posterior with the Prior Analytics, or the third book of the Psychology with the two preceding books: we seem to have before us nothing but disjointed notes or rough drafts badly pieced together. Such imperfection in whole works can hardly be referred to any one but Aristotle. If some treatises, again, or at least considerable portions of them, prove upon examination so far advanced that the author's last touches hardly seem wanting, the inference is irresistible that, granted they arose at first out of Aristotle's oral lectures, with such fulness of details and elaboration they must have been intended for ultimate publication, whether in the author's lifetime or subsequently. Thence it is easy to pass on to the provisional assumption that Aristotle intended to bring his entire Encyclopaedia to the same degree of completeness, but was prevented by death from executing his design. As it is, we seem justified in concluding that the unfinished works were brought out by his immediate pupils from a combination of the materials above mentioned, pieced together and supplemented by not inconsiderable additions: much in the same way (to use Bernays' instructive analogy) as most of Hegel's works for the first time saw the light in the complete edition made by his pupils after his death.

There is a further circumstance which must be taken into account. From this edition, of which comparatively few copies were ever made or in circulation, the works as they have come down to us must be allowed to deviate considerably. Our present text can be traced back in the main to the revised edition of Andronikos of Rhodes, a contemporary of Cicero. This edition is known to have differed as to order and

1 As in the Metaphysics, K cc. 1—7 = B.T.E; A cc. 1—5; M cc. 4, 5 = A c. 9.
2 In the Physics, Bk. vii, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, are other instances only less striking than those named.
3 So far we may accept Strabo's inferences (XIII. 608, 609), although his story of the fate of Theophrastos' library contains a gross exaggeration: see now Bursian's Jahresar. ix. 338; XVI. 253 f.
arrangement from the former one; besides, in the intervening 250 years the text had received considerable damage. Thus may be explained the appearance of numerous Peripatetic interpolations; also cases where a series of fragments represents the original work, as in Bk. vii of the Nicomachean Ethics, and in some measure in the Poetics; or where excerpts from another work are inserted, e.g. from the Physics in the latter part of Bk. xi (K) of the Metaphysics and in part of what is now Bk. v (Δ) of the same work.

Only by such a combination of assumptions is it possible satisfactorily to interpret the present condition of the Politics, where traces of its mode of compilation may clearly be discerned in interpolations, glosses incorporated in the text, abrupt transitions, inequalities of execution, frequent lacunae, transpositions and double recensions. Yet the whole is pervaded by an organic plan well considered even to the finest details, and beyond all doubt the actual execution is mainly based upon written materials from Aristotle’s own hand. There is only one

(1) from Aristotle’s own drafts as revised after his lectures for the use of his pupils: supplemented by the use, as (ii) subsidiary sources, of

(a) Aristotle’s own sketches, prepared for use at his lectures:

(b) lecture-notes taken by pupils (with or without supplements of their own):

(g) passages from works by his pupils:

(d) additions by editors: very rarely

(e) excerpts from his own works.

2 Sober criticism will not be deterred from attributing the plan to Aristotle simply because at the beginning of Bk. viii there is no δὲ in the received text to correspond to a preceding μὲν δὲν, or because a connecting δὲ is sought in vain in intro at the opening of Bk. xi, and should at least be altered to γὰρ, if this opening and the close of Bk. i are to be kept side by side. Such twofold transitions from one book to another are found in the Nicomachean Ethics between iv and v, vii and viii, ix and x; while between vii and ix Grant has good ground for suspecting the words περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἔπτι τοιούτων εἰρήσθω 1163 b 27. [On the transition from Metaph. vi (E) to vii (Z) see Bonitz ii 294.]

4 That the work in its present shape is as late as Cicero’s time is the opinion of Krolin Zur Kritik aristotelischen Schriften 1 29 ff. (Brandenburg 1872. 4), and Polemar Tirovionia critica in Aristotelis Politica (Leyden 1873. 8), and in one sense they are not far wrong; cp. the introduction to my edition of the Poetics, 4 n. (1). They suppose the compiler or compilers to have had mere fragments of Aristotle’s own composition before them, which they arranged and pieced together for themselves into a whole full of contradictions by borrowing from the writings of Theophrastos and other Peripatetics, or, as Polemar thinks, by additions of their own. Polemar’s arguments, however, rest almost entirely on misapprehensions, and this is partly true of Krolin’s, while others do not in the remotest degree suffice to establish such sweeping assertions. Krolin does indeed allow that the first book is by Aristotle; but from 13 § 15 he infers that it was originally an independent work, not reflecting that, when taken in connexion with 3 § 1, this passage proves just the opposite; that further the first chapter has no sense except as an introduction to the whole of the Politics, of which we have also an express anticipation at the commencement of c. 3, where there is no trace of a change by another editor. The greater part of Bk. xi, in which only “isolated pillars” of Aristotle’s structure have been left
passage of any length, IV (vii). 1, where we seem to catch the tones of the more animated oral lecture in such marked contrast to all the rest of the work as forcibly to suggest the idea that here we have the lecture-notes of a pupil. 1 But the parts executed are often unequal; they never grew to the dimensions of a book actually fit for publication; and when such a work made its appearance after the master’s death the editors did not refrain from adding a good deal of foreign matter contradictory of the spirit and interdependence of the work. 2 Here and there, again, we find a twofold discussion of the

standing, he assigns to Theophrastos; c. 6, he says, is wholly spurious and of very late origin, c. 5 defective and largely interpolated; and that there is much to offend us in both these chapters is undeniable: see below p. 33 ii. (4). The third book he seems to regard as a medley taken from Theophrastos, and various writers of his school, and from other Peiripatetics: c. 14 in particular as an excerpt from Theophrastos, Περὶ βασιλείας: cp. p. 18 n. (7) and n. on III. 11, 9 (624). In the principal part of Bk. IV (vii) he finds “fragmentary sketches”; he agrees with Niebuhr (Kön. Alterth., 758 Isler) in deciding that the second and larger part, if not the whole, of Bk. V (viii) was not written by Aristotle, any more than a considerable part of Bk. VI (iv), of which c. 15 together with VII (vi). 8 is an excerpt from a work by Theophrastos on magistracies; while the greater part of Bk. VIII (v) probably consists of excerpts and pieces retouched from Theophrastos, Περὶ καύσων: comp. n. on III. 14, 9 (624) and VIII (v). 11, 9 (1720). There are some resemblances to the Aρεωπαγιτῆς of Isocrates: see on III. 3 § 2, § 9, 6 § 10, 7 § 1, 11 § 20, IV (vii), 1 § 5, VI (iv), 9 § 7, VII (vi). 5 § 10, VIII (v). 1 § 2. Yet Spengel’s assertion “totum Ἀρεωπαγιτῖcum in usum suum Aristoteles verīt, tam multi sunt loci, qui eadem tradunt” (Aristotelische Studien III. 59) is a gross exaggeration, as unproved as it is impossible to prove. But why Aristotle should not be credited with them, why we must follow Krohn in rejecting as spurious all the passages where they occur, is simply inexplicable. Compare further my review of Krohn in Philol. Anzeiger v. 1873, 676—680. The most material objection which he raises to the genuineness of Bk. V (viii) is that ἐνθυσιαστικός only in the Problems, ἐνθυσιασμός only in the dialogue On Philosophy,—whereas Theophrastos paid great attention to this morbid state of ecstasy or delirium.

1 But a pupil of Aristotle, not necessarily of Theophrastos, as Krohn thinks: see notes on IV (vii). 1 § 2 f., § 13. Another well-written chapter is VI (iv). 11, and this even Krohn reckons as part of “the well-preserved patrimony of Aristotelian thought.” His attempt even there to ferret out at least an interpolation, § 15, rests upon nothing but a gross misconception, as is shown by Susanthi loc. cit. p. 679.

2 To start from the internal connexion of a work as a whole is the only safe mode of procedure in all so-called higher criticism. By discarding this principle Krohn and Polenaar lose all solid footing, preferring, as they do, to regard more unconnected fragments as the genuine kernel of the work: Susanthi loc. cit. 679. Not every contradiction is sufficient proof of diversity of authorship; however small the dimensions within which this genuine Aristotelian kernel is reduced, we shall never succeed in eliminating from it all discrepancies of doctrine. Nay, Krohn justly reminds us that “even this original kernel can only be understood on the assumption of a gradual advance in the great thinker’s development.” After we have detected interpolations, and restored by their excision the connexion which they restored, only an accumulation of difficulties, or such contradictions as strike at the very heart of the system, need be taken into account. Further it must be admitted that no hard and fast line can be drawn here, so that at times the decision is doubtful. Upon such considerations a list of spurious or suspected passages (without reckoning glosses of later introduction and other smaller matters) might be drawn up, in partial agreement with Krohn, as follows:
same topic; either both were found amongst Aristotle's materials and then included that nothing might be lost, or else only one was written by Aristotle and the other was derived from a pupil's notes. The work is disfigured by numerous lacunae of greater or less extent: entire sections of some length are wanting altogether. The right order has often been disturbed. The two grossest instances are that Books vii and viii should come before Bk. iv, and Bk. vi before Bk. v (counting the books in the order in which they have come down to us). No scruple has been felt about restoring the proper sequence in this edition, though the dislocation was unquestionably very ancient. For to all appearance

11. 8 § 1 (δος...βουλημένος), 10 §§ 3, 4, 12 §§ 6—14:

11. 17 §§ 3, 4:

ii. (vii). 2 § 3—4 § 1, 10 §§ 1—9:

v (viii). 7 §§ 13, 14:

vi (iv). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—10.

vii (vi). 2 § 7 (ετη...βανωσία), 2 § 9—3 § 6:

vii (v). 6 §§ 5, 6 §§ 12, 13, 7 §§ 5—10, 12 §§ 1—6, perhaps also 12 §§ 7—18.

To this total of about 515 lines shorter bits must be added from 11. 6 § 18; 111. 14 § 15, 23 § 11; vi (iv). § 5, 14 § 5. On vi (iv). 14 §§ 11—15 see below p. 65 n. (1). Several of these passages display historical erudition valuable in itself but out of place—a characteristic of the school as contrasted with the master. As to the doubts recently cast upon iv (vii). 7 by Broughton, and upon iv (vii). 13 by Broughton and Wilson (and earlier still by Congreve), see the critical notes and n. on iv (vii). 13 § 8 (881).

1 Besides the end of Bk. iii and the beginning of iv (vii) see 11. 7 §§ 10—13 =7 §§ 18—21, 111. 15 §§ 7—10 = 10 §§ 10—13; iv (vii). 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2; vii (v). 1 § 1; 7 § 1; 10 § 24=10 § 25.

2 See particularly 1. 8 § 3, 10 § 1, 12 § 1; 11. 2 § 6, 5 § 2, 11 § 5;

111. 3 § 2, 12 § 6, 13 § 3, 6 § 6, 16 § 2;

iv (vii). 11 § 2, 13 §§ 11, 14 § 7;

v (vii). 7 § 15;

vi (iv). §§ 7, 8, 10 § 2, 11 § 1, 12 § 5;

vii (vi). 4 § 1, 8 § 24;

viii (v). 1 § 7, 7 § 9, 10 § 25, 12 § 11, 18. Conring saw this, but carried it too far: "necem aristoteliam quasi stellis illustrare sategit" Göttling sneeringly writes, taking credit for having put all these "stars" out. But when the asterisks are removed the lacunae are still plain enough if the critic has the eye to see them. Cp. my critical edition p. lii.

3 [On these transpositions see pp. 78 —95.]

4 The one transposition was first made by Nicolas Oresme (died 1382) in his French translation, not published until long afterwards (Paris 1489); and again by Segni in his Italian translation (Florence 1549). A more detailed proof of its correctness was undertaken by Seiano da Salò Quinque quaestiones ad octo libros de republica (Rome 1577), Conring, Barthelmy St Hilaire, Spengel Uber die Politik Transactions of the Munich Acad. v. 1 ff. Arist. Studien 11. 44 ff. (Munich 1863), Nickes De Arist. Politicorum libris (Bonn 1851), Brandis in his History Grieck.-Köm. Philos. ii 1666 ff., 1679 ff. and by others. It has been disputed without success, amongst others by Woltmann in the Rheinisches Museum (New Series) 1. 1842. 321—334, Forkchner in Philologus XVI. 1861. 20—68, Bendixen in Philologus XIII. 1858. 264 ff., XIV. 332 ff., XVI. 408 ff. and in Der alte Staat des Aristoteles (Hamburg 1868. 4to), by Krohn op. cit. 30, and Diebitsch De rerum conexu in Arist. libris de re publica (Breslau 1875).

The other transposition was very nearly assumed by Conring; the first who actually made it and tried to demonstrate it was St Hilaire. He was followed by Spengel and even by Woltmann, but was opposed not merely by Bendixen, Forkchner, Krohn, and Diebitsch, but even by Hildenbrand Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie i (Leipzig 1860) 371 ff., and by Zeller op. cit. ii 672 ff. n. (2), although they have accepted the first transposition, Hildenbrand under certain conditions and Zeller unre- servedly. See below p. 58 n. 2.

5 See Jahrbücher für Philologie xcix. 1869. 593—610, ci. 1870. 343 f., 349 f. and the following paragraphs in the text.
even the epitome in Stobaeus 1 presents the traditional arrangement 2; and this epitome was taken from a more comprehensive work by Arcios Didymos of Alexandria, the friend of Augustus and of Maecenas 3. Didymos naturally followed the new recension, the work, beyond all doubt, of his contemporary Andronikos of Rhodes, in which, as has been said 4, the text of the Politics has come down to us. Yet, as we shall see 5, in the incomplete sentence with which the third book breaks off sufficiently clear and certain evidence remains that in the older edition Bk. iv (vii) still stood in its right place after Bk. iii.

But there is another circumstance which makes it very questionable to start with, whether the work ever existed in a more complete form. There was a Politics in the Alexandrian library attributed by some to Aristotle, by others to Theophrastos 6; consisting, it would seem, of exactly eight books; a numerical correspondence not easy to ascribe to mere accident. This fact we learn from the catalogue of Aristotle's writings in Diogenes of Laeret 7 and in the Anonymus of Ménage 8. The catalogue goes back to the biographies of Hermippos of Smyrna, a pupil of Callimachus, as its ultimate authority; and no doubt that author followed closely what he found in the Alexandrian library 9. Before this the Peripatetic philosopher Hieronymos of Rhodes appears to have used the Aristotelian Politics 10; even Eudemos may possibly betray an earlier acquaintance with the treatise 11. And it is

1 Ecl. eth. 326 ff.
4 See p. 13 n. 4.
5 See p. 47 f.
6 Zeller suggests that this confusion may be explained if Theophrastos edited the work: op. c. II ii 678 (1).
8 πολιτικής ἀκρόασεως ἡ (so the Ambrosian ms. discovered by Rose: see Berlin Aristotle v. 1467, No. 70). Ménage incorrectly gave Κ, which Zeller op. c. II ii 75 ed. 2 had conjectured to be a mistake for Η. Rose suggests that the Anonymus was Hesychios of Miletus, ff. 500 A.D. In Ptolemy's catalogue the work occurs as No. 37, liber de regimine civitatis et nominatur hulitikon tractatus VIII (Berlin Aris, vol. v. p. 1471).
9 See the Introduction to my edition of the Poetics (ed. 2) 19 f.
10 He is quoted in Diog. Laeret. 1 26, cp. Pol. l. 11. 9 with the critical notes.
highly improbable, to say the least, that in the century (200 b.c.—101 b.c.) which elapsed between Hermippus and Apellikos of Teos, the precursor of Tyrannion and Andronikos 1, this older edition should have been so completely lost that the new editors had not a single copy of it at their disposal 2, while it is equally incredible that they should intentionally have declined to use it. The exact agreement in the number of the books would undoubtedly render it a far more reasonable conclusion that—except for the transposition, to which we have now no clue—the new edition of this work differed much less from the old than was the case with some other Aristotelian writings.

The first distinct traces of actual use of the treatise are next to be found in Cicero 3. It is true he did not use it directly 4 and the new recension of Andronikos was not at the time in existence. Yet we are not obliged to assume that he drew from an earlier writer who availed himself of the former edition 5: it is quite as conceivable that Tyrannion, with whom he was in frequent intercourse, may have provided him with extracts from the work suitable for his purpose, and these may have been his sources 6. Even when the new edition appeared, it found but few readers; the traces of its use are extremely scanty 7, and it is in

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1 See Strabo I. c., Plutarch I. c.
2 Polenaar op. cit. p. 78 finds no difficulty in this.
3 De fin. v. 4. 11, ad Quint. fratr. III. 5. 1, De leg. III. 6. 14, De rep. 1. c. 25 (comp. Pol. III. 9 §§ 11, 12, 6 § 3 ff., 1. 2 § 9), c. 26 (cp. Pol. III. 1 § 1, 6 § 1, 7 §§ 1, 2), c. 27 (cp. Pol. III. 9 §§ 1, 2, 10 §§ 4. 5, 11 §§ 6, 7, 16 § 2), c. 29 (cp. Pol. VI (iv). cc. 8, 11). The doubts of Heitz (op. c. 241), whether after all we get any real evidence from Cicero, are unreasonable in face of the quotation ad Quint. fr.
4 See: Zeller op. c. II ii 151 n. (6).
5 So Zeller I. c., Whether the author of the Magna Moralia in I. 4, 1184 b 33 f. shows any acquaintance with Politics IV (vii). 13, 5 Zeller rightly regards as uncertain.
6 Cp. ad Att. IV. 4 b § 1, 8 a § 2, ad Qu. fr. II. 4 § 3, III. 4 § 5, 5 § 6.
7 Alexander of Aphrodisias On the Metaphysics 15, 6 (ed. Bonitz): Enubulos, a contemporary of Longinus, 'Episkeyse taw on 'Aristotelon en deuterw twn politeiwn pro q 'Platos poliiteian an-tewrmnov ed. Mai Script. vet. nov. coll. Vat. II. 671 ff.; Julian Letter to The-mistios 266 D, 263 D: Schol. Aldina upon Aristoph. Acharn. 92, 980: Schol. on Lucian Dream 3 (in p.m.f'w): Michael of Ephesus On the Nicae. Ethics fol. 70 a, 180 a, 187 b, 188 b, 189 a: Pseudo-Plutarch De nobil. c. 6 939 b ff., c. 8 937 a ff.: Suidas and Photios 5 c. oxi-tiav: Eustathios On the Iliad p. 625, 36, p. 126, 12 ff.: De Thessal. urbe p. 281, 60 (ed. Tafel): Theodoros Metochites Miscell. 644, 667 (ed. Kiessling).—Thus Dionysios of Halikarnassos in his description of the Greek asyngwtra Roman Antiquities v. 73 has not used Aristotle III. 14 §§ 8, 9 as his authority, but the similar account in Theophrastos peri basileias. In his critical edition, p. xliv and note (82), Susemihl wrongly followed Spengel Arist. Stud. II. 57 n. (4) in maintaining that everything which Dionysios relates I. c. v. 73 f. exactly agrees with Aristotle III. 14 ff., and consequently that Theophrastos peri basileias is bor-rowed altogether from Aristotle. Meanwhile Krohn, op. c. 47, pointed out cer-tain essential differences, and Henkel, op. c. 3 note 1, has more accurately ex-plained where Theophrastos' line of thought diverges and becomes original. Hence what Dionysios has here borrowed from Theophrastos could not have been derived from Aristotle. But this only
GENERAL ESTIMATE. 19

keeping with their infrequency that we do not possess a single ms. of the Politics of earlier date than the fourteenth century. Amongst the Arabs it remained quite neglected. To the reading public of the west in the Christian middle age it was introduced by the Latin translation of the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke¹: on the basis of his version Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas wrote commentaries to the work ².

III. General Estimate.

At the time when the Politics was first made known to mediaeval students, and for some centuries afterwards, the ground was not prepared for a due appreciation of it. It was only by degrees, as the development of the modern state went on, that the treatise began to be rightly understood ³, until at last even in its present incomplete and fragmentary condition we have learnt to recognise in it "the richest and greatest contribution of antiquity, or, allowing for the difference of the times, perhaps the greatest of all the works we have upon political science". There is certainly no second work to be named in this field of enquiry which in a like degree displays the rare combination of statesmanlike intellect, a scholar's acquaintance with history, and the observation of a man of science, with the philosopher's systematic arrangement of phenomena and keen penetration into their inmost nature ⁴. Marvellous student of human nature that he was, Aristotle, although never actually engaged in public affairs, has observed with all a statesman's shrewd sense the complicated political and social relations

increases the improbability of Krohn's assertion mentioned p. 15 n. above, for which these two passages are his sole authority,—that Pol. III. 14 is an excerpt from that very work of Theophrastos. Compare the note on III. 14. 9 (624).

¹ See above p. 1.

² That of the two Thomas wrote his earlier than his master Albert, between 1261 and 1269, was the view of Jourdain Recherches critiques sur les anciennes traductions d'Aristote 393 ff., 456 (Paris 1819). Nearly the whole text of the old Latin version was incorporated in the commentary of Albert, who in this work imitated the method of his pupil. Cp. my critical edition VI nn. (4) & (5). [Von Hertling in Rh. Mus. XXXIX. 1884. 446—457 argues that the question of relative priority cannot be decided, but that S. Thomas left his commentary unfinished at his death in 1274. Albertus Magnus died 1280.]

³ On this subject generally see Oncken l. c. 1. 64—80. The first beginnings of such an appreciation are to be found in Oresme: cp. Roscher in the Zeitschrift f. d. Staatswissensch. XIX. 1863. 305 ff.

⁴ Zeller op. c. II ii 753 f. Compare Bradley's admirable exposition in Hellenica (Oxford, 1880) 181—183. Lang is certainly not far wrong when he remarks in the Introductory Essays to Bolland's translation of Bks. I. III. IV (VII) p. 15 (London 1877. 8), 'Indeed, when we come to analyse his method we find three incongruous elements, really scientific enquiry, aristocratic prejudice, and the dreams of a metaphysic which literally sublimi ferit sidera vertice, and listens for the eternal harmonies of Nature'. This thought is worked out more fully by Grant Aristotle 117 ff.

⁵ Zeller op. c. II ii 707, 708.

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of his nation, and in part of other nations. He has analysed them with the cool indifference of the biologist, with the same unwearied calm and caution which characterize his treatises on natural science. The astonishing store of information which he had amassed upon history in general and the special history of nearly all the Greek communities is here turned to the best account. At the same time there is diffused throughout the work a warm genial breath of philosophic and moral idealism, which, however closely allied to some of its defects, nevertheless reconciles us to certain harsh traits in it. From the writer's peculiar point of view however this very tendency to idealism, so far from softening such traits, serves only to bring them into stronger relief: so that every now and then we see the shrewd thinker, elsewhere so strictly logical, entangle himself in a network of contradictions.

The peculiarity of his point of view and therewith the distinctive importance of the work, historically and for all time to come, consists in this, that Aristotle alone with full and complete success has given expression in theory to the whole import of the Greek state and of Greek political life in all its bearings. The only limitation to this is the decided repugnance he manifests to certain political and social ideas, the outcome of that development of democracy, whereby we may fairly admit the Greek state to have been, so to speak, carried beyond itself. This success deserves to be all the more highly estimated in proportion as his position is in this respect unique. Certainly even before he wrote, not to mention Plato's trenchant dialogues, there was a literature—it may be a tolerably large literature—upon political, legal and social questions, as may be learnt from his own and Plato's cursory notices, although we know next to nothing else about these writers.

The passages quoted show how many ideas deserving of consideration they had disclosed, but at the same time how far they fell short of the goal which Aristotle attained. Here again his dependence on Plato is

1 1. 3. 4 with n. (31), 1. 6 §§ 1—5 nn. (49 b) (50 b), 1. 9. 11 n. (88 b), 1. 6 §§ 17—19 nn. (219) (221), 1. 8. 16 n. (269), 1. 9. 33 n. (342), 1. 12 §§ 2—4 nn. (409) (404), 1. 3. 1 n. (454), 1. 13. 11 n. (596), IV (vii). 2. 5 ff., IV (vii). 6. 1 n. (770), IV (vii). 14. 16 n. (911), v. (iv). 1 § 5, § 6 nn. (1118) (1123). Comp. also 1. 4. 8 n. (476), v. (iv). 3. 7 n. (1158). To this list may be added Thalets 1. 7. 12 § 12, Hippodamos 1. 8, Thimbron or Thibron, IV (vii). 14. 17 and perhaps Telekles VI (iv). 14. 4. n. (1321). Aristotle makes no mention of Xenophon: yet see n. on IV (vii). 14. 16 (911). In many of the passages cited above it is doubtful whether he means statements in writing. See L. Stein's paper Greek theories of political science before Aristotle and Plato in the Zeitschrift f. d. gesammte Staatswissensch. IX. 1853. 115—182.

2 Laws 1. 630 E, XII. 972 E. Cp. on the latter passage n. on 1. 6. 17 (219), on the former Hildenbrand op. cit. 395 n. (2).

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evident; a dependence far greater than was once imagined or than might be expected from the severity of his polemical criticism, which is frequently, nay in most cases, successful. For firstly, Aristotle's criticism touches what are merely external excrescences of the two pattern states sketched by Plato in the Republic and the Laws; enough of common ground still remains on which to raise his own design of an absolutely best constitution side by side with them. Further, the Laws proves Plato by no means deficient in exact knowledge of Athenian public life; while above all, his descriptions in the Republic of other constitutions besides the 'only perfect state', i.e. of the actually existing forms of government, suffice to show 'that he did not lack experience or penetration for judging of political conditions'. In short Aristotle is indebted to his master for numerous ideas in every department of political speculation. But it should not be forgotten how often these ideas in Plato are mere germs which only received a fruitful development at the hands of his disciple; or random statements which require to be demonstrated and expanded by Aristotle, and to be fitted into their place in the whole framework of his system, before their full scope is attained. When all has been deducted that can in any way be regarded as an inheritance from Plato, quite enough remains which Aristotle can claim for his very own. One great difference in the works of these two men is most characteristically presented. When Plato comes to deal with existing forms of government he depicts them in a rough and ready way; whereas Aristotle bestows

1 I may refer to the notes on
13. 16 (127) IV (VII). 6. 5 (774),
11. 5. 2 (153) IV (VII). 10. 13 (838),
11. 5. 7 (158) IV (VII). 12. 2 (850),
11. 5. 15 (166) IV (VII). 15. 10 (936),
11. 6. 5 (192) IV (VII). 16. 1 (937),
11. 6. 10 (208) IV (VII). 16. 12 (944),
11. 7. 6 (236 b) IV (VII). 16. 15 (946),
11. 9. 5 (285) V (VIII). 5. 4 (1024),
11. 9. 23 (325) V (VIII). 5. 5 (1025),
also to Thurot Études sur Aristote 109 ff.
(Paris 1866, 8). Van der Rest Plato et Aristote 452 ff. (Bruxelles 1876, 8).
2 Zeller op. cit. 11 i 783 (Eng. tr. Plato p. 492). More precise details are given in Steinhart Introductions to Plato's Works V. 238 ff., Susemihl Plat. Phil. II. 226 ff.
3 Reference may be permitted to the notes on the following passages:
Bk. I. 2 § 2 n. (2); 5 § 9 (46); 6 § 8 (54); 9 § 18 (93); 10 §§ 4, 5 (98); 11 § 6 (103); 13 § 12 (121), 13 § 16 (127).
Bk. II. § 5 § 1, 2 (153), 5 § 16 (167), 5 § 17 (168), 5 §§ 19—24 (172); 6 § 5 (192), 6 § 6 (201), 6 § 9 (206 b) (207), 6 § 15 (215); 8 § 21 (273) (274), 8 § 25 (277); 9 § 2 (279), 9 § 5 (283) (284), 9 § 11 (295 b), 9 § 13 (297), 9 § 20 (318), 9 § 25 (330), 9 § 27 (335), 9 § 31 (341), 9 § 34 (344):
Bk. III. 3 § 9 (466); 4 § 18 (499); 7 § 1 (533); 11 § 19 (579); 16 § 2 (673), 16 § 11 (653): Bk. IV (VII). 6 § 5 (774); 7 § 2 (781); 10 § 13 (838); 12 § 2 (859), 12 § 3 (860), 12 § 8 (866) (867), 14 § 13 (907), 14 § 14 (908); 15 § 10 (936); 16 § 1 (937), 16 § 12 (944), 16 § 14 (947), 16 § 15 (949), 16 § 17 (948); 17 § 1 (950), 17 § 5 (952): Bk. V (VIII). 4 § 2 (1006), 4 § 7 (1014), 4 § 9 (1015) (1016), 5 § 3 (1022), 6 § 2 (1064), 6 § 9 (1071); 7 § 9 (1105): Bk. VI (IV). 1 § 1 (1114); 2 § 3 (1139) (1140): Bk. VII (VI). 2 § 3 (1391): Bk. VIII (V). 9 § 13 (1644); 11 § 10 (1724) (1725), 11 § 11 (1727), 11 § 12 (1729); 12 § 8 (1763), 12 § 9 (1764).
the most affectionate care on explaining and reproducing their minutest details; it is evident that he lingers over them involuntarily, as if they were his own peculiar province, with far greater pleasure and patience, in spite of his theories, than when he is treating of his own ideal state.

From the point of view which has just been characterized the horizon is to Aristotle necessarily limited. Here, too, it is to the limitation that he owes most of what he has in common with Plato upon this subject. In both, the close connexion of Politics with Ethics has a beneficial effect; in both, it is a weakness that this connexion becomes, in genuine Greek fashion, too much like entire unity. Each of them recognises in the state itself the school of morality in the Greek sense of the word, as the harmonious development of all the powers with which individuals in different kind and degree have been endowed; the preparation, therefore, for true human happiness. Only from this point can we explain the peculiar assumption, common to these two thinkers, of a pattern state to be specially constructed in contrast to all actually existing constitutions; a state only possible amongst Hellenes as the most highly gifted race; in which the perfect citizen is also the perfect man\(^1\). Further, these two philosophers have no higher or more comprehensive conception of the state than as merely a Greek city-community, a canton with hamlets and villages: hence their ideal of a perfect state never really emerges from this narrow setting\(^2\). Nay more, it is saddled with all the conditions of a small Greek city-state: slavery in the first place; depreciation of labour; contempt for commerce, industry, and trade; and the peculiarly Greek conception that leisure, to be devoted to the exclusive pursuit of the affairs of the state, and to the intellectual and moral culture of himself and his fellow-citizens, free from all compulsion to trouble about a living, is the only thing worthy of a true freeman; a conception that to our present view savours strongly of idleness. Lastly this makes it necessary that the minority, consisting of an exclusive body of full citizens, should have a secure capital guaranteed to them\(^3\).

But there is this vast difference between Aristotle and Plato. By the latter this very limitation of the Greek city-community is carried to the

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\(^1\) I may refer the reader to the somewhat daring but ingenious attempt of my excellent colleague Von Wilmowsitz-Mollendorff *Aus Kydathen* 47—54 (Lehrin 1886. 8) to trace the growth of this idea in Plato and his predecessors, and the rise of political speculation generally, to the internal history of the Athenian people and state.

\(^2\) Comp. on I. 2. 4 note (11), I. 2. 6 *n.* (19 b), II. 2. 3 (132), III. 3. 4 (460). Wilmowitz on the other hand endeavours to show, *op. c.* 110—113, that the Athenian state of Cleisthenes and Pericles, as it actually existed, was not really subject to this limitation.

\(^3\) See the notes on I. 9 § 18, 10 § 4, 11 § 6, 13 § 13; II. 9 § 2, 11 § 10; III. 13 § 12 (599).
CONTRAST TO PLATO.

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extreme, and the state as it were forced back into the family, becoming
under the ideal constitution nothing but an expanded family. The
former on the other hand gives all prominence to the conception of
the state, so far as the above limitation allows; he is careful to draw the
sharpest distinction between the state and the family at the very time when
he is demonstrating the true significance of the latter in relation to the
former. This is made the starting-point not simply of his whole ex-
position, wherein at the outset he assumes a hostile attitude to Plato, but
in II. 2 § 2, § 7, of his attack upon Plato's ideal state in particular. By
exploring, in all directions farther than did his master, the nature of
the Hellenic state, he has penetrated to the inmost essence of the state
in general, of which this Hellenic state was at any rate an important
embodiment. He has thus succeeded in discovering for all succeeding
times a series of the most important laws of political and social life.
Here first, for example, not in Plato, do we find the outlines of
Political Economy. At the same time in this limitation of his point of
view must be sought the reason why from the soundest premisses, from
observations of fact most striking and profound, he not unfrequently
deduces the most mistaken conclusions.

IV. Economic (O'IKONOMIKH)—Slavery and the Theory of
Wealth.

The opening chapters, Bk. i. cc. 1, 2, form the introduction to the
work, and here we follow our author with undivided assent. In oppo-
sition to Plato he traces the origin of the family to a process of organic
natural growth, and next shows how the state arises out of the family
through the intermediate step of the clan-village. At the same time
he states what is the specific difference between the state and the
family, and characterizes the former as the product of no arbitrary
convention, but rather of a necessity arising from man's inner nature.
He proclaims a truth as novel as it was important that man, and

See the notes on I. 1 § 2, 3 § 4, 7 §§ 1, 2.
2 See further II. 3 § 4—4 § 10, 5 §§ 14—26 and note on II. 2. 2 (131).
3 On this and the following sections comp. Susamihl op. cit. On the composi-
tion of the Politics 17—29.
trans. (London 1877. 8), may be com-
pared.

5 Van der Rest op. c. 372. That from
this proposition there follows for Aris-
totle the natural right of slavery, as
Oncken (op. c. II. 29 ff.) maintains, is un-
deniable; yet he deduces it only by the
aid of his other assumptions. Oncken
(p. 23) thinks no one would now subscribe
the further proposition that he who is by
nature outside the state, ἀνθρωπός, is either
exalted above humanity or a degraded
savage. I am of the contrary opinion;
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

properly speaking he alone of all creatures upon the earth, is a being destined by nature for political society. Nevertheless the actual combination to form the state appears (see 2 § 15) to be man’s own spontaneous act\(^1\), quite as much as the actual formation of poetry out of its germs in man’s inner nature and the first rude attempts to develop them\(^2\).

The expositions which form the first main division of the work, the theory of the household or family as the basis of the state (\(\text{οἰκονομία} \ i. \ \text{cc. 3—13}\)), make a mixed impression upon the reader: especially is this true of the account of slavery c. 4 ff.

Besides (1) the view of those in favour of simple adherence to custom, who would maintain the existing slavery due to birth, purchase, or war, as perfectly justified, and (2) the more moderate view accepted by Plato, which pronounced against the extension of slavery to Hellenes\(^3\), Aristotle found a third theory already in the field which rejected all slavery as contrary to nature. However true in itself, this last-named theory was many centuries in advance of the age\(^4\); and beyond all doubt its defenders had lightly passed over what was the main point, the possibility namely of making their principle a living reality at the time\(^5\). Either Plato was unacquainted with this view or he considered that it did not require to be refuted; in any case it was an axiom with him, that within the limits assigned slavery was justified. Thus Aristotle deserves unqualified approval for having been the first to appreciate the

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\(^1\) Hildenbrand \(\text{op. cit.}\) 393 ff., Oncken \(\text{op. cit.}\) ii. 18 ff. Comp. \(\text{n. on i. 2. 15}\) (28 ff).

\(^2\) \(\text{Poet. c. 4 §§ 1—6.}\)

\(^3\) See on 1. 5 § 9 \(n. (46)\), 6 § 8 (54).

\(^4\) Even in the time of the Roman empire voices like Seneca’s remained unsupported. The whole order of ancient society was once for all established on the basis of slavery, and even Christianity, although it contained in itself the principle which must lead to its extinction, could make no alteration for the time being. The primitive Christian Church may have indirectly prepared for the abolition of slavery (see Lecky \(\text{History of Rationalism}\) ii. 258 ff.), but it was directly hostile to such a change. See for proof and elucidation of this statement L. Schiller \(\text{Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Sklaverei}\) 3 ff. (Erlangen 1847, 4) and Oncken \(\text{op. cit.}\) ii. 60—74. It should be remembered that even now all the traces of slavery have not as yet disappeared amongst Christian nations, one of the most important having only been destroyed by the recent civil war in North America; that serfdom was but lately abolished in Russia, and the last remnants of it in Germany were not removed until the present century. [If the status of slavery is not tolerated openly in Christendom, there is much analogy to it in the position of uncivilized tribes in relation to European peoples in colonial settlements, e.g. that of the South-African natives to the Boers, under the guise of indenture. But the system of labour recruiting in the Western Pacific for Queensland and Fiji, even assuming that no irregularities occur, and the coolie traffic generally (whether in English, French, or Spanish possessions) have equally the effect of placing ignorant and unprotected natives entirely at the mercy of their employers, and that, too, in a strange country. H. W. J.]

\(^5\) So Hildenbrand rightly thinks \(\text{op. c. 405.}\)
difficulties of the question in their full extent. But a successful solution of it was for him impossible. With a clear and true insight he saw that the theory referred to could not practically be carried out in the Greek state; a higher conception of the state, as we have said, he neither did nor could possess. It was inevitable that this insight should mislead him into the belief that the view itself was theoretically incorrect: that he should honestly endeavour to find scientific grounds for this belief of his, is entirely to his credit. It was just as inevitable that the attempt merely involved him in self-contradictions, and indeed resulted in the proof of the exact opposite. In substance he decides in favour of a view similar to Plato’s, which he more exactly determines and modifies by saying that there are certain slaves by nature who are to be sought for amongst non-Hellenes, and that none but these ought actually to be enslaved. ‘The thought that slavery is incompatible with the dignity of man’ has occurred to him as well as to the unconditional opponents of the institution, but not as yet ‘the thought of the universality of man’s dignity’. In contradiction to his own psychological principles he makes the difference between the most perfect and the least perfect of men as great as that between man and beast, and thinks that thereby he has theoretically discovered his slaves by nature. But he has himself to admit that there is no certain practical criterion by which to distinguish these men from others. It is quite possible that a slave’s soul may dwell in a nobly formed body, and the soul of one of nature’s freemen in an ignoble frame; furthermore men of truly free and noble mind may be born amongst the non-Hellenes, or men of servile nature amongst the Hellenes. The consequence is that the criterion of Hellenic birth, to which on the whole Aristotle adheres, ought not to serve as an unconditional protection against well deserved slavery. These, he thinks, are only exceptions to the rule; but he cannot deny that these exceptions are numerous; and yet he does not observe, that therefore of necessity there must be many cases where slavery as it actually exists is in perpetual conflict with the law of nature, even as laid down by himself. His remarks on the need of domestic servants for the house, and on the natural antithesis of ruler and subject pervading all relations of existence are clear and striking; but they by no means warrant the conclusion that these servants must at the same time be slaves or serfs. Yet in all fairness it ought to

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1 See on 1. 4 § 2, 5 §§ 8, § 9 n. (45), 6 §§ 3, § 8 n. (55), § 9 n. (59), § 10 n. (57). Compare also the notes on 1. 4 § 5, 13 § 12.
2 Comp. the notes on 1. 5 § 10 (47), 6 § 8 (54).
3 Hildenbrand op. cit. 404 f.
4 Comp. the notes on 1. 6 § 9 (56), and 6 § 3 (50).
5 See the notes on 1. 5 § 8 (43) and 5 § 9 (45).
be borne in mind not merely that the Fathers of the early Church used
arguments in favour of slavery which are no better, but that in all ages
attempts have been made to justify serfdom or slavery by similar falla-
cies. Nay more, Aristotle's arguments, when properly qualified, are
well suited to become the subject of grave consideration even in our
own day; to make us aware of contradictions in our present views;
and thus to suggest some modest restraint upon a too vehement
criticism of the great thinker of antiquity. Or does the conviction,
which is forced upon us by experience, that whole races of men lack
the capacity for civilization, so readily accord with our belief, no less
well founded, in the dignity of human nature everywhere? And does
the interval between the lowest individual of such a race and the great-
est spirits of humanity really fall far short of that which separates man
from the animals? If lastly it is not to be denied, that even within the
pale of civilized nations Providence ensures the necessary distinction
between some men adapted to physical toil and others who are suited
to intellectual exertion, should we not be as perplexed as Aristotle if
we were required to set up a valid criterion between the two sorts of
natures? As a matter of fact he who has to live by the labour of his
hands will always be debarred from that complete participation in
political life which constitutes the citizen proper. Even the edu-
cated man of our own day is so fully occupied with the discharge of
his professional duties that frequently he has no time to take that share
in politics which the modern state, if it is to prosper, is obliged to
demand from him.

The more general discussions on production and property which
follow the investigation into slavery, i. 8—11, cannot be said to be
attached to it 'in a fairly systematic manner', but on the contrary
quite loosely and lightly. It is open to question, however, whether the
passage which we must in all probability assume to be lost a little
further on (i. 12, 1) did not originally supplement and complete the
requisite organic connexion of these discussions with the theory of the
family as a whole.

1 Oncken op. cit. II. 73 f.
2 Oncken op. cit. II. 38.
3 On this subject see some remarks of Lang, op. c. 60, and Bradley op. c. 215 f.,
217 f., which are quoted in the notes on
1. 5. 10 (47) and III. 5. 7 (51 f.).
4 Both are included under κηρυματιστική. The Greek κηρύσσει and the German 'Er-
werb' more properly mean 'Acquisition'. Plato indeed, Soph. 219 c, d, opposes
κηρύσσει to ποιητική, classing all the 'arts' under one or the other of these two
divisions. But it is convenient to retain the established technical term in English
treatises on Political Economy, viz. 'Production', that is, production of wealth.
Tr.]
5 As Teichmüller asserts Die Einheit
der aristotelischen Eudämonie 148 (St
Petersburg 1859. 8).
6 Zeller op. c. 11 ii 693.
7 See on I. 12. 1 n. (107).
However that may be, certain it is that the principle of exclusive slave labour, which Aristotle has adopted, has robbed his economic theory of precisely that which must be taken to be the soul of the modern science, the conception of economic labour. It has already been remarked that he cannot help sharing to the full the national prejudice of Greece against all industrial labour as something degrading and servile. As Oncken in particular has excellently pointed out, his sort of distinction between direct or natural production and indirect acquisition by means of exchange, and further between the subdivisions of the two species, derives its peculiar colouring from this defect. 'The axiom 'that man must consider himself the born proprietor of all the treasures 'of the earth, we also hold to be true'; and the proposition, which Aristotle is fond of repeating and which we meet with once more here, that nature makes nothing in vain, should continue to be respected in spite of the thorough-going or half-and-half materialism of our times. But one essential side of man's relation to his planet and to the rest of its productions and inhabitants has escaped Aristotle altogether: of the important part borne by labour in determining this relation he knows nothing; in common with all the ancients he lacked the idea of the gradual acquisition of command over nature and of the gradual unfolding of human culture which accompanies it step by step. Hence it is that he has no presentiment of the epoch-making importance of agriculture as the transition to a settled life; he sets this occupation completely on a level with that of the nomad, the hunter, or the fisherman. He does not separate settled cattle-breeding from the pastoral life of the herdsman who wanders without a home; nor does he bring it into inseparable connexion, as he should do, with agriculture. Agriculture moreover, he thinks, can be carried on by slaves just like other trades, and 'the owner of a piece of ground tilled in this way stands to the 'fruits of the earth in much the same relation as the herdsman, the 'hunter and fisherman. He gets them ready made into his hands, and 'with even less trouble than they do: thus the notion of individual 'labour, of personal acquisition in agriculture, falls into the background 'in Aristotle's view. And this explains the gross inexactitude in his 'notion of property, which is disclosed when he treats plunder as a 'further natural species of production standing on the same footing with 'the former species.' Besides, in so doing he overlooks the fact that

1 op. cit. II. 75—114: whence the passages with quotation marks are taken.
2 Cp. also on VII (VI). 4. 11 n. (1422).
3 See IV (VII). 9 §§ 3. 4 οὕτε βέβαιοιον βίων οὖσιν ἀγωγαῖον ἢ ἰδιον τούς πολίτας...
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plunder by its very nature cannot possibly be included, as it is by him, with direct appropriation of the gifts of nature as distinct from sale and barter, that is, from every kind of voluntary exchange: for it is nothing else than the transfer of property in the rudest form by violence and without compensation. Whoever then regards the most violent form of this transfer as natural would be bound in all fairness to hold the same of its milder forms, fraud and theft. Nothing but personal labour creates a valid and incontestable right to property, and such a right over the soil can only be won by the plough. Thus Aristotle can make an excellent defence of the utility of property against Plato and can set it in its true light; but missing the conception of economic labour he misses therewith the full and logically clear notion of property. His notion too of what is natural must under such circumstances lose all definiteness when it comes to be applied to civilized nations in advanced stages of development. He certainly never intended to concede to plunder a place in his model state; but he is exposed to the charge of inconsistency, when he nevertheless declares it to be something natural on the ground that it undoubtedly is so to men in a state of nature, without seeing that what is natural for men in a state of nature is not natural for civilized men. Indeed he has in general no sort of insight into the nature of historical development; for in history he discerns, not the reign of general laws, but merely the action of individual men, free or even capricious, although often wrecked on circumstances.

When he comes to treat of exchange, not merely do we find Adam Smith’s distinction between value in use and value in exchange already anticipated, but the whole discussion is evidence ‘how acutely Aristotle has thought out a subject which Hellenic philosophy before him seems at the best to have barely touched. The successive steps in the rise of commerce and the origin of money could not be exhibited with more of truth to fact or of historical accuracy than has been here accomplished in a style of unerring precision, piercing to the heart of the subject to reproduce it with classic brevity and definiteness, yet so exhaustively that modern science has found nothing to alter or to add.’ Besides admitting that exchange of commodities is not contrary to nature he goes on to show how from it buying and selling necessarily arose, and from that again a new mode of acquisition, trade in merchandise. Apparently he would further allow exchange to be carried on through a coined medium, so long as it is merely to relieve indispensable barter and not as a business of its own. But here comes in again his want of clearness and that inconsistency which leads

1 See on 1. 8. 7 n. (71) and 1. 9. 8 n. (82).
2 Van der Rest op. c. p. 382.
him to see an ever increasing degeneracy and departure from the paths of nature\(^1\) in what he himself recognises as a necessary development: 'starting with the most accurate views on the nature and necessity of monetary exchange he is led in the end actually to reject all commerce and all practical trading with capital.' He rightly sees how essential it is that the article chosen as the medium of exchange should be useful in itself\(^2\), but at the same time as the determinate value of each coin is regulated by law and convention he is misled into the belief that nothing but pure caprice has a hand in this convention: that it was by mere chance that metals have been selected out of all useful articles, and in particular that amongst all the more highly civilized nations gold and silver are exclusively employed for coining into money, at all events for foreign trade. Once for all he states the case in such a way that it might easily be believed he has come, a few lines further on, in contradiction to himself, to hold that coined money no longer current loses even its value as a metal\(^3\).

Further, while correctly explaining the origin of money, 'he never-theless fails to recognise to the full extent the way in which its introduction must naturally react upon the value of natural products: how 'they are all without exception thereby turned into wares, whose value 'is regulated by their market-price, so that anything which finds no 'market, or no sale in the market, possesses no more value than heaps 'of gold on a desert island; the richest harvest of the productions 'of nature, if its abundance does not attract a purchaser, being just as 'useless rubbish as the wealth called into existence by Midas\(^4\). After 'the later stage of a monetary system has been attained Aristotle makes 'the vain attempt to preserve in his conceptions the primitive economy 'of nature, which has come to an end simply because it has become 'impossible. In the business of the merchant he sees no more than 'what lies on the surface, speculation, money-making, the accumulation 'of capital: accordingly he condemns it as a purely artificial and 'unnatural pursuit. There too he overlooks the mental labour, 'the economic service which trade renders, not by any means exclu-sively to benefit the purses of those engaged in it.' The insatiate nature of unscrupulous avarice he opposes in most forcible language, but it is in vain that 'he endeavours to restrict productive labour in 'domestic economy within any other limits than those which are set 'by the powers and conscience of the individual\(^5\). Of industry as

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\(^1\) See on I. 9. 8 n. (82).
\(^2\) See on I. 9. 8 n. (84).
\(^3\) But see on the other hand the note on I. 9. 11 (87).
\(^4\) Cp. on I. 9. 11 n. (88).
\(^5\) Comp. the notes on I. 9 § 13 (90), § 18 (93).
'understood in Political Economy he has no more conception than 'of labour.' Having failed to recognise the importance of agriculture in human development he now mistakes still more the benefits introduced by property, which money first made really capable of transfer, 'that 'second great victory in the struggle between human labour and the 'forces of nature'. To this great democratic revolution it is impossible 'to accommodate' his thoroughly aristocratic economic theory, which, at the expense of toiling slaves and resident aliens, guarantees in true Hellenic fashion to the handful of privileged citizens their leisure and the secure provision of their subsistence from their family estates, so that in fact they need take no trouble to increase their possessions. 'Aris- 'totle's freeholder,' in Oncken's words, 'is not a producer at all, but 'consumes what is given by nature. Aristotle has no insight into the 'true natural law of economic development, the aim of which is to 'overcome nature by freeing industrial life from the vicissitudes of her 'smile and frown.' Of the importance herein attaching to capital antiquity generally and the middle age never had an inkling; as little did they perceive that to receive interest on capital is not really different from selling the produce of labour. On the perverse view which Aris- totle took of money² it is intelligible, that in accord with all ancient philosophy and the whole of the middle age³, he declares lending money upon interest to be the most shameful of all modes of gain; yet it is certainly true on the other hand that 'the free community of antiquity 'was in reality nothing but an association of capitalists who lived on 'the interest of the capital they had invested in their slaves.'

Lastly, it is interesting to see how inconsistent this whole economic theory becomes when it passes over to the 'practical part'. What is here (1. 11 §§ 1, 2) described as the most natural mode of life is nothing but cattle-raising and tillage pure and simple on a large scale, which is impossible without considerable capital, an industrial spirit and a know- ledge of the market. Consequently 'the separation which Aristotle has 'made between artificial and natural modes of life cannot be strictly 'maintained even in the case of those who rear cattle and till the soil, 'for whom nature herself, in the strictest sense of the word, provides a 'field of labour. He proves in his own case the truth of his profound 'remark made in this same connexion: that in all such matters, while 'speculation is free, practice has its necessary restrictions.' It is no less noteworthy that in his economic theory he completely loses sight of that

¹ Cp. n. on 1. 9. 18 (03).
² Cp. nn. on 1. 10 §§ 4. 5.
³ Comp. Lecky op. c. 11. 277—289, Lang op. c. 59. [See however Cunnin- 
gham Christian Opinion on Usury pp. 26—33. 36 (Edinburgh 1884).]
essential distinction between the family and the state upon which he insists so much elsewhere. Several times in these discussions he mentions the πολιτικός who controls the finances of a state as well as the ὀικονόμος who manages the property of a household, and that too in a way which forces the reader 'to assume that the task and the procedure in both cases are completely similar': I. 8 §§ 13—15, 10 §§ 1—3, II § 11. With this agrees the decided irony 1 with which he speaks of those statesmen whose whole political wisdom lies in their financial devices, while these devices amount to nothing but keeping the state coffers constantly filled by all kinds of monopolies. And yet 'the great revolution caused by the necessity of exchange he has deduced with perfect correctness from the fact that entirely new conditions of life and of production arise as soon as ever a single family develops into a circle of several families (I. 9. 5). What changes then are to be anticipated when small communities coalesce into a political unity; when intercourse springs up between different political bodies and reacts in a modifying and transforming manner upon the internal condition of each of them! Had Aristotle gone into this question the untenable-ness of his economic theory would have been made even more glaringly 'manifest than is at present the case.'

In the last chapter of the first book, when Aristotle comes to enquire into the treatment of the slave and his capacity for virtue, his peculiar view of natural slavery involves him in an awkward dilemma, from which he cannot be said to have escaped very happily. The slave by nature to a certain extent remains a human being, and yet again to a certain extent he has, properly speaking, ceased to be one. On the one hand Aristotle demands that there should be a specific difference, and not merely one of degree, between the virtue (ἀρετή) of the man, the woman, the child, and the slave (e.g. 13 §§ 4, 5). On the other, his own subsequent elaborate enquiry into ethical virtue 2 as soon as the question is started, wherein consists the distinction between the virtue which commands and the virtue which obeys, tends far more to a mere quantitative variation than to really distinct species 3—to say nothing of the further question, wherein the obedience of the wife differs from that of the child, and both from that of the slave. And this is not the only defect which this enquiry displays 4.

1 Strangely misunderstood by Oncken L.c. II. 113, who in consequence unjustly accuses Aristotle of a fresh contradiction here. While admitting that many states need such devices, Aristotle does not thereby imply that he thinks this a proof of the excellence of such states.
2 On the way in which Aristotle distinguishes intellectual from moral excellence see on I. 13, 6 n. (112).
3 Van der Rest op. c. 378. Comp. also nn. on I. 13 § 7 (114 b) and on §§ 11—13 (120—122).
4 See the nn. on I. 13, 12.
V. The Review of Preceding Theories and Approved Constitutions.

With the second book we come at once to the theory of the state properly so called; divided, according to Aristotle's own statement, into two parts which treat (1) of the constitution, and (2) of legislation. From two passages in the later books, iii. 15 § 2, vi (iv). 1 §§ 9, 10, it is unquestionable that the philosopher intended to treat of both in his work; but in the form in which it has come down to us it has not advanced beyond the former, and even of this considerable sections are wanting.

The second book more especially constitutes the critical part, the remainder of the work the positive or dogmatic part, of the theory of the constitution. In the former is contained an examination of the model constitutions proposed by other theorists, Plato, Phaleas, and Hippodamos, as well as of the best amongst the forms of government actually established, Sparta, Crete, Carthage, and the Solonian constitution; a criticism which of course gives us glimpses of many of the positive features of Aristotle's own ideal of a constitution. His attack upon the polity of pure reason, as it claims to be, in Plato's Republic ranks among the most successful parts of the whole work. In a higher degree perhaps than anywhere else is here displayed 'the philosopher's practical sense, his clear eye open to the conditions and laws of the actual, his profound comprehension of human nature and of political and domestic life.' Against every form of socialism and communism it remains unrivalled in cogency up to the present day. All the well meaning attempts that have been made to defend Plato against this criticism have disclosed very little that will

1 If this sense could be disputed for the latter passage, the former at all events excludes all objection. Cp. the notes on these passages, (636) and (1130); also Hildemandbrand op. c. 351 f., Zeller op. c. 11 ii 677.


3 Zeller op. c. 11 ii 697 f.

4 The oldest attempt of this kind known to us is that of the Neo-Platonist Eubulos, mentioned above p. 18 n. 7. It has been submitted to an examination in detail by Ehrlich De iudicio ab Aristotele de republica Platonica facto (Halle 1868, 8). Amongst the moderns similar attempts have been partially made by Camerarius, J. G. Schneider, &c.; more thoroughly by Schlosser, who displayed a singular and singularly unfortunate zeal against Aristotle; much more moderately and impartially by Fülleborn; lastly by Finzger De iis quae Aristoteles in Platonis politia reprehendit (Leipzig 1822, 8). These have also been answered by Ehrlich, as well as by other writers.
CRITICISM OF EARLIER THEORIES.

stand proof; nor have the charges of sophistry brought against it been to any extent successfully made out. Only this much is true, that however forcible this criticism is in general it nevertheless contains misapprehensions in particulars, some of which are very serious; and its author had not the power, if indeed he ever had the will, to transfer himself to the innermost groove of Plato's thought.

These defects stand out far more forcibly when in the following chapter he treats of the state described in Plato's Laws. Upon this criticism we cannot pronounce a judgment by any means so favourable: indeed it contains some things which are all but incomprehensible. Even the refutation of community of goods has not altogether that full cogency, derived from the essential nature of the case, which is apparent in the refutation of community of wives and children. As we see from this criticism, and yet more clearly from that upon Phaleas, § 6 ff., Aristotle is himself in favour of considerable restrictions upon the rights of property. Every difference of principle in this respect between his own ideal state and Plato's in the Laws disappears: when all things are taken into account Aristotle is no further removed from Plato's first ideal state in the one than Plato himself in the other. Here, therefore, Aristotle's criticism can only affect what are relatively subordinate points, and under these circumstances it frequently assumes a petty and generally unfair character. The refutation of

1 See on II. 2 § 4 (133), 3 § 9 (142); 4 § 1 (145), § 2 (146) (147), § 9 (151) (152); 5 § 3 (154), § 10 (162), § 16 (167), §§ 20—23 (172), § 25 (181) (182), § 27 (184).

2 See on II. 5 § 17 (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (170), § 27 (184); 6 § 3 (187) (189); also on $S$ 22 (177), 6 § 5 (195).

3 See Zeller Plat., Studien 203 ff. (Tübingen 1839. 8).

4 Even Zeller and Oncken do not seem as yet to have observed this difference. It was fully recognised by Van der Rest op. c. 108 ff., 121 ff., 221 ff., 348 ff.: but he did not investigate its causes, and in one particular he should be corrected by the notes on II. 5. 25. It would be quite possible to suspect with Krohn (see p. 14 n. 4) that, wholly or in part, c. 6 is not genuine. But it is hard to see who but Aristotle could have written §§ 10—15, and scarcely anywhere are the difficulties greater. See the notes on these sections.

5 See on II. 5. 5.

6 See on II. 5 § 7 n. (158), § 15 n. (160), 7 § 6 n. (238 b). How Van der Rest op. c. 349 can blame Aristotle for requiring the public education to aim at creating such a spirit of fraternity that we willingly grant our fellow-citizens a share in the enjoyment of our own possessions, is incomprehensible.

7 It is much to be regretted that all comparisons between the ideal states of Plato and Aristotle—such as Bröcker Politicorum, quae documentum Plato et Aristoteles, disquisitio et comparatio (Leipzig 1842. 8), Orses Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis librorum de republica (Berlin 1843. 8), Pierson Vergleichende Charakteristik der Platonischen und der Aristotelischen Ansicht vom Staat in den Rhein. Mus. XIII. 1858. 1—48, 209—247, Rassow Die Republik des Plato und der beste Staat des Aristoteles (Weimar 1866. 4)—have either been expressly confined to the ideal state of the République, or, being left incomplete, contain no sort of collection of the similarities and differences between the political ideal of the Laws and that of Aristotle. See further the notes on I. 13 § 16: II. 6 § 5 (192), § 6 (201), § 14 (212); 7 § 5 (234), § 6 (236 b); 9 § 5 (285): IV (VII). 16 § 15.

8 See the notes on II. 6 § 3 (188) (189), § 4 (190), § 5 (192) (193), § 6 (201), § 7 (205).
Phaleas, again, is enriched with the fruits of extensive observation of mankind; but, like the review of Plato's *Laws*, it leaves untouched the kernel of the matter, the inalienability and indivisibility of the equal portions of land allotted to the citizens. Furthermore Aristotle sees with keen perception that if this measure is to be carried out, a normal number of births and deaths must be calculated and the surplus population, on the basis of this calculation, removed by a resort to abortion, in order that the number of citizens may always remain the same. Nor has he any scruples about recommending this horrible measure and thus invading far more than Phaleas, or Plato in the *Laws*, the sanctities of marriage and family life. What he further insists upon in reply to Phaleas is the same thing which he had already insisted upon when criticizing Plato (c. 5 § 15), namely that uniformity of education of the right kind is the main point, while all the other institutions have only a subsidiary importance.

We may admit then with Oncken that Aristotle belonged to the few privileged spirits of antiquity who were the pioneers of progress towards that richer and riper humanity which remained foreign to the heathen world at large. In defending the natural law of marriage and private property he first discovered the fundamental laws of the independent life of the community: the position which he assigns to women goes far beyond the Hellenic point of view: and he was the first who, by adjustment of the unity of the state to the freedom of its citizens, at least attempted to determine the limits of the state's activity. But we must also bring out more forcibly than Oncken has done how far, even in Aristotle, all these great conceptions fall short of attaining their clear full logical development to important results. And the review of Hippodamos shows us how little, after all, he was disposed, or even qualified, to follow ideas even then not unknown to Greek antiquity, the tendency of which was by a sharper limitation of the field of law and justice so to break the omnipotence of the state that its legislation should be confined to the maintenance of justice within these limits; this, rather than education, being made its function. Here, as in the defence of slavery, we see that along with the excesses of democracy Aristotle rejected many just conceptions which had grown out of it. However much to the purpose the

(204), § 9 (206 b), § 10 (208), § 13 (210), § 14 (212), § 15 (213—215), § 18 (220), § 19 (225—227).

1 See nn. on II. 6 §§ 5 (192), § 10 (208), §§ 12, 13 (209) (210), 7 §§ 5 (234).

2 See nn. II. 5 §§ 15 (165 b), 7 §§ 8 (238).

3 *op. cit. 191 f.*

4 See the Excursus II on Hippodamos at the end of Bk. II.

5 See above p. 20; and further the Excursus on Hippodamos just cited.
objections which he brings against Hippodamos with regard to his
division of the civic body; they are defective from the jurist’s point of
view; while he makes not a single attempt to refute what is the
total foundation of the whole scheme, the need for the restriction upon
legislation described above. Evidently he thinks it not worth while to
do so, just as in a later passage (III. 9. 8) he treats every opinion on the
function of the state which implies such a mode of regarding legislation
as ipso facto disproved.

The review of the political institutions of Sparta, Crete, and
Carthage is primarily of great historical value for our knowledge of
their constitutions: indeed apart from it we should know next to

1 Compare the notes on II. 8 § 2 (253), § 9 (264), § 24 (276): but on the other
hand II. 8 § 12 n. (265).
2 See the notes on II. 8 § 5 (258), § 15
(268).
3 Trierer Forschungen zur spartanischen Vor geschichte 90 f. (Berlin 1871. 8) endeavoured to prove that, in his
account of Sparta and Crete, Aristotle chiefly followed Ephoros. Here I in
the main agreed with him in my critical edition p. LXII f., with considerable qualifi-
cations however in regard to Sparta. Meanwhile Gilbert Studies zur altspar-
tanischen Geschichte pp. 86–109 (Göt-
tingen 1872. 8) endeavoured to show that
on the contrary Ephoros made use of the
für Philol. cv. 1872 p. 657 made reply to
him that Ephoros’ work, as is well known,
only went down to the year 340 B.C. (It
would have been more correct if he had
said to 355: for all that follows was added
by Demophilus, the son of Ephoros,
probably after his father’s death.) But it
can be proved that Aristotle wrote at
his Politics as late as 331, and for the
proof Frick refers to Müller Fragm. hist.
Gr. ii. p. 121. Both Gilbert and Frick
ought to have known that, from the dates
there quoted by Müller on the authority of
Meier, Rose Aristoteles pseudographus
p. 397 ff. had with far greater reason
inferred that the Πολιτικά did not ap-
ppear until the period between the years
318 and 307, and further that it is only on
account of the uncertainty of the dates
themselves that Heitz Die verlorenen
Schriften des Aristoteles (Leipzig 1865.
8.) p. 247 sq., Aristot. fragm. (p. 242 in
the Paris edition of Aristotle), rejects this
inference. Even if Rose is right we should
conclude from this, not as he does, that
Aristotle cannot have been the true au-
thor, but only that the work was first pub-
lished after his death with additions by
the editor. For the genuineness of the
groundwork at least has been sufficiently
made out by Heitz and by Bergk Zur
Aristotelischen Politie der Athener (On a
fragment of the Politics found lately,
treating of Athens), in the Rhein. Mus.
XXXVI. 1881. 87–115: cp. Susemihl in
Bursian’s Jahresthe, xxxv. 1882. 20–22.
If the matter rested thus Gilbert would be
completely refuted. But leaving the cor-
rectness of these dates an open question,
it is not very probable, to say the least,
that Aristotle should have published thus
carly a work like the Πολιτικά based upon
such comprehensive studies. On another side Oncken op. c. xi. p. 330 f.,
by the help of fragments of this work
which we still possess on the Πολιτικά
Lacedaemon, has tried to prove that
Aristotle, quite independently of Epho-
ros, was the first to investigate Spartan
constitutional history in true scientific
spirit; that he probably visited Sparta
himself for this purpose and drew infor-
mation there from living oral tradition.
The difficulties in connexion with this
hypothesis are patent, and with reference
to Crete at any rate the coincidence be-
tween Aristotle and Ephoros is of such a
kind that in accordance with the line
of argument above Aristotle must have
used either Ephoros or his authority:
see the notes on II. 10 § 1 (351), § 2 (352,
354), § 5 (359), § 6 (360). Even with
reference to Sparta hardly any other con-
clusion seems possible: see the notes on
II. 9 § 17 (310) ; 10 § 1, § 2 (352, 354),
§ 5 (359) : VIII (v). 1 § 10 (1498), 7 § 2
(1592), 11 § 3 (1710), 12 § 12 (1771),
and compare Rose op. cit. 398, 400.
Only we are not to infer from this that
Ephoros was Aristotle’s only authority

3—2
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nothing of the Carthaginian constitution: moreover we are bound on the whole to subscribe to Aristotle's estimate of them. We shall not venture however to rank his merits quite so highly as Oncken has done. Certainly there never was before so mercilessly destructive and yet so just a criticism upon that Spartan state which up till then had been, most unwarrantably, the idol of all aristocratic and oligarchical circles. Yet on the one hand we must remember that close as were his relations with those circles, and although in essentials his own pattern-states were based upon similar foundations, Plato had been by no means blind to the defects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions. Indeed in important particulars, and even in those of the greatest importance, Aristotle can but repeat the censure pronounced by his master. On the other hand it is really necessary to reflect how, after so crushing a criticism which leaves scarcely anything untouched, Aristotle can possibly still be content, like Plato, to pronounce the Cretan and here. On the contrary while it is more than doubtful whether he has Ephoros in view when he quotes certain opinions and statements (see on 11. 6. 17, 11. 9, 11), it is quite certain that in regard to both states Aristotle diverges considerably in details from Ephoros, partly indeed from all other authorities. This divergence must be due to another source, and here and there to one which he alone has utilized: see on 11. 10 § 6 (360), § 10 (369): VI (IV). 11 § 15 (1301).

1 In spite of Oncken's opposition it still will remain the universal belief that the picture which Aristotle draws of the condition of Sparta agrees fully and completely only with the Sparta of later times. But the extreme view that this description in no respect applies to the Sparta of the earlier times should perhaps be modified. What is to be said, for instance, when Triebert op. cit. p. 136 ff. actually praises Aristotle for having in his criticism of the Spartan constitution taken into account simply the existing historical relations of his age, thereby fulfilling a condition laid down generally by the science of history in our time; while at the same time he would fain persuade us that this procedure, so far as the history of Spartan antiquity was neglected, was due to ignorance and resulted in misstatement? Why should not a part of the mischiefs discovered by him, and the germ at least of the remainder, have always existed in the Spartan state, even if it was not perhaps until after the Persian wars that this germ developed with gradually increasing strength and banefulness? And the procedure which Triebert commends only deserves to be praised because in fact even in historical matters we are fully entitled to argue from consequences to their causes, from the end to the beginning. Whoever considers the facts collected in the note on 11. 9. 37 (350) will hardly find the suggestion of Triebert and others—that the readiness of the Spartan ephors and senators to receive bribes only belongs to later times—particularly credible; but first of all he will enquire, with what data these later times ought rightly to commence. Fülleborn in a note to Garve's translation 11 p. 242 says most sensibly: 'Aristotle's remarks are very strangely contradicted by all the famous anecdotes of the heroic and chastity of the Spartan women. But different periods must be distinguished in Spartan history.....and it should be borne in mind that Aristotle after all deserves more credit than scattered anecdotes of such a kind.' But should not this consideration be extended to other cases? Where Aristotle assumes that Spartan institutions were always thus and thus, while later writers contradict him and even claim to know the names of those who introduced the change, should we directly and unhesitatingly pronounce these later authorities right? See the notes on 11. 9 § 14 (299, 300), § 15 (303).

2 Of what is really the main point Aristotle says this himself 11. 9 § 34 (ep. note). See further the notes on 11. 9 § 5 (283), § 11 (295 b), § 20 (318), § 23 (324), § 25 (330), § 27 (335), § 31 (341).
Spartan constitutions (with the addition merely of the Carthaginian) to be the next best after his own model state, and thus himself to sacrifice to the idol he has just destroyed. As to the socialist elements in those constitutions, they certainly do not go too far for him, but on the contrary not far enough; like his master, he is far more rigidly logical. The social principles of Aristotle’s model state are as strictly deduced as those of Plato’s.

It would be quite incredible that, amongst the best approved constitutions actually established, Aristotle should not have mentioned Solon’s as well as the other three. For this reason alone it is hardly conceivable that the section in which it is discussed should not be genuine: rather is it matter of surprise that the subject is dismissed so briefly. But the mere list of legislators, with which the second book ends, is certainly a foreign interpolation which contradicts the clearly expressed purpose of the book.

VI. The Leading Propositions of Political Science.

We might naturally expect the exposition of Aristotle’s own model constitution to follow directly upon this criticism of those which claim that title. But here again, with that characteristic unlikeness to Plato which was before remarked, our philosopher declines to regard as comparatively unimportant everything else in political theory except the perfect state. The positive or constructive side of the theory of the constitution, to which we now come, includes two parts, one general, the other special. The former and much shorter portion, III. cc. 1—13, treats of the fundamental conditions of the healthy working of constitutions, which, as such, apply equally to the best form of state and to all others. More explicitly, this portion falls into two main divisions: the first (A), cc. 1—5, while touching here and there by anticipation upon the classification of separate constitutions, for the most part merely prepares for this by a discussion of the fundamental political conceptions which must be assumed for all of them: the true citizens cc. 1,

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1 See further the notes on II. 12 § 1, § 10 (421), § 12 (423, 425), § 13 (427).
2 p. 21.
4 Hildenbrand, op. c. 408 f. He rightly points out another reason why Bk. 111 should follow closely on Bk. II; the latter, at its very outset, along with its task of criticism attempts a positive ‘solution of the problem’—of the utmost importance for all constitutions and intimately connected with the subject of Bk. 1—‘whether and to what extent the family and private property, institutions subserving individual interests, have any right to continue in the presence of the state, the organization for the common weal.’
5 III. 1 § 9 n. (439 b), 3 §§ 1, 2 n. (456), 5 §§ 5—7 n. (508).
2: the essential identity of a state c. 3: the relation between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man cc. 4, 5. Now this relation will vary under different constitutions and thus determine their nature and comparative merit. The subject of the remaining chapters (B), cc. 6—13, is, firstly, a definition of constitution (πολιτεία) in general, and a preliminary classification of the several forms of the state (πολιτείαι). As we are told in Bk. 1., the end of the state is Happiness, the true well-being and common good of the citizens. All constitutions which make the interest of the governed the end of government are normal constitutions (ἀριθμεῖ τι πολιτείαι): those which exist for the interest of the governors are corruptions or degenerate varieties (παρεκβάσεις) c. 6. Then, by a merely numerical standard, the normal constitutions are provisionally divided into Monarchy, True Aristocracy and Polity (Πολιτεία proper); the corrupt forms into Tyranny (τυραννίς), Oligarchy, Democracy; according as one man, a minority, or the majority respectively rule (c. 7). We pass on (c. 8) to consider secondly a series of difficult problems (ἀπορίαι). From the discussion of the first of these it appears that it is merely an accident of Oligarchy and Democracy that a minority governs in the one, a majority in the other. It is essentially the selfish government of the rich by the poor which constitutes Democracy, the selfish government of the poor by the rich which constitutes Oligarchy (c. 8). The remaining discussions treat at greater length three separate inquiries: (a) in c. 9, (β) in cc. 10, 11, (γ) in cc. 12, 13. From the definitions just framed the first (a) draws the inference that in reality the true end of the state is not adequately secured upon the democratic principle—equal political privileges to all citizens who are equal in respect of free birth: nor yet upon the principle of oligarchy; for the state is no joint-stock trading company: the aristocratical principle of intelligence, virtue, and merit is alone sufficient

1 The subdivisions of III. cc. 1—13 may thus be tabulated:

(A) First main division: cc. 1—5
   (a) Who is the true citizen? cc. 1, 2
   (β) What constitutes the identity of a state? c. 3
   (γ) Is the virtue of the good citizen the same with the virtue of the good man? cc. 4, 5.

(B) Second main division: cc. 6—13
   (I) Constitution defined; preliminary classification of constitutions: cc. 6, 7.
   (II) Discussion of difficult problems (ἀπορίαι): cc. 8—13

More precise definitions of Democracy and Oligarchy: c. 8
The comparative merit of constitutions: cc. 9—13
(a) the aristocratical principle preferable to that of democracy and of oligarchy: c. 9
(β) the mass of the citizens and the laws in what sense sovereign on an aristocratical principle: cc. 9, 11
(γ) the claims of the better citizens and of the mass how best accommodated on this principle, and the varieties (monarchy, pure aristocracy, polity) thence resulting: ce. 12, 13.
This is followed by the inference (β) that the higher the capacity of a body of citizens, and consequently of a state, the more as a rule does the worth of eminent individuals fall short of that of the great mass of other citizens taken collectively, just as the wealth of the richest individuals amongst them is outweighed by the total property belonging to the remainder. Hence, even on an aristocratical principle, sovereignty belongs to the whole body. Yet this many-headed sovereign, besides being restrained by the laws, must always in the direct exercise of its powers be confined to the election of magistrates (ἀρχαρεσία) and to the scrutiny of their conduct, when, at the expiry of their term of office, they render an account of their stewardship (ὑθυραί). All the details of state affairs will be entrusted to the magistrates elected by such a competent civic body from amongst its ablest members.

A marvellously profound thought this, marking its author’s essential independence of Plato¹, and proving how powerfully he had been influenced by democracy and the Athenian polity. However distinctly he, like Plato, disapproves of its unrestrained development in Athens and elsewhere subsequently to the time of Pericles², he has nevertheless laid down for all time the justification of the democratic element in political life³, and has done something at least to set a proper limitation to it. Moreover this thought has a far wider bearing. A true constitutional state combining freedom and order, whether under a monarchy or a republic, whether prince or people is sovereign within it, is only conceivable if the sovereign has definite limitations imposed by law upon the direct exercise of his sovereignty, in keeping with the true

¹ Spengel Ueber Arist. Pol. 15 n. 18, Henkel, op. cit. 80, n. 12, Oncken op. c. 11 165 f., 174. The last rightly remarks that with this proposition Aristotle set himself free from the concept of philosophic omniscience, while to Plato ‘nothing was so certain as that the Demos meant the sovereignty of folly, and the rule of philosophers the reign of wisdom itself.’ But how can Congreve conceive of Aristotle’s own ideal state if he thinks (p. 137) that this proposition is only relatively true (not the slightest trace of this is to be found in its author), and is intended only to indicate that of the two evils, democracy and oligarchy, the former is the lesser? This is strange egesis.

² For this reason Oncken’s assertion l. c. 172, that the exposition given 11 §§ 15, 16 is borrowed from observation of the Attic democracy, as it was even after Pericles’ time, is not correct.

³ Whether Trendelenburg in Natur-
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external and internal relations of power. No doubt the restraints imposed by a constitutional state of large size in modern times are very different from those devised by Aristotle for his Greek canton-state, and suggested by the forms most suited to his purpose amongst those in actual existence. Yet after all, although the idea was foreign to him and to all antiquity, it is upon just this principle that representative government rests. Now-a-days the people does not elect the magistrates, unless it be the president of a republic, the borrowed monarchical head of the whole state: they are nominated by the monarch or his republican fac-simile, and there is no popular court to which they are directly accountable. Legislation again, the settlement of the state revenue and expenditure, and all that is included therein, are no longer directly in the hands of the entire body of the citizens. But even under a strict constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is the only recognized sovereign, the people have a most substantial share of political privilege, in that through their representatives they take part indirectly in legislation, in voting the budget, the ratification of treaties and the control of the administration. Even the most conservative modern statesman no longer overlooks the fact that the strange phenomenon, changeable as the wind, called public opinion¹, may in certain circumstances be consolidated into a firm, enduring, real popular will, which even under the most absolute monarchy gradually becomes the most powerful and irresistible of all political forces; and that thus the so-called sovereignty of the people, which as a legal principle is more than doubtful, yet in fact indirectly and ultimately ever prevails. No one knows better than Aristotle that nothing is more foolish than the masses: but he is quite as well aware, that again there is nothing wiser. Where the one quality ceases and the other begins he has not attempted to determine and perhaps this is an attempt which no mortal man can make with success. He is 'far too well-trained a realist,' to fall into the error of those who treat that Proteus, the public, as if it did not exist, or who do not know how to reckon with such a force². He was, so far as we know, the first to expound, prove, sift, and limit this thought which up till then had only been thrown out by democratic party leaders³; the first who, while accepting it not with interested views merely but from full conviction, yet considers it impartially in the spirit 'of the true statesman 'who has in view only the welfare of all, and of the psychologist who 'has an understanding for the instincts of a great people. He believes

1 Demosth. Fals. leg. 135; ὦς ὁ μὲν δὴ-μός ἐστιν ἀσταθητὸτατον πράγμα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀσωφητῶτατον, ὡσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ πνεύμα ἀκατάτατατον, ὡς ἐν τύχῃ κινοῦμενος.
² Oncken op. c. II. 168.
³ Compare Athenagoras in Thucyd. vi. 39. 1: also Pericles ib. II. 40, Otanes in Herod. III. 50 s. fin.
the individual can be ennobled through the common feeling of the body corporate to which he belongs; that his powers and intelligence can be multiplied, his good instincts raised, his bad ones corrected through being merged in a higher unity; and this is the only ethical point of view, under which an intrinsic right to political elevation can be ascribed to the people. Aristotle uses an example here (c. 11 § 3) which contains in itself a great concession. The capacity of the public for judging in matters of artistic taste he touches upon as a truth which needs no proof; and yet on this very field the right of the masses to decide is much more disputed and much more disputable than on that of public life, where the weal and woe of each individual is in question and the healthy instinct frequently sees further than all the intelligence of the experts. 1 Plato is of quite another opinion (Laws iii. 700 E ff.), 2 and nothing is easier than by resolving the public into its elements to show that it really consists of mere cyphers: but it is impossible to do away with the fact that the poet or artist is nothing without this public, which he must conquer in order to rule, and that the judgments of this court have a force with which the view of the experts, who are seldom agreed, can never be matched. 3 Spengel 4 is undoubtedly right: these chapters (iii. cc. 9—13) contain doctrines more important than any to be found elsewhere in the work, doctrines which deserve to be written in letters of gold.

This section ends with the remark (iii. 11. 20) that all this does not as yet inform us what kind of laws there ought to be, but simply that those made in the spirit of the right constitution are the right ones. In other words, the order of merit of the normal constitutions, and in its complete form that of the degenerate varieties, is not yet decided. We

1 See however the notes on iii. 11 § 2 (65 b), 15 § 8 (647).
2 Yet on the other hand see Symp. 194.
3 Such a resolution Socrates undertakes in Xenoph. Memor. iii. 7 in the case of the popular assembly (Vettori).
4 Oncken ii. 165 f. 'What,' he rightly adds, 'would have become of the German drama of Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller, had its fate rested solely with the critics, from Gotschfeld and Nicolai down to the romantic school?' It is however a mistake to suppose that the further step from this 'passive' popular sovereignty to the 'active sovereignty, which finds expression in the self-government of the Demos by the Demos' was also taken by Aristotle, 'when he recognized Polity as a form of government on an equality with Monarchy and Aristocracy' (Oncken ii. 169, 239 f.). For (1) Aristotle did not recognize Polity as standing on an equality with the other two forms of government, vi (iv). 8. 1; and (2) no greater rights are granted to the people in a Polity than in an aristocracy or a moderate democracy, vi (iv). 14. §§ 10, 14. And when Oncken made the assertion (ii. 174) that Aristotle invariably subordinated to the law and the popular decree the wisdom and virtue of even the best individual citizen, he must surely have forgotten the substance of iii. c. 13, c. 17 §§ 5—8.
5 Arist. Stud. ii. p. 54 (646).
6 In general the result of the preceding statements is that Democracy is preferable to Oligarchy, and the latter preferable to a Tyranny; but whether and how far a moderate oligarchy deserves to rank before an unrestrained democracy has not yet been decided.
naturally expect the remaining discussion (γ), cc. 12, 13, to give at
least the outlines of such a decision, bringing the whole exposition into
real organic connexion with the previous classification of forms of
government, and thus concluding the general theory of the constitution.
But at first sight this expectation would seem to be wholly disappointed.
Schlosser was the first to find fault, not without reason. So much of
the previous discussion (cc. 8—11) is repeated in cc. 12, 13 that he
conjectured, not very happily, that these chapters had been transposed.
After him Bernays declared cc. 12, 13 to be simply another version of
cc. 9—11 and cc. 16, 17. This view requires careful examination.
Against it may be urged that the subject of cc. 14, 15 (indeed
the whole discussion περὶ βασιλείας, cc. 14—17) is quite as closely
connected by its contents with c. 11 as it is with the latter half of c. 13
(§§ 13—25), and much more so than it is with cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12; and
as it most naturally follows upon c. 13, there would be a tremendous
gap, in accordance with the remark above made, between the end of
cc. 11 and the discussion on Monarchy at the beginning of c. 14, which
Bernays' view would directly follow. Notwithstanding this, cc. 12,
13 §§ 1—12 might well pass for another version of cc. 9—11, lacking
only the important second question as to the limits to the sovereignty
of a competent body of citizens. In that case, however, the editor
must have made more than a slight change in the passage to adapt it
to its present place. For though the reference in 13 § 1 to c. 9 ff. as
preceding might be cut out as a loose addition, that contained in
13 § 2 is firmly embedded in the context. On the other hand, the
latter part of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), which is really devoid of all con-
exion with the earlier part as it at present stands, might conveniently
come immediately after c. 11 as an exception to the rule there set
forth, thus: 'if however an individual man is superior to all the
'citizens together, then in the best state he stands above the law
'as absolute king and ruler.' The question of 11 § 20 noticed
above would then remain unanswered, but it might be urged that it
belongs to the theory of the special constitutions to provide the
answer. But graver considerations remain. From 11 § 8 it would

1 In his translation vol. 1, p. 296 n. 79.
2 In the note to his translation, p. 172.
3 Bernays indeed disputes this. He maintains that the sentence which states the propriety of this transition, φαμέν γὰρ
τῶν ὁρθῶν πολιτείων μίαν εἰσα τάτην ἑ. ὑ. βασιλείαν (11. 14, 1) finds no point of con-
nexion in the last words of c. 13, since the normal constitutions are not there men-
tioned. But surely it is enough that in
13 § 20 the mention of them as opposed to the corrupt forms serves to introduce
the whole of the succeeding exposition, although at last this stops short (§ 24)
merely at the antithesis of the best con-
stitution and the corrupt forms.
4 Cf. the notes on III. 13 §§ 1, 2.
5 As Conring saw.
6 P. 41: see also p. 43 n. 2.
follow, in contradiction to Aristotle's view, that even in the best state the magistrates might be elected from men of a definite census only. Further there is one short sentence in c. 13, in its traditional place entirely unconnected with what precedes or follows, § 6, which however would be quite in place immediately before § 13. The close of § 12 has no counterpart at present in the previous chapters, yet it cannot be separated from its immediately preceding context; and it is evident that the subsidiary question here raised,—Are the best 'laws to be made for the advantage of the better citizens or of the 'majority?'—stands in the closest connexion with the main question at II § 20; but no less evident that the answer to it here given is incomplete. There is then in any case a lacuna after II § 12: we can easily imagine something to fill it, after which what in our present order stands as § 6 followed quite naturally.

If therefore we really have two versions of the same subject-matter before us, then the older one contained in cc. 12, 13 has been handed down to us in worse condition and is the more incomplete; the later version, cc. 9—II, must have been left unfinished. In any case there is no redundancy noticeable here, but rather a lamentable deficiency. But on the other hand, the inquiry as to which is the most normal and best of the normal constitutions (II § 20) can only be conducted by a more exact determination and modification of the previous result with regard to the most legitimate holder of sovereign power; and this consideration seems to render necessary a certain review of all the political factors, whatever their justification. It was further stated expressly, II § 1, that all the cases except that in which the sovereignty of the people is justified are to be afterwards discussed. Now it cannot be denied that c. 12 does make a start in this direction by first deciding universally which factors really can lay claim to political rule and thereby granting at the outset that wealth (and therefore Oligarchy) has a certain justification. The diffuseness of the repetition is not commendable, but in such works as those of Aristotle's which have been preserved it has simply to be accepted.

1 See the note on III. 11. 8 (569).
2 πότερον τῷ νομοθετή τοῖς νόμοις, βουλουέντας τοὺς βουλεύειν τοὺς ἄριστους νόμους, πρὸς τοῦ τῶν βελτίων διαφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλείων; III. 13 § 12. Compare ὁποίοις μέντοι τινάς ἢ δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ἄριστους κειμένους νόμους, οὐδὲν πιστὸν δῆλον...πλῆρες τοῦτο γε φανερῶμεν ότι δὲ εἰς πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κεῖται τοῦτον νόμον, II 8 § 20.
3 See Thurot's excellent and convincing analysis Études 47 ff., from which Susemihl should not have expressed partial dissent in Philologus xxix. 113—15 and in the critical edition. It requires correction in one important point only which does not affect the present question: see the note on III. 13. 12 (599). Compare also Susemihl Compos. der Arist. Pol. 23 ff (where however the last sentence of n. 19 should be rescinded) and in part Spengel Arist. Stud. III. 24.
4 See again the note on III. 13. 12.
5 Cp. the note on III. 11. 1.
6 See on III. 13. 12 n. (599).
in silence. The main point is that in the lacuna following 13 § 12, before § 6 (the proper place of which is between § 12 and § 13), a convenient place presented itself for a discussion declaring the true Aristocracy to be an unlimited democracy of none but competent men and ranking it above Polity (Πολιτείᾳ)\(^1\); as in the latter the inferior capacity of the body of citizens leads to the introduction of a property qualification to ensure the election of none but men of special excellence as magistrates. Lastly, it is clear from cc. 14—17, that in the developed Greek state there is only one case where Aristotle admits monarchy, namely, when the monarch is superior in ability to all the rest taken together; and he assumes that only the citizens of the best state, all men of ability themselves, will accept such a monarchy. It becomes doubly difficult then, nay almost impossible, that such a case should ever occur. Still it remains just conceivable, and as long as this condition of things lasts the best state, instead of being an aristocracy, is, in this exceptional case, the only true monarchy: this then is the absolutely best constitution, superior even to Aristocracy\(^2\).

VII. Monarchy and the Best State.

If the foregoing arguments are sound, the special theory of the constitution falls into three parts; the theory (i) of monarchy, (ii) of the best constitution, (iii) of the remaining constitutions. The first comprises Bk. iii cc. 14—17, the second Bk. iv and v. (in the old order vii, viii), the third the remaining three books.

Aristotle's conception of monarchy as explained above not unnaturally determines the very character of his discussion of it. This discussion has indeed come down to us in the utmost confusion, and appears somewhat defective: but even after a clear order of thought has been attained by means of various transpositions, the impression it makes upon us is, from the standing of our own political development and experience, highly unsatisfactory. The cause of this is not far to seek. The only true and proper monarchy which Aristotle from his point of view can recognise, is absolute monarchy: we may for the most part entirely concur in his objections to this form, and yet consider that, treated thus far, the subject has been by no means exhausted. In Aristotle's time the sole monarchies of any note which history had

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1 See the note last quoted.
2 See vi (iv). 2. 2 with nn. (1136, 1137). If this premiss be granted, the unlimited rule of a person superior in ability to all the others together, including even the best, must certainly be absolutely the best.
produced, except the Greek tyrannies, were despotism, as found in the huge empires of the east, and the so-called patriarchal kingship of the heroic age—the rule of a chief over a small clan and territory, over a Phoenician or Hellenic city-state or canton in prehistoric centuries. Even the rule of the Macedonian kings was, by him at least, regarded in no other light. For the small Greek state, which he keeps solely in view, monarchy is hardly deserving of much more consideration than as the imperfect historical starting-point of all subsequent development. In the organism of the large modern state, absolute monarchy, where it has rightly understood its task, has actually helped to educate men for a reign of law under a constitutional monarchy. Nowhere else could this latter arise. The ancient state had not got so far as its very first condition, which is representation; and like all other political thinkers of antiquity even Aristotle, as was remarked above (p. 40), was as yet far removed from the faintest idea of this kind. It was his too one-sided conception of the state as the exclusive means of educating men to mental and moral excellence that gave rise to his ideal state, and made him set ideal monarchy in it above ideal aristocracy, thereby declaring the form of government proper for intellectual minors to be the highest form for the most enlightened,—although, this being so, he can scarcely hide from himself its impossibility. This however did not hinder him from seeking, by the adjustment of opposite forces, a further practical ideal amongst the degenerate constitutions in Polity (Ιολατεία) and so-called aristocracy. Here he has rightly pursued the thought of elevating the authority of the state above the strife of divergent interests; yet from the circumstances, the most effective realization of this thought in limited monarchy never came under his ken. He can finely describe the functions of the king, but the real significance of this form of government is concealed from him: he gets no farther

1 Spengel Arist. Stud. 11. 57: "Βασιλεία is to Aristotle a historical tradition rather than a form with any further capacity for life in the mental development of his own nation;—and like all Greek philosophers and political writers he rarely notices any other. Thus he is careful to set forth in various ἀργαλείας the difficulties involved in the practicability and proper limits of this government.

Our astonishment at this defective method of treatment, which first surprised Schlosser, hereupon ceases. Spengel put the question Ueb. Arist. Pol. 10—

Did Aristotle conceive the theory of monarchy to be complete with the discussions of cc. 14—16? The way kings govern, their inner life, their influence on the people is quite lost sight of. This must be answered in the affirmative with one exception, to be afterwards mentioned p. 46, for which we can easily account. The ideal king, the preeminent—by best man, can have no instructions given him (c. 13 § 14, c. 17 § 2).

2 And therefore far from any idea that true popular liberty thrives best under wisely limited monarchy.

3 See the notes on III. 13 § 14 (601), § 25 (615).

4 See Henkel op. c. 95. n. 25; also VIII (v). 10 §§ 9, 10 with n. (1665).
than to base it exclusively upon personal merits, so that no place is left for it in the practical ideal of mixed constitutions. This inevitably causes an internal inconsistency in the work. According to his plan, the last three books ought to have treated exclusively of the remaining constitutions other than monarchy and pure aristocracy. But on the historical ground of revolutions and their prevention he cannot help treating of monarchy over again in Bk. VIII (v).

It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that nothing can be a greater mistake than the assertion, sometimes made of late, that in his ideal king Aristotle had his own pupil, Alexander, before his mind. It may be surprising that the philosopher's relations with the court of Macedon failed so completely to influence his political theory, that he had no apprehension that he was living right at the close of Hellenic history, with its political development, its system of great and small states; but on the contrary saw nothing impossible in such a new development of a Greek city-state as his ideal constitution would present. But the fact that it is so cannot be altered by our astonishment and inability, with the means at our disposal, satisfactorily to explain it. This ideal of Aristotle's is in reality a small Hellenic city and not a large state like Macedon, which ceases to be a state (πόλις) in his sense of the term, and is no more than a race or nationality (ἐθνός), carrying out a policy of conquest and not, as he requires, a policy of peace. If then the ideal king is to arise only in the ideal state, he cannot be an Alexander. Once no doubt the thought flashes forth, IV (vii). 7. 3, that the Greeks united in one could conquer the whole world. But to Aristotle the end of the state is, as we said, not the conquest of the world but something quite different; no longing for such a state

1 See the n. on III. 13. 9; also VI (iv). 2, 2, VIII (v). I § II with n. (1503), 10 §§ 36, 37 n. (1708).
2 Henkel op. c. 86.
3 So Hegel Gesch. d. Phil. II. 401, Heldenbrand op. c. 426. Recently Oncken (op. c. 1. 16 f., 188 f., 11. 261 ff.) fancied he had discovered traces of Macedonian sympathies completely pervading the Politics. How unsuccessful this attempt was may be judged upon referring to Torstrick Litt. Centralbl. 1870 coll. 1177—1179; Henkel op. c. 86 n. (19), 977 n. (26); Bradley op. c. 179, 238 f.; Susenbuhl in the Jahrb. f. Philol. 1871. 133—139 (where too much is conceded to Oncken) and Bursian's philol. Jahrbücher. III. (1874—5). 376 f.; or to the notes on III. 13 § 13 (601), § 25 (615); 14 § 15 (633); 17 § 5 (678): VI (iv). II § 19 (1303). The last attempts to stamp Aristotle as a Macedonian partisan, made by Bernays Phokion, pp. 40—42 (Berlin 1881), and Wilamowitz Antigonos von Karysios 182 f., 185 f. (Berlin 1881), have not proved more fortunate; see Bursian's Jahrbücher. XXX. 1882. 11, 15 ff. Compare also Hug Demosthenes as a political thinker (Studien aus dem klassischen Alterthum I. 51—103, Freiburg 1881), who goes still further than I do. Wilamowitz in a review of Hug (Deutsche Litteraturzeitung 1882, col. 1081 ff.) has already somewhat modified his position: see Jahrbücher. I. c. 18 f., where I have also explained why the passage IV (vii). 2. 11 (cp. the note) is still important for this question although the whole chapter, to which it belongs, is spurious.

4 Cp. the note there (783).
of united Hellas, which would contradict all the rest of the *Politics*, is in the least discoverable in this passage.

On the subject of historical science Aristotle's notions are very defective; he is in truth still far removed from that 'which we ourselves have only learned to know within the last century, that which Turgot and Lessing intended by the improvement and education of humanity, and Hegel defined as its organic development.' He altogether mistook the true importance of labour, 'the mightiest lever in this process.' Yet it would be going too far to deny him all insight into the course of development of the Greek nation from the state of nature to the state of civilization, and from one grade of civilization to another, or into the features of this progress stamped upon the history of the Greek constitutions. We are set right on this point by a brief but especially interesting part of the discussion on monarchy (III. 15 §§ 10—13), when taken in connexion with similar passages further on. 'Aristotle has not simply observed for himself the career of the separate states; he knows that they have also a common constitutional history: that a definite order of polity belongs to an entire period: that the same development of mental culture, of social and military organisation, is accomplished all through a group of connected states and causes their political relations to assume an homogeneous form. And so he depicts with a few masterly strokes the chief stages of development through which the political world of Hellas passed.' The first development embraces the normal constitutions as far as Polity: the second, in another order, the degenerate forms as far as democracy: the former carrying us to restrained, and the latter to unrestrained, popular supremacy. The main character of both periods is republican. In the first of them Monarchy is only a starting-point, as has been said, for Aristocracy and Polity; in the second Tyranny is only a stage in the transition to Democracy.

Any one who has followed the order of our work up to this point will be bound to admit that the description of the ideal Aristocracy, or the normal and absolutely best constitution, can now no longer be deferred. If so, then the two books containing it, which have come down to us as the seventh and eighth, should according to Aristotle's design follow directly as the fourth and fifth. Now the last chapter of Book III, c. 18, forms an immediate transition to this description, breaking off with an unfinished sentence, which is repeated in another

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1 Oncken II. 169, cp. 137 f.
2 Cp. the notes on III. 14 § 12 (627), 15 § 11, § 12 (662), § 13 (663).
3 Henkel op. c. 94. But certainly this description leaves much to be desired, as may be gathered from Oncken's remarks. Cp. also the notes on III. 15 §§ 11—13.
4 Henkel op. c. 96 f.
form at the beginning of the seventh book of the old order\textsuperscript{1}, but with an apodosis here added and the sense complete as follows: 'He who would investigate wherein the best constitution consists must first determine what is the best life'—since on Aristotle's view of the end of the state the one serves as an aid to the other\textsuperscript{2}. And this circumstance loses none of its weight by the fact that this transition can hardly be by Aristotle himself, but by the author of the older edition. For even then it shows (see above, p. 17) that he at all events found the seventh and eighth books still arranged correctly as the fourth and fifth.

It can hardly be maintained that the discussion contained in the first chapter of the seventh or, more correctly, the fourth book, as to where that best and most desirable life, the life of happiness, is to be sought, is not by Aristotle: but while appropriate to his oral lectures, as was remarked above (p. 12), it is to all appearance very foreign to this written work\textsuperscript{3}. And this is no less true of the treatment of a second preliminary question which follows in close connexion, in cc. 2 and 3 and the beginning of c. 4; namely, whether capacity in war or in peace is more desirable for the state, and in particular whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific inquirer is the happier for the individual. Further, the way in which this subject is settled or rather left unsettled is quite unlike Aristotle\textsuperscript{4}. To the genuine Aristotle this is no preliminary question, but the really fundamental problem of his whole ideal of the state. 'The one side of it he has himself settled with the most desirable clearness when describing his ideal, IV (vii). 14. 10 ff., in such a way that he at the same time lays down the principles for the solution of the second and much more difficult question, which is really the cardinal problem of his whole practical philosophy.

For here no less than in what follows\textsuperscript{5}, as in the \textit{Ethics} and \textit{Metaphysics}\textsuperscript{6}, he ranks the theoretical life above the life of practical politics, and yet he considers the individual to be merely one living member of that corporate body the state: and the reconciliation of this antithesis can only be found in a political life which itself regards the promotion of art and science as its highest and ultimate aim\textsuperscript{7}. This.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} In the text both versions will be found at the commencement of Book IV (vii).
  \item \textsuperscript{3} See the notes on IV (vii). 1 § 2, § 10 (704), §§ 13, 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} See the notes on IV (vii). 2 §§ 3—6, § 11 (725), § 16 (729); 3 §§ 3, § 6 (741), § 8 (743), § 9 (745), § 10: 4 § 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{5} IV (vii). 15 §§ 8—10, V (viii). c. 3, c. 5 §§ 4 with \textit{nn.} (1023, 1024) §§ 12—14.
  \item \textsuperscript{6} Cp. the notes on IV (vii). 14 § 8 (903), 15 § 2 (921); V (viii). 2 § 1 (977); also on c. 3 §§ 5 (991, 992), 5 § 10 (1003), and Excursus I upon Bk. V (viii).
  \item \textsuperscript{7} See the passages quoted by Zeller ii 614 u. 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{7} Cp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (viii).
\end{itemize}
is really the fundamental thought of Aristotle’s ideal state, but we nowhere find it worked out; nor could the editor to whom we must attribute the section in question, cc. 2, 3. He would not else have attempted in his clumsy manner, unlike Aristotle’s\(^1\), to solve the problem and fill up the lacuna which he had rightly perceived to exist. This circumstance shows then, either that Aristotle stopped short on the very threshold of his description of the ideal state, or else that his continuation of it, which has not come down to us, had disappeared remarkably early.

With the fourth chapter the outline of this best constitution really begins. Aristotle sets out with the external conditions, treating first of the natural conditions, of the land and the people (cc. 4—7); then of the social and socio-political conditions, the exclusion of the citizens from all work for a livelihood, the proper division of the soil, the proper qualifications and position of the cultivators, the regulations for the building of the city, its small towns and villages (cc. 9—12). Here at length begins the internal development of the best constitution: yet by the end of Bk. v (viii), it has advanced no further than its first stage, the education of the boys, in the middle of which it comes to a dead stop, so that the third of the three questions proposed in the last chapter—namely whether melody or rhythm is of greater importance for the purposes of musical instruction—is never discussed at all, and the question what sorts of time are to be employed for the same purposes remains undecided\(^2\). We may at all events be thankful to fate for sparing us a section of the work, which is rich in interest for the science of education in all ages, though it fails to satisfy our curiosity as to the further organisation of the ideal state. Some compensation for the deficiency in this direction is afforded by many observations not merely, as has been said before, in Bk. II, but also in Bk. III. Thus in the latter we learn how this or that ought to be regulated in the state, or sometimes even how it should be in the best state or the best constitution, or in the Aristocracy\(^3\). And Aristotle’s many previous intimations\(^4\),

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1. See the notes on IV (vii). 1 § 10 (705); 2 § 6 (717); 3 § 3 (736), §§ 8—10.

Even William of Moerbeke writes at the end of his translation: *residuum huinis operis in gree noundum invent.* Of older scholars Conring in particular endeavoured to determine more accurately the parts missing; of the moderns more especially Hildenbrand (op. c. 449 fol.), who at the same time refutes, most successfully in the main, the arguments by which others have in vain sought to show that the deficiency does not exist or is at any rate unimportant. So too Zeller op. c. 11 ii 676 f., 736 ff. Compare further Spengel Ueb. die Pol. des Arist. 8 foll.

3. See III. 1 §§ 9, 10 nn. (440, 441); 4 §§ 4: 5 n. (471); n. (491) on 4 § 16; 5 §§ 2, 3 n. (504); 5 n. (509); 7 § 3 nn. (536, 537); 11 §§ 8, 9 n. (560); 13 §§ 8, 9 n. (595); 11, 12 n. (599), §§ 24, 25; 15 §§ 4—6, 9, 10; 16 §§ 2—12; 17 §§ 1, 2; c. 18 with the notes.

4. 1. 13. 15 with n. (126)—cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6 n. (285)—II. 9 § 1, 10 § 9 n. (368).
taken along with other considerations, give us at least partly to understand what portions are wanting.

When we consider the very high mission of culture with which Aristotle's ideal state is entrusted in the promotion of the sciences, and the preference which Aristotle expressly concedes to the education of the intellect over that of the character, it is surprising that he takes up the whole of early education until the twenty-first year with gymnastic and military exercises, so as to leave no more than three years, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth, for all the other subjects of instruction. Moreover one of them, music, is so limited that an influence upon the formation of character, or very little else, is all that is left to it. Besides this, only reading, writing, numeration, and drawing are noticed; and this short course of three years will be wholly taken up with them. Hence we cannot look for more advanced scientific instruction, and even poetry can scarcely be employed for anything further than learning to read and write, or getting by heart lyric pieces to sing. The exclusion of comedy, moreover, and of all connected kinds of poetry, from the domain of youth is expressly mentioned iv (vii). 17. 11; and the same holds of all music with a 'cathartic' effect, v (viii). 7. 3 ff.

On this analogy it can scarcely be doubted that the exclusion must be assumed to apply in general to all the kinds of poetry to which solely this sort of effect is ascribed by Aristotle, that is, to epos and tragedy as well as to comedy: and that Aristotle wished to restrict attendance at the theatre and the recitals of the rhapsodes to grown-up persons, or at any rate not to allow them to young men until after their seventeenth year. Thus the use made of poetry for the education of the young in Aristotle's ideal state could hardly go beyond a mere chrestomathy from Homer, Hesiod, perhaps also from a few tragedies and easy prose writers, in learning to read and write. But Aristotle states, iv (vii). 15. 9, v (viii). 3. 13, that the education of the body must form the commencement, while the moral education must advance within the soul, from which we indirectly learn that a chapter on

iv (vii). 5 § 2; 10 § 10, § 14; 16 § 12; 17 § 12—cp. 17 § 5 § 7: v (viii). 3 § 10—cp. 7 § 3; 6 §§ 15, 16. Cp. also the note on v (viii). 2 § 2 (979). On 11. 6 § 14, 111. 3 § 6 foll. see below.

1 See iv (vii). 14. 8 foll. n. (603), 15 § 8 and generally the passages quoted on p. 48 n. 5.

2 See v (viii). 4 §§ 7—9 with Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. v (viii).

3 See v (viii). 5 §§ 4—7 with nn. (1024-5-7); § 15 foll. nn. (1044, 1045); 6 § 1 ff. nn. (1061-2-7-8, 1071-3); 7 § 3 ff. nn. (1086-7, 1098, 1104-5-9); also the Excursuses i, ii, iii, iv at the end of Bk. v (viii).

4 Zeller op. c. II ii 737 should be corrected by this.

5 Cp. v (viii). 6 § 9 with n. (1073); also nn. on 7 § 4 and Excursus v at the end of Bk. v (viii).

6 See the Introduction to my edition of the Poetics pp. 8 f., 15, 64 f.
SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION WAS INTENDED TO FOLLOW. AND THE QUESTION, HOW FAR THE 'HIGHER' SCIENCES ARE TO BE CONSIDERED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES, IS ASSUREDLY NOT PROPOSED, V (VIII). 2. 2, IN ORDER TO REMAIN UNANSWERED. LASTLY, IN V (VIII). 3. 10, A LATER INVESTIGATION IS EXPRESSLY ANNOUNCED TO DECIDE WHETHER ONE OR MORE SUBJECTS SHOULD BELONG TO THE MORE REFINED TRAINING WHICH AIDS AT THE HIGHEST INTELLECTUAL SATISFACTION; BUT IN THE ACCOUNT WHICH HAS COME DOWN TO US WE SEEK IN VAIN FOR THE FULFILMENT OF THIS PROMISE. ON THE OTHER HAND EVERY DIRECT INFLUENCE IN THIS DIRECTION IS EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED FROM THE BOYS' EDUCATION UP TO THEIR TWENTY-FIRST YEAR, V (VIII). 5. 4. HENCE WE MAY INFERR FROM HIS OWN WORDS THAT ARISTOTLE, LIKE PLATO, INTENDED A LATER TRAINING IN THE HIGHER SCIENCES FOR STATE PURPOSES TO FOLLOW THIS LOWER EDUCATIONAL COURSE; AND THIS WOULD FURNISH THE SOLUTION OF THE RIDDLE. EVEN AS TO THE SUBJECTS OF THIS HIGHER INSTRUCTION ARISTOTLE CAN HARDLY HAVE THOUGHT DIFFERENTLY FROM PLATO, EXCEPT THAT PERHAPS HE ADDED POETRY; PURE MATHEMATICS, HOWEVER, ASTRONOMY, THE THEORY OF MUSIC, AND LASTLY, FOR NATURES MOST SCIENTIFICALLY ENDOURED, PHILOSOPHY PROPER, WERE CERTAINLY THE MEANS OF INSTRUCTION ENJOINED. THERE IS AMPLE TIME FOR THEM, AS THE ACTIVE DUTIES OF FULL CITIZENS DO NOT BEGIN UNTIL MILITARY SERVICE IS OVER, IV (VII). 9 § 5 f, 14 § 5; AND NO ONE WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR A CIVIL MAGISTRACY MUCH BEFORE HIS FIFTIETH YEAR, EVEN IF HE ENTERS THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY EARLIER, 9 § 9 n. THUS THEIR SERVICE IN THE ARMY LEAVES THE YOUNGER MAN LEISURE FOR SCIENTIFIC STUDIES. ONLY ARISTOTLE MUST HAVE MAINTAINED, IN OPPOSITION TO PLATO, THAT THIS EXTENDED COURSE SHOULD BE DIFFERENT FOR PRACTICAL MINDS AND FOR THOSE WHOSE BENT IS MORE TOWARDS THEORY; IN ORDER TO MAKE OF THE FORMER OFFICIALS FOR THE STATE, AND OF THE LATTER ITS MEN OF SCIENCE, WHO IN OTHER RESPECTS MAY, AND INDEED OUGHT TO REST SATISFIED WITH THE FULFILMENT OF THEIR GENERAL CIVIC DUTIES.

IN THIS PARTICULAR ARISTOTLE APPROACHED THE MODERN IDEA OF THE STATE MORE NEARLY THAN ANY OTHER ANCIENT THINKER. YET WHEN LOOKED AT IN THE LIGHT OF HIS OWN PREMISES THIS SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM CANNOT BE SAID TO BE ALTOGETHER HAPPY. IF IN THE BEST STATE THE BEST MAN IS TO BE AT THE SAME TIME THE BEST CITIZEN AND STATESMAN; IF MOREOVER SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY

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1 Zeller op. c. 11 ii 737 n. 4.
2 See nn. on 11. 5. 25 (181), IV (VIII). 17. 15 (970).
3 No previous enquirer has thought of this. Oncken alone felt the difficulty, but did not also see that with the means at our disposal the veil may be sensibly lifted. See next note.
4 This disposes for the most part of Oncken's objections op. c. 11 204 ff., 218 f. He does not see that it is only in the instruction in practical music and in gymnastic that Aristotle maintains a mean which must not be exceeded; he never says a word to the effect that in the sciences also one can learn too much: see Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. V (VIII).
5 See the note on IV (VIII). 3. 8 (743).
6 See III. c. 4 with the notes on § 1 (468). § 5 (471), § 16 (491); c. 5; 18 § 1.
is to be the higher, moral and practical excellence the lower, part of
human virtue; then the only logical consequence is Plato's govern-ment
by philosophers—which, taken in itself, Aristotle rightly rejects, π. 5. 25\(^1\).

The chapters on the education of the boys are incomplete: this
theory of the subsequent higher training of our future citizens, as well
as the discussion on female education which was expressly promised
1. 13. 15 (cp. π. 11. 9 §§ 5, 6)\(^2\), is wanting. We lack too the entire regu-
lations for the external life of children and adults whether men or
women,—or in other words the whole of civic discipline; for Aris-
totle no less than Plato conceived the state to be an educational
institution. As a necessary consequence, he took this discipline and
moral guidance through the whole of life to be simply a continued
course of education\(^3\), and both alike to be the proper field of state-
activity. Almost all the other intimations of Aristotle, to which we find
nothing corresponding in the execution, relate to this comprehensive
subject. One special division which he mentions π. (vii). 16 §§ 12, 13,
17 § 12 (comp. 17 §§ 5, 7, 10), is the superintendence of the morals of
the boys and their education under Inspectors (παιδονόμοι), officers
appointed on the Spartan precedent\(^4\). They are to have their official
quarters near the gymnasium for the young, π. (vii). 12. 5: to take
care that no stories unseemly to their age are told to children even
under five years of age, c. 17 § 5; and that they have as little as
possible to do with the slaves, § 7. They have also to take precau-
tions that no improper statues or pictures are exposed to view within
sight of the children (§ 10), from whom even the paintings of a Pauson
with their comical and satirical exhibitions of what is low and hateful
must be kept at a distance: π. (viii). 5. 21\(^5\). In this part of the work
too we were to have been more precisely informed what habit of body
in the parents is best adapted to give them healthy offspring\(^6\); whether
comedies should be exhibited, and the recital of satirical poems (e.g.
\(\tauαυβατοι\)) allowed, and in what manner; perhaps also how far drinking

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\(^1\) See the note on π. 11. 5. 25 (182); Nic. Eth. vi. 7, 7 (vi. 8 144 b 14 ff.) Metaph. 1. 1. 11 ff. (681 a 12 ff.).

\(^2\) See the notes on both passages (126-7), (285).

\(^3\) Nic. Eth. x. 9, 9, 1180 a 1 ff. This is not expressly stated in the Politics; but the same thought forms the basis of
the remarks in π. (vii). 12 §§ 4—6; 17 §§ 9, 8, as Zeller op. c. π. 11 ii 739 n. 4 rightly reminds us. Cp. nn. on π. (vii),
12 § 5 (863), 17 § 9 (972).


\(^5\) See the notes on π. (vii). 12 § 5, 16 § 12, 17 § 5, § 10, § 12; π. (vii). 5 § 21.

parties of adults are to be countenanced, IV (vii). 17. 12. Inspectors for the women (γυναικοφόρου) are also mentioned along with the inspectors of boys as officials in aristocracies, VI (iv). 15. 13, VII (vi). 8. 23: they certainly ought not to be absent from the true Aristocracy. We can hardly be wrong in assuming that on the decision of these two boards of officers the exposure or rearing of new-born infants depended; and that for the purpose of maintaining the same fixed number of citizens they were authorized, nay were bound, to enforce abortion if necessary; II. 6. 10 ff., IV (vii). 16. § 15, § 17.

This unalterable number of citizens is bound up with the equally unalterable number of inalienable and indivisible family properties, IV (vii). 10. 11, of which, as in Plato’s Laws, each citizen holds two, one near the town, and one further off in the country towards the boundaries of the territory. This indicates a second treatment of the same subject, comprising the more accurate discussion of property in general and of national wealth which was expressly promised, IV (vii). 5. 2; and here the propriety of the provisional definition of national wealth adopted in the passage just cited should have been submitted to a second and more detailed examination. Here also a place would no doubt be found for explaining more fully the reasons promised IV (vii). 10 § 10, § 14, why Aristotle was induced to adopt συνσίτια; why it is better to promise and grant freedom to serfs and slaves as a reward for good conduct; together with the discussion of their general treatment announced in this passage; also the consideration of the question postponed in II. 10. 9, as to what means it may be expedient to tolerate in order to prevent an increase of population beyond the limits fixed.

But there is an explicit proof, that even the political organization of the ideal state was to be treated in detail. In one passage, II. 8. 25, the more precise solution of the question whether and under what conditions and at whose instance changes in the established laws are admissible is left over for further consideration. What sort of restrictions Aristotle wished to introduce in this respect we cannot tell: it is only certain that, while he did not allow the popular assembly the initiative, he yet made every new law dependent upon their consent.

1 Zeller, op. c. II ii 739 n. 3, assumes a discussion on this last point to be promised. The context does not appear to me to warrant this: see the note there.
2 See the notes there.
3 The usage was somewhat different, though still analogous, at Sparta: see n. on IV (vii). 16. 15.
4 See the notes there; also II. 7. 5 with n. (236).
5 Cp. the notes on II. 6. 15, IV (vii). 10. 11.
6 Cp. the note on IV (vii). 5. 2.
7 Cp. the notes there.
8 Cp. n. on II. 10. 9 (368).
9 Cp. the note there, (278).
10 Of course constitutional changes are not permissible if it is seriously meant that this constitution is in all points absolutely the best.
Moreover, the powers of the popular assembly were but limited even in this limited of all communities, composed of men not under thirty-five\(^1\) nor yet over seventy years of age. Apart from the election of magistrates they were not to extend much beyond the acceptance or rejection, without further debate or amendment, of treaties, and of peace or war, as previously determined upon and proposed by the senate and the highest magistrates\(^2\). Yet on the other hand popular courts of justice on the Athenian model were to decide charges brought against magistrates during the time of their accountability\(^3\). Equal in birth, in landed estate, in immunity from all remunerative or productive labour\(^4\), and in respect of a public education from their seventh year\(^5\), all citizens of this state enjoy equal rights. Any qualified citizen may, it seems, vote for any other for any magistracy, such a civic body being credited with the intelligence and good will to nominate to each branch of the government the persons most suitable on the ground of the distinctions in capacity and training which, in spite of equal circumstances, have manifested themselves\(^6\). But Aristotle certainly did not intend to leave undecided at what precise age the entrance upon full citizenship was to take place; nor again at what age men were superannuated, and upon retiring became priests, IV (vii). 9, 9, whereby almost entire leisure for science was secured to them in their old age\(^7\). The figures 50 and 70 which have been tentatively assumed will at least be not far removed from his view; and thus this governing civic body will be considerably in the minority when compared with the total number of citizens superannuated or not yet fully qualified, the boys, younger men, and the aged of the citizen order\(^8\). Only foreigners and resident aliens are allowed to engage in trade, industry, or manual labour; a pro-

\(^1\) See nn. on IV (vii). 9 § 9, 16 § 9.

\(^2\) This follows from II. 11, 6, III. 11, 8 n., taken in connexion with the other passages quoted in Exc. IV at the end of Bk. II.

\(^3\) This may be inferred from II. 12, 5, III. 11, 8: see notes there; also Exc. V at the end of Bk. II. But Aristotle might have required that the jurors in these courts should be elected instead of being chosen by lot; see II. 11, 7 n. (391).

\(^4\) II. 9 § 2 ff., 11 § 10: III. 5 § 2 n. (504); § 3, § 5 n. (509): IV (vii). 9 § 1, § 3 f., § 9; 10 § 13; 12 § 4: V (viii). 2 §§ 3—6 n. (982); 4 § 1 n. (1004); 5 § 8 n. (1028); 6 § 4 ff.; § 16; 7 § 1 with notes. Cp. also Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (viii); n. on I. 11, 6 (103) with the passages there quoted.


\(^6\) See I. 7 § 1 n. (58 b): III. 1 §§ 9, 10 n. (449, 441), 11 §§ 2 ff., 13 § 9 n. (505), 16 § 2 n. (672), § 13; 17 §§ 1, 2: IV (vii). 8 § 4; 9 §§ 7, 8; 13 § 9 n. (885), 14 § 5: VI (iv). 11 § 8: also II. 2 §§ 6, 7, and cp. the notes on II. 2, 4 (133) and III. 13, 12. Other passages seem to contradict this, as II. 2 § 2 ff. § 4 n. (133); III. 4 § 5 n. (471); 5 § 10; 6 §§ 1, 2; 7 §§ 1, 2; 15 §§ 8—10; 18 § 1: but see the notes: also n. on IV (vii). 9, 9.

\(^7\) Because old men are no longer of service for government II. 9, 25. See the note there and on IV (vii). 9, 9 (816).

\(^8\) Cp. n. on IV (vii). 9, 9 (817).
hition which strikes a severe blow at the cultivation of the imitative arts, that is, at the fine arts. The soil is to be cultivated by serfs who are not free, or at all events by vassals of non-Hellenic descent who are but half free.

But, while emphatically not a conquering military power any more than a trading community, this state with its one aim of culture makes the largest concessions possible in both these directions. It is to be a maritime state, iv (vii). 6. 1 ff., as well as, like Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, to exercise an hegemony; that is, to stand at the head of a more or less dependent confederation, in which union has been achieved, if necessary, with the edge of the sword. In this way Aristotle thinks that the peculiar spirit and core of Athenian social and political life, that wonderfully noble union of manliness with culture, has been best preserved and promoted by a partial fusion with Spartan forms. He may even have counted on the tribute of the allies to fill the treasury. Otherwise it is not easy to see why, after the wise regulation that only a part of the soil should be broken up into family properties, the rest being reserved as domain land, only the expenditure upon public worship and the common messes, not that upon any other state function, is taken into account when he comes to deal with the revenue from this domain land, iv (vii). 9. 7. 'The messes (συσκίτα) are with Aristotle, as they were at Sparta, at once common meals and military unions. Some of them are to be held in the guard-houses inside the city wall. All boards of officials have their messes, each in its own official quarters: so, too, the priests; even the rangers and field-patrols in the country. The rule of a common mess-table is binding on all collective members of the political body corporate.' In particular from them springs that voluntary communism which Aristotle praises in the Spartans, and the entry into them was undoubtedly to begin with enlistment amongst the recruits at the age of seventeen. Later on, but yet hardly before the training of these recruits is completed with their twenty-first year, they are also per-

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1 Even vocal and instrumental virtuosi in music are classed with manual labourers (ἀρχαίοι), v (vii). 58 ff., n. (1028) b, 6, 4 ff., §§ 15, 16; 7 § 6: comp. Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. v (vii).
2 iv (vii). 9 § 8, 10 § 13.
3 ['Culture-state'; one which exists to promote the higher civilization: see p. 48. Tr.]
4 Cp. notes on iv (vii). c. 6.
6 Cp. Schömann op. c. pp. 272, 279

Eng. tran., Triebcr op. c. 1—26.
7 iv (vii). 12. 1.
8 iv (vii). 13 §§ 2, 7. 8.
9 Oncken op. c. II. 198.
10 II. 5. 5 ff., iv (vii). 10. 9, cp. II. 5 §§ 15, 16, with notes, also the notes on ii. 5. § 6 (156b), 7 n. (158): also vii (vii). 5. 10 with note.
11 V (vii). 4. 9, cp. Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. v (vii).
12 See on iv (vii). 17. 11 n. (966).
13 iv (vii). 17. 15.
mitted to attend drinking-parties\(^1\) and there to sing,—which under all other circumstances is strictly prohibited to adults\(^2\); further to visit the theatre and musical and poetical entertainments of all kinds\(^3\).

From the foregoing it is also clear now that the passages to which we are referred in ii. 6 §§ 12, 13, are still extant\(^4\), but that more precise explanations ought to follow. Similarly the promise of future discussions upon the size of the town and the question whether it is essential that the citizens should be of the same descent, iii. 3 § 6, is fulfilled as far as the first part is concerned in iv (vii). c. 4; but the second part was scarcely to be dismissed with merely the subsequent remark viii (v). 3 § 11 f.; it was no doubt to be more thoroughly discussed in the examination of the absolutely best constitution\(^5\).

It appears to us, it was remarked before (p. 46), not so easy to understand how the resident alien of Stageira, the great realist, the friend of the Macedonian kings under whose spear the last energies of Greek life were bleeding away, was still Greek and Athenian enough to dream of the possibility that the ‘nobility of mankind,’ the Greek nation, had yet to wait for the future to produce its noblest race, who alone would be one day capable of creating this pattern state, iv (vii). c. 7. More intelligible, but all the more repulsive, is it to note how Aristotle sets about the propagation of this noblest of civic bodies, in true Spartan or Platonic fashion\(^6\), by tyrannical marriage-laws and matrimonial supervision and inhuman exposure of children, as if he were raising a breed of race-horses: to see the successful defender of the family and of property, who investigates with admirable profundity the moral nature of marriage\(^6\), at the same time hampering and almost stifling the free use of property and of the mental faculties, and destroying the healthy vital atmosphere of marriage. And this by measures which, as we have said (p. 34), go far beyond those of Plato in the Laws, by fixing a normal number of children which the whole body of citizens are permitted to have and sanctioning abortion in order to secure that the number is never exceeded.

**VIII. The Pathology of the Existing Constitutions.**

The opening words of the sixth book—Bk. iv. in the old order—are in their most suitable connexion when following directly upon the

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\(^1\) iv (vii). 17. 11.  
\(^2\) v (viii). 5 § 8, 6 § 4 with notes: cp. n. on iv (vii). 17. 11 (966). No weight can be given to v (viii). 7. 13 f., as the passage is conjectured to be spurious;  
\(^3\) iv (vii). 17. 11.  
\(^4\) Cp. n. on ii. 6. 14.  
\(^5\) Cp. n. on iii. 3. 6.  
\(^6\) Cp. Exc. i at the end of Bk. ii.
description of the ideal state. The task of Politics, we read, is not simply confined to an examination of the absolutely (απλος) best constitution. It equally includes the determination of what is best on the average (ταις πλειονθες πολεμιοι); and of the best constitution under the given circumstances (εκ των υπαρχοντων), or in other words the best for a given people or a given population. If finally it happens that even this last is out of the question, political science has to treat of the best possible form of some worse constitution; and hence must investigate all possible species and even sub-species of constitutions. The third book, for example, spoke of democracy and oligarchy; this is now corrected by the statement that there are several subordinate varieties of both. But while those fundamental distinctions of the third book are again resumed, we are expressly told in c. 2 that the first problem has already been solved by an account of the absolutely best constitution, or, what is the same thing, of monarchy and aristocracy proper; thus only the remaining normal constitutions and their corruptions have still to be discussed. The order in which these stand is as follows: mixed or so-called Aristocracies, Polity (Πολιτεια), Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny. The problems to be solved are as follows; to determine (1) how many subordinate kinds of constitutions there are; (2) what is on the average the best constitution; (3) for what different sorts of people the different forms are adapted; (4) how we ought to set to work in regulating each form of democracy and of oligarchy; and, last of all, (5) what are the causes which overthrow and the means to preserve the various constitutions. Thus, first of all, we here find from Aristotle himself an express corroboration of the view that the seventh and eighth books (old order) came fourth and fifth in the work as he wrote it: and in c. 7 § 2, he once more repeats the same declaration, that the absolutely best constitution discussed in those books alone deserves to be called Aristocracy in the strict sense of the word; just as the interpolator of c. 3 § 4, refers to this part of the work under the name of the "discussions on Aristocracy" (ἐν τοις περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν), and so must still have had the original order before him. In the next place the order given in the above arrangement is adhered to most strictly in the exposition which follows.

For setting aside c. 3 and c. 4 §§ 1—19, which certainly do not contradict this procedure, but, as was just remarked, can hardly be by

1 aί ὄνομαζομεναι ἀριστοκρατίαι vi (iv).
2 See the note on vi (iv). 1, 4 (1116).
3 See the notes on vi (iv). 3 § 1, § 2,

9. 10: see note on vi (iv), 2. 4.
10: see note on vi (iv). 1, 4 (1116).
Aristotle himself, there is, first, an enumeration (1) in c. 4 §§ 20—31 of the four varieties of Democracy and at the beginning of c. 5, §§ 1—3, of the four varieties of Oligarchy passing from one resembling Polity to one which approaches Tyranny; then, c. 6, it is shown why there can only be four varieties for each of these two constitutions: next follows a discussion of mixed or spurious Aristocracy in its two varieties, when mixed with democratic and oligarchical, or merely with democratic elements, c. 7; cc. 8, 9, treat of the constitution most nearly allied to this last, Polity (Πολιτεία) or equal combination of Oligarchy and Democracy; and c. 10 of Tyranny and the forms in which it blends with Monarchy. Then (2) c. 11 presents Πολιτεία in its character as the rule of the well-to-do middle class, as the best constitution on the average. The next investigation (3) breaks off unfinished in § 5 of c. 121: the passage which follows (12 §§ 6, 13 § 1—11), i.e. all the following chapter except § 12, does not belong to this subject but to the regulation of Polity: had it been more correctly edited it would have been worked into c. 9 to which I would transpose it. Only one circumstance is out of harmony: in the order which has come down to us, (5) the theory of revolutions and the safeguards of constitutions does not come last of all, but takes up the whole of (old) Bk. v, while (4) the regulation of the different forms of Democracy and Aristocracy does not appear till the first four chapters of (old) Bk. vi. The last three chapters of (old) Bk. iv, cc. 14—16, are taken up with fundamental considerations of a general kind on the regulation and organization of all possible constitutions, except Monarchy, Tyranny, and true Aristocracy, according to each of the three authorities in the state. Thus the deliberative or decreeing body is treated in c. 14, the administrative body or the organisation of the officials and magistrates in c. 15, the judicial power in c. 16. In accordance with this it has been proposed to transpose the (old) Sixth Book before the (old) Fifth, so that the former becomes the (new) Seventh and the latter the (new) Eighth: and this order has been followed in the text2. If it is right

1 See the note there, (1315).
2 Hildebrandt op. c. p. 372 ff. defends the received order here by saying that Aristotle intended to lay down in VI (IV), cc. 14—16 the elements of the constitutions and then in the first place in Book V of the old order, went on to describe their practical working, because upon this depends the right combination of the elements which follow in the (old) Book VI. Zeller on the other hand op. c. 11 ii 675 ff., evidently with the right view that thus to interlace questions (4) and (5) directly contradicts Aristotle's express announcement above, makes this whole announcement refer only to the contents of Books IV and V of the old order: in these two books Aristotle, as he thinks, gives a complete discussion of the theory of the imperfect constitutions with regard to their general underlying principles; in the (old) Book VI he adds a more special exposition. I have explained in the Jahrb. f. Philol. ci. 1870. 343—346, 349 ff. why
it must certainly be assumed that the four references back to the (old) Fifth Book which we find in the (old) Sixth do not, at least in their present form, belong to Aristotle, but at the earliest to the author of the later edition which has come down to us. One of them, vii (vi). 4. 15, is in fact so little suited to its context that it at once proclaims itself to be a spurious insertion. Two of the others, vii (vi). i § 1 and i § 10, may be removed, at least without much harm, on the same grounds. But the fourth, vii (vi). 5. 2, is so firmly embedded in the context that there is no resource but to assume that the interpolator has changed the future, which Aristotle himself used here, into the past; an assumption quite as possible for the third passage as that of an interpolation. The two parts of the work thus moved into immediate proximity—the three concluding chapters of Bk. vi (iv) and the first seven chapters of Bk. vii (vi)—then become the general and particular parts of the same discussion. But we miss the account, promised at the beginning of Bk. vii (vi), of the possible combinations which may arise when in one and the same state the several political authorities are regulated according to the principles of different constitutions, vii (vi). 1. 3 f. Nor is this the only defect. In the eighth and last chapter of Bk. vii (vi) the theory of the organization of the executive still remains a rough sketch, not yet worked out in detail. It certainly brings to a real solution a part of the questions merely proposed or mentioned provisionally in vi (iv). c. 16: but it contributes hardly anything towards a more thorough solution of a problem expressly mentioned there vi (iv). 15 § 14, as not yet satisfactorily solved; namely a discussion of the differences between magistrates in different constitutions; while it omits altogether any mention of the influence of the various departments of public business on the mode of election to different offices, which was also expressly promised there, vi (iv). 15. § 22. But these are inconsiderable defects, and if on the transposition

I cannot accept this solution: the main points of my explanation will be found with some modifications in the notes on vi (iv). 2 § 5 (1143), § 6 (1144).

1 See the note there (1424).

2 Only in the latter passage the δὲ which follows must be changed into δῆ, or else the whole of the following clause νυν δὲ τὰ δὲῳματα...λεγουσιν expunged.

3 See the note there, and Spengel Ueber die Politik 36 ff.

4 In that case the change of δὲ into δῆ, slight as it is, will be unnecessary.

5 See the note on vi (iv). 2. 6 (1144). Oncken, op. c. ii. 253, thinks these seven chapters contain nothing but repetitions of propositions enlarged upon long before; but this statement is not proved, and is quite incorrect.

6 E.g. the deliberative body and the election of magistrates on oligarchical, the lawcourts on aristocratical, principles. Cp. the last note (1488) at the end of Bk. vii (vi).

7 Cp. upon this point the more precise explanation in the note on vi (iv.) vi. 1 (1343).

8 Oncken l. c. complains of the way in which this sketch, modelled in its main features on the organization of the Attic
proposed this book, vii (vi), no longer forms the conclusion of the discussion on imperfect forms of the state it will be most obvious to treat them like other spaces left blank in the course of, and not at the end of, principal sections; where we have more reason to conjecture subsequent losses than to infer that the execution on Aristotle’s own part was deficient.

For the highly artistic construction of Book viii (v) it will be sufficient to refer to the Analysis; on the transpositions necessary even in this book, as well as on the spurious passages in all the books, to the Commentary. It would be superfluous to commend to the thoughtful reader the ripe political wisdom shown in the account of the forms of government actually established; and this eighth book in particular preeminently reveals the statesman. In his picture of the despot of the shrewder type who skilfully copies the genuine king, viii (v). 11. 17—34, it really looks as if he had anticipated with prophetic eye the second French Empire and the third Napoleon. Can these precepts on despotism (τυπάρρις) have actually been read by the latter and turned to account? That question no one perhaps is in a position to answer.

There is yet another fact which quite apart from this may be emphasized here. As Teichmüller especially has shown, Aristotle recognised even in his day the importance of the influence which the mode of life and the social relations of a nation exercise upon the form of its political development and of its constitution. Yet Zeller’s remarks, that he nevertheless does not speak of civil society as distinct from the state, and that the different principles of classification which he assigns for the forms of government will not quite blend into a unity, appear to be by no means completely answered by Teichmüller’s explanations. It is true that in πι. 5. 9 ff., iv (vii). 7 f., Aristotle draws a definite distinction between social relations and the political relations proper which

government, follows without any introduction upon what precedes. This is quite true, but he appears to overlook Δαι περι έκεινον ει τι λοιπόν, ον χειρόν έπισκέψαθαι in the announcement of the contents vii (vi). 1. 1, which points to a supplement with such additions; since in the execution it is the first four chapters that answer to the following words και των οικείων και των συμφέροντα προπον οποδούναι πρός ἐκάστην, but in reverse order. That the whole book is a regular medley of motley elements, which, although perhaps of the same date, certainly never stood in the same original connexion is therefore (see p. 59 n. 5) an ungrounded assertion. See the note on viii (vi). 1. 2 (1379 b).

1 [See also below, pp. 93 ff.]
2 Cp. Hildenbrand op. c. 469—486; Zeller op. c. ii ii 750; Oncken op. c. ii. 241—252; Henkel op. c. 91: Van der Kest op. c. 519 ff.
3 In Die aristotelische Eintheilung der Verfassungsformen 12 ff (St. Petersburg 1859, 8). Compare the review by Suesmühl Jahrb. f. Philol., cl. 1871 p. 137 sqq., from which is taken all of importance in what follows.
4 op. c. ii ii 699, 705 foll., 749.
in various ways depend upon them: vi (iv). 4 §§ 20—22, 6 §§ 1—3, 12 § 2; vii (vi). 4 §§ 1—3, 8—14; cp. iii. 12 § 7 f.; iv (vii). cc. 8, 9; vi (iv). cc. 3, 4. But he nowhere attributes to the former independent importance, or a separate province of their own: they are generally regarded only as the condition which is requisite in order that the life of the state may take this or that form. But this leaves the distinction imperfect. In general, where Aristotle discovers a new conception he also coins his own term for it, or at any rate remarks that there is as yet no appropriate word for it in Greek. But here, in keeping with this imperfection, there is no such remark with reference to civil society; but, as Teichmüller¹ himself quite rightly observes, the word 'city' or 'state' (πόλις) is sometimes used in a narrower sense to exclude the merely social elements, sometimes with a wider meaning to include them. Further, the distinction of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity, and so also amongst the degenerate forms, that of Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy, merely according to the number of the rulers (iii. 7. 2 f.), is certainly only provisional. Immediately afterwards (iii. c. 8, see above p. 38) it is described as something merely accidental in the case of Democracy and Oligarchy, which in the extreme case might even be absent, the real ground of the distinction being poverty and wealth. Indeed later on the mere distinction in number is, in the case of Aristocracy and Polity, completely abandoned. Even in the ideal Aristocracy the whole civic body rules itself; and although here, as was remarked above (p. 54), the real governing body of fully qualified citizens forms a minority of the whole number, yet one can see no reason why in a spurious Aristocracy the actual civic body must necessarily be a smaller number than in a Polity. Thus the only normal constitutions proper that remain are ideal Monarchy and ideal Aristocracy, see vi (iv). 7 § 2, 8 § 1; spurious Aristocracies and Polity only occupy the place of intermediate or transitional forms between the normal constitutions and their corruptions. The so-called Aristocracies are said to be mixed forms combining aristocratic with democratic elements or both with Oligarchy, vi (iv). 7 § 4, 8 § 9; why there should not also be among them combinations of aristocratic and oligarchical elements² without democratic admixture, is not quite clear. Polity appears as a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy: if this is the case, both these extremes, to which it is intermediate, must be considered to be perverted forms of it, instead of Oligarchy being a corruption of Aristocracy and Democracy of Polity, as was said at first (iii. 7. 1 foll.) and again repeated vi (iv). 8. 1. There are however even later passages

¹ l. c. 14 ff. ² See the note on vi (iv). 7. 4 (1238).
in which Oligarchy is defined as a corruption of Aristocracy; and his qualification of prevailing views, that it is the rule of the rich rather than of the minority, is in some measure ignored viii (v). 7. 1.1 In Polity then no aristocratic element is recognised; for the principle of Aristocracy is virtue or superior excellence², while the only excellence discoverable in Polity is superiority in war; III. 7. 4, comp. vi (iv). 13. 7 foll.³ This is just what Aristotle censures in Sparta, ii. 9. 34 f., iv (vii) 14 § 15 ff. (cp. 2 § 9); and consequently he ought not to have reckoned the Spartan constitution, as he does, with spurious aristocracies, but with Polities. But on the other hand how should Polities be counted amongst normal constitutions of even the second rank unless a certain excellence of the citizens was also required in them? Or is the public education, for which Sparta is praised, v (viii). 1. 44, to make the difference? But there was nothing of the sort at Carthage, and yet Aristotle classes the constitution there with aristocracies and not with Polities⁴. Again, the rule of the majority and of the minority is represented as quite indispensable to the notions of oligarchy and democracy, vi (iv). 4 §§ 5, 6; while in vii (v). 7 §§ 5—9, vi (iv). 7 § 4, 8 §§ 3 ff., Aristotle is made to adopt—at one moment to adopt and then at the next to contradict—a view which is altogether incompatible with such definitions, viz. that the mixed constitutions which incline more to democracy should be called Polities, and those which incline more to oligarchy, Aristocracies⁵. Such inconsistencies would certainly be too glaring even for a far less able thinker. They are not made a whit more intelligible by the fact that the conception of Oligarchy oscillates somewhat between a government of wealth, of birth, and of a minority: on the contrary they bear the clearest marks of interpolation⁶. But further: the best of the four varieties of democracy is a departure from Aristotle's conception of democracy, the government of the rich by the poor, for it represents both as sharing the government equally, vi (iv). 4. 22. Even the conception of a degenerate constitution as government in the interest of the governors is not at all applicable here, if we follow the description given in vii (vi). 4 §§ 1—7, nor yet in the case of the best and most moderate oligarchy. Thus both should be reckoned

1 See note there, and on viii (v). 7. 6 (1599).
2 See the note on iii. 7. 3 (536).
3 See the note on iii. 7. 4 (538).
4 So Nic. Eth. 1. 13. 3; 1102a 10 f., x. 9. 13, 1180a 29 ff.
5 Vi (iv). 7 § 4; ii, viii (v). 7 § 4 and also perhaps 12 § 15. In ii. 11 § 5 the expression is more hesitating.
6 It is a strange misconception of Oncken's cp. c. ii. 236 f., to attribute the propositions contained in vi (iv). 8 §§ 3, 4 to Aristotle himself, whereas in fact the whole chapter is written to refute them.
7 See the notes on vi (iv). 4 § 4 (1164); 7 § 4 (1238); vii (vi). 27 (1402): viii (v). 7. 6 (1599).
amongst the normal constitutions of the second class: and even the second and third varieties of oligarchy would have to be included with them as forming the lowest types of normal constitutions; since they are still governed by the laws, and so are constitutional, not arbitrary, governments. It is surprising how Teichmüller could overlook the fact that on his own showing, the social element—whether the predominating employment is agriculture and cattle-rearing, or trade and industry, or something intermediate, the pursuit of both equally—only suffices to distinguish three varieties of democracy, so that Aristotle is obliged to take other points of view in order to make out four. In the case of oligarchy the distinction, which Aristotle certainly makes, between the rich nobles and merchants or manufacturers who have made money, does not come into consideration to mark the distinction which he draws between the four varieties of this constitution. In place of it we have merely the ever increasing growth of wealth and its accumulation in fewer and fewer hands, and here again in the account which Teichmüller himself gives of these varieties this is precisely the case. In the whole scheme of the successive grades of constitutions from the Ideal Monarchy downwards, through the genuine and spurious Arisocracies, Polity, first Democracy, first Oligarchy, &c., down to the most extreme Democracy, then the most extreme Oligarchy (government by Dynasts), and finally Tyranny, this being the ultimate stage of development, there is no place where the historical forms of the monarchy could be fitted in. Lastly, from what precedes it is seen that the early and provisional statement of the relation of the constitutions to one another, III. c. 7, has not simply been modified by the further course of the discussions, but that in the end hardly any part of it is left standing; so that it may well be asked whether under these circumstances Aristotle was justified in putting it forward even provisionally. No doubt all these vacillations, inequalities, and contradictions, affect the husk rather than the core of Aristotle’s political theory: indeed a certain portion of them are by no means to be regarded as actual mistakes. The main supports of this political system are, that the unqualified principle of democracy and the absolute principle of oligarchy, the latter more even than the former, introduce the same sort of arbitrary government, which comes to a head in Tyranny—that a good middle class is the foundation of a healthy political life: and

1 Comp. Oncken op. c. II. 252, who however is not altogether right; he goes too far in maintaining that hence under certain conditions an oligarchy does not differ from an aristocracy, nor a democracy from a polity.
2 op. c. 18 f.
3 op. c. 20 f.
4 See n. on II. 10. 13.
5 See n. on vi (IV). 11. 21 (1305).
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their strength has outlasted the storms of centuries. Poets like Phocylides and Euripides (the latter with a political intention), had, it is true; sung the praise of the middle class; but Aristotle is the first thinker who makes the functions of the middle class in society and in politics the foundation of his practical political theories, and of his explanation of political history. His love of the mean in all things is nowhere so systematically and so consistently carried out as here.

He forcibly depicts the equalizing force of the well-to-do middle class and the permanence of the constitution where it is most strongly represented, that is, Politeia. The next best condition is one where it is at least as strong as one of the two contending extremes, rich and poor, and thereby is enabled to stave off the decisive victory of either. Even then it is possible to maintain, according to circumstances, either another Polity, or at least a law-abiding and moderate Democracy or Oligarchy, as the case may be. But where the middle class is weaker than either separately a perpetual struggle prevails between the two extremes, with never-ending revolutions, and the end is the fatal exhaustion of both: while Tyranny succeeds to their inheritance.

But the more essential the part played by Polity in the philosopher's political system, the more surprising does it appear that his remarks on this form of government cannot be combined in all their details into a consistent whole, a complete picture which shall be quite distinct. At one time he represents it as being in accordance with an aristocracy and a 'polity' to fill all offices by election, without a property qualification; in the case of polity, therefore, by no higher qualification than is generally requisite here for actual citizenship (iv). At another time however the application of the lot, either alone or accompanied by election with restriction of the right of voting or being voted for, (iv). is said to be characteristic of Polity. This contradiction may not be so important perhaps as at first sight appears; yet we are all the more surprised to find in the same chapter the restriction of the popular assembly to the mere election of the council and the magistrates represented as characteristic of Polity, (iv). and then to hear (§ 15) that usually in Polities the resolutions of the popular assembly may be annulled by the council and the questions which they affect brought before the former assembly again and again, until it passes a resolution conformably. In the same place exactly the opposite procedure is recommended as more just, and that, too, for Democracy:

1 See n. on VI (iv). 11. 9.
2 Oncken op. c. 11. p. 225.
3 Oncken op. c. 11. 227, 228.
4 See the note on VI (iv). 15. 21
5 See n. on VI (iv). 9. 5 (1255).
6 See n. on VI (iv). 14. 15 (1349).
thus then the latter, by adopting it, would become even better than the ordinary Polities. Must we here recognise another of those additions whereby the school obscured the master's work? Who again can fail to be surprised at the great concession which is made to unqualified popular rule and paid democracy, vi (iv) 9 § 2, 13 § 5, when Aristotle states that the combination of the two measures, payment of the poor for attendance in the popular assembly the council and the law-courts, and punishment of the rich for their non-attendance, is appropriate to Polity? It may be that he is thinking only of those Polities in which the middle class is not numerous enough to maintain a decided preponderance as compared with the two extreme parties, where consequently its deficiency must be artificially made good in this way. But this, to say the least, has never been expressly mentioned by Aristotle, and there is all the more reason to hold, that in the end he has approximated, much more than he himself believes, to unqualified government by the people, and that his Πολιτεία is nothing but Attic democracy without its unfavourable side. Aristotle himself remarks, III. 15. 13, that when once states have grown more populous and cities increased in size it is not easy to call into life any constitution except a democracy; and in vii (vi). 5 §§ 5, 6, that since then even the older moderate patriarchal democracy of peasant proprietors has come to an end. It is a result that he laments, but he is aware that it is unalterable. All that remains is so to shape the most advanced democracy itself that it may lose as far as may be its arbitrary, despotic character and wear the appearance of something like Πολιτεία. This may be done by regulating for the advantage of all the system of payment, which cannot be altogether avoided here, and by checking the demagogues in their practices of vexatious accusations. The detailed proposals which Aristotle makes in this direction vii (vi), 5 §§ 3—8, 6 § 4; viii (v). 8. 15 ff, 9 §§ 5—11 ff, prove his lively interest in this question. Oncken has well said: 'Either renounce freedom and equality, that is, the essential nature of the constitutional state in Hellas, and give up the community to the despotic rule of violent oligarchs; or make the whole civic body of legislators and judges, summon the rich to take honorary magistracies, compensate for the service which watching over them. It was

1 The practical proposals in vi (iv). 14 §§ 11—15, which Krohn refuses to attribute to Aristotle, would certainly not be missed, if omitted altogether.

2 As Onken thinks op. c. II. 239.

3 Nor can it be inferred from the following words in vi (iv). 13. § 7 on the amount of the property qualification in the Polity, to which Oncken appeals, if these words are rightly taken—see the note there (1269); and on 9 § 3 (1254).

4 With Oncken op. c. II. p. 240, though his assertions require considerable modification in accordance with what is stated in n. 4 on p. 41.

5 op. c. II. 259, 260.
"the only alternative which could be found. This once conceded, even "an opponent could not deny that the embodiment of the Athenian "spirit in Athens was without parallel in Hellas. With all its failings "it was the only state in which the political idea of the Hellenes at- "tained to complete expression, the community in which dwelt the "heart and soul of the Hellenic race; with whose power and liberty the "national life of Hellas became extinct. With deep dislike Aristotle "watches the great multitude in this mighty city reigning and ruling "like an all-powerful monarch; few there are whose observation traces "the mischiefs of its constitution so clearly to their causes. But the "idea of this state conquered even him. He investigated, observed, "described Athen, its history and its organization, as no one ever "did before him. The study which he devoted to it was the only "homage which he voluntarily paid it: no word of acknowledgment "escapes him. But throughout it receives from him involuntary hom- "age, since it is the only state whose actual life he could or did take "as a model for his own political design. He imagined himself stand- "ing as a physician at a sick bed; but the patient revealed, what no "healthy subject could teach him, the very idea of the Hellenic state."

IX. Date of the Work and its Assumed Connexion with the
Nicomachean Ethics.

"There are notices in the Politics of the Sacred War, viii. (v). 4. 7, "as of something in the past; of Phalaecus’ expedition to Crete, which "took place at the end of it, Ol. 108, 3 (B.C. 346)2, as a recent event, "νεωστὶ πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβεβηκέν εἰς τὴν νίκον, II. 10. 16: lastly, of "the assassination of Philip (B.C. 336), viii. (v). 10. 16, without any "intimation that it had but very lately happened. On the other hand "the passage II. 10. 16 appears to have been written before B.C. 333. The Politics as a whole must have been written later than the Nicomachean Ethics, which is quoted six times, II. 2 § 4; III. 9 § 3, 12 § 1; IV (vii). 13 §§ 5, 7; VI (iv). II. 3, and earlier than the Poetics which is announced as to follow in v (viii.) 7. 3."

1 In his Constitution of Athens in the

2 Diod. xvi. 62.
3 Cp. the note there (1673).
4 Zeller op. cit. II ii 154 n. (4).
5 See the note there (375).
6 See nn. on these passages.
7 Cp. the Introduction to my edition of the Poetics, p. 11f. Heitz’ objection (in Die verlorenen Schriften 99 ff.) there mentioned in n. 2 on p. 12 has in the meantime been answered in detail by Vahlen Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad. lvii. 1874. 293—298: he has made it tolerably certain that the chapter on κάθαρσις in question, which is now lost,
It must indeed be admitted, and has already occasionally been pointed out above, that a part of the inconsistencies in the work were, from Aristotle's general position, inevitable, nay even characteristic; that on the most careful revision he would never have detected them. Others again are such as might easily have escaped his notice. Yet after all, enough inconsistencies repetitions and other discrepancies remain to compel the inference that not only did Aristotle never give the finishing touches to this work, but that he must have been a long time over it, taking it up at intervals and with many interruptions through other works. In consequence of this he had altered his views on many points, and had not always the details of the earlier portions fully present to his mind when he came to write the later ones. The view here taken would be materially confirmed if the larger sections which are wanting were not really written, the work never having been completed as a whole.

It will be hardly possible to substantiate a well-grounded objection to the Aristotelian origin of the six citations of the Ethics, and yet that work itself calls the theory developed in it not Ethics but Politics, and the same title is confirmed by passages of the Poetics and Rhetoric. For the intermediate expression of the Rhetoric (1. 4. 5, 1359 b 10 f.), ἡ περὶ τὰ ἡθικὰ πολιτικὰ, is here our guide, by making Ethics and Politics in the narrower sense appear as parts of Politics in the wider sense. The matter is thus stated with perfect correctness by the author of the Magna Moralia at the commencement of his work, and Aristotle himself explains in the last chapter of the Ethics that a full realization of the principles laid down in it can only be expected from political education and legislation.

stood at the conclusion of the whole treatise after the discussion on Comedy, and not where I looked for it. Yet my remarks i. c. p. 8 still retain their force. 1 Comp. the notes on Bk. II. 4 § 4 (149); 5 §§ 1, 2 (153); § 14 (164); 6 § 15 (215), § 18 (220); 10 § 8 (366):

Bk. III. 4 § 5 (471), § 9 (478):

Bk. IV (VII). 13 § 4 (872), § 8 (881);

14 § 6 (899):

Bk. V (VIII). 3 § 6 (993), § 11 (1000);

$5$ § 4 (1024), § 15 (1041); 6 § 14 (1079):

Bk. VI (IV). 1 § 7 (1124--5); 2 § 3 (1140), § 5 (1143); 4 § 21 (1194, 1198), § 22 (1199--1201), § 24 (1203), § 25 (1204); 6 § 4 (1223); 7 § 1 (1230 b); 9 § 9 (1265); 14 § 3 (1319), § 9 (1331), § 10 (1334), § 13 (1337), § 14 (1338); 15 § 16 (1366), § 19 (1369), § 21 (1371):

Bk. VII (VI). 1 § 6 (1383); 7 § 1 (1450):

Bk. VIII (V). 1 § 2 (1493), § 13 (1504);

3 § 3 (1511); 5 § 9 (1559); 10 § 3 (1649), § 5 (1650), § 6 (1657); 11 § 16 (1731); 12 § 11 (1767), § 14 (1777).

2 See however the notes on IV (VII). 13 §§ 5, 7 (876, 879, 881): and n. (1287) on VI (IV). 11. 3 in regard to the citations there.

1 1. 2. 3 1094 a 24 f.

1. 3. 5 1095 a 2;

1. 4. 1 1095 a 14 f.;

cp. 1. 13. 2. 1102 a 7 ff., VII. 11. 1. 1152 b 1 ff.

4 Poet. 6. 16. 1450 b 6 sqq. (cp. note 71 to my edition of this work). Khet. 1.

2. 7. 1356 a 26 sqq.

5 Brandis op. c. II ii 1335 n. certainly expounds his words differently; but see Zeller op. c. II ii 608 n.

5—2
To regard the *Ethics* and *Politics* however as forming the first and second parts of one and the same work, as has now and then been done, is certainly not correct\(^1\). Yet this view is undoubtedly very old. For it must even have been adopted by the writer who at the close of the *Ethics* appended that introduction to the *Politics* now to be read there which may be translated somewhat as follows\(^2\): “Since then “previous writers have omitted to make legislation the subject of their “enquiries, it might perhaps be as well that we should ourselves take “this subject into consideration together with the theory of the consti- “tution generally, in order that the philosophy of Man may be as far as “possible brought to a conclusion. First then let us try to review “whatever has been rightly stated at various times by our predecessors; “next from a comparison of the constitutions to investigate what it is “which preserves and destroys states and individual constitutions, and “from what causes some are ordered well and others ill. For when “this has been considered we should perhaps be more likely to gain a “comprehensive view not only of what constitution is absolutely the “best, but also how each separate constitution should be regulated, and “what laws and customs it must adopt (in order to be the best of its “kind). Let us begin then with our discussion.”

Schlosser long since, with good reason, doubted the genuineness of this patchwork in the forcible and cogent remark\(^3\): “there is no coher- “ence between the close of this passage and the beginning of the “*Politics*, and Aristotle does not follow the plan here marked out.” The opening of the *Politics* is only intelligible when regarded as belonging to an independent work which starts from the notion of its own subject- “matter, the state. We are not told that something similar was stated rather differently at the commencement of the *Ethics*; the state is here “first constructed as the all-comprehensive association which has the “highest good for its end: nor is there the least intimation that for the “realization of unimpeded virtuous activity, the full meaning of this “highest good, we were referred in the last chapter of the *Ethics* to the “*Politics*. The supposed transition then is pure fancy with nothing here

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\(^1\) So recently by Nickes for example.

\(^2\) *Nic. Eth. X. 9* §§ 22, 23 1181 b 12 f. παραλίποντον οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνε- ρεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοῦ γε ἐπεκέφασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἰσος, καὶ ὅλως ἐπερὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἡ περὶ τὰ τῆς ἀνθρώπους φιλοσοφία τελειωμην. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ τε κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθόμεν ἐπελθέν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνημμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρησάτα ποία σώζει καὶ φθειρεῖ τὰς

\(^3\) In his translation of the *Politics* i. xvii. His further conjectures need not be refuted now.
to support it. In keeping with the announcement contained in it Aristotle should rather have begun with the second book¹, making what is contained in Bk. viii (v). come next, and then developing the contents of iv (vii), v (viii), and lastly of vi (iv), and vii (vi). What must be understood by a 'comparison of constitutions' we see clearly from x 9 §§ 20, 21, 1181 a 16, 17, b 7²; at the same time we also see how much the interpolator has misunderstood the expression he borrows. There it denotes the combination of different laws and elements of different constitutions into a new constitution and new legislation: here it can only denote an accumulation of information on the constitutions of as many different states as possible and on the history of their development, because only from that can we gather what is here intended to be gathered from this 'comparison'³. That before Aristotle no scientific enquiry into legislation existed is palpably untrue; and had the absence of such enquiry been the only inducement to the composition of his work, how could this have sufficed to make him lay down "the theory of the constitution generally"? That no writers had been found to elaborate this is not asserted even here; on the contrary we are promised an exposition and estimate of all the facts already discovered by earlier enquirers. Even the words καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας contain an un-Aristotelian idea, for they imply that Legislation must be a part of the theory of the Constitution, while to Aristotle, we have seen, both are parts of Politics proper. Of the incredible mode of expression in the concluding words from καὶ τοῖσι πολιτείᾳ ὁρίστη onwards we will say nothing: it is sufficient to remark that the interpolator has left out just what is most important, which in the translation above has been added within brackets. In short, to whatever period this interpolation belongs its author did not himself know what he was about, and it would be for the most part lost labour to seek to discover "method in his madness."

That in spite of their close connexion⁴ the Ethics and the Politics are regarded by Aristotle as two independent works, is sufficiently shown by the way in which the one is quoted in the other. Until sufficient reason

¹ For the interpretation which Nickes, l.c. pp. 29, 30, puts upon the concluding words,—² Let us then follow this statement of ours, but only after prefixing "a commencement dealing with other matters,"—is not calculated to inspire confidence.

² οἷοί ἐν ὕφθατ (ἐκ, οἱ συμφαται) μέλην εἶναι τὸ νομοθετεῖσαν συναγαγόντω τοὺς εὐ-δοκιμοῦσας τῶν νόμων, and τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αὶ συναγωγαί, where the expression certainly tends to pass over into the meaning put upon it by the interpolator, but goes no farther.

³ This disposes of the unhappy attempt of Nickes l.c. 25 f. to interpret the passage. In his refutation of the earlier attempts he is on the whole successful.

⁴ As Zeller observes op. c. 11 II 104 f. n. (1).
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is adduced for transferring the first chapter of Bk. IV (vii). from Aristotle to Theophrastos or some one else, the yet more unequivocal mention of Ethics there (§ 13) as 'another study,' ἑτέρας... σχολής, has the most decisive importance: although the term 'another study' would mean no more when so applied than it does in the case of the Prior or Pure and Posterior or Applied Analytics, for example. Yet no one has tried to show from the close connexion between them that these latter treatises are merely parts of one and the same work. In fact Politics in Aristotle's sense, so far as the state according to its idea is a means of training to human virtue and therefore to happiness, is nothing but Applied Ethics: the problem of Pure Ethics being to show wherein virtue and happiness consist. But since this idea of the state could only be truly realized in the absolutely best state, which does not as yet exist, which even if it did exist would only be one state amongst many—since therefore the virtue of the citizen is dissociated from the virtue of the man—Ethics has to deal with the moral activity of the individual, Politics with that of the state.

In Aristotle's classification of the sciences, both studies, in common with Poetics, have a somewhat uncertain place and worth assigned them, as Zeller and Walter have shown: nor does it appear that Aristotle cleared this up sufficiently to himself, or even tried to do so. It is a peculiar weakness of his Ethics that it has no purely scientific importance for him; it merely serves as an introduction to practical morality: but again, as he himself explains, the direct value of mere theoretical instruction for this purpose is very slight, nay, quite insignificant. Yet practical insight (φύσις), without which there is no moral virtue, can be materially promoted by Ethics, although it does not by any means coincide with Ethics in subject-matter. So too the practical insight of the leading statesman in political life can exist in a purely

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1 See above, p. 15 n. 1.
2 Cp. the note there (799).
3 Cp. Zeller op. cit. II ii 104 f. n. 1, 182, 607 n. 3; Oncken op. c. t. 164 ff.
4 op. c. II ii 176—185.
5 Die Lehre von der praktischen Verwendung 537—554 (Jena 1874. 8). But not every statement in that work is correct.
7 Nic. Eth. I. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff.; cp. 1. 9. 10 1100 a 1 ff.; II. 1. 1 1103 a 14 ff.; II. 4 §§ 3—6, 1105 a 26—b 18; X. 9=x. 10 (Beckk.): cp. Pol. IV (vii). 13. 11 ff., Nic. Eth. II. 6 §§ 4—8, § 15 1106 a 26—b 7, and 1106 b 36 ff.; II. c. 9. Comp. also Walter op. c. 151—162 who certainly should not have relied upon the probably spurious chapter II. 7.
8 Cp. nn. in 1. 5. 9 (45), I. 13. 6 (112).
9 Nic. Eth. I. 1. 2. 2 1094 a 22 ff., 1. 3. 7 1095 a 10 ff., 1. 4. 6 1095 b 4—13, VI. 7. 7 1141 b 21 ff. Comp. Walter op. c. 157, 400 ff.
10 As Zeller thinks, op. c. II ii 608 n.; he has been refuted by Walter p. 151. There is no doubt that the passage of the Nic. Eth. adduced by Zeller, VI. 8 §§ 1—4 1141 b 23—1142 a 11, is not by Aristotle, as was long ago shown by Fischer Fritzche and Rassow.
empirical manner without a comprehensive theory of politics; but on
the other hand there is much to learn from such a theory, and the great
practical statesman will be all the greater the more he has appropriated
it to himself. That the main value of πολιτική consists in affording this
important contribution to the education of capable statesmen is stated
by Aristotle iii. i. 1; vi (iv). c. i; vii (vi). 5. 1; iv (vii). 13. 5, and in
other passages, and this fully agrees with his analogous view about
Ethics. But his inconsistency with himself does not go so far here as
before; rather he demands of political theory iii. 8. i (cp. vi [iv]. 13.
5), that it should exhaust all conceivable cases, even those of which it
may be foreseen that they will seldom or never actually occur.

[X. The most recent criticism of the text.

The comparative worth of the Manuscripts.

This question, of which some notice will be found above, has
recently been raised anew by Busse in an excellent dissertation De
praesidiiis emendandi Aristotelis Politica. By a minute analysis of the
old Latin version, Busse proves beyond all doubt that it has been
over-estimated by Vettori and Schneider, and even by Susemihl, and
is by no means so strictly literal or correct as they supposed.

To begin with, William of Moerbeke's ignorance of Greek was
something deplorable. He renders περὶ τῶν ἀποφημιμένων περὶ κτλ.,
de pronunciatis de optima civitate; πρὸς δὲ τῶς ἄλλοις ἀριθμ ἄλιοι;
ἐπιτίθεσθαι praeferri; ἐπιδημεῖν praefectum populi esse; evidently arriving
at the meaning of a compound by the most rudimentary analysis, as τὰ
ἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα bona quae circa res bellicas. But mere ignorance
whether of the meaning of words or of the construction—and it would
seem as if, in ii. 12. 8, he made Οἰλυμπίασιν an accusative after τῶν
νικήσαντος qui vicit Olimpiasem; at any rate he gives super lecta for

1 Comp. nn. on iii. 8. 1 (542); iii. 13.
13 (601); vi (iv). 15. 4 (1350); see also
iii. 2 §§ 1—3.
2 Berlin, 1881. 8.
3 Susemihl however in the large critical
edition (1872) p. xxxiii f. had already
pointed out inaccuracies and inconsistenc-
cies in William's translation and the need
of caution in inferences from it to the
original. See also the edition of 1879,
c.g. i p. 204 n. 1, 210 n. 2.
4 Yet it is an exaggeration when Roger
Bacon writes "ut notum est omnibus
Parisiis literatis nullam novit scientiam
in lingua graeca de quo praesumit, et
ideoomnia transfert falsa et corrumpit
scientiam Latinorum." Cp. Jourdain
Recherches p. 67.
5 Busse op. cit. p. 36 f. Space permits
only a few typical instances to be selected
from his stock.
6 The best ms. gives Olimpiasem.
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3. 9—does less to obscure the readings of his original than a fatal inconsistency and fluctuation in the choice of renderings. The prepositions are changed or confused on almost every page. So likewise the particles: γὰρ autem in ἐστι γὰρ II. 9. 18, ὅσος γὰρ IV (vii). 17. 13, δὲ γὰρ v (viii). I. 2. 2; γὰρ igitur, III. 7. 5; δὴ enim I. 2. 1; οὖν enim I. 8. 6, etc.: not to speak of the stock renderings καὶ...δὲ ceterum, καὶ τοι et quidem. Sometimes he omits particles (μὲν, γὰρ, δὲ, οὖν); sometimes, e.g. II. 5. 9 δικαῖος et iuste, he inserts them. They are most frequently inserted to avoid asyndeton, as in II. 3. 7 φράτωρα φιλέτην fratruelum aut contribulem, etc. He is careless of the order of words; thus II. 4. 6 καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὀντῶν ἀμφότερον ένα et ambos fieri unum ex duobus existentibus; IV (vii). 3. 8 κυρίως καὶ ἐν δομίνοις (i.e. καὶ κυρίοις). His carelessness leads him repeatedly to translate the adjectives ἀριστοκρατική, ὀλιγαρχική by the nouns aristocratia, oligarchia.

This being the ordinary style of his translation, when he comes to passages where his Greek original was defective, it is only occasionally that he transmits the defect faithfully: as in VIII (v). 6. 3 εὐθὺς (for εὐθα) in θο, which he took for a proper name; III. II. 3 κρῖθη (for κρίνουσι, so Ms) Kries; II. 9. 30 φιλίτα (so Ms) amicabilia; V (viii). I § 4 Ms αὐτ ἵπσορομ (he has read the compendium αὐτῶν); 6 § 9 Ms οὐκ αὐτός (for αὐτός) id ἵπσομ. More frequently he tries to get some sort of sense by putting in a word or phrase suggested by the context, or by a parallel passage in the Politics. Take for instance VIII (v). I. 3: Π¹ gives ἀνώταις εἰς τί ὄντας, with space for one letter; Ms has slurred over this defect of the archetype by reading ἐπί; not so William; from the immediately preceding ἐκ τοῦ ἱσοῦ ὁτίουν ὄντας he derives inaequades in quocunque existentibus. Similarly with natura for δύναμιν in IV (vii). II. 4 (from the adjoining φῶς), alia quidem esse eadem for τὸ πάσι μετείσθη VI (iv). 4. 25 (from the following τάλλα μὲν εἶναι ταύτα): see also III. 16 § 5 universale borrowed from c. 15 § 4 το καθόλου, IV (vii). I § 4 quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant, IV (vii). II § 1 si ad votum oportet adipsici positionem borrowed from 5 § 3 τὴν θέσιν ἐλ χρώματι ποιεῖν κατ' εἰδίχν; etc. Thus the defects and false readings of his original, which must have resembled Ms though not so corrupt, are made worse by alterations and superficial remedies. In IV (vii). 14. 22 Π had the same hiatus as Ms has now, through the homoeoteleuton σπονδοῦς-ἀξειν, σχολ-ἀξειν: William does what he can

1 p. 12. 2 p. 11. 3 p. 30. 4 pp. 29, 30. 5 pp. 14, 27. 6 p. 9. 7 pp. 9, 12, 23. Compare the lacuna at V (viii). 5. 17, where ἀξ... is all that stands in Ms of ἀκροφιμενοι. 8 Busse pp. 15—20.
to conceal this by translating ἔνεκεν τάξει καὶ θῆς εἰρήνης gratia ordinis et pacis, as if he had read τάξεως. In vi (iv). 4. II M gives τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἃ instead of τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἃ; so too Γ, for William renders <minus> quam to make sense. Similarly v (viii). 6. II M has ἦποντο for ἦποντο; William sequenbantur; which must be his attempt to make sense out of ἦποντο.1

Another source of divergence between the codices and William’s Latin must also be kept in view, viz. the freedom with which he sometimes translates. Thus in ii. 9. 20 δημαγωγεῖν αὐτοὺς ὡνγὰκὸντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς regere populum se ipsos (he read αὐτοὺς) coegabant reges, he may perhaps have simply exchanged the passive construction for the active. This is a not uncommon resource with him: see vii (vi). 7 § 5 προσκείσθαι αφιέρωνe, 8 § 1 διαιρέσθαι dividere etc.; and for the converse ii. 7 § 6 διέξει ostendatur, 8 § 5 γράφειν scribatur, viii (v). 8. 9 παρεληφέναι comprehendantur, etc.² Though he hardly ever appears to omit words from Γ, it can be shown that he sometimes adds: c. g. i. 5. 8 εἴπερ τοῖς εἰρημένοις si quidem et dictis <creditur>, ii. 9. 3 κεκτημέναις περὶ οἴκους (so M for περιοίκους) possidentibus <praedia> aīra domus, etc.³ Yet additions may be due to glosses, like vidēro fugientem proelio, (?) αὐτάνευθε μάρχει νομίσω in the margin of P1, etc.⁴ Lastly, how much caution is needed in handling this translation may be judged from a few characteristic blunders taken almost at random: i. 9. 1 οὕτε τῶρρω ἐκείνης οὐκε ῥόγες longe <posita>; ii. 8. 13 οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὔδὲ ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἢζοῦν κτλ non bene autem quae de indicio habet lex indiscerare dignificant, though here one might suppose he had ὁ κρίνειν ἤζοῦν before him⁵: ii. 11 § 1.4 έκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν ῥήμα quodque perficitur ab eisdem⁶: c. ii. 15 τῷ πλούτειν, αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκτέμποντες εἶπ τὰς πόλεις inditando semper atīqaam populii partem emittentés super urbes, suggested perhaps by ποιοῦν ἐντο- ῆυσ in vii (vi). 5. 9⁷: iii. 3 § 2 εἴπερ οὖν δημοκρατοῦνται si quidem iigitur in democratiam versae fuerant quaedam: 13 § 2 οἴκων habetur: iv (vii). 16. 14 πρὸς θεῶν ἀπόθεοισαν τῶν ἐληξίων τιν ἐν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τοιοῦ ad deorum reverentiam his, quae sortitae sunt cum qui de generatione honorem (as if ταίς εἰληξίωιας were read)⁸.

From this examination of the old translation Busse concludes that it is a less trustworthy representative of the better recension (Π' i. c. Γ P M) than P1, the codex of Demetrios Chalkondylas. Its lost original was slightly better than the very corrupt Ambrosian manuscript

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1 pp. 21—23: Γ may have had εἰ-ποντο, but this is less probable.  
3 p. 32.  
4 p. 34.  
5 pp. 24, 43.  
6 p. 20.  
7 p. 41.  
8 pp. 43, 20, 41.
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M³, but closely resembled it; the common archetype of the two being itself very corrupt, with numerous omissions through homoeoteleuta and one or two glosses inserted in the text¹. And it was from this Latin translation and not from another manuscript, he thinks, that the scribe of P² derived those readings wherein he departs from the second or worse family².

These conclusions however are by no means warranted³. The ignorance and uncritical spirit of William of Moerbeke render it all the more certain that in the majority of the right readings which are due solely to his translation he must have followed a codex considerably better (as it was also older) than the archetype of P¹ or of M³. When all deductions have been made for variants arising from conjectures and mistranslations, the old translation presents the correct reading 18 times unsupported: 7 times in conjunction with P⁵ only: once in conjunction with P² only: 3 times with P¹ (or its corrections) only: once with Aretinus only: 5 times in conjunction with more than one of the inferior manuscripts⁴. To these may be added some 12 other passages where the evidence, though good, is less convincing⁵. Whereas the correct reading is due to P¹ alone 11 times, to P¹ in conjunction with inferior authorities (Ar., P² margin, P³) 5 times: and several of these are such changes as Demetrios or Aretinus could

¹ pp. 45—47. ² In proof of this Busse quotes (p. 48) from v (vii). 8. 2—a passage where the second family II² exhibits an hiatus—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P¹</th>
<th>M</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>παραδεόμενη</td>
<td>παραμολόβα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παραμολόβα</td>
<td>τὸ μικρὸν ὁπάνημα</td>
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<td>òναυρεῖ</td>
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William transl. praevariatio parvae expensive consumunt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I³ (margin)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>υπεισοδονοσα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αλ μικραι δαπάναι</td>
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</table>

There is nothing new in this critical observation. Compare Susemihl’s large critical edition (1872) p. xiii: “mirum autem est in eis verbis, quae in vulgatae recensionis codicibus omissa hic liber (I²) cum paucis aliis et vetusta translatione servavit, eum aliis illis interdum accuratius cum hac assentire aut alias eiusdem sensus voces quam illos hic illic offerere, ut propensum facile fias ad credendum hos in eo locos non ex codice Gracco antiquo quio, sed ex ipsa translatione Latina esse haustos.”

³ With what follows compare Susemihl Politica poetorum edita (1882) Preface pp. xix—xviii.

⁴ Π alone gives 1258b 40 Χαριτίδης 1260a 4 ὁ ἄρχοντα καὶ, 1260b 41 εἰς ὁ ἰτὺς, 1266b 2 ὁ ἱδήν, 1271a 20 καί, 1276a 33 ἔτος ἐν, 1282a 27 μέγιστα, 1285a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1332a 42 ἐνά δέ, 1336a 34 σοφοδασομένων, 35 κατά, 1296a 8 συντάσεις, b 38 πλήθει, 1320b 9 τὴν Ταραντην ἀρχι, 15 τῆς αὐθής ἀρχι, 1321a 12 ὀπλικτῆς, 1303a 24 ἐγγυς δόν (or ἐγγυζον;), 1311a 6 χρημάτων: ΠΓ¹ 1328a 5 παρά, 1330a 6 εἰσαγεῖν, 1340a 16 δηλον δι δέ, 1321b 29 τὰ omitted, 1322b 36 προσευθήνας (?), 1306b 39 καὶ omitted: ΠΓ¹ 1259b 28 δέ; ΠΓ¹ 1265a 16 παρὰ, 1272b 39 καθ’ αὐτο: ΠΓ¹ (corrector) 1278b 22 παρ’: ΠΑγ. 1289b 38 πολέμους; ΠΓ¹Αγ. 1336b 6 δὲ: ΠΡ² 1303b 31 τὰ: ΠΑγ. 1322a 33 σὺ: ΠΑγ. 129 (corr. 3) 1335a 26 σωματος: ΠΓ² 1254a 10 ἀπλός (ἀπλὼς διως Μ²: ΠΓ, διως ετ). ⁵ Of the disputed cases 1260b 20 αἰκονίου, 1262b 32 τοὺς φίλακας, 1274b 20 (ἀποτινεις or ἀποτινεῖν;), 1280a 29 ταλαντων may be mentioned.
easily make for themselves¹. In 4, or perhaps 5, places P² has alone preserved the right reading: it is difficult to find a single passage where it is due to M or to P³ alone². From P⁵ and from Aretinus unsupported a greater number of such cases is derived; but the uncertainty, whether we are dealing with a genuine reading of a manuscript or merely with conjecture, proportionately increases. The latter is more probable not only for P³, but for the few occasional good readings of the worst manuscripts³.

Further it must be noticed that while M, Γ are often found alone supporting a variant against P¹, M, P¹ are less frequently (the number of such cases being about 3/5) alone in agreement against Γ, and it is very seldom indeed that P¹ Γ alone support any reading against M. What is the right inference to draw from this state of things? Evidently that Γ and M go back to one common archetype, and P¹ to another (from which also must be derived the traces of the better recension in P¹ P²): only the immediate ancestor of M had been corrected by the latter, while this was not the case with Γ or the authorities from which it is derived⁴. The genuine readings of the family Π will be found to have been preserved sometimes in the one archetype (of M, Γ), sometimes in the other (of P¹ and of the corrections in P² P³): and the relationship between the members of the family may be represented by the following tree.

¹ P¹ alone 1259 a 13 ἔλαιονεργεῖον, the right order of 1278 a 36 f. (corr.¹), b 4 
² κακεῖνος corr.¹ (κακέοινος), 1286 b 17 με-
³ τέβαλων (perhaps Γ also), 1287 b 38 βασι-
⁴ λικῶν, 1238 a 5 ἀπάγχευα, 1335 b 20 γενο-
⁵ μένων, 1338 b 4 πρότερον (corr.¹), 1340 b 30 
παιδιῶν, 1290 b 24 ἐπέρων, 1314 a 35 τὸ
⁶ ποιεῖν (?); P¹ Λρ. 1263 b 4 μ, 1280 b 19 ἐπισεῖν; P¹ (corr.) Λρ. 1255 a 37 ἐκγένων,
⁷ 1299 a 14 ποληίτες; P¹P² (margin) P³
⁸ (later hand) 1284 a 37 κυλῦσειν. Of these ἔλαιονεργεῖον, πρότερον, παιδιῶν, τὸ ἐπισεῖν,
εκγένων are of slight weight.
⁹ 1270 b 38 ἔπισε, 1325 a 29 αὐτὸ τὸ (corr.¹),
¹⁰ 1339 a 14 ἐπισεῖν: perhaps 1338 b 33 ἀπαθάναγγήτουs.
¹¹ 1267 b 33 τὰ Λ, U (corr.); 1274 b
¹² 20 τὶ ποιεῖσθαι Λ'; 1275 b 39 τοῦτο Λ'
¹³ Aldine and M (1st hand); 1331 a 24 
θεῶς Π⁴ Λρ. 1295 a 28 Ἡ L'C Λρ.,
¹⁴ 1317 a 12 τῆς Ρ b Λρ. 1302 b 39 τὸ ποιοῦ 
Ρ b.
¹⁵ For proof of this see (beside the criti-
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Few of the readings common to M⁵ P¹ or of those common to Γ M⁵ have much to recommend them. Yet this is far from proving P¹ to be our best authority. Against such a view may be urged (1) the number of mistakes with which, no less than Γ or M⁵, it abounds: (2) the futile attempts at correction which it sometimes exhibits, e.g. III. 13. 15 ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ διάκειν for αὕτα γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διάκειν (δοκοῦσι having been omitted in the archetype of Π²): (3) the fact that, as just shown, Γ, solely or with inferior manuscripts, furnishes the true reading at least 34 (perhaps 46) times; whereas P¹, alone or with inferior manuscripts, does the same only 16 times. These considerations are not to be set aside by an isolated passage like III. 9. 8, where P¹ διακῶπτονσι is a trifle nearer right than M⁵ διακωνοῦσι Will. ministrant⁴.

All existing manuscripts of the Politics, when compared even with those of the Ethics, are late and bad. Still there are degrees of badness: and if to follow Γ M⁵, other things being equal, in preference to P¹ sometimes leads an editor away from the true reading of Π¹, he would yet oftener go astray if he followed P¹ against Γ M⁵. The relationship between the two families is itself obscure. In some respects Π² is the better of the two, particularly where it preserves words omitted in Π¹: in such cases it is seldom Π² that has a gloss inserted, nearly always it is Π¹ that is mutilated². Yet as a general rule Π¹ should be followed in preference to Π².

Coming now to Busse's view about P⁵, we must admit that this manuscript presents most remarkable variants. Take v (viii). 2 § 5 ff. (1337 b 17 ff.):

P¹ M⁵ William P⁵
πρὸς ἀκριβείαν ad perfectionem πρὸς τὸ τέλειον
εἰρημέναι dictis ῥηθεὶσαι
§ 6 ἐνεκέν Gratia (Bekk.)
τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἰπσίου quidem enim αὐτὸν μὲν γὰρ (Bekk.)
φίλον amicorum τῶν φίλων
c. 3 § 1 τὴν δὲ μονοικίην ἡδὴ de musica autem περὶ δὲ τῆς μονοικίης
§ 3 τέλος finaliter τελευταῖον
ὅτι δεῖ ποιουτας quod facientes oportet τι ποιοῦντας δεῖ(Bekk.)³

In some of these instances the discrepancy has nothing to do with
cal notes) Susenmihl's Third edition (1882)
Preface pp. x, xi, where also the diagram is given, p. xvi.
⁴ Quoted by Busse p. 45.
² The manuscripts of the Nicomachian Ethics show an equally perplexing discrepancy between KbM⁵ and LbO⁵ in some parts of the treatise, K⁴Μ⁴ and L⁴Ο⁴ in others.
³ Other instances of close agreement with the old translation, in 1327 a 34, 1329 a 17, 18, 1334 a 37, 1336 a 34, b 18, 1320 a 10, 1307 b 32 f. Susenmihl op. c. viii.
the old translation: and this is still more plain from the following variants of \(P^5\): 1330 a 32 χρή for δεί c. c. 1; 1333 b 2 δὲ καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα for καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ (\(P^1\) omit δὲ); 1335 b 23 παιδοποιίας for τεκνοποιίας; 1336 b 5 γὰρ τοῦ for τοῦ γὰρ, 1339 a 16 χάριν for ἐνεκα, 1340 a 8 δήλον for φανερῶν; 1342 a 6 ἀπάσιας for πάσιας; 1309 a 18 ὅν for μή. But at the same time this corrupt carelessly written book has some readings agreeing with \(P^1\) and \(M^8\) against the old translation, and others which no Latin version would ever have suggested. Thus 1338 b 27 λειτουργοί \(M^8 P^5\) deficientes William, 1318 b 31 τημημάτων τῶν μείζονας ἀπὸ omitted by \(M^8 P^5\) translated by Will.; 1326 b 4 μὲν τοῖς \(M^8 P^1\) Ald., τοῖς μὲν \(P^2\); 1332 b 1 μεταβάλλειν \(M^8 P^1,5\) metabαλεῖν \(P^2\); 1334 b 2 τε untranslated by Will., τὰ \(P^1,5\); 1335 a 16 τὸ c. c. τοὺς \(M^8 P^5\); 1337 a 18 βέλτιον \(M^8 P^5\) Alt., βέλτιστον c. c. optimus Will.; 1319 b 24 καὶ τὰ \(P^1,5\) and in the margin of \(P^4\), κατὰ c. c. in Will.; 27 aι πρῶτερα \(P^1\) and the corrector of \(P^4\), αἱ πρῶτερον \(P^2\); 1322 a 22 τοὺς εἰρημένους \(M^8 P^1\) and \(P^1,5\) (1st hand), τῶν εἰρημένης c. c. dicto Will.; 1306 a 22 ἐγχειρίσωμεν ceteri, ἐγχειρίσωσιν \(M^8\), ἐγχειρισώσων \(P^5\) manus incertum Will.; 1313 b 2 φρονύμα τε \(P^1,5\) \(R^1\), φρονύματι τε c. c. sapientiae Will.; 1316 a 32 τῶν c. c. τῶν \(P^1,5\) Alt., in Γ \(M^8\) a hiatus. Take even the suspected passage 1334 a 28, 29 δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τῶν ἀριστα δοκοῦντα πρότετε καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαῦοντας c. c., indigent iustitia et multa temperantium qui optime videntur agere et omnibus beatis frui Will. Any one correcting the text from the Latin version would surely have written ἀπολαῦοντες; but \(P^5\) has δοῦνται......οἱ ἀριστα δοκοῦντες......ἀπολαῦοντες. Or again, 1311 b 7 διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνα (αἰσχύνα \(M^8 P^1\) αἰσχύνασθαι \(P^2\)); ἰσχυρεῖται quod aliqui monarcharum in corpus verecundiam fecerunt would have suggested αἰσχύνα, not αἰσχύναι which is what we find in \(P^5\). So again had the scribe wished to emend the corrupt ὀπλίτευν of 1321 a 12, William’s armatīcām would have suggested ὀπλιτικόν or ὀπλίτην, not ὀπλιτικῶν which is the reading of \(P^1\). Far more probable is it that here traces of the archetype still remain. Similarly in 1320 b 3 the right reading ἀφιεμένων seems to have come down in \(P^5\) as well as in \(P^1\): it is at least unlikely that William’s respuentes suggested it. Even in viii (v) 8, 2, the passage which Busse thinks conclusive, but for the reminiscence of a phrase in Plato it is by no means clear that παραδυνμένη should supersede ἄπεισοδύννη\(^2\).

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1. Consensus codicum.
2. Bekker, who took \(P^2\) of the second or worse family as the foundation of his text, often adopted readings from \(P^5\): in some cases even, e.g. 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16 f., 34 f., where \(M^8 P^1\) have a better reading. See p. 76.
Dislocations and double recensions.

The text of the *Politics*, when put into the more coherent shape which to the German editor most nearly reproduces Aristotle's intention, is seen to depart from the order of the manuscripts not merely in the two great instances of the arrangement of the books, but also in a large number of other cases. It will be useful here to review, at greater length than can be done in the critical footnotes, the difficulties for which transposition seems to be suggested as a natural remedy, especially as the fullest account of these suggestions has often to be sought in monographs or magazine articles not always readily accessible.

(1) Bk. 1. 11 §§ 5, 6. Montecatino, p. 422 of his Commentary on Bk. 1., was the first to enquire what is the connexion between § 6, εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικῶτατα μὲν τῶν ἑργασιῶν ὅπου ἑλάξιστον τύχης, βαναυσότατα δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβώνται μάλιστα, δουλικώτατα δ' ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεί- σται χρήσεις, ἀγενέστατα δὲ ὅπου ἑλάξιστον προσδεὶ ἀρετῆς, and the context. Piccart, p. 140, proposed to remove it to follow τῶ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων (l. 27). As Schneider saw, this will not do; for the third or mixed sort of χρηματιστική could not be excluded from the ἑργασία of § 6. Now the last words of § 5, immediately before εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικῶτατα κτλ, are, περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῶσθω χρήσιμων μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἑργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. This reads like the final remark of Aristotle on the separate branches of χρηματιστική, considered not in regard to theory but to practice (τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν, § 1): no new remarks upon them ought to be added. If so, § 6, which consists of such remarks, would be in place if it preceded περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ κτλ: or, which is the same thing, if the sentence περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ...τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν be transposed to follow ἀρετῆς. The argument too runs on better to the next sentence ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνιοῦς γεγραμμένα κτλ, § 7. "I have here said what was necessary in a "general way on each of these various branches; to go accurately into "details would no doubt be useful for the various pursuits themselves, "but it would be a tedious subject to dwell upon. The reader is "referred for particulars to the separate works which have been written "upon them.""


(2) Bk. i. 13 § 8. q. v. "It is strange," says M. Thurot, "that "after having spoken of the deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle does "not say one word of the ἀρετὴ διανοητικὴ which properly belong to it, "while speaking three times, II. 15, 17, 20, of ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ in the same "sense. Further, it is singular that in order to prove that he who com- "mands ought to have ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ in perfection, he says that the work "belongs to him who directs it and that reason (λόγος) is a directing "faculty: this reflexion evidently applies to the ἀρετὴ διανοητικὴ of τὸ "λόγον ἔχου, elsewhere called φρόνησις, III. 4. 17, and not to the ἡθικὴ "ἀρετὴ of the ἄλογον." He proposes therefore to transpose ll. 14—17, ὁμοίως τοίνυν...ἐργον to follow ἐπιβάλλει αὐτῶι: to omit ἡθικὴ in line 20, and change ἡθικὴ to διανοητικὴ in ll. 17. (The transposition becomes less needed and less satisfactory if ἡθικὴ be retained.) Now there is no doubt that, on the stricter Aristotelian theory, φρόνησις in separably involves ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ, Nic. Eth. vi. 13 §§ 2, 3, 6 (cp. ib. 12 § 6, ἐτι τὸ ἐργον ἀποτελεῖτα αὐτῷ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν); so ll. 20 ἡθικὴ may stand. The dianoetic virtue, in its perfection, seems to reside solely in the master who commands. Cp. § 7, just above the present passage, ὁ δούλος ὅλως ὅψιν ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικὸν, and Pol. III. 4. §§ 17, 18, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχόντως ἕνωσ ἀρετὴ μόνη. τάς γὰρ ἄλλας έσκειν ἄναγ- καίον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχόμενων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχόμενον δὲ γε συν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθῆς with the notes.

(3) ll. 4. 4. ἔσκε δὲ μᾶλλον...μὴ νεωτέρέζειν. "It is singular that "Aristotle supposes here what he has not yet proved and is going to "prove later on, namely, that communism relaxes the bond of family "affections. Again in c. 5 § 24, 1264 b 1, he supposes without saying "so, that community of wives and children will make the labourers "more obedient" (Thurot). He therefore suggests that ll. 4. 4 should follow κοινωνίαν in ll. 5. 24. A better place would seem to be in 4 § 9, 1262 b 24, after Aristotle has proved that ὑδαρῆς φιλία must result from the Platonic institutions in the absence of the ordinary motives to mutual kindness. The argument of §§ 5—9 goes to show συμβαίνεις ἀνάγκη τοιαύτην ὅν προσήκει τούς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίως γίνεσθαι; the application to the agricultural class would come in appo- sately to point this reversal of the effect intended."

(4) ll. 6 § 3 sub fin. καὶ περὶ τῆς παίδειας, ποιῶν τινα δει γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων. Aristotle would hardly consider a discussion περὶ παιδείας to be extraneous to the main political subject of the Republic. Moreover

1 Etudes sur Aristote 18, 19. Comp. also Susemihl Quaest. Crit. vi. 9—11.
in line 37 he exchanges the construction with *peri* for a new one *oietai dein...pepsihrwoke*. The clause καὶ *peri* πυθεύως...φυλάκων should come amongst the subjects (*peri* ὀλέγων παύμαν) on which Socrates in the *Republic* has touched, and therefore in § 1 after κτήσεως 1364 b 30¹.

It is possible, however, while admitting that the transposition would give a better position to these words, to defend their present place. Aristotle is evidently criticizing in an unsympathetic spirit. He has reduced the points touched upon to a minimum (*peri* ὀλέγων παύμαν). Afterwards, when he complains of the extraneous topics which take up the bulk of the treatise (criticism on poetry and art, psychology, metaphysics, ethics), he has grudgingly to allow that some of these long digressions do serve the purpose (or at least are introduced under the colour) of elaborating the training of the guardians.

(5) II. 7 § 1, ἀ νέν ἴδιατῶν αὖ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν. Giphanius (Van Giffen)² comparing c. 12 § 1, ἐνιοὶ μὲν ὀνκ ἐκουσώσαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν ὑπὸ ὑπονομὸν, ἀλλά διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον... ἐνιοὶ δὲ νομοθέται γεγονασι...πολιτευόντες αὐτοῖ, proposed to omit φιλοσόφων καὶ. Spengel³ simply transposed these words before ἴδιατῶν.


The third objection to Phales' scheme, §§ 8—13, emphasizes the necessity for equality of education as well as of possessions. Like the preceding criticisms, §§ 5—7, it deals with the internal arrangements of the state. In §§ 14—17 there is a transition to its external relations, which Phales ought not to have overlooked, as he did. It is not likely then that in §§ 18—20 (with which we must take § 21) Aristotle would return to internal matters and repeat his previous objection in other words. Yet this is what he has done if the common order be retained. Let the two passages be read side by side, and it will be seen that there is no new thought in the latter, but only a reiteration of the former in different language.

ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ τὰς συνείς ἵσας εἶναι τοῖς πολιτίσ τρόσ το μῆ σταταιζεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλοις, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπείν. καὶ γὰρ ἄν οἱ χαρίεντες

¹ Compare Victorius Comm. p. 106 (ed. of 1576): adiungit autem in extremo disputasse itiam illic Socratem de disciplina quam putaret convenire custodibus illius rei publicae: hoc enim coniungiri debet cum iis quae nunc repetit facienti-


It seems advisable therefore to remove §§ 18—21 to precede § 14 et seq., to treat as parallel versions §§ 10—13, §§ 18—20 cited above, and to take § 21 as coming directly after them but before § 14.

(7) II. 11 § 12. In § 9 Aristotle says that eligibility to office on the ground of wealth and on the ground of merit are traits of oligarchy and aristocracy respectively: hence the Carthaginian constitution, where wealth and ability combined are qualifications for the highest offices, must be a third and distinct scheme. This, he adds, § 10, is a fault in the legislator, who ought to have made provision that ability should not be associated with poverty even in citizens in a private station: ὅποιος οἱ βελτιστοὶ δύνωνται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἄσχημον, μὴ μόνον
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άρχουτες ἀλλὰ μνημοσυνέταιντες. Now here, as far as the sense goes, the clause in § 12 belongs: βελτίων δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τῆς ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχούσιν γε ἐπιμελείσθαι τῆς σχολῆς. "If he was "forced to neglect the last-mentioned task, at least he might have made "provision for poor men in office.” Then would follow quite naturally the criticism of § 10: "at all events he should not have allowed these "high offices to be virtually put up for sale".

(8) III. 7 §§ 3, 4 οταν δέ το πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὅνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως. ἕνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἄρετὴν ἡ πλείον ἐνδέχεται, πλείων δ' ὑδή χαλετῶν ἕκριβοσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἄρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα την πολεμικὴν αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλῆθει γίνεται διάπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὕτης οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὑπόλα. Spengel² first called attention to the difficulty of συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, when as Aristotle goes on to explain (ὑδή χαλετῶν) it is hard for a large number of citizens to attain a high standard of excellence. Thurot³ supposed a lacuna to precede συμβαίνει, containing a reason for the name Πολιτεία, something like this: <διὰ τὸ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀρώτουν>. The parallel passage in III. 17. 4 πολιτικῶν πλῆθος ἐν ὧν πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικὸν may have suggested to Zeller the insertion of πολεμικὸν before πλῆθος in § 3. In any case he is right so far as this, that the remark to which συμβαίνει εὐλόγως refers must emphasize the warlike character of Πολιτεία. Schmidt lastly found such a remark, and the lost subject of the verb συμβαίνει, in the last clause of § 4, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὕτης οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὑπόλα, which he would transpose to come after πολιτεία.

(9) III. 11 § 20 ἀλλὰ γὰρ...§ 21 κεῖσθαι τῶν νόμων. Schneider bracketed the clause ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους as superfluous and disturbing to the context. If retained in the present order there appears to be a double recension ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους = πλὴν τοῦτο...νόμων⁵. But it seems better, with Congreve, to reverse the order of the two sentences.

(10) III. 13 § 6 εἰ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν...ἐξ αὐτῶν. Thurot⁶ sums up his elaborate examination of the context as follows. Aristotle has proposed, § 5, to investigate who ought to have power in a state where all kinds of superiority are represented—wealth, nobility, virtue, numbers. The discussion continues as follows: (i) If the virtuous are few in number we must enquire whether there are enough of them to govern the state

¹ Susemihl Jahrb. f. Ph. xcvi. 1866. p. 333.
² Ueber die Politik p. 23 n. 24.
³ Etudes sur Aristote p. 42, 43.
⁵ Susemihl Quaest. Crit. iii. p. 16.
⁶ Etudes sur Aristote 47—51.
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or to constitute a state by themselves, § 6. (ii) No superiority gives exclusive right to power, §§ 7—10. (iii) The best laws are adapted to the interest of the whole state and the body of citizens, §§ 11, 12. (iv) Individuals, one or more, of pre-eminent virtue cannot be reduced to a level of equality, §§ 13, 14 (then follows a digression on ostracism). Now (i) has no direct bearing on the question proposed: the right of virtuous men to command must be proved before any enquiry as to what ought to be done when the virtuous are few in number: (ii) is the negative solution and (iii) has the germs of a positive solution, which we may suppose more fully developed in a part now lost. A discussion of a particular case, analogous to that in (i), is presented in (iv). The conclusion is that the proper place for (i) will be after (iii), i.e. somewhere between ἄρετήν (§ 12, end) and εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν, the beginning of § 13. For §§ 7—12 are certainly just as much in place immediately after the question proposed in § 5, which they answer from the negative side. And although in itself § 6 might very well follow § 5, it must excite considerable suspicion to find that the important question started in § 6 is never fully answered at all and not even noticed until § 13.

(i1) III. 13. 22. The sentence ὅστε διὰ τοῦτο...τοῦτο δρῶσιν, if genuine, interrupts the thread of the remarks begun in § 20 and continued to διορθοῦν in § 23, to the effect that the problem, what to do with unduly eminent citizens, is one which is equally urgent in all constitutions. The words cited ὅστε διὰ τοῦτο...τοῦτο δρῶσιν, however, do not bear upon the general problem, but on the particular case of monarchs. Hence, as Thurot² saw, they would be more in place in § 23 after διορθοῦν, at the end of the general reflexions. Bernays³ however found them a place at the end of § 20 above, after ἐξελε τρόπων.

(i2) III. cc. 15, 16. On the question of absolute sovereignty, πότερον ποτε ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον ἐναι πάντων ἢ ὁ συμφέρει, a succession of ἀπορία and a general investigation are promised in 15 § 3. What follows in the order of the manuscripts may be briefly summarized as follows: (a) Is the rule of the best man more advantageous than the rule of the best laws? §§ 3—6. (β) Assuming that in certain directions the laws are insufficient, should the decision rest with the one best man or with a number of the more competent citizens, in the extreme case the whole body of a qualified community? §§ 7—10. Then comes a historical or antiquarian appendix to this ἀπορία, contained in §§ 11, 12. (γ) How are the standing difficulties of hereditary succession, §§ 13, 14.

1 Susemihl in Philol. xxix. 1870 pp. 113—I. 4. ² Etudes sur Aristote 51—53.
3 In his Translation p. 211. 4 For a fuller account see the Analysis p. 112 f.
and (δ) a body-guard, §§ 14, 15, to be dealt with? Aristotle appends to this last enquiry a sort of digression, § 16, showing what would be the decision in the case of the constitutional monarch. But, as he explains, resuming his argument with c. 16, it is not the constitutional monarch, but the absolute sovereign about whom the question is now being raised (§§ 1, 2, down to the words κατὰ τὴν ἐκατὸν βούλησαν ὁ βασιλεύς). Here it seems absolutely necessary to assume a lacuna. For what immediately follows, § 2 δοκεῖ δὲ τισὶν...§ 4 πάντων, relates to a different ἀπορία altogether: (ε) Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly where the citizens are all on the same footing (ἐξ ὀμοίων ἡ πόλις)? Should not power rather pass from hand to hand (ἀνὰ μέρος)?

Here the limit of ἀπορία distinctively discernible is reached: in the remainder of c. 16, §§ 4—13, ἀλλὰ μην...ὁμοίως, no new question is started, but remarks are jotted down which bear more or less directly on those formulated in the preceding chapter. Thus all from § 4 ἀλλὰ μην as far as κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in § 9 must belong to the first ἀπορία (α): Is the rule of the best man to be preferred to that of the laws? Not that it could anywhere find a place as a whole in 15 §§ 3—6; but the earlier part (α) ἀλλὰ μην...§ 5 τῶν κειμένων could suitably be transferred to the end of 15 § 5 to follow καλλίων and precede ὅτι μὲν τοῖς...; the remainder (β) 16 § 5 ὃ μὲν ὃν τῶν νόμων...§ 9 κατὰ τὸ ἔθος might be inserted a little higher up in 15 § 5 between πᾶσαν and ἀλλ' ἴσως. Again, the next piece of c. 16, (c) §§ 9, 10 from ἀλλὰ μην οὐδὲ ράδιον as far as συμφράδιμον, clearly has for its subject that comparison of the one best man with a number of qualified citizens which is introduced in (β): and this might go in 15 § 10 after ὃ εἰς and before ἐν δή.

To this same ἀπορία further belongs the remainder of c. 16, from § 10 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν to the end δὲν ὄμοιως; when placed side by side with c. 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...ὁ εἰς, it is seen to be another recension of that passage.
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Such would be the best restoration of the primitive order of these two chapters, if the order of thought and the connexion were solely to be followed. Yet undoubtedly the less complicated and artificial assumption is that of two independent versions combined by an over-careful or unintelligent compiler. Such a view has been acutely advocated by Mr J. Cook Wilson¹. “It may be that the two chapters belong “almost wholly to two parallel versions and that instead of being “combined they should be still further resolved.” Thus

(i) 15 §§ 2, 3 τὸ μὲν οὖν...ένοικος = 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τῶν...ἐλαττον.

(ii) 15 §§ 3—6 ἀρχή...πάντας corresponds in subject to 16 §§ 3—9 τὸν ἀρχὸν...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος + §§ 10, 11 εἰς...καὶ...περὶ τῶν...τοιοῦτον.

(iii) 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...δὲ εἰς corresponds in subject to 16 §§ II—13 ἀλλὰ ὤτι...δεῖν ὁμοίως and to §§ 9, 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν

¹ Journal of Philology x. 1881. pp. 82, 83.
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Of these passages the third [16 §§ 9, 10] disturbs the context and looks like a parallel version of the second.

To this arrangement of the contents of the two chapters it may be objected (1) that the second version is so fragmentary as to present no statement of the problems under discussion and no intimation when we pass from one of them to the other. (2) The arrangement destroys what appears to be one connected sentence beginning 15 § 16 τάχα μὲν ὄνν and continued in 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως. The sense runs on without a break from 15 § 14 ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν to 16 § 2 δ’ βασιλέως. (3) The resolution into parallel versions is not complete; it must be supplemented by transposition: for it has to be admitted that 16 §§ 4, 5 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὄσα...τῶν κειμένων “interrupts the argument of the context: “it belongs to the same part of the subject as §§ 10, 11] 1287 b 16—23 “and may be read after τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν 1287 b 23” (in § 11).

Spengel proposed a simpler remedy for the confusion of cc. 15, 16: viz. to transpose 16 §§ 4—9 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὄσα γε...κατὰ τὸ ἐθος to follow κάλλον, at the end of 15 § 5. The passage following κατὰ τὸ ἐθος in 16 § 9 also begins with ἀλλὰ μὴν, and there is an actual case, viz. the ms. Λε, where the recurrence of a word (συνλογισμὸς in Rhet. 1. 2 1357 a 17 and b 6) led to the omission of the intervening passage and its insertion in the margin. The inadequateness of this solution of the difficulty need hardly be demonstrated. For not only (1) does Spengel propose to insert οὐ after ξητεῖν in 16 § 11, but (2) when he has transposed 16 §§ 4—9 to follow 15 § 5, he is obliged to explain that what we then get is a sort of dialogue between the supporters of personal rule and of the laws.

(13) IV (VII). 1 §§ 11, 12 = c. 2 §§ 1, 2

έχομενον δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλειν ἐνδαίμονα τῆν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καλῶς πράττειν τῆν μή τὰ καλὰ πράττουσαν’ ὀδὴν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὐτ’ ἀνδρὸς τόπερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῆν αὐτήν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τῆς αὐτήν, λοιπὸν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. φανερόν δὲ καὶ τούτοις τάντας γὰρ ἀν ὠμολογη- σειαν εἶναι τῆν αὐτήν. ὦσοι γὰρ ἐν

2 Arist. Stud. 111. 26 (78), f.
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οὔτε πόλεως χωρίς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως; ἀνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρόνησις τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὅν μετασχών ἐκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρόνιμοι καὶ σώφρονες. C. I §§ 11, 12.

πλούτω τὸ ἔνν εὐ τίθενται ἐφ’ ἐνός, οὔτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὄλην, εάν ἡ πλούσια, μακαρίζουσιν. ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μᾶλλον τιμῶσιν, οὔτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἁρχούσαν εὐδαιμονεστήτων εἶναι φαίνει ἄν. εἶ τε τις τῶν ἑνα δι’ ἀρετῆς ἀποδέχεται καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήμει τὴν σπουδαιότεραν. C. 2 §§ 1, 2.

Here the language is by no means similar and the thought that virtue in the state is the same as virtue in the individual seems introduced in different connexion in the two passages. Nevertheless they cannot both stand. The latter opens the discussion afresh without any allusion to the previous chapter, as Spengel observed. If it is to be fitted into this part of the work, it must be intended to supersede some part of c. 1. Susemihl is probably right in holding this part to be §§ 11, 12.

(14) 4 §§ 8, 9. Giphanius (Van Giffen) calls attention to the difficulty of connecting the last words of § 8, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἰσώθει γίνεσθαι, with those immediately preceding. Schneider proposed to transpose the whole period to the end of the chapter to follow εὐσώφητος: in this way § 9 ὁ λεχθὲς ὁρὸς would refer to the number of the citizens. If the words ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι are in their right place and are to be taken with § 8, the preceding sentence θείας γὰρ...τὸ πάν must be parenthetical. They cannot go with § 9 as the passage stands. Koraes omitted διό: it is a smaller change, with Böcker, to transpose ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι to follow αἰναγακαῖον in § 9.

(15) 4 §§ 8, 2 οἶον εἶτε τροφῆς τοιτό ἑστών εἶτε χώρας πλῆθος εἰτ’ ἅλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἑστών. Bojesen saw that these words should follow directly upon § 1 οὐσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν which they illustrate. They are not suitable to be instances of ἐν τι κοινὸν καὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς κοινονοῖς ἄλλης κοινονίας, as on the ordinary arrangement they might be taken to be.

(16) 4 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δ’ ἡ...κτῆσεως ἑστών. The proposal to make this passage follow πολιτείας at the end of § 5 serves to bring the mention of κοινωνία in § 4 nearer to the κοινονοῖς of § 2.

1 Ueber die Politik, pp. 45, 48.
2 Jahrb. f. Philol. xcviii. 1866 p. 602. See also Böcker De quibusdam Pol. Ar. locis (Greifswald, 1867) p. 61, Spengel Arist. Stud. iii. 30 (82).
3 Comm. pp. 921, 2.
4 op. c. 13, 14.
5 Bidtrag (Copenhagen 1845) pp. 24—26.
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(17) iv (vii) cc. 13—15. Wilson regards c. 13 as a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "In each the same question is proposed, what is happiness or the chief good? (compare 1332 a 7 and 1333 a 15, 16); and the discussion of it is followed in each by a transition, in almost "the same terms, to the subject of education (cp. 13 §§ 10—13, with "15 §§ 6, 7 ὡτι μὲν οὖν...ἡχθαί).” These transitional passages stand as follows:

αλλὰ μὴν ἁγαθοὶ γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. (§ 11) τὰ τρία δὲ ταύτ’ ἐστι φύσεις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φύσιν δεῖ πρῶτον οἶνον ἀνθρω- πον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῷων, εἶτα καὶ ποιον τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἕνα δὲ οὐδὲν ὀφέλος φῦναι: τὰ γὰρ ἐθή μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ: ἕνα γὰρ ἐστι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιμ- φοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν θυών ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. (§ 12) τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῷων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῆ, μικρὰ δ’ ἐνα καὶ τοῖς ἐθεσιν, ἀνθρώπος δὲ καὶ λόγως μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον.

ὡστε δεὶ ταύτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλ- ληλοίς. πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἔθισμοι καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, εὰν πειθώσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον. (§ 13) τῆς μὲν τοῖνυν φύσιν οἶνος εἶναι δεὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχερώτους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομιθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἣν ἡ παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔθισμοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ’ ἀκούοντες. 13 §§ 10—13.

There is certainly a striking parallelism here: compare especially 13 § 13 with τούτων δὲ ποίους...θεσιν in the right hand column; but it is partly covered by the reference back τυγχάνομεν δὲ διηρημένοι πρότερον, which Wilson is obliged to suppose inserted or to be, possibly, a reference

1 Journal of Phil. x. pp. 84, 85.
to the *Ethics*. That there is an advance in the treatment of cc. 14, 15 will become apparent on a close comparison with c. 13: see the *Analysis* (p. 116). Similarly in iii. c. 9 there is an elaboration of the earlier sketch in iii. c. 6; in i. cc. 5—7 the conclusions anticipated in i. c. 4 are but amplified and supported.

In i. § 12 the fact that man often obeys reason in opposition to habits and nature is a strange reason why habits and nature should be in harmony with reason. Hence Böcker proposed to transpose ἀλλάζοις to follow βελτιον at the end of § 11. In this place it emphasizes the agreement necessary between the habits and the natural capacity of our citizens. But Wilson points out that the parallel clause in c. 15 refers to λόγος and ἐθή; hence he defends the order of the manuscripts. The meaning then would be: "reason ought to work for the end which the legislator has in view in harmony with nature and habit; for men may be induced by reason to do what they would never do by nature or by habit."

(18) iv (vii). 16 §§ 4, 5 σχέδων δὲ πάντα...τούτων. This solution of the whole question discussed in this chapter should surely follow the difficulties enumerated, and not interrupt the enumeration, as it does at present. It is proposed to remove it to follow § 8 πληθον ἡ τίν. ετί <ἡ μικρόν>. If this be done, (1) § 6 ἔστι δ' ὅ τῶν νέων κτλ. will directly explain § 4 ἔστι δ' ὅθεν ἄρχειμενοι...βαύλησι; (2) the transposed passage will have an excellent continuation in § 9, which fixes the ages for marriage at 18 and 37 (?) respectively.

(19) iv (vii). 17 § 6 τάς δὲ διατάσεις...διατευνομένους. These remarks must apply to the very earliest infancy. If so they ought to come after § 3 ἀσκησιν; for in § 4 Aristotle goes on to discuss τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν. The transposition suggested is supported by the fact that then ἐπισκέπτεων δὴ will follow directly upon § 5, to which in any case it must be referred.

(20) iv (vii). 17 § 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραθόρυβῳ...ἀναγκαῖον. These remarks are clearly intended to put a close to the whole discussion of §§ 8—14. If so, they should come at the end, i.e. after δυσμένειαν (? δυσγένειαν) in § 14.6.

(21) v (viii). 4 § 7. The clause δὲι δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργον κράνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν' ἀνταγωνιστάς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσιν,

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1 Comp. Susemihl *Aris, Politica tertium* ed. pp. XXI, XXII.
3 *op. c. 15.
6 Susemihl *l. c.*
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πρότερον δ’ οὖκ εἶχον must refer to the Lacedaemonians and their recent rivals the Thebans. They would stand better directly after the criticism on the Lacedaemonians in § 4; the intermediate remarks, §§ 5, 6, being of a general character and a deduction from this particular case. Moreover δὲ should then be changed to δό.

(22) v (viii). v § 17 ἐτι δὲ ἀκροωμένων τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς καὶ χωρίς τών ρυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. As they stand, these words, introduced by ἐτι, should give a second reason ὅτι γνῶμεθα ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἢδη διὰ τῆς μονοικῆς, the first being the ‘enthusiasm’ inspired by the melodies of Olympos. But the reason alleged is surely only a generalization of the first: ‘enthusiastic’ strains inspire ‘enthusiasm’: and, further, all men become attuned to the mood of musical imitations by listening to them. Now a little further down, § 18, we are told that “rhythms and melodies afford the best imitations, “short of the reality, of emotions, virtues, and moral qualities gene- “rally: which is plain from their effects. For as we listen to music the “soul undergoes a change.” But why should this change of mood in the soul prove music to be the best means of faithfully pourtraying morality and emotion? Transfer to this place the words from § 17, and the reason is plain: “because all men are attuned to the mood of the musical imitations to which they listen, even if there be no words, but mere rhythm and melody,” i.e. a purely instrumental performance.

(23) v (viii). v § 25 καὶ τις ἔσολε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ρυθμοῖς* * εἶναι (δοὶ πολλοὶ φασί τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δ’ ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν). Böcker recommends that this, the only clause not at present included in the huge period stretching from § 17 to the end of c. 5, should be transposed to a place before the apodosis, i.e. after § 23 and before ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων § 24.

(24) vi (iv). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19. There are good grounds for believing that this portion of Bk. vi (iv) is not genuine. From the parallelism of 4 § 7, ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτείαι πλείους καὶ δι’ ἥν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον, to 4 § 20 (the first words after the suspected section) ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτείαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον, the inference was drawn that there were two interpolations. That the second is not a continuation of the first, but rather a parallel version unskilfully added by the compiler, seems probable from the

1 Susemihl ib. p. 411, Q. C. iv. 20, also Böcker independently φ. c. p. 18.
2 Susemihl Philologus xxv. 1867, 411—413, Q. C. iv. 20, Spengel Arist. Stud. 44. 45.
3 φ. c. p. 18.
4 Susemihl in Rhein. Mus. xxii. 1866.
fact that the promise made in 4 § 7 διώτι δὲ πλείως κτλ, is never redeemed: instead of this the main subject of c. 3 is treated over again in 4 §§ 7—19. We will here cite only the more exact correspondences adduced by Wilson in support of this view.

τὸν μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείως πολιτείας αἰτίον ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. 3 § 1.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκίων συγκε-μένας ὀρῶμεν πάσας τὰς πόλεις, ἐπειτα πάλιν τούτοις τοῦ πλήθους τοὺς μὲν εὔπορους ἀναγκαίων εἶναι τοὺς δ’ ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄπορων τῷ μὲν ὀπλιτικόν τῷ δ’ ὁσπλ. καὶ τῶν μὲν γεωργικόν δὴμον ὀρῶμεν ὑπά, τὸν δ’ ἀγοραίον, τὸν δὲ βάναυσον. 3 §§ 1, 2.

ἐτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον δια-φοράς ἔστιν ἣ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἢ δὲ κατ’ ἀρετὴν. * * καὶ εἰ τι δὴ τοῦ-οῦτον ἐτερον εὑρήται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐκεῖ γὰρ διείλομεν ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ πάσα πόλις. 3 § 4.

...φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγ-καίον εἶναι πολιτείας, εἰδεὶ διαφε-ροῦσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ’ εἰδεὶ διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. 3 § 5.

ἀναγκαίον ἀρὰ πολιτείας εἶναι τοσ-αύτας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς ύπεροχὰς εἰσὶ καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων. 3 § 6.

ὁμολογούμενεν γὰρ οὖν ἐν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πάσιν ἔχειν πόλιν. 4 § 7. καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀλλ’ ἐκ πολλῶν συγκείται μορίων, ὥσπερ εὑρήται πολλάκις. 4 § 9.

ἐν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλήθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοὶ, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναυ-σον, κτλ

τρίτον δὲ <τὸ> ἀγοραίου, κτλ τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμήσον, δ’ τούτων οὔδεν ἦττον ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶν ὑπάρ-χειν κτλ 4 §§ 9, 10.

ὡστε κτλ......φανερον ὅτι τὸ γε ὀπλιτικόν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ τῆς πόλεως μόριον. * * ἐβδομον δὲ τὸ ταῖς οἰκίαις λειτουργοῖν, ὅπερ καλοῦ-μεν εὐπόρους. οὐδεν δὲ τὸ δημοοργικόν κτλ

......ἀναγκαίων καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναι τινας ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. 4 §§ 15—17.

"ὡστε οὖν εἰ ζῴου προηρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἰδὴ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν ἀπο-διωρίζομεν ὅπερ ἀναγκαίον πᾶν ἔχειν ἐξ ζῷων κτλ

ei δὲ τοσαύτα εἶναι δει μοῦνον,τούτων δ’ εἰν διαφοραί, ...δ’ τῆς συζεύξεως τῆς τούτων ἀριθμοῖς εἶναι συζεύξεως ποιήσει πλείω γένει ζῴων κτλ. ....

ἀναγκαίων ἀρὰ πολιτείας εἶναι τοσ-αύτας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς ύπεροχὰς εἰσὶ καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων. 3 § 6.
Whereas in 3 § 4 the one version refers to Bk. iv (vii), even those parts of the original order of the books before him, "the second version inserts, "instead of the reference, a long passage similar to that part of Bk. "iv (vii) which the first version refers to."

To sum up, there does appear to be sufficient evidence of a parallel version: it must be remarked, however, (1) that the second version, as it now stands, plainly refers to the former 4 § 7 ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην: therefore this at least must be due to an editor who wished to make the two continuous. (2) There seems to be nothing in c. 3 to correspond with the simile of an animal in 4 §§ 7, 8; for the sense and bearing of 3 §§ 5, 6, suggested by Wilson, appear very different.

(25) vi (iv). 6 §§ 2, 3. those δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν, ὅταν κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησιμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν. ὅλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἔξειναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικοῖς, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔξειναι σχολαίζειν ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδοιν ὀνόσων.

The clause διὸ...μετέχειν is omitted by the manuscripts of the second recension. Either it is an interpolation or, if genuine, out of place; for there is nothing preceding διό of which it could be the effect. Thurot would find a place for it after προσόδοιν ὀνόσων, but he has to admit that ἔξειναι σχολαίζειν is forced and unusual; it is ἔξειναι μετέχειν wherever this subject comes up, and the second claim forms no real antithesis to the first. Rassow gives a more satisfactory contrast by inserting δημοκρατικὸν after ἔξειναι: "on general grounds to exclude from citizenship "those who have the requisite amount of property would be an "oligarchical measure, to admit them democratical." After this rule

1 "The words may perhaps refer to Bk. iv (vii)" (Wilson). But he does not further explain.
2 Etudes sur Aristote 60, 6
3 Bemerkungen pp. 13, 14.
has been laid down the clause διὸ...μετέχειν comes in with excellent sense as stating the practical result. It will be necessary to insert δ᾽ after σχολάζειν.

(26) vi (iv). c. 12\(^1\). The subject of this chapter is the third of the investigations enumerated in c. 2 §§ 4—6, ἐπείτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή; what form of government is most adapted to a state under given circumstances. After the general conditions, that it must be that supported by τὸ κρέπτον whether their preponderance comes from τὸ τοιὸν or τὸ ποσὸν, Aristotle points out (1) when a democracy is desirable in the words of § 3, ὃπον μὲν ὃν ὑπερέχει...τοῦτον; (2) when an oligarchy would suit better in the remainder of § 3, ὃπον δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐτόρων...πλήθους; while (3) the circumstances favourable to a Polity (in the technical sense) are pointed out in §§ 4, 5, ὃπον δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων...ὁ μέσος. The similarity of their form proves that these three sentences ought to be taken closely together: (2) and (3) are however separated by the words δεῖ δ᾽ ἄλλη τῶν νομοθετη...τοὺς νόμους τοῦτοι, the former part of § 4. Not only so, but this sentence has nothing to do with the special conditions of an oligarchy: ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ must refer to Polity in the technical sense; accordingly the sentence belongs to the second investigation of c. 2, τίς κοινοτάτη κτλ. Moreover from 12 § 6, ὅσῳ δ᾽ ἄν ἁμενον right on to the end of c. 13, τὸ ἀρχεσθαι, Aristotle never recurs to the enquiry τίς τίσιν αἱρετή. He appears to go off on the subject of the stability of Polities (in the technical sense), ending with a brief historical digression, 13 §§ 6—12\(^2\).

The conclusion to which these facts point is as follows: The enquiry τίς τίσιν αἱρετή is broken off abruptly at ὃ μέσος in 12 § 5; if it was ever complete—cp. vii (vi). I. 5, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτείων τίς συμφέρει τίσιν, ἐρημεῖ πρότερον—the rest of it has been lost. The beginning of 12 § 4, δεῖ δ᾽ ἄλλη...τοῦτος, together with 12 § 6 and the whole of c. 13, belong to the previous enquiry. Bücheler with great probability would insert 12 § 4, δεῖ...τοῦτος + 12 § 6, c. 13 §§ 1—6, ὅσῳ δ᾽ ἄν ἁμενον...ἐτέρων μόνον in the account of the constitution of Polity given in c. 9 § 6, between ὃ μὲν ὃν τρόπος τῆς μείξεως οὕτως and τοῦ δ᾽ εὖ μεμίχθαι, where certainly the subject-matter is strikingly similar. For the remainder of c. 13, §§ 7—12, δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν...ἀρχεσθαι, he finds a fitting place at the end of c. 9 after ἀλῶς.

(27) viii (v). i § 8. There are two ways in which revolutions arise, διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς: ὅτε μὲν γὰρ...ἐκεῖνων, ὅτε δὲ...

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\(^1\) See Susemihl in *Rhein. Mus. xxi*. 564 ff.; also Böcker *op. cit.* § 11, pp. 24—32.

\(^2\) The reader may satisfy himself of this by careful examination of the passage: *cp. Analysis* p. 121 f.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

μοναρχίαν. But in § 9 another way is seemingly brought in ἐπὶ περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἢπτον κτλ, and in § 10 another ἐπὶ πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κτλ. Further, these two latter cases properly belong to the first alternative, when the revolutionary party wish for a change in the government; they are both equally opposed to the other ὅτε δὲ κτλ, where the object is not to overthrow the form of government, but to crush the present holders of power. If then Aristotle wrote in the proper logical order, the place for the second leading alternative ὅτε δὲ οὐδὲ...ἡ τῆν μοναρχίαν is in § 11 between πολιτεία and πανταχοῦ¹.

Wilson² discovers a parallel version of 1 §§ 2—7, δεὶ δὲ πρῶτον...στάσεων εἰσιν, in I §§ 11—16 πανταχοῦ γὰρ...τῶν τινῶν πολιτείων. The most striking correspondences which he adduces are:

1. ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, διαφέρον-ται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἷον ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τι ἵσοι ὅσιν, ἵσοι ὅλως εἶναι νομίζουσιν.
2. δεὶ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὅτι πολλὰ γεγένηται πολι-τείαι πάντων μὲν ὁμολογοῦντον τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἵσον, τούτου δὲ ἀμπατανώτων, ὡσπερ εἰρήται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἵσους ὅπειρον ὄντας οἰς ἐσθαλ ἀπλῶς ἵσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἔλευθεροι πάντες ὁμοῖος, ἀπλῶς ἵσου εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὀλιγ-γαρχία ὃ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἐν τῇ ὄντας ὅλως εἶναι ἀνίσους υπολαμβάνειν (κατ' ὀνομὰ χαῖρ ἄνισον ὄντες ἀπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). §§ 2, 3.

Further “the main thought of these two parallel passages is repeated “in a shorter form” in 2 §§ 2, 3: “there is here then perhaps another “re-writing, seemingly by a later hand, of the introduction to the book “and with this third beginning seems to cohere the rest of cc. 2, 3.” Wilson sees in each of these a probable reference to Bk. III; at I §§ 2, § 13, 2 § 2. It must be observed however (1) that the main difficulty of c. 1 lies in §§ 8—11, and is not removed by these suggestions: (2) there is a real advance in c. 2 as compared, for instance, with I §§ 11—16: and yet (as Wilson sees) if I §§ 11—16 is another recension of I §§ 2—7, 2 §§ 2, 3 has quite as much right to be so considered. (3) It is possible that 3 §§ 14, στασιάζουσι δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις...Ἰσοὶ ὄντες,

¹ Susemihl Quaest. Crit. v. p. 10. ² Journal of Philology x. 84.
should precede § 11, πανταχοῦ γὰρ κτλ. At all events that passage is 
out of place where it stands in c. 3.

(28) VIII (v). c. 4. In this chapter §§ 1—7, γίνονται μὲν...ἐπηρε-
ασθείς, have for their subject the cases where στάσεις has arisen 
dissensions amongst the leading men. The subject of §§ 8—12, μετα-
βάλλοντοι δὲ καὶ...πρὸς πολλοὺς, is wholly different. Aristotle returns to 
the case which he calls in c. 3 § 6 δὲ ἀφέψαν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, 
when any party in the state has become over-powerful. This ἀφέψαν 
may be κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν οὐ κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν; but all the examples in 3 §§ 7, 8 
illustrate the former kind. It seems best then to transpose 4 §§ 8—12, 
μεταβάλλοντοι δὲ καὶ...πρὸς πολλοὺς (which contain examples of the 
latter kind) to follow διναστείας at the end of 3 § 82.

(29) VIII (v). 6 §§ 10—13, ὁμονοιότα ὑπὲρ ἀλγαρχία...ἡ Ἰφιάδον. In 
its present place this passage interrupts the orderly enumeration of the 
causes which tend to overthrow oligarchy owing to internal dissensions: 
(1) 6 §§ 2—5 continual decrease of the privileged body, (2) §§ 5—7 
rise of demagogues amongst them, (3) §§ 8, 9 extravagance and reckless 
living, (4) §§ 14, 15 insults offered κατὰ γάμους ἡ δίκας, (5) § 16 refusal 
on the part of some oligarchs to go the full length in oppression of the 
Demos. In §§ 10, 11, coming between (3) and (4), the conditions of 
permanence in an oligarchy are touched upon; a better place for them 
has after § 16; while §§ 12, 13 are probably interpolated3.

A few remarks may be useful on the suggestions here passed under 
review. Though necessarily an unsatisfactory remedy4, transposition 
has been used with great effect in some authors (e.g. Lucretius) and has 
always been a recognised expedient. But it has been most successful 
when applied to verse and to dislocations arising mechanically through 
the displacement of leaves or by carelessness of transcribers. Now only 
a small part (if any) of those here assumed can have had such an origin. 
The most reasonable account of the majority presupposes an editor 
dealing unskilfully with Aristotle's materials5. In proportion as this is

1 Susemihl Politica tert. ed. p. xxiii; 
2 Böck er op. cit. 37.
3 Böck er op. cit. 40, 41.
4 Susemihl Quaest. Crit. v. 12, 13.
5 "Before we can prove that a transpo-
sition is correct, we must have shewn 
not only that the passage cannot be 
placed in its old position, but that it 
must be placed in its new." Postgate 
Notes p. 24.
6 "Hoc est uerisimilimum: ipsum 
Aristotelem omnes has particulas, quas 
in altera Politicorum recensione siue 
uberiori tractare siue continenti exposi-
tionis ordini inserere sibi proposuerit, 
in margine hic illic adnotasse; posteros autem, qui ediderunt libros, cum nesci-
rent, quid notis illis uoluisse scriptor, 
ieptissimé confusas in hunc, quem ho-
die tenent, locum contulisse, quem for-
tasse reuera mutilatum lacunosumue 
deprehenderant." Böcker op. cit. 32, 33. 
There was no place for footnotes in 
an ancient book: but some instances in 
the above list—e.g. (3) (11) (15) (21) 
(23) (27) (29)—have quite the look of 
marginal notes. Compare the remark of 
Welldon Translation p. 100 n. 2.
admitted the certainty that a given transposition restores the original form, due to its being logically required, diminishes: and room must always be allowed for the misgiving "ne hoc modo ipsum potius Aristotelis telem corrigamus quam editores eius antiquos: certe cur ab eo ipso in "libris celerrime scriptis, nequaquam diligenter ubique elaboratis, inco- "hatis potius quam perfectis optimam semper disponendi rationem "esse inuentam non sane scio cur credam."

These observations are all the more necessary as the most recent edition of any part of the Politics⁵ carries still further the disintegration of the text, transposing and rejecting supposed interpolations in a part of the treatise hitherto believed not to need these remedies⁶. The most important change introduced is to make Bk. i. cc. 8—11, peri χρηματιστικῆς, precede the discussion peri δεσπότων καὶ δοῦλων, thus inserting them in i. c. 3 § 3 between χρηματιστικῆς and πρῶτον δέ. That the topics of Bk. i. would be thus better arranged may be admitted: but the probability (not to say the certainty) that Aristotle even intended ultimately so to arrange them will require cogent proof, especially if it can be shown that with the present order the transition from topic to topic is natural, the development logical, the indications of a disposition of the subject-matter borne out in the sequel. Briefly to sum up, Schmidt presents Bk. i. in the following order: c. i. c. 2 §§ 1—6 παίδες: then comes § 8 presented as two parallel versions:

Then follows 2 § 7 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον...τῶν θεῶν. Then another double recension consisting mainly of 2 §§ 13, 14:

₃ Even Krohn Zur Kritik 33—35 regards the first book as Aristotle's. He nowhere states how far it had been manipulated by the οἰκείων αναγωγή.
₄ ait' <a> for ἐτί.
What is left of c. 2 follows in the usual order, i.e. §§ 9, 10 έκ τοίτων...ἐπιθυμητής, §§ 10—12 δίωτι...τόλιν, §§ 15, 16 φύσει...κρίσει: also c. 3 §§ 1—3 as far as χρηματιστικής. Then cc. 8—11 in the following order: 8 §§ 1—13 πρωτόν μὲν οὖν ἀπορησειεν (the preceding sentence of 8 § 1 δῆλον... ἤν is enclosed in brackets)... οἰκίας: 10 §§ 1—3 δῆλον... ζῷον: 8 §§ 14, 15; 9 § 1 καὶ ἑοκεν... γίνεται μᾶλλον: 9 §§ 12, 13 καὶ αὐτή... χρημάτων κτῆσις: 9 §§ 2—12 λάβωμεν... οἳ κατὰ φύσιν: 9 §§ 14—18 τῆς δ’ οἰκονομικῆς οὖν... χρηματιστικῆς... ὁρον: 10 §§ 4, 5; c. 11; c. 12 § 1 as far as γαμική. The rest of c. 3 follows, i.e. §§ 3, 4 πρωτόν [δὲ] περὶ δεσπότου... βιάιον γὰρ: cc. 4—6 as usual; c. 7 §§ 2—5 ὅ μὲν οὖν δεσπό- της... θηρευτική, after which ἡ δὲ... χρήσθαι... τὸν πόλεμον [καὶ πρῶτον] should be inserted from c. 8 § 12: then 7 §§ 1, 2 φανερὸν δὲ... ἵστον ψυχή...: lastly cc. 12, 13 from καὶ γὰρ γνωσκός (in 12 § 1) to the end. Ἰ.Κ.

1 The parallel versions here given hardly deserve that name if compared with those pointed out by Spengel, Susemihl, Wilson. It is essential that the same thought, or something very similar, should be found repeated with a mere variation of language. Schmidt employs the two columns to separate genuine Aristotelian fragments from the additions of editors. In the right hand column above, the conception of αὐτάρκεια is found three times, and the passages where it occurs are judged by him to be additions to the original Aristotle (ϕ. c. 804) because, if the end of the state is εὖ γὰρ, it cannot be αὐτάρκεια. This then, he argues, is an instance of two independent definitions which have been blended into one. Similarly with other cases where, according to his view, the present text, or, as Krohn calls it, ‘our old recension’, has been formed by the comprehension of heterogeneous materials.
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

INTRODUCTION. B. I. cc. 1, 2.

I. As the end and aim of every society is a good, the end and aim of the state, the highest society under which all the rest are included, is the highest good: 1 § 1.

II. The assertion (in the Politicus of Plato) that the difference between the family and the state is merely quantitative, not qualitative, and hence that there is no essential difference between a father, a master, a king, and a republican statesman, 1 § 2, disproved by an analytical enquiry into the origin of the family, the village-community, and the state: 1 § 3, 2 § 1.

(a) The family is formed by nature out of the two smallest natural unions, of husband and wife, and of master and slave, solely for the support and propagation of life: 2 §§ 2—5.

(b) In the same natural manner out of the household or family grows the village-community, the first in the ascending scale of societies formed for purposes wider than the satisfaction of mere every-day wants. Out of the village arises the state, in which the primitive form of government was accordingly monarchy: 2 §§ 5—7.

(c) The state itself then, the most complete society, springing up, like the rest, to provide the bare means of living, continues to exist for the full development and perfecting and independence of life. It is, in a higher sense of the term, most truly a natural growth; and man is a being by nature ordained for civil society, 2 §§ 8, 9, far beyond all other animals, because he alone possesses speech and the perception of good and evil, of right and wrong: 2 §§ 10—12.

(d) Moreover the state is in the order of nature prior to the family and to the individual: 2 §§ 13, 14.

(e) Only the actual establishment of the state raises man to what he really is and endows him with those higher gifts of virtue, in the absence of which he is no better—far worse indeed—than any of the brutes: 2 §§ 15, 16.

A. Of the Family in general. There being three fundamental constituents of the family, the subject is divided into a consideration of the several relations (1) of master and slave, (2) of husband and wife (the conjugal relation), (3) of father and child (the parental relation). To which must be added a consideration of wealth and its acquisition (χρηματιστική); the relation of this subject to that of the family (οἰκονομική)1 is a disputed point needing investigation: 3 §§ 1—3.

B. Special Exposition: c. 3 § 3—c. 13 § 6.

I. Of the relation of master and slave, or of Slavery: 3 § 3—7 § 5.

(a) Transition to this subject, 3 § 3. Statement of the two main points in the inquiry, 3 § 4.

(b) These two points discussed at length: cc. 4—6, c. 7 §§ 1—3.

(i) The nature and justification of Slavery: cc. 4—6.

(ii) How far Slavery is in accord with the law of nature: cc. 5, 6.

(a) There are as a fact men whom nature intended to be the slaves of the rest, c. 5.

(b) But for that very reason slavery imposed simply by the laws of war upon men who are not of this sort is contrary to nature, c. 6.

(β) The view quoted in the Introduction from Plato's Politics that rule over freemen and over slaves, whether in the family or in the state, is not essentially different and that it rests upon a science, is now more completely stated and disproved on the ground of the results just obtained, 7 §§ 1, 2.

There are however sciences treating of the functions of master and slave. Wherein such science consists: 7 §§ 3, 4.

II. Of Property and its acquisition: cc. 8—11.

(περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς: of the acquisition or management of property, the art of wealth.)

1 [No uniform rendering of these two words has been attempted, and the term 'economic science', used a little lower down as a virtual reproduction of one of them, is without authority in this sense. The more common equivalents are, for χρηματιστική 'finance', 'money-making art'; for οἰκονομική 'household management', 'domestic economy'. Tr.]
(a) Theoretical discussion. The relation of the art of wealth (Χρηματιστική) to a theory of the family or economic science (Οικονομική): cc. 8—10.

(a) The different cases possible: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Proof that the first is inadmissible: acquisition of property does not coincide with the whole field of economic science: 8 § 2 (ὅτι μὴν ὁν…).

(c) To decide whether the former is at any rate a branch of the latter (or even an auxiliary science), it is necessary, 8 § 3, to distinguish

(i) direct acquisition through production by means of cattle-breeding, hunting, plundering, fishing, agriculture, and fruit-growing: a species of acquisition belonging as such to economic science and forming a part of it, or an auxiliary science: 8 §§ 3—15,

and (ii) indirect acquisition by exchange, c. 9:

either (a) simple barter, not in itself unnatural provided it does not go beyond actual needs, 9 §§ 1—6,

or (b) exchange through the medium of money, an artificial, though necessary, development of barter to facilitate intercourse. So long as it remains true to this object and no more than a means to the easier satisfaction of actual needs it does not become unnatural or foreign to economic science, as it does when trade is carried on as a distinct profession, money is made an independent end, and exchange simply a means to unlimited accumulation of money and capital: 9 §§ 7—18.

(d) It is now possible to decide finally between the various alternatives remaining, so far as the natural species of acquisition is concerned. This is in one respect an actual branch of Economic, in another respect, and more truly, only an auxiliary to it: 10 §§ 1—3.

(c) The most unnatural species of exchange is trading with money in the strict sense, the lending out of money on interest, which directly makes money out of money: 10 §§ 4, 5.

(b) The art of acquiring wealth in its practical application: c. 11.

(a) Classification of the different branches of this art: 11 §§ 1—4.

(i) Production proper: cattle-rearing, agriculture, fruit-growing; culture of bees, fish, birds: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Acquisition by means of exchange: 11 § 3.

(a) trade: whether (1) maritime, (2) inland, or (3) retail trade;

(b) the lending of money on interest;

(c) hired labour (1) of artizans, (2) of day labourers.

(iii) Branches of a mixed nature: forestry, mining, 11 § 4.

(b) General remark on the different character of these various branches as judged by an ideal standard, 11 § 6.

(c) For particular information as to the practical exercise of these various branches of acquisition reference is made to special works upon these subjects and to
the stories current in various quarters of the means by which individuals have been enriched: 11 §§ 7—13.

III. The management of the household, as it affects the members, especially in the marital and parental relations; also in the relation of master and slave: cc. 12, 13.

(a) Different nature of the rule exercised over the wife and over the children: c. 12.

(b) The management of a household extends to inanimate property but especially and primarily aims at promoting virtue and excellence in the members of the family, preeminently in those who are free: 13 § 1.

(c) Proof that even a slave is capable of a certain mental and moral excellence and that he requires it: that the virtue of man, woman, child, slave, is different in kind and degree, 13 §§ 2—12, since

(a) although the parts of the soul are the same, they exist differently in man, woman, child, and slave, 13 §§ 5—9:

(β) a more detailed investigation shows that by common consent certain qualities would not be virtues in a man which are so in a woman, a child, or a slave: 13 §§ 10, 11.

(γ) The virtue and excellence of a boy and a slave belong to them not in themselves, but in relation to another: 13 § 11 (ἐπεὶ δὲ...).

(d) A more precise statement wherein the excellence of a slave consists. It is the master’s business to train him to it. The right mode of treating slaves: 13 §§ 12—14.

(e) The right course of training for women and boys is a subject that goes beyond the limits of the family and more properly belongs to the theory of the best polity: 13 §§ 15, 16.
PART II: OF THE POLITY OR CONSTITUTION: B. II.—VIII.

A. CRITICAL PART.

Examination of the schemes of an ideal best polity put forward in the theories of preceding philosophers, together with those most commendable amongst the constitutions actually established. It is shown that none of them really answers to the best polity: B. II.

I. The object and principles of this review: c. i §§ 1, 2.

II. CRITICISM OF THE IDEAL POLITIES: i § 3—8 § 25.

a. PLATO'S IDEAL STATE IN THE Republic: i § 3—5 § 28.

(a) The end which Plato assumes for the state, its utmost possible unity, really involves, in the form in which he assumes it, the abrogation of the state, and is thus incapable of realization: c. 2.

(β) But even granting that this is the true end and practicable it would not be secured by the means which Plato proposes; viz. the enforcement, upon the two upper classes, of community of wives and children and community of property: 3 § 1—5 § 13.

(i) Arguments against community of wives and children: cc. 3, 4.

(1) Plato thinks it a proof of perfect unity that all should apply to the same objects the terms 'mine', 'another's'. But there is an ambiguity in the word “all”. Plato's view would not be correct if “all” meant “all collectively”, but only if “all” meant “each individual”:_a meaning here impossible: 3 §§ 1—3. This argument applies also to community of property.

(2) Men care far less about the things which they share in common than about what is their own. Hence the community of children will result in the total neglect of them by all alike: their real or nominal parents will, one and all, feel but slight interest in what becomes of them. So that a specific real relationship, however distant, would be of far more service to them than this general indeterminate paternity: 3 §§ 4—7.

(3) Many parents however would inevitably recognise their own children: 3 §§ 8, 9.

(4) As a rule violence and outrage are avoided with especial care in the case of near relations, but when it is not known who these are this heedfulness disappears: 4 § 1.
II. cc. 1—5.

(5) It is strange that in spite of the community of children Plato does not altogether prohibit unnatural love but only its worst excesses; nor even that because he is scandalized at its impropriety between the nearest blood-relations: 4 §§ 2—6.

(6) The end Plato has in view is the greatest possible unity and harmony amongst the ruling class of citizens: all are to feel themselves members of a single family. But the result would be just the opposite, since when thus generalized all specific affection for kinsfolk would be abrogated and replaced by a feeble attachment in the last degree 'watery' and attenuated: 4 §§ 5—9. <For Plato's purpose, then, these institutions would have been better adapted for the third class of the population, than for the first two as he proposes, in order to make its members disunited and more obedient: 4 § 4.>

(7) Plato's regulation for removing children, under certain circumstances, from the two upper classes into the third, and conversely, would be attended by great difficulties: and as such children are not to be informed that they were born in a different class, the mischiefs pointed out under (4) and (5) would be more likely to occur in their case: 4 § 9 (ἀλλὰ μὴν...), § 10.

(ii) Arguments against community of property: 5 §§ 1—13.

(1) The different forms of communism possible, 5 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Community of property is no doubt more conceivable where, as in the Platonic state, the cultivators are not the owners of the soil: 5 § 3. But still in all that relates to social intercourse, to meum and tuum, communism is shown by experience to produce much dissension, 5 § 4. Far preferable therefore would be that state of things where property in general remains in private ownership, but the laws have inspired the citizens with so much public spirit, that they are willing to give up to their fellow-citizens much of their private possessions for common use: 5 §§ 5—8.

(3) Communism destroys the high enjoyment afforded by private property, which is in itself fully justified and in many respects morally noble: 5 §§ 8, 9.

(4) With community of wives, children, and property there could be no such virtues as chastity (σωφροσύνη), in respect of one's neighbour's wife, or liberality: 5 § 10.

(5) Lawsuits about disputed property, cases arising from perjury, &c. are not due, as Plato maintains, to the absence of communism, but to the prevalence of moral corruption: 5 §§ 11, 12.

(6) In general Plato's procedure is unfair; he has before him only the evils of which we should be rid by communism: the advantages we should lose he overlooks: 5 § 13.

(γ) Further objections to the Platonic institutions generally: 5 §§ 14—28.

(i) Their defects are ultimately due to the defectiveness of the end which they subserve, as pointed out above under (a). But so far as political unity within due limits must be the object of political institutions it is surprising that, considering the great importance which Plato attaches to the right education, he should not seek to attain this unity amongst his citizens by education, the introduction of common messes, &c. instead of the means which he employs: 5 §§ 14, 15.

(ii) If the Platonic institutions were really serviceable, they would have been carried into effect before now: 5 § 16.
(iii) But the experiment would prove beyond all doubt that the practical application of them could not be carried further than is at present actually the case in some states: 5 § 17.

(iv) Besides, the regulations laid down by Plato are extremely imperfect. They only apply to the two upper classes of citizens, and equal difficulties present themselves whether they are extended to the third class or not. In the former case the true foundation of the Platonic state would be annulled; in the latter the state would be divided into two hostile camps in direct contradiction of the unity intended, as the advantages which Plato claimed for his state (see 5 § 11 above) would for the most part be rendered illusory: 5 §§ 18—24.

(v) The analogy of animals, who have no domestic life, does not prove that women can share the occupations of men: 5 § 24 (ἀτροπον δὲ καὶ...).

(vi) To keep the same rulers always in office is a dangerous measure, but consistency on Plato’s part requires it: 5 §§ 25, 26.

(vii) Plato himself admits that his regulations do not secure the complete happiness of the upper classes. If so, then further this is true of the whole state: 5 §§ 27, 28.


(a) Comparison of the Republic with the Laws; the relation between the schemes of polity laid down in these two works: 6 §§ 1—5.

(β) Criticism of the state in the Laws: 6 §§ 6—22.

(i) It would require far too large a territory: 6 §§ 6, 7.

(ii) It is not enough that a code of laws should take account of the land and the people; the neighbouring people have also to be regarded: 6 §§ 7, 8.

(iii) Again, the principles regulating the limit to be set on possession need to be expressed more clearly and fully: 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) There is an inconsistency in demanding equality of landed estate without at the same time fixing a definite unalterable number of citizens: 6 §§ 10—13.

(v) We are not told how the ruling citizens are to receive an education distinguishing them from the rest, nor in what this education should consist: 6 § 14.

(vi) It is inconsistent to make landed estate inalienable and at the same time allow moveable property within certain limits to change hands: 6 § 15.

(vii) The division of each citizen’s real estate into two separate establishments is awkward: 6 § 15 (καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀκοπηδάων...).

(viii) The constitution proposed in the Laws is a combination of Oligarchy and Democracy, i.e. a Polity (πολιτεία) technically so called. But

(1) this sort of mixed constitution, though perhaps the best on the average, is by no means the next best after the absolutely perfect scheme: 6 §§ 16, 17.

(2) Plato himself calls it a blending of Democracy and Tyranny, which is self-contradictory and, as a matter of fact, incorrect: 6 § 18.

(3) The oligarchical element is far too preponderant in this constitution of Plato’s: 6 §§ 19—21.

(ix) The mode in which the magistrates are elected is politically unsafe: 6 § 22.
II. cc. 5—8.

c. Phaleas' scheme of polity: c. 7.

(a) Brief account of this scheme: 7 §§ 1—4.

(β) Criticism: 7 §§ 5—23.

(i) The objection brought against Plato, 6 § 10, holds also against Phaleas: if there is to be a maximum fixed for property, then the number of children must also be limited: 7 § 5.

(ii) Although a certain equality of possessions is no doubt of importance for the state, it is much more important that the estates should on the average be neither too large nor too small: 7 §§ 6, 7.

(iii) Far more important, again, is equality in respect of a good education, which trains the intellect properly and duly moderates the desires: 7 §§ 8, 9. §§ 10—13 = 7 §§ 18—20.

(iv) Moreover Phaleas has never sufficiently defined equality of possessions, as he makes no allusion to moveable property: 7 § 21.

(v) In his regulation of property he ought to have taken some account of the external concerns and relations of the state, but he has left them altogether unnoticed: 7 §§ 14—17.

(vi) Phaleas prohibits all handicrafts to his citizens; but the measures adopted by him to render this possible are not suited to his object: 7 §§ 22, 23.

d. Hippodamos' scheme of polity: c. 8.

[(a) Introductory remarks on Hippodamos himself: 8 § 1.]

(β) Account of his model constitution: 8 §§ 2—7.

(i) Number of the citizens, 8 § 2.

(ii) Division into artizans, farmers, soldiers, 8 § 2.

(iii) Division of the land; a part to belong to the temples, a part to the state, a part to private individuals, 8 § 3.

(iv) Legal regulations: 8 §§ 4, 5.

(1) The administration of justice to be confined to three objects, § 4.

(2) Right of appeal, § 4.

(3) Alterations in the mode in which jurymen record their verdicts, § 5.

(v) Honorary distinctions for those who are the authors of useful reforms in the existing laws and institutions: 8 § 6.

(vi) Maintenance, at the cost of the state, of the orphans whose fathers have fallen in war: 8 § 6.

(vii) Election of magistrates: 8 § 7.

(γ) Criticism: 8 §§ 7—25.

(i) That all three classes should have an equal share in all the privileges of citizenship is impossible: 8 § 7 (ἀπορώσει δ' ἄν...)—§ 10.
(ii) It does not appear what is the end to be answered by such a farmer class owning the private lands: if it is also to cultivate the state lands its very existence is contrary to the object in view: yet one is at a loss to know who else could do this: § 10 (ἐπὶ οὐ γεωργοὶ ...).

(iii) Nor is the proposal as to the mode in which the jurymen should vote, § 5, any better: §§ 13—15.

(iv) The proposal to reward reforms in legislation, § 6, is open to the objection that while on the one hand the unchangeableness of the existing laws is dangerous, §§ 16—22, on the other there is pressing need that any change in them should be attended by conditions every whit as stringent: §§ 23—25.


(a) The Spartan polity: c. 9.

(a) General prefatory remark upon the twofold standard to be set up in criticising a polity: § 1.

(b) The defects of the Spartan polity: §§ 2—36.


(1) Under a good constitution judged by the first standard there will be provision that the citizens are released from all manual labour, and hence that the soil is cultivated by others than the citizens. But the position of the Spartan peasantry, the Helots, is radically wrong: §§ 2—4.

(2) The license of the women, and their virtual supremacy at Sparta, are mistakes judged by either standard: §§ 5—13.

(3) The permission to give away or bequeath land at pleasure, the absence of any limit to the amount of dower, the unrestricted right of the father (or of the successor to his rights) to bestow an heiress upon any one he likes;—all this combined has brought two-fifths of the Spartan land into female hands and occasioned moreover terrible inequality of possessions with a frightful diminution in the number of men capable of bearing arms. In these circumstances the very law which was designed to increase as much as possible the body of Spartan citizens serves only to swell the ranks of paupers: §§ 14—19.

(ii) Political defects: §§ 19—36.

(1) In the Ephorality, §§ 19—24:

(2) in the Council of Elders, §§ 25—28:

(3) in the Kingly office, §§ 29, 30.

(4) Bad management of the public messes at Sparta: §§ 31, 32.

(5) The Admirals (παῖδαρχοι), § 33.

(6) All the institutions tend solely to military excellence, § 34, which is, after all, but a means to an end and not an end in itself, § 35.

(7) Defects in the financial administration, § 36.
II. cc. 8—12.

(β) Criticism of the Cretan polity: c. 10.

(a) How the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan polities may be historically explained: 10 §§ 1, 2. [Digression on the geographical position of Crete and its political relations under Minos: 10 §§ 3, 4.]

(β) Comparison of the Cretan and Spartan polities: 10 §§ 5—16.

(i) The resemblances, 10 §§ 5—7.

(ii) The differences between the two: 10 §§ 7—14.

(1) How far the public messes are better regulated in Crete than at Sparta. Some other social rules peculiar to the Cretans: 10 §§ 7—9.

(2) How far again the magistracy of the κόσμοι is worse managed even than the ephorality: 10 §§ 9—14.

(iii) Nothing but its favourable geographical position has saved Crete more than once from the outbreak of mischiefs similar to those at Sparta: 10 §§ 15, 16.

(c) Criticism of the Carthaginian polity: c. 11.

(a) General introductory remarks on the excellence of this polity, its resemblance to the Cretan, and more especially to the Spartan polity: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(β) Comparison of Carthage and Sparta in respect of the institutions at Carthage which correspond to the public mess, the ephorality, the kingship, and the senate: 11 §§ 3, 4.

(γ) To what extent

(i) the democratical element: §§ 5, 6,

(ii) the oligarchical element,

is more strongly represented at Carthage than in Crete or at Sparta

(1) in the Boards of Five, 11 § 7,

(2) in the exaggerated respect paid to wealth in the appointment to the highest offices, and in the fact that they can be bought—a practice mischievous to a true aristocracy: 11 §§ 8—10, § 12, §§ 10—12.

(δ) One defect very usual at Carthage is that the same individual simultaneously fills a number of offices: 11 §§ 13, 14.

(ε) From many of the evils resulting from the defects of their polity the Carthaginians are preserved solely by external means, placed at their disposal by the insecure favour of fortune: 11 §§ 15, 16.

(d) Criticism of the Solonian constitution: 12 §§ 2—6.

(a) Transition to this criticism, 12 § 1.

(β) There are no good grounds

(i) either for the praise bestowed by its friends: 12 §§ 2, 3,

(ii) or for the censure bestowed by its opponents: 12 §§ 3—6, upon Solon's constitution,
[IV. Appendix.

On the most prominent legislators, whether they aimed at founding new polities or not: 12 §§ 6—14.

(a) Zaleukos, with remarks upon a supposed school of legislators, Onomakritos, Thales, Lycurgus, Zaleukos, Charondas: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Philolaos, 12 § 8,

(c) Charondas, 12 §§ 8—10,

(d) Phaleas, 12 § 11,

(e) Plato, 12 § 12,

(f) Draco, 12 § 13,

(g) Pittacus, 12 § 13,

(h) Andromadas, 12 § 14.]

B. POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: B. III.—VIII.

I. FUNDAMENTAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

B. III. cc. 1—13.

First group: the most general conceptions: III. 1 § 1—6 § 2.

a. The essential nature of a polity or constitution, of a state, of a citizen: cc. 1, 2.

(a) The enquiry into the nature of a constitution raises the question 'What is a state?' and this introduces the further question 'What is a citizen?': 1 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Citizenship is defined by participation in the government of the state, there being two forms of this government, the one exercised by the general deliberative and judicial bodies, that is, the popular assembly and the jurymen (δικασταί), the other by the particular magistrates. Different polities have different regulations as to the government, and so too as to the right of participation in it. Citizenship not necessarily dependent on descent from citizens: 1 § 2—2 § 5.
\[ \text{β. The true nature of the state is so largely bound up with its constitution that a change in the latter is sufficient to destroy the identity of the state, c. 3.} \]

\[ \text{γ. Is the excellence (ἀπερατία) of the citizen the same as the excellence of the man? 4 § 1—6 § 2.} \]

\[ (a) \text{ Not unconditionally the same, since} \]

\[ \text{(i) the former varies with the particular polity, while the latter is always one and the same: 4 §§ 1—3.} \]

\[ \text{(ii) It is true that in the highest sense the excellence of the citizen means the excellence of a citizen of the best polity. Yet even in the best polity the citizens are not all equally good men, although they may be equally excellent in their several functions: 4 §§ 4, 5.} \]

\[ [(iii) The state consists of very dissimilar elements, which differ in their degrees of excellence: 4 § 6.] \]

\[ (b) \text{ Government in the state must fall to the men who are intellectually and morally the most capable. Hence the excellence of the citizen who rules, \textit{i.e.} his excellence as a ruler, must coincide with his excellence as a man: 4 §§ 7—9.} \]

\[ (c) \text{ But no one can properly command in the state unless he has first learnt properly to obey; this then is a further qualification included under the excellence of the ruler, that is, by (b), under the excellence of the good man. It follows that the excellence of the citizen and the excellence of the man are in their innmost nature really identical and only apparently distinct (and the best polity that in which they are coextensive). The moral excellences (ἀπερατία) displayed in ruling and obeying, though specifically distinct, are yet generically the same. Only the intellectual or dianoetic excellence is generically different in the ruler, where it is higher practical insight and prudence, from what it is in the subject, where it is merely right apprehension of the command: 4 §§ 10—18.} \]

\[ (d) \text{ In agreement with these results the best polity refuses to allow its citizens to engage in agriculture or trade, to be artizans or labourers. Men who are thus occupied must have a status assigned them distinct from that of the citizens. In all the other polities, true civic excellence, identical with the excellence of the good man, can neither wholly nor approximately be attributed to any of the citizens except those who are in a position to abstain from such occupations: 5 § 1—6 § 2.} \]

\[ \text{Second group of principles. Development of the chief species of particular constitutions, with their order of merit: 6 § 2—13 § 25.} \]

\[ a. \text{ Determination of all the possible leading types of polities: 6 § 2—7 § 5.} \]
(a) A polity or constitution is nothing but a form of government, and the separate polities are especially distinguished by the different supreme authorities in whose name government is administered. This being so, the difference in polities is mainly based upon the observance of the end of the state, and upon the different possible modes of ruling men, whether in the interest of the governed, or in the selfish interest of the governors. Thus the important distinction is that between normal polities—in which the government is for the good of the governed and so for the true end of the state, the common weal; that is, the general happiness and the perfecting of life—and perverted forms: 6 §§ 2—11.

(b) The next subdivision is into three normal constitutions—Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity—and three corresponding perversions—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy, according as the supreme power is vested in one man, in several, or a large number: c. 7.

β. Closer investigation into the nature of these constitutions and their relative values: cc. 8—13.

(a) Democracy more precisely defined as selfish government by the poor, Oligarchy as selfish government by the rich; the rule of the majority or the minority being but a subordinate characteristic, the absence of which, even when amounting to a reversal of the numerical proportions, would not affect the essential nature of the case: c. 8.

(b) Which of the normal constitutions is the most normal and the best, and what is their order of merit: cc. 9—13.

(a) The right (δικαίως) recognised by the principles of Democracy and of Oligarchy respectively, and its divergence in each case from the absolute right which is based on excellence (τὸ κυρίως δικαίως, τὸ κατ' ἀρετήν): c. 9.

(b) Who ought to be sovereign, judged by the standard of this absolute right, and how far his powers should extend: cc. 10, 11.

(i) Objections to the exclusive sovereignty of every class or person: c. 10.

Not simply of (1) a tyrant, § 1 or (2) the great masses of the poor, §§ 1, 2 or (3) the rich, § 3; but also (4) the respectable classes (οἱ ἐπισκεῖς), § 4, or (5) the one best citizen (εἰς ὁ σπουδαίωτατος), § 5.

If however (6) the law is held to be the true sovereign, precisely the same questions recur in another form, § 5.

(ii) The true normal state of things: the whole body of citizens relatively so virtuous that the merit of the great majority of them taken collectively will exceed that of the specially gifted minority. In that case

(1) sovereignty should be vested in this whole body of citizens, 11 §§ 1—5; but

(2) its exercise restricted to legislative and judicial powers, more particularly the election and control of the responsible magistrates, to whom the
III. cc. 6—13.

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citizens should entrust the details of state business: 11 §§ 6—9.

(iii) First objection to this arrangement, 11 §§ 10—12, and reply to the objection, 11 §§ 13, 14.


(v) Under this arrangement the law must undoubtedly be the truly supreme sovereign: the unrestricted plenary powers of the human sovereign being exercised only in the province of the particular and individual which law by its very nature cannot define. The more precise character of the laws must in each case be determined by the constitution: 11 §§ 19—21.

(γ) True constitutional principles more precisely elaborated: cc. 12, 13.

(i) A claim to political privilege not conferred by all personal advantages, but only by those which are necessarily connected with the essential nature of a state, viz. free birth, wealth, and more especially merit (ἀρετή = capacity and virtue): to which may be added nobility, as being a higher degree of free birth and a combination of excellence with influence: c. 12. Polities where the case is otherwise, are no normal forms but mere perversions, 13 § 1.

Fuller statement of the claims justified, 13 §§ 2—5.

(ii) None of the advantages mentioned can lay exclusive claim to justification even from the one-sided oligarchical or democratical point of view, much less from that of the true aristocracy, as even in respect of merit it is always a question whether the excellence of the pre-eminently good men is or is not outweighed by the aggregate endowments of the great majority: 13 §§ 7—10.

(iii) If it be so outweighed there is a solution of the difficult question, whether the laws should be made for the advantage of the majority or of the better men: 13 §§ 11, 12.

(iv) This case also provides for

(1) the normal and best polity proper, True Aristocracy:

(2) a Polity, where distinctions of property are also regarded, will be the utmost attainable in other cases.—This whole discussion, (1) and (2), or something similar, is lost.

(3) In general, the superior merit of a body of men within the state can only establish its right when this body is large enough numerically to form a state of itself, or at all events to appoint the magistrates, 13 § 6. When it is a single citizen, or a few, whose preeminent endowments outweigh those of all the rest collectively, perverted forms of government resort to ostracism and other violent measures to remove such men and get rid of them, but in the best constitution nothing remains except to give them unlimited authority unfettered even by law. In such a case the best constitution would take the form of Absolute Monarchy: 13 §§ 13—25.

1 [Bernays supposed cc. 12, 13 to be another version of cc. 9—11: see Introd. p. 42.]
II. THE SEPARATE POLITIES OR CONSTITUTIONS:

B. III. c. 14—VIII (V).


MONARCHY: III. cc. 14—18.

(a) The questions which come under consideration in the examination of Monarchy: 14 §§ 1, 2 (διαφοράς).

(b) The different varieties of monarchy or kingship: 14 § 2 (ῥάδιον...)
—§ 15.

(a) The office of the Spartan kings; §§ 2—5.

(β) Despotic monarchy amongst non-Hellenic races; §§ 6, 7.

(γ) Αἰσθηματεία or elective tyranny; §§ 8—10.

(δ) The Hellenic kingship of the heroic age; §§ 11—13.

Recapitulation of these four varieties, § 14.

(e) True absolute monarchy, with full powers, § 15.

(c) Why it is only absolute monarchy that requires fuller consideration in this place: 15 §§ 1—3.

(d) Objections to its utility: 15 §§ 3—16.

(a) In general it is better to be governed by the best laws than by the best man: 15 § 3—§ 5 (πάσαν); 16 § 5 (ὁ μὲν οὖν)—§ 9.

(β) It may be granted that there certainly is one province, that of particular fact, for which the decision of the laws is insufficient; yet it is always a question whether it is better that in this province the one best man or the whole body of capable citizens should have the decision in its own hands:

15 § 5 (ἄλλα ἱσω...κάλλιον): 16 § 4 (ἄλλα μὲν ὅσα...)—§ 5: 15 § 6:
15 §§ 7—10, 16 § 9 (ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ...)—§ 10=16 § 10 (εἰσὶ δὲ)—§ 13:
15 § 10 (εἰ δὴ)—§ 13 (δημοκρατίαν).

(i) Many questions are more correctly decided by the great majority than by an individual: 15 § 5 (ἄλλα ἱσω...)—§ 7, and many eyes see more than two: 16 § 10 (εἰσὶ δὲ)—§ 12.

(ii) A large majority of men of comparative excellence cannot be so easily led astray by personal feelings; 15 §§ 8—10.

(iii) As it is the custom for monarchs to associate their friends with them in power, they themselves ipso facto allow the claim of those who are equal and alike to an equal share in the government; 16 §§ 12, 13.
III. c. 14—IV. c. 1.

(iv) Even a monarch cannot be sole ruler; a number of officials is always required. If so, it is better from the first not to have a monarchy but to appoint this number of ruling officials by the constitution: 16 § 10.

(v) If the absolute rule of a single ruler can only be justified on the ground of merit, several capable men have in general more capacity than one: 16 § 11.

(vi) Historical appendix on the development of the remaining constitutions out of monarchy: 15 §§ 11—13 (δημοκρατία).

(7) What opinion should be held of hereditary succession to the throne? 15 §§ 13, 14.

(8) And of the armed force or body-guard to be assigned to a king? 15 § 14 (ἐχεῖ δ' ἀπορίαν)—16 § 2 (βασιλεύς).

(i) This question can easily be settled in a monarchy limited by law: 15 §§ 14—16.

(ii) Here, however, we are discussing absolute, not limited, monarchy: 16 §§ 1, 2.

(e) The unrestrained rule of one man over all the rest for his whole lifetime appears unnatural when these others are more or less his equals: whereas the only normal course appears to be to divide the government amongst several men under the restrictions imposed by the laws: 16 § 2 (δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν)—§ 4.

(c) How far these doubts and objections are well grounded: c. 17.

(a) Monarchy not in itself unnatural any more than the rule of a master over slaves (δογματεία) or a normal republican government (πολιτεία); under changed conditions each of them becomes appropriate: 17 § 1.

(β) In fact, however, as an actual form of government in the developed state, kingly rule is only conceivable as an absolute monarchy under the most capable citizen; yet not actually suitable and natural save in a single exceptional case, namely, in the state of things explained above (c. 13 §§ 13—25): 17 § 2.

(γ) [Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity severally adapted to citizens of different kinds: 17 §§ 3, 4.] It is only in the single case above-mentioned that Absolute Monarchy should supersede Aristocracy: 17 §§ 5—8.

(f) Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the stricter sense: c. 18.

Pure Aristocracy: the true normal form of the absolutely best constitution: B. IV (VII), V (VIII).

Preliminary Questions: IV (VII) cc. 1—3.

(a) The best form of polity is that which is auxiliary to the best and most desirable life. A definition of the latter is thus required and first obtained: 1 §§ 1—10. This best life or happiness is shown to be the same for the individual and for the state: 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2.

Summary of the results of this investigation: 1 §§ 13, 14.
[§3] A second preliminary question. Even if happiness is made to depend pre-eminently upon virtue and excellence, we may yet be in doubt whether excellence in peace or in war is the main thing for the state, whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific enquirer is the happier for the individual: 2 §§ 3—3 § 10.

(i) Excellence of the internal administration is the main thing for the state: military excellence is only needed for self-defence and for acquiring as slaves those for whom nature intended this lot. The state should not make conquest and subjugation its aim and end: 2 §§ 8—18.

(ii) For the individual it is not the tyrant’s life but active employment in the service of a free and capable state that is alone a great or noble thing. Yet the scientific life is no less an active life, and is besides an activity of a higher order than the other: c. 3.

Outline of the absolutely best constitution:

B. IV (VII) c. 4—V (VIII) c. 7.

(a) The External Conditions: IV (VII) cc. 4—12.

(i) The natural conditions; the land and the people: cc. 4—7.

(A) Prefatory remarks: 4 §§ 1—3.

(b) Of the proper number of citizens and inhabitants: 4 §§ 4—14.

(c) Of the character and extent of the territory and of its geographical form: 5 §§ 1—3.

(v) The position of the city, 5 § 3 (τῆς δὲ πόλεως...)—6 § 8,

(a) on the land side: 5 §§ 3, 4,

(b) towards the sea; 6 §§ 1—5.

Of the regulation of the naval force: 6 §§ 6—8.

(E) The best natural endowment and disposition for the citizens: c. 7.

(ii) The social or socio-political conditions: cc. 8—12.

(A) Exclusion of the citizens from work for a livelihood, and of all who work for a livelihood from citizenship: c. 8—10 § 8.

(a) Distinction between the classes which are actual organic members of the state, and such as are merely indispensable conditions for the existence of the former: 8 §§ 1, 2; §§ 4, 5; §§ 3, 4.

(b) Enumeration of the classes indispensable to the state, 8 §§ 6—9.

(c) It is a feature of the best polity that only the classes which are from the nature of the case members of the state, viz. fighting men and administrators (including those who administer justice), with the addition of the priests, who form a third, peculiar element, are in fact recognised as its members, or have the citizenship. These functions are exercised by them alone, the first in their youth, the second in their mature age, and the third when they are old men. All other classes—farmers, artizans, tradesmen, etc.—are excluded from citizenship. Hence every such employ-
ment, even agriculture, is prohibited to the citizens, yet so that the soil belongs to them, although it is cultivated by serfs or dependents (δαύλοι ἡ περίοικοι) of non-Hellenic descent: c. 9.

[(d) Such regulations are no mere innovation; they are of old standing in Egypt and Crete, as also are public messes in Italy and Crete: 10 §§ 1—9.]

(b) The proper scheme for dividing the land: the right qualifications and position of those who cultivate it: 10 § 9 (περὶ δὲ…)—§ 14.

(a) General leading principles: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(1) No community of property, only a certain common use granted out of friendship, § 9;

(2) No citizen to be in want, § 9:

(3) The common messes to be provided at the public expense, § 10.

(4) So also the worship of the gods, § 10.

(b) The territory is accordingly divided into public land and private land, and each of these again into two parts: 10 §§ 11, 12.

(c) The cultivators of the soil should be either (1) serfs of different races and of docile temper (μὴ ὑμοιοτίμησιν), those on the state domain to belong to the state, those on private estates to the private owners: or failing this, (2) dependent subjects (περίοικοι) of similar temper and of non-Hellenic descent: 10 §§ 13, 14.

(c) Regulations for the building of the city and the hamlets and villages: cc. 11, 12.

(a) The city: 11 § 1—12 § 7.

(1) Its site, on the slope of a hill, if possible, facing the east or else the south: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Provision for a perennial supply of sufficient wholesome water, 11 §§ 3—5.

(3) Of fortified positions inside the city: 11 § 5.

(4) Plan for laying out the streets: 11 §§ 6, 7.

(5) The walls, 11 §§ 8—12. Plan of sites in the walls where the guards may hold their mess, 12 § 1.

(6) The Upper Market-place, a public square for freemen (ἄγορα ἐλευθέρα) with the principal temples and the gymnasia for the older men, 12 §§ 2—5. The Market-place for trade and in it the law courts and official buildings: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Public buildings in the country: 12 § 8.

(β) A detailed sketch of the internal working of the Best Polity: IV (VII) c. 13—V (VIII) c. 7 (incomplete).

(i) General introductory remarks: IV (VII) c. 13.

(A) A right knowledge of the end of the best polity is as necessary as of the means which actually conduce to it: 13 §§ 1, 2.
(B) Its end is the happiness or well-being of all the citizens, which mainly consists in their highest excellency, though this is impossible apart from favourable external conditions, under which alone such excellency can be fully realized: 13 §§ 3, 4. These favourable conditions assumed to be at the legislator’s disposal include, besides those already discussed, a happy natural capacity on the part of the citizens (φύσις), whilst the concern and principal task of the legislator is to see how this capacity can be improved into actual excellency by habituation and instruction: 13 §§ 5—13.

(ii) The Education of the citizens: IV (VII) c. 14—V (VIII) c. 7 (left incomplete).

Its aim and end: 14 § 9—15 § 6.
The means to be employed: IV (VII) § 6—end of V (VIII).

(A) Should the education of the rulers and of the ruled be different or the same, on the principles of the best constitution?

Different, in so far as the two are here different persons: the same, in so far again as they are the same persons but at different ages, and as in a government exercised for the common good of the ruled it is not possible to govern well unless one has learnt to obey well: 14 §§ 1—8.

(B) At what should the education of the citizens aim? What is the distinctive end and object of a virtuous life? 14 § 9—15 § 6.

(i) The virtues of the non-rational part of the soul (the moral virtues) are inferior to those of the rational part (the mental excellences or intellectual virtues) and have their end in the latter just as work has its end in leisure, war in peace: 14 §§ 9—14.

(ii) Hence appears the defectiveness of constitutions like the Spartan, which, conversely, make war and conquer the object of the state, and strive solely to educate the citizens to be good soldiers, and nothing more, instead of treating military excellency as only a means to an end: 14 §§ 15, 16. Besides

(i) such principles have already been refuted by experience, namely by the sudden and lamentable collapse of the Spartan state and its power: 14 § 17.

(ii) Such principles aiming at the subjugation of other states imply the perverse opinion that it is nobler to rule over slaves than over freemen: 14 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) They are also dangerous in their influence on the behaviour of the citizens towards their own state: 14 § 19 (ἐτι)—§ 21 (ἀνθρωπος).

(iv) What are the ends for which alone war must be waged and citizens become good soldiers: 14 § 21 (τὴν ἐρ...δουλευειν).

(v) Another appeal to experience; states which have not learned to excel in the arts of peace must necessarily fall as soon as they have acquired their empire: 14 § 22.
IV. cc. 13—16.

(3) The virtues of peace and of leisure must rather have the preëminence; all
the others ought however to be practised, since without the means the end cannot be
attained and many indispensable virtues are easier to practise in war than in peace.
For undisturbed peace easily leads us to rank external goods above virtue. But on
the other hand this same mistake is the foundation for a onesided military tendency
as, for instance, amongst the Spartans: even capacity in war, which is all they strive
to attain, is only a means to an end, to the complete acquisition of external goods: 15 §§ 1—6.

(c) The right educational means: 15 § 6 (<οτη>...)—end of
B. v (viii).

(a) Preliminary remarks on the right course of education in general and the
order of succession of educational agencies. Bodily development must precede that
of the mind; in the latter, again, the training of the irrational soul by habituation
must precede that of the rational soul through instruction: yet in such a way that the
former always regards the latter as its aim and end: 15 §§ 6—10.

(b) Means to be employed before birth; the care requisite for the
procreation of children of mental and bodily vigour and of good
capacity: c. 16.

(i) The proper age for marriage: 16 §§ 1—10.

(a) The leading principles which determine it: 16 §§ 2—4, §§ 6—8.

(b) The difference of age between the parents to be such that their powers of
procreation do not cease disproportionately, § 2.

(b) The difference in age between parents and children not to be too great or too
small, § 3.

(γ) The educational requirement above mentioned, that the children to be
brought up must be physically strong, § 4 (...βούλησαν). Whereas the offspring
of marriages between those who are too young is usually stunted, § 6.

(δ) Further, young mothers invariably suffer greatly in childbirth, § 7: and
(ε) cohabitation begun at too early an age is prejudicial to female morality: also
(σ) it stunts the growth of the husbands, § 8.

(ii) All these considerations may be satisfied by observing the limits of age
within which married people are capable of having children, 16 §§ 4, 5, and
thus we arrive at the proper determination, viz. 37(?): for men and 18 for
women: 16 §§ 9, 10.

(2) The season of the year and appropriate weather for entrance upon marriage
and its duties: 16 §§ 10, 11.

(3) The right bodily condition for the parents: 16 §§ 12, 13.

(4) Provision for the proper treatment of women with child: 16 § 14.

(5) Exposure of deformed infants: procurement of abortion to be sanctioned, in
order that the prescribed number of children may not be exceeded: 16 § 15.
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(6) Further a limit of age should be set beyond which parents are not to have children: this limit prescribed. Procurement of abortion when conception takes place beyond this age: 16 §§ 16, 17.

(7) Penalty for adultery: 16 § 17 (ἀστρ...)—§ 18.

(c) Means to be employed directly after birth, 17 §§ 1—14.

(1) In infancy, §§ 1—3, § 6, § 4.

(2) In the subsequent period to the fifth year, § 4 (τὴν δ’ ἐχομένην...)—§ 7. With a preliminary discussion of the question how far all coarseness and indecency is to be proscribed, and on the other hand how far male adults should be allowed to be spectators at comedies and the like: § 7—§ 14, § 13, § 14, § 12.

(3) Education from the fifth year on to the seventh: § 14 (διεξελθόντω...αὐτοῦ).

(d) The course of Public Education proper from the age of seven to that of twenty-one: IV (vii). 17 §§ 15, 16, v (viii).

(1) General introductory remarks. Two grades of age distinguished. Statement of the three questions to be discussed in regard to this course of education proper: IV (vii). 17, §§ 15, 16.

(2) It is more than necessary, it is most essential for the best polity, that a definite regulation of this educational course should be prescribed by law: v (viii). 1 §§ 1, 2.

(3) It is not to be a domestic private education: it must be a universal and public course: 1 §§ 3, 4.


(i) Fundamental considerations: 2 §§ 1—3 § 12.

(a) Difference of views both as to the subjects of instruction, and as to the end and aim of the training: where there is agreement as to the subjects there are divergent views as to their practical application and mode of treatment, due to the difference of opinion as to their end: 2 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The pupils must indeed be taught what is indispensable for external life, yet here the right limits should be observed. The educational means usually employed should not be used (as, music alone excepted, they all may) with the idea of their conferring a purely practical external utility. They ought rather to be regarded as simply the conditions to the attainment of a higher end: 2 §§ 3—6.

(g) The list of these subjects of ordinary education: reading, writing and arithmetic, gymnastic exercises, drawing, music: 3 § 1.

(δ) The ultimate end of education is the right occupation of the highest and truest leisure, which is not merely an interlude to work, but in itself the highest goal of life. Amusement and pastime serve as recreation to fill the less exalted leisure: but for the higher leisure the mind requires a different kind of activity, bringing with it the enjoyment of the highest intellectual gratification. Preliminary proof that amongst the ordinary subjects taught, music even in the judgment of our ancestors tends to this end, 3 § 2—§ 11 (δὴ λαύ): and that the other subjects should be so used as not to lead away from it, but, indirectly at least, to conduce to it: 3 § 11 (ἐκ δὲ)—§ 12.
(ii) Athletic exercises (γυμναστική) : cc. 3 § 13—4 § 9.

(a) As was stated above, IV (vii). 15 §§ 6—10, education must begin with bodily exercises : 3 § 13.

(β) But two errors should be avoided ; the one, of training up the boys like athletes, as is commonly done ; the other, the Spartan practice of brutalizing them by excessive exertions : 4 §§ 1—7.

(γ) We must therefore begin with easier exercises for the first period, and wait until they have attained puberty, and have been taught the other subjects of instruction for three years, before we commence the more exhausting gymnastic training : 4 § 7 (ὅτι μὲν οὖν)—§ 9.

(iii) Music : cc. 5—7.

(a) Statement of the question : Should music serve for pastime recreation and relaxation, or for moral training, or lastly as a purely aesthetic and theoretic enjoyment, thereby ministering to the highest intellectual gratification ? 5 § 1—§ 4 (εἴρημένων).

(β) The first and third of these ends are to all appearance foreign to the education of youth, though something may be said in favour of taking notice of them too in connexion with it. But it is still a question whether for any of these three objects it is necessary to learn to be a practical musician oneself: 5 § 4 (ὅτι μὲν οὖν)—§ 8.

(γ) Answer to the first question : Music can and should subserve each of those three aims, not only the highest intellectual gratification, but also mere recreation, since it is a thoroughly innocent enjoyment ; and considering the frequent need for recreation in life this alone would suffice to justify its admission to a place in the instruction of youth. This consideration is not then to be wholly disallowed, as we supposed above (§ 4) : yet it is only subordinate, 5 §§ 9—15 : and the main point is that music is, thirdly, an excellent means for the moral training of the young : 5 §§ 16—25.

(δ) From this follows the answer to the second question :

(i) that in general the young should in fact be taught to become practical musicians : 6 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) and yet the adult citizens of the best state have in general to refrain from practising music themselves : §§ 3, 4.

(iii) Further this musical instruction should be regulated, §§ 5, 6, as follows :

(a) With regard to the degree of proficiency to be attained, the pupils should not be trained up to be professional virtuosi, but only receive the needful training of their characters and their tastes : 6 § 6 (φανερῶν...)—§ 8.

(b) For this reason all musical instruments, like the flute, which are only in use with professional performers, should be excluded from the instruction of the young : 6 §§ 9—16.
(c)Lastly, as to the various modes (ἀρμονλαί) and rhythms:

(1) for musical performances by professional musicians all modes are permissible, since all serve to promote the homoeopathic purification of the emotions which procures the educated the highest intellectual gratification and the multitude recreation and amusement. Hence for the sake of the public at large who are not citizens—the farmers, artisans, labourers—at such performances even the modes and pieces which gratify their low taste must be admitted. But for the moral training of the young only those which best represent, and for that reason best train, character, the Dorian mode especially. The Phrygian mode should not be allowed: 7 §§ 3—12. [Perhaps however the Lydian mode may be tolerated, since we are not excluded from paying some regard to the amusement of a maturer age, and even adult citizens are on certain occasions allowed to sing: also the modes which are appropriate to the compass of the voice in mature life may be allowed as well as those specially adapted to the young: 7 §§ 13—15.]

(2) The elucidation of the further question stated in 7 § 2, whether the rhythm or the melody and tune is of chief importance for the instruction of the young, is altogether wanting.

B. THE REMAINING CONSTITUTIONS: B. VI (IV), VII (VI), VIII (V).

Introductory remarks: B. VI (IV) cc. 1, 2.

i. Why it belongs to political philosophy to consider not merely the absolutely best constitution, but also the best on the average, the best in any given case, and even the best possible organization of any actually existing polity: 1 §§ 1—7.

ii. This implies an exact acquaintance with all possible forms of government, and therefore with all the possible varieties of Democracy, Oligarchy, etc., which up till now have been left out of sight: 1 § 8.

iii. The theory of legislation moreover is based upon this exact acquaintance with constitutions: 1 §§ 9—11.


The actual details of the theory of the established constitutions: VI (IV). c. 3—VIII (V).

i Enumeration of all possible constitutions: VI (IV) cc. 3—10.

[(i) The difference between polities depends on the extent to which different classes take part in the government, c. 3.]
(ii) How Democracy and Oligarchy ought rightly to be defined: 4 §§ 1—6.

(iii) The explanation of the fact that Oligarchy and Democracy come to be regarded as almost the only constitutions. Why there are more than these two and their sub-species. The classes of people necessary in the state: 4 §§ 7—19.

(iv) The different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: 4 § 20—6 § 11.
(a) The basis of the general difference between them, 4 §§ 20, 21 (...διαφοράν).
(b) Enumeration of the four kinds of Democracy from the best, which resembles Polity, down to the worst or unrestrained Democracy, which resembles Tyranny: 4 § 22 (δημοκρατία)—§ 31.
(c) Enumeration of the four kinds of Oligarchy in corresponding manner, from the most moderate to that which resembles Tyranny, viz. arbitrary dynastic government (δυναστεία): 5 §§ 1, 2.
(d) In spite of a constitution externally oligarchical a state may nevertheless bear a democratic character, and conversely: 5 §§ 3, 4.
(e) Reasons assigned why there can only be these four species (α) of Democracy, 6 §§ 1—6, (β) of Oligarchy, 6 §§ 7—11.

(v) The different species of Mixed Aristocracy and the forms of Polity: c. 7—9 § 5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.
(a) Of Aristocracy and Polity in general: 7 §§ 1—4.
(b) The species of Mixed Aristocracy: 7 §§ 4, 5.
(c) Of Polity: c. 8, 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.
(a) Justification of the arrangement by which Polity is reserved for treatment to this point and Tyranny comes last of all: 8 §§ 1, 2.
(b) A further and more exact distinction between Polity and the Mixed Aristocracies. Refutation of the view that those species and varieties of Polity which incline more to Oligarchy than to Democracy should be included under Mixed Aristocracies, 8 §§ 3—9.
(c) Genesis and organization of Polity: 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(i) The three different ways of fusing Democracy and Oligarchy in Polity, 9 §§ 1—5. (ii) The middle class as the proper support of Polity, 12 § 4. (iii) On the degree of success in the fusion depends the durability of the Polity. When therefore Polities or Mixed Aristocracies are established, it is a grave mistake if out of favour to the rich the claims of the poor are only satisfied in appearance, the concession made to them being in reality annulled and rendered void by all kinds of
illusive devices. Enumeration of such illusive measures and of the similar counter-measures adopted in democracies with the opposite intent: 13 § 6—13 § 6.

(iv) The criterion of a successful fusion in Polity, also in Mixed Aristocracy, 9 §§ 6—10. (v) The amount at which the property qualification for the franchise should be fixed, 13 §§ 7—9 (πολεµευόν). (vi) Peculiar constitution of certain individual Polities, 13 § 9. (vii) Historical remarks: 13 §§ 10, 11.

(vi) The different species of Tyranny, c. 10.

ii The best constitution on the average (ἀριστη ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι): c. 11.

(i) This is, in the main, Polity, as the rule of the well-to-do middle class: II §§ 1, 2.

For (a) as in the life of the individual moral virtue and excellence consist in the right mean between two opposite extremes of error, so the life of the state prospers best when the well-to-do middle class has the preponderance, whereas the extremes of wealth and poverty are two main sources of the two opposite kinds of crime and wrong-doing: II §§ 3—5.

(b) Excessive wealth leads to despotic ambition, extreme poverty to servile submission: II §§ 6—8 (πολεως).

(c) The middle class has the most assured existence; the more strongly it is represented in the state, the more the state is secured from insurrection and internal troubles and from the danger of degenerating into one of the three worst perversions or degenerate types of polity, extreme Democracy, extreme Oligarchy, or Tyranny: II § 8 (καὶ σφόνται)—§ 13. This accounts for the fact that Democracies are ordinarily more stable than Oligarchies, because in the former the middle class is usually more numerous and influential than in the latter, II § 14.

(d) The best legislators have come from the middle class, II § 15.

(ii) All this explains why Polity, although the constitution best adapted for most states, is yet of rare occurrence: II §§ 16—19.

(a) It frequently happens that the middle class in a state is not very numerous, II § 16.

(b) In the frequent party conflicts between rich and poor it is invariably the practice for the victorious side to seize the government for itself, and not to come to terms with the defeated side, II § 17.

(c) Of the two states that were in succession supreme in Greece, the one, Athens, introduced democracies and the other, Sparta, oligarchies, each in her own interest: II §§ 18, 19.

(iii) The nearer any one of the remaining constitutions stands to that which is the best on the average, the better it is: the further it is removed therefrom, the worse it is: II §§ 20, 21.
iii What kind of polity is relatively the best for different kinds of people (τις πολιτεία τις καὶ ποια ποιους συμφέρει): 12 §§ 1—3, § 4 (ὁπον...) —§ 5.

(i) General positions laid down, 12 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Their application (a) to Democracy and its different species, 12 § 3, (b) to Oligarchy and its different species, 12 § 3 (ὁπον...), (c) to Polity, 12 § 4 (ὁπον δὲ...) —§ 5, (d) to so-called or Mixed Aristocracy (this is wanting).

Recapitulation of all the previous discussion, 13 § 12.

iv The theory of the best possible organization of the different Democracies and Oligarchies, or of that which most corresponds to the spirit and intent of each of them respectively: VI (IV). 14—VII (VI).

(i) General fundamental positions as to the ordering and organization of all possible polities: VI (iv). cc. 14—16.

(a) Distinction of the Deliberative, Executive, and Judicial authorities in the state: 14 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Organization of the Consultative or Deliberative body in accordance with the various polities: 14 §§ 3—15.

(a) The department of the Deliberative authority, and the three possibilities that either the whole body of citizens, or particular magistrates, have to decide upon all that belongs to this department, or again that it is divided between the one and the other: 14 § 3.

(b) These three possible cases, the different forms under which they may appear in practical application, and the sphere of action (whether larger or smaller) assigned to the different deciding factors, how distributed amongst different polities: 14 §§ 4—10;

(i) amongst the different species of Democracy, 14 § 4—§ 7 (πάντες);

(ii) those of Oligarchy, 14 § 7 (τὸ δὲ τυπα...)—§ 9;

(iii) Mixed Aristocracy, 14 § 10;

(iv) Polity inclining to Aristocracy, and Polity proper, 14 § 10.

(γ) Measures by which at all events to secure that the decrees passed and the verdicts of the courts shall be good and salutary for the state, (i) in the most extreme Democracy, where all is decided by decrees of the people, through the adoption of certain oligarchical elements or of institutions related to Polity, while the democratical principle is still retained: and (ii) in an Oligarchy, through the adoption of certain democratical institutions or of others peculiar to Polity, or else by a procedure the reverse of that usual in Polities: 14 §§ 11—16.

(c) Organization of the Executive power, or the magistracies: c. 15.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 15 §§ 1, 2.

(b) What kind of officials are to be regarded as really magistrates, i.e. as ministers or authorities of the state: 15 § 2 (ἐστι δὲ...) —§ 4.
(γ) What officials are required for every state, great or small, 15 §§ 5—8.

(δ) The distinction between different magistracies according as the nature of the department they administer involves its extension over the whole state or its division according to definite localities, 15 § 9 (...τῶν αὐτῶν), and further according as the same department controls all the persons affected by it, or different classes are assigned to different magistrates, 15 § 9 (καὶ πότερον...)

(e) The difference between magistracies in the various constitutions: 15 §§ 10—13.

(i) Certain offices are the same under different forms of the state, only the mode of appointment to them being different, 15 § 10.

(ii) Others are generically the same under different forms but specifically different: i.e. different as to the extent of their powers, § 10.

(iii) Others again are peculiar to given forms of the state, §§ 11—13.

(ζ) The different modes of appointing to magistracies and their distribution amongst the forms of government, 15 §§ 14—21.

(i) Each of the three questions to be considered, viz. who have the right to elect, who are eligible, and what is the mode of election, admits of three possibilities: combine each possibility under the first of these heads with each possibility under the second and third severally, and we obtain as the total number of conceivable cases nine for each of the three, i.e. 27 in all: 15 §§ 14—18.

(ii) These modes classified under (A) Democracy § 19, (B) Polity, not only Polity proper, but also the variety which has an aristocratical, and that which has an oligarchical character, §§ 19, 20, (C) Oligarchy §§ 20, 21 and (D) Mixed Aristocracy § 21.

(η) The duties of its department must determine what mode of appointment is advantageous for each office, 15 § 22.

(d) Organization of the judicial authority; c. 16.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 16 § 1.

(b) The different kinds of courts, 16 §§ 2—5.

(γ) The possible differences between them as to who are eligible as jurors (ὁ δικάσωτης); how they are to be appointed; whether they are to exercise all possible judicial functions or only to serve in certain courts, 16 §§ 6, 7.

(δ) Classification of them under the different forms of the state, Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity, 16 § 8.

(ii) Organization of the different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: vii (vi) cc. 1—7.

(a) The discussion of this subject announced: the questions which remain as to the organization of other constitutions, and as to the blending of different forms when one power in the state is regulated in accordance with one form, and another in accordance with another form: 1 §§ 1—4.
(b) The species of Democracy: 1 § 5—c. 5.

(a) Species are distinguished according to the various occupations of the different democratic populations, and the degree to which they have severally adopted democratic institutions: 1 §§ 5—10.


(γ) All the democratic institutions developed from them: 2 §§ 5—8.

[(δ) Objections to absolute Democracy and recommendation of a peculiar form of compromise between the claims of Democracy and those of Oligarchy: 2 § 9—3 § 6.]

(e) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Democracy, 4 §§ 1—14:

(i) of the two intermediate species, 4 § 15: and

(η) of the extreme Democracy, 4 § 15 (τῆς τε τελευταίαν...)—5 § 11.

(i) The institutions which promote the growth of this form: 4 §§ 15—20.

(ii) The measures which tend to neutralize its dangerous effects, and even impart to it, so far as is possible, a tolerable and durable character: c. 5.

(A) Preliminary remark on the urgent need for such measures: 5 §§ 1, 2.

(B) Particular instances of measures of the kind, 5 §§ 3—11:

(a) a diminution in the number of political trials, 5 §§ 3, 4:

(1) by not distributing the fines amongst the people, (2) by imposing severe penalties upon false accusation:

(b) the practice of summoning few popular assemblies and allowing the courts to sit as seldom as possible in the poorer states, 5 §§ 5, 6; and in the richer states of bestowing large sums at rare intervals upon the poor, and freeing the richer citizens from useless burdens: 5 §§ 7—9.

(c) Measures taken at Carthage and Tarentum; 5 §§ 9—11.

(c) The species of Oligarchy: cc. 6, 7.

(a) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Oligarchy: 6 §§ 1, 2;

(β) of the several intermediate species, 6 § 3; and

(γ) of the most extreme Oligarchy or Dynastic government, 6 §§ 3, 4.

(δ) Measures more directly affecting oligarchies at large, 6 § 5—7 § 7.

(i) The principal safeguard of Oligarchy, 6 § 5.

(ii) Arrangement as regards the military force and service in the army, 7 §§ 1—3.

(iii) Individual members of the popular party may be won over to the oligarchical government, 7 § 4.

(iv) To the highest posts in the government should be attached costly burdens to be defrayed for the commonwealth, 7 §§ 5—7.
(iii) The theory of the organization of public offices: a fuller account in detail, c. 8 (incomplete).

(a) The questions to be discussed, 8 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The officials necessary in every state, 8 §§ 3...21.

Superintendents (α) of the markets (ἀγορανύμοι), § 3, (β) of the streets, public buildings, harbours; the city police (ἀστυνύμοι) §§ 4, 5. (γ) Police officers in the country (ἀγρόνυμοι, ἐλωροί); (δ) financial officers (ἀποδέκται, ταμιά); § 6. (ε) Keepers of archives and registers (μνήμωνες, ἑπιστάται), § 7. (fp) Officers for penal administration, executioners and the like, §§ 8—13. (γ) Military officers (στρατηγοί, πολέμαρχοι, ναύαρχοι, κτλ), §§ 13—15. (δ) Board of control, for scrutiny of the accounts of retiring officials (εὐθυνοι, λογισταί, ἑπιστάται), § 16. (ι) Legislative committee, to summon and direct the popular assembly, and to bring matters before it (πρόζωλοι, βουλη), § 17. (κ) Officers to superintend public worship (ἱερεῖς κτλ), §§ 18—20. (λ) Recapitulation, § 21.

(c) Magistrates peculiar to certain given constitutions, 8 § 22.

The theoretical treatment of the cases where different forms of polity are combined in one and the same state, is wanting.

v The causes of decay in the various forms of the state and the corresponding safeguards: B. VIII (V).

1 Preliminary Observations: 1 §§ 1—8, §§ 9—11, § 8:
3 § 14: 1 §§ 11—16.

(a) Statement of the whole question: 1 § 1.

(b) The general cause of all internal political disturbances consists in dissension as to the extent to which political equality should be carried: the rich and the nobles claim special privileges over the poor, the latter on the ground of their free birth claim equality with the rich: 1 §§ 2—7.

(c) Two species of revolution, 1 §§ 8—11:

(a) Overthrow of the constitution, §§ 8—11: whether
(i) subversion of the entire polity, § 8; or simply
(ii) accentuation or relaxation of the same form of government, § 9; or
(iii) abolition of single parts of the constitution, § 10.

(b) Change merely in the holders of power, § 8.

(d) Special application of the remarks in 1 §§ 2—7 to Democracy and Oligarchy. Two kinds of equality distinguished: it is necessary to pay attention to both kinds: 3 § 14, 1 § 11 (πανταχοῦ...)—§ 15.

(e) Why Democracy is in general more enduring than Oligarchy, 1 § 16.
The causes of decay inherent in all polities in common: cc. 2—4.

(a) The three points for general consideration in this inquiry: the tendencies, the objects in view, and the external occasions which lead to political revolutions, 2 § 1.

(b) The tendencies and claims which lead to intestine disturbances and to revolutions have been already characterized (1 §§ 2—7). How far they are justified, or not, 2 §§ 2, 3.

(c) The objects sought to be attained in rebellions and insurrections: 2 § 3 (πῶς ...πόλεσιν).

(d) The definite occasions of revolution: 2 § 4—3 § 8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(i) Insolence in the rulers, 3 § 1.

(ii) Their greed for aggrandisement, 3 § 1.

(iii) Efforts of the subject body to attain higher political honours, 3 § 2.

(iv) Preponderating influence of individuals, 3 § 3.

(v) Fear of punishment or of injustice, 3 § 4.

(vi) Contempt for the governing class on account of their weakness, 3 § 5.

(vii) Disproportionate growth of separate elements in the polity or classes of the population, 3 §§ 6—8; 4 §§ 8—10: and conversely

(viii) The establishment of an equivalence in point of numbers between opposing elements in the state.

(ix) Appropriation of offices by electoral intrigues (διὰ τὰς ἐπιθελάς), 3 § 9.

(x) Neglect of the dangers threatening the constitution from individuals, 3 § 9.

(xi) Gradual introduction of slight changes unobserved, 3 § 10.

(xii) Any sort of difference between the inhabitants, 3 §§ 11—13, §§ 15—16.

As (a) difference in race, particularly when alien settlers have been admitted, §§ 11—13:

(b) difference in sentiment, and especially in political sympathies, between the dwellers in different localities of one and the same state, due to a difference of character in the localities, §§ 15, 16.

(xiii) Private feuds between leading, influential citizens, 4 §§ 1—7.

(c) The means usually employed to effect revolutions, 4 §§ 12, 13:

(a) force, (β) stratagem, (γ) stratagem succeeded by force.
III The causes of decay and the corresponding safeguards in the particular forms of government: cc. 5—12.

(a) Positive or dogmatic exposition: c. 5—c. 12 § 6.

(a) Republics, cc. 5—9.

(i) The Causes of Decay, cc. 5—7.

(a) In democracies, c. 5.

(a) Change to Oligarchy due to the continual persecutions of the rich by the demagogues, 5 §§ 1—5.

(b) Change to Tyranny, the demagogues usurping absolute power. Why this only happened in former times, why it is no longer usual for tyrannies to arise, 5 §§ 6—10, namely, because

(1) formerly demagogues were also generals, 5 §§ 6, 7.

(2) formerly certain officers had too large powers assigned them, 5 § 8 (ἐγινοντο...προταυς)1.

(3) The states were as yet small, and the people in former times busy with their occupations in the country, so that it was easier for military chiefs to seize absolute power, 5 §§ 8, 9.

(c) Change from the most moderate to the most extreme form of democracy, due to the demagogic intrigues of candidates for office, 5 §§ 10, 11.

(b) In oligarchies, c. 6.

(a) Downfall of oligarchies through ill-treatment of the people, 6 § 1.

(b) Downfall through dissensions between the rich oligarchs themselves, 6 §§ 2—9, §§ 14—16, § 10.

(1) If the actual members of the oligarchical government are reduced to a mere handful, so that even persons belonging to the ruling families are excluded from it by law, 6 §§ 2—52.

(2) If the oligarchs themselves from mutual jealousy adopt demagogic intrigues, 6 § 5 (κυνονται...)—§ 7:

(i) one member of the government, or a minority, intriguing to gain over the rest to his support, 6 § 6:

(ii) a part of the oligarchs (or all of them) intriguing with the people, 6 §§ 6, 7:

(a) where the people has the right of electing to the public offices, § 6, or if

(b) the law courts are constituted out of the people, § 7, or

(γ) in case some of the oligarchs are aiming at concentrating the power of the state in yet fewer hands, § 7.

1 Perhaps (2) should properly follow (3).
2 If § 5, καὶ ἐν Ἐρυθραῖσ...πολιτεῖαν, be genuine we must add: "In the same way a small number of oligarchs, in spite of good government, can procure the downfall of the oligarchy at the hands of the people."
(iii) If individual oligarchs who have squandered their property attempt to make a revolution or to enrich themselves from the public means, thus embroiling themselves with the government, or raising a popular insurrection, 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) If members of the oligarchy are involved in private enmity owing to marriage relations or lawsuits, 6 §§ 14, 15.

(v) An oligarchy may be subverted by its own members on account of the too despotic character of the government, 6 § 16.

Concluding remark: an oligarchy united in itself is not easily overthrown from without, 6 § 10.

(c) Fall of the old oligarchy by the formation of a new one within it, 6 § 111.

[(d) Overthrow of oligarchies by the generals of mercenary troops enrolled for war; or in time of peace by the generals called in because of the mutual distrust of the oligarchs; or by a commander appointed on the same grounds to mediate between them, 6 §§ 12, 13.]

(e) Change from Oligarchy to Polity and from Polity to moderate Democracy due to a depreciation of money, whereby the property qualification required by law for the franchise ceases to be adequate, 6 §§ 16, 17.

(f) Change from one kind of Oligarchy to another: 6 § 18.

(c) In Mixed Aristocracies and Polities: c. 7 §§ 1—13.

(a) Fall of aristocracies and revolutions in consequence of the number of those who take part in the government becoming too small, 7 §§ 1—4:

(1) especially when the large body excluded consider themselves equal in merit, 7 §§ 1, 2;

or (2) if able and distinguished men are ill-treated by men not superior to them in desert although occupying higher offices in the state, 7 §§ 2, 3;

(3) are excluded from the government in spite of their merits, 7 § 3;

or (4) if some of the citizens are too poor and others too rich, 7 § 3,

or (5) an individual is so powerful that he is likely to attain supreme power, 7 § 4.

(b) The principal danger for Aristocracies of this type and for Polities consists in the fact that the oligarchical element in them has not quite successfully blended with the democratical element, but the one of these preponderates over the other, 7 §§ 5, 6. [Consequently a revolution to this preponderating side may easily take place; that is, to complete Oligarchy or Democracy. Sometimes however there is a movement in the opposite direction: 7 §§ 7—10.]

(c) Aristocracies of this type are subject, above all other forms of government, to dissolution brought on by unperceived gradual changes, 7 §§ 11—13.

(d) Concluding remark on the changes in republics taken in common.

Sometimes they are of internal origin, sometimes they are brought about by powerful foreign states, 7 § 14.

1 Perhaps §§ 10, 11 should also be enclosed in the square brackets.
(ii) The safeguards: cc. 8, 9.

(a) Preliminary remark.

The safeguards are implied in the statement of the causes of destruction: 8 § 1.

(b) Enumeration of the safeguards: 8 § 2—9 § 22.

(a) In Polities and Mixed Aristocracies especial care must be taken that slight changes and deviations from the existing laws do not gradually creep in unobserved: 8 §§ 2, 3.

(b) In the same governments precautions must be taken against those illusory measures discussed in vi (iv), 12 § 6—13 § 6: 8 § 4.

(c) In Aristocracies and Oligarchies the government must not only treat the governed well, but must also treat its own members on a footing of democratic equality, 8 § 5: hence many democratic measures are often quite in place even under these constitutions, 8 §§ 6, 7.

(d) The citizens must be kept in constant vigilance over their constitution, 8 § 8.

(e) All disputes between the principal men must as far as possible be avoided and prevented; and, so far as this fails, care must be taken that no others but the original parties to the quarrel are involved in it, 8 § 9.

(f) In Polities and Oligarchies a fresh valuation of property must be taken frequently in order that the property qualification for the franchise, if it is to retain its relative importance, may undergo the necessary revision at the proper time, 8 §§ 10, 11.

(g) No citizen to be disproportionately elevated: in particular, provision should be made by legislation to prevent the rise of unduly powerful individuals: if this does not succeed, they should be removed from the state by ostracism: 8 § 12.

(h) There should be a special board of magistrates to have supervision over the private lives of the citizens and see that they are in accord with the existing form of government, 8 § 13.

(i) Care must be taken that one part of the citizens does not prosper at the expense of the rest, 8 §§ 14—21; and hence

(1) that magisterial offices never fall exclusively into the hands of one of the two opposed classes of the population, 8 § 14:

(2) that the antagonism between rich and poor is adjusted or else that the middle class increases, 8 § 14:

(3) especially that the public offices do not afford any opportunity for enriching oneself from the public property, 8 §§ 15—19.

(4) In democracies the property of the rich must be spared, 8 § 20;

(5) in oligarchies posts with emolument attached to them must be assigned to the poorer citizens, and the insolence of a rich man towards a poor man must be punished more severely than if it were towards another rich man, 8 § 20.

(6) Further in oligarchies the accumulation of landed property in the same hands must be restrained within limits fixed by law, 8 § 20.
VIII. cc. 8—10.

(7) Care must be taken in an oligarchy that the decisive authority rests in the hands of the rich, and in a democracy that it rests with the poor: but in other respects equal, nay even higher, privileges must be conceded in the former case to the poor, and in the latter case to the rich, 8 §§ 21.

(â) It must always be kept in view that attachment to the established form of government, special knowledge of the subject, and lastly virtue and integrity are requisite for the highest official positions: the second qualification indeed in certain offices in a higher degree than the third, in others again the third qualification in a higher degree than the second: c. 9 §§ 1—4.

(i) In a word, every measure that helps the healthy working of a constitution tends also to preserve it, 9 § 5.

(m) The citizens who desire the continuance of the form of government must be the numerical majority, 9 § 5.

(u) Even in the worse forms of Democracy and Oligarchy the mean must be preserved: it is the exaggeration of democratic and oligarchic measures which infallibly leads to the downfall of Democracy and Oligarchy respectively: 9 § 6—§ 11 (δῆμος).

(o) But the principal thing is to educate the young in the spirit of the established form of government: 9 § 11 (μέγιστον δὲ)—§ 16.


(A) Discussion of certain fundamental points: 10 §§ 1—13 (ἀναπείρω).

(a) The government of a king is closely related to Aristocracy, but Tyranny (τυραννίς) combines the evils of the most extreme Democracy and of the most extreme Oligarchy: 10 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The opposite nature of kingly rule and tyranny is at once shown in their divergent and opposite origin: 10 §§ 3—8.

(c) A more precise statement of the antithesis between them: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(d) The points which Tyranny has in common with Oligarchy on the one hand and with Democracy on the other: 10 § 11—§ 13 (ἀναπείρω).

(b) Causes of the overthrow of monarchies and of monarchs in general: 10 §§ 13—28.

(a) General statement

(1) of the motives for conspiracies and attacks upon a sole ruler, 10 §§ 13, 14, and (2) of the objects sought thereby, 10 § 14.

(3) Some of these attacks are directed against the person of the usurper; in others the assailant desires to seize the throne for himself, or to effect a revolution in the government: 10 § 15.

(b) These points of view presented in detail: 10 §§ 15—28.

(1) Attacks in consequence of injuries received, 10 §§ 15—20;

(2) from fear of punishment, 10 § 20;
(3) from contempt for the ruler, 10 §§ 22—25;
(4) from greed of gain (largely wanting), 10 § 25;
(5) from ambition, 10 §§ 26—28.

(c) Special causes of the downfall of (a) tyrants and tyrannies, (b) of kings and kingships: 10 §§ 29—38.

(a) Tyrants and tyrannies: 10 §§ 29—34.

(1) A tyranny is destroyed from without by more powerful foreign states not tyrannies whether (i) under a royal or aristocratical, or (ii) under a democratical government, 10 §§ 29, 30.

(2) It is ruined from within by the members of the ruling family quarreling amongst themselves, 10 § 31.

(3) Most tyrants make themselves despised and this most frequently brings about their fall, 10 §§ 32, 33.

(4) Again, every tyrant is necessarily hated; hatred and righteous indignation against him often accomplish his overthrow, 10 §§ 33, 34.

(5) The same causes which threaten Extreme Democracy and Extreme Oligarchy are also dangerous to Tyranny: 10 § 35.

(b) The government of a king (as distinct from a tyrant) is mostly destroyed from within.

Either (1) feuds break out between members of the royal family, 10 § 36: or
(2) the kings overstep the legitimate limits of their authority and aim at making themselves tyrants, 10 § 38.

(3) Under an hereditary monarchy it is often impossible to prevent the succession to the throne of princes who render themselves contemptible, 10 § 38,

or (4) to exclude others who behave with insolence and violence, forgetting that they are not tyrants but kings, 10 § 38.

(5) Why it is that even in recent times tyrannies have sprung up, but no new monarchies arise, 10 § 37.


(A) The office of king is best preserved by the gradual diminution of its absolute authority in keeping with the spirit of the times, 11 §§ 1—3.

(B) The tyrant can only secure his throne, 11 §§ 4—34,

(a) by employing the most extreme measures of force and corruption, 11 §§ 4—16:

(i) by getting rid of all the principal men, entirely forbidding the common pursuit of culture, and putting down all messes and clubs, 11 §§ 4, 5:

(2) by compelling all the citizens to live in public, 11 § 6,

and (3) by imitating all the other regulations of Persian and other oriental despotisms, 11 § 6:

(4) by sending secret spies and detectives amongst the citizens, 11 § 7;

(5) by setting all classes of the population against one another, 11 § 8;
VIII. cc. 10, 11.

(6) draining the means of all his subjects, 11 §§ 9, 10, and (7) perpetually creating wars, 11 § 10,

(8) by suspecting his own friends most of all, 11 § 10,

(9) by allowing families to be governed by women and by giving slaves license to indulge all their caprices, just as in the most extreme democracy, 11 §§ 11, 12;

(10) by permitting no dignified or free-minded character to remain near him, 11 § 13;

(11) by being more intimate with strangers than with his own townsmen, 11 § 14.

(12) The three leading points of view in this policy, 11 §§ 15, 16.

Or (6) by demagogic devices joined with activity in war, when the tyrant poses as the friend of the people and makes his usurped power approximate to that of a king, 11 §§ 17—34.

(1) Careful management of the state funds; avoidance of lavish grants to mistresses, foreigners, or artists; a statement of accounts presented; no treasures accumulated for himself, 11 §§ 19—21.

(2) He should endeavour to create the impression that all taxes paid and services rendered are not for him but for the state, 11 § 21.

(3) He must inspire reverence by a dignified bearing and by capacity in war, instead of inspiring fear by severity and rough treatment, 11 § 22.

(4) He should not merely himself avoid crimes and offences against his subjects, but he should not allow them to be committed by any of his family or court, especially those who are of the female sex, 11 §§ 22, 23.

(5) He should be moderate in his indulgences, or at least should conceal his excesses from the world, 11 §§ 23, 24.

(6) In his care for the adornment of the capital he must not seem to have any ulterior object, 11 § 24.

(7) He should create the impression that though he is free from childish superstition yet he is very specially concerned to honour the gods, 11 § 25.

(8) He must award, to those who show themselves deserving, higher honours and distinctions than they could hope for in a free state, and he must always bestow distinctions and rewards himself, but have punishments inflicted and executed by others, 11 § 26.

(9) On the other hand, like monarchs generally, he should especially avoid raising individuals to greatness, least of all a man of bold and enterprising character, 11 § 27.

(10) Of all deeds of violence, personal insults or ill treatment, and seduction accomplished by force are the most dangerous. If he cannot altogether avoid them, he should give to the former the colour of paternal chastisement, and seek to succeed in his intrigues by dint of impassioned persuasion alone, 11 §§ 28, 29.

(11) He should especially be on his guard against people who imagine that they, or some one whom they love, have been so deeply wronged by him that they are ready to hazard their lives in opposing him, 11 § 30.

(12) While he should seek to please rich and poor alike, he should yet prefer to rest his rule upon the poor where they are the stronger, but where the rich have the upper hand, upon the rich, 11 §§ 31, 32.
(13) The leading points in this whole policy, and the great advantages which attend on it, 11 §§ 33, 34.

[(c) Oligarchy and Tyranny the least enduring forms of government. Historical survey of the tyrannies which lasted the longest, with the reasons why this was the case: 12 §§ 1—6.]

(b) Criticism of Plato's doctrine

of the successive changes from one form of the state to the other: 12 §§ 7—18.

(a) His theory of the transition from the best form of polity to the remaining forms: 12 §§ 7—10.

(i) It takes the right point of view for the cause of the decline in the best form; but the explanation given of the appearance of this cause is

(A) not peculiar to the best form of the state, but applies to all human affairs in common, 12 § 8, and

(B) supposing the best form of government to have been introduced into different states at different times before the period which Plato assumes for the universal decline, it is scarcely conceivable that, on the approach of this period, it would be subverted at one and the same time in them all, 12 §§ 9, 10.

(ii) No reason can be given why the best form of state should invariably pass over into that which stands next to it, 12 § 10.

(β) The case stands no better with his account of the transitions from the remaining forms of the state, to one another or to the best form: 12 § 10 (ὁ ὁδὸν τοῦτον)—§ 18.

(i) Plato adheres to the same principle that every form of polity is changed into the form nearest to it, whereas the change to the opposite form is quite as frequent or even more so, 12 §§ 10, 11.

(ii) As to the second point, Plato has said nothing definitely about the change to the best form of the state; but if the omission is to be supplied in accordance with his exposition there is nothing for it but to assume that the sole transition from Tyranny or into the best state is the change when the former passes into the latter: which would be incorrect, 12 §§ 11, 12.

(iii) Further, in regard to the first point, the change from Oligarchy to Tyranny does take place, 12 § 13.

(iv) Nor is the reason assigned by Plato for the change from Mixed Aristocracy to Oligarchy the true one. For

(1) the true motive is different;

(2) what Plato takes to be the true ground for the transition to Oligarchy is not present in many oligarchies; and

(3) where it is found in Mixed Aristocracies experience shows that no such transition takes place, 12 § 14.
(v) As regards the transition from Oligarchy,

(a) that the state is divided into two states, one of the rich, the other of
the poor, is not more true of Oligarchy than of the Mixed Aristocracy at Sparta
or of other forms of government: 12 § 15.

(b) The change from Oligarchy to Democracy is really due to several causes,
but Plato (1) only cites one of them, which does not hold except under strict
limitations, 12 § 17, while (2) this cause is not altogether necessary to a revolu-
tion from Oligarchy to Democracy, provided there are other causes: 12 § 16, § 18.

(vi) Again, the transition from Democracy to Tyranny is not adequately explained,
12 § 18. (*This is almost entirely wanting.*)

(vii) Plato speaks throughout as if there were only one species of Democracy
and of Oligarchy, 12 § 18.

PART III. The third main division of the work, treating of Legislation, is
entirely wanting.
Symbols and Abbreviations.

Γ = codex Graecus deperditus ex quo originem deduxit vetusta translationis latina Guillelmi de Moerbeka.
M² = cod. Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 ord. sup.
P¹(corr.¹) = correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.
P¹ = correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.

PI = the agreement of M²P¹ in a reading, presumably that of their archetype.

P² = cod. Parisinus Coislinianus 161.
P²(corr.¹) = correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.
P²(corr.²) = correctiones nigriores.
P²(corr.³) = correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.
P² = correctiones rubrae.

S¹ = cod. Laurentianus 81, 21.
S² = cod. Laurentianus 81, 21.

T¹ = cod. Urbinas 46.

U¹ = cod. Marcianus Ven. append. 1v, 3.
V¹ = cod. Vaticano-Palatinus 160.

W¹ = cod. Reginensis 125.
C¹ = cod. Camerarii deperditus.

Ald. = editio princeps Aldina.

II² = the agreement of Ald. and all existing mss. except M²P²P⁵ in a reading.

II³ = “,” “,” “,” “,” except M²P¹P²P³P⁵ in a reading.

II = codex archetypus deperditus superstitium librorum et Aldinae.

Bk.¹ = the Berlin Aristotle in quarto edited by Imm. Bekker in 1831.
Bk.² = the Politics reprinted in octavo (3rd edition in 1855; 4th, unaltered, in 1878).

Susem.³ = his ed. in Bibliotheca Teubneriana, 1882. Susem.⁴ = the present work.

Note that P¹-⁶(corr.) = the corrector of P¹ and the corrector of P⁶; but P² and P⁴(corr.) = the first hand of P² and the corrector of P⁴.

[Δρχων] Bernays = Bernays proposes to omit Δρχων from the text.
<και οἰκονομικῷ> Rassow = Rassow proposes to insert και οἰκονομικῷ in the text.
Susem. = Susenmihl conjectures; but
P¹ (?) = P¹ may have had the reading in question.

etw * * denotes a lacuna; that after etw some word, or words, has been lost.

The passages conjectured to be out of place in our authorities are, as a rule, printed twice over: where they occur in the mss. in thick Clarendon type; again, in ordinary type, but between angular brackets < >, in the place to which the editor would transpose them.
1 'Επειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὕτων καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἁγαθὸν τινὸς ἔνεκεν συνεστηκηκικοί (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἁγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσιν πάντες), δῆ- λον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἁγαθὸν τινὸς στοχάζονται, μᾶλλον δὲ 5 καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας

1252 a 1 [ἐπειδὴ...] 7 πολιτικὴ] Schmidt || kυριωτάτη before πασῶν M5 D1

Introduction, cc. 1, 2: περὶ οἰκονομίας, cc. 3—13 (the latter a necessary preliminary to the rest of the work, πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πάλιν ἐς οἰκίας). The prevailing tone is dialectical, and the contents of Bk. i, are nearly exhausted by a list of the problems (ἀποφαίων) started for discussion; (1) the difference between a city-state and a family, between πολίτης and οἰκονόμοις, (2) the elements of the state, πόλις εἰς ὧν σύγκειται, c. 2, (3) the natural basis of slavery, ὅτι εἰσὶν φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δουλοί, cc. 4—6, (4) the relation of χρηματιστική to Economic, πότερον ἡ χρηματιστική ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ τῆς, cc. 8—11, (5) the capacity of the slave (and the artizan) for moral virtue, πότερον ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τις δού- λον παρὰ τὰς ὁργανικὰς, 13 § 2 fi. See further the Analysis and Introd. pp. 23—31.

1. The city is the highest form of association, having the highest good for its end: § 1. The city not an enlarged family, but an essentially distinct organization, as is evident when it is analyzed into its simplest elements: §§ 2, 3.

§ 1 πόλιν] Ἀ ‘city,’ but at the same time a sovereign ‘state.’ κοινωνία—which includes any form of communication or social intercourse, κ. ἀλλακτικα, commercial transactions, exchange Nic. Eth. v. 5. 9; ταύτην τῷ κ. τῆς γαμμ. ὁμώλων, the marriage union Pol. iv(vii). 16. 2—denotes chiefly in this treatise (1) the voluntary combination, association, or cooperation of free men with each other in objects in which they have common interests (τόσον, ὡς ἕξαι συμμαχίας κοινωνεῖ). or, as it is sometimes put, formed with a view to certain common advantages (χρήσεως μη ἐφημέρου ἔνεκεν: τῆς μεταδόσεως, συμμαχίας, καλῶν πράξεων χάρων). Hence by a natural transition, concretely (2) the associated body, the members who compose the union; so that ἡ πολιτική κ., ‘civil society’ = the community, τὸ κοινόν (c.g. ii. 3. 1 compared with ii. 2. 2. iv(vii). 14. 1). See further on 1. 2 § 12, 8 § 13, III. 9. 12.

3 δοκοῦντος ἁγαθοῦ] seeming good, which may not really be the agent’s true interest, although he thinks so, cp. iv(vii). 13. 2. (See this case fully elucidated Nic. Eth. iii. 4 §§ 1—4. § 17, § 20, the solution being ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐκαστὰ κρί- νει ὅρθως καὶ ἐν ἐκάστῳ τάλησεν αὐτῷ φαίνεται.) Both δοκεῖ and φαίνεται are often opposed to ἐπιστήμαται as semblance to reality, but while δοκεῖ = putari to be thought, φαίνεσθαι = videi to appear, of an object present to sense; hence τὸ δο- κών = subjective opinion, τὰ φαίνεσθαι = objective facts. Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v.

4 πᾶσαι μὲν...μᾶλλον δὲ] The clause with δὲ gives the true apodosis to ἐπειδὴ: ‘while all aim at some good (κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἔφεραται), the highest and most comprehensive aims especially at the highest good.’

5 κυριωτάτου] Cp. iii. 12. 1 and note SUSEM. (1)

Aristotle’s proof, if we assume ἡ πολι-
περιέχουσα τὰς ἀλλας. ἀυτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις (1) καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτεία.

§ 2 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οὖνται πολιτικοὶ καὶ βασιλικοὶ καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ δεσποτικοὶ [ἐναι] τῶν αὐτῶν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ οἱκονομικός καὶ δεσποτικός) ἀλλὰ οὐκ εἴδει τοῦτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἀν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσποτῆτα, ἀν δὲ πλειονῶν, οἰκονομοῦν, ἀν δὲ ἐτὶ πλειονῶν, πολιτικοὶ ἡ βασιλικοὶ, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρῶν πόλεων καὶ πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ βασιλικοῦ, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς εὐφημήκη, βασιλικοῦ, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικῶν ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ.)

9 εἴσιν omitted by Π (added after τῶν by a later hand in Μ) || 14 εὐφημήκη Μ (1st hand), εὐφημήκη Μ (corrector), εὐφημήκη 14 Q Qb Rb Sb Tu U V Vb Wb L* Aldine || 15 τοῖς is omitted by Π3 Blk. || 16 [ἄρχων] καὶ ἀρχόμενος Ψ Bernays (cp. III. 17. 7) needlessly

tικὴ to be the ‘art’ concerned with η κοινωνία η πολις, is given Nic. Eth. 1. 2 §§ 5—7; cp. el γὰρ καὶ ταύτων ἐστίν ἔνι καὶ πόλεις, μείζον γε καὶ τελείωτέρον τὸ τῆς πόλεως…..κάλλιον καὶ θείτερον οἶκες καὶ πόλεως, sc. τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθόν: which is more precisely described in the case of the ‘city’ as justice and the interest of the community, τὸ κωνικὸν συμφέρον.

Ἡ πασῶν…πάσας περιέχουσα.] See n. on 11. 2 § 7, where is explained, from Nic. Eth. viii. 9 §§ 4—6, how this supreme society embraces all the 'parts' (μέρα) of itself.

§ 2 οἱ δόσοι μὲν κτλ] Plato Politicus 258 E ff.; cp. c. 3 § 4, 7 §§ 1, 2 nn. Socrates too expresses himself to this effect in Xenoph. Memorab. III. 4 § 6 f. § 12 ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἱδίων ἐπιμέλεια πληθεὶς μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κωνικῶν. SUSEM. (2) πολιτικῶν] A practical statesman, a magistrate in a free city, self-governed according to Greek ideas; so § 8 § 15, 11 § 13, 11. 7. 1 πολιτικὸς ὁ φιλόσοφος καὶ ιδιώτης, cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. 18 (. σοφόταται. Occasionally much more than this, for Aristotle requires that ὁ ός ἀληθῶς π. should know psychology, N. E. 1. 13 §§ 2—7, legislation, and other sciences: hence joined with νομοθετῆς, a theoretical statesman, student of politics: iv(vii). 4. 3, vi(v). I § 3, vii(v). 9. 9. 9 πληθεὶς κτλ] They assume that a king differs from e.g. a householder only in having more numerous, not more heterogeneous, dependents. πλῆθος = numbers: 8 § 15, Rhet. 1. 4. 10 (τὸ πλῆθος τῆς φυλακῆς = the strength of the defensive force), cp. Metaph. 1. 9. 24 ἀριθμῶν = τὸ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγων.

10 εἴδει] or κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ‘specifically,’ ‘in kind’; εἴδει διαφέρειν = to be essentially different, because division into species takes account only of essential qualities.

11 ἐν μὲν ὀλίγων] Schneider supplies ἄρχων here, and καλοῦσιν before διαστήματος, but νομίζουσιν (εἴσιν) would do just as well in the latter case, and in line 14, while either ἄρχων or εὐφήμηκη must be understood to follow ὅταν ὃς δὲ in line 15.

12 ὡς οὖν δόσοι κτλ] Whereas the state is composed εἰς εἴδει διαφερόμενων, 11. 2. 3, where see n. SUSEM. (2 b) Plato Polit. 259 b μεγάλης σχῆμας οἰκήσεως ή σκορπα ὅπερ πόλεως ὅχος μών τι πρὸς ἄρχην διάστητον; ΝΕ. 24. οὖν. ΞΕ. οἰκήσεως, ὃ νοοῦσα διακοπῶν ήμεῖς, φανερῶν ἡ εἰστιμησθή μιαν περὶ πάντων ἐστὶ ταῦτα. ταύτην δὲ εἶναι βασιλικὴν εἶναι πολιτικὴν εἶναι οἰκονομικὴν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερόμενα.

13 καὶ πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ βασιλικῶν] sc. οὗκ εἰδεῖς νομίζουσιν διαφέρειν.

15 τῆς ἐπ. τῆς τοιαύτης] ἰ. τ. τῆς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ, not τῆς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, the regal science of government (Kassow Bemerkungen p. 3). SUSEM. (3) Cp. n. on τοιαύτην c. 8 § 7. The one man supreme over the state is called a king; the ruler who follows out the principles of the same kingly science (when in office), but takes his turn (κατὰ μέρος) at governing and being governed, is a republican magistrate.
§ 3 δὴ λέγομεν ὅ ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον ἑπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ύφη-3 γιγαντικήν μέθοδον. ὁσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀνυπνήτων ἀνάγκη διαίρεσιν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὐτώ καὶ πόλιν εξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοτοῦντες ὑφόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τὸ τε διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλοι, καὶ εἰ τί τεχνικὸν ἐπιδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἑκατὸν τῶν ῥήματων.

2 εἰ δὴ τις ἕξ ἀρχής τὰ πράγματα φύσεως βλέπειν (Bk. vii. 17) ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις, κάλλιστ᾽ ἀν οὔτω § 2 θεωρήσειν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτων συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ 4

§ 3 17 τὸ λεγόμενον] sc. 9 ὅτι σὺ καλὸς λέγονσα, all between being parenthetical. When such side-notes are imbedded in the text the construction of the main sentence is often difficult to follow: e.g. 2 § 2 3 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 §§ 4—6, perhaps 13 §§ 6—8: I. 10. 7—9: IV (vii). 3 § 1, 13 §§ 2—4, 16 §§ 2—4: v (viii). 5 §§ 2—4, §§ 18—24, perhaps 6 § 15—7 § 1, 7 §§ 6—8. In iii. 9 §§ 6—8, vi (iv). 4 §§ 8, 9 and perhaps in iii. 12 §§ 1, 2 the interruption of the original construction almost amounts to acolathia. See Bonitz Aristotelische Studien ii. 11.

κατὰ τὴν ύφηγημένην μέθοδον] in accordance with the method of inquiry which has previously been 'started' or 'traced out' or 'followed,' and so the usual method of inquiry (Bonitz): De Genr. Anim. iii. 9. 1, 758 a 28 ff.: τὸν ύφηγημένον τρόπον Pol. 1. 8. 1, Nic. Eth. ii. 7. 9. The participle is passive, as is ύφηγεται (ὑφήγεται ἢκ.) Pol. 1. 13. 6. See 3 § 1, 8 § 1 n. (66), iii. 1. 2 with n. (434) (Schneider). SUSEM. (4)

18 ὡσπερ γὰρ κτλ] "As in other subjects a compound has to be resolved into its ultimate elements, these being the smallest parts of the whole, so here by inquiring of what elements a city," which is a compound iii. 1. 2, "is composed, we shall better discover the difference between the four types above-mentioned (πολιτικός, βασιλικός, etc.) and whether systematic knowledge can be attained about them severally." Although he did not apply the mathematical method of pure deduction to biological or political sciences Aristotle derived both the processes of Analysis and Synthesis and the terms (ἀναθεὼν, σύνετον διαίρειν) from geometry: see the instructive passages Nic. Eth. iii. 3 §§ 11, 12 ὡσπερ καὶ ἀναλύει τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὡσπερ διάγραμμα (a geometrical problem), Metaph.

VIII (0). 9. 4 1051 a 21—29 εἰρήκεια δε καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἑνεργεῖα, διαίρεσις γὰρ εἰρήκειαν.

21 τούτων καὶ 23 τῶν ῥήματων should be taken as above and not referred to εἰς ὧν σύγκειται (πόλις) as the grammatical antecedent.

c. 2 Origin of the city from the family through the village-community: §§ 1—8. The city a natural institution §§ 8—12, prior in the intention of nature to the family and individual §§ 13, 14, and of incalculable utility §§ 15, 16.

We have here the Patriarchal Theory, as it is called by Sir H. Maine, applied to the origin of society. The family living under the headship of the father is taken as the ultimate social unit. Until quite recently this was the accepted view: see Maine Ancient Law c. 5 esp. 122—135; Early History of Institutions c. 3, Early Law and Custom cc. 7, 8. There are certain difficulties of this derivation of the state which Aristotle avoids by making the combination of families of different stocks (γένε) depend on contiguity of residence and on convenience. See J. F. McLemmon's criticisms Studies in Ancient History, esp. 213—227, 235—309.

On the origin of civil society there is something in Plato Rep. ii. 369 b ff., Laws iii. 676—682, Polybius vi. cc. 4—7, Cicero De Rep. 1. 25, 26 §§ 39—42 (with Lactantius Instit. vi. 10), De Off. 1. 17 §§ 53, 54, De Fin. iii. §§ 62—67. A. C. Bradley Helenica 190—212 gives the best general commentary on cc. 1, 2; Oncken Staatslehre ii. 3—27 is also helpful.

§ 1 24 τὸ πράγματα φύσεως] "things in their growth or origin" (Shilleto); Plato Rep. 369 A, Laws 757 c.

27 οἶνον] "namely," introducing the two relationships (each of which needs a long parenthetical explanation) into which the family can be analysed, § 5.

28 καὶ τὸ τοῦτο κτλ] Cp. Zeller Philosophie der Griechen II 11 5 111, who quotes De Animā 11 4. 2, 415 a 26 φυσικότατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζώοις ὁσα τέλεια...τὸ παίρνει ἔτερον οἶνον αὐτό, ζώον μὲν, φυτῶν δὲ φυτὸν, ἵνα τοῦ άδικεῖ καὶ τοῖς θείοις μετέχων ἢ δύνανται. Individuals perish but the species, the kind, is immortal. So first Plato Ἴμπροσθ. 206 ε, 207 c.—208 b. Susem. (5)

οὐκ ἐκ προορισμῶν] not by design, or of deliberate purpose, ἢ γὰρ προορισμὸς μετὰ λόγου καὶ δεινολίας: instincively.

30 ἀρχόν κτλ] "governor and governed by nature" clearly = "master and slave" not as 1 § 2 ‘political ruler and subject.”


διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν] "for preservation": i.e. to secure the means of subsistence. How far this is true of the ‘slave by birth’ on Aristotle's view is explained § 6—10, as Fülleborn has correctly observed: in the case of the master it should be remembered that without slaves in his household he can procure at best but a poor and uncertain subsistence: see § 5 n. (15). Susem. (6)

§ 3 34 διὰ δεσποτῆς κτλ] 'It is not simply, as Fülleborn (II. 75) supposes, that both master and slave are alike interested in the establishment of this relationship: Aristotle really means that the master's interest is advantageous for the slave, and conversely': cp. 5 § 10 n. (57). Only the advantage to the slave comes indirectly, κατά συμβεβηκός, III. 6. 6 n. (L. Schiller). Susem. (7) Cp. § 5 2. 1252 b 1 οὐδὲν γὰρ κτλ] "For nature never fashions things niggardly, for various and dissimilar purposes, as Delphic cutlers do their knife" (Shilleto). 2 τὴν Δελφικήν μάχαιραν] "According to Hesychios, s.v., the Delphic knife had the upper part only of iron, λαμβανόμενον έμπροσθόν μέρος σιδήρων; the handle, perhaps also the back, was of wood. Gottling De m. D. quaes est apud Aristotelem (Jenae 1856. 4) maintains it was a knife and spoon combined, for sacrificial purposes" (Schnitzer). Hence Gottling proposes μύστρον for μέρος in Hesychios, as above. Oncken, II. 25—27, dismisses the obscure words of Hesychios in favour of Oresme's explanation: "suppose a piece of iron with a thick end and a pointed end, with the back left rough and the other side sharpened to a blade. Then you have a knife for cutting, you can file with the rough back, and by turning it round use the thick end for a hammer. Such a rough sort of tool would certainly be cheap enough," Cp. βδελυκολόχαια VII(iv). 15’ 8 n. Susem. (8) Δελφική μάχαιρα ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοκρητῶν Makarios ap. Walzium Arsen. 179: with which agrees the explanation.
in appended prov. 1. 94 (to 180, p. 393 of Gotting. the Corame Parrocigraphier, 1839) Delphic μέχαρα: ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν
κέρδοις καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς λαμβάνειν προαιρο-
μένων, παρόσον οἱ Δέλφοι τὸ μὲν τι τῶν
ἱερεῶν ἀλάβασιν, τὸ δὲ τευτονίας μαχαίρας
(Ποροί τῆς χειρὸς) ἐπάρτετο. Athenaeus iv. 74 p. 173: 'Αχαίοι δὲ ἐν
Ερετρείῳ ἐν Ἀλκμαίων τῷ σατυρικῷ καρυ-
κοποῖου καλεί τοὺς Δέλφους διὰ τοῦτον:
Καρυκοποίου προβλέπων βδελύτορας
παρόσον τὰ ἱερεῖα περιέμυσιν δῆμος ὥν
ἐμείσθεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκκατέρωθεν, εἰς ταῖς
δὲ ἀποβλέπους καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἢρη: Ἀλλ' ἐν
Δέλφων πλέαστα ἀκοών | δούλα μα-
χαίρας | καὶ προδιδόσκας τοὺς σώος προτ-
όλοι. It was from Thomas Aquinas ad locum that Oresme derived the explanation
cited above. See Von Hertling Rhein. 
Mus. xxxix. p. 447. Mr W. Ridgeway
thinks the name given to "a large kind
of knife, which could be used for either
fighting or carving, from the sacrificial
knife having been used as a weapon
to slay Pyrrhus, Pindar N.ii. vii. 42."

3 ἐν πρός ἐν] There are of course
exceptions to this rule, as Aristotle himself
always De Part. Anim. iv. 6. 13, 683 a 22
ὅτι ἔνεξηται κριτήρια δυνάμει ἐπὶ δό
ἐργα καὶ μὴ ἐμπόδιες πρὸς ἑπέραν, οὐ-
δὲν ἡ λόγιος εἰσάγει ποιήσει ῥητορ
καὶ λειτουργείν ὕποτε ἡ καλ-
κεντρίκη πρὸς ἐπίτευξιν ὄρεξικον
καὶ ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἐμείσθεν, καταχρῆται τῷ
ἀυτῷ ἐπὶ πλέα ἐργα. SUSEM. (9) See
De Animis 11. 8, 10, 420 b 16. We
shall find the rule applied to political
offices 11. 11, 13, vi(iv). 15. 6.

4 μὴ πολλοῖς ἐργοῖς κτλ] "if re-
stricted in use to a single function." Fülle-
born asserts that the conclusion does not
follow from the premises, even supposing
there is no exception to the rule (see
preceding note). But surely the propa-
gulation and the preservation of the species
are two different ends. At the same
time Aristotle should have emphasized
the fact that woman is not nearly so far
below man as the natural slave (see § 2)
is below his master. SUSEM. (10)

§ 4 5 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις κτλ] 'Whereas in Greece wife and slave are
distinct, in barbaria they are not, be-
cause all—men and women—are slaves'
(Jackson). In Thrace e.g. the women
did farm-work μιθὲν διαφερόντως τῶν

οὐτω γὰρ ἀν ἀποτελεῖτο κάλλιστα (1)
4 τῶν ὁργάνων καὶ ἀνάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει
5 τὸ after ἐκ is omitted by IIι Bk.

Fülleborn (II. 84) objects that this is an unsatisfactory
reason to assign for the servitude of women outside
Greece, since where all of both
sexes are slaves we should rather infer that
they are all equal. (In this last sense in-
cide Grotius seriously takes the words,
supplying ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἔχει tat ταῖς καὶ τοῖς
ἀλλαῖς τοῖς σύμβασι καὶ τοῖς διστάσεσι.
"Fülleborn's objections arise from his
having been misled by the omission
mentioned above, in n. (10), and so having
misunderstood the real sense of the pas-
sage. Aristotle’s meaning is this: be-
cause the barbarian nations are slaves by
nature, the men are not capable of re-
specting the freedom of the female sex
in the women, and of according to them
the position which by nature belongs to
the woman in relation to the man; but
treat them as slaves. And hence neces-
sarily arises the perversion of nature, that
in the marriage relation you have one
slave ruling despotically over another.
To the same cause, the servile character
of these nations, or at least of the Asiatics
(1. 6. 8 n.), Aristotle attributes the fact
that they themselves are ruled by their
kings as slaves; or in other words that
the form under which the state exists
amongst them is despotism, III. 14. 6 n.,
which in reality cannot be considered to
constitute a state at all, a state consisting
of free citizens but not of slaves, 7 § 1,
III. 9 § 6, 12 § 8; cp. vi(iv). 4 § 11, a
passage which is probably not genuine.
Such a despotism is only an abnormally
expanded family: (‘non civitas erit sed
magna familia,’ Grotrius De ture bellii ac
pacis III. 8. 2). It is a species of that
which Aristotle denotes by ἔθνος, i.e. a
mere aggregate of men of the same race,
a tribe population or nationality, as
contrasted with πόλις, a city-state: § 6; 11.
1 § 3; III. 3 § 5, 13 § 19, 14 § 15;
iv(vii). 4 § 11; vii(vii). 10 § 8 with nn.;
Nic. Eth. 1. 2. 8, 1094 b 10; Rhet. 1. 5. §
1300 b 31; cp. Schlosser 1. 278. [Cp.
ἔθνος = federation in Polybios and Dio-
doros, esp. of the Achaean and Aetolian
Leagues: δὲ ἐθνικὰς χρεῖας ‘for federal
purposes’ Diod. xviii. 13.] See further
n. (13): 5 § 8, 6 §§ 4–6 with nn. (47),
(54), (56); 7 § 5, 8 § 12; iv(vii). 2 § 15,
14 § 21 with nn." SUSEM. (11)
6 τάξιν. αἰτίων δὲ ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἀρχὸν οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἅλλα γίνεται (1) ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δοῦλης καὶ δούλου. διὸ φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ


§ 5 ὡς ταυτὸ φύσει βαρβάρον καὶ δούλον ὅτι ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦτων τῶν 10 δύο κοινωνίων οἰκία προτέτη, καὶ ὅρθως Ἡσίοδος ἐπέ ποιήσας ὀικῶν μὲν πρῶτα τυε ναῖκα τε βοῦν τ᾽ ἄρσητεν ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἄντ᾽ οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἔστιν.

η μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἰκός ἐστιν, οὐς ὁ μὲν Χαρώνδας καλεῖ μοσιττόν, 'Επι-15 μενενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρής ὀμοκάτους ὁ δὲ ἐκ πλειώνων οἰκείων κοινωνία 7

9 ὧν before ταυτὸ Γ, omitted by M* P₁ || 12 ἐστίν. * * Susen. wrongly, see Dittenberger Gött. gel. Anz. 1874 p. 1372 ff. || 15 ὀμοκάτους IP P₁ L* Susen. and M* (corr.), perhaps rightly, but see Dittenberger p. 1357 ff. and Commentary n. (17): ὀμοκάτους = ὡμοκήπως Ridgeway (also Shilleto in unpublished Adversaria: 'si Epi-

8 Euripides Iphigeneia in Aulis 1400 Nauck. The words following are ἄλλων βαρβάρων, μήτερ, Ἑλληνών τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἱ ἐκ Ελευθερών. Susen. (12)

§ 5 10 πρώτη] predicatively, "from these two relationships,"—man and wife, master and slave,—"arises primarily the family." For the sense, πρῶτον καὶ ἀναγκαίοτερον οἰκία πόλεως Nic. Eth. VIII. 12-7. The three stages, οἰκία κώμη πόλις, are given by Plato Laws i. 626 c ff. Ἡσίοδος Works and Days 405. Clearly Aristotle did not know of the spurious line 406 in our texts, κτηνὴν ὁ οὖ γαμήσῃ, ἡτὶς καὶ βοῶν ἐπεκού. Susen. (18)

12 ὁ γὰρ βοῦς κτλ.] "the ox supplies the place of a servant." Cp. 5 § 9 n. (46). If with both these passages we compare 4 §§ 1-4, it is evident that Varro's division De re rustica i. 17, which Grotius mentions op. c. i. 5, 3, is quite in the sense and spirit of Aristotle: ali in tres partes (sc. dividunt) instrumenti genus: vocale et semivocale et mutum. vocale in quo sunt servî: semivocale in quo sunt boves: mutum, in quo sunt plaustra. (L. Schiller.)

12 ἡ μὲν οὖν κτλ.] μὲν ὁ δὲ, repeating after the quotation from Hesiod the clause 9 ὡς μὲν οὖν κτλ. Take κατὰ φύσιν with συνεστηκυῖα: "thus then the society which in the order of nature has arisen to meet every-day needs is the household: sharers in one meal-jar as Charondas calls them; joint-holders of a piece of land in the phrase of Epi-

14 Χαρώνδας] PI. ii. 12 § 7, § 11 n. (416); vii(iv). 11 § 15, 13 § 2 nn. Holm Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum (Leip-

15 ὀμοκάτους] The reading is doubtful. (1) The MSS. of the better family give ὀμοκάπτως. (2) If Aristotle is quoting from a collection of oracles (Ἑρμοῦ)
ascribed to Epimenides, then, as these would be written in hexameters, the text requires a word capable of standing in an hexameter verse and ὑμοκάπτων, which satisfies this condition, appears to possess a decided advantage. For ὑμοκάπτων of the inferior MSS, is usually taken to be a compound with κατη a trough, crib: hence any feeding-place; and if this etymology be correct nothing but arbitrary lengthening of the first syllable in arsi could adapt the word to an hexameter verse. (3) Gottling, again, thinks that Epimenides could not possibly have called the families of the Cretans ‘mess-mates,’ because the αὐσσοτία were established amongst them. But, even assuming that Epimenides actually wrote the line in question, there was, as Dittenberger remarks, no absolute necessity that he should confine himself in this oracle to the circumstances of Crete, especially as his influence was actively felt far beyond the island.

In favour of ὑμοκάπτων Dittenberger urges that ‘it is like Aristotle to support the results of his own inquiries by a subsequent appeal to the language of common life, to proverbs, passages in the poets, or specially significant sayings and expressions of prose writers. In this place Charondas and Epimenides are evidently quoted for this same purpose, in connexion with the definition of the family as a society existing for the whole of daily life. Consequently it is the satisfaction of daily recurring needs which brings individuals together in a household. The expression of Charondas (and that of Epimenides also, if we read ὑμοκάπτων) fits in perfectly with this, by making common participation in food, which is the most important daily need, characteristic of the household. But ὑμοκάπτων = smoke-fellows could only be taken as alluding to the common sacrificial fire, which would not suit the present context, although it is true that from the point of view of the Greek the family was a society for worship. Yet ὑμοκάπτων should be understood of sharers in the smoke of the common hearth, just as we might speak of ‘hearth’s meaning homes or families’; thus the same idea of a common participation in food would be denoted but in a different form.

All these difficulties Ridgeway (Camb. Philological Soc. Transactions Feb. 23, 1892) seeks to avoid by retaining the reading ὑμοκάπτων (with a), Doric for ὑμοκάπτων (κῆπος) = with a common plot of ground. SUSEM. (17)

“The Cretan poet used a Doric form, for the retention of the dialectic form in Aristotle cp. θάλας I. 11. 12: κῆπος is the common plot of ground that furnishes the common food supply (σινήν): cp. ii. 5. 2 (γῆπεδων and καρποί). The scale of social development here indicated seems to be (1) original οἰκία: (2) οἶκος = joint family of Hindus or Slavonic house-community, where the proceeds of the undivided property (κῆπος) must be brought into a common chest or purse: vide Sir H. Maine” (Early Law 237—255) after that, “(3) the οἶκος breaks up into separate οἰκίαs forming the κῆπω (the Russian village community): all are sprung or believe themselves to be sprung from a common ancestor (ὁμογάλακτες)” (Ridgeway). For the undivided family property comp. E. de Laveleye La propriété primitive cc. 13—15 (Engl. tr. pp. 175—214), Hearn Aryan Household 176—191, and the criticism by D. McLennan Patriarchal Theory c. 8: also Caillemer Droit de succession p. 34 ff., Janet Les institutions sociales et le droit civil à Sparte (Paris 1880) p. 88.

6 εἰκ  πλειάνων κτλ] Instances of services needed from time to time for which members of a village community unite (as distinct from the daily wants which originate the family) are, to repel a common enemy or to execute a great work of common utility (Fülleborn 1195, 96). Add the exchange of commodities, which is unnecessary in the household: 9 § 5 with note. SUSEM. (18)

16 πρῶτη = simplicissima, quae tamquam pars inest alius (Bonitz).

6 § 17 ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας] i.e. all the rest of the village except the original

household may be most naturally regarded as a colony or offshoot of the original household. 

SUSM. (18b)

18 οἄγαλκτες According to Philochoros Frag. 91—94 and Frag. 139 in Haprokration and Siudas (c. Oly. Γεννήται, ομογάλκτες, ὅργεων) the members of each of the 360 ancient Attic γένεων who were afterwards called γεννήται = kin, clansmen, were originally called ομογάλκτες—foster-brothers, fellow-nurslings (J. G. Schneider Addenda ii. 471). Pollux vii. 37, viii. 9. 9 ὁ μετέχωντες τοῦ γένους ἐκαλούντο γεννήται καὶ ομογάλκτες, γένει μὲν οὖν προσήκοντες, ἐκ δὲ τῆς συνόδου οὖτος προσαγορεύμενοι. 

SUSSEM. (19).

Thus only is the γένος hinted at here. "The identity of the κόσμη and the γένος is apparently indicated III. 9 §§ 12, 14 where we have the πόλεις defined as (α) ἡ τοῦ εὖ γεννήται καὶ ταῖς αἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, and (β) ἡ γένεων καὶ κομμῶν κοινοί" (Heitland Notes 8). Even then no place in the development is found for φανταζεί, φυλαλαί, or Aristotle's "associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals" Nic. Eth. viii. 9. 5; cp. Pol. iii. 9. 13 (Oncken). Apparently they are held to be of later origin than the state. Nor is there any explicit reference to συνοικισμός, although, as Stein suggests, Aristotle has doublets been influenced by the history of Attica.

As to the meaning of ομογάλκτες, Aristotle unquestionably understood it to imply common ancestry in our sense, even if παῖδας to καὶ παῖδων παῖδας be rejected as a gloss. And this may well have been the sense in which it was anciently applied to the clansmen (γεννήται). For descent had long been reckoned through males in Athens,—indeed Diakirachos (Pr. 9 Müller) appears to denote by πάτρα what is usually called the γένος: and even where individuals not connected by blood had entered a clan they may have come to believe the contrary. (See Maine Early Law p. 272 ff.)

Or the word may have first meant "those of kin by descent through females only." On the evidence of Spartan and Athenian customs, and from indications in Homer and the legends, it has been with good reason inferred that this system of kinship once prevailed in Greece, McLennan op. c. 225—309: cp. i. H. Morgan Ancient Society c. 8 esp. 230—234. "If ομογάλκτες = members of a γένος, the name itself demonstrates that this membership in the γένος depended on their having had the same mother's milk" (Ridgeway). If so, we may similarly interpret ὁμοσίπωνοι and ὀμοδάκται as survivals from a time when eating from the same meal-jar or sharing the same smoke, and not inheritance of the same father's blood, constituted in a savage society the earliest idea of kinship? See Exe. 1 to ii. 11.

Another meaning proposed is: 'those who offer the same milk', from a comparison of Sanskrit sapinda, samānādaka = those who offer the same cake, the same water: i.e. 'near kin', 'distant kin' respectively (Heurn op. c. 171): but for this there is no evidence.

διό = hence: viz. because the 'city' arose through the village from the family. Thus Plato argues Laws i. 680 d ff.: εὖ ὅθε το πρεσβύτατον ἀρχεῖ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἄρχοντας αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι... βασιλεία παῖδος δικαιοτάτης βασιλεύμενοι. 19 αἱ πόλεις = Hellenic city-states, τὰ ἐθνή = non-Hellenic races or populations. As in IV (vii). 2. 10 ἐτεί δὲ τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς τοῖς διανυπάρκους πλεονεκτεῖν... οἷον ἐν Σκηναίαι καὶ Πέραιαι καὶ Ὀρθῆ καὶ Κέλτοις, Aristole uses ἐθνῆ on the grounds assigned in v. (11) as equivalent to non-Hellenes, precisely as the word is used in the New Testament for Gentiles (Jews and Christians τῷ πρῶτῳ). Other reasons assigned 114. 14 § 12, 15 § 11 nn. (657—9), viii(v). 10 § 3 (1649). SUSEM. (19 b) Also, as Postgate suggests, vii (iv), 13 § 11. On the advantages of monarchy in a primitive society, see Bagehot Physics and Politics 65 f. (Jackson).
§ 7 ὁστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συνεξειαίαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὁ λέγει (p. 3) ὁμορος, 
θεμιστεύει δὲ ἐκαστὸς
παῖδων ἢ' ἄλοχων.

σποράδες γὰρ καὶ ὀφθω τὸ ἀρχαῖον φικοῦν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεῦσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἐτί καὶ νῦν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύσω, ὡσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδος ἐαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι, ὀφθω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεών.

§ 8 ἡ δ' ἐκ πληεύσων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλεις ἦδη, πάσης ἃ ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ως ἑτοσ εὐεπίω, γινομένη μὲν 30 οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἑνεκεν, ὅσα δὲ τοῦ εὗ ζην. διὸ πᾶσα πόλεως φύσει

21 αἱ is omitted by M⁴ P¹, whether rightly, is very doubtful. 24 σποράδες γὰρ καὶ ὀφθω <ἀγγειετην> Schmidt edits, σποράδες γὰρ καὶ ὀφθω [τὸ ἀρχαῖον] and 26 ὡσπερ γὰρ Schmidt formerly (now withdrawn). 28 ἡ δὲ Μ⁴ P³⁺ᵃ⁺ᵇ⁺ᶜ⁺ᵈ⁺ ε⁴ Q⁴ Q⁺ᵇ⁺ сотрудникstant transposed by Schmidt to follow 18 παῖδας. See his arrangement and alterations Introd. p. 96. 29 γενομένη Schneider 30 οὖν is wanting in M⁴ P¹, but cp. IV (VII). 10 § 1, 1329 b 3.

21 ὁστε καὶ αἱ ἀπ.] 'Wherefore likewise the colonies' [i.e. the villages] 'because of their kinship' sc. βασιλεύοντα. So § 11 ὁστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (Shilleto).


24 τὸ ἀρχαῖον] With the adverbial use comp. Xen. Helen. v. 2. 7 καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἄλοχον.

24 ff. 'A reminiscence of the famous saying of Xenophanes given by Clem. Alex. VII p. 711 b: "Ελληνες δὲ ὡσπερ ἀνθρωπομορφόντες οὖν καὶ ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς τούς θεούς ὑποτίθεται καὶ καθάπερ τὰς μορφὰς αὐτῶν ὄμοις εαυτοῦ ἐκαστὸς διαφόρα τῷ φυσικῷ" (Ridgeway).

See still further statements about the popular religion in Metaph. xii (A). 8 §§ 19—21, 1074 b 3 ff.

§ 8 28 τ' δ' ἐκ πληεύσων κτλ] Cp. ii. 2 § 8 with note and references, also αἱ. on iii. 3 §§ 3, 4; 9 § 10 (554). Susenum. (20 b)

"The union of several village-communities forms, when complete, an actual city, attaining, so to speak, the limit of perfect self-sufficiency: at the outset a union for a bare livelihood, it exists to promote a higher life." See Grote History ii. 341—344 on city-state (villages: on this deduction of the state generally A. C. Bradley Hellenica 197—199, who observes 194 n. that "freedom", though not in a mere negative sense, best answers to αὐταρκεία: a life which leaves no want of man's nature, external or spiritual, unsatisfied. In N. E. I. 7, 7 τὸ αὐτάρκεια ὑποτιθέμενον αἰρέτων ποιεῖ τὸν βίου καὶ μη- 

dενός ἐνθὲ, the sole condition of a life that is desirable and lacks nothing. Cp. N. E. x. 6. 2 οὐδὲν ἐνθές...αὐτάρκειας.

29 ff. Compare C. 4 § 1; II. 2 § 8; III. 1 § 12, 6 §§ 3, 4 ff.; 9 §§ 5, 6, 11—14, esp. τής γεννών καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ἐς τελείαν καὶ αὐτάρκους «χάρῗς»: τούτου δ' ἐστίν, ως φαίμην, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμονίως καὶ κάλας. τῶν καλῶν ἀρα πράξεων [χάρῳ] βετόν ἐστιν τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζύγου; further III. 12 § 9, 13 § 1, 18 § 1; IV(VII).

4 §§ 11—14, 5 § 1, 8 § 4, 8 §§ 9, 9 §§ 1, 2; IV(VI). 4 §§ 9—11; VII(VI). 8 § 3. These passages would prove (even if it were not self-evident) that the perfected and beautified life, made complete self-sufficing and satisfying, is one with the life of happiness or well-being (εὐδαιμονία): cp. n. (284) on II. 9 § 5. Susenum. (21)

The implication of εὗ ζῆν and αὐτάρκεια which dispenses of Schmidt's attestation of the clauses where the latter conception comes in (Jakrb. f. Phil. CXXV. 1882, 804, cp. Intro. 97 n.) may also be studied in Nic. Eth. 1. 7 §§ 6—8. In De anima II. 8. 10, 420 b 19—22, τὸ εὗ is opposed to αὐτάρκειαν, to εὗ αὐτάρκης in De part. animal. III. 7. 18, 670 b 23.

30 διὸ κτλ] Two proofs that the 'city' is natural. (1) It is the outcome and realization, the final cause, of the previous societies: they are natural, so also is the 'city'. (2) It alone is fully self-sufficing;
but to be self-sufficing is end and highest good (and end = fully developed nature).

Against whom, we may ask, is this directed? No doubt there were Sophists who criticized political institutions, of whom Hippias and Thrasymachus may serve as opposite types. But perhaps Antisthenes was the first deliberately to oppose the outcome of civilization and to advocate a return to a ruder and simpler life: Zeller *Socrates and Socratic*. p. 322—5.

The anti-social theories of Plato's Callicles in the *Gorgias*, of Thrasymachus and the speakers in *Crito*. B. II, are not directly subversive of the state: like Hobbism, they are conservative in their aim.

32 ἄ δέ φυσὶς τέλος) *Physics* II. 1. 8

33 Bk. 30 f. φύσις in first sense = ἔνδεικνυμία; in second sense = ἑκοτωσία πολεμικά. of ένδεικνυμία, καί τοῦ τέλους τούτου, ὡστε πάντων τῆς τέχνης καὶ τοῦ τεχνικοῦ, ὥστε καὶ φύσις τοῦ τέλους λέγεται καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ: II. 11 § 8, 194 a 28 f. ἄ δέ φυσὶς τέλος καὶ ά ένεκα ἅν γὰρ ἡμιχών τῆς κινήσεως οὕτως ἔστι τοῦ ἐχόμενος, τότε τέλος καὶ τὸ ένεκα… βούλευται γὰρ οὐ παρέναι τὸν ἐχόμενον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον. *De anima* III. 12. 3. 434 a 32 f. (Eaton). "Is it the bud, or the blossom, or the ripe fruit that is natural to a tree? All three: only it is unnatural and contrary to the design of the tree that the bud should wither before coming into bloom and bearing fruit." (Fülléborn). *Susem.* (22)

§ 9 34 f. έν… βέλτιστον) The whole connexion requires that this should be a second proof (or at least an amplification of the first proof) ὅτι πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστιν. And so in fact it is, only it must be supplemented from what precedes. It runs thus: 'the final cause, that is, the end, of a thing is best. Now self-sufficiency is the end and the best' (thus including under one both the subject and the predicate of the former premiss). With this must be mentally supplied from the foregoing; 'the end discloses the true nature of the thing', and 'political society alone' (i.e. no society short of the state) 'affords to its members true self-sufficiency'. Then the conclusion follows that the state is by nature. Similar abbreviations of the steps in an argument are found elsewhere in Aristotle, so concise sometimes as to be almost unintelligible: e.g. *Metaph.* xi (A). i § 2, § 5, 1069 a 24, b 5 (Freudenthal). *Susem.* (23)

1253 a 1 'From this then it appears that the city is part of the order of nature and man a social being'. *N.E.* IX. 9. 3: no one would choose the possession of every good to be by himself, political γάρ ὁ ἀνθρωπός καὶ ο ἡμικονία πεφυκός. See also *ib.* 1. 7. 6. "The dogma of ἡ πόλις ἐστι, καὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπός φύσει πολιτικὸν ἢν, as interpreted by Aristotle, implies (1) that social organization is not a violation of nature, (2) that the πόλις differs from the οἰκία in something more than size, (3) that existing institutions are capable of improvement, (4) that there is a form or type or end towards which they may be improved. It is plain that the exposition of this dogma appropriately holds a prominent place in the introduction to a work which has for its main purpose the development of a scheme of the normal πόλις" (Jackson).

3 ὁ ἄπολις κτλ] 'He who is cut
off from civil society by nature, and not by chance, is either low in the scale of humanity, or above it—as is also he whom Homer reproachfully described as 'clanless lawless heartless'; for he", not the ἀπόλοι, but ὁ ὸμήρος λοιδορθεῖς, "is at once naturally unsociable and pugnacious)—being in fact solitary, like the blot at backgammon" (Jackson).

§ 10 ἀμα γὰρ φύσει τοιούτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἀτέ περ ἄγεισι ὁν ὦστερ ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ζῷον ὁ ἀνθρώπος πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἁγελαίου ζῷον μᾶλλον, δὴ ἡλιον. οὐδὲν γὰρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἢ φιάσκοι ποιεῖ. λόγον

§ 11 δὲ μόνον ἀνθρώπους ἔχει τοῖς ζῴοις ἢ μὲν οὖν φωνῆ τούτου

6 [ἀφ'] Schmidt || [καὶ] Spengel partly recognising the fault in the ordinary construction: that ὀστερ...ἐπιθυμητής is parenthetical was first shown by Jackson (Journal of Philology vii. 1877, p. 236 ff.); see Comm. || ἀτέ περ omitted by L², erased in U²b || ἀπερ...7 πεττοῖς transposed to follow 29 ὑδερ Schmidt || 7 ἄγεισι ὁν omitted by U²b W²b L², with vacant space left, by P²36. Q²M²b Ald. and 1st hand of P² Q²b S¹b T¹b V¹b; ἄγει,...πεττοῖς omitted by Ar., ὁν by R² and P¹ (1st hand); ἄγει ὁν was inserted by P³ (corr.3), ἄγει by a later hand in Q²b S¹b and by a later hand in the margin of T¹, ἀνεῖ γυγοῦ τυχάνων V¹b (a later hand), ἄνει γυγοῦ τυχάνων C⁴ also, ἄνει γυγοῦ Bas.² || πεττοῖς M¹b, πετευως I' and p¹ in the margin, γρ. πετευως P¹ (corrector) in the margin, and a later hand in the margin of S¹b || ἃςον after ὁ ἀνθρώπος Π² I bK.

(Arist. Studien iii. 5), that the lover of domestic strife is clanless lawless heartless; not, that the outlaw or broken man or ‘rover’ is pugnacious and aggressive. The right sense can be secured by a mere change of punctuation. The parenthetical sentence refers by way of illustration to Homer’s πολέμου ἐπιθυμητῆς ἐπιθυμητῆς who is a φύσει τοιούτος, i.e. an ἀπόλος φύσει, in whom to the unsociable character is superadded an inclination to war. Aristotle does not say that the ἀπόλος is always or commonly aggressive; thus there is no reason for regarding aggression as a characteristic of the ἄγει (Jackson). Sus. (24) (25)

διότι here, like ὧδε, "that."

διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν De hist. anim. i. 12: πολιτικὰ δ’ ἦσιν ἐξα ὡν ἐν τι καὶ κοινῶν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον, ὡστε ὁ πάντως ποιεῖ ἀγελαία. Not all gregarious animals form a community, but those which, like bees, wasps, ants, cranes, and lastly man, are engaged upon some common work (Eaton). Sus. (25 b)

9 For parallel passages consult Zeller ii 424 n. (3); for Aristotle’s teleology, ib. 422—423, 438—497.

§ 11 On the physiological distinction between φωνῆ mere voice, articulate speech, and λόγον rational language, see De hist. anim. iv. 9. 530 a 20, b 8 ff., Probl. x. 39, 895 a 7 ff., Poet. 20 § 2, 1456 b 22 ff. στοιχεῖόν = φωνῆ ἀδιάρετος, οὐ πάσα δὲ ἄλλη ἐξ ἡς περὶ αὐτῆς
1253 a 4—1253 a 21.

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ηδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ ἔστι σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρ-
χει ἧδος (μὲχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ
ἔχειν αἰσθήσιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ηδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαινεῖν

14 ἄλληλοις), ὦ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ

§ 12 τὸ βλασφερόν, ὡστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἁδικὸν τοῦτο γὰρ
πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοὺς ἀνθρώποις ἰδιον, τὸ μόνον ἄγαθὸν
καὶ κακὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἁδικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων
ἔχειν· ὦ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἀκατοῦ ημῶν

§ 13 ἠστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλων πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀνα-
we should then expect ἀλλὰ πάντα rather than πάντα de: “for a hand thus rendered useless <no longer> has the qualities of a hand, whereas the definition of every object is contained in its function.” ὁμονύμους

§ 15 26 χωρίσθενες cut off from society, living in isolation, μονάτη γὰρ χαλεπὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Comp. the discussion in N. Eth. IX. c. 9 showing that friends are indispensable to Wellbeing: θέσει τῷ εὐθαμβηκότῳ φίλῳ σπουδαῖοι...ἡ ταύτῃ ἐνέδρα ἦσσα, ἢ οὐκ ἀυτάρκης.

finally: χωρίσθενες τῶν ἀλλοίων ἐξει κτλ] ‘will be related to the state as any other part to the whole of which it is a part’: i. c., § 13, will be relative and subordinate to it, will be υστέρον non πρότερον.

§ 15 31 ὁ δὲ πρῶτος κτλ] Cf. Introd. 24, and notes on II. 9 § 8 (288), § 12 (296), § 14 (300).

§ 15 15 χωρίσθενες ἀλλοίων ἐξει κτλ] ‘will be related to the state as any other part to the whole of which it is a part’: i. c., § 13, will be relative and subordinate to it, will be υστέρον non πρότερον.
§16 χαρίσθεν υμον και δικης χειριστον παντων. χαιρεται γαρ 
αδικια εξουσια ρπαι δε ανθρωπος ὀπλα ἐχων φύεται φρονι- 
35 σει και ἄρετη, οις ἐπι ταναντια ἐστι χρὴσθαι μαλιστα. διὸ ἀν-
ουσιωται και ἀγριωται ἀνευ ἄρετης και πρὸς ἀφοροσία 
και εἴδωδην χειριστον. 

η δε δικαιοσύνη πολιτικων ἡ γαρ δικη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξει ἐστιν 
η δε δικη τοῦ δικαιον κρίσεις.

3 ετει δε φανερόν εξ ὧν μοριῶν ὡ πόλεως συνεστηκεν, Π

32 [τελεσθέν] and 33 [χαρίσθεν υμον και δικης] Jackson || τελεσθέν και χαρίσθεν υμον και δικης, Spengel || ων ἐν τοι βικ., but inserted in the margin of Π|| 35 ἀρετης due to 36 ἀρετης, having displaced a word like τέκνη Freundenthal (cp. Met. 1. 1. 6 p. 98 b 27 f.) or καρτερία Susem.; not ἐρωτε Lindau, ἐρέξει Hampke, nor ἐρήγη Schmidt: hardly κρατεί Schnitzer. [φρονης και ἄρετη] Conring Madvig, [και ἄρετη] Schneider, <ἐπι> φρονης και ἄρετη Welldon, * * φρονης Thurot, φρονης και ἄρετη Reiske (this makes bad worse, Montecatino protested against it), χρησε κατ’ ἄρετην Oncken. See Susem. Quaest. Crit. 11. 5 f., iv. 5 f. || 38 [ἡ... 


νόμου καὶ δικής appear strange, and 26 χαρίσθεν Spengel || ων wanting in Π² Bk., but inserted in the margin of Π|| 35 ἀρετης due to 36 ἀρετης, having displaced a word like τέκνη Freundenthal (cp. Met. 1. 1. 6 p. 98 b 27 f.) or καρτερία Susem.; not ἐρωτε Lindau, ἐρέξει Hampke, nor ἐρήγη Schmidt: hardly κρατεί Schnitzer. [φρονης και ἄρετη] Conring Madvig, [και ἄρετη] Schneider, <ἐπι> φρονης και ἄρετη Welldon, * * φρονης Thurot, φρονης και ἄρετη Reiske (this makes bad worse, Montecatino protested against it), χρησε κατ’ ἄρετην Oncken. See Susem. Quaest. Crit. 11. 5 f., iv. 5 f. || 38 [ἡ... 


§ 16 34 ὁ δὲ κτλ] ‘Man is born with weapons to be used by (i.e. to subserv) wisdom and virtue; weapons which are, however, especially liable to abuse’ (Montecatino): φρονης the dative of reference (Jackson). Most editors make it causal or instrumental. ‘But (1) what can ‘weapons for practical wisdom and virtue’ mean? Hardly weapons for the exercise, but rather such as serve for the attainment, of these qualities. Yet δικαια ἐξουσια διπλα shows that the former are meant. (2) It is essential to the thought that we should learn whence man, of all creatures, gets these dangerous double-edged weapons, so eminently adapted for purposes mutually opposed (πάνω μετα), for good and for evil. Whereas that they are for good needs not be stated: Aristotle’s teleological standpoint implies it.’ Susem. Cp. Rhet. 1. 4 § 13 (Spengel).

III. 10. 2 οὐδὲ τὸ δικαίου πόλεως φθαρτικών.

Susem. (28 c) Jackson keeping the last clause ἡ δὲ δικη κτλ (which he holds to be a parenthetical explanation of δικη in ἡ γὰρ δικη κτλ, rightly placed last in a Greek sentence) would translate: ‘now justice belongs to a state’, i.e. can be found only in a πόλις, ‘δικη or the administration of justice—which is the determination of what is just—being a regulation of the political community.” Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 6. 4 ἡ γὰρ δικη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου κτλ of the δικαιον ff. with Jackson’s notes.

c. 3 Economic has three parts treating of the relationships which make up the household, (1) διεσποτικη (2) γαμικη (3) πατρικη: §§ 1, 2. The relation of (4) χρηματικη to economic is obscure: § 3. Upon διεσποτικη, which we take first, there are widely divergent views §§ 4.

Roughly speaking the rest of the book treats of (1) διεσποτικη in cc. 4—7, (4) χρηματικη in cc. 8—11, (2) and (3) in cc. 12, 13.

c. 4 The household needs implements which may be animate or inanimate: such an implement is called a chattle (κτήμα), and is πρακτικον, for use not for production: §§ 1—4. The thrill (κτήμα ἐξηρυκτον) defined §§ 5, 6.

c. 5 But are there any persons answering to this definition, ἀτεις δούλων? § 1 As it is advantageous to both and to each, and therefore just and natural that body should be subject to soul, appetite to reason,
The oikias, enumerated just afterwards, are the three ‘pairs’ of relationships συζυγίας (or, 2 § 5, κοινωνία).  
4. έπειτα δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἑλκτοὶ κτλ. by the method noticed 1 § 3 u., 8 § 1 u., III. 1. 2 n. (434).  
SUSEM. (29)  
5. πρώτα] The ἀνάφερεν of 1 § 3.  
§ 2 9 γαμήκη = ‘conjugal’, πατρική = ‘paternal’ relationship: senses obviously more precise than the ordinary use of the terms warranted. Thus ή γαμήκη ὀμιλία, the marriage union, ιν(νι)ς, 16 § 1 = simply cohabitation. Schneider thinks ἀνάφερεν, Götting θεοσκοπία (sic) would better express the former relation from the side of the stronger analogously to δεσποτική, or Latin maritalis. Strictly πατρικός = hereditary, as e.g. in III. 14. 6: but in Nic. Eth. v. 6, 8, VIII. 10. 4 it is used, as here, for ‘paternal’.  

152 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 3.  
[3. 1  
ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν; πάσα γὰρ σύγ- (II) κειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν ἡ οἰκία συνέστηκεν: οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἔπει 5 δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἐκαστον ζητητέον, πρῶτα δ’ καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δούλου καὶ τόσο, καὶ ἄλοχος καὶ πατήρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τρεῖν τούτων σκε- 2 πτέον ἀν εἰπ τι ἐκαστον καὶ ποιον δει εἰναι. τάυτα δ’ ἐστὶ 2 δεσποτική καὶ γαμήκη (ἀνώνυμου γάρ ἢ οἰκιακὸς καὶ ἀν- 10 ὁ δρόσοι σύζυγος) καὶ πρίτων πατρική (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ ὥν ὁμόστατοι Ἰδίῳ ὁμόματι). ἐστις ότι αὐτθεῖ τρεῖς δι’ εἰς- 3 μεν, ἐστι δὲ τι [μέρος] ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μεν εἰναι οἰκονομία, 

1253 b 2 ἀνάγκη P46-Q M Bb Uβ Wb Lb. Ald., while Q4 Bb (which has however † in the margin) Sb Tb and Vb (1st hand) omit ἀναγκαίον... 4 συνέστηκεν (a later hand has inserted the words in the margin of Vb) ‖ περὶ οἰκονομίας (οἰκιὰς Bk.3 following the mss. used by Accoromboni and Sepulveda) ἐπείν πρῶτον P46-Q M Bb Uβ Wb Lb. Ald. Bk. in place of πρῶτον.....εἰπεῖν ‖ συνέστηκαται after 3 οἰκίων P46-Q M Bb Uβ Lb. Ald. Bk. 3 οἰκονομίας] oikias L P46-Q M Bb Lb. Bernays ‖ παλιν ἡ οἰκία Γ apparently, πάλιν οἰκία P33-C 4 and a later hand in Vb, ἡ οἰκία πάλιν Μ P4, αὐτὸς οἰκία P46-Q M Bb Uβ Wb Lb. Ald. Bk. ‖ 4 συνέστηκεν] συνεσταται P46-Q M Bb Uβ Wb Lb. Ald. Bk. ‖ 5 πρῶτον] <καὶ> πρῶτων Bender ‖ 7 τούτων σαπετείνων after 8 ἄν Π4 Bk. ‖ 9 καὶ is wanting before γαμῆκῃ in Μ P4, ‖ 10 πατρικῇ Αρ. apparently (cp. c. 12 § 1), τεκνοποιτικῇ Βk. following Γ and the mss. (Wb Ald. omit ἀνώνυμων.....τεκνο- ποιτικῇ), τεκνοποιτικῇ Dindorf (Steph. Thes.): πατρικῇ was abbreviated πρικῆ; this became πωκῆ or ποιτικῆ, and was then wrongly emended ‖ 11 δὴ SUSEM. 3, 5 Γ Π II Ar. Bk. ‖ 12 δ’ ἐτι or δε τι <ἐτι> SUSEM., δε <δ’> τι: i.e. δε <τεταρτόν> τι (after first suggesting δ’ ἐτι <τεταρτόν> τι) Schmidt, probably right ‖ [μέρος] Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. II ii 693 n. 4, ed. 3).

15

[tois de meugous munrosis autheis: opowes de' exeis, thewphetos. (II) 

lEayw de xeri tis kaloumpenhs thewmatistikhs.

p. 5)

15 [de] Schmidt, who transposes proston [de]... 1256 a 1 proston (cc. 3 § 3—7 § 5) to follow 1259 a 39 yamik (cc. 12 § 1); see Introvd. p. 97 || 17 dunaimeva M'P1 C', dynaimeva P (=) Suseum.1,2; poteirimus William || 23 etei onw elpomen ouv <&ft> Schmidt || [kai... 24 oikovomias] Susen. On 23—33 cp. Susen. Qu. Cr. II. 7 ff.

§ 3 13 tois de meugous munros] 8 § 1, 9 §§ 12—18, 11 § 13. Suseum. (29 b)

§ 4 20 kathaper elpomen kta] 1 § 2 f. cp. 7 §§ 1 nn. Suseum. (30)

tois de parapaiwv] Comp. below 6 § 1 foll. with nn. The only representative of this view of whom we have certain knowledge was the rhetorician Alkidamas of Elaia, a disciple of Gorgias (see ii. 2, 2 n.), who gave expression to it in his 'Messenian' speech delivered on behalf of Messene after its restoration by Epaminondas, in order to overcome the obstinate refusal of the Spartans to recognize the new state: eileuforeous afhke panta theis, oudeva douloou h' fowis patoiy, Aristot. Rhet. I. 13. 3, with scholiast. Compare Spengel (ii. 179) [and Cope] on that passage: and esp. Vahlen Der Rhetor Alkidamas (Vienna 1864. 8). 14 ff.

Possibly (see 7 § 3 n.) Aristotle was acquainted with the lines of the comic poet Philemon (fragm. inc. xxiv Meincke,号. Meincke's ed. p. 410) kaw douloos esti, apar arii tou authen exeis, d' fowis gar oudeis douloos egenhthi pato; h' de aiv tuchava to swma katedoulwvta. Suseum. (31)

Zeller Socrates p. 322 n. 3 is inclined to attribute this view to the Cynics.

21 vumw... fowes] On this famous antithesis of the 'conventional' and the 'natural' see Soph. Elech. 12 §§ 6 173 a 7 ff., Grant Ethics 1. 149—151, and esp. Sidgwick Journal of Philology V. 73—77.

22 dioptter kta] Wherefore slavery (tov despotexen) is unjust also, as resting on mere force (Wyse).

C. 4 § 123 h' ktevnikh = the theory of the acquisition of property. Gottling and Bernays in a more general sense, 'the theory of property'; and certainly with this rendering the words in brackets would fit better into the context. But in what follows ktevnikh everywhere denotes the same thing as thewmatistikhs in the wider sense, the 'science' or 'art' of acquiring wealth, first introduced 3 § 3, see 8 § 1 n. Property, as being indispensable for living, belongs to the household: hence by analogy it follows that every chattel is an instrument for the householder's use, and that the slave is an animate instrument of this kind. But from the fact that the theory of acquisition or even the theory of property is a part of the science of household management, no such conclusion follows, even when taken in connexion with the first premiss, which is sufficient of itself to prove it in the manner indicated above. Besides, the words bracketed anticipate the decision which at 3 §§ 3 is distinctly postponed to c. 8, and the way in which the question is raised 8 § 1 presupposes that no such decision by antici-

pation has yet been given. The statement made here does not agree with the results of cc. 8—11; for not the whole theory of property and its acquisition,
meros thes oikonomias] (anev yap ton anagkeiow adynaton) 25 kai xyn kai ev xyn) 'osther di taix iorismenais teknaia anagkeian an eiv uparxhien ta oikeia orhana, ei mellei §2 apotelesethsehai to ergon, [ou to koi oikonomikoi] ton de orhanyon ta mev anvycha ta de emvycha (oio to kuberenvi h o mev oiax anvychon de prorfei emvychon 'o xar 30 uperetnes ev orhanyon eidei tais teknaia estin), oux kai <to oikonomikoi> to kthma orhanyon pros xwri esti, kai h kthsis

25 kai ev xyn wanting in PM and P1 (first hand, added in the margin) || dei Susem., de PI P2-3 C4 Mb, de ev Q Qb Rb Sb Tb Vb Bk.; wanting in P14-6. U6. Wb L6 Ald. Hence [de] Susem. || 26 mellos Koraces and perhaps 31 to pid oikonomikoi] ton oikonomiow P2-3-6. Q M6 Qb Rb Sb Tb U6 Wb L6 Ald. Bk., with a later hand in C4 and the 1st hand in Vb (the dative in Vb by a later hand); [ou to koi oikonomikoi] and 30 ou tow kai <to oikonomikoi> Rassow Susem. Thurrot once proposed to omit 30 ou kai and transpose 27 oux kai...30 estin to follow 31 ou kai...32 esti, kai] Schmidt

but only as much of it as relates to the ‘natural’ part concerns oikonomikoi, and that only indirectly. My defence of the words, Rhein. Mus. XX. 510, is exposed to objections not then foreseen: it would seem that this is an-Aristotelian interpolation. SUSEM. (32)

24 anev yap ktl] Cp. 2 §8 n. (21). Mere life, bare existence, xyn, is of course the immediate end of the household and of household management: good life or well-being, ev xyn, is the end which the state has in view: but indirectly the state and its end is the end of the household 2 §§2—9. Consequently we find that side of oikonomia, which is directed towards securing the fitness of those belonging to the household, and so towards the perfecting of life, ranked above the use and preservation of property, or the side which is directed to mere living, 13 §1 n. SUSEM. (33)

25 tais iorismenais teknaia—the arts which form distinct professions: ‘as the craftsmen of a particular trade-guild must be provided with suitable tools etc.’ Bernays. In any case the phrase means ‘the arts’ properly so called; immediately below they are termed productive or creative (poias, poietuka orhana §4 with n.) as contrasted with the merely practical activities to which Economic and the art of life belong. According to Aristotle these productive arts are to be subdivided into (1) the useful, and (2) the imitative or ‘fine arts’.

In the sphere of practice the end lies in the activities themselves, energeiai: in the sphere of the arts, in certain definite special products, xera, distinct from the activities which produce them: Nic. Eth. 1. 1. 2, 1094 a 3 l., diafora de ti sphaierai tov televn: ta mev gar eis ev prorfei, ta de par apaitas xera tuva, 1. 1. 5 1094 a 16 diaforer de oivxen tov energieis autai einai tov telh tov praxeon xh para taista allo tou, kathas peri eto tov lexeioum episthmwn, 11. 4. 3 1105 a 26, vi. 2. 5 1139 b 2, 11. 5. 3 1140 b 3, 6. In conformity with this distinction Schlosser prefers to explain iorismenais t. as arts restricted to definite distinctive ends. But can this be expressed by the one word iorismenais? Fulleborn wavers between this explanation and his own, which makes ap. tecx = definite special arts (the one all-embracing art of life. But conduct or the art of life—even if we include in it the perfecting of life—embraces at the most only the practical activities; and from what has been said it follows that the technical or productive activities, poias, would be excluded from it. Cp. also IV (vii). 3-3 n. SUSEM. (34)

§2 30 ev orhanyou eldas] is classed with, ranked under the head of, implements: cp. tais ev ulhs eldas arxas Mele. 1. 3. 3 983 b 7, the material sort of causes; ev mohron eldas De Caelo 1. 1. 7 268 a 5. The same idiom frequently where eldas and the genitive are almost a paraphrase for the thing in question: nomyoxeis eldas kai politeias Pol. III. 15. 2, cp. VI (iv). 6. 9 ollygarxiai eldos.

31 to kthma orhanyou ktl] ‘the chattell is an instrument to aid him in
living." But it is not true conversely that every instrument of use for living is a piece of property or chattel. The analogy of the distinctive crafts is against this; for the helmsman's assistant is not his property, and the difference between the ends for which instruments are used in the two cases does not supply any reason for this distinction. See further 1. sec. 3. 6 § 5 n. 6 § 10 n. SUSEM. (35)

33 ὤργανον πρὸ ὄργανων] an implement superior to other implements; see 7 § 3 and De part. animal. iv. 10. 21. 687 α 21 ἐστι γὰρ (sc. ἡ χεῖρ) ὦστερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανων. For this relation διαλός = ἐμφυκός ὄργανον, ὄργανον = ἐμφυκός διαλός Eaton cites N. Ed. viii. 11. 6

§ 3 35 Δαιδάλου] Not a real historical personage, but only the legendary personification of the first prominent advance in Greek architecture and more especially in sculpture. Before him the human figure had been represented with the feet together, the arms joined to the body and the eyes shut. He first made the eyes look as if open, detached the arms from the sides, and showed the feet stepping apart (scholiast on Plato Meno 97 β, Suidas s. v. Δαιδάλου ποιήσα). When contrasted with the archaic style his figures came to be praised for their illusive lifelikeness; and this, or rather his choice of attitudes of motion and action for his figures, is all that is meant by the story to which Aristotle here alludes, viz. that his figures moved as if alive and had to be chained to prevent their running away (Plato L. c.). See Brunn History of the Greek Artists i. 14—23. SUSEM. (36)

36 ὁ ποιητὴς] Homer Hid. xvii. 356 ὄφρα οἰς αὐτῶν ἄθεων δυνατάς ἀγώνα. SUSEM. (36 b) There is a similar ingenious fancy in Lytton's Coming Race.

§ 4 1254 a 2 ποιητικὰ = for production (of fresh utilities embodied in material objects), πρακτικῶν 'for action'—merely for use, i.e. as we see from 8 § 2 the consumption or utilization of commodities. In Political Economy consumption is either productive or unproductive, and the definition of wealth will vary according as we consider it from the producers' or the consumers' point of view: Mill i. c. 3, Sidgwick Principles i. c. 3 § 7.

On the distinction here made between ποιητικός and πραξις cp. iii. (34, 40) and Zeller op. c. ii ii 164, 177 ff., 586, 586, 652 ff. Consult also the special treatises Ed. Müller History of the Theory of Art in Greece 11. 38 ff., 374 ff., Teichmüller Forschungen (Aristotelian Researches) 11. 12—63, Reinkens Aristotle on Art 1—12, 169—179; Susemihl in the Jahrb. f. Philol. 1872. 319 ff., Rich. Schultz De poetics Aristotelianae principiis (Berlin 1874. 8), Walter Theory of Practical Reason in Gk. Philosophy (Jena 1874. 8) p. 80 ff., 245 ff., 276 ff., 296 ff., 504 ff. Oncken very justly remarks, op. c. ii. 39 ff., that even from Aristotle's own point of view we must be surprised at a conception of slave-labour so one-sided that even its capacity for production (i.e. of fresh objects of utility) is denied. "This could not be maintained in view of the fact that in the art and industry of Hellas the whole of the unskilled labour engaged upon the
production of fresh utilities was performed exclusively by slaves, and thus the slave in the great workshops and manufactories was not merely an aid to the use or enjoyment of the goods of life but indirectly a producer of new commodities, at least in the sense in which this is true of the weaver's shuttle." SUSEM. (37)
Hereby opposed to μόρια which when separated can do no work, as we saw, 2 § 13 (Shilleto).

Thus the definition of ὁ φύτευς δύνας is ὁργανὸς ἐξηγοῦν πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστὸν, δῶς ἄλλον ψω, and this exactly corresponds to the limited meaning of κτήμα ‘chattel’, ‘thrall’, as for instance in Ν. Ε. ν. 6 quoted above.

c. 5. To whom then does this definition apply? Are there any ὁφύτευς δύνας, for whom a slave’s estate is greater good and just?

§ 1 2ο τὸ λόγῳ... ἐκ τῶν γνωμένων] Aristotle emphasized the distinction between the abstract and concrete treatment of a subject. The former is ἄγωγος or διαλεκτικὸς ἔργον as opposed (ὁ) to ἀναλυτικὸς ὁ ἐκ τῶν κυμάτων, (ὁ) to φυσικοὺς ἔργον ἐπίκειται: Waite Organon ii. 354. Zeller Phil. i. 171 n. 2. Eaton rightly compares iv (vii). 1. 6.

§ 2 22 τῶν συμφερόντων] Under the limitation laid down iii. 6. 6, see n. (7).


25 καὶ ἐάν βελτίων κτλ.] This passage is referred to iv (vii). 3, 2, see the note: cp. iv (vii). 14. 19 τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικὸς ἄρχει ἡ τῶν ἐλευθερῶν ἄρχη καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετὰ ἀρετῆς. SUSEM. (38 b) Cp. also viii (v). 11. 34.

§ 3 26 τὸ γὰρ ἀποτ. κτλ] Cp. N. E. Εἰθ. ii. 6. 4 πάσα ἀρετή, ὡς ὃ ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἐχὼν ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐργόν εὐ αποδιδόνω τους (Eaton).

28 τῶν τοὺν ἐργῶν] The function proper to them, the work which they exclusively perform in their relation of government and governed, lies in the mere exercise of command and tender of obedience. See Plato Kfr. i. 353 λ: τὸν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἔργον, διὸ ἢ μᾶλλον τι ἡ καλίστα τῶν ἄλλων ἄπεργατα ἢ γάρ] This argument only applies to the general proposition καὶ εἰδὴ πολλὰ καὶ ἐργῶν τῶν καὶ αρχαγγέλων ἀρχηγοῦ, not to the particular explanation attached to it καὶ ἐὰν... ἐργῶν. SUSEM. (39)

The sentence is parenthetical as in 1. 1. 3, where see note. “For wherever several parts, whether continuous or discrete, combine to form a single composite whole, in all such cases may be discerned a principal or ruling part and one subordinate which is ruled. This follows from the whole order of nature (ἐκ καθολικοῦ, as e.g. ἐκ ἐπιτομῆς, 2 § 2) and is seen to hold good of living things.”
The conclusion is based upon the whole order of nature: it is a universal natural law, not a special law applying to living organisms (Bernays). SUSEM. (38) 6. It is not probable that the law with genitive = a partitive genitive (Bohnitz Ind. Ar. 235 b 11), for the only support for such a use is the spurious treatise Peri phyton, 386 a 39, to which, it appears, it is in the sense of the domain, and correctly, to render ‘taking the whole of nature this is preeminently true of living things’.

32 tois μη μετέχουσι κτλ] αιεί τὸ χείρον τὸ βελτίωνός ἐστιν ἐνεκεί, καὶ τὸν φιλονόμον ὁμώς ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν IV (vii). 14, 10.

33 ἀρχή, ὁ οἶκον ἀρμονίας] ‘Even in things without life there is a species of dominance, in music for instance’: each musical ‘mode’ being ruled by its keynote, η μέση (originally the note struck by the middle string of the heptachord!). Compare Probl. xix. § 33 920 a 21 ὑ γάρ μέση καὶ ἡ γεμών: § 36 920 b 9 τὸ ἀρμονία ἐστίν ἀπάσαις sc. ταῖς χρονίαις, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν πως πρὸς τήν μέσην: § 44 922 a 23 ἐπείδη τῶν μεταξὺ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μείσον μονόν ἄρχη τις ἐστιν ...27 φθόγγοι ὡς ἡ μέση καλουμένη μονή ἀρχή ἐστι βασικὸν τετραχόρον. On the technical sense of ἀρμονία = εἰδος διαπάσων see Exc. iii. on Bk. v (viiit). Another political simile from the ‘modes’, Eth. Euid. VII. 9, 4: ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων καὶ τῶν ἐν τais πολιτείαις, inas-

* The term ‘dominant’ for the fifth above the C'-note in a modern scale is quite different.

much as some are δόρθαι, others παρεκβάσαι. Giphanius and others wrongly take ἀρμονίαs as qualifying ἀρχή = dominance in the sense, that is, of a blending or subordination of parts. Cr. De Anima 1. 4. τὴν ἀρμονίαν κράσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐννομιοῦν εἴτε. This would be the sense of συμφωνία, rather than of ἀρμονία, in music: Probl. xix. 39 821 a 2.

[εὔτερηστεράς ἐστὶ σκέψεως] “would perhaps involve a discussion somewhat outside the subject”. Obviously the simple meaning here as in εἰς. πράξεις IV (viii) 3, 8: not to be pressed (by) Thurlot Ethides 219 f., Ueberweg Hist. of Phil. Eng. tr. 1, 143) to signify ‘those parts of Aristotle’s strictly scientific works which are “dialectical” i.e. controversial, rather than “apodeictical” i.e. purely scientific.’

34 τὸ δὲ ξύλον κτλ] The enumeration is interrupted at ἀρχήσον by the qualifying phrase in parenthesis δεὶ ἐποίησιν ...ἐξειν in such a way that even the first member (ξύλον) is only quoted by its first division into soul and body, while the second subdivision into rational and irrational parts of the soul is not added until the enumeration is resumed, § 6. We should expect δεύτερον, τρίτον to correspond with πρῶτον, in place of them we find πάλιν and ἐτη δὲ in § 7. SUSEM. (39 b)

§ 5 This does not help us to determine what ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν. But Aristotle’s meaning is the same as in 2 § 8 οὖν γὰρ ἐκατόν ἐστι τῆς γεγενέος τελεσθείσης ταύτην φαμέν τῆς φύσιν εἶναι ἕκαστον. Cr. N. Eth. ix. 9, 8, Cic. Tusc. 1 § 32 (Eaton).
erasing *φάσλος* kai just afterwards; *μοχθηρῶς*, due to a mistaken correction written over *μοχθηρῶς*, may have displaced *φάσλος*, as Schmidt once suggested: now he suspects *μοχθηρῶς* ὅ: [ἡ μοχθηρῶς ἔχοντων] Studemund 1254 b 2 καὶ παρὰ φύσιν wanting in M* and P1 (1st hand), but added in the margin by P1 || P3.3. have πεῖρα for παρὰ || 6 [καὶ βασιλικὴν] Oncken, perhaps rightly

§ 6 1254 b 3 f. This analogy is carried out in *Nic. Eth.* v. 11 § 9, i. 3 § 18, iii. 3 § 18, i. 3 § 6. Cf. also Plato *Phaido* 80 A ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦτι θυμοὶ καὶ σώμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἀρχήσαν ἡ φύσις προστάτες, τῷ δὲ ἀρχέαν καὶ δεσπότεις; *Phadrus* 237 f., not to mention *Rep.* ix. 589 e, 590 c, d (Eaton). Several characteristic phrases here come from Plato. For similar analogies turning on various forms of ἀρχή see *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 8 f., i. 11 § 9 with Jackson’s notes; viii. 10 §§ 4, 5, i. 11 § 1—6.

§ 6 τοῖς παθητικοῖς... λόγον ἔχοντος*] Cp. iv. (VII). 15, 9 with n. (935). More precisely Aristotle distinguishes in the human soul (1) the rational part or thinking soul, ὑνίας, (2) the sentient appetitive soul, cp. iv. (VII). 7. 5 n. (768), and (3) the nutritive or vegetative soul. The lower animals have the two latter merely, plants have only the third: see Zeller op. c. ii. ii. 497 f., 509 f., 566 ff. The nutritive soul is of no importance for the present inquiry, compare *Nic. Eth.* i. 13 §§ 11—14; here it is left entirely out of the question as in c. 13 § 6, IV(VII). 14 § 9 f., 15 §§ 9, 10, where see the notes, cp. also iii. 4 § 6 n. (472). He further divides the rational soul into two parts: i cognitive reason (ἐπιστημωνικόν), ii reflective or opining reason (λογιστικόν, δοξαστικόν). The latter includes that part of the speculative reason which attains to a mere idea or opinion (ὑπόθεσις = unverified belief, assumption, δόξα) but falls short of true knowledge, and more especially the practical reason with its peculiar faculty of taking counsel or deliberating with itself (μοιαστικῶν, see 13 § 7 n.), or in other words the faculty of reflection from which Aristotle has borrowed the name (λογιστικῶν) for all this part of the reason. It was explained in n. (34) on 1. 4. 1 that the practical reason is again divided into (1) διάνοα πρακτική, practical reason in the strict sense, and (2) constructive, i.e. technical, reason, δ. ποιητική, which when developed becomes τέχνη, artistic skill*: see *Nic. Eth.* vi. i. § 5 f.; 2 § 5, § 5; 4 § 3, £ 8, 12 § 2; Metaph. vi. 1. 5 1025 b 25 f. Compare Walter and Zeller as above quoted, and in modification of their views Susemihl *Studies in the Nic. Eth.* in the *Jahrb.* f. Philol. CXIX. 1879. 737 ff.

If we combine with the above the results stated in the note on 1. 13. 6 we obtain the following scheme of the rational soul according to Aristotle:

*In the Politics however τέχνη generally denotes (1) Art as opposed to Nature, (2) the total activity in any department whatsoever of technical skill or the construction of new products—the exercise of crafts and industries of all kinds, including occasionally even practical aptitudes such as Household Management (οἰκονομία). This is the sense in 4 § 1 above, where the former or ‘arts proper’ are accordingly distinguished from practical aptitudes by the addition of ὀφειμένων, cp. n. (34). It is only in 21 § 6 that τέχνην καταρτά ἐργασία = occupation where artistic skill is most required: see n. (102).
Now in the Politics we have to deal throughout with the supremacy of practical reason (in the strict sense of the term) over the second part of the soul, the **aistheteikos** or perceptivous (cp. De Anima III. 7. 2 ὁς ἑτέρον τὸ ἀνοικτά καὶ θεωρητικόν, οὗτος ἄλλως οὕτως τοῦ **aistheteikos** ἄλλα τὸ ἄλλο) in regard to its appetitive or emotional, and not to its sentient or perceptive side. Obedience to this supremacy constitutes moral or ethical virtue, virtue of character, ἡσος. Cp. I. 13. 6 n., Nic. Eth. 1. 7 § 12 f., 13 § 10f.; VI. 12 § 6. Susem. (20)
§ 7 10 πάλιν...13 ετί δέ] See on § 4 a 34 above. **άσαντως** Here again, in man’s relation to the animals we see the same thing: clearly, from what follows, the difference between ruler and ruled and the advantage derived by the one from the rule of the other. Susem. (41, 42)
Cp. 2 § 2 διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (Congreve).
**11 τὰ ἡμέρα τῶν ἄρων** Plato Politicus 264 Α, δέχετο τὸ ἔθνος τῷ τιθασθεὶ καὶ ἄγρῳ. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἔχοντα πιθανοῦ ἢν μὴ ἔχοντα ἀγρία. A division which Aristotle censures as unscientific De part. animal. 1. 3. 13 643 b 3, πάντα γάρ ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡσα ἡμέρα, καὶ ἄγρῳ τυχγάνει δύνατα.
**13 τὸ ἄρτεν κτλ**] Cp. 12 § 1 nn. (108, 109), 13 § 9 ff. (117, 120). Susem. (42 b)

**14 κρείττον...χείρον** Elsewhere τὸ **θηλυ** is declared to be ἄσπερ ἄρρεν πεπρωμένον, or ἀναπτικός. This is Plato’s doctrine of the natural inferiority of the sex: Kerp. v. 455 έτι πάσον ἀνθρώπον τρόπον, ήμίν δὲ· ἡ **θηλία** ἡ **θηλία** ἡμῖν φύσις ετέρος πρὸς ἀρέτας **χείρον** τῆς τῶν ἀρέτων. Timæus 42 Α, 2: τὸ κρείττον τοιοῦτον ἐπί γένους...ἀνήρ, 90 Ε f.
**15 ἐτι πάντων ἀνθ. sc. in relation to one another.**

**§ 8 16 ὁσοι...17 θηρίων**] Cp. III. 11. 5 καί τα διαφέρουσαν εἴδη τῶν θηρίων, ὡς ἐποίησι; How is the existence of such men possible, on Aristotle’s own psychology? There is a difference of kind between man and the brutes, the latter not having a rational part of the soul (see n. on § 6 above); but between the most perfect and the least perfect of men there is not at most a difference of degree, even when in the latter this rational part is reduced to the minimum immediately described, n. (45). We must understand Aristotle to follow the general current of Greek ideas and the usage of language when “he regards bestial limitation to sensual enjoyment, callousness to insult, indifference to knowledge, coarseness and vulgarity in act or speech in general as a servile, degraded disposition **ἀνθρώπο-δοσία**” (Schiller, who quotes Orelli Arist-
18 ἐστὶν Μ', ἐστὶν Ἐος. P2-3-4, Q M Tb Ald. Bk., ἐσταὶ Sb
|| 20 ἐστὶν Bücheler for ἐστηρ, but see Dittenberger op. c. p. 1366 f. || ἐστιν ἄρα | Susen.; since no δε corresponds to the preceding μέν οὖν and μὲν Thurat suspects some deeper corruption, a lacuna, it may be, before ἐστὶν γάρ || 21 ὁ δυνάμενος...22 καὶ suspected by Schmidt || 23 λόγον Π2 Ar. Bk. Schneider Spengel, perhaps rightly || [αισθάνεται] Bender [ἀλλά] Spengel αἰσθάνονται? Schneider

toltes Pädagogik 69). The passages to consult are III. 4 § 11, IV(VII). 17 § 7, § 9; also v(VIII). 6 § 8, v(VII). 15 § 5
with the notes: Nic. Eth. 1. § 3: III. 10 § 8, 11 § 3: IV. § 6: and the further references under ἀνθρωποδόθης Bonitz Att
Ar, 54 b 30 f. Susen. (43)

19 οἱς βέλτιοι κτλ] Plato Rep. IX, 590 D ὅς ἀμενοὶ ὅπερ παντὶ ὑπὸ δολοῦ καὶ 
φρονίου ἀρχικὴς μάλιν μὲν οἶκον ἐξουθον εἰ ἄρτα, εἰ δὲ μη, ἔξοδον ἐφεστῶ-
τος: a passage which contains something more than the germ of Aristotle's whole
document of natural slavery.

20 τοῖς ἐρημημοῖοι τῷ σώματι, τῷ 
παθητικῷ μορφῶ, τῷ χῆραι, τῷ θηλεί (Con
greve).

§ 9 21 διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστὶν] As a
general rule slavery is due to natural
inferiority. But this must not be pressed
too far: from c. 6 an unjust slavery is
possible, cum hi sunt alterius qui sui
possunt esse, Cic. De Rep. III. § 37
(Congreve). Susen. (44)

22 ὅσον αἰσθάνεται ἄλλα μὴ ἔχειν] In c. 13 § 14 the capacity to admit reason
or understand its commands (αισθάνε-
θαι) is ascribed to these natural slaves in
a higher degree than to children (see
note), for children, while their reason
is still undeveloped, attend too much to
the mere suggestions of the instincts and
passions of sense; Nic. Eth. 1. 3, 6, III.
12. 6. Moreover Aristotle is here asserting
more than his own psychology justifies:
for what he here leaves to the slave's practical reason is more correctly
attributed to the irrational soul, that is,
to speak accurately (see n. on § 6), the
appetitive soul, in IV (VII). 14 § 9, cp.
Nic. Eth. 1. 13, 15 f.: namely, the ca-
pacity of allowing itself to be guided by
practical reason. As the power to reflect
is to Aristotle amongst the most essential
peculiarities of the practical reason—see
n. (40) on § 6—this cannot with any con-
sciousness be wholly denied to the slave as
it is here and c. 13 § 7 (where see note)
it be once granted that the slave's soul
has a rational part under which is in-
cluded the possession of practical reason.
At the most it may be merely an ap-
proximation to the state here described.
See further on c. 13 § 12. λόγος,
which here = reason, is the βουλευτικῶν
of 13 § 7 (see n.): more precisely, ὁθὸς
λόγος in the Ethics, right or sound un-
derstanding as the law and criterion of
human action in the sphere of practice
and morals. Preeminent skill in the
exercise of this λόγος is φύσις = insight,
prudence: see Zeller op. c. II ii 652 f.,
Walter op. c. 353—503. Aristotle is
consistent when he allows φύσις to
none but the φύσις ἔσχατης: I. 13, 8 n.
(115), III. 4, 17 n. (497). But if the φύσις
dοῦλος were wholly devoid of practical
reason of his own he would, by Aristotle's
own definition, cease to be a human
being and to possess even the scanty
remains of capacity for human and moral
virtue which is left him according to c.
13 §§ 1—14: cp. Poetics c. 15 § 1 with
my note (16 b). He would then be re-
duced to the level of the brute, in himself
unable to resist the promptings of sensual
desires. See n. p. 211. Susen. (45)

23 λόγῳ αἰσθ.] On αἰσθάνεται, αἰσθά-
νεθαι see n. (570) upon III. 11, 9.
Susen. (45 b) If λόγον is the right
reading, then the copula is omitted as if
αἰσθάνεται were an adjective: "the other
animals (are) not attentive to reason, but
obey their passions."
πλημμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρῶν
25 ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὰναγκαία τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ
ἀμφότερον, παρά τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ᾠδέ.
§ 10 βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέρουν.
ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ
πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν, τὰ δ’ ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀχρήστα πρὸς
30 τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν
βιόν (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρμηνεύει eis τε τὴν πολεμικὴν
χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ του-
ναντίων, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἐχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς
ψυχὰς· ἐπεὶ τούτῳ γε φανερὸν, ὥς εἰ τοσούτῳ γένοιτο δια-
35 φορῷ τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεών εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπο-
λειπομένους πάντες φαίνει ἄν ἄξιοι εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν.
§ 11 εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ’ ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ
tῆς ψυχῆς τούτῳ διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν
tὸ τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

28 τοιεῖ P3§6. QM§ B T9 Ar. Ald. and 1st hand of P (emended by corr.) μὲν
<ταπεινά καὶ>, or something similar, Schmidt with great probability; ὀρθὰ]
νωθρὰ Reiske || 31 καὶ wanting in L. || ὁπους...32 εἰρηνικὰ] Schneider and Schmidt,
perhaps not unreasonably || 33 ἐλευθέρων] ἐτέρων or a little before τῶν δούλων
τῶν μὲν Πετίταν wrongly: Aristotle’s meaning would have been clearer if he had
added μόνον after σώματα or after ψυχὰς || 36 Oncken thinks the conclusion omitted
after δουλεύειν; but it came first: βούλεται μὲν οὖν...τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς

24 f. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει κτλ] “Moreover the service afforded by
the slave is not very far removed from that of
domesticated animals; viz. bodily ailments (note
the dative) towards the necessities of
life.” Comp. Plato Pol. 289 b; slaves and
domesticated animals as species of the
same genus περὶ ὀμοίων κτησιν τῶν
ἀμφῶν πλὴρ δούλων: also c. 2 § 5 above n.
15: and 6 10 n. (57). SUSEM. (46)
§ 10 27 βούλεται] Nature designs, but
is sometimes thwarted. See 6 § 8 n. (56).
32 χρείαν] “including services in
war as well as in peace.”
34 ἐπεὶ τούτου γε κτλ] Cp. IV (vii),
14. 2. Congreve and Eaton compare
Herod. v. 47. This remark has a truly
Hellenic ring. To the Greek, mental
worth is necessarily and naturally
presented in a harmonious external form;
and in the very beauty of the race, of
which he was thoroughly conscious, Aris-
totle finds direct proof of its superiority
to the barbarians. What a complete jus-
tification this for the slavery of the black
and coloured races! Zeller op. c. 11 ii
601 n. (2). See on 1. 2 § 4 n. (13).
Lang however from another point of
view justly remarks op. c. Essays 60: “we must remember no one would have
been more bitter than Aristotle against
the negro-slavery on plantations of
modern days. To turn the servants of
the noble life into tools of limitless money-
making would have been, in his view,
unnatural. We must remember also, that
he would have held up the promise and
reward of freedom, to stimulate his serfs
to virtuous lives, and, with freedom in
prospect, and friendship in the meantime,
with every lovely rite of divine service
performed for their sake, there may have
been worse lives than those of the Greek
slaves.” SUSEM. (47)
§ 11 38 οὐχ ὁμοίως ρᾴδιον δεδεν κτλ] Eaton compares Nic. Eth. 1. 13. 16 ἀλ
ἐν τού τοῦ σώματι μὲν ὁμοίως τὸ παραφερ-
μένου, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁμοίως.
Should we not rather think of Plat.
Phædr. 250 b E, Xen. Mem. III. 10. 3?
c. 6 There is then one species of
slavery, which is natural. But there is
another species, conventional slavery: § 1.
The justice of the convention which allows
prisoners taken in war to be sold for slaves
is unconditionally challenged by some (A)
and defended by others (E) : § 2. The
reason why there are these conflicting
views, and why nevertheless they have a
common ground, is the implication of
virtue and superior force. The issue
turns on what constitutes right and justice:
§ 3. Weakness of the one view (A),
which implies a denial of the right of super-
ior virtue to rule: § 4. Others (C),
again, argue that all slavery, so far as it
is legal, is just: but the war might be un-
just, and they would refuse to apply their
principle consistently to captive Greeks:
§ 5. This refusal leads them back to the
view of διόδος: § 6. Illustration from
the conception of nobility: § 7. Men are
marked off for true freedom and true
nobility by virtue (σωφρόνει): § 8. Recapitu-
lation: §§ 9, 10.

See Excursus II.; Hampke in Philo-
logus xxiv. 1866. 172—175, who com-
pares iv(vii). 2 §§ 12—18; in The Transac-
tions of Camb. Philol. Soc. ii. 1883
Jackson pp. 111—116, Postgate pp. 119—123,
Ridgeway pp. 128—130; and Susemihl in Hermes xix. 1884. 576—588.
The chapter reminds us of \( \text{N. Eth. 1, cc. } 8—12 \), in so far as Aristotle is testing his
theoretical conclusions by a comparison
with various received opinions.

§ 1 1255 a i ff. "It is thus plain that
in certain cases there are natural freemen
and natural slaves, for the latter of whom
the estate of slavery is both advantageous
and just. And yet it is easy to see that
those who maintain the opposite" viz. of

The doctrine of natural slavery (against
Ridgeway 129 f) "do, to a certain ex-
tent, argue correctly. For the terms
slavery and slave are used in two senses.
<Besides the natural> there is also the
conventional slave and conventional
slavery; this convention being a species
of agreement whereby the conquered in
war are declared the property of their
conquerors."

6 ὃ γάρ νόμος...7 φασίν) Xenophon
Cyropa. vii. 5. 73 νόμος γάρ ἐν πάσιν ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἀδιόφι ἐστιν, ὅταν πολεμοῦντος πόλει ἄλφαι,
τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἐν τῇ
πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα (Conreve).
It is well known that customs and usages
purely conventional and resting on mere
tradition were called νόμοι by the Greeks
and considered more sacred and venerable
than the written laws: i.ı. 16 § 9 ἐν
ciπερ ἐν τοῖς κυριωτέρους καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ
γράμματα νόμον ὁ κατὰ τὰ ἐθνῶν, and
vii (vi). 5 § 2. Yet these "unwritten
laws" are regarded as if each of them
could be derived from a definite law-
giver: see on ii. 9 §§ 12, 14. Susem.
§ 2 7. "This conventional right is by
many jurisconsults arraigned, like a
demagogue, of unconstitutionalism." Yet
'slavery among the ancients was at first
an unmingled blessing—an important
conquest of the spirit of humanity. When
men were altogether barbarous they
killed their prisoners."—Lecky Hist. of
Rationalism ii. 254.

§ γράφονται παρανόμως] 'This in-
dictment was laid against any private
citizen who had proposed or carried an
unconstitutional law or popular decree,
i.e. one which contravened laws or decrees
in force at the time and not previously

II—2
repealed. Proceedings had to be commenced within a year from the day when the proposal was made or adopted; otherwise the proposer escaped a personal prosecution. The illegality might consist in the substance of the proposal, in its form, or in both at once. A decree (φήμια) would be formally unconstitutional if brought before the popular assembly without consent of the Boule previously obtained, although there might be no decree proposed by the Boule on the same subject which it could contravené' (Meier and Schömmer Attischer Process 283 f.). The comparison here relates to illegality in substance, for the sense is that the convention or positive law in question violates natural law. 

SUSEM. (49) 9 ώς δεινον κτλ] "on the ground that it is monstrous if mere ability to subdue by force, and superiority in might alone, shall give ownership and rule over which it subdues." The representatives of this view are no doubt the same as those who declare all slavery to be contrary to nature; see § 4, τοις μὲν εἰσαία δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἰσαι and 3 § 1, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ διαπότεχθε, where see note. SUSEM. (49 b) Note the genitive after ἀρχωμένων, "subject of the coerer".

11 "This then is their view: others again take the former view": (ἐκείνως): namely, that prescribed by the convention or positive law mentioned in § 1: δοκεῖ εκείνος repeats the φασίν of line 7. For convenience we may denote by (A) the opponents (τοῖς μὲν), and by (II) the defenders of conventional slavery (τοῖς δὲ); the view of the latter is shared, though on other grounds, by a third party (c) the τινὲς of line 22.

§ 3 12 "The reason of the conflict" between (A) and (II) "and what" at the same time "makes the (two opposed) views overlap." The general sense, as explained p. 206, is that (i) the views of (A) and (II) stand sharply opposed (cp. 19 διασταύρων χωρὶς), and yet (ii) they have a common point of contact, the two distinct facts (i) and (ii) being due to one and the same cause, the implication of virtue and force.

Bernays differently, see p. 209. SUSEM. (51) 13 λόγοις, often taken as = arguments, or again as = propositions, should be explained more widely as "the propositions [conventional slavery is just, is unjust] together with the arguments supporting them and the conclusions adopted in consequence of them," thus nearly = views or reasonings (Postgate op. c. 121, 123 n.), "platforms" (Heitland), theories.

ἐπαλλάττειν, as in 1. 9, 15, vii(v). 10, 2, vi(vi). 1. 3; see Heitland's examination of these passages Notes 11—13, and the passages collected by Jackson op. c. 114 n. Bonitz Index s.v. compares ἐπαφειτῆτε and explains that from the sense of "to alternate" it comes to be applied ad ea quae inter duo genera ita sunt interposita ut cum utroque cohaerant. "Said of two different, or even opposite, things or views which yet have something in common and again approximate or meet or even cross or run into each other or are in inseparable connexion" (Susem.). Oncken took it of "arguments crossed or traversed by counter arguments." Heitland and Jackson of "propositions overlapping": but the former thinks these are the sub-contraries (a) some slavery is just, (b) some slavery is unjust: the latter holds that it is the λόγοι of (A) and (II)—all slavery is unjust, all slavery is just—which overlap: because the "slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just." (See by all means the context of this remark, Ex. 11. p. 208.)

τρόπον τινά κτλ] "in a sense virtue, provided it finds proper appliances, is in fact best able to subdue by force, and the conquering side always has advantage in good of some sort." These two clauses are not opposed (against Jackson 114 f., Postgate 122), they merely put the same thing in a different form. There is always a presumption that βία carries with it ἁρπή: this is the common ground where the two contending parties meet, and here Aristotle also agrees with them. But from this they draw opposite inferences as to the nature of τὸ δίκαιον, as to when it is just to use force.
χάνουσα χορήγια καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μίλιστα, καὶ (II) 15 ἐστιν αἰὲ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὡστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἀνευ ἀρέτης εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μό-
§ 4 νον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφιβολησίαν (ἀκὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εὖνοια
dοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δικαιο, τὸ τὸν
kρείττονα ἄρχειν) ἐπεὶ διαστάτων γε χωρίς τοῦτον τῶν λό-
20 γων οὔτε ἵσχυρον οὔδεν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανοὶ ἄπεροι λόγοι, ὡς
17 εὐνοία Lambin, wrongly: <μετ'> εὐνοίας? Schneider

14 χορήγια = means, resources: ἡ ἐκ-
τὸς ἥ ντος, favourable external circumstances, external goods Nic. Eth. x. § 4; so of the individual Pol. iv(vii). 13 § 3. In a wider sense, anything with which the state requires to be furnished, even population, territory iv(vii). § 2, § 4.
13-16 ὅτι...βίαν] Fülleborn remarks with truth that the qualifications necessary here (amounting in all to ceteris paribus) really make the whole theory futile, because 'other things' in this connexion are so seldom 'equal.' Bodily qualities, superior numbers and weapons, all sorts of external circumstances often largely contribute to victory. Con-
quest is no valid proof of the higher excellence of the conqueror: besides, the one kind of mental capacity which has contributed to his victory is no guarantee that he also possesses the other which qualifies him for wise government, above all for the exercise of despotic rule over a conquered foe. Nevertheless Aristotle would be borne out by a belief in the moral government of the world: *in the main success attends upon the most capable nations. SEUSEM. (50)
15 ὡστε δοκεῖν κτλ] "hence it seems that force to coerce is never independent of virtue, but that the dispute turns on the nature of right and justice."
§ 4 17 f. ("For this reason some take the mutual goodwill" of governors and governed "to constitute right, others stand on the naked right of the stronger to rule.") The parenthesis is due to Ridge-
way; Heitland saw that 'this remark breaks the course of the argument' (p. 14). The grounds for the view of (ii), which had not been stated above §§ 1, 2, are now given by ἐὰν τούτο.
τοὺς μὲν] Clearly again the unqualified opponents of slavery. SEUSEM. (50 b)
Jackson, 115 n., first proved that one meaning of εὐνοία is 'loyalty: the will-

ing obedience which an inferior renders to a kind and considerate superior'. To take it solely to mean 'the goodwill of governors to governed' seriously invalid-
dates the protest of the anti-slavery party para φῶς εἶναι τὸ δεσποῖς; masters might always urge the plea that they held their slaves from disinterested motives. Giphanius notes well: benevolenta et bona existimatio magistratus et dominus pererit. Cp. vii(vii). § 4, § 10; viii(v). 11 § 11: ἀναγκαίων εὐνοίας εἶναι ταῖς τυ-
rωμαίις sc. τοῖς δικαίως καὶ ταῖς γυναικείς.
19 ἐπεὶ answers the sentence 15 ὡστε
dοκεῖν... "If however these two views stand opposed and apart, the former has neither force nor plausibility, (implying as it does) that the superior in virtue has no right to rule and be master." χωρίς is used predict-
atively, διαστάτων is the opposite of ἐπαλάττειν: if the point of contact be-
tween the two views be lost, if they stand opposed without any community. For the sense of separation the passage quoted by Jackson (see p. 208) De long. et brev. vita, 464 b 26, is most instructive: τότερον ταὐτὰ μακραία καὶ τὴν φῶς ὑγεία τῶν φῶς συνεκτόνων, ἢ κεχωρίσται καὶ τὸ βραχίονα καὶ τὸ 
νοσοῦς, ἢ κατ' ἐνίας μὲν νοσοὺς ἐπαλα-
lαττεῖ τὰ νοσοῦ ἡν τὴν φῶς σῶματος τοῖς βραχίοις, κατ' ἐνίας δὲ οὔτεν κωλύε 
nοσοῦς εἶναι μακροβίους ὡντας. Others (Schneider, Jackson, Postgate, Ridgeaway) take διαστάτων = si per se ponantur, if disentangled,' each taken separately.
20 ἄπεροι λόγοι = one of the two sets of arguments advanced, that of (A). Postgate (op. c. 112) thinks ἄπεροι λόγοι would be clearer. Schneider took it = neutra ratio: to which Hampke rejoined that this sense requires οἴδητεροι. Jackson however still maintains that it is a true plural 'as in 13 τῶν λόγων', but then we should have ἀμφότεροι: his novel and ingenious interpretation, op. c. 115 f,
§ 5 ou dei to bél'tioun kat' áret'hv árxein kai dêstóz'chein. ólous (II) de antêxómenoi tines, ós oiôntai, dikaiôv tîvns (ó gar vómos dikaión ti) tîn katá polémov doulieian tîvénav dikaiâv, áma de ou fásvn. tîn te gar árkhv évdéxetai mi de 25 kaiâv einai ton polémov, kai ton aîaziou doulieivn oudâv- môs án faíhe tis doulou einai' ei de mh, sumpbhsetai tous (p. 9) euynestatous einai dokoutau doulous einai kai ek doulou, éan § 6 sumpb' prathnav lhrhêntas. diôster aïtvous ou boulountai légein doulous, ãlla tovs bârbhîrous. katai'n òtan tovtó te- 30 giasin, ou'dev ãll로 eîwqovnt ò to fûsei doulou òpere éx árkhv' eîtpomev' anângk' gar einai tînas fânavi tous mèn § 7 pantaxov doulous tovs de oudâmou. tov aïtvov de tròpov kai 19

24 ãma] ólous ÍI Pâ Mâ Th l. ãp. ãma p in the margin, ãpâv apparently Ar. § 27 kai ek doulâv transposed to follow 1255 b 2 ágathv Schmidt || 28 aîtvous Montecatino and perhaps Pâ. Over this word p3 has the gloss tovs euqeniv kai krapthêtavas which Mâ has in the text after lhrhêntav || 32 pantaxov] éx árkhâs ÍI, ãp. aînâ- tâvov p in the margin

departs widely from that here given. Hampke also takes 19 tovtovn tōv lôgōv as a singular of one view and hence infers that ákpev lôgou denotes one view also: M. Croiset, 'les opinions de nos adver- saires'.

óvs ou dei, epexegetic of lôgou, 'the view namely that...'. But Jackson following Heinsius makes it depend on πîvov: 'plausibility to shew that is not the right of superiority in virtue to rule'. Why does Aristotle expose the weakness of (A)? He admits euqon as the principle regulating the relations of citizens in the normal politeia, but as between master and slave it is not to supersede the right of virtue to rule.

§ 5 21 Take álous with antêxómenoi.

"Others again simply holding fast to something just and right as they suppose (for whatever is legal is just) admit the justice of slavery in accordance with the laws of war, but in the same breath withdraw the admission. For not only may the war have had an unjust origin, but further no one would call him, who is undeserving of slave's estate, a slave. Else it will follow that men who are held to be of the noblest birth are slaves or come of servile ancestry, if they" [or their ancestors] "happen to have been taken prisoners and sold":— as Plato was by Dionysios. The view of (c), 22 tîvns, is substantially the common opinion in Greece, with its latent meon-
sistencies. ólous was taken by Hampke = 'embracing both the former views'. Ridgeway (op. c. 130) objects that 'if Aristotle was enunciating another theory here, he would have used éti de'. It will be found upon comparison of De Anima 1. 5 §§ 10, 11 410 b 2 and Meteor. 1. 3 §§ 14, 15 357 b 10, 12, that ólous and éti de are used in parallel clauses to introduce distinct objections, the order of the clauses being indifferent.

§ 6 28 diôster ktl] 'Hence they refuse to call their own countrymen slaves, and only apply the term to bar- barians': aîtvous used absolutely for aî- tovs < tovs 'Ellînav > which comes to the same thing as 33 aîtvous. Eaton com- pares the noble conduct of Callicratidas, Xen. Hell. 1. 6, 14.

30 ouðev ãllâ ktl] In making this qualification they are really on their way to the principle of natural slavery laid down by us at the first: they are compelled to admit that in certain cases there is a distinction between two classes, the one who are everywhere, the others who are nowhere, slaves. Having thus reduced the intermediate view of (c) to its right sense Aristotle has no need to refute at length the extreme views of (A) and (B).

33 a)øs dø tì] “which implies the existence of an absolute, as well as a relative, nobility and freedom”.

36 On the tragic poet Theodektos of Phaselis, a contemporary and friend of Aristotle who is rather found of quoting from him, see Susemihl’s note (163) on Poetics 11 § 1, Bernhardy Griech. Literaturgesch. II b p. 64 f., Welcker Die griech. Trag. III. 1069 ff. [also Cope Journal of Cl. and Sacred Philol. 11. 260 f., Int. io Rhetoric 53 f., note on Rhet. II. 23. 3]. These lines are frag. 3 in Nauck’s Trag. Græc. frag. SUSEM. (53)

§ 8 39 δοτάν δὲ] From vii(iv). 8. 9, viii(v). 1. 7 (cp. III. 13. 3; Rhet. I. 8. 5) we learn that true nobility is a combination of wealth with high excellence hereditary in a family, ἀρέτη καὶ πλοῦτος ἀρχαῖος. How far this third or intermediate view of slavery and the limits within which it is justified as natural agrees with that of Aristotle himself, is more clearly seen from the discussion in iv(vii). 7 §§ 1—3, where see nn. (780, 781). The question there is, to what are we to ascribe the higher endowments and ‘virtue’ which distinguish the Greeks from other races and make the latter their born slaves? Only Aristotle there more precisely restricts this relation to the Asiatic portion of the non-Hellenic nations, as indeed he does before III. 14. 6, δουλικότεροι τά ἡγη οἱ μὲν βαρέσαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑυρώπῃν. The other references are 1. 2 § 4, 5 § 8 f., 6 § 4, 7 § 3 f., 8 § 12: iv(vii). 2 §§ 15, 16, 9 § 18, 14 § 21 with the note.

In his whole doctrine Aristotle follows, in the main, the indications of his master. Plato in like manner condemns the enslavement of Hellenes by Hellenes; Repl. v. 469 b f., 471 A f. Ideas which Plato only suggested, Repl. viii. 549 A, ix. 590 C, Politiccs 300 A. Aristotle works out systematically: see on 1. 5 § 9 n. (46) and the next note: Introd. p. 24 f.; Zeller op. c. II i 755 f. [Eng. tr. Plato p. 458 f.]. SUSEM. (56)

1255 b 1 δύσσουσι κτλ. So above § 10 δοθεῖται . . . πολιτικὸν βίον. Cp. III. 13 § 3 n., Rhet. 1. 9 § 33. Theognis 533 f. οὕτω δουλεύει κεφαλή ιθεία πέρικεφαλήν ἄλλας σκολής, οἱ μὲν δολίας ὡδὰς φοῖται οὐδὲ ἐκάθος ὑπὸ νοτείνεται καὶ σκότειν τοῖς ἑλευθέροις (Camerasius); also Plato Cratylus 394 d (Schiller). Oncken remarks: “what Aristotle requires however as the visible and palpable mark of innate slavery is not the deformity which Theognis has in view, but a greater endowment of rough muscular force. He overlooks the fact that the domestic service of the slave hardly demands more strength than the military service of the freeman, who needs a good deal besides mere erect stature”. SUSEM. (55)
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5 The text can hardly be sound
p. 1371!.
or
Susem. 2 OVK
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fxe pos] This is said of property
generally and of the child NIC. Eth. V. 6.
8 quoted on 4
SUSEM. (57)
5 above.

lidates all practical
application of Aristotie s theory.
It is even pnssi-bte-for-a

See however Jackson

Ureek to be a natural slave, for a barbarian, though an Asiatic (see on I. 2.
4 and above n. 54), to be a natural freeman ^. g. Hermeias, Aristotle s friend
and the uncle of his wife, who had actually
been a slave: seeonii. 7. 17. Hence the
non-Hellene may even prove to be the
natural master of the Hellene.
SUSEM.

Eth.

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(56)

9 5 OVK eurlv] Fortunately we can
check the text (see Crit. Notes) by the
directly opposed statement with which
c. 6 opens, by
6,
10, and the next
in certain
words, line 6, %v TKTI KrX
&quot;

cases there is a clearly marked distinction of this sort, where namely ......
&quot;

TO 8e KaKc3s] sc. dpxetv.
10 TO -ydp avTo KTX] See
6 8e 8ovXos...i2
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3 n.( j).

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note ad

loc.

irpos aXXi^Xovs] In Nic.
6, 7, 1161 a 32 ff., itis said

that there can be no friendship between
master and slave qua slave
ev ols yap
KOIVQV eaTiv ry dpxovTi /cat o.px/m. rjdev
/^w, ovSe 0tXt a ovdt yap 5t /catof. The
relation is like that of a craftsman to
his tools, of soul to body, of master to
slave.
w0eXetrat [tv yap TrdvTa raura
UTTO T&V xp^lJ-tvuv (cp. TO avTo avjji&amp;lt;pepei of
the text), 0tXta 5 OVK (TTiv....6 ydp SouXos 2/j.^vxov opyavov, TO 5 opyavov d\f/vxos
5ov\os.
CTTIV 0tXta
rj fj,v ovv 8ov\os, OVK
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f

irpos avTov, 77
avdpuiros- 5o/cet ydp
elvai TI diKacov iravri dvdpuTry irpos irdvTa.

TOV Swd/^evov Koivuvfifrai vo^ov Kal (rvvdrjKal (f)i\ta 5??, Ka9* oaov dvOpwTros.
Zeller II ii 692 f., following Ritter, rightly
KTJS,

calls this an inconsistency which does the
philosopher honour. The author of the
32)



14 τούτων] τουτότοι Susem. 1,2; τουτότοις < εἶναι > ? Susem., τουτότοις < καλ > Schmidt at one time: τούτων was suspected by Schneider and Koraes, οὕτως ἰδεω-μένως Koraes || ἰδεωμένοι Susem. || ἰδεωμένοι transposed to follow 15 νόμων Schmidt || 15 φανερών ...20 ἁρχή transposed to follow 1256 a ό τρόπων Schmidt || 16 καὶ before ἐκ τούτων would perhaps come after those words

Eudemian Ethics, vii. 9. 2 1241 b 17 ff., withdraws the concession: since there is the same relation between soul and body, craftsman and tools, master and slave, in these cases there is no association (κωμωνᾶ) possible. οὐ γὰρ διό ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐκ, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός (the two members of such a relation are not independent). οὐδὲ διαμέτρετο τὸ ἄγαθον ἐκατέρω, ἀλλὰ ἀμφό-τέρων τὸ ἐνός οὗ ἑνεκά ἐστιν (the good of the one is not separable from the good of the other, the good of both is the good of that one of the two for whose sake the other exists). τὸ τε γὰρ σωμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφωνον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου δὲ δοῦ-λος ὀσπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαι-ρετῶν. That even a slave is a man is emphasized in another fragment of Plhe- mon, besides the one quoted on 3 § 4, viz. Ἕκοκχομένους 28: καί δοῦλοι ἦς τις, οὐθὲν ἡττον, ἔδεσσα, ἄνθρωπος οὕτως ἐστιν, ἄν ἄνθρωπος ἦ. Cp. Becker Chari- kles III. 12 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 327. Consult further Pol. iv (vii). 8 §§ 1—4 n. (801); i, 2, 3 n. (7); iii. 6, 6. Susem. (57 b) Comp. F. A. Paley's Epureides, Pref. to vol. 1. pp. xiii f. with refl. there given, esp. Hel. 728, Melanippe fr. 506 (516), Phrixus fr. 823 (828): also Oncken III. 33 ff.

c. 7 Δεσποτεία then, or rule over slaves, is not the same as statecraft: § 1. Nor does the relation of δεσπότης depend upon science: § 2. In what sense may be a science of the duties (1) of slaves (2) of slaveowners (the latter quite distinct from ἐκ κτητικῆς, sc. δουλῶν): §§ 3—5.

§ 1 17 τινας] Plato. See on 1 §§ 1 n. (2). Susem. (58)

"It is plain that here and 1 § 1 Aristotle is thinking of Plat. Polit. 258 E sq. esp. 259 B. It is however a mistake to attri- bute the doctrine, without qualification, to Plato, who at 268 D introduces a long and elaborate myth with the express intention of warning us, that though the shepherd-king of the theocratic period exercised all regulative functions indiscriminately, this state of things ended with the Saturnian age. See by all means 274 E sqq. From this point to the end of the dialogue the Elate is mainly engaged in discriminating the polítikos from a host of rivals. Clearly the doctrine in question is at variance with the whole tenor of the Republic. May we not attribute it, on the strength of Xenoph. Memorab. iii. 4 § 12, Occan. 13 § 5, to Socrates?" (Jackson).
excellence \( (\text{ἀρετή}) \) arises from knowledge, philosophers have in his eyes the highest excellence in every respect. Aristotle has not taken pains enough over his refutation here. In the *Ethics* he is more accurate, beginning with a successful attack upon the Socratic principle which Plato accepted: see Zeller *op. c.* ii 627 f. *Susem.* (69, 60)

\[ \text{kata} = \text{in virtue of, as in καθό.} \]
The term ‘master’ is not applied to any one because of his knowledge, but from his being of a given character.

\[ \text{§ 3 27 \text{τά μὲν ἐντιμώτερα κτλ}} \]
The latter are the conditions for bare existence, the former for the ennobling refinement and perfecting of existence. *Susem.* (61)

\[ \text{§ 29 A verse of the *Pankratia*, a comedy by Aristotle’s younger contemporary Phillemon, frag. 2. (J. G. Schneider). But if one master thus differs from another, it is implied that in the activities of freemen there is a similar difference; that thus all human occupations exhibit an ascending scale from the lowest and most mechanical work up to the highest and most intellectual, which Aristotle calls \( (\text{διαγωγή}) \) employment of leisure, as distinct from work or occupation (Ludw. Schneider). See IV (vii). c. 8 f.; c. 14 § 12 ff. *Susem.* (62)

\[ \text{§ 4 32 οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτάσει} \]
Below c. § 8 2 τίς γὰρ ἐσται χρήσις οἷον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἀιών. παρὰ τὴν οἰκ.: III. 4. 11 τὴν περὶ τά ἀναγκαῖα <ἀρχὴν δεσποτικῇ>, ἀ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τῶν ἀρχιτῶν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖοι ἀλλὰ χρησίμαι μᾶλλον. *Susem.* (63)

\[ \text{§ 33 οὐδὲν μέγα ἡκουσα} \]
IV (vii). 3. 2 οὐδὲν γὰρ τὸ γε δοῦλος, ἡ δοῦλος, χρησίμαι σεμνῶν, VI (iv). 15. 3 al δ᾿ ὑπηρετικαὶ <τῶν ἐπημελεῖων> καὶ πρὸς ὥσ, ἀν εὐπορῶσι, τάπτουσι δούλους. But see i. 13. 14 and n. (123). *Susem.* (64)

\[ \text{§ 5 36 The overseer, ἐπίτροπος, or house-steward, έπικλν, was himself a slave: *Pseud.-Arist.* Οἰκ. 1. 5 § 1 1344 a 26, 6 § 1 1345 a 8 ff., Xen. Οἰκ. 12. 2, Aristoph. *Knights* 1947 f.; Becker Charikles III. 23 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 363. Yet no doubt Greeks by birth were readily taken for this office, as well as for that of παιδαγωγός. *Susem.* (64)

*Translation*: hence all who have the means of escaping personal discomfort employ an overseer to take this charge and themselves the while engage in public affairs or in study.
§ 8 In what relation does χρηματιστική stand to Economics? Is it (1) the same science, or (2) a branch of it, or (3) a subsidiary science? It is not the same, for it serves a different purpose, accumulation: §§ 1, 2. Whether it is a branch or not is disputed, and must be decided for each of the various species of χρηματιστική separately: § 3.

Review of the various natural modes of subsistence: §§ 4—12.

The natural art of production (κτητική), which has for its object the accumulation of natural wealth within due limits, is a branch of Economic: §§ 13—15.


There can be little doubt that Aristotle wrote with especial reference to Plato: Rep. ii. 379 b—377 a, Laws xi. 918 a—920 c (cp. viii. 585 e, 829 d), Soph. 219 a, 222 b ff., 223 c, D, Politicalis 287 c—290 a, etc.

§ 1 1256 a a χρηματιστική is applied (1) to the whole art of acquisition, being thus completely identical with κτητική. In this sense the term was introduced at 3 § 3 (cp. 4 § i n.) and this holds throughout c. 8, and in 9 § 4. In a narrower sense it is used (2) for the acquisition by exchange, μεταβαλλοντική, of the kind of wealth which in Aristotle's view is unnatural, i.e. not for use, but to exchange again at a profit. In this sense χρηματιστική 'money-making, profit-making,' = κατατική 'trade.' So from c. 9 § 1 onwards. Again in 9 § 12, 10 § 2 it is used (3) for that part of the art of acquisition which, as opposed to (2), is directed solely to natural wealth and is intimately connected with Economic. Plainly (3) = τή ἀναγκαλὰ χρηματιστική,
1256 a 5 [f] ὑπηρετικῶν, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικῶν Bender, certainly not right. That Μ* omits ἦ is quite unimportant. || 6 κερκιδοποιικὴ P2*+ B Q Sb*+ Th* Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P3, κερκιδοποιικὴ P3 (1st hand) || 9 ἐρωτὸν Π1 SUSEM. || 10 χαλκὸς Π1 SUSEM. || 11 τῇ ὁικονομικῇ καὶ κρατικῇ || 13 παρὰ] περὶ Μ* P3 Sb*+ Th* ||

(2) = ἡ μὴ ἀναγκαία of c. 9 § 18; and (1) the widest range of the term includes both, the getting of goods as well as the getting of gain. SUSEM. (69)

2 κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον “in accordance with the procedure adopted,” namely, that from part to whole. See 1 § 3 n. (4); 3 § 1 n. (29): III. 1 § 2 n. (434). SUSEM. (66)

επείπερ... ἢν] “since the slave is, as we saw, included under the head of property,” being defined as κτήμα, a chattel.

5 καὶ εἰ ὑπηρ. κτλ] The more precise way in which this third possibility is expressed leads us to anticipate a decision in its favour (Hampke). However when the decision comes to be made, 10 §§ 1—3, it only has a preference given it; it is not exclusively adopted, as Hampke thinks. That the question, in which of the two senses χρημ. is auxiliary to Economic, is never taken up is most surprising. We can only conjecture the answer from passing hints: see on 10 § 2. SUSEM. (67)

7 ἢ μὲν ὅργανα... ἢ δὲ τὴν ὑλήν] The one provides tools to work with, the other raw material to work up (Oncken).

SUSEM. (67 b)

This distinction comes from Plato Polit. 287 ζ, ὡς ἔσεσθαι ἐκ τῆς κρατικῆς παράφορον ὅργανα περὶ τῆς ὑφηγητικῆς... ἐξεῖδομεν ὦς συναιτῆσιν: 288 ι, Ε τὸ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις σωματόν παρέχομεν ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰς δημο-ηγητοῖς ὑπάρχον ὑπάρχον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ εὐφορία (Jackson).

So too the conception of υπηρετικῶν τέχναι comes from the Polit. 281 ε: ὅπειρα μὲν τὸ πράγμα αὐτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, ταῦτα δὲ δημιουργοῦσι δόρα παρασκεκαθόρουσι... ταῦτα μὲν ἐνειστίνων <πρ surpr>. The Eleean quotes τάς μὲν περὶ τὰ ἁρμάκτας καὶ κρατιδάς as the first examples of ἐνειστίνων τέχναι. (Eaton).

§ 2 θλήν τὸ ὑποκείμενον κτλ] Plato denotes this by τὸ πρωτογενές ἀνθρώπου κτήμα Polit. 288 ε: but ἐνειστίνων occurs in Phil., 54 ε ἐνειστίνων μὲν ἐνειστίνων... παντ' ὅργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὑλήν παρατίθεσθαι πάσιν.

12 τὶς γὰρ κτλ] See n. (63) on c. 7 § 4. SUSEM. (68) What art is to use the household goods if it be not Economic (παρὰ = except)?

14 Two alternatives are given in § 1, ἢ μέρος τι η ὑπηρετική, and it is not easy to see what has become of the latter in the statement here πότερον μὲρος αὐτῆς ἢ ἔτερον ἐλέος and in § 3, 17 ἢ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι ἢ ἔτερον γέφυρος. For reasons given in excursus III. on Bk. 1. p. 209 q. v., both alternatives of § 1 should be supposed included under μέρος, that term being so loosely used as to include even an auxiliary science. SUSEM. (69)
§ 3 Vahlen (see critical notes) takes εἰ γὰρ to mean "if namely" as in Alk. De soph. 11, 12 ἀρ᾽ αὐτοὶ εὐθές ἡμᾶς ἀλλόν τινα παθεῖται μελέτην λόγον; εἰ γάρ οἱ τοῖς ὁδήσασι εὐεργεσμένοι... ἀπείτασι καὶ φθόνοι τὰς τῶν ἀκοῦστῶν γνώμας ἐμπιστεύει, and Aris. Rhet. III. 17, 11 εἰ γάρ Αχιλλέα λέγων Πηλέα ἐποιεῖ, εἰτα Λικόν, εἰτα τὸν θεόν, ὦμοιος δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπιν, ἥ (ins. ἡ) τά κα κα τοῦκε ἡ τοιῶν ἡ ἐστὶν. Elsewhere γάρ appears redundant, or rather, no apodosis is expressed to the sentence introduced by it: Nic. Eth. VIII. 8, 6 οἱ χρήσαι δὲ καὶ η mô̂̂ς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν ὥς γάρ (so long namely as) ἂν πορίζοις ὄνομας ἢ ὀφθείει ἄλλωσι: so ἐπὶ γάρ Rhet. 11. 25. 10, ἡ γὰρ Pol. VI (IV). 8, 6, ὡτέ μὲν γάρ (v. 1) 1. 8. "See however Spengel Aris. Poet. u. Vahlens neueste Bearbeitung p. 13 ff." (Susemihl).

16 The elements of wealth enumerated in Rhet. 1. 5 § 7 (and Pol. 11. 7 § 21) are γῆς, χωρίων κτησις, ἐτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτησις καὶ βοσκήματων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων; also νομισμάτων πλήθος which, according to c. 9 below, is not true wealth.

17 πρῶτον] There is no word like δέστερον which expressly corresponds to this, cp. Poet. 13 § 2. What, we may ask, answers to it in substance? Either (i) the expression is again inexact, and ἡ προφήτην ἐπιμέλεια must be extended to the industries concerned with all the necessary life—shelter clothing tools, all things in general which Aristotle calls "instruments for life and wellbeing," including slaves—if directly produced or acquired by plunder without resort to exchange. If so, Exchange is the δέστερον. This view is supported by the actual use of τροφή in a wider sense than food, for sustenance generally; "subsistence," § 8, 10 §§ 1, 3. (In these passages acquisition by exchange must be understood as well as that branch of χρηματιστική which, because directed to procuring the requisite subsistence, really belongs to economic science: but this does not affect the present question.) Or, (ii) if all that is meant is direct production and appropriation of food, in the strict sense of the term, then we must look for "secondly" in the remarks on the procurement of clothing and tools from the proceeds of the chase or from animals under domestication, § 11, and on the capture of slaves, § 12. In any case, whatever the grounds for supposing the text defective (see on § 12 n. 74), this is not one. (Susem.) (70)

πότερον is dependent, like πῶθεν line 15, upon ἐστι τοῦ χρ. ἑπιμέλεια.

§§ 4, 5 That the way in which animals support themselves determines their mode of life is more fully stated Hist. animal. 1. 1. 23; 487 b 33 ff., VIII. 1. 11, 589 a 4 ff.; and the proof is given in detail ib. VIII. cc. 2—11. Under καρποφόρα are included animals who feed on berries,
7. The cattle being forced to shift their quarters for pasturage the owners must also go about with them, as farmers to whom live-stock serves instead of land."

roots, fruit and vegetables, so that the term is wider than ψοφόφαγα = herbivorous. In Hist. animal. σαρκοφάγος ‘carni-
vorous’ is chiefly used: ξυφόφαγος hardly ever.

§ 5 26 βαστώνας facilities: “to enable them to get at their food and capture it.” By τούτων understand ζώα primarily, though καρπός would be included. Bernays reads κατά for και: “to give them facilities for the capture of their food.”

§§ 6—8 Smith Wealth of nations Introd. Chap., Mill Pol. Econ. 1. pp. 11 ff. rightly place lowest in the scale the savages who depend upon casual hunting or fishing, although in such a life fits of prolonged and strenuous exertion alternate with periods of indolence. In Homer the cannibal Cyclopes are a pastoral people. As Aristotle thought that all domesticated animals had once been wild, Hist. anim. 1. 1. 29 488 a 30 ff., he must have overlooked the labour of taming them; cp. n. above on 5 § 7.

31 The Scythians, or such North African tribes as Herodotos describes, iv. 186, would represent these νουκάδες. They are wholly distinct from the non-migratory νομάδες of Hellenic democracies, vii (vi). 4. 11.

32 "The cattle being forced to shift their quarters for pasturage the owners must also go about with them, as farmers to whom live-stock serves instead of land."

§ 7 36 ληστείας] It is highly characteristic of the Greek philosopher that while he is indignant against trade and particularly against lending money on interest, 9 § 9 ff., 10 §§ 4, 5, he includes piracy as one species of the chase amongst the direct natural modes of acquisition or production, and therefore as appropriate to a householder. He was led to this by the observation that not only do certain uncivilized tribes live by plunder, and combine with a nomad life a life of brigandage, but also amongst the most ancient Greeks, as Thuc. 1. 5 precisely informs us, piracy was rather honourable than disgraceful οὐκ ἐξουσίος πιὸ αἰσχύνη τοῖς τῶν ἐργῶν φέροντος δὴ τι καὶ δύνας μᾶλλον, cp. Hom. Od. 111. 73, ix. 252: and even later it was usual amongst the Locrians and other Hellenic peoples (Thuc. 1. 5, 11. 32, iv. 9. 2). Here he has forgotten his own principle, that the true nature of a thing must not be sought in its beginnings, but in its perfect development, 2 § 8. A strong national prejudice is apparent in all this, but it is well known that the earlier centuries of the Christian era had the same aversion to lending on interest (see Introd. 39), while many barbarities were allowed without scruple, as for instance the right to plunder wrecks, which Schlosser (1. 47 n.) adduces as a parallel. See Introd. 27 f. Susem. (71)
μνας καὶ ἐλη καὶ ποταμοῦς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοι-(ΠΙ) κούσιν, οἳ δ’ αὐτ’ ὀρνιθῶν ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων’ τὸ δὲ πλείστον
30 γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῆ καὶ τῶν ἃμέρων καρ-
§ 8 πτών. οἳ μὲν οὖν βλοι τισσοῦτοι σχεδὸν εἰσίν, ὡσοὶ γε αὐτό-
ντων ἔξοισι τήν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δὲ ἀλλαγῆς καὶ κα-
ηλείας κομίζονται τήν τροφήν, νομαδικὸς γεωργικὸς λη-
παρκός ἀλλευτικὸς θηρευτικός. οἳ δὲ καὶ μεγώντες ἐκ του-
των ἠδέως ἔξοισι, προσαναπληροῦσι τῶν ἐνδεέστερον βιόν, ἣ
τυχάναι ἐνελπίστων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἳον οἳ μὲν
5 νομαδικὸν ἁμα καὶ θρητικὸν, οἳ δὲ γεωργικὸν καὶ θρη-
§ 9 τικὸν’ ὁμοιῶς δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους’ ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεία
συναναγκαία, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγοσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύ-
της υπ’ αὐτής φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως δεδομένη πάσιν,
§ 10 ὄστερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθὺς, οὐτῶς καὶ τελειω-
nosti, καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἄρχης γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνε-
κτίκτει τῶν ξόων τοιαύτην τροφήν ὡς ἰκανήν εἶναι μέχρις
οὐ ἄν δύνηται αὐτῷ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννήθην, οἳον ὡσα
σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἡ φωτοκεῖ· ὥσα δὲ ζροτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννῳ-
μένοις

41 [ἐργασίαν...b i τὴν] Schmidt

1256 b 1 πορίζονται ΠΙ² Bk. perhaps rightly || γεωργικὸς is wanting in Π M*, and perhaps Spengel is right in transposing it to follow θηρευτικός || 3 τῶν ἐνδεέστερον βιόν Bernays, τῶν ἐνδεέστατον βιόν Π II Bk.; τὸ ἐνδεῖς τοῦ βιοῦ Bas., τὸ ἐνδεῖς κατὰ τῶν βιῶν Reiske (better) || [§...4 εἶναι] Schmidt || 8 διδομένη ΠΙ² Bk. || 13 γεννῳ-

μένοις ΠΙ² Bk.¹

37 τοιαύτην] ‘such as before described’ i.e. ‘suitable for fishing’. The same use of the pronoun in 1. 1. 2, and in
II. 4. 4. δέι δὲ τοιοῦτον (i.e. ‘less friendly’) εἴμαι. See Cope on Rhet. 1. 5. 6.
36—38 With this classification of the different modes of the chase cp. Plato
Laws VIII. 823 B : πολλῇ μὲν ἡ τῶν ἐνυ̃-
δρών (sc. θῆρα), πολλῇ δὲ ἡ τῶν πη-
νών, πάμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεζὰ
θηρευματα, οὗ μονὸν θηρίων ... καὶ κλω-
πείας καὶ ληστῶν ... θῆρας. See also n. on
7 § 5. 8
39 ἃμέρων] cultivated.
§ 8 40 ὡσοι γε αὐτόφυτον] ‘derive their employment from natural growth.’
Nature is used now for what is primitive
(?) the later development.
41 κατπ南昌=retail trade; ἐμπορία= wholesale trade, commerce. The former is used as a contemptuous term, “huck-
stering”, Plato Laws VIII. 849 D, XI. 918 D, Soph. 223 D.
1256 b 1 τὴν τροφήν = subsistence,
support: see n. (70) on § 3. SUSEM. (72)
2 οἵ δὲ κτλ] “Others select out of these some which they combine in order to
pass an agreeable existence, supplying by an
addition the deficiency in independence of
a more meagre mode of life” (Cope).
§ 9 7 συναναγκαία=constrain: σού
intensive as in συμπληρών.
§ 10 12 ὡσα σκωληκοτοκεὶ ἡ φωτο-
κεῖ] Aristotle erroneously believed that
insects lay no eggs, but produce worms or
maggots which are then transformed through
several metamorphoses into the perfect insect: see Aubert and Wimmer
Intro. to the De generatione animal. p.
14, Meyer Thierkunde des Ar. p. 201 f.
What he says of the difference between
worm and egg serves in particular to ex-
plain this passage. Thus De gener. anim.
II. 1 §§8—12, 732 a 25 ff: one species of
animals, the viviparous, bring forth young
like themselves fully developed; others
bear offspring not yet organized or of
perfect form, and of these the vertebrates
14 έχει τροφήν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλομέμενον γά- (III 13).

§ 11 λακτος φύσιν. ὀστε ὀμοίως δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ [γενομένοις] οὐὴ-7 τέου τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν Ἐσω ἐνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔδα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ ἑνα 19 τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἐνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐσθήσῃ καὶ ἄλλα ὀργανά γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηδὲν μήτε ἀτέλεις ποιεῖ μήτε ἑμίτην, ἀναγκαίου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.

23 διὸ καὶ ἢ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἐσται (ἡ γὰρ θη-8 κτική).

15 [γενομένοις] Göttling, τελεωθετῶν Ar. Susēm. 13. [γενομένοις] ΓΜΠ² BK., γενομένοις Π' (1st hand), ἄλλος γενομένοις Π' (corr. in the margin), γενομένοις (= the facts) Zell (in his ed. of the Ethics II. p. 405 f.), [καὶ γενομένοις] Bernays, [δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις] Bender || 18 Before πάντα in Π' is another τὰ ἄλλα (τὰλλα Π'), a repetition of the preceding: τὰν (sic) Π' (1st hand), τὰ πάντα Π' (corrector) || 20 γίνηται Μ土豪 Π' || γονίον Corning Susēm, which suits the sense but is against Aristotle's usage, γάρ Susem., οὖν ΓΠ Αρ. ΒК. Bernays || 23 [διό...24 αὐτῶν] and 23 κτητικὴ φύσει πολεμική also 24 [ἡ δὲ...25 πόλεμον καὶ πρῶτον] Schmidt, who transposes the latter to follow 1253 b 39 θερωτική. See Qu. Cy. III. 5 ff.

(τὰ ἑναμα) lay eggs, while the invertebrates (τὰ ἑναμα) breed worms. The difference between egg and worm is this: if the young animal is developed from a part and the rest serves as nourishment for it, it is an egg: but if the whole of the young animal proceeds from the whole of what is produced, it is a worm. Also Hist. anim. i. 5. 3489 b 6 ff.: a perfect germ (κόμμα) is called an egg when one part of it serves for the formation and another for the nourishment of the young animal developed out of it, a worm when the whole animal is developed out of the whole of the germ by its organization and growth: cp. ib. v. 19. 2: 550 b 28 ff. ἐκ δὲ τῶν σκολῆκων οὐκ ἐκ μέρους τῶν γίνεται τὸ ἔσων, ὡσπερ ἐκ τῶν ὕδων, ἄλλα ὕδων αὐξώνται καὶ διαρροήμενον γίνεται τὸ ἔσων, καὶ De gener. anim. III. 2. 4 752 a 27 f. οὐκ ὡσπερ οἱ σκολῆκες αὐτὰ δὲ αὐτῶν (sc. τὰ ὕδα) λαμβάνει τὴν αὐξήσεων. It follows from these explanations that what Aristotle asserts in the present passage of worms is in reality only true of eggs. All that the former receive from the parent worm is that capacity for perfect self-development which is wanting in the egg. Cp. also 10 § 3 n. (96).

Susem. (73)

14 τοῦ καλομέμενον γαλακτος φύσιν = the natural substance called milk. So τὸν ἄξιον, τοῦ θερμοῦ φύσις = air, heat respec-

176 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 8. [I. 8. 10 tively: see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 838 a 8 ff. with the examples 837 b 42 ff.

§ 11 15 [γενομένοις] “after they are born.” The crude teleology of §§ 11, 12 is common to all the Socrates and was probably derived from Socrates himself; Xen. Mem. i. 4. 5 ff.

§ 12 23 διὸ καὶ ἢ πολεμικὴ κτλ.] This does not directly follow from the foregoing. Some intermediate thought has to be supplied: <it must further be assumed that amongst men themselves the less perfect are formed for the service of the more perfect>.

Cp. also n. (70) on § 3. Susem. (74)

“There are at least four ways of taking this passage. (1) Vettori Giphanias Schneider Bojesen make αὐτῆς and ἦ both refer to πολεμικῆς. (2) Lambin, Schnitza, Stahr refer αὐτῆς to πολεμικῆς, ἦ to θερωτικῆς. This is plainly absurd: for if θερωτικῆς can be used against men as well as wild animals it is no longer μέρος πολεμικῆς, but at least as extensive as πολεμικῆς. (3) Garve, followed by Hampke p. 16, refers αὐτῆς to κτητικῆς, and ἦ to θερωτικῆς. There are three objections to this: (a) It proves too much; for if we deduce the right to make war from the right to hunt, why should not captives be eaten?—a notion which Aristotle (?) IV (vii). 2. 15 expressly repudiates with abhorrence. (b) Wars of
The clause ὡς φίλει δικαίον assigns a separate justification for the kind of war in question, which is not therefore deduced from the chase. It depends upon the view of slavery laid down in cc. 5, 6. (4) Sepulveda renders: quod habuit beneficio etiam parandum ratio, a natura myiodaniouproficiatur, ma-
king ἐπεμέλεια an epithet of κτητική and μέρος αὐτῆς = μέρος πολεμικῆς κτητικῆς; he also refers ἢ to ἐπεμέλεια. But though this gives excellent sense it involves transposing φίλει after κτητική and there is hardly good evidence of two adjectives in ἀμφιβολογία thus combined, the one as attribute the other as substantive. SUSEM. Quaest. Crit. III. p. 6 f. Then translate: "hence the natural art of war will belong in a sense to the art of acquisition (for the chase is only one branch of it)" viz. of natural warfare, and ἐπεμέλεια, § 7, is αὐτóφυος ἐργασία. "It i.e. war has to be employed not only against wild animals but also against all such men as, though naturally slaves, refuse submission, this species of war having a natural justification."

The view given above as (3)—αὐτῆς = κτητικῆς, ἢ = ἐπεμέλεια—is supported by Jackson, who would extend the parenthesis to πολέμων. He translates: 'natural warfare will in a sense be a branch of acquisition: for (1) the chase is a mode of acquisition, and (2) can be applied either against wild animals (in which case it is ἐπεμέλεια proper) or against natural slaves, who refuse to obey, that being a branch of war which has a natural justification.' He adds: "The διάφορος then is ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῆς ἐπεμέλεια proper πολεμικῇ
translates "in so far as Economic must either find ready to hand, or itself provide that there may be found ready to hand, necessities of life and utilities which are capable of being stored for the common use of state or family."  

30 True wealth is for use: δλος δε το πλούτεως ἐστιν ἐν τῷ χρήσασι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κέκτηται καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνεργεία ἐστὶ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρήσις πλούτου K. 1. 5. 7.

§ 14 32 αὐτάρκεια = the amount of such property absolutely necessary to secure independence of all external aid.

οὐκ ἀπειρός See 9 §§ 13, 14. The notion of a limit to true wealth recurs in Epicurus arīμ Diog. Laerc. X. 144: ἣ τῆς φύσεως πλούτου καὶ ἀφρατί καὶ ἐυπόριστος ἐστὶ, ὃ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἀπειρόν εἰσπέσται. The earlier political economists believed in a possible "glut of capital": Mill P. E. 1. 5 § 3.

Σελήνων] Frag. 13, 71 Bergk. Susem. (76)

§ 15 35 οὐδὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. iv (vii). 1 § 5 n. (965), 1 § 7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει περάς, όστερ πολὺν τι, πῶς γὰρ τὸ χρήσασιν ἐστι; ὡς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ βλάστησιν ἄναγκαιον ἢ μηδὲν βεβολοῦ εἶναι αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχωρίσω. Susem. (76 b)

37 ὥργανων πλῆθος κτλ] in other words, means and appliances for life, and for the life of wellbeing and perfection as the end of the household and of the state. But cp. Exc. III. Susem. (77)

The definition of wealth as "instruments" (given also 4 § 2) is commended by J. S. Mill Political Economy 1. 10 as adding distinctness and reality to the common view. His definitions are "any product both useful and susceptible of accumulation"—with which comp. 1256 b 29—and "all useful or agreeable things which possess exchange value." Mill too restricts the term to material wealth.


§ 40 ἰν μιλίστα κτλ] "which is especially called money-making," χρηματιστική (2) of 8 § 1 n. "and fairly so called; to which is due the opinion that wealth and property have no limit." But 9 § 4 the first sense seems to recur.


41 δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικὴν, δι’ ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ (III)

peateda εἶναι πλοῦτον καὶ κτήσεως. ᾧς μιᾶν καὶ τὴν

αὐτήν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γενναίας

ἐστι δ’ οὖσ’ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκεῖνης. ἐστι δ’

4 ἣ μὲν φύσει ἢ δ’ οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δ’ ἐμπειρία.

§ 2 τίνος καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 11

τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνεύθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διπτῇ ἣ χρήσις

ἐστίν, ἀμφότερα δὲ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλὶ οὐχ ὰμοίως καθ’

αὐτό, ἀλλ’ ἣ μὲν οἰκεία ἢ δ’ οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος,

9 οἷον ὑπόδηματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεις καὶ ἢ μεταβλητική. ἀμ-

§ 3 φότερα γὰρ ὑπόδηματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττό-

μενος τῷ δειμένῳ ὑπόδηματος ἀντὶ νομίζομεν ἢ τροφῆς

χρήσιν τῷ ὑπόδηματι ἢ υπόδημα, ἀλλ’ οὗ τὴν οἰκείαν

χρῆσιν οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἐνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ

§ 4 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτήματων. ἐστι γὰρ ἢ

15 μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ

κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλεῖο τα ὑ’ ἐλάττω τῶν ἰκανῶν

41 οὐτ’ Bas. in the margin

1257 a 1 [folios 5 μᾶλλον] Schmidt | 3 χρήσεως] κειμένη Γ (—posita William)

Susem. | 6 χρήσεως Β M* and p1 in the margin | 7 καθ’ αὐτό] after ὰμοίως

Koraes | 9 ὑπόδημα] M Π1 | 12 οἱ οἰκεία [Koraes, Scaliger proposed to trans-

pose these words to follow χρήσις, which also occurred to Koraes, but see Comm.

n. (78)

§ 2 1257 a 6 ἐκάστου γὰρ κτλ] “Compare End. Eth. III. 4, 1231 b 38, where we find the same classification of χρήσεις, though the use in exchange is

reckoned a species not of καθ’ αὐτὸ χρήσις, but of κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The two

classifications are as follows:—

Politics

καθ’ αὐτὸ οἰκεία
καθ’ αὐτὸ οὐκ οἰκεία
κατὰ συμβεβηκός

ὑπόδεις
μεταβλητική
ὡς ἄν εἰ τις

σταθμὸ χρήσαιτο

τῷ ὑπόδηματι

End. Eth.

καθ’ αὐτὸ
κατὰ συμβεβηκός
κατὰ συμβεβηκός”

(Jackson).

(9 ὑπόδεις] = wearing, ἢ μεταβλητική =

the use in exchange. The shoe when

used as an article of exchange preserves

its proper nature, it is still to be worn by

somebody; although as it is not made to

exchange this use is οὐκ οἰκεία.

§ 3 10 καὶ γὰρ... 12 ὑπόδημα] This is

true. The question is always how

much money or food the shoe as such, and

not the leather used in making it, is

worth: the labour has to be paid for as

well as the materials (Göttingling). Cp.

n. on § 8 (83) and Introd. 28. Susem. (78)

12 ἢ υπόδημα] as a shoe.

§ 4 14 ἐστι γὰρ... πάντων] sc. χρή-

σις. “All things have a use in exchange.”

We now speak of the two values of

ting, value in use and value in exchange.

(15 ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον) (τὸ δὲ

υπέργεια, derived in the first instance from

a natural origin [whatever it may after-

wards become].

I2——2
έχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ὡς καὶ δήλων, ὅτε οὐκ ἐστὶν φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἢ κατηηλική· ὅσον γὰρ ἴκανον αὐτοῦ, ἀναγ-§ 5 καίον ἢν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγήν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ 20 κοινωνίᾳ (τούτῳ δὲ ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερῶν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστίν ἐργὸν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὗσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνων πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων * * * ὅν κατὰ τὰς δείσεις ἀναγκαίων ἢν§ 24 ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ [καὶ] τῶν (p. 1) § 6 βαρβαρικῶν ἑθῶν, κατά τὴν ἀλλαγήν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλαττοῦνται, ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ οὐδὲν, οἷον ὁινὸν πρὸς σῶτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τῶν οἰκατων. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλή-13

17 [ἡ καὶ...19 ἀλλαγήν] Schmidt | φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς] tis φύσει χρηματιστικῆς Schmidt | 18 χρηματιστικῆς Schmidt | μεταβλητικῆς Bernays | 20 [τοῦτο...οἰκία] Schmidt | ἐστιν] ἢν Schmidt | 22 τῶν omitted in II. and Ar., it is supplied by μ in the margin | 23 καί was left out by Camot, [καὶ] Koraes | ἐτέρων | Schneider, ἐτέρων | Koraes, <ἐτέρων> ἐτέρων Bernays (on which see Comm.): Fülleborn saw that something was lost: ἐτέρων <ἐτέρῳ ἡγόρου>? Susem. Welldon changes ἐτέρων into ἐδέσω | Koraes added ἢν | 24 καί is wanting in I, [καὶ] Susem., καὶ <καὶ> Schmidt and Bernays (perhaps rightly): Busse transposes καὶ to precede πολλα—not badly | 25 ff. Michael of Ephesus in his comm. on Arist. Ethic. f. 70<sup>ο</sup> refers to this passage

17 ἡ καὶ δήλων...κατηηλική[Barter is sufficient for natural wants, as he goes on to show. Money is an artificial means of facilitating this, not of natural origin, but only due to custom and convention, see §§ 8—11 n.n. (82, 83)) when applied within due limits it is not contrary to nature. The whole explanation would have been clearer, Fülleborn rightly observes, had Aristotele definitely stated what he means by ‘trade’ (κατηηλική= huckstering, retail trade): viz. that it is a buying and exchanging “not for one’s own wants, but in order to sell again”. As it is, this is left to be inferred from the context. Susem. (79)

18 ὅσον γὰρ κτλ] “For the necessity of exchange is confined, as we saw, to the satisfaction of the exchangers’ own wants.” Cp. τοιαύτης=only so much 13 § 12.

§ 5 21 ἅλλη ἢδη] but not until the society extended. “Since trade is introduced at a later stage it is not ‘natural’. Possibly directed against Plato’s primitive state, the ἄλλην, ἤδη, ὅτι, τῶν πόλεων, Kep. II. 371 Α—Δ: ἄγορα δ’ ἢδων καὶ νόμισμα ἐξουσιοῦν τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενη-σεται.

22 οἱ δὲ κεχωρ. κτλ] Bernays thought the addition of a word for “lacked” unnecessary, ‘because this idea is implied in κεχωρισμένοι’. If so, as κεχωρ. <ἐτέρων> ἐτέρων=separated (or divided) one from this thing, another from that, so κεχωρ. πολλά should mean ‘separated from many things’. But as Bernays gives ‘division of possessions’ i.e. separate property ‘was introduced for many things’, he must intend κεχωρισμένοι πολλά to stand for ‘living in divided possession of’, or in respect of, ‘many things’: a sense hardly possible in any case and quite inconceivable if the participle has a different construction with ἐτέρων. Susem.

Postgate would govern πολλάν καὶ ἐτέρων by ἐκοινώνων, supposing πολλά to be opposed to πάντων (as πιλειοτός οἰκία, 11. 27), and understanding ἐτέρων of the primary division of the joint-household into two: “again when the original household split into two, each half continued to hold in common a large part of the stock, viz. all that the other half left it”.

23 κατὰ τὰς δείσεις] Comp. 2 § 5 n. (18). Susem. (80)
The substance is as follows:

...
σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἰς τοὺς ητέρους ἔτερους, τὸ μὲν πρῶ- (ΠΙΙ) τον ἀπλώς ὀρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον 40 καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλλόντων, ἵνα ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως § 9 αὐτῶν; ὁ γὰρ χαρακτὴρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείων. πορι- 15 σθένος οὖν ἢ ἦν νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καταληκτικόν, τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀπλώς ἵσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δὲ ἐμπερίας 4 ἢ ἦν τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλείστουν § 10 ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἢ χρηματιστική μᾶλλον περὶ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἐργὸν αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πόθεν ἐσται πλῆθος [χρημάτων]; ποιητική γὰρ [εἶναι] τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νο- 16 9 μίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικῆν § 11 καὶ τὴν κατηληκτικὴν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λήρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ’ οὐδὲν, ὅτι μετα-

38 καὶ εἰ Μ.Π.Π Βκ. (perhaps rightly) || 40 ἐπιβαλλόντων Μ.Π.Π Βκ.
1257 b 3 οὖν omitted by P283. Q Sb Tb Ald. Bk. and P4 (1st hand) || γενόμενον ? Susem. || 7 [χρημάτων] Giphanis || ποιητικήν [γάρ] Schmidt, who transposes ποιητικήν...8 χρημάτων to follow 10 κατηληκτικήν || γὰρ] δ’ Bernays, inserting γάρ after the next following καί, thus: χρημάτων... ποιητική γ’ εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου καὶ <γάρ> χρημάτων καὶ γάρ κτλ. If so, 9 τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ must also be omitted || εἶναι omitted by Π1 || τοῦ omitted by Μ4, bracketed by Koraes; οὖν? Susem. || 8 Giphanis proposed to omit γάρ; Schmidt transposes it to follow 9 διὰ || πολλάκις after τιθέασι Μ4 Ρ1 || 9 διὰ τὸδ’) δ;) Susem. || 10 Thurot proposes to omit καὶ before τῆς, καὶ <εἶναι> ? Susem.; Schütz rejects καὶ τὴν κατηληκτικὴν (or τὴν χρηματιστικήν καὶ) || 11 νόμος Lambin, perhaps rightly: yet see Comm. n. (86)

38 σιδήρος] "Byzantium is an instance of the use of iron money: cp. Plato Comicus Peis. 3 χαλεπῶς ἄν οἰκή- σαμεν ἐν Βυζαντίος ὅποιον σιδηρέων τοῖς νομίσμασιν | χρώνται. These coins were commonly called οἱ σίδηροι, cp. Aristoph. Clouds 249. εἰ τοὺς ητέρους ἔτερον] Aristotle has in mind some such coinage as the Electrum money used at Cyzicus" (Ridgeway). Electrum was the material of the earliest known coins of Lydia, before the time of Croesus, and of the Ionian cities: see Gardner Types of Gk. Coins p. 4 ff., Head Coinage of Lydia p. 11. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κτλ.] This is the old-fashioned bar-money, like the iron money at Sparta, Pseudo-Plato l. c. ἐν Ἀκαδαι- μοῦν σιδήρῳ σταθμῷ νομίσμασι. Cp. Xen. De Rep. Laced. 7, 5; Plutarch Lys. 17 (ὁξελακον, spits), Lyc. 9; Polybios vi. 49; and H. Stein On the Spartan iron money in Jahrb. f. Philol. I.XXXIX. 1864.

332 ff. SUSEM. (85) § 9 1257 b 1 Take έκ τῆς ἀναγκ. ἀλ- λαγῆς with πορισθέντας rather than with ἐγένετο, "as soon as a currency was prov- ided in consequence of the necessary exchange, there arose the other branch of the art of wealth, I mean retail-trade: at first no doubt in a rude form, but after- wards improved by experience as to the quarters from which, and the way in which, exchange of commodities" not μεταβαλλόμενον <τὸ νόμισμα>, "will produce the largest profit ".

§ 10 8 καὶ γάρ...10 κατηληκτικήν] This is the error best known as the Mercantile System: the confusion of money with wealth exposed by Adam Smith Wealth of Nations B. IV. Cp. Mill Pol. Econ. pp. 1—4. Even in Khet. 1. 5. 7 νομίσματος πλῆθος is only one of many 'elements' of wealth.

§ 11 11 νόμος παντάπασι] An allu-
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sion to the derivation of νόμισμα = money, currency, from νόμος = convention, current custom: see n. (83). It may be for the same reason that money is more pointedly said to be νόμος rather than νόμος, 'conventional', as we should expect. The same allusion in Pseudo-Plato Erayxias l. c. 5, n. (82) (Schneider). Susem. (86)

12 oðdé Bk., oûte II. 20 αὐτὴ] ἢ Ἡ Schmidt 24 χρηματιστικής Schmidt, who transposes καὶ αὐτὴ...30 κτῆσι to follow 1257 a 5 μᾶλλον 21 ἢ Ἡ Plb. Q (?) L. Ald., ἢ Ἡ S, ἢ Rassow Bernays omits χρημάτων after διά 24 δὲ Giphanius oûtos omitted by Π

The mythical king of Phrygia is said to have captured Silenos and restored him to Dionysos, who in return for the kind treatment of the prisoner allowed him to wish for whatever he liked. The fatal boon was subsequently withdrawn by the god at Midas's request, see Ovid Metamorph. xi. 90—145. Aristotle must have had a version of the story in which, instead of this happening, Midas died from hunger and thirst. Would the Midas of the legend have fared any better in the end, if all his food had been converted into drink, or all his drink into food? In the one case he would have been starved to death, in the other killed by thirst. Susem. (88)

20 n. (1). Susem. (88 b)

19 ἐτέρα ἢ χρ.] Getting of goods for use, χρηματιστικής (3) of 8 § 1 n.

21 διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς "by exchange of commodities. And this species, i.e. καταληκτική, is thought to deal with money, for currency constitutes and limits exchange: i.e. trading begins and ends with money. στοιχεῖα, main constituent, seems to mean indispensable agent in exchange. Elsewhere called guarantee, τῆς μελλόντος ἀλλαγῆς οἰῶν ἐγεννησίς, N. E. § 14: and ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρεᾶς, representative of demand ib. § 11.

In the words of the line from Solon, 8 § 14" (Bernays). Susem. (89)
25 ὁσπέρ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ υγιαίνειν - εἰς ἀπειρον ἐστὶ καὶ (III) ἐκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρον (οὐτὶ μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο βουλονταὶ ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπειρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσας), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς 29 χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
§ 14 πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις, τῆς δ᾽ οἰκονομικῆς [οὐ χρη- 18 ματιστικής] ἐστὶ πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον. διὸ τῇ μὲν φανεταὶ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλοῦτον πέρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γνωμονέων ὀρὶ<μεν> συμβαίνων τόπων πάντες γὰρ εἰς ἀπειρον αὐξοῦσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα. 34
§ 15 αὕτων δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις

25 As Eucken remarks, we should have expected εἰς: but this change would be very bold (see 36 and 1258 a 1) || 30 τῆς δ᾽...31 ἔργον suspected as an interpolation Schmidt || οὐ χρηματιστικὴ ἔργον (corr.2), Reiske first omitted these two words (but after 31 οἰκονομικῆς he inserts δ καὶ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, in which case Schneider and Gurlitt recommend ταυτῷ instead of τοῖτῳ); [οὐ] Bojesen Thurot Schütz, αὐ Bernays, οὖ Susem. || διά <τι δὲ> τῇ μὲν * * φανεταί Schmidt || 33 ὀρίζουν Syburg, ὀρίζει τῷ Π. Αρ. || 34 νόμισμα, αὕτων * * διά τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν Schmidt

25 τοῦ υγιαίνειν depends on εἰς ἀπε- 27 ρον: medicine is without end in respect of health; medicine recognises no limits within which its production of health is confined.
28 πέρας...πάσας]. "For all arts are limited by their ends." True in cases where, after a certain limit has been passed, the number and amount of the means applied do not contribute anything to the attainment of the end, nay even hinder it. But does it also hold for the all-embracing end of human life, the happiness and perfection not of individuals but of whole nations and finally of the human race? Aristotle did not think of that: and no wonder, when we consider it is only the discovery of modern Political Economy, that capital is simply accumulated labour: that the means to continued progress in national civilization are guaranteed solely by the transmission and growth of the national wealth from generation to generation, which money first made possible. We ought rather, with Stahr and others (Introd. p. 28), to recognise Aristotle's penetrating insight, the ripeness and maturity of many of his conclusions in this 9th chapter, "the unpretending germ from which two thousand years afterwards grew the science of society". Cp. further IV (vii). 1 § 5 n. (695), n. (700).
Susem. (90)

§ 14 30 If οὐ have been changed or omitted, take τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as an adjective: so perhaps l. 39 below, and undoubtedly §18, 1258 a 17: "but to that branch" of accumulation "which concerns the householder there is a limit". See however n. on 8 § 12, p. 177.
31 τοῦτο = to attain this limit, χρηματα ποιεῖν as Schneider says. τῇ μὲν] 3. "in one sense", viz. when regarded as an instrument. Lambin Schütz Bernays take it as "to the one branch", viz. that which concerns the householder.
34 εἰς ἀπειρον] Cp. [Xen.] De Vesti- 35 gai. 4 §§ 6, 7: ἀργύρῳ δὲ οὐδὲς πα οὐτῶν πολύ ἀκήθατο ὥστε μὴ ἐτί προδεδείγησαν. 3. τη χρηματιζόμενοι = those who are engaged in traffic.
35 τὸ σύνεγγυς, the close relationship between the two branches of χρηματιστική is the cause of this mistake.
§ 15 ἐπαλλάττει] See on 1. 6. 3. "The practical application of the two kinds of χρηματιστική overlaps, through being concerned with the same article.
Here two χρήσεως ἐπάλλαττονι because they have the same object in common". (Postgate).

37 τῆς μὲν κτλ] 'The one application has a different end' (viz. enjoyment, use) 'the other aims at mere accumulation'.

39 διατελοῦσιν κτλ] 'persist through life in the opinion that they ought at least to hoard their stock of money if not to go on adding to it indefinitely' : νομίσ. οὕτωσιν = their substance or capital in money, Bonitz s. v. Better thus taken than as a paraphrase of νόμισμα, for which idiom see Waltz Ουγ. 1. 283 and cp. ἡ τοῦ ὅρινος οὕτω 693 b 6.

§ 16 This gives the reason why men fall into the error just noticed, the external, the trap into which they fall, having been stated in § 14: ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως = τοῦ διατελεῖν ἡ σφάζει κτλ. (Postgate).

40 αὐτοῦ δὲ κτλ] 'Perhaps the thought becomes clearer' says Füllcbeorn 'when expressed as follows: men have a universal desire for long life, and without setting a definite aim before them,' without making clear to themselves wherein the value and happiness of life really consist, 'they work on incessantly to procure themselves the means of living through this indefinite series of years. Now if they would consider how to provide for present enjoyment' and for the ennobling of life, 'their desire for gain would be rendered more definite and limited'. SUSEM. (91)

1258 a 2 ὅσοι δὲ κτλ] "those who set their hearts upon a life of happiness look for it in sensual enjoyments": whereas, on Aristotle's own theory, the true embellishment and perfecting of life, i.e. happiness, consists in the utmost possible cultivation of mental and moral excellence, of which the highest and noblest enjoyments are but a necessary consequence, a moderate share of external goods and bodily pleasures being required not as constituent element but merely as indispensable condition: all beyond this hinders rather than promotes true Wellbeing. See Zeller Phil. d. Gr. ii 609: cp. iv (VII). i §§ 7, 8. SUSEM. (92)

3 ἐπιβαλλόνται] 'throw themselves upon' (cp. Hom. II. vi. 68, ἑνάρα ἐπιβαλλόμενον 'desire' in the same metaphorical sense as ὀργήσεσα, υπέκεισα. But otherwise II. 1. 1 'to adopt'. For the intransitive use of the active see I. 13 §§ 8, 13. In Nic. Eth. 1. 5 §§ 1, 2 ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος is the life of sensual enjoyment. As Plato explains Ἐρημ. 380 εἰ, money is the means to this life, so that φιλοκερδῆς, φιλοχρηματῶν are convertible terms with τὰ ἐπιθυμητικά: hence ὁ χρηματιστικός ἀνὴρ comes to be compared with ὁ φιλάνθρωπος and ὁ φιλόσοφος.
§ 17 ἐτερον ἐδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τούτοι εὐλυπθεὶ. ἐν ὑπερ-(III)
βολῇ γὰρ ὄψης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολὴς ποιητικῶν ἐπιτούσιων καὶ μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς δύνασθαι πορίζειν, δι’ ἀλλὰ αἰτίας τούτο πειράται, 
10 ἐκάστη χρῶμενοι τοῖς δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἄνδριας 20
gὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς
§ 18 καὶ ἱατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ὑδρηγῆς τῆς δ’ ὑδρεον. οὐδὲ
dὲ πᾶσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὡς τούτο τέλος οὖν, πρὸς δὲ
tὸ τέλος ἀπαντᾶ δέν ἀπαντᾶν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μή ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τῆς,
16 καὶ δὲ αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν χρείᾳ ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς; εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ
tῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἐτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικῇ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν
ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν, οὐχ ἀσπέρ αὐτή ἀπειροῦ ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα
10 ὄρον ὑδὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορροφοῦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ

12 ὑδεῖαν Ἡ. B. 13 | 15 [τῆς τε μή ἀναγκαίας] Schmidt || μή is transposed by
carried out by Hämpe and Rassow to precede 17 ἀναγκαίας—but wrongly | 16 [καὶ περὶ...19
dὸν] Schmidt || 17 <καὶ> κατὰ φύσιν Thurat || 18 ὑ Schneider (perhaps
rightly, unless we prefer to omit ὑ...τροφῆν.) || αἰτή Welldon || 19 Bender
considers the whole of c. 10 ὑδήν...8 ἔστιν to be spurious; but see Comm. n. (9.)
|| Schmidt transposes 19 ὑδήν...38 ἱδῶν to follow 1256 b 30 ὁικᾶς

§ 17 8 καὶ μή κτλ]. “And if they
cannot procure this” (ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερ-
βολῆς) by mere accumulation they at-
tempt it by some other supposed cause,
perverting each of their faculties to
attain it.”

§ 18 13. πάρας ποιοῦσι χρηματισ.] Compare Plato Rep. I 342 D: the true
iatρος ὁ χρηματιστής, and 346 C, D: ἡ
μισθωτικὴ accompanies the other arts to
provide remuneration.

14 ἀπαντᾶν = meet in, conspire, tend
to: referre ad.

19 ὄρον = standard, limit. Properly

§§ 16—18 In the several points Ari-
stotle is quite right, but in reality all this
makes against him. For it shows that
the fault lies with the men and not with
the ‘arts’. If men misuse not medicine
merely, but moral virtues like courage, as
a means to their own avarice and craving
for pleasure; if they can follow agricult-
ure, cattle-rearing, etc. in the same
spirit; why are commerce trade and
banking to be unceremoniously rejected
merely because they can serve such men
as a still reader and more successful
means to the satisfaction of their desires?
Why should it be culpable in any one to

carry on such pursuits merely to gain a
living by them? (Glaser). It is true
that if there were no stock exchange
there could be no speculation in stocks,
and then no one would be tempted to
such excessive indulgence in it as is cer-
tainly liable at times to endanger the
morality of whole nations [as e.g. at
the time of the South Sea Bubble]. But
without the shadow no light; civilization
is impossible without luxury. ‘In spite
of many great evils which money has
brought into the world it is to this inven-
tion alone that we owe the fact that nine-
tenths of mankind are now no longer
forced to serve that fortunate minority,
the owners of real property. Think of the
time when money was still scarce in
Europe; the land then belonged almost
exclusively to the clergy and the no-
bility. Money alone introduced a new
species of commodity of inexhaustible
ownership, which stands open to all to
acquire’ (Schlosser). “Aristotle forgets,
too, that, even before money was in-
vented, people might find no limit to
wealth-seeking. Τὸν ἀστερὸς of
Odysses, Od. xiv. 96, went beyond the
limit of his consumption, and its aim was,
not nurture, but power, as he could make
grants to his *comitatus* out of his herds and flocks" (Lang). And is not the total result attained in itself truly surprising, namely, that the landowner who sells just enough produce to defray all his other household requirements is the sole householder (*oikowmos*); whereas the merchant, the tradesman and the banker are not? Not unnaturally Plato and Aristotle looked only at the dark side of trade. Like true Greeks (*Introd*. pp. 22, 29 f.) their standpoint was still that of the fortunate minority supported by the remaining nine-tenths who serve: as is seen in their approval of slavery and their scheme of a body of citizens living a life of free leisure, without work, finding exclusive unpaid occupation in science, aesthetic enjoyment, and civil administration. Physical labour in Greece was for the most part converted by slavery into slave-labour. Thus all respect for it was lost: "when agriculture, trade, and work in factories or on board ships, were given up to serfs and slaves, the contempt for these occupations was made permanent, just because men saw them carried on by such people, as conversely they had originally been given up to serfs and slaves because they were thought unworthy for free citizens to follow" (Schiller). Even Plato and Aristotle thoroughly despaired physical labour as something servile and, in the bad sense of the word, mechanical (banastic), as intellectually and morally degrading: see c. 11 § 6 with the passages quoted in n. (103). Consequently, trade and commerce, even the pursuit of agriculture proper—see IV (vii). 9 §§ 3, 7; 10 §§ 9—14, Exc. III on BK. i, and Plato *Laws* vii. 806 D f.—all paid labour, see n. (102), appeared to them more or less unworthy of true freemen. It is a further consequence that, though Aristotle forcibly rejects the extreme de-

velopments of Plato's social and political theories, yet after all he is taking the same line with more prudence and reserve. See *Introd.* p. 21 nn. (1) and (3), p. 33 n. (7). *Susem.* (93) c. 10 Decision of the question raised in c. 8 §§ 1: §§ 1—3; *Usury the most unnatural form of gain*, §§ 4, 5.

§ 1 19 δελαον δε κτλ] "But it will now be easy to decide the further question started at the outset, namely, whether the art of wealth is the concern of the householder and statesman or not, but"

...Then comes a lacuna which may tentatively be filled as follows: "but, <...far so as in general needed for the management of a household, is the concern of a subordinate science. Plainly the latter is the case, and the former only so far as the head of the house has to see that the art of acquiring wealth is practised, without exercising it himself; for it is his function, as we said, to use and not to acquire. Furthermore it is an auxiliary science for procuring instruments for living and not the mere materials: these> must be given already." But the briefer and somewhat different restoration given in the critical notes is also admissible: "<...of some one else. For it is not his business to procure all that is necessary for living>: nay there must be definite materials found him beforehand." *Susem.* (94)

23 οὔτω καὶ τροφὴν κτλ] "so nature must provide land or sea or something else as means of support." Lambin and Göttling make γὰρ ἡ δαλατταν epexegetically of τὴν φύσιν and Jackson shows that this is not impossible by citing Plato *Laws* 891 c, τὴν φύσιν ἀυτοῖς ταῦτα αὐτὰ, sc. πόροι καὶ θρόνοι καὶ γίγναι καὶ ἀλήθη. But the above rendering best agrees with 8 §§ 9, 12, 10 § 3.
24 taüta] autên Glaser (wrongly), πάντα? Oncken, τάλλα Bender (both better, but hardly correct) || 25 οὐ γάρ κτλ] From this illustration it would be inferred that the domestic branch of χρηματιστική is related to οικονομική as shuttle-making to weaving, and not as the production of wool to weaving. Thus the question proposed 8 § 1 and not expressly taken up afterwards would have to be decided as follows: the domestic branch of χρηματιστική provides the household with the needful raw materials for use, by artificial appropriation of nature's stores, so far as nature herself, whose especial function this is, has made no direct provision. On the other hand the sum total of the necessaries of life are certainly called elsewhere, § § 15, 4 §§ 1—4, the instruments (broker) for living or managing a household. As however this is not a mode of production but a practical, utilizing activity of consumers (ο δὲ βιος πράξεις, ου πολεμοί), the two answers to a certain degree coincide: so far, the question which remains unanswered need not have been proposed. But there is a difference, again, between earning a livelihood directly and indirectly procuring the appliances and tools required for it. The latter is undoubtedly the business of domestic χρηματιστική, and therefore it stands to Economics in the relation of a subsidiary art that provides, not simply materials, but also instruments. Not only is c. 10 required as an indispensable conclusion to the entire discussion begun at c. 8, but even beyond that there is much that we look for in vain in it; whether Aristotle himself left it thus incomplete, or, as is not quite impossible though indemonstrable, we have here the inadequate execution of another hand substituted for a discussion that has been lost or was never really written. In the latter case there must have been a lacuna here. Susen. (95) 28 απορήσεων ἄν] χρηματιστική (3) is just as much, or as little, a part of Politics or Economics as Medicine is, and no more. For health is just as necessary to the state as property, and yet the duty of providing health is not considered to belong to Politics or Economic. § 3 34 [μάλιστα] if possible, this must be found by nature, i.e. without the trouble of acquiring it. 35 φύσεως γάρ κτλ] It was explained in n. (73) on 8 § 11 that on Aristotle's own theory it is impossible to see how far
I. 10. 5] 1258 a 24—1258 b 5. 189

gewühvnti παρέχειν' παντί γάρ, εξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφή το (III)
§ 4 λειτόμενον ἐστίν. διό κατὰ φύσιν ἐστιν ἡ χρηματιστική (p. 17)
πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων.

dιπλάς δ' οὐσίς αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν κατηλ- 23
κῆς τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαινο- 1258 b 1

τρικῆς, τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς ψευγομένης (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ
φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν), εὐλογωτάτα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολο- 1258 b 2

τατική διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἰναι τὴν κτήσιν
§ 5 καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὥσπερ ἐπορισάμεθα. μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν,
5 ὁ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλέον. ὥδεν καὶ τούνομα τοῦτ' εἰλιφεν'

38 <ἡ> ἀπὸ Schneider  || 39 [κατηλικῆς...μὲν] Schmidt
1258 b 1 μεταβολικής Π² Bk. and yr. p¹ (in margin); [μεταβολική] now, perhaps
rightly, μεταβολικῆς <καί> formerly, Schmidt || 3 ἐπὶ Jackson, τινι Bk. 2, ἀπ'
ceteri  || τιν omitted by M, [τιν] Jackson (unnecessary) || κτήσιν, <ἐπὶ τόκῳ
χρωμένου> now, <ἐπὶ τ. χρωμένων αὐτοῦ> formerly, Schmidt  || 4 ὥσπερ ἐπορισάμεθα
ὁπερ ἐπορισθῇ Π² Bk., ὥσπερ ἐπορισθῇ Schmidt  || 5 αὐτὸ] αὐτῶν Τ Ar.

this is intended to apply to the animals
which according to him are produced from
worms. SUSEM. (96)
36 παντὶ γάρ κτλ] "for every animal has
for its sustenance the remainder of the
matter out of which it grows." Hence
the animal and vegetable world is nature's
reserve for the support of man.

§ 4 1258 b 1 τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς ψε-
γομένης] Attested in equally general terms
by Plato Latus xi. 918 b : compare
Andoc. i. 137, Diog. Laert. i. 104. An
Athenian would find capital for mercan-
tile concerns, but he considered it on the
whole disreputable to engage in them
personally (Becker Char. ii. 134 ed. 2,
Eng. Tr. p. 281). SUSEM. (97)

2 ἀπ' ἀλλήλων] If neuter, the profit
made from mutual exchange. But more
likely masculine, derived from men
defrauding and overreaching one another;
the root, probably, of Aristotle's objection
to trade altogether.

μισεῖται] Demosth. xxxvii Adv. Pant-
actenium § 52: μισοῦν, φησίν, Ἀθηναίοι
tοὺς δανειφώτας. SUSEM. (97 b)

ἡ ὀβολοστατική = obol weighing, petty
usury; Lysias adv. Theochn. i. § 18 p. 117
explaining the law τὸ ἀργύριον στάσιον
eiναι ἐφ' ὀπόσῳ ἀν βουλήσῃ ὁ δανειέων
says τὸ στάσιον τοῦτο ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἃν ἴση
ταται ἀλλὰ τόκον πρὸς τιθέσθαι ὁ ἱκός
ἀν βουλήσῃ. Cp. also Aristoph. Clouds
1146, Antiph. Νεότ. frag. 1, Meineke 92
in Athen. i. 108 e (Cope). The insecure-
ness of the principal lent was the main
cause of a high rate of interest. Thus
upon bottomly the average rate charged
was 20 per cent., which would go to
cover insurance, [Xen.] De Virt. 99.
9. On house-rents the return was only
8½ per cent. Partly, too, the absence of
a paper medium of the nature of bills of
exchange, drafts, or bank notes, contri-
buted to the same result: Büchsenschütz
Besitz und Erwerb pp. 98, 946 ff.

3 διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ κτλ] "According
to the texts both of Becker and Susemihl
ὁβολοστατική is hated because it draws a
profit from coin instead of from commo-
dities exchanged by means of coin. But
the explanatory sentence—μεταβολῆς γὰρ
ἐγένετο χάριν, οὗ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλέον
—seems to show that ὀβολοστατική is
hated because it seeks to accumulate coin
instead of using it in the furtherance of
exchange. In order to reconcile the
explanatory sentence and the sentence
explained, read in the latter ἐπὶ instead of
ἀπ' οὐτίν, omit τιν with M, and restore
Bekker's ὥσπερ. In this way we obtain
an appropriate sense: 'ὁβολοστατική is
hated because it is directed to the acquisi-
tion of coin, instead of to the end with
a view to which coin was invented: for it
was to further exchange that coin was in-
troduced, while interest multiplies coin
itself'" (Jackson).

§ 5 τόκος] "Perhaps from Plato
Rep. VIII. 555 E, οὗ δὲ δρ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκα-
ύφαντες, οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες τούτος ὅραν, τῶν
λοιπῶν τῶν ἀδί υπεκοιτα ἐνέντες ἀργύριον
тома гаг та тиктόμεναι τοίς γεννώσιν αυτά ἐστίν, ὃ δὲ (III τόκος γίνεται νόμιμα εκ νομίσματος, ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παραφύσιν οὖν τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν διωρίκαμεν ἰκανός, τὰ IV πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν. ἐστὶ δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα ἐμπειρον εἶναι, ποία λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, ὅλον 14 ἕπαυν κτῆσις ποία τις ἡ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὦμοιος δὲ καὶ τὰ 2 τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων (δεῖ γὰρ ἐμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλληλά τε τοῦτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποία ἐν ποιοῖς τόποις:

7 ἐκ is omitted by Π² Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand), perhaps rightly: it is added by P⁴ (corrector) || 10 δὲ] γὰρ Γ' Αρ., perhaps rightly || 11 ἐλευθερών? Jackson || 12 δὲ] ὃ Λαμβιν, perhaps rightly || τῆς omitted by Π² Bk. || κτήματα] κτήματα Bernays


With 3—8 διὰ τὸ κτλ comp. Plato Laws v. 742 c, viii. 842 b. Every one will agree with: Füllborn that this proof is sophistical. But Stahr rightly observes: 'it was not until capital itself attained its complete development, that is, only in recent times, that the justification and reasonable necessity of interest became clear. The history of capital recounts the gigantic efforts that had to be made, the difficulties that had to be surmounted, in order to its formation. From the point of view of universal history the high rate of interest in ancient times has perhaps been a favourable means to that end; yet its immediate effect, in conjunction with a cruel law of debtor and creditor, was to excite repulsion in men with moral natures and this led them decisively to condemn interest altogether, as Plato did.'

All this tends to give Aristotle's whole theory of exchange the following shape: 'he first includes under the term Exchange (ἀλλαγή) all buying and selling barter. Next he subdivides this genus into two species, the one good and praise-worthy, the other not so. The former belongs to Economic. It exchanges the surplus stock of the household for commodities which the household needs; or if this surplus stock is sold for money it is with no intention of making a profit, but only to purchase other necessities with the proceeds. The other species is distinguished by the intention of making a profit, and this exchange with a view to gain is χρηματιστική in the narrower sense or trading proper. It is again subdivided into two branches: the one includes all traffic in commodities whether in exchange for other commodities or for money, the other is traffic in money alone by lending it on interest. Aristotle regards this last as wholly detestable: the former as less bad, but still bad enough' (Schlosser). SUSEM. 98 c. 11 Production viewed on the practical side. Cp. Analysis p. 100. § 10 χρησῖν = practical application, as in 9 § 15.

πάντα δὲ κτλ] The theory has its limitations solely in the nature of the case generally; but in practice the nature of the particular locality where we live, and therefore the climate, the character of the soil, &c, determine whether we are chiefly confined to agriculture or to cattle-rearing, to mining or commerce by sea, whether there can be preserves of fish and fishing or not, which sorts of grain or of cattle must be procured, and so on (Schiitz). SUSEM. 99 11 Ποτ ἐλευθερόν](ἀναγκαλον], strictly limited, cp. Metaf. 1. 2 § 11 § 582 b 27: αὐτή (First Philosophy) μόνῃ ἐλευθέρᾳ τῶν ἑπιστημῶν, and § 14 § 983 a 10, ἀναγ- καιστεραί μὲν οὖν πάσαι αὐτῆς.
αλλα γὰρ ἐν ἀλλαις εὐθυνεῖ χώραις), εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας, (IV) καὶ ταύτης ἡδὴ ψυλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελη-
τουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν πλοτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἀφ’
§ 3 ὦσον ἔστι τυγχάνειν βοσθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρῆ-
21 ματιστικῆς ταύτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς
καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρια, ναυκληρία φορτηγία παράστασις: διαφέρει δὲ τοῦτον ἐτερα ἐτέρων τῷ
tὰ μὲν ἄσφαλέστερα εἰναι, τὰ δὲ πλεῖον πορίζειν τὴν ἐπὶ-
§ 4 καρπίαν, δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμὸς, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρία (ταυ-
τὴς δ’ ἢ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἄτεχνων
καὶ τῷ σῶματι μόνῳ χρησίμου): τρίτον δὲ εἰδος χρημα-
tιστικῆς μεταξὸς ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἐξει γὰρ καὶ τῆς
κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὡσα ἀπ’ ἑώς

26 τεχνῶν] τεχνῶν Vermehren, perhaps rightly || 27 τρίτον] τέταρτον Π¹ and
Π⁴ (corrector), ἀλλως τρίτον p¹ in the margin || 29 ὡσα] ὡσα Bernays

§ 2 17 εὐθυνεῖ =thrive, have abundant
offspring: see Verrall Trans. of Camb.
Phil. Soc. ii. p. 165.
18 ἡδὴ and here (when we come to this)
we find two kinds : agriculture proper and
fruit-growing. The technical terms per-
haps of Apollodoros, § 7.

The cultivation of the olive and in particu-
lar in vine would be included under ἡ πεφυτευμένη; see Steitz
Hesiod’s Works and Days (Leipzig 1871) p. 27 f.
Susem. (100)

§ 3 23 φορτηγία =inland trade. Su-
sem. This is the view of the comment-
tators generally, but Cope disputes it.
He remarks: “φορτηγίας and its deriv-
tives φορτηγείν, φορτηγικός, φορταγωγός,
φορταγωγεῖν, seem to be always applied
to commerce carried on by sea, whether
vaivos or πλοῖα be expressed or not (the
sense of ‘porter’ given in the lex, seems
not necessary in any of the passages, cp.
For this reason, and because
commerce by land at Athens and in
Greece generally was so utterly insigni-
ficant in comparison that it might well be
passed over without notice, I rather think
that Aris. means by ναυληρία building
and letting out ships for traffic, and by
φορτηγία commerce proper, the transport
of goods on board of them, perhaps in-
cluding also land transport. On this
view Xenophon’s distinction De Rep.
Laced. 7 ὡ μὲν γεωργεῖ, ὡ δὲ ναυληρεῖ, ὡ
dὲ ἐμπορεύεται, would correspond to Ar-

istotle’s here.”

παράστασις virtually = κατηλική, sta-
taria mercatura, hominum nimium in foro
consistentium.

24 ἄσφαλεστερα For definition of ἄσφαλεια in this connexion, see Khet. 1. 5,
καὶ ἐν τῷ εὔηθει καὶ οὖν κεκτηθηθαί οὐσὶν ἐφ’ ἄυτῷ εἰναι τῷ ἐρχεῖν αὐτῶν (Jackson).
επικαρπία = profit additional to the
principal (τὰ χρωμαί): see on § 11.

In any case the division is incomplete.
The occupations distinguished in § 6 as
τεχνικάτατα, which are not unskilled
manual labour nor service for wages, are
here omitted: see ἄν. (102, 103). More-
over in v(viii). 2, 5, where μισθαρικὴς
ἐργασία is said to be degrading and
βαναυσοῦ, the term has quite a different
meaning, see n. (981). Susem. (101)

§ 4 26 By ἄτεχνοι καὶ τῷ σῶματι
μῶνον χρησίμοι Cope understands the
ἡπεῖς in a general division of the popu-
lation; farm-labourers, porters, etc.

29 ὡσα κτλ is in loose apposition to
 eius χρησι, “all the wealth or property
derived from land and such of its useful
products as are employed by the
proprietor himself,” like the καρποῖν ἡ πεφυ-
tευμένη γεωργία. Even if Bernays’ ὡσα
is right, we cannot accept his punctuation
(a colon after 28 πρώτης, no parenthesis,
but a single sentence from ἔχει to 31
μεταλλευτικής) or his translation of ὡσα
ἀπὸ γῆς ‘directed to the land’. Susem.
30 ἀκάρπων] Compare Rhet. 1. 5. 7: κάρπιμα δὲ λέγω ἀφ᾽ ὅν αἱ πρόσοδοι (Jackson).

31 ὑλοτομία, the growing and cutting down of timber as distinct from the fruit-trees of ἡ περιφυντικὴ γεωργία.

§ 5 32 γένη, εἰδὴ interchanged: cp.

§ 8 3 ἐτερον εἴδος with § 3 ἐτερον γένος.

§ 6 36 ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης] “where chance has least play”: where nearly everything turns upon acquaintance with the facts, technical knowledge and skill; where the skilled craftsman’s hand is guided by intellectual training, which is the all-important element. Cp. Walter op. c. 505 f. Clearly Aristotle means what we call the fine arts and all the higher technical pursuits, including the sciences themselves and rhetoric, if followed or taught professionally for pay. In particular the art of the sophists, for which see n. (552) on III. 9. 8, also v(viii). 2. 5 with n. (981). SUSEM. (102).

Compare Polos, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνης ἐποίησεν, ἡ δ᾽ ἀπειρία τύχης, Melaph. 1. 1. 8, 981 a 4 (Jackson).

37 βαναυσοταται κτλ] This and many other passages—c. 13 § 13; III. 4 § 12, § 5 § 4; § 6; v(vii). 9 § 3; § 14 § 7; v(viii). 2 § 5; § 6, § 6 § 3—6, § 16, § 7; § 7; vii(vi). 4 §§ 11, 12 with notes; Plato Laws v. 741 E, 743 D f., cp. viii. 831 c f., 846 d f.; Xenophon. A. 4 § 2 f., cp. 6 § 6, § 10 § 10—show clearly how closely related were the conceptions of the servile (cp. n. 43) and the mechanical both to Aristotle and to the Greeks at large (see further Herod. ii. 167). ‘Servile’ occupations like that of the hired labourer, § 4, form according to this description the proper antithesis to those which are ‘artistic’ (n. 102); mechanical trades are intermediate, yet even the artisan, to say nothing of the labourer, is only a superior kind of slave. Aristotle has really before him the “sedentary” crafts, τέχναι ἐθνίται Eud. Eth. 1. 4. 2, 1150 a 30, which are not conducive to bodily health or a noble carriage; v(viii). 2. 4 n. (980). Similarly we read in Plato Rep. vi. 495 D that manual labour disfigures the body and mars the soul; Xen. l.c. says that it hurts men’s bodies by keeping them in a sitting posture (καθαρσίας Καθαρίζεται, or in other cases standing all day long over the furnace; and Pseudo-Plato Erat. 137 b that it makes them go about with stooping shoulders and backs bent κυντάρωται διόν (the references from Eaton). This is totally unlike the way in which Socrates thinks and judges: ‘he speaks as the son of a poor craftsman, Plato Xenophon and Aristotle like men of rank and property’, Zeller Phil. d. Gr. 11 i 142 (Eng. tr. Socrates and Socratics p. 170 n. i). Compare Xen. Mem. iii. iii. c. 10. With the definition of servile employments compare c. 2 § 2 n. (6b) and c. 5 § 7 ff. SUSEM. (103).

For λαβωνται see v(viii). 4. 1: the workmen themselves ‘spoil’ or ‘deprave’ their bodies; i.e. render them feeble and unfit to do service for the state in war.
39 διὸ τούτου ἐλάχιστον προσδεί ἄρετῆς. (IV) 1258 b 30—1259 a 15. 193
33 <περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εὑρηται 34 <καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς
§ 7 <τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατριβεῖν.> ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶν εὔνοιας 40 γεγραμένα περὶ τούτων, οἷον Ἀραχνηδίδι τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ
1259 a 1 Ἀπολλοδόρῳ τῷ Δημιουργεῖ" περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψιλῆς καὶ πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλως περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα μὲν
ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελέσαι ἐτί δὲ καὶ τὸ λεγόμενα 4 σποράδην, δι' ὅν ἐπιτευχήκασιν εὔνοις χρηματιζόμενοι,
§ 8 δὲι συλλέγειν. πάντα γὰρ ἀφέλεμα ταύτ' ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶσιν τινὶ χρηματιστικὴν, οἷον καὶ τὸ Ἀδῶν τοῦ Μιλήσιου·
to γὰρ ἐστὶ κατανόημα τι χρηματιστικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνον μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσαν, τυχάνει δὲ καθὸλου τι
§ 9 διὸ, οὐνεδίζοντον γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφέλοις τὸς φιλοσοφίας οὕτης, κατανοησαντα φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαίων
φοράν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς αὐτρολογίας, ἐτὶ χειμώνοις ὄντων εὐπορήσασθαι χρημάτων ὅλων ἀρραβώνας διαδόνειν τῶν
ἐλαιουργεῖων τῶν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὅλων μεθοισαμένου ἀπ' οὐδενός ἐπίβαλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καίρος
15 ἢκε, πολλῶν ἐξουσίων ἄμα καὶ ἔξαφνη, ἐκμισθοῦντα
40 χάριτι (χάριτι Μ') δὴ Π. Ar. Bk. Bernays
1259 a 6 οἷον.....18 σπονδαῖονιν seems to have been used by Hieronymos of Rhodes as quoted by Diog. Laert. I. 26 || 13 ἐλαιουργεῖων Π1 and Hieron. ἐλαιουργῳς Π Susem.1-2, ἐλαιουργων Π1, ἐλαιουργῶν Μ2 Q (? ) S2 Tb, ἐλαιουργῶν Π2.3. Ald. Bk. Bernays, ἐλαιουργῶν Π2
39 διὸ τού...ἀρετῆς] "where excellence" of any kind, and so, where bodily excellence "is least needed." No doubt lending money on interest is particularly meant, 10 § 4. Such business he includes under the servile occupations. Susem. (104)
§ 7 40 περὶ τούτων.] With the transposition this aptly refers to 34 τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, exact particulars in detail. 1259 a 1 Ἀπολλοδόρῳ τῷ Δημιουργεῖ]
Also mentioned by Varro R. R. 1. 1. 8, and several times in Pliny's Natural History. Susem. (108)
3 διὸ ἐπιμελέσαι = whoever is interested in the subject. We are referred to written works in Ret. 1. 4, 13, 1360 a 30.
§ 8 6 τὸ Θάλεω Νίκ. Eth. vii. 7. 5 1141 b 3 ff. On Thales see Zeller 1. 168 ff. [Eng. tr. Pre-Socratics i. p. 211 ff.]
I don’t know what you’re talking about, but I’ll try my best. The text seems to be a mix of Greek and Latin, possibly from a classic work. Here’s a transcription of what I can make out:

"... establishing a transcendent, polis-like essence, or ethically, as Plato..."

The text appears to be discussing the concept of a transcendent or polis-like essence, possibly in the context of Plato's philosophy. The text might be discussing the idea of a transcendent essence that is established through ethical means, as suggested by Plato's work. The use of Greek and Latin words suggests that the text is from a classical source, possibly a philosophical or political treatise.
39 ημικη * * και γάρ γνωικός ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνοι, ὡς ἑλευθερωθε(ν) 
4ο ποιον μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἁρχῆς, ἀλλὰ 
1259 b γνωικός μὲν πολιτικός τέκνοι δὲ βασιλικός· τὸ τε γάρ 
ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θηλεος ἥγεμονικότερον, εἰ μὴ ποιον συνε- 
στηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεω-
§ 2 τέραν καὶ ἀτέλειον. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαις ἁρχαις ταῖς 
5 πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἀρχον καὶ τὸ ἄρχομενον (ἐξ ἱσον 
γάρ ἐναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδέν), ὦμως 
δὲ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἁρχη γνατοὶ ἀρχηται, ζητεῖ διαφοράν εἰναι 
καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὦσπερ καὶ Ἀμασίς εἶπε

...
Amasis, calling them together, explained to what vile uses the object of their present adoration had once been put. Similarly he had risen from the common people to the throne, and as king he demanded their respect. Suesem, (110 b)

§ 3 9. (catâ méros i § 2. The husband holds, as it were, permanent office.

11 catâ φ.] by right of affection.

12 διερ ἐστι κτλ.—and this gives a form of monarchy, viz. hereditary monarchy, III. 14. 6. Bernays takes εἰδος as 'essential nature,' but compare N. C. Eth. VIII. 10. 4, ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς νεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα.

16 τῷ γένει ἦν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν] So too in Pilgrim's words, ἐν ἁγίων ἐν θεῶν γένοις, ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνεύμων ματρὸς ἀμφότερος Nem. 6. 1, men are of one race with the gods, earth being the common mother of both. The same is implied by Hesiod's verse ὁ δὲ θεῖος θεός θεοί θυσίοι τὰς θρόωποι Works and Days 108 (J. G. Schneider). See Steitz opr. c. 50 f.

Susem. (110 b)

c. 13 Various degrees of excellence requisite in the different members of the household; §§ 1—11. The promotion of this excellence in slaves, §§ 12—14; in women and children, §§ 15, 16.


§ 18 τοῖνυν traducendo ad novam cogitationem inserri' Bonitz Ind. Ar. quoting Physics 1. 2 §§ 7, 8 185 b 3, 9. Perhaps it only resumes a thought previously expressed, 'then,' 'accordingly:' see n. (107 b). Bernays gives 'It is clear beforehand then.' Suesem.

20 Here πλοῖος ἀρετῆς, but in 8 § 15 it is πλῆθος ὅριαν. The same is implied by Hesiod's verse ὁ δὲ θεῖος θεός θεοί θυσίοι τὰς θρόωποι Works and Days 108 (J. G. Schneider). See Steitz opr. c. 50 f.

Susem. (111)

§ 2 25 τῶν ἄλλων ἑξευν. Sc. τὸν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν' Rhel. 1. 6. 9 with Cope's n.
tautón esti to ἔποιημενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, (V)

30 πότερα καὶ τοιτῶν εἰσὶν ἀρεταῖ, καὶ δεὶ τήν γυναῖκα σώφρονα εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιαν, καὶ παῖς ἕστι καὶ ἄκο-
§ 4 λαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὐ; [καὶ] καθόλου δὴ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἐπισκε-
pτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἀρχοντος, πότερον ἢ αὐτῇ ἀρετῆ ἢ ἐτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεὶ ἀμφιτέρως μετέχειν καλο-
35 καγαθίας, δια τί τοῦ μὲν ἄρχειν δέοι ἢ ἄρχομεν καθιστάξ; (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μάλλῳ καὶ ἱπτων οἶον τε διαφέ-

reiv to mēν γὰρ ἀρχέσαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἰδει διαφέρει, τὸ
§ 5 δὲ μάλλῳ καὶ ἱπτων οὐδέν). εἰ δὲ τοῦ μὲν δεὶ τὸν δὲ μη, 5
θαυμαστών. εἰτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δι-
40 καιος, πῶς ἄρξη καλῶσ; εἰθ' ὁ ἄρχομενος, πῶς ἀρχή-

σεται καλῶς; αἰκολαστος γὰρ ὃν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδέν ποιῆσεν
τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερον τοιν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν
ἀμφίτεροις ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφοράς, ωσπερ καὶ τῶν
§ 6 φύσει ἀρχοντου καὶ ἀρχομένου. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ύφηγεῖται πε-
5 ρι τήν ψυχήν. εἰ ταύτη γὰρ ἔστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἁρχον τὸ δ' ἁρχομενον, ὃν ἐτέραν φαιμὲν εἶναι ἀρετῆ, οἰον τοῦ λόγου
(p. 21)

30 σώφρων after 31 εἶναι Π'Bk. || 31 καὶ before ἀκόλαστος omitted by Π'I || 32 καὶ before καθόλου omitted by Γ'M' || 37 διαφέρει τῷ Αρ.

1260 a 4 ἄρχοντων καὶ omitted by Π' Αρ. Bk. || ύφηγεῖται Π' Βk. and p' in the
margin, ύφηγεῖται <τα> Schütz; yet ύφηγεῖται can also be used passively || 6 μὲν
einai φαιμὲν Μ' Π', μὲν φαιμὲν εἶναι Π' (corrector)

§ 3 31 παῖς...σώφρων] Compare Nic. Eth. III. 12, § 1119 a 33: we apply the
term ἀκολοθία to the faults of children so far as they bear a certain resemblance
to the vice of intemperance (ἀκολοθία). SUSEM. (111 b)

§ 4 37 εἰδεi διαφέρει] see on 1 § 2.
§ 5 1260 a 3 ὡσπερ καὶ...ἀρχομένων] sc. διαφοράν εἰδι, as explained § 8 2 ff.
§ 6 4 ύφηγεῖται] "this is indicated (or, given in outline) in the case of the
soul." The participle ύφηγημένος (1 § 3) seems evidence that the verb is used pas-
sively (Bonitz Ind. Ar.); but Schütz' suggestion <τα> gives the middle a fair
sense: "to this result the relations which exist in the soul at once lead us." SUSEM.

6 ὃν ἐτέραν...7 ἱλόγον] "and we say that a different kind of excellence belongs
to the one and to the other of these, I mean to the rational and irrational
parts of the soul." Namely intellectual or
dianoetic virtue (ἀρετή διανοητική) to the
rational soul: moral virtue (ἡθική ἀρετή, excellence of character) courage, temper-
ance, etc. to the irrational appetitive
soul; Zeller Π' Η 624—658. The
dianoetic virtues are discussed in B. vi of the
Nic. Eth. and the latest detailed investi-
gation of this subject, Walter op. c. 283—
537; gives the following results.

Each of the three kinds of reason,
theoretic, creative, and practical in the
narrower sense (see n. 40), has its parti-
cular dianoetic virtue, or it may be, vi-
tues. Practical wisdom or insight (φρο-
νησις), if not the only virtue, is at all
events the most indispensable and im-
portant virtue of the practical soul (Walter p. 356 ff.; see on 5 § 9 n. (48);
III. 4 §§ 7, 8 nn. (474—5), §§ 16, 17 nn.
To theoretic reason belongs (i) νοέω in
the narrower sense, intelligence, com-
prehending in itself the two extremes
of all inademonstrable knowledge, which
must be assumed for every syllogism and
for scientific demonstration; at the lower end of the scale the immediate judgment of perception, and at the other end, by means of induction, the principles and axioms on which all demonstration, definition, and division rest: (ii) ἐπιστήμη, demonstrated science with the exception of metaphysics; and (iii) σοφία, wisdom, the highest or metaphysical knowledge which consists of elements of both kinds, demonstrated truths and truths immediately known. It is of slight importance whether Zeller and Walter are right, that Aristotle regarded all three as diastatic 'virtues', or whether, as Döring tries to prove against Walter in Kunstlehr des Arist. (Aristotle's Theory of Art) p. 63 f., only the third, σοφία, was really so considered by him. In the creative reason, lastly, τέχνη, artistic skill, is not itself a diastatic excellence, though it can lead to one, Nic. Eth. vi. 5. 7. 11.40 b 21 f.1

For the 'excellences of character' cp. 5 § 6 n. (40): in regard to temperament in particular II. 6 § 9 n. (206 B), 5 § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12, i11. 4 § 16 n. (491), IV (vii). 1 § 4 n. (693). SUSEM. (112) 7 τοιῶν] See on § 1. 'But' or 'now it is clear' (Bonitz).

§ 7 8 ff. 'Since then there are by nature various sorts of things subjected to rule (the rule of a free man over a slave being different from that of a husband over a wife, and again from that of an adult over a child), and all have the elements of the soul present in them, only in different degrees (the slave in general being destitute of the deliberative faculty, which in the woman has not sufficient authority and in the boy is as yet undeveloped);

1 Whether this is really Aristotle's theory or not, Döring does not venture to decide. I see no ground for doubt. But perhaps Aristotle wished to restrict this artistic excellence to the higher group of arts, the imitative arts, see n. (34). If this be so Walter's conception of them, p. 512, is unaffected by Döring's objection, p. 65 n. In Nic. Eth. i. 3. 20 σώσεις, apprehension,—see Pol. III. 4 §§ 16, 17 n. (457, 8), vii (iv). 4. 14 n. (1169)—is adduced as a diastatic virtue along with σοφία and φύσις. It would take too long to explain how this is to be understood.

for this reason the ruler requires the intellectual virtue in perfection (for the work belongs simply to the master-workman, and here this is reason), while each of the others needs only his fitting share thereof. And so, too, must it be with the moral virtues: we must suppose all to need a share of them, though not equally, but only in so far as each requires for his work.'

Bermays defending the order of the mss. translates from 14 ὁμολογεῖ as follows: "A similar gradation must likewise be assumed for the moral virtues: all must possess them, though not equally, but only in such measure as is necessary for their respective duties. The ruler must have moral virtue in its perfection;—for every work depends in all its parts on the supreme master, and reason i.e. that which makes the ruler a ruler 'is supreme master'; if then the work is to be successful, the ruler must satisfy the demands of reason on all sides, and must therefore possess complete moral virtue. "Those again who obey need severally so much virtue as is proportional to their share of the total work." This however does not meet Thurot's objections, Études 16 ff. 'The transposition is indispensable. From the proposition 'reason is the master-workman' it first follows that the ruler must possess the highest intellectual virtue, and only secondarily that he must have the highest moral virtue. Aristotle has been speaking (a 2—7) of a virtue of the rational, and of a virtue of the irrational, part of the soul, and he admits (a 10—14) that both these parts are possessed by slaves, women, and children. Before going on to inquire how they all share in the moral virtue of the irrational part he must have noticed the manner in which they share in the intellectual virtue of the rational part. Indeed the words which Bermays inserts 'the demands of reason on all sides' imply the diastatic virtue." Cp. Hermes xix. pp. 588—592, Quaest. Crit. vi. p. 9 f. SUSEM. 9 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον. See 12 § 1, ὠ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχής. SUSEM. (113)
éunuptarx ei mev tâ mórria tîs phvêtis, all' éunuptarx ei dia- (V) pherôntron (o mên vàp doûlos ìlwos oîc èxei to boulentukon, tv ðê thliced èxei mév, all' àkrivon, o ðê paîs èxei mév, § 8 all' àptelexê)1 ómowos toînun anagkaiôv èxein kai peri tás 7

15 òthikas àretás: ÿpolîptéton deîn mév méteîxein pûtântas, all'
16 ou tûn aûtvn trôpton, all' òsson èkástot prôs tû aûtv érgonô 
diô tûn mév àrkhontâ telêan èxein deî tv n <ðianto>òthikà
àrethn (tv gàr érgon èstîn ãplîs toû àrkhîtêkontos, o ðê
19 lògous àrkhîtekontâ), tûn ð' àlllon èkáston, òsson èpìbâllle
14 aûtovs. <òmowos toînun anagkaiôv èxein kai peri tás
15 òthikas àretás: ÿpolîptéton deîn mév méteîxein pûtântas, all'
16 <ou tûn aûtvn trôpton, all' òsson èkástot prôs tû aûtv érgon.>
§ 9 ówste fâneron òti èstîn <èkáston idia > òthikè àrhet thn eirh-8
21 ménev apánton, kai ouc ò aûtù sôophroûnì ymânikos kai àndrós,
ou'd anvôria kai dikaiosûnì, kathîper fêto òwkrâptas, all'

Q Sb Tb Ald. Bk. || 22 ò òwkrâptas P4, which Wilson (perhaps rightly) approves

12 ð mêv gàp...boulentukon] Just the same thing is said in other words 5 § 9 n. (45). See also n. (115). SUSEM. (114)
13 òxei mêv, all' àkrivon] Cp. n. (117). This can establish a difference of degree only, not a difference of kind, between the virtue of a man and of a woman. See III. 4. 17 n. (495). SUSEM. (114 b)
§ 8 17 tv n <ðianto>òthikà àrethn]
It is self-evident that only the 'dianoetic' virtue of practical life, phronèsis or practical wisdom, is here treated: see nn. (45) (112); IV(viii). 1. 4 (693). Where it is a question of executing another's command, as it is always and unconditionally with the slave, there this virtue belongs only to him who gives the command, he who obeys merely 'right opinion' about it. All the difference now is, whether he can attain this right apprehension more or less easily, thoroughly or carelessly: III. 4. 18 n. (498). Compare also nn. on III. 4. 8 § 16 (493), § 17 (497), §§ 7, 8 (474-6). But so far as a natural slave, who is denied every capacity for deliberation, can be said to have ever so small a share of approximate intellectual virtue in the department of practice, such virtue consists merely in the fact that one slave understands his master's commands and knows how to execute them better, more quickly, and more aptly than another. SUSEM. (115)
19 èkáston] sc. òxeiv deî tv n ð. áp. èpìbâllle 'so far as is incumbent on them.' Impersonal; cp. De long. vitae 1. § 4, 464 b 33, lêkton òsson èpìbâllle tv òphikî filosofia: Herod. II. 180 tòûs ðèlfoûs òô èpìbâllle parâschevèn.
16 òsson èkástot] sc. èpìbâllè.
§ 9 20 <èkáston idia > ò âretî ktl] "that the moral virtue of each of the above classes is peculiar to itself." Bernays translates as if he had before him the words inserted.
22 òwkrâptas] The historical Socrates unquestionably did so, Xen. Synp. 2. 9; cp. Zeller op. c. II i 221 [Eng. tr. Socrates and Socrates p. 145 n. 1]. But here no doubt Aristotle has in view the Platonic Socrates; amongst other passages in Meno 71 D.f., to which he alludes
more distinctly § 10 n. (118). Like Socrates in Xenophon l. c., Plato (Rep. v. 452 e f.) holds that, apart from begetting and bearing children, the difference between the sexes is a difference of degree: upon this is based his demand that women should share in the education of men, in war and public business, also (although this is expressly stated only in the Laws) in the public messeis: see II. 5 § 1 n. (153), 6 § 5 n. (106), 7 § 1 n. (231 b). Further, community of wives in the two upper classes of his ideal-state (II. 1 § 3 ff., 7 § 1) is clearly connected with this; compare n. (142) on II. 2 § 9, Zeller op. c. II I 775 [Eng. tr. Plato p. 481], Susemihl Plat. Phil. II. 168-170. Aristotle on the contrary records the results of careful scientific observations on the difference in temperament between the two sexes in Hist. Anim. ix. 1 § 5, §§ 7, 8 608 a 21 ff.: to ἥδε θεία μαλακότερα καὶ κακονυγότερα καὶ ἤγετον ἀπλά καὶ προπέτεστα καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν τέκνων τροφὴν φροντιστικότερα... ἔστι δὲ καὶ δισθύμων μάλλον τὸ ἄθλητον ἄρρενον καὶ δυσελπικόν καὶ ἀναίδεστον καὶ πυευδεστον, εὐπαττήστερον δὲ καὶ μηκοκοικώμον, ἐστὶ δὲ ἀγρυντύστερον κτλ. Cr. De gener. anim. iv. 6. 10 f., 775 a 12, and Zeller 111 ii 688 with n. (3). SUSEM. (116).

23 ἦ μὲν ἄρχική κτλ] Cr. III. 4 § 3 n. (470), § 16 n. (491), § 17 n. (495): also I. 5 § 7 n. (42 b), 12 §§ 1, 2 nn. See on the other side n. (120) on I. 13 § 11. SUSEM. (117).

§ 10 24 κατὰ μέρος] 'in detail'.

25 The same protest in Nic. Eth. II. 7 § 1, cp. II §§ 3, 4.


27 οἱ ἐξ ἀριστερὰς φέρειν] As Gorgias does in Plato's Mono 71 b f., where the Platonic Socrates attacks the doctrine. Aristotle is here defending Gorgias against that polemic and expresses his agreement with him in the main. Schlosser well observes that the defence certainly misses the mark, as Plato in the Mono insists with perfect right that the generic notion of virtue ought first to be defined, and in the Ethics Aristotle starts from that. On Gorgias see n. (448) to III. 2. 2. SUSEM. (118).

§ 11 28 ὁ ποιητὴς] Sophocles Ajax 293. See further n. (117). SUSEM. (119) 31 ἐπει δὲ κτλ] 'Since the child has not yet fully developed, his excellence is not to be referred simply and solely to himself, but to perfect development and the standard of his educator.'

The slave's moral excellence is restricted to that which fits him to be well employed by his master, the child's to that which fits him to be well trained by his father. In the child only the germ of human virtue is present (Nic. Eth. 1. 9. 10, III. 12. 5 ff.); on this see IV(vii). 13. 5 n. (875); but in the adult slave, so far as he possesses the indispensable minimum of such a virtue at all, it is at least actually developed. Children and slaves have only to obey; the wife must indeed obey her husband, but then she has along with him to command the remaining members of the family. This implies that her virtue is not merely ἐπισκηπτική, as Aristotle inexacty puts it § 9. Further with §§ 8-11 compare Poetics 15 § 3 and note (191 b) in Susemihl's edition. SUSEM. (120).
§ 12 (ad se ipsum William) [33 το τέλος] τον τελεων Π4-6. WbL Ar. Ald. Bk. 36 ελλειψει P3 (but ελλειψη corr.) Göttl. Bk. 3 Susem. 1-2.3 perhaps rightly \[\text{[ἀπορρήσει...b 2 τεχνηών] Schmidt} \] 37 ἄρα Π2 (yet Q perhaps has ἄρα) 39 ἦ ναυ. ἀναγκαίων <δ> διαφέρει νε Schmidt. 40 τοὐσ Π1 (emended apparently by P1) 40 Whether Ar. read αὐτῷ in his ms. after τοσοῦτον as I once assumed from his translation, is more than doubtful: τοσοῦτον <αὐτῷ> ? Schneider \[\text{[ἐπί-βάλλει]}\] επιβάλλει τα Schmidt \[\text{[41 <δουλείας> or <ὑπηρεσίας> before ἀρέτης?] Susem. (see Comm.)}; yet in 38 ἀρέτης alone expresses this \[\text{[ἐπι]}\] περ omitted by ΓΜ, hence [περ] Susem.1

§ 12 35 ἀρέτης...36 ἐργαν [But how on Aristotle's own psychology and theory of virtue is even this minimum of moral virtue, which is the condition of his serviceableness, possible in the slave, if he shows no trace of deliberation or purpose of his own? See Nic. Eth. III. cc. 2, 3, Walter ὑ. c. p. 169 ff., 212 ff., Zeller ὑ. c. η. 530 n. (3). Yet all goodness or badness of character and conduct is derived from the quality of the πράσεως, i.e. from the bent of the will in intention and purpose: Pol. 6 §§ 5, 6, 17, 15 ι. n. (884) on Pol. iv (vii). 13 § 9. Plato speaks far more humanely on this subject Laws vi. 776 b, where he admits that ere now many a one has found in his slaves men on all points of more approved virtue than his brothers or sons. But in this he contradicts the fundamental assumptions which he makes in common with Aristotle; cp. Zeller η. 575 f. [Eng. tr. Plato p. 459]. Aristotle himself grants that every slave may have a noble character, Pol. 15 § 3, καὶ γὰρ γυνῆ ἐστὶν χρυσῆ καὶ δοῦλος, καθιστό γε ἵνα τοὺς τὸ μὲν χέριν τὸ δὲ ὅλον φαύλον ἐστὶν. If he is more consistent elsewhere, his consistency only involves the whole theory in self-contradiction in another way, and discloses all the more its untenableness on internal grounds: see 5 § 8 n. (43).

§ 9 n. (45): also p. 211. Susem. (121) 39 ἦ introduces Aristotle's own view: "or shall we rather say..." more freely; "surely here is a very great difference." § 13 40 κοινωνός [Ἰων] whereas the citizens are κοινωνοί βίου; Nic. Eth. v. 6. 4, τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶν κοινωνὸν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτόκρατος: the slave is excluded from βίος, ἤδ. Χ. 6. 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἄνδρα ποιῶν μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον. ὦ δὲ πορρῶτερον 'further removed', 'less dependent' on his master. τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρέτης] sc. αὐτῷ: just so much of virtue as of slavery falls to his share. The verb intransitive but personal, Comp. III. 6. 3, καθ' ὄνομα ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ εἰρ. καλὸς: IV (vii). 1. 10, ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὀσοῦτερ ἀρέτης: Herod. iv. 115, vii. 23, Dem. De Cor. § 254, p. 312, 2. "This special virtue, i.e. excellence of function, of the free workman differs from the true virtue of man in being something inferior and approximating to that of the slave: see n. (103) on ι. § 6 with the references, esp. III. 4. 12 n. (486)." Susem. (122) Mr T. L. Heath objects to this, that if τοσοῦτον is the subject of ἐπιβάλλει, the change of subject from δ' δὲ is surely very harsh. "Indeed, without αὐτῷ, is it not inconceivably harsh? I think the sentence would go much better, if we could
make δ δε the subject of ἐπιβάλλει. I should translate ‘the artizan is further removed and entrenches on virtue only to the same degree as he entrenches on slavery.’ Cf. for the supposed use of ἐπιβάλλει De cædo 1. 5 § 10, 272 a 25 ὡσ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ [γραμμῇ] ἐπιβάλλει τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, καὶ η ἑτέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ τοσοῦτον, where ἐπιβάλλει contrasts with ἀπολινίσθαι. There is any reason why ἐπιβάλλει should not = ἐπαλλάττει? In point of fact this is perhaps the right construction. That we require αὐτῷ with the other, was pointed out by M. Schmidt and by me in my first edition (1872). At the same time is not ἀρετή by itself also strange? (See Critical Notes). If something like σωλήν or τῆς τοιαύτης has been lost, αὐτῷ may well have been lost with it. We certainly should expect ‘he shares in servile virtue in so far as his condition approximates to a slave’s.’ Susem. (123)

1260 b 4 ἀφαιρ. τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν = is under a definite, limited form of slavery. Comp. Rhet. 1. 1 § 1, 1354 a 3, with Cope’s note: also ἐρωμένας above 4 § 1, n. (34). Some interpret wrongly, ‘detached from the master.’ That the slaves should be ranked as a natural class and the artizans (who had largely sprung from them, 111. 5. 3) as an artificial class, is significant of the Greek contempt for labour. See n. (93).

§ 14 4 Τὴν διδασκ. ἡχοντα] “the person who instructs him in routine duties.” This is the possessor of, or proficient in, the δουλική ἐπιστήμη which is more fully described above 7 § 2, where it is distinguished from δεσποτική. The discussion on the ‘virtue’ of the slave results in a more precise determination of δεσποτική and its elevation by an exten-
10 ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοῦς ὀμιλίας, (V) τῇ τὸ καλὸς καὶ μὴ καλὸς ἔστι, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν τὸ ἐκ κακός φεύγει, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα 12 ὑποδιέκεισθαι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετῆς, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέπουσα παιδευέναι καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναίκας, εἰπέρ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους.

12 Nickes omits τάς, following Ar. || 13 διελθεῖν Schmidt || 17 καὶ is omitted by III, [kai] Susem. || 20 οἰκονόμοι Π, οἱ κουωνοὶ II Bk., qui gubernant (οἰκονόμοι?) Ar. || έπεὶ...21 λεκτέων and 22 [λέγουσα καὶ] Schmidt || 24 πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης II Bk.

11 τῇ τοῦ καλῶς ἡμεῖς (Congreve). πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ <ὑμῖν> διώκειν, how the right intercourse ought to be followed: cp. τὸ δὲ κακός <ἀρχεταί καὶ ἀρχεῖα> αὐτομφόρος ἐστὶν ἄμφος, 6 § 10. 12 ἐν τοῖς...πολιτείαις This discussion means the scheme of the best state more especially, as is shown by the reason subjoined. But so far as that has come down to us in B. IV(vii) and V(viii), this point was never reached, nor the question of the proper training and education of the women. Comp. Introd. p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. Susem. (126)

15, ἀναγκαῖον) Probably because the family will then be treated as a part of the state, and will be better understood in relation to the whole. Comp. n. (33).

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κτλ] Cp. V(viii). 1, i, VIII(v). 9, 11 ff., and Nic. Eth. v. 2, 11, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἄλλη ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομῶν ὑπὸ νοεμοβλέπεται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν κτλ, with Jackson's notes. The all important term πολιτεία will be fully explained in B. III (1 § 1, c. 3, 6 § 1 &c). It will be found to be a much wider term than 'constitution' or 'form of government' (τάξις τῶν ἀρχῶν), as indeed the English word 'polity' is still. See vi(iv). 11. 3, βίοι τίς ἐστὶ πόλεως, and n. (486) on III. 3. 9.

16 διαφέρει πρὸς=is an important means towards the excellence of the city: literally "makes a difference with regard to..." So iv(vii). 14, 7, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις.

§ 16 18 αἱ μὲν...πολιτείων] Cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6 n. (285), Plato Lat. vii 781 B, οὗ γὰρ ἤμαν μόνον ἐστὶν, ὅδιείν ἰσν, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναίκας. Susem. (127)

20 οἰκονόμοι, administrators, τῆς πολιτείας suits Aristotle's views elsewhere at least as well as οἱ κουωνοὶ; see III. 4 §§ 14, 15; IV(vii). 14 §§ 4—6.

21 διαφέρει κτλ] "let us dismiss the present discussion as complete, and carry on our subject from a fresh starting-point. And first let us review those theorists who have put forward a scheme for the best form of polity." With τῶν μὲν λόγων cp. τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους, III. 6. 3.
EXCURSUS I.

EPII'INISDES I. 2 § 5.

The most detailed account we have of Epimenides is in Diog. Laert. i. 109—115 (cp. Suidas s. v.), whilst of modern writers Heinrich Epimenides of Crete (Leipzig 1801. 8), Höck Kreta III. 246 ff., and C. Schultess De Epi-

meneide Crete (Bonn 1877. 8) give the fullest particulars. He was probably of Phaistos in Crete, but lived principally at Knosos and was held in unbounded esteem as an expiatory priest, a prophet, and a worker of magical cures. At the same time, it would appear, he was shrewd in practical statesmanship, so that some reckoned him among the seven wise men. His whole history is mythical. He is said to have reached the age of 154 or 157, or in the Cretans' version of the story, of 299 years, and further to have passed 57 years of his early life asleep in a cave. The story of his having effected the purification of Athens about 596 B.C. has been shown to be unhistorical by Niese Contributions to the history of Solon and of his time pp. 12—14 (in Historische Untersuchungen Arnold Schäfer gewidmet, Bonn 1882). Whether he owes his place among the seven sages solely to this work attributed to him as Solon's coadjutor, which is Niese's opinion, is not so certain. For to all appearance it is on better authority, at the least, that he is said to have played an important part in Sparta about 580 B.C., where he seems to have pronounced the oracles whereby the transference of the election of ephors from the kings to the popular assembly1 received the requisite religious sanction2. In connexion with this he introduced there the worship of the Cretan moon-goddess Pasiphaë and her oracular dreams: in their ancient official building the ephors had a memorial to him (Paus. III. 11. 11) and even preserved the hide, or animal's skin inscribed with oracles which he was alleged to have written. See Urichs On the Rhetra of Lycurgus in the Rhein. Mus. vi. 1848. 217—230, Duncker History of Antiquity vi. p. 352 ff. ed. 5 (1882), Schäfer De ephorí̂s Lacedaemonií̂s pp. 14—21 (Leipzig and Greifswald, 1863. 4); also Gilbert Studien (Studies in the history of ancient Sparta) p. 185, Frick De ephorí̂s Spartanis p. 31 f. (Göttingen 1872. 8). There is a curious story which makes him come to Athens only ten years before the Persian wars, and there prophesies these wars, Plato Laws i 642 D. The works attributed to him in Diog. Laert. i. 111—two epics, Κοινητάν καὶ Κοιννήτανον

1 If indeed, considering the strange method by which the ephors were selected (see n. on 11. 11. 23), they can be said to have been elected by the popular assembly at all.

2 Trierber (Forschungen Berlin 1871. 8) Researches into the history of the Spartan constitution, p. 130 ff., has indeed endeavoured to prove that the new position of the ephors did not begin until a consider-

ably later period. Of course the ephors did not attain their new position at a single blow, as it were, by the mere fact that their election was taken out of the hands of the kings. On the contrary it must evidently have taken long and arduous struggles to change the dispro-
portionate superiority of the kingly power into corresponding inferiority.
EXCURSUS II.

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gένεσις καὶ Θεογονία, and Ἀργοὺς ναυτηγία τε καὶ ἱάσων έις Κόλχους ἀπόπλους, with prose works περὶ θυσιῶν and περὶ τῆς ἐν Κρήτῃ πολιτείας—never had any existence: they are a mere invention of the romancer Lobon of Argos in his work περὶ ποιητῶν, as Hiller has shown in the Rhein. Mus. XXXIII. 1878. 525 ff. Other works really appeared under the name of Epimenides, of which some were forgeries attributed to him, others the writings of a later Epimenides. The Fathers mention a work Ou Oracles, περὶ χρησμῶν, which can episcopally be a prose writing by him, but rather a collection of his oracles; if it is here that the hexameter Κρήτης δεῖ ψεύσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστρίπες ἄργαί occurs, which the writer of the Epistle to Titus, 1. 13, attributes to one of the Cretan prophets, ἦδος αὐτῶν προφήτης, without mentioning his name. Theodoret indeed ascribes the verse to Callimachus, but in his hymn to Zeus (1. 8) only the first words are found: hence Epiphanius (c. haer. 1. 14) and Hieronymus (T. VII A. p. 707 Vall.) remark that Callimachus on the contrary first took them from Epimenides: cp. Lübeck Hieronymus p. 12 f. However that may be, the word quoted by Aristotle most probably occurred in a hexameter, very likely in a collection of oracles which Aristotle had before him, of which Epimenides was the reputed author. Moreover, in Rhet. III. 17. 10, 1418 a 23 f., Aristotle says that Epimenides did not divine the future, but only interpreted the obscurities of the past, περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἐμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν, ἄδήλων δὲ; and this could hardly be affirmed except upon the evidence of such a collection. What connexion there was between this published collection of his oracles and the one which was jealously guarded at Sparta, it is impossible to say. SUSEM. (17)

EXCURSUS II.

ON I. 6 §§ 1—8, 1255 a 5—b 3.

The recent contributions of Jackson Postgate and Ridgeway to the explanation of this passage, referred to in n. (51) on 6 § 1, have not superseded the more successful results attained by Hampke in the Philologus XXIV. 1866. 172 ff. Jackson however has the credit of clearing up the sense of εὖνοα, and Ridgeway by restoring the right punctuation has helped to correct Hampke's interpretation and to remove apparent difficulties. He saw that in § 4 the words 17 διὰ γάρ... 19 ἄρχει form a parenthesis, and hence that the ἐπεί following refers not to this parenthesis but to the sentence which precedes it.

Aristotle admits that not every form of actual slavery is natural; a distinction must be drawn between a slave who is so by nature and a slave according to convention and law. The two may, but need not necessarily, coincide. There are natural bondsmen who are not as a matter of fact enslaved, and people who are not nature's slaves are actually in servitude: the former though not in slave's estate deserve to be so; while the latter, although held in bondage, are undeserving of it. The (unwritten) law in question consists in the universal agreement that prisoners captured
in war are the slaves of their conquerors (ἐν ὃ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατοῦμεν τῶν κρατοῦτων εἶναι φασίν). This brings Aristotle to the two extreme and opposite views between which his own holds the mean, the views of the unconditional opponents (A) and of the unconditional defenders (B) of each and every form of slavery. He first speaks of the former, remarking that they impeach the legality of the convention or positive law in question, inasmuch as the better man may become the slave of the stronger or more powerful, whereas in a rational state of society virtue is the sole title to rule. This then is their view (11 οὕτως): the others (B), on the contrary, take the former view, ἐκεῖνος, that namely prescribed by the foregoing positive law. The two views stand sharply opposed (19 διόσταται χωρίς) and in conflict (ἀμφισβήτησις), yet they have a common point of contact (ἐπαλλάττουσι), both facts being due to one and the same cause. Aristotle might have prevented all misapprehension of these words if he had written ποιεῖ δὲ in line 13. This common cause of both facts is, namely, that virtue (ἀρετή) is that which primarily gives force and might, and that without some sort of excellence the exercise of force is impossible (ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴν τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιωζοῦσαι δίναται μᾶλλον, καὶ έστιν αὐτὸ τὸ κρατών ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθῷ τινός); only, of course, virtue still requires the indispensable condition of favourable external circumstances (χορηγία). This then is the common point in the two contending views, the point where Aristotle agrees with both, that in the first place only virtue deserves to rule, and in the second place the requisite force to rule essentially depends upon virtue (ὡστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βιαν). But from this common point the conflict between the two theories breaks out on the question, wherein right and justice consists (ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν). Just for this reason (διὰ τούτο) the opponents of all slavery make the essence of right to consist in the mutual good-will of rulers and ruled: i.e. in the fact that the ruler, on his part, does not govern in his own selfish interests, but for the welfare of his subjects; and in the willing obedience, on their part, of the ruled. In other words they transfer to the relations between master and servant the principle which Aristotle himself recognizes as the true one in the state, where he uses it to distinguish “normal polities” from “degenerate forms” (παρεκβάσεις). In this Aristotle discovers their mistake: they assume that the truly virtuous man cannot desire to exercise any other kind of lordship,—that it would be a misuse of his force, were he to do so: that he would thereby cease to be a truly virtuous man. So conversely, from the pro-

1 [Dr Jackson having kindly read this excursus as it was passing through the press remarks upon this last sentence, that in his opinion this is precisely what these people do not appreciate and what Aristotle wishes to impress upon them, viz. that virtue is the sole title to rule. He objects (1) that the words ὃτι τρόπον τινὰ...ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθῷ τινός are not to be taken as implying that the two parties have formulated their views in this way, but as Aristotle’s explanation of their common statement μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βιαν. Further (2) he regards the two propositions contained in ὃτι τρόπον τινὰ...ἀγαθῷ τινός as the cause but not the matter of the partial agreement between (A) and (B); and he demurs (3) to the statement that the two views simultaneously διόσταται and ἑπαλλάττουσι, (4) to the sense given to ἀπερσέων λύγας, and (5) to the vagueness in which the whole passage is left, especially in the part about τὸ δικαίον.]
position ‘virtue gives force’ the defenders of all slavery argue that ‘might is right’—forgetting that it is not virtue alone that gives force, but that it must have favourable external circumstances; when this is not the case the better man may easily succumb to the inferior. Aristotle might well assume this to be actually the reasoning employed by (B), for no other is logically conceivable. In regard to (A), the philosopher is not so certain whether they do thus far agree with (B) and with himself; whether they all really assume that, as a rule, virtue leads to victory. As therefore the sole right of virtue to rule became doubtful, he feels obliged to give an explicit justification of his course in attributing to them the argument above. This is because, if the point of contact between the two views is lost, and both stand opposed without any community, the views of (A), ἀτεροί λόγοι, contain nothing tenable or convincing, since they would yield this result that those who stand higher in mental and moral capacity do not deserve to be rulers and masters (ἐπεὶ διαστάτων γε χωρίς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὔτε ἱσχύον ἀδιάδειν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἀτεροί λόγοι, ὅσον δὲίν τὸ βέλτιον κατ᾽ ὠρειν ἀρχεῖν καὶ διεστίζειν). Postgate correctly remarks that it would have been clearer if Aristotle had written ἀτεροὶ λόγοι for ἀτεροὶ λόγοι.

Aristotle next passes to the view of a third party (C), agreeing in the practical result with that of (B), though not in the reason assigned, as its defenders simply (ὁλως to be taken with ἄντεχόμενοι) adhere to the principle “what is legal is right”; while even this result is restricted, because the principle is not allowed to apply to the case of non-Hellenes conquering Hellenes, but only to that of Hellenes conquering non-Hellenes or to the relations of the non-Hellenes to one another. The view of (C) is thus essentially nothing else than the popular opinion current in Greece, involved in this inner contradiction; and Aristotle shows that, in the main, his own coincides with it, since it maintains what is true in the popular opinion at the same time that it gets rid of its inconsistencies. For on Aristotle’s theory also Greeks are, in the main, the natural rulers, barbarians the natural slaves, though this is a rule which certainly admits of many exceptions (see Introd. p. 25). Susemihl.

[Some salient features of Dr Jackson’s interpretation may here be appended in his own words. He distinguishes three theories in 1255 a 7—26: viz. i. that of (A) who argues that all slavery is unjust and unnatural, because violence is wrong; ii. that of (B) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because might is right; iii. that of (C) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because what is legal is just1: while Aristotle declares that in practice some slavery is just, some slavery unjust. “In 1255 a 12—21” he continues “Aristotle seeks to show that the positions of (A) and (B) are open to attack precisely in so far as they differ from his own.

“Now the λόγοι of (A) and (B)

i. All slavery is unjust
ii. All slavery is just

1 [Dr Jackson’s notation X, Y, Z is here altered to (A), (B), and (C), for the sake of uniformity.]
επαλλάττουσιν: i.e. slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just. How is it, then, that these λόγοι επαλλάττουσιν? What is the reason of the controversy between (A) and (B)?

The reason is, Aristotle tells us, that, as ἀρετή with proper appliances is able to exert force or violence, while force or violence implies ἀγαθῶν of some sort or other, (A) and (B) agree in assuming that where there is βία, there there is ἀρετή, and consequently suppose that they differ fundamentally in their notions of δίκαιον. That is to say, on the assumption that βία is always accompanied by ἀρετή, (A), who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βία is detestable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, condemns all relations between inferior and superior which are not based upon 'loyalty', i.e. the willing obedience which an inferior renders to a kind and considerate superior; while (B) who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βία is respectable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, takes as his principle 'might is right'.

When however the two theories are withdrawn within their proper limits, so that they διεστάσις χωρίς and no longer επαλλάττουσι, the theory which (A) advances against (B) and the theory which (B) advances against (A), ἀφέναι λόγοι, have neither force nor plausibility as against the modified doctrine ὡς δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ᾽ ἀρετήν ἀρχεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν."

He adds in a note: "In other words, so long as (A) maintains that All slavery is unjust, and (B) that All slavery is just, (B) has something ἵσχυρὸν and πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has something ἵσχυρὸν and πιθανόν to urge against (B). But when (A) and (B) respectively fall back from their advanced and untenable positions to the position of Aristotle, (B) has no longer anything ἵσχυρὸν or πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has no longer anything ἵσχυρὸν or πιθανόν to urge against (B). It will be seen that I take τοὺς λόγους and τῶν λόγων to be 'the theories of (A) and (B)', ἀφέναι λόγοι to be 'the theory adverse to (A's) theory and the theory adverse to (B's) theory', i.e. 'the theories of (B) and (A)'." He agrees with Heitland (Notes p. 11) that ἐπαλλάττεω means primarily to 'overlap', whether by superposition or by juxtaposition, and continues: "But when may propositions be said to 'overlap'? At first sight two cases suggest themselves: (1) All X is Y might be said to overlap Some X is Y, and (2) Some X is Y and Some X is not Y might be said to overlap one another, provided that these subcontraries are incompatible. It appears however that ἐπαλλάττεω marks not so much the transgression of a limit, as the invasion of a region beyond, and consequently that All X is Y could not be said to ἐπαλλάττεω Some X is Y. For this reason, as well as because ἐπαλλάττεω understood in the former of the two senses indicated above, would not find a proper antithesis.

1 Apart altogether from my doubts whether the words of § 4 (especially ἐπελ, ἀφεναι, ὡς ob ἰδι as constructed with πιθανόν) can grammatically bear the meaning which Dr Jackson here assigns to them, I fail to see what imaginable interest the unconditional supporters of slavery, (B), have to contest the right of τὸ βέλτιον κατ᾽ ἀρετήν to rule at all, or why they should seek to advance anything possessing force and plausibility against the modified doctrine." SUSEM.
in διαστάσεων χωρίς, I take ἐπαλλάττειν here in the latter of these senses, the whole field of slavery being a debatable ground which from opposite quarters (A) and (B) have overrun. With the phrase διαστάσεων χωρίς, which represents the relative position of (A) and (B) when they have withdrawn to their own sides of the field, compare the kindred use of κεχώρισται in μκ 1, 464 b 27. Thus while I agree with Heitland that ‘overlap’ is the best English equivalent for ἐπαλλάττειν, I demur to his unqualified statement that the latter word expresses the relation in which subcontraries stand to one another.”)

Bernays’ rendering of 6 §§ 3—5, 1255 a 12—24, mentioned in n. (51), is as follows (the words in italics being supplied by him to explain the connexion of thought).

“The reason for the difference of opinions, and the common ground taken by the divergent views, is that to a certain extent intrinsic merit, when it attains external means, becomes also most competent to do violence, and every superior force depends upon the excess of some good quality or other, so that violence seems not to be devoid of all nobler elements and the difference of opinion therefore concerns the question of justice only. For the one side discovers justice in benevolent treatment, which precludes slavery; the others even hold it to be just that the stronger should rule. Whereas if the views stood harshly opposed to each other, so that merely external or brutal violence according to the one, and intrinsic merit according to the other, justified the claim to rule, then the view which impugns the right of the man, who is the better by his intrinsic merit, to be ruler and lord would be unable to adduce anything cogent or even plausible on its own behalf. Others however fasten wholly on an assumed empirical justice, such as the law, and declare slavery brought about by war to be just merely because the law sanctions it; yet in the same breath they are forced to admit that it is unjust.”

**EXCURSUS III.**

**The relation of χρηματιστική to οἰκονομική: I. 8. 2.**

ὁτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ τῷ οἰκονομικῆς χρηματιστικῆς, δὴ λοιπὸν πέπτειν δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν εἴδος, ἐξελεί διαμφισβητηθησίν. The most obvious course is to understand ἑτέραν εἴδος as only another expression for a mere auxiliary science (ὑπηρετική), or at least as including the relation of an auxiliary science under the case that the two are wholly distinct. In this sense all the commentators take it; both (1) those who think with Hampke—see n. (67) on I. 8. 1—that Aristotle simply wished to set up as an auxiliary science just so much of χρηματιστική as stands in a natural relation to οἰκονομική, and consequently in c. 8 § 13 would set matters right by omitting μέρος, so that the direct branch of χρηματιστική is not there said to ‘be a part of’, but only ‘to belong to’, οἰκονομική, as that with which it is concerned:—and (2) those who with Büchsenschütz rely on the received text.
of 8 § 13 and maintain Aristotle's decision to be this: that the direct branch of \( \chiρ̄ματιςτική \) is really a part of \( οίκονομική \), but that the 'natural' part of indirect \( \chiρ̄ματιςτική \), the theory of exchange, is, on the contrary, merely an auxiliary science. Now there is no passage in which Aristotle makes even the slightest allusion to such a difference in the relation of the two to \( οίκονομική \). But he states explicitly that not until c. 10 does he proceed to give a definite answer to the question proposed in c. 8 § 1, viz. how that branch of \( \chiρ̄ματιςτική \), with which the householder is concerned, is related to \( οίκονομική \); the answer being that it is in one respect a part of \( οίκονομική \), in another respect an auxiliary science, 10 §§ 1—3. The matter cannot therefore have been previously decided. And yet he had just said that \( οίκονομική \) has to do with the use or consumption of commodities, \( \chiρ̄ματιςτική \) with their production, and that hence the two are heterogeneous, because consumption and production are not the same thing. Now, as Schütz remarks, this necessarily implies that for the same reason even the branch of \( \chiρ̄ματιςτική \) most closely allied to \( οίκονομική \) cannot be a part of it except in a restricted and relative sense1. This again is decisively confirmed by Aristotle's requirement, IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 18; 10 §§ 9—14, that while none but landowners are to be citizens and none but citizens landowners, they shall not themselves carry on agriculture or cultivate their own estates, since in this way even agriculture really ceases, strictly speaking, to be a distinctive part of household management or domestic economy. Yet on another side the connexion still remains so close that Aristotle can distinguish between the functions of husband and wife in housekeeping by saying III. 4. 17 n. (496), that the one has to acquire, the other to keep; in other words that the external management of the property is more appropriate to the husband, the internal management to the wife. From all this it follows that \( ἐτερων εἴδος \) denotes something which is not connected with \( οίκονομική \) either as a part of it, or simply as an auxiliary to it: the more subtle distinction between branch and subsidiary science is, for the present, to remain undecided; and \( μέρος \) is used in a vaguer sense, even covering the case of an auxiliary science, this being also true of 10 § 1, so that there is certainly no need to expunge the word there. Such instances of inexactness and careless expression frequently obscure Aristotle's meaning; but in this part of the work they are unusually numerous. Thus \( \chiρ̄ματιςτική \) has three meanings, (1) = \( κτητική \), in the widest sense; 3 § 3 and c. 8: and, in a narrower sense, (2) = \( μεταβλητική \) or \( κατηλική \), \( ἡ μὴ ἀναγκαία \) of 9 § 18 (so from c. 9 § 1 onwards); and again (3) = \( ἡ ἀναγκαία, \) \( ἡ κατὰ φύσιν, \) 9 § 12, c. 10 (cp. n. on 8 § 1). Several times only accurate observation of the context can determine which of the three senses the word has. Similarly \( μεταβλητική \) or \( μεταβολική \) as a general term for exchange includes under it both the natural and unnatural species of indirect acquisition, both that which comes under \( οίκονομική \) and

1 If Büchsenschütz had definitely put the question to himself, whether acquiring can be a branch of using and consuming he would no doubt have answered in the negative. To acquire and to spend, or consume, are really opposed; which is what Aristotle says briefly, but to my thinking quite clearly.
that which is alien to it: but sometimes it is found in the narrower acceptance of retail trade proper, καταχώρησθαι, as in 9 § 12, 10 § 4, 11 § 3. Teichmüller has some good remarks on the want of a strict terminology in Aristotle Arist. Forschungen II. 4 ff.

Besides, to ask whether χρηματιστική is a part of οἰκονομική, is, as Oncken has pointed out, a perverse way of raising the question. For χρηματιστική, conversely, has a wider field than οἰκονομική: even the finances of the state and the labour of the whole society of the citizens are intimately concerned in it, and the earnings which supply the wants of single households form only an important part of this sum total of the national income. Aristotle finds himself accordingly compelled to speak of a χρηματιστική (8 §§ 13—15; 11 § 13) which is not simply for the householder and the family circle, but for statesmen and the commonwealth. At the same time he is so inconsistent as to designate the accumulation of a stock of commodities or possessions which shall be useful for civil society, whether it be by direct production or by plunder, a branch or a concern of οἰκονομική. Cp. the notes on 8 §§ 13—15, and on 11 § 13. Susem. (69)

NOTE ON I. 13 § 12: REASON AND VIRTUE IN THE SLAVE.

The difficulty pointed out in notes (45) and (121) on 5 § 9 and 13 § 12, may perhaps be removed as follows. If the slave by nature is to be altogether without that lower part of reason, which Aristotle here calls τὸ βουλευτικόν, he would be without reason altogether; for still less can he be said to have the higher part, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, scientific thought. But then he would quite cease to be a human being. The expression ὅλος οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, 13 § 7, should therefore be taken as hyperbolical and interpreted in the light of that other, and itself hyperbolical, statement κοινώνων λόγου τοιούτου σοιν ἀλάνσεβαί ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν 5 § 9: reason is present in the slave only, so to speak, as a δίναμις, not as a ἐξίς; and Aristotle avails himself of the

1 Staatslehre II. 81: "It is just like putting the question: Is the universal the same as the particular, or a part of it, or a distinct species? For that χρηματιστική has the wider generality and that οἰκονομική is the particular, is evident. We should have expected to hear, what χρηματιστική is in itself, what comes under it, and then the relation of οἰκονομική to it would have followed of itself and have been arrived at very simply. Whereas by adopting the opposite" (?) "procedure, we can only with difficulty surmise that χρηματιστική is undoubtedly an independent branch of science, treating quite generally of the means to acquire property and increase wealth; that οἰκονομική teaches us to apply to the maintenance of the household the means, which the other science indicates." It must be observed in reply to this, (a) that only the smaller and less essential branch of οἰκονομική in Aristotle's sense has this function, 13 § 1, (b) that as it has to do with consumption, while χρηματιστική is concerned with acquisition, even this branch of οἰκονομική is not related to χρηματιστική simply as particular to universal.

2 Schütz alone saw this difficulty and vainly tried to get over it by the omission of καὶ πολιτικῶν and καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, 8 § 15. He failed to see that it was also necessary to reject πόλεως ἐν 8 § 13 sub fine, that these words indeed must be the first to go.
NOTE ON I. 13. § 12.

hyperbole μὴ ἔχειν to denote that only the indispensable, or roughly speaking insignificant, minimum of rational deliberation, and therefore of reason generally, is found in such men. It is precisely similar with c. 6 of the Poetics, where first of all § 9, 1450 a 7, characters (ἡθ) are said to form a part of every tragedy, and then a little farther on § 14, a 23, we read ἀνεν μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἀνεν δὲ ἡθον γένοιτ’ ἂν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἁθεῖς τραγῳδίᾳ εἰσὶ καὶ δῶς πιοταί πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι. Comp. Hermes xix. 1884, p. 592. Susem. Plato too, Rep. iv. 441 A, says λογισμὸν δ’ ἐνοι κὲν ἐμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὐφεντο. Taken strictly this would deny to children and many adults the possession, as well as the use, of reason.


ἀναφορμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὀλου οὐκ ἐσται ποιος οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὀμονύμως. ὅσπερ ε’ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην: διαφαρείσα γὰρ ἐσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ (? γὰρ) τὸ ἔργον ὁμορραται καὶ τῇ δυναμεί, ὅστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα οὐντα οὐ λεκτόν τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ’ ὀμορρυμα. The words of n. (28) p. 150 “if τοιαύτη = a true hand” will admit of further elucidation. Schöll, who maintains this to be the meaning of τοιαύτη, ‘talis qualis esse debet vera manus’ (Susem. Quaest. Crit. iv. p. 5), cites as analogous the use of τοιοῦτος in De part. animal. 1. 1 §§ 25, 26, 640 b 33; καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχῆματος μορφήν, ἀλλ’ ὀμορρα ωὐκ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπος. ἔτι δ’ ἀδύνατον εἶναι χείρα <τὴν> ὁπωσοῦν διακειμένη, οἰον χαλκὴν ἢ ἐξλίνην, πλὴν ὀμονύμως, ὅσπερ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἰατρῶν. οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ποιεῖν τὸ ἐαυτῆς ἔργον, ὅσπερ οὐδ’ αὐθεντικὸν λιθίνον τὸ ἐαυτῶν ἔργον, οὐδ’ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἰατρός. ὀμοίως δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲ τῶν τοῦ τεθνηκότος μορφῶν οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐστὶ, λέγω δ’ οὐν ὀδυμόν, χείρ (where Schöll has himself added τῇν). The citation is the more apposite because Schöll takes διαφαρείσα χείρ to mean precisely τοῦ τεθνηκότος χείρ, ‘manus corporis extincti, ἀναφορμένον τοῦ ὀλου, quae propter hanc solam causam simul corrupta est appellanda.’

There is however another suggestion. Even granting that, as Schöll contends, διαφαρείσα is subject and τοιαύτη predicate, and that διαφαρείσα means ‘a dead man’s hand,’ may not τοιαύτη mean simply ‘homonymous,’ a hand in much the same sense as a hand of stone? Thus explained ἐσται τοιαύτη is parallel to οὐ λεκτόν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλ’ ὀμορρυμα, there is no need to insert οὐκ, and πάντα γὰρ (which the best MSS. of the old translation attest) is a distinct improvement upon πάντα δὲ. So in effect Vettori p. 14 (ed. of 1576) : “posset enim, inquit, aliquis manum vocare e lapide formatam, quae tamen manus non esse perspicitur: neque enim fungitur munere manus. manus vero hominis mortui talis profecto est.”
Book II is the critical portion of the work, just as an examination of preceding theories serves for an introduction to other Aristotelian treatises. Metaphysics Physics Psychology &c. Here cc. 1—8 deal with Political Thinkers, cc. 9—12 with Existing Constitutions. See Intro. p. 32.

c. 1 Our object is to discover the best scheme of political society. We must therefore examine in detail the best existing forms of government and the theories of our predecessors: § 1.

First of all, should the community which in some measure is implied in every city (§ 2) extend to wives and children, and to property, as in Plato's Republic? § 3.

§ 1 1260 b 27 προαιρομέθεα This is evidence (as against Göttling Preface p. xviii, and others) that Aristotle intended to construct an ideal state: see Spengel Ueber die Politik p. 11, and compare IV (VII). 13, 4.

κοινωνίας τῆς πολ.] This takes us back to I. 1 § 1. The imperfect 'associations' whose relation to civil society, ἡ πολιτικὴ κοιν., was the preliminary problem, have been dealt with in B. 1.

29 κατ' εὐχήν] For this expression see § 7 n. (202); IV(vii). 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 § 3, 10 § 13, 11 § 1, 12 § 9, 13 § 9; VI(iv). 11 § 1 with notes. SUSEM. (128)

In Plato εὐχής ὁμοία—a chimerical scheme, e.g. Kep. 456 c, όν καὶ αὕτη αὐτή τε εὐχής ὁμοία ἑνώμοιασιν, 499 c, δικαίων ἀν καταγελύφθη, ὅσ ἄλλως εὐχής ὁμοία λέγοντες; and in 540 ν. μὴ εὐχής εἰρηκέναι εἰπών. Thus εὐχή is an ideal, something visionary, impracticable, as in Demosth. c. Τιμοκ. 722, 19, εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ καλῶς μὲν ἔχοι, μὴ διωνεί>'+Αριστ., εὐχής οὐ νόμον διαπράπτων ἐν ἑργών. Similarly ὀφθαλμικά εὐχή Aristotel implies that no restrictions are placed on the realization of the scheme by circumstances.


32 ἵνα κτλ.] 'in order to note what they have of right and useful, and to show that it is from no love of ingenious speculation at all hazards (as the search for some new form of polity, distinct from these, might seem to imply) but from the
kai to χρήσιμον, ἕτε δὲ τὸ ἐξείτιν τι παρ᾽ αὐτὰς ἐτερον μὴ (1) δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι Βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ 35 καλὸς ἔχειν ταῦτα τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχοῦσας, διὰ τούτο ταύτῃν δοκῶμεν ἐπιβάλλεσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.

§ 2 ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον, ἥ περ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης 2 τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦτοι πάντας πάντως κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολιτάς, ἢ μηδενός, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μὴ. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς 40 κοινωνεῖν φαινότων ὡς ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τις ἐστὶ, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ τότος εἶς τὸς μᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολίται κοινωνοῖ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως).

§ 3 ἀλλὰ πότερον ὡςων ἐνδεχεται κοινωνησαι, πάντων βέλτιον 7 κοινωνεῖν τὴν μέλλουσαν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλὸς, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; ἐνδεχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων καὶ κοινωνοῖ τοὺς πολιτάς ἀλλήλοις, ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος. ἕκει γὰρ ὃ Σωκράτης...
tiated from an offensive and defensive alliance (άμαχία) and a race or tribe (έθνος): § 3. It is this which makes reciprocity the political safeguard, § 4, allowing the citizens to become alternately rulers and subjects, although a permanent governing body would be better, §§ 5, 6; allowing also a change of functions among the officials, § 7. Further, the greater independence (αδιάρεσα) secured in the city essentially depends upon a degree of unity less than that of the family, § 8.

See Grote's Plato c. 35, 111. pp. 160—
243. Oncken i. 171—193 and various monographs quoted in the Introd. p. 32 n. 4, p. 33 n. 7. The main defects of this criticism are at once apparent; Zeller, Platonic Studies p. 203, 290, has rightly traced them to an excessive striving after logical clearness; a tendency to reduce the Platonic utterances to a number of precise dogmatic propositions and to test the independent validity of each empirically, without regard to its inner connection with the whole system of idealism. Hence it comes about that the spirit of the Platonic teaching is hardly ever adequately appreciated, while now and then there is a captious, almost pedantic, disposition to get at external results and to fasten on details with but little insight into their true relative importance. "Several objections urged by him turn more upon the Platonic language than upon the Platonic vein of thought, and if judged by Plato from his own point of view would have appeared admissions in his favour rather than objections" (Grote). This is the sober fact, and serves to account for the piquant charges of injustice, sophistry, and mala
fides sometimes brought against Aristotle. § 11 πάντων and κοινάς are unintentional misrepresentations of the kind just criticized. The 'marriage laws' in question affect only Plato's Guardians, and do not establish community of wives at all, in the strictly literal and unobjectionable sense of the term (which would be a gross libel, we are told, on the philosopher who made marriage, so to speak, a 'sacrament'). Indeed they 'seem to aim at an impossible strictness,' hardly less exacting than vows of celibacy (Zeller Plato p. 480 Eng. tr.). And this must have been Aristotle's judgment: he never attacks them on the score of license, but only on grounds of public expediency. Moreover the aim of these laws and the arguments by which they are defended are such as to lay them open to the inexact and invidious appellation even at the hands of impartial modern critics. See c. g. Dr Jowett's remarks Plato 111. p. 160 ff.

11 δὴ ἂν αἱτίαν ἀιτία δὲ ὑπ’ "that which he assigns as the reason why such legislation is necessary does not appear to result from his proposals": συμβαίνον following as if τοῦτο δὲ ὃ ἦν πρόφανος. In 4 § 5 is a similar attraction. The 'reason' in question is the fundamental assumption of the Platonic state that the utmost possible unity is desirable: communism, within certain limits, is a means to this unity.

13 Thurot would translate: "further in view of the end which he says ought to be set before the city his present statement (of his scheme) is impracticable." But it is simpler to take τέλος as subject; πρόσ may be adverbial (see Crit. Notes) : "the
end as there stated by Plato is impossible (to attain)." For υνυν = in the case supposed, see 3 § 2, 8 § 10; υνυν δ' (on the scheme of Hippodamas) ἔχον χνουν.  

14 διελείν = analyse, define (by analysis), more nearly determine: ΙΙΙ. 13 § 6, 14 § 2. De gen. et corr. I. 1. 1 τας τε αἰτιας διαφεροντων.  

§ 2 16 λαμβάνει γάρ κτλ] Keph. IV 422 D f., 423 D f.; v. 449 H f., 462. The three general positions which Aristotle takes up against Plato in §§ 1, 2 are treated in reverse order in the sequel. The third, "the end is impracticable" in c. 2; then the second, "the means are unsuitable" in cc. 3, 4. §§ 1-13: lastly, "the many other difficulties" in c. 5 §§ 14-28 (Thurhot). Comp. Analysis (P). 102, 103, SUSEM. (130).  

17 μα μαλλον] too much of a unity.  

18 πλῆθος γάρ φι] See 5 § 15; ΙΙΙ. 1 § 2, § 12.  

22 οὐ ποιητέων...πόλιν] With these words the polemic against Plato is resumed exactly where it had started at the commencement of the work, 1. 1. 2 cp. note (2 b) and Introd. p. 23, i.e. with the specific difference between a state and a family; and this point of view is retained in §§ 7, 8, 3 § 4-4 § 10, 5 §§ 14-24. The discussions in this book supply the further relation that the maintenance of the state itself is conditioned by the maintenance of the family. SUSEM. (131)  

§ 3 The state is an organized unity. The plurality of parts which it contains are specifically distinct and properly subordinated. This however is one distinctive thought of the Republic, the ground of Plato's analogy between the state and the individual.  

24 οὐ γάρ...ἐξ ὁμοιων] Apparently contradicted by ΙΙΙ. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, ΙΙΙ. (IV). 11 § 8; but there equality of rights is intended by ὁμοιων (Eaton). The present statement is repeated ΙΙΙ. 4. 5 where uniformity of moral excellence is disregarded: here the sense is similarity of functions (Postgate), as is illustrated by Ν. Εθν. v. 5, 9, οὐ γάρ ἕκ δό ιατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' εξ ιατρῶν καὶ γεωργίων, καὶ ὄλως ἐτέρων καὶ ὄλως ἀλλά τούτων δεὶ ισοφήναι. It is the basis of the arrangements proposed Pol. ΙV (VII) cc. 8, 9. See on 1. 7. § 1 n. (58 b).  

συμμαχία] A confederation is a different thing from a state: see ΙΙΙ. 3 § 5, 9 §§ 7, 10. It is not an organism but an aggregate of homogeneous members. The
25 μαχία και πόλις: τό μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρῆσιμων, καὶ ἦ (I) τό αὐτὸ τῷ εἰδεῖ (Βοσπειάς γὰρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία πέφυκεν), ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ σταθμὸς πλεῖον ἐλκύσει (διὸσκε δὲ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πόλις ἐδνος, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κόμως ὦσι κεκρωμένοι πληθος, ἀλλ' οἶον Ἀρκάδεσ). εἶ ὦν δὲ δει εν § 4 γνέφασθαι, εἰδεὶ διαφέρει. διότερ τὸ ᾶσον τὸ ἀντιπεποθός

26 τῷ (τῷ P4) αὐτῷ P4C4ΘbTbUb || 27 ἐλκύσῃ Π2Bk., ἐλκύσῃ M* || διοίσει... Ἀρκάδες transposed by Susen. ¹ to come before ἀλλὰ πάτερον 1261 a 2, but wrongly || 28 καὶ πόλις καὶ δει Susen. || 29 ἀλλ' πάλαι Schneider, [ἀλλ'] Schlosser Garve || Ἀρκάδεσ * * Conring, οἶον <πίν> Riese; but see Dittenberger ὁ. c. p. 1376 ff. and the Comm. below || 30 γνέφασθαι Susen. || εἰδεὶ <δεί> διαφέρειν Bücheler (probably right), εἰδεὶ διαφέρειν M*

separate autonomous states, the Lacedaemonians and their allies, for example, are homogeneous.

25 τὸ μὲν answered by 29 εἰ δὲν δεῖ. The one (the alliance for war) will be of advantage from its mere size however much alike in kind, just as (it will be of advantage) if a weight shall pull more (than another), i.e. like a heavier weight which turns the scale. The more members the stronger the alliance.

27 διοίσει κτλ. "Upon something similar," the character of the constituents, whether heterogeneous (so as to allow of reciprocity) or homogeneous, "will depend the difference also between a city and a race, provided the race does not live with its population separated over a number of villages, but like the Arcadians." Not observing the parenthesis and taking ὅταν μὴ δια κεκωρ, as epegeitical of τῷ τοιοῦτῳ the editors have referred this remark to the process of συνοικισμός, the change from village life by which a Greek ἐθνος was consolidated into one city. But (1) the Arcadians must surely be cited as an example of a race and not (as they would be upon that view) of a city: (2) this is not a distinction between ἐθνος and πόλις universally, but between one ἐθνος and another. (3) We should then expect μεγάς, or οἶον <πίν> or something equivalent: and the exact force of the future and of τῷ τοιοῦτῳ (not τοιοῦτῳ) would be missed. (4) In that case Arcadians means simply Megalopolitans, whereas Tegeatans, Mantineans and others might equally claim to belong to the Arcadian league (τό 'Ἀρκαδικῶν). Hence Dittenberger, in Gott. gel. Anzeiger 1874 p. 1381, rejects the supposed reference to συνοικισμός and takes ὅταν μὴ κτλ as a limiting clause, which excludes from the comparison the cases where the people live κατὰ κόμως and opposes to the city-state only such 'races' as the Arcadian.

29 Ἀρκάδες Who are meant? The interpretation of the passage turns upon this. When Plato, Symp. 193 Α., writes διοίσεις ὑπὸ τόθεον καθαπέρ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων the words spaced show that the Mantineans are meant. Demosthenes Or. XVI uses Ἀρκάδες nine times and Megalopolitai seven times of the same people whose city was entitled in full ἡ μεγάλη πόλις τῶν Ἀρκαδῶν. There everything is clear from the interchange of terms. But if the words "when they live like the Arcadians" indicate an ἐθνός so well known as to spare Aristotle further explanation the instance chosen ought, as Dittenberger urges, to be before all things perspicuous. Understand then neither the Mantineans with Schneider, nor the Megalopolitans with Camerarius, nor with Giphanios the Maenadians and Parrhasians in the southwest before the founding of Megalopolis; none of these exclusively; but the entire population of Arcadia, as the word naturally means. See Note on Arcadia at the end of B. II.

“Further compare 1. 2 § 4 ν. (11), § 6 (19): III. 13. 19 (607); IV(VII). 4. 11 (769).” Susen. (132)

εἰ δὲν δεῖτι Whereas (in the case of the city-state) the elements which must coalesce into one are (must be, see Crit. Notes) specifically distinct. So that it would not make a single city, III. 3 § 5, 9 § 9, to join by an external tie two such similar units as the civic body of Corinth and that of Megara: the conditions for reciprocity would be wanting.

§ 4 30 τῷ ᾶσῳ τὸ ἀντιπεποθός] Not 'equal retribution' but the propor-
tional adjustment of claims, i.e. reciprocity of services and functions.

As ‘reciprocal proportion’ regulates the exchange of different wares in Nic. Eth. v 5, so here it regulates the relations between the magistrate for the time being and the ordinary citizen, who render, the one service, the other πιστή και γέρας Nic. Eth. v 6 § 7, 1134 b 7. On the application of the principle of ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ‘reciprocal proportion’, to commerce, friendship, and exchange generally, see my edition of the Fifth Book of the Ethics p. 88 ff. In Nic. Eth. v 5 § 6, 1132 b 32 it is ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ’ ισότητα, i.e. ‘reciprocal proportion’ as opposed to the ‘retaliation’ of the Pythagoreans, which is said to hold the πόλις together. The inconsistency is however only apparent. Here, where it is not necessary to emphasize the distinction between ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, i.e. κατ’ ισότητα λόγων, and ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ισότητα, i.e. κατ’ ισότητα ἄπλως, τοῦ ἴσου τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς is the equivalent of ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν in the other passage. By a similar inexactitude in Nic. Eth. IX 1 § 1, 1163 b 33 geometrical proportion takes the place of reciprocal proportion as the rule of exchange. Just so, although τὸ ἄπλως δίκαιον is τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν vii(v) 1, 1301 b 37, at vii(vi) 2 § 2, 1317 b 3 τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικόν is said to consist in τὸ ἴσου ἄξιον κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἄλλα μὴ κατ’ ἄξιαν, τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν in the former passage including, and in the latter excluding, τὸ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἴσου. See my notes on Nic. Eth. v 3 § 7."}

"Jackson.

From the apparent inconsistency Grant inferred, Ethics I p. 52 f., that the remarks on Retaliation in the Ethics are a development and improvement of those in the Politics. The common source may be Plato’s Πολ. κρίσις, the true πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, of Ἰανν. VI 757 b, C. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μείζον πλεῖον τῷ δ’ ἐλάττων εἰμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρα διδόσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμῶν μείζον μὲν πρὸς ἀριθμῷ αἱ μείζον κτλ.

31 ἐν τοῖς Ἡθικοῖς Nic. Eth. v. 5.6, where from the nature of the case and the explanations given τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς is not to be understood negatively of retaliation for evil suffered, but positively as a recompense for good received. (As there explained the one, retaliation, repays like with like; the other makes requital by the corresponding term in reciprocal proportion: for in reference to his demand the builder is to shoes as the shoemaker to the house.) More precisely thus: of the different members of a community Α transfers to Β the goods which he (Α) has and Β has not, receiving in return that which he lacks himself and Β has: thus a shoemaker exchanges shoes with a baker for bread. Hence we read in § 9 of the same chapter that an association (κοινωνία) of two similar members, as two physicians, is impossible; it can only be formed by a physician and a farmer, or generally by members dissimilar and unequal, between whom equality or proportion is thus said to be produced.

Now the dissimilar members in the state are rulers and subjects. The former afford the latter a wise and intelligent guidance in return for which they receive respect (Π. Ε. viii. 14. 3, 1163 b 6), willing obedience, and skilful execution of their commands: and the subjects, in return for this obedience, receive from their rulers the wise government before mentioned. On this depends the continuance and well being of the state. Compare further 1. 2. 16. III. 10. 2, with notes (28 c, 562).

But as the greatest possible equality amongst the citizens is the aim of Aristotle’s best policy no less than of Plato’s—Π. 7. 1 n. (28 b), Π. vii(vii). 8. 4 (757), vii(vi). 11. 8 (1293); III. 16. 2 (672), 17 § 2, 1 § 10 (440. 441), 13 § 9 (505), § 12 (597-9)—a seeming inconsistency arises; compare also III. 4. 5 n. (471). The fuller explanation which follows in the text is intended to remove this inconsistency by showing that even in the ideal state there is the same difference between rulers and subjects and the same adjustment of the difference, and to what extent this holds. Thus §§ 4-7 διότι τὸ ἴσον...ἀρχάς are a digression, but one indispensable to Aristotle’s argument, which, putting this aside, runs as follows: the state has more need than the family of a plurality, or more precisely of a plurality of dissimilar members, § 2. Remove the dissimilarity and you destroy the state which is still more evident if independence (ἀντάρκεια) be also taken into account, § 8.

Camerarius, and long before him Eubulos, blame Aristotle unfairly for not seeing that Plato’s unity of the state meant only the utmost possible unity concord and unanimity among the citizens. From
έπει καὶ έν τοῖς ἐλευθεροῖς καὶ ἵσοις ἀνάγκη τοῦτ’ εἶναι. ἀμα (1) γάρ οὐχ οἶνον τε πάντας ἀρχεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὢν κατ’ ἐνιαυτόν ἦ § 5 κατά τινα ἀλλήν τάξιν ἢ χρόνον, καὶ συμβαίνει δῆ τὸν 35 τρόπον τοῦτον ὡστε πάντας ἀρχεῖν, ὡστε ἐν εἰ μετέβαλλον οἱ σκυτείς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ ἂεί οἱ αὐτοὶ σκυτοτόμοι § 6 καὶ τέκτονες ἤσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ** βέλτιον οὖτως ἐχεῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅσ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἂεί βέλτιον ἀρχεῖν, εἰ δυνατὸν εὖ οἶς δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν διὰ τὸ τὴν

32 ἀμα] ἀλλὰ Π¹ in the margin || 33 γάρ] δὲ Γ Μ² || 34 ἢ] καὶ Λ. (probably right) || 35 μετέβαλλον Μ² Π¹ Σusem.²-² || 36 ἂεί after οἱ αὐτοὶ Γ²-⁴ Κ² Θ¹ Υ¹ Ald. Bk. and a later hand in Π³ (omitted by the first hand in Π³) || 37 ἐπεὶ] ἐκεῖ Bernays, who by omitting with Koraes τά which follows skillfully removes all traces of the lacuna after δὲ discovered by Conring and Schneider (viz. ἐκεῖ δὲ βέλτιον οὖτως ἐχεῖν καὶ περὶ τὴν κ. τ. τὴν πολιτικὴν δήλον): <οὖτος> οὖτως Schlosser—equally wrong: cp. the Comm.: βέλτιον ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει ταύταν ἐφιγον ἂεί ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποτελεῖται, καὶ πεφυκε δῆ βέλτιον or something similar Thurot

3 § 3; 4 § 5 ff., § 4; 5 § 11, §§ 14, 15, §§ 19, 20 it is clear that Aristotle was well aware of this fact. Nevertheless it may easily be seen that this does not affect the soundness of his reasoning which, as even the language shows, is directed more especially against Republic v 462, where Plato is showing how the abolition of family life would be the means of making all the citizens of his ideal state feel as the members of a single family (cp. n. 149) or even of a single man (καὶ ἢς δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνός ἀνθρώπων ἔχει, ἄντα σκ. πᾶλιν ἀράτα δουκείατα). Is this not, as Aristotle rightly puts it, to prescribe for the state the end of the representation so far as possible an individual man? “Aristotle’s argument is that unity when applied to the state is an analogical term, and that Plato’s use of it subverts the very ground of the analogy” (Eaton). Comp. also Oncken I. 173 f. Σusem. (133)

32 τοῦτο = τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός. There must needs be reciprocity even among first and equal citizens, as in the ideal state.

ἀμα γάρ... 39 δυνατον] All cannot rule at once: the only possible alternatives are (a) a perpetual ruling body, ἂεί or καθάπαξ (cp. I. 13 § 4) τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχεῖν: (b) alternation or rotation of functions, μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεῖν οἱ κατό μέρος (cp. I. 1 § 2, III. 6 § 9). Comp. iv(vii). 14 §§ 1, 2 where this argument recurs.

§ 5 35 ὡστε apparently redundant after συμβαίνει, as in vi(iv). 5. 3 συμβαί

βεκυκον ζώη τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν εἰκαὶ, καὶ so De Sen. ii § 5, 437 b 5 8 συμβαίνει ζώτε δοκείν. Similarly with other verbs: Pol. viii(v). 9 § 8 ἐστιν ὡστ’ ἐχειν ἰκανόν, Phys. viii. 6. 2, 258 b 17 ἐστιν δ’ ἐνδεχόμενον ὡστ’ εἰναὶ ποτὲ. § 6 37 ἐπεὶ δὲ **] The difficulty is that, if no lacuna be assumed, οὐτῶς properly refers to μὴ ἂεί οἱ αὐτοὶ, and this is against the sense. To take οὐτῶς = ὡς νῦν οὖτως (see c. 1 § 3), with Lambin, ita ut semper, is as forced as to insert οὖς with Schlosser.

“The sense is satisfied if we supply something like this: But <as in fact the work of a carpenter is always done by a carpenter and never by a shoemaker, and from the nature of the case each work is more successful when executed by the same persons, who make their own business, and as therefore it is better it should be so with political society>... (Thurot). Σusem. (134)

39 εὖ οἴς δὲ κτλ] “But where it is not possible, because all are naturally equal,” τὴν φύσιν adverbial accus. with οὖσα; comp. n. on I. 12 § 2 “and at the same time therefore it is but fair, whether a good or a bad thing for ruling,” as opposed to obeying, “that all should take a turn at it—this retirement in rotation of the equal citizens from office imitates an original dissimilarity.” φαῖλον = an unsatisfactory arrangement, c. 7 § 5, the thought being perhaps different from Plato’s in ῾Ερ. I. 345 d ff., whether office
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mischievous. It is not (1) 'unanimity', i.e. community of political principles and aims, the ὑμόνοια of Nic. Eth. IX. 6, 1167 a 22, as appears from c. 9 § 22, 1270 b 21 &c. Nor is it (2) 'uniformity', i.e. the suppression of individuality, so that all the citizens are of one type: for the discrimination of functions, carrying with it diversity of character, is, under the name of justice, the very foundation of the Platonic πόλις. Hence it is not (3) 'organization', as organization implies discrimination of functions combined with unanimity in the sense here given to the word. Rather it is (4) 'centralization'. Plato is anxious that his citizens should be bound together by a common interest in the πόλις, and, with a view to this, proposes to eliminate all those inferior κοινωνίαι which induce subordinate affections and create separate interests, thus, he conceives, weakening the supreme tie of patriotism. On the other hand Aristotle regards the subordinate affections which are induced in the inferior κοινωνίαι—for example, οἰκία, σύμπλοκα, συναριτισμοῦ, φιλεταί, φυλάτται, παιδεύεται, ἑρωισταί Nic. Eth. VIII. 9 § 4 f, 1160 a 9, q.v.— as valuable in themselves, and therefore does not desire that they should be merged in patriotism. Further he maintains that the elimination of the inferior κοινωνίαι, which μορίων ἔοικαι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἑυκρίνει τὰς κοινωνίας Nic. Eth. VIII. 9, 1160 a 9, will not cause the subordinate affections to be merged in patriotism, i.e. to be transferred, unimpaired in force, from the inferior κοινωνίαι to the supreme κοινωνία. He thinks, in fact, that the πόλις is properly a complex organization containing lesser organizations within it, rather than a large family or a colossal man. It will be observed (1) that Aristotle's criticisms arise directly from the theory of the πόλις which he has developed in the first book, and (2) that they indicate the same appreciation of φιλεταί in all its forms, which has led him to devote to it two out of the ten books of the Nic. Eth.1 JACkSON.

§ 8 10 ἐνοῦν is infinitive, 'the endea-

vour to intensify the unity of the state is not so desirable.'

12 βούλεται = tends, means; the meaning of a state is then first realised or fulfilled when...

14 έπερ οὗν κτλ] Cr. I. 1. 8 nn. (20 b, 21); III. 1 § 12 πόλις το τῶν τιο-

ντῶν πλῆθος ἰκανον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ἄρθρον. n. (447), 9 § 14 π. (560), IV (VII). 4 § 11 (750), 5 § 1 τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖναι μιαθείς αὐτάρκης (764), 8 § 8 ή γὰρ πόλις πλῆθος ἐστιν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἄλλα πρὸς ὑπάρχειν αὐτάρκης n. (804). SUSEM. (138)

Add IV (VII). 4. 14 δῆλον τοινῦν ὡς οὔ-

τος ἐστὶ πόλεως δρόσος ἀριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπέρβολη πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ἄρθρον εὐθύνοντος.

cc. 3, 4 Objections to communism, chiefly to the abolition of separate families. Even supposing Plato's end, i.e. the most perfect civic unity, to be desirable, his communistic scheme is not the best means to secure it. A series of detached remarks, so closely allied in some cases that it would not have been difficult to bring them together under one and the same head. See fuller details Analysis pp. 102, 103 and compare throughout Pl. Rep. v.

The Platonic scheme, as Grote (III. 207) reminds us, is only partial communism. Modern communistic theories contemplate individual producers handing over the produce of their labour to be distributed among themselves by official authority. But the producing and labouring classes in the Republic are not communists at all: they are private proprietors with separate families, taxed only with the maintenance of a body of public functionaries, the guardians. Hence the arguments advanced by Aristotle, however just in themselves, have little direct application to the scheme which he is ostensibly criticising; they belong to a far wider enterprise on which he has embarked, an advocacy of the principle of individualism against socialism in general, beginning (1 § 2) with the inquiry into the limits of community and subsidiary
to his own constructive theory in B. III.

Again, while the peculiar marriage system of the Republic would unquestionably result in the abolition of the ordinary separate family, Aristotle is unable, perhaps from a defect of imagination, fully to realize the new state of things which Plato intended to create. He persists in attaching the old meanings to words (3 §§ 5–8, 4 §§ 6–9), whereas it is Plato’s avowed aim by an extension of the affections into an intimate and equal sympathy with a whole class (esprit de corps) to supersede nearer family relationships and extinguish private interests.

§ 1 16 τούτο = τό μιᾶν ὅτι μάλιστα κτλ. Even granting the utmost unity in the (civic) association to be the best, such unity does not appear to be made out by the scheme that all shall simultaneously apply the terms minē and not-minē.

18 κατά τόν λόγον] with ἀποδεικνυόμενον, established by the proposal that all shall agree in their use of minē and not-minē: ἐὰν πάντες...μὴ ἐμὸν is explanatory of λόγον. For κατά = by, cp. Metaph. Θ. 8 § 14, κατά τῇ δῇ τούτον τούτον λόγον φανερὸν ὅτι...1050 b 3.


SUSEM. (137)

§ 2 20 ‘All’ has two senses, (1) each individual, pro se quisque; (2) the whole body collectively. If ‘all’ is taken in the former sense, this is perhaps more what Socrates means (‘proposes to do’).


25 ἦν δ’ οὐχ οὕτως. But then it is not in this sense that communists will apply the term ‘all’. The whole body collectively, not the individuals exclusively, will have the right to say “mine” in this sense.

26 πάντες ]( ὃς ἕκαστος) Another instance in III. 11. 2. Also vi(IV). 4–26 where the distinction is skillfully worked in: μάναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, συνήθετος εἰς ἑκ πολλῶν οἱ γὰρ πολλοί κυριοὶ εἶναι οὐχ ὃς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες.

§ 3 28 τῷ γὰρ πάντες κτλ. The terms “all” and “both” and “odd” and “even” by reason of their ambiguity tend to make arguments fallacious even in dialectical discussions (and much more so when handled by sophists for purposes of deception).

29 καὶ περιττά καὶ ἄρτια] See 27 τοῦτο (ταύτ’ ὅτι τοῦ ἄρτιον) ενδέχεται τῷ δὲ ὑπάρχειν τῶν ἤμων μισθεῖρα. De Soph. Ei. 4 § 7, 156 a 33: παρά δὲ τῆς διαφέρειν ὅτι τά πιάν ἐστι διὸ καί τρια, καί περιττά καί ἄρτια, ‘to (fallacious) division is due the instance, that five is two
and (is) three, odd and even’ (Eaton). SUSEM. (138)

Walford and Postgate would take περιττά καὶ ἀρτία to be predicates of πάντες and ἄμφιτερα. But five in the passage quoted above is at once an example of ἄμφιτερα, 2 + 3, and of περιττά. As ἄμφιτερα = sum of two things, so περιττά = an odd sum total, ἀρτία = an even sum total. In all three cases the fallacy is not really due to ambiguity in the terms themselves, as Aristotel admits De Soph. El. 20 § 2, 177 b 7, of δύον τὸ παρὰ διάλεγον, unless the confusion of two things as distinct as δρος and δρίς be said to be due to ambiguity.

30 ἐν τοίς λόγοις in disputations, in dialectic. SUSEM.

ἐριστικοῦς] Because they may be construed both collectively and distributively (Schneider); in Aristotle’s phrase they admitted of συνθέσεις and διάφρασις, illicit combination and disjunction. See De Soph. El. 4 § 6 166 a 22, 6 § 3 168 a 26, 20 § 1 177 a 33, 30 § 7 181 b 20: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἄμφιον καὶ τὸ ἀπάντων πλεῖον σημαίνει, the words ‘both’ and ‘all’ have several meanings (Eaton). Further compare VIII(v). 8. 3: παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ἐπὶ αὐτῶν, ὡσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος: εἰ ἐκάστος μικρὸν, καὶ πάντα (illicit σύνθεσις). SUSEM. (139)

31 ὅδ' μὲν] as ὃς ἐκάστος; ὅδ' δὲ = collectively.

32 ὅσον ὡμονοιτικὸν] Since democrats may quarrel, although πάντες μὲν, ὅσι ὃς ἐκάστος δὲ they are supreme in the state. The individuals whose unity is Plato’s main object can call nothing their own; it is only the body politic as a whole, after all, that can say “mine”.


πρὸς δὲ τούτους κτλ] ‘In the next place, the scheme in question has another disadvantage. The property shared by the greatest number meets with the least attention. For men care most about their private matters and less for the public concerns.’ The zeal and attention of individual owners are checked and chilled by division of ownership. So with the sons who are a ‘common possession’ of the Guardians.

35 ἦς ὁσὸν ἐκάστῳ ἐπίβαλλει ‘or (only at most) in proportion to their stake in them.’ Since the whole clause answers to μάλιστα and ἢττον, the verb would seem to be impersonal: ‘as much as it falls to each man’s share’ to care. For the impersonal use, see I. 13 § 8. For the meaning, Herod. VII. 23 μέρισαν δοσον αὐτοίς ἐπίβαλλε: hence Herod. IV. 115 ἀπολαχωτές τῶν χρημάτων τὸ ἐπίβαλλαν = their due share. Camerarius cites Ptolemy as using the word to express ‘proportional parts’ in astronomical calculations. The same thought recurs 1262 a 3 in the words ὁπόστος τυργιάνει τῶν ἀριθμ. ὃν. If the society consists of a thousand members, the interest of each is represented by the fraction τρίτο. But such is the tendency of human nature that the interest felt and care bestowed will be even less than this.

πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις κτλ] ‘Each is more likely to neglect them, amongst other reasons, because there is some one else to look after them; just as with the attendance of servants it sometimes happens that the work is not so well done by many as by few.’

§ 5 According to Plato’s regulations, Rep. V 457 c—464 b, all the children of the Guardians, the two upper classes who are full citizens of his ideal state, are to be taken from their mothers directly after
§ 5 τούσ τῶν ἐκλαττὸν. γίνονται δ’ έκαστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν νιόι, καὶ οὕτως οὕς έκάστου, ἀλλ’ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχῶν ὀμοίως εὕτως νιόι. έστιν πίευς ομοίως ολυμφρόσυνιν, επεί οὕτως ἐκάστος εὕρεται τῶν ἐν πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἣ κακώς, ὃπόστος τυγχάνει τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὄν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δείνος, τοῦ-

1262 a 1 ἐπεὶ Biicheler, ὅτι ? Susem., ἐτι Γ II Ar. Bk. Bonitz seeks to prove that this alone is right (Hermes vii. p. 102 ff.), and in the Addenda to my critical edition, p. lxix, I somewhat hastily acceded. If ἐτι be accepted there must be a full stop before it || 2 λέξει Γ (7) Ar. (7) Susem.1-2 || 3 τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰνθ' and the 1st hand in P1.2 Qb (emended by a later hand in Qb), τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰθ || ὁν omitted by II7 Ar. || τοῦ δείνος II Ar. and also probably Γ, huius filius William || In the whole passage 1—14 Schmidt proposes extensive changes thus: ὀλυμφρόσυνιν. κρέστων ἀρα έδον ἀπεξεὶς εἶναι (transposed from 13) ἐνός τῶν αὐτοῦ μόνον προσαγορεύ-, νοτών, <ἡ> διαυγλίων ἢ καὶ μιρίων τοῦ τρόπου τοῦτον νιόι, ἐτί τοῦτον τοῦ τρόπου <νιόι> λεγ—ὁντε ναι καθ' ἐκαστον τῶν χιλιων [ἡ] δεσον ἢ πολίς εὐτίκην, οὕτως ἐκαστος ἐμὸς λέξει <ὡς καλ> τὸν ἐν πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακώς ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὄν, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζει [εἰ μὴ ἐμὸς τοῦ δείνος] ἄδηλην κτλ.

birth. The sickly and deformed are to be exposed, as well as the offspring of incapable parents and of unions formed in violation of the laws and magisterial authority (provided recourse has not been had to abortion in this latter case). The remainder are committed to public nurseries or crèches, in order that the real parents and children may be kept in ignorance of each other and that no favouritism may be shown. According to definite gradations of age all the Guardians alike are to treat one another and feel love for one another as parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, brothers and sisters. See h. (133). Susem. (140).

38 χίλιοι] Not a fixed number, but merely suggested as a convenient round number by Kep. iv. 423 A. ‘Now each of Plato’s citizens has a thousand sons, not in the sense that each of them is his son exclusively, but (in the sense) that any of them is just as much a son of any other of the elder citizens. And the consequence will be that all these fathers alike will be indifferent to him.’

39 οἷος οὐς ἐκάστου] Not as being children of his individually; but to any of the children (of a given year) any of the fathers (of that year) stands in a paternal relation.

1262 a 1 ἐπεὶ οὕτως κτλ.] Almost word for word from Kep. v 403 E, πασῶν ἄρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνυμφωνήσουσιν εὗρος τινος ἢ εὗρος ἢ κακώς πράττοντος, ο’

μυθή ἐλέγομεν τὸ ρῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ εὕμορ εὗρος πράττει ἢ ὅτι τὸ εὕμορ κακώς: i.e. when any individual member fares well or ill, they will all with one accord use the expression ‘it is well with mine’ or ‘it is ill with mine.’ Hence translate: ‘As if if ἐτι be retained, “Further” each of the elder citizens, when he uses the term ‘my son’ to express his sympathy in the joy or sorrow of a younger comrade, uses it only in the sense of the fractional part which he himself forms of the whole body of citizens. That is, he says ‘my son’ or ‘so and so’s’; and this ‘so and so’s’ applies equally to each of the thousand citizens or whatever the number of which the state consists.” To take ἐμὸς—my son (not my brother or my father) is justified by νιός in the preceding line, 6 τέκνων, 14 νιόν (cp. 4 § 7). In spite of the χίλιοι νιόι (h 28) it is the elder generation, the ‘fathers’, that are meant by τῶν χίλιων ἢ δεσον κτλ. In fact the hypothetical round numbers (see § 6 διαυγλίων καὶ μιρίων) serve merely to present the case definitely and vividly. To οὕτως corresponds ὁπόστος…ὡς, as τοῦτον τοῦ τρόπον τοῦ δείνος; mine or A’s or B’s, and so on through all the thousand. When a ‘father’ uses the term ‘my son’ in Callipolis he will be aware that he shares the relation with a number of other ‘fathers’.


3 οἷον—I mean.
7 [ἐκαστον…8 μυρίων] Schmidt (transposed as above) || μέν ὦνμα Bonitz, perhaps rightly: yet the instances in which μέν in Aristotle stands without any ἄνα following have not yet been sufficiently explained: μὴδὲν with a comma after (instead of before) τὸ αὐτὸ Bernays || προσαγορεύοντα Bernays, perhaps rightly: yet the plural may be intentional although the participle goes with ἐκαστον || 8 καὶ]

§ 6 And yet it is better in this fashion for each of the 2,000 or 10,000 elder citizens to use the term ‘mine’ (of any one), all calling him by the same name” viz. son or as it is used under the present system” with the addition of different names, as nephew, cousin, &c? 7 ἐκαστον…8 μυρίων] Of course only those citizens are meant whose age entitles them to call a boy ‘son’ and not ‘brother’ or ‘grandson’. Here τὸ αὐτὸ = son. SUSEM. (141) With αὐτὸ μέν κτλ may be mentally supplied ἀγαπητός τις πάντων (Thurou).

8 δισχιλίων] Is this genitive after ἐμαστον, as above? Is it not more forcible if taken after τὸ αὐτὸ = the same relation? Each calls him ‘mine’, (which will result in) the whole body (plural) calling one person the same relation of some 2,000 people (T. L. Heath).

A different construction of § 6 is proposed by Bonitz; viz. to take ἐκαστον as the object, instead of the subject, of τὸ λέγειν, and to make δισχιλίων the genitive after τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα, which is a correction for μέν:—‘is it better in this sense to call each (of the younger generation) ‘mine’, using the same name [i.e. son] for 2,000 or 10,000?’ In the same essay (Hermes vii pp. 102—8) Bonitz defends the ms. reading ἤτι (a 1) on the ground that a new objection, No. 3, is there introduced. The last, No. 2 (§ 4 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀλεγωρηθοῦσα) dwelt on the depreciation which the term ‘my father’ suffers. “The multitude of fathers, whom each of the younger men has, is prejudicial and fatal to the loving attention which a son otherwise receives from a father.” In the passage which follows (1 ἤτι ὦτος…14 νῦν) “the fact is viewed from the opposite side. The name ‘my son’ loses all value, as each one who uses it shares the problematic relationship with an indefinitely large number.” With all deference to authority so weighty, it may be doubted if the two sides are opposed: at all events in a 13 (κρεῖττον γὰρ κτλ) the point of view is the advantage of the younger generation no less than in α 1 (ἀλεγωρηθοῦσα). Comp. Susemihih Quest. Crit. vi p. 16 ff.

§ 7 9 ἐ μέν γὰρ κτλ] “For one and the same person is called by one man his own son; by another his own brother, or cousin; (by another) according to some other kinship either by blood relationship or by some connexion and affinity to himself in the first instance or else to his kin: and furthermore by another his clansman, his tribesman. For it is better to be actually an own cousin than in Plato’s sense a son.” There is at present a kind of community in relationship: only it does not extend so far and is compatible with dissimilar individual interests.

“For φιάτορα, φιλέτεν consult the following references: 5 § 17 n. (169), 11 § 3 with Exc. iv; iii. 2 § 3 (451), 9 § 13

Π. 3. 7] 1261 b 38—1262 a 9. 225
10 prosoagorevei tov aytov, ó ἴανέφιον, ἢ κατ' ἀλλ' ῥιω τινᾶ (I) συγγένειαν, ἢ πρὸς αἵματος ἢ κατ' οἰκείοτητα καὶ κηδείαν αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἐτέρους φράτορα, φυλέτην. κρείττον γὰρ ἰδιον ἀνέφιον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον του· § 8 τοῦ νῦν. 
οὗ μήν ἀλλ' οὗδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατόν τὸ μή τινας 13 ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδέλφους τε καὶ παίδας καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας, αἱ γίνονται τῶν τέκνων πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ἀναγκαίων λαμβάνειν περὶ § 9 ἀλλήλων τῶν πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιούσιον πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γὰρ τοις 20 τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναίκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς καὶ γυναίκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οἷον ἵππου καὶ βόας, αἱ σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὀμοία αὐτοδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς-4 σιν, ὥσπερ ἦν ἐν Φαρσύλῳ κληθείσα Δικαια ἵππος. ἔτι δὲ 15 καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ράδιον εὐλαβηθησάν τοῖς ταύτην κατασκευάζοντι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον αἰκίας καὶ φόνους [ἀκούσιος τοὺς δὲ] ἐκούσιος καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας: ὄν 12 αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ Βκ., αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ ΓΠ || ἦ] εἶτα ὁ Susem. || ἔτερον Lindau, ἔτερον ΓΠ Λγ. Βκ., ἔτεροι Bernays, ἔτεροι Spengel || 13 <ἡ> φυλέτην Bas.3 Bk., aut contribuere William || ἐταῖρον <ἡ> φράτορα <ἡ> φυλέτην Schmidt || 27 [ἀκούσιος τοὺς δὲ] Bender, ἐκούσιος [τοὺς δὲ ἐκούσιος] Congreve; τοῖς δὲ ἐκούσιοι omitted by L3, which proves nothing against their genuineness, still should not the brackets include all four words? See Comm. || Lambin omitted καὶ μάχας

(558); vi(v). 14 § 4 (1321 b), 15 § 17 (1367); viii(vi). 4 § 19 (1427), 5 § 9 (1437); viiii(v). 1 § 10 (1499), 4 § 10 (1526), 5 § 11 (1564), 8 § 19 (1626).” Susem. (141)

§ 8 Yet after all parents would suspect relationship from the likeness of their own children. Comp. Jovett on the Republican p. 165 ff.

17 λαμβάνειν τὰς πίστεις derive their convictions; so in tv(vii). 1. 6. § 9 τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους. Books of travel round the world, as in Rhet. i. 4. 13 (where see Cope's exhaustive note), Melior. i. 13, 13, 11. 5. 14. Such books were also called περίπλους and περιγραφές. Usually παραγματευότα makes ἐπί; but once, Rhet. i. 2. 5, it has πρὸς. In Pol. tv(vii). 1. 4. 8 we have τοῦτον ἀν εἰρ τῷ νομοθετῷ παραγματεύειν, ἄτομο... 20 των τῶν ἄνω Δίβων] See Exc. 1. to B. 11 p. 326 ff., as regards the evidence for these customs. Comp. also 1. 2. 4 n. (11) and n. (116). Susem. (142) 24 ὅπερ... ἱππος] The same remark in Hist. Anim. vii. 6. 8, 886 a 12 (Schneider). Further compare De Genere. Anim. iv. 3. 1, 767 b 5: 'ο μὲ ἑκώς τοὺς γονεῖς ἢν τρόπον τινὰ τέρας ἐστὶν παρεκβιβάζεσθαι γὰρ ἴδιας ἐν τούτοις ἐκ τοῦ γένους τρόπον τινὰ (Eaton). Susem. (143) Δικαία here probably means "docile": Xenophon Cyneg. 7 § 4, Memor. iv. 4. 5: ἐδε τινὲς καὶ ἵππον καὶ βόον τῷ βουλαμένῳ δικαίου ποιήσαται πάντα μετά εἶναι τῶν διαδότων (Jackson). c. 4 § 1 25 τὰς τοιαύτας the following. 27 [ἀκούσιος τοὺς δὲ] ἐκούσιος] Can it be said that a divine law forbids involuntary homicide in the case of father, mother, &c., but permits it in other cases? On the contrary, responsibility ceases for involuntary acts; nothing but negligence is then punishable; nor can we talk of such acts being allowed. Bu
ouδὲν ὀσίαν ἔστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς (I) μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὡντας, ὅσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπωθεν' 30 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείων συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἠγωνιῶντων ἢ γνωριζόντων, καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς § 2 νομιζομένας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μὴ <οὖ> δεμιάν. ἦτοπον δὲ 15 καὶ τὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς νιὸν τὸ συνείναι μόνον ἀφελεῖν τῶν ἐρώτων, τὸ δ' ἐραν μὴ κωλύσαι, μὴδὲ τὰς χρη- 29 ἀπὸθεν Μπορ. 14 Λ. Αλδ. 30 ἀλλὰ] ἤ Π (γρ. ἀλλὰ corr. 1) in the margin of Π) 32 μὴ <οὖ> δεμιάν Jackson, <μὴ> μηδεμιάν Schneider, μηδεμιάν ΠΒ Αρ. Βκ. Susem. 1-2-3, μηδὲ μιαν Π (1 hand) intentional homicide is forbidden by the law of God and of nature in the case of the nearest blood relations, while under certain circumstances it is allowed in the case of strangers. So too outrage, blows, abuse are all intentional acts. On these grounds the words bracketed must be regarded as an interpolation (Bender). Susem. (144) 28 ὃν οὐδὲν ὁσίον] To this Plato might certainly reply, that where relationship is abolished, crimes (even if they are still committed) cannot be aggravated by the fact of being crimes against relations (Oncken). Susem. (145) 32 λύσεις=expiations. Editors compare Kep. II 364 E: ὃς ἂρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρὰμι ἀδικημάτων διὰ τούτων καὶ παιδας [ἥδων] εἰσὶν μὲν ἔτι ἑώρηκαν εἰς καὶ τελευτήσας, ἢ δὲ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν: Eur. Ου. 51ο φόρων φόνον λόγια, 507 μισάμα λόγια. Such purifications for homicide were unknown in the Homeric age. Grote, Hist. I. 34 compares Thuc. I. 126—128 for their great importance. τῶν δὲ κτλ] "All the editors assume that the words τῶν δὲ μηδεμιάν, whether with or without Schneider's addition, stand for τῶν δὲ μὴ γνωριζόντων ενδεχεται μηδεμιαν γινεσθαι λυσιν, as if Aristotle wished to say 'it is possible that no expiation should be made'. He ought however to say 'it is not possible that any expiation should be made'. Hence I conjecture τῶν δὲ μὴ <οὖ> δεμιάν." Jackson. §§ 2, 3 ἄτοπον δὲ κτλ] Kep. III. 403 Λ. Β: οὐδὲν ἂρα προσωτείον μανικικὸν οὐδὲ ξυγγεγένεις ἀκολούθησα τῷ ἀρστὶ ἐρωτὶ, οὐ προσωτείον ἂρα ἀυτὴ ἡ ἠδονὶ (sc. ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀρφοίσυα) οὐδὲ κοινωνεῖσιν αὐτῆς ἐραστὶ τε καὶ παιδικοῦ ὀρθοῦ ἐρασί τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις...οὐκ ὡς, ὡς οὖν, νομοθετήσεις ἐν τῇ οἰκείομενῃ πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ ξυνείναι καὶ ἀπεσθαίναι ὅσπερ ιέος παιδικῶν ἐραστικἡς, τῶν καλῶν χάριν ἐναντιῇ...εἰ δὲ μὴ, ψυγών ἀμονασίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέστατον. With this compare v 468 c, where the gallant soldier is rewarded with the right to kiss his comrades upon the expedition, καὶ μηδεν έξεκαναι ἄπαρανθήσαται ὃν ἂν βούληται φιλεῖ, ἵνα καὶ, εὰν τίνι τού τεχνῆς ἐραν ἢ ἄρρενος ἢ δηλείας, προθυμότερος ἢ πρὸς τὸ τάρατεια φέρειν. See also Zeller's Plato p. 555 s. Susem. (146) 34 τὸ δ' ἐραν μὴ κωλύσαι κτλ] This objection might apparently be met, like the last, n. (145), by some sort of defence. It would however be open to reply on behalf of Aristotle that if the relation of Guardians to one another is seriously to be taken as that of parents and children, brothers and sisters, it is unseemly at any rate to make such strong concessions to sensual passion—whatever may have been Aristotle's own opinion on the direction it took in Greece (see on 1089). Besides, the Platonic institutions take precautions against the "marriage" of those who are actually parents and children,—a fact overlooked by Oncken, who (I. 181) attributes to Aristotle an objection which he neither did nor could bring against Plato on that score—but none at all against the "marriage" of actual brothers and sisters: comp. Kep. v 461 e, αδελφοῦς δὲ καὶ αδελφαί δώσει ὁ νόμος συνα- κείμην, Susseml Plut. Phil. II. 171. As Aristotle does not take especial exception to this it must be assumed that he did not feel his Greek sentiments excessively out- raged, any more than Plato, by incest under this form. It is also significant that he has no word of blame for the deception whereby the rulers in the ideal state are directed to ensure that as many as possible of the ablest guardians of both sexes procreate children, and as few as possible of those who are inferior, Kep.
35 εἶναι omitted by M* and P3 (1st hand, supplied by p3)  40 ἐσκε...b  3 νεωτέρεις  Thuot transposes this passage to follow 1264 a 40 κουσωνίαν, Susem. to follow 1262 b 24 πολιτευόμενος, Intro. 79  41 τοις γυναικας καὶ τῶν παιδῶν  5 6 xiaπαινεὶ νανάχη τοῦ αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἐσται φίλα κοινῶν ὄντων  1262 b δαμ τοις φίλαξι' ἐτον γὰρ ἐσται φίλα κοινῶν ὄντων  41 εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναίκας καὶ τῶν παιδῶν  1262 b δας ἡ τοῖς φίλαξι' ἐτον γὰρ ἐσται φίλα κοινῶν ὄντων  1262 b 4  συμβαίνειν  ἀνάγκη τοῦ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον νόμον ὅν προσ- 5 ἥκει τοὺς ὁρόθις κείμενοις νόμοις αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ δι’ ἥν  5 6 καὶ τὰς γυναικας. φιλιαν τε γὰρ οἰόμεθα μέγεθος εἶναι τῶν ἁγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτως γὰρ ἂν ἢκιστα στασιμύ-  41 εἶναι τας γυναικας κατα τοις παιδων
10 κράτης, ο καὶ δοκεῖ κάκευνος εἶναι φησί τής φιλίας ἕργον, (I) καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ῥήμεν λέγοντα τὸν 'Αρι- 
στοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦν- 
tων συμφυήναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἕκ δύο ὄντων [ἅμορφον] ἐνα.: 
§ 7 ἕνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἅμορφον ἐφθαίρατι ἢ τὸν ἑνα, ἐν 17 
15 δὲ τῇ πόλει τήν φιλίαν ἀναγκαιὸν ὑδαρῆ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν 
κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ήκιστα λέγειν τῶν ἑμὸν ἢ υἱὸν 
§ 8 πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν, ὁπέρ γὰρ μικρὸν γυλκύ εἰς πολὺ 
ὑδαρ μιχθὲν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τήν κράσιν, οὗτο συμβαίνει 
καὶ τῆν οἰκείοτητα τῆν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομα-

13 συμφύηαι, P2,3 Qb Tb U b Ald. Bk. (perhaps more correct), συμφυήαι P4 (1st hand), συμφυήαι P4 (corr.) || [ἅμορφον] Congreve || 14 ei τὸν ἑνα Conring, ei τὸν ἑνα <συμβαίνει> ? Susem., ei τὸν ἑνα Tyrrell || 19 καὶ] κατὰ Lambin, καὶ <περί> Koraes in his Commentary; καὶ <κατὰ> Bernays and independently, but hesitatingly, Vahlen (Zitschr. f. d. östr. Gymn. xxiii. 1872. p. 539), but Bernays makes ἀναγκαῖον ὑν (omitting the comma before διαφοροτίζεων) depend on συμβαίνει, while Vahlen takes this as an absolute accusative. This slight alteration is certainly preferable to that proposed for διαφοροτίζεων (see below), but, as Vahlen rightly judges, not absolutely necessary: either ἀναίσθητον εἶναι can be supplied with Vahlen, or the acc. τῆν οἰκείοτητα κτλ taken as the object of διαφοροτίζεων, with Congreve and Susem.; then ἀναγκαῖον ὑν is to be construed, as Bernays does, omitting the comma; in the former case it is an absolute accusative. Bender (partly anticipated by Spengel) suspects ἀναγκαῖον ὑν || τῆν πρὸς εἶναι πρὸς Spengel

§ 10 φιλίας] Cr. vi(iv), ii. 7: ἡ γάρ κοινωνία φιλικών. Susem.

11 ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις] Plato Symposium 192 c sq, comp. 191 a. Hug in p. x of his edition of that dialogue considers ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι to be the title for the Symposium; but this could only be allowed if the text read “Plato in the discourses on love” whereas it is “Aristophanes in the discourses on love,” and there is nothing to hinder our supplying “contained in Plato’s Symposium.” Moreover Plato’s own theory of love in its fulness and integrity is there given to Socrates alone, who expressly combats the suggestion made by Aristophanes that it is “seeking the other half of ourselves” 205 D; cp. 212 c. Yet no doubt, in so far as Aristotle here makes use of the thought expressed by Plato’s Aristophanes, Plato agrees with the latter. This much is clear, that Aristotle intends to designate Plato as the author of the Symposium. Susem. (148)

12 ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων κτλ] The genitive absolute after λέγοντα instead of δὴι or accusative and infinitive.

§ 14 ἕνταῦθα κτλ] “In this case either both will be spoiled or at least the one absorbed in the other.”

15 υδαρί] water, i.e. diluted (un- 
mixed, ἄκρατος: Aesch. Agam. 770 υδαρε 
σαίνει φιλότητι, Poetics 27 § 13, 1462 b 7 
υδαρή μιθὸν, a tame spun-out plot.

16 ήκιστα λέγειν least likely to ap- 
ply the term ‘mine’: § 5. Owing to a 
feeble esprit de corps they would take 
little pains to assert the relationship.

18 ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων κτλ] ‘So too is it in the end with 
the mutual affection implied in these names’: συμβαίνει sc. ἀναίσθητον εἶναι.
The special affections would be lost in the general sense of comradship. This seems simplest, though it is also possible to govern ὀκειότητα by διαφροτίξεων; so that either ἡ πατέρα κτλ is the subject of διαφροτίξεων, as Congreve and Susmihl think, or as Ridgeway Texts 11. 132 proposes ἡ πατέρα κτλ is to be regarded as epehexetic of the wider term ὀκειότητα. He translates: 'so the result is that in such a constitution as Plato's least of all is it necessary to have regard for the mutual family feelings implied in these names' (of father and son).

21 πατέρα ὡς νιόν κτλ] "that one citizen should care for another as father for son, or son for father, or as one brother for another." "Ridgeway aptly compares VIII(v). 11. 21 ταμίαν ὡς κοινόν ἄλλα μὴ ὡς ἰδίων, Melaph. M. 5 § 6, 1079 b 34 τῶν ὡς γένους εἴδων, species in relation to a genus. For other views of the construction see Critical Notes.

§ 9 23 τὸ ἀγαπήτων has been taken to mean (1) only, rare, unique, μόνον (Eaton, quoting Odyssey 11. 365 μονὸς ἄγαπητὸς); and (2) much desired, dearly prized, precious. Susm.

See Cope's note on Khd. 1. 7, 41: καὶ τὸ ἀγαπήτων (μείζον ἄγαθον ἄρτε), καὶ τοὺς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἄλλως, where it must have the second meaning, as unicus in Catullus 64. 215.

§ 4 1262 a 40 γεωργοι] Here as often the farmers stand for the entire third class of citizens in Plato's ideal state, τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν πλήθος of 5 § 18, all who are neither ἄγοντες nor εἰκοσαὶ, properly including (§ 9) τεχνηταί and all who are engaged in trade as well as in agriculture. See 5 § 20, where all are enumerated. The strength of this class excites Aristotle's fears: see 5 §§ 19, 20, 22.

41 χρήσιμον] Comp. VIII(v). 11. 15 (Eaton). This section is the only new application of the argument in the whole passage which follows § 3. For the rest, §§ 5—7 are essentially a repetition, with certain distinctive and appropriate nuances, of the objections contained in 3 §§ 4—7; yet they are not constructed like another version simply to supersede them. Neither passage gives the slightest cause for suspicion of its genuineness. We must be content to set down to the occasional negligence of Aristotle's style this reiteration of a previous line of argument without any indication that it has occurred before. Comp. u. (164) on 5 § 14. Susm. (149)}
26 τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δ' ἐκ τοῦ -(I) τῶν εἰς ἑκείνους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν, τίνα ἐσται τρόπον' καὶ γνώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας (p. 28)  

§ 10 τίσι τίνας διδάσκειν, ἕτε δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι λεγόμενα μάλλον 30 ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, οὐσιν αἰκίας ἔρωτας φύσιν: οὐ γὰρ ἐτι προσαγορεύονται ἰδέαλφοι καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας οἱ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες τοὺς φύλακας καὶ πάλιν οἱ πάρα τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, ἦστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.  

5 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας 36 κοινωνίας διορίσθη καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον' ἐκόμενον II  

δὲ τούτων ἐστιν ἐπίσκεψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα τρόπον δὲ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι  

28 <γὰρ> γνώσκειν Bernays, perhaps rightly  31 προσαγορεύονται Koraces  32 τοὺς φύλακας before of το II Bk.; omitted by M'P1  33 φύλαξ  

Π, φύλαξ εἰς p1 ΠΙΙ Ar. Bk.  

who as they grow up may display higher mental and moral qualities, in order that they may be received amongst the children of the Guardians and educated along with them for duties like theirs. See République III 415 b, IV 423 c. SUSEM. [150]  

27 πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν] Schlosser remarks that this requires a more detailed proof. SUSEM. [151]  

There does seem some variance between the rule laid down above, Κεφ. 423 c. Τίτων. 19 Α (τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὰν ἄλλον λαθρα διαδοτέοι πόλιν, ἐπαναξιομείων δὲ σκοποῦσαν δὲ τῶν ἄξιοι πάλιν ἀνάγεται δειν, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ σφίν αναξιόν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐπισώπων χώραν μεταλάθεται), and that other regulation about exposure Κεφ. v 460 c (τὰ δὲ τῶν χερόνων, καὶ εάν τί τῶν ἑτέρων ἀνάπρο σχέσθαι, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατα- 

κράτονοι),.  

28 καὶ γνώσκειν κτλ] But what harm could this knowledge do in the case of the children of Guardians who were degraded? As to the children of the third class adopted as Guardians, nothing could prevent the whole body of Guardians from knowing in the end that they were of different blood. But if we assume that all the other institutions of this ideal state are practicable, these adopted children would suffer no neglect, from any one or in anything, on that account. SUSEM. [152]  

Aristotle implies that jealousy and dis-
union would follow the recognition of the facts. 

29 τίσι τίνας διδάσκειν] This clause depends on γνώσκειν.  30 πάλαι=above, §§ 1—3. So in III. 14, 14 τὸν πάλαι λόγον. VIII(v). 11. 24. Obviously Aristotle shrinks with horror (as we should) from these crimes against blood relations: but there is no evidence that it is on the ground which Grote ascribes to him, "that serious mis-

chief would fall upon the community if family quarrels or homicide remained without religious expiation."  

34 ὡσε εὐλαβεῖσθαι "so as to be on their guard," as they might be if they used these terms of relationship.  

c. 5 Objections to community of prop-

erty: §§ 1—13. See Analysis p. 103.  

§ 1 37 τίνα τρόπον δὲ κτλ] This issue is not decided in what follows, for the conclusion adopted in §§ 5—8 excludes the first and third of these alter-

native in their application to all the land, 

but does not necessarily exclude the second. Later on however, iv(vii). 10. 10 n. (834), we perceive that even the second sugestion does not by any means correspond with Aristotle's view, which is more like the third, provided it be restricted to a part of the territory, where-

as Plato had extended it to the whole. In Plato's Callipolis the Guardians are forbidden the possession of gold and silver and of money altogether, and so far they
39 η μη κωμη after ελαιν M* P1. In Π δει was perhaps repeated before ελαιν || [πότερον—40 κωμη] ? Schmidt and then a colon after νενομοθετημενων

1263 a 1 [τα περι την κτησιν] Susem. || 2 πασας Π Susem. 1-12 Freudenthal (perhaps rightly), πασω M* || πασι: <τας κτήσεις η τας χρήσεις η> τας ορ πασι <τας χρήσεις η τας κτήσεις η> τας Spengel, ** τας Susem. 1-12 || τε] γε Koraes Oncken Bernays which gives no sense || χρήσεις κωμαις ειναι βελτιων η τας κτήσεις Koraes Oncken || 3 και] η Schlosser Koraes Oncken, κατα Bernays || χρήσεις <η μονας τας κτήσεις η τας χρήσεις> Freudenthal, χρήσεις <η τας κτήσεις μονών η τας χρήσεις> Busse, χρήσεις <η> Heinsius Hampke

have no property of their own. Nevertheless the connex of Platonic thought leaves no doubt that the entire body of Guardians is the sole proprietor of the soil, and that thus they hold landed property in common. The farmers of the third class are consequently tenants who pay a rent in kind for the farms they cultivate, this rent being a definite amount of the produce supplied to the Guardians, who have the other indispensable necessaries of life provided for them by other members of the third class in lieu of a tax levied for protection. Lastly, the common dwellings and common meals of the guardians make community of property and community of life amongst them an actual accomplished fact. See Rpf. III 416 c, IV 419, V 464 c, and comp. Zeller's Plato p. 481 Eng. tr. The extension of these common dwellings and common meals to women is not expressly mentioned by Plato, but it is implied in his complete equalization of male and female Guardians:—cp. n. (106) and i. 13. 9 n. (116). Thus, as Oncken i. 183 justly observes, “Plato has simply abolished the possession of capital by a theoretical flat, while Aristotle B. i c. 8 has done his best to banish it to the remotest regions of economic life. Only landed property with the income derived from it is of any account in their philosophical deliberations.” There is this difference between them that Aristotle believes community of property to be possible apart from community of families: whereas the fact is that there cannot be a true marriage in our sense of the term without settled and independent housekeeping of one's own. Here he is not so consistent as Plato, which is easily explained however by the fact that his whole economic theory rests upon the basis of slavery in the genuine fashion of antiquity, of Greek antiquity especially. And one consequence of this is that, as Oncken again justly observes, his conception of property does not involve that of personal labour. On this point see Intro. p. 27. SUSEM. (153)

39 πολιτειαν] Cognate accus. after πολιτευονται. The phrase recurs vii(4). 1. 4. We find καθ' ας πολιτευονται, ii. 7. 11; the accusative in i. 11. 13 τατά πολιτευονται, and in τα προς αυτως ii. 7. 14, is not quite similar.

§ 11 40 χωρίς σκέψαται ἀπο] separately from=independently of. Comp. Plato Phaedr. 85 c διαφωνας ἔχει χωρίς ἀπ' ἄλληνων, “to separate them.” This is the sense of ἀπο in ἀπόφασις, negative predication, διαφημημένον τον ὄντος as Aristotle puts it. Compare πάροιμως ἀντί ημών Problems. xvi. 10. 917 b 4, and Nic. Eth. ix. 8. 1 oδεν ἀντί εαυτοῦ πράττει, nothing away from, i.e. unlike, himself.

1263 a 1 ἕκεινα χωρίς = the families are separate.

2 κτήσεις (χρήσεις; ownership, fec-simpel) (usufruct, income returned).

3 οἶνον introduces the application of the three modes of communism to land and its produce. “I mean, (1) when the estates are held separately but the crops are brought into a common stock for consumption, or (2) when the land is held in common and cultivated by the state as
public property, but the produce divided for private uses, or (3) when both lands and crops are held in common." Of modern theories, (3) alone answers to what Mill Pol. Ec. II. c. 1 calls thoroughly going communism: (2) to the milder forms proposed by St Simon and Fourier.

I. 1. If in Leb. cp. O.V.T & V. v.

4 TOY] Editors refer to Lacedaemon (§ 7) and Tarentum viii(vi). 5. 10. But these instances seem hardly sufficient to establish the first form of communism: and Ἵνθυ, see n. (11), would suggest here also non-Hellenic tribes, to whose customs Aristotle paid considerable attention to judge from the fragments of his Νόμωμα or Νόμωμα βαρβαρικόν; cp. IV(vii). 2. 11. That work being lost, the most apposite references are from Diodorus v. 44, of the Vaccoaeans, a Celtiberian tribe: v. 9, of the exiled Cnidians and Rhodians who colonized the Aeolian isles (Lipari): v. 41, of Panchaia, which Strabo thinks a fiction. Nearcuss in Strabo xv. 1. 66 testifies to the custom amongst certain tribes of India. Further, the prevalence formerly of this system of land-tenure would serve to explain συνοίτια.

5 τινες] On this second system, if the soil is to remain common property there must be a periodic partition, such as is in force even now in Russia, in some Swiss cantons (e.g. Glaris) and amongst the village communities (dessas) of Java. This was the characteristic feature of the German mark, first known by Caesar's account of the Suevi (Bell. Gall. vi. 29). Strabo viii. 6. 7 affirms it of the Dalmatians, and the Greek settlers on the Aeolian islands finally adopted this plan, Diod. v. 9. In fact, "there appears to be no country inhabited by an Aryan race in which traces do not remain of the ancient periodical redistribution," which preceded and at length ended in perpetuity of occupation: Maine Village Communities p. 81. To collect these traces is the object of M. de Laveleye's Primitive Property: see pp. 109, 145 ff. (of the English trans. by Marriott). It was a modification of this second system which appears to have prevailed among the Village Indians of North America at the time of its discovery. "They still held lands in common: the lands of each Aztec "group" could not be alienated. They constructed joint-tenement houses and lived in large households composed of a number of related families, sometimes fifty or a hundred families together: and there are grounds for believing that they practised common living in the household; i.e. something analogous to συνοίτια; L. II. Morgan Anc. Society pp. 187, 200 ff., 535—538.

§ 8 τέτερον] a distinct body, αὐτόν = the citizens themselves; αὐτόν αὐτοῖς διαποροῦντον = when they are αὐτόργανοι, Thucyd. i. 126.

"This remark is quite true in itself, but it makes for Plato rather than against him. His guardians are a distinct body from the γεωργοί and are thus in the position described as most favourable to communism" (Oncken). SUSEM. (154)

10 τά περὶ τὰς κτήσεις is nomin., the subject of ἄν παρέχοι and not the object of διαποροῦντον.

11. "For where all have not equal shares in enjoyment any more than in work, indeed have very unequal shares, dissatisfaction must needs be felt with those who have much enjoyment and little labour, by those who get less and have more work to do." This is the standing difficulty of communistics schemes, see Mill Pol. Econ. II. 1 § 3.
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑργοῖς μὴ γινομένων ἴσων ἄλλῳ ἀνίσων ἀναγκαίον (II) ἐγκλήματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν [ἡ λαμβάνουσα] τοῦτο, ὅλη ἐν δὲ ποιούσας τοὺς ἐλάττως μὲν λαμβάνουσι, § 4 πλείω δὲ ποιοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὰ συνύμ, καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀν-θρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων. δηλοῦσι δ' αἱ τῶν συναποδημῶν κοινωνίαι: σχέδον γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι διαφέρομενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσ- κρούσεως ἀλλήλους. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τοῦτοι μάλιστα (p. 29) 20 προσκρούσεως οὐς πλείστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακοινίας § 5 τὰς ἐγκυκλίων. τὸ μὲν ὅπως κοινᾶς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας τε καὶ ἀλλας τοιαύτας ἐξει δυσχερείας: ὅπερ δὲ νῦν τρόπων ἐξει καὶ ἐπικοινωνήθηκαν ἐδεσί καὶ τἀξεῖ νόμων ὁρθῶν, οὐ μικρόν ἀν διενέγκαι. ἐξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφιτέρων ἀγαθὸν. 25 λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφιτέρων τοῦ τὸν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτή-

12 ἄλλων ἀνίσων omitted by O2-3 Qib Tb Ub Ar. Ald. Bk. and P4 (1st hand; added in the margin) || 13 [ἡ λαμβάνουσα] Congreve, μὲν [ἡ λαμβάνουσα] omitted by Ub Ald. || 18 διαφέρονται Kones || προσκρούσει for προσκροῦσες Congreve || 20 χωρίωμεθα P1 || 22 νῦν after τρόπων ἐξει M P1 || 23 καὶ after ἐξει omitted by P3 || ἔδεισι P2 Ar. Bk.

§ 4 15 κοινωνεῖν governs τῶν ἀνθρω-πικῶν πάντων; “to share in all relations of human life, especially as such affect property.”

17 συναποδημῶν] N. Eth. viii. 9 §§ 4, 5; συμπεριλαμβάνεται γὰρ ἐπὶ τους συμ-φέροντες, καὶ παρακλίσει τὴν ἔως τοῦ βιοῦ. 18 διαφέροντες...προσκρούσεως] Participial construction with ellipse of copula, as perhaps in i. 5, 9 αἰσθησάμενα. τῶν ἐν ποσὶ] things near at hand, immediately before us: Herod. III. 79; ἐκτεινον τῶν μάγων πάντα τόν ἐν ποσὶ γινόμενον.

προσκρούσεως] Comp. N. Eth. ix. 4 § 1, τῶν φιλῶν οἱ προσκρούσκοι = friends who have broken with each other.

20 τὰς δ. τὰς ἐγκυκλίους] for the daily round of services. Cp. i. 9. 9 (Eaton), also ii. 9. 9 n. 291. SUSEM. (155)

§ 5 22 ἄλλας τοιαύτας] Aristotle never urges (1) that communism will diminish the efficiency of labour, nor (2) that it will relax the checks on an increase of population. The Hellenic idea of the omnipotence of the state precluded these objections. The conclusion at which he arrives is endorsed in the remarks of Mill Pal. Ec. ib. p. 128: “We must compare communism at its best with the régime of individual property, not as it is, but as it might be made. The principle of private property has never yet had a fair trial in any country.”

δν δὲ νῦν τρόπων κτλ] δν τρόπων νῦν ἐξει with the exepexgetic ἐπικοινωνήθηκν κτλ is the subject of δἰενέγκαι: “the order of things at present existing if improved by good manners and the enactment of wise laws would be far superior”; ἔδεισ, somewhat wider than morality, see § 15; ways, habits, instincts.

“This is in reality not so much proved as stated; still it is not laid down simply on the strength of § 4. Oncken 1. 184 goes decidedly too far in saying the attacks on community of property lack all precision and point, and that the doctrine is not refuted on its own merits like the community of families. He fails to notice what is pointed out by Zeller Platonic Studies p. 289 that the words of §§ 6—8 all will thrive better under a system of private property because then each one labours assiduously for his own advantage’—apply to property exactly the same argument which was used with most effect to refute on its own grounds community of wives and children and was for that reason twice advanced, 3 §§ 4—7, 4 §§ 4—8 n. (149).” SUSEM. (156)
seis or the others. He når πῶς men einai koinías, ὄλως (II) § 6 ὁ ἰδιας. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διηρήμεναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπιδιώκουσιν ὡς πρὸς ἰδιον ἐκάστῳ προσερέμεντες. δὲ ἀρετὴν δὲ ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρήστων σθαι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν τὸν τρόπον τούτον ἐν ἑνίασι πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένοι, ὡς οὐκ ἔν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκουμέναις § 7 τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ γένοιτ' ἀν. ἰδιαν γὰρ ἐκαστὸς τὴν κτήσιν ἔχουν τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρήσται κοινῶς, ὅπου καὶ ἐν Δακεδαίμοις τοῖς δεύτεροι χρῶνται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπέων ἱδιοῖς, ἐτὶ δ' ὑπόποιος καὶ κυριοί, καὶ

28 μᾶλλῳ τε; Susem. || 29 ἐκάστῳ προσερέμεντες P1 IF Blk. (perhaps rightly) || 33 γίνεται? Susem. || 35 ὅτι κοινῶς Susem.1-2, lamiam william || 36 ὅτι εἰπέων? Susem. ὡς εἰς πᾶσαν? Schmidt, ὡς εἰπέων Giphanius, ὡσπερ? Koraes || ἀν (?) Γ

26 For ὄλως = in general, almost like ἀπλῶς, comp. III. 9. 4, VIII(v). I § 3. § 13 where it is opposed to κατὰ τι as here to πῶς. § 6 27 The division of attention will remove mutual dissatisfaction: the article implies 'those grounds of complaint specified above.' Each will set about his own task, e.g., the cultivation of land.

29 δὲ ἀρετὴν κτλ] Public virtue will ensure that, as the proverb has it, in all that relates to use friends go shares in property.

"Comp. IV(vii). 10. 9 with n. (831). Giphanius observes that this favourite maxim of the Pythagoreans is purposely introduced here because Plato (Rep. IV 424 A) applied it to the absolute community of property. It is not Aristotle, however, but Plato who misconstrues it: in fact after the latter had misinterpreted it, the former restores it to its original sense. See Zeller's Pre-Socrates i. p. 345 n. 2, Eng. tr." SUSEM. (156 b)

31 ἐν ἑνίασι πόλεων] See the commen

32 ὡς = implying that.

33 τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ] either is or might become.

§ 7 34 τοῖς δὲ χρήσται κοινῶς] Here even Aristotle's political theory has a certain dash of socialism; only in the main he stops short of the actual facts as presented in Sparta particularly, whereas Plato set out from these Spartan institutions, but only to go far beyond them. It is also justly observed by Oncken i. 183, that in general wherever, as was the case in Greece, the freemen are principally supported by the labour of strangers who are not free, there the ruling caste as a whole stands in a certain communistic relation as opposed to the servile caste. Compare further n. (166). SUSEM. (158)

35 ὅπου καὶ ἐν Δακεδαίμοις κτλ] Xenophon De Rep. Lacled. 6 §§ 3, 4 relates in the main the same facts, first, as to slaves and helots; and as to horses, with the more precise limitation that a sick man or any one requiring a carriage or desirous of travelling rapidly to a given place will, if he sees a horse anywhere, take it and after using it return it faithfully unhurt. As to dogs, he still more definitely restricts this usage to the chase. Those who require the dogs invite their owner to go hunting; while he, if he has not the time, readily sends them off with the pack. There is no such information in Xenophon about produce growing in the fields: what he does say is that after a meal in the country people left the remainder of the food they had prepared in store-chambers: others, detained while hunting and in need of food, might, if they had no provisions with them, break the seals of these store-chambers and take what they required, leaving the rest behind and replacing the seal. SUSEM. (159)
§ 8 δεδηθὼσιν ἑφοδίων, <τοῖς> ἐν τοῖς ἅγροις κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερῶν (II) τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς· ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιούτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦτο ἔργον ἴδιον ἐστὶν. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἴδιον ἄμφιθητον ὅσον διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἴδιον τι. μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλιάν ἐκαστος, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τοῦτο φυσικόν.

§ 9 τὸ δὲ φιλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δὲι φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ἐτεί φιλοῦσι γε πάντες ὡς εἰπέτειν ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἐταίροις ἢδιστον’ ὃ γίνεται τῆς κτήσεως ἰδίας ὑπόσις.


37 ἑφοδίων] πρὸ viaticis William || <τοῖς> or <τάσις τοῖς> before κατά Sauppe, before ἐν Susem., <τοῖς> ἐν had also occurred to Vahlen, Ztschr. f. d. östr. G. xxv. 1874, p. 487, [ἐν] τοῖς ἅγροις Oncken, [ἐν] ταῖς ἄγραις Bernays, <ταμεῖοις> ἐν or <ταμεῖοις> ἐν v. Leutsch, ἐν ταῖς ἄγραις Busse and Ridgeway independently || χώραιν] θήραν Bücheler, perhaps rightly

1253 b 1 αὐτὸς omitted by Π1 || 3 τὸ omitted by Qb Tb U b and P2 (1st hand; added by corr.3) || 4 καὶ τὸ Π1 Ar., καὶ τὸν Γ' Π2 3-4 Qb Tb U b, τὸν Ald. || φιλο-χρήματον <καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον> ? Koraes, accepted by Bernays || 5 ἐκαστὸς Π3-4 Qb Tb U b Ald. and P2 (1st hand; emended by corr.3) || 6 ἐτείνοις Π1 Susem.1-2 || 7 οὐ after δὴ omitted by Π1 || 9 τὸ after μὲν omitted by Π1, τῷ Bernays

§ 8 39 τοιοῦτοι sc, οὖν τῇ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς. Above δὲ ἀρετήν.

νομοθέτου ἔργον] Undoubtedly Aristotelic hopes for results of human legislation which now we only expect from the training of the conscience by morality and religion; see on 9 § 12 n. (296). Herein he agrees with Plato; not however, like him, from any denial or under-estimate of the rights or power of individuality (Oncken). See notes (161) and (162). Susem. (160)

40 ἐτὶ δὲ κτλ] “Again, even to the pleasure we feel, the difference that it makes to call a thing our own is unspeakably great.” An expression like οὐράνιων οὗν, θαυμάσιον δακ, nium quantum.

41 μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην] By μὴ or μὴν with the indicative, no uncertainty is intended; ibi quoque adhibita reperitur, ubi res affirmatur non negatur. “It may well be that our love for ourselves is not without a purpose.”

§ 9 1253 b 2 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο] Comp. Nic. Eth. ix. 8, 1, 1168 a 28, Rhet. i. 11, 26, 1371 b 18; also Plato Laws v 731 D (Eaton). Congreve quotes Nic. Eth. ix. 4, 1, where even friendship and benevolence are reduced to forms of self-love, τὰ φιλικὰ τὰ πρὸς τούς φίλους... ἐσκεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλύθειναι. Susem. (161)

3 καθαπερ κτλ] “just as the love of money means to love it more than is right”3; Pl. Rep. i 347 β τὸ φιλάργυρον εἶναι όφειδός λέγεται (Vettri). Comp. also Nic. Eth. iv. 4. 4; φερομεν τὸ φιλότιμον ἐπαινούτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἰ πολλοί, ψευντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

§ 10 7 συμβαίνει] of awkward consequences involved in a theory: ανμιβανεν dicitur ubi factis ex aliqua hypothesis conclusionibus ipsa hypothesis refutatur (Bonitz).

8 ἀναρροῦσιν ἔργα] “destroy the functions.”

9 σωφροσύνης] Even Zeller Phil. d. Gr. ii ii p. 697, n. 7, thinks this an unfair objection, because in Plato’s commonwealth a guardian is bound to continence
in respect of all women to whom he is not married by the authorities, the Platonic ‘community of wives’ being the very reverse of free indulgence of the appetites. Quite true: but then neither is this the point of Aristotle’s objection. What he urges is that voluntary self-restraint, which is nowhere possible save where monogamy is established, and in Plato’s state is out of the question, alone deserves the name of continence, ἑυφροσύνη. We must admit with Oncken that he is right in this, and that §§ 9, 10 make an especially agreeable impression, as a defence of the individual’s moral freedom. Further, see n. (206 b). SUSEM. (162)

11 érγον καλὸν] Strictly, a godly deed, fair to contemplate; then a ‘moral action’ (since the motive makes the act virtuous; it must be done τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα), with that peculiar implication of ‘nobleness’ which runs through the Nic. Ethics.

12 πράξεων ἐλευθερίαν] for which private property, e.g. money, is required. Comp. Nic. Eth. x. 8. 4 τῷ μὲν ἐλευθερόν δείχνει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πρᾶξει τὰ ἐλευθερία; ib. § 7. Can we ascribe acts of liberality to the gods? τίνι δὲ δόσσων; ἀτοσον δ᾿ εί καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ νόμωμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

13 ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει...14 ἐργὸν ἔστι] for the use of one’s possessions is the field for the exercise of liberality. Cicero’s usus virtutis, Acad. post. 1. 38 is analogous to ἐργὸν in this sense.

§ 11 17 φιλίαν τινά θαυμαστὴν] Comp. Dante Purgatorio xv. 55—57, which per quanto si dice più il nostro, | tanto possiedi più di ben ciascuno, | e più di caritate arde in quel chiostro; 73—75, e quasi gente più lassù s’intende, | più v’è da bene amare, e più vi s’ama, | e come specchio, l’uno all’altro rende.

Ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις] Here he evidently has in mind Plato’s expressions, Repub. iv 425 c: τὸ δὲ, τὰ ἀγαφαί ἐμβολαιά τε πέρα κατ’ ἀγαφὰν ἐκαστὸν ἀ πρὸς ἄλληλους ἐμβαλλόντων...τούτων τολμήσομεν τοὺς νομοθετεῖν; 464 D δικαία τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἄλληλους οὐκ ὁχεῖσθαι εἰς αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐπος εἰτεῖν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἰδιὸν ἥκτρισθαι πλὴν τὸ σωμα; Although not precisely the same evils are enumerated there and here, nor expressly derived from the institution of private property, yet in fact Aristotle’s words quite accord with the view of the Republic. Comp. §§ 20, 21 with nn. (174, 175). SUSEM. (163)


§ 12 22 ὦν οὐδὲν γίνεται] This is begging the question, though it may fairly be surmised that communism would not cure all these evils.
23 ἐπει καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοι- (Π) νονούντας πολλῷ διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὀρόμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρίς
25 τὰς ὑπόθεσις ἔχουσας· ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὅλους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοι-
νώνων διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτη-

§ 13 μένους ἵνα τὰς κτήσεις.

30 αἴτιον δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρῆ νομίζειν
§ 14 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ὤσιν ὀρθὴν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶς μιᾶν
καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ ὡς πάντως. ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς
οὐκ ἦσταν. προϊέσα τὸλις, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς ἦστα μὲν, ἐγγὺς δὲ οὖσα
τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι, χείρων πόλις, ὡσπερ κἂν εἴ τὴν τὴν
35 συμφωνίαν ποίησαν ὄμοφωνιάν ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μιᾶν.

25 τοῖς] τῶν Ρ¹ Q¹ Ub Ald. || 32 πάσων p¹ Π² Bk. || ἐσταὶ M¹ and P¹ (1st
hand) || 33 Walford (as cited by Eaton) transposes πόλις to follow ἐσταὶ
μὲν || 34 ἐσταὶ was added after ἐναι by Vettori Bk. Susen12, critic William

23 ἐπει καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κτλ] “Since we see just those people who are joint
owners and who share property quarrelling far more than those who have
their estates separate.” Are these the συναπο-
δομος of § 4? Or is the reference to com-
mercial partnerships?

25 ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν κτλ] The cases of
quarrels seen to arise out of partnerships
are few; it is true; but then we compare
them with the large number of those who have
separate possessions.

§ 13 29 ἀδύνατος] Compare Grote
III. pp. 217—222. “This supposed im-
possibility is the mode of expressing
strong disapprobation and repugnance.
Plato’s project contradicts sentiments con-
ceived as fundamental and consecrated:
the reasons offered to prove it impossible
are principally founded upon the very
sentiment adverted to. The truly for-
cible objection is the sentiment itself.”
Plato impugns it and declares it to be
inapplicable to his guardians: amongst
whom as he conceives, a totally different
sentiment of obligation would grow up.
Similarly “if Sparta had never been
actually established and if Aristotle had
read a description of it as a mere project,
he would probably have pronounced it
impracticable.”

30 παρακρούσεως] “fallacy” as in
De Soph. El. 17 § 3; 175 b 1, Demoth.
c. Timocr. § 194, 760 27 φενακισμοῦ καὶ
παρακρούσεως ἐνεκα.
Whereas the steps of 'dancing' are composed by βάσει, 'step' in metre. This is from Νέταρθ. XIV (N) 1. 10, 1087 b 33, ὁ δὲ ἐν ητὶ μέτρῳ σχηματίζει, φαινομένος, καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἑστι τῇ ητὶ ἑ τοιούτων, ὅν ὅν ἐν ἀρμονία διέσις (in music a quarter-tone, the smallest interval), ὁ δὲ μεγέθει δάκτυλος ὁ ποῖος τῇ τοιούτων, ὁ δὲ μυθικὸς βάσις ἡ συλλαβή. Instead of the regular orderly sequence of βάσεις, steps in dancing or feet in recitation, of various lengths, there will be only a single monotonous step or a single beat.

§ 15 36 πρότερον] §§ 5—8. SUSEM. (165)

37 κοινὴ τοιοῦτον] widen it so that all shall share in it.

tόν γε μέλλοντα παθιέντα κτλ] Comp. 7 § 8 n. (238), and below §§ 18, 19. SUSEM. (165 b)

39 τοῖς τοιούτοις=such direct, compulsory measures, as Plato proposes.

40 ήθος, φιλοσοφία, νόμοι] Comp. φύσις, ἡθος, λόγος of IV(VII). 13. 11 n. (887). SUSEM. (166)

50 φιλοσοφία in the wider sense, 'culture,' as in 7 § 12. So Rhet. II. 23. 11 of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, perhaps a quotation from Alkidamas. An approximation to Isocrates' use of the word for 'literary training.'

τά περὶ τάς κτίσεις] Aristotle's fondness for social institutions of the Cretan and Spartan type—see § 7, n. (158)—is here seen in a new direction, of which we shall hear more in c. 9 § 31 n. (341), 10 §§ 7, 8, IV(VII). 10 §§ 9, 10 and notes. Compare further notes 168, 192, 208—11, 234, 236 b. SUSEM. (166)

§ 16 1264 a 3 οὐκ ἐν ἑλαθέν] An appeal to the evidence of history. It is like Aristotle to seek for the doctrines he approves some basis in tradition, authority, popular or wide-spread beliefs. "An institution which has flourished in many different ages and races must presumably fulfil some want and correspond to some deeply-seated instinct." Grote rejoins that the same objection (like the objection of impossibility) would apply to the novels of his own ideal state. But Aristotle might fairly have argued that the long time which has elapsed without a communistic state makes it the less likely that one ever will be established, as no originating cause seems forthcoming adequate to start it.

4. οὐ συνήκται have not been systematized. A 'synthesis' is wanting.

τοῖς δὲ οὐ χρωνται] Much that is known is not introduced because it is regarded as impracticable. Assuming that the earth, and doubtless the race of men upon it (8 § 21 n.), has always existed and always will exist Aristotle shares the conviction of Plato and most other Greek thinkers that there has not been one single historical development of humanity, but it has begun and been carried on, in a manner similar if not quite the same, for innumerable times over and over again. Hence to a greater or less
§ 17 γνώσκωντες. μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, εἰ τις τοσὶ ἐρ- 6 γοις ἔδω τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην: οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζουν αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζουν ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίας καὶ φυλαίς. ὥστε οὐδέν ἄλλο συμβήσεται νευμοβεθημένοι πλὴν μὴ γεωρ- τίο γεῖν τοὺς φύλακας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπι-
§ 18 χειροσύνη. (οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' οὐδέ̄ ρ τρόπος τῆς ὀλης πολιτείας τῆς ἔσται τῶν κοινώνουσι, οὔτ' εἰρηκεν ὁ Ἀκράτης οὔτε βίδιον
7 αὐτῶν Αλ. αὐτῆς Thom., αὐτῶν Böcker, αὐξ Bernays, αὐτή Jackson, αὐτίκα Welldon || 8 φατρίας Με Π3-4 Θb Αld. Susem.2-3, φατρίας Π1 || 9 οὐδέ̄ν [p. 10 και μν] τὸνν Triebner

extent everything has existed before, and there is nothing new under the sun: all discoveries have been already made and then lost again, so that they need to be rediscovered. See Zeller II p. 792. Comp. Susemihl in Jahrb. f. Philol. vol. ciii. 1871, p. 135 ff.: IV(vii). 10 §§ 7, 8 n. (828). Plato however would have had all the more right to reply to this objection that he himself has but made such a rediscovery: that, as Oncken observes, he has only followed Aristotle's advice and collected institutions hitherto widely scattered: that his innovation consists solely in this combination of old material, as all the elements of his ideal state were to be found previously isolated, some in Sparta and Crete, others amongst the Pythagoreans, and others again in Socrates. Comp. Zeller's Plato p. 483 f. SUSEM. (167)

This view found a strong expression from K. F. Hermann The historical elements of Plato's ideal of a state, in Gesam. Abhandl. vii. 140; "Plato has drawn every single feature in his picture of the state from the actual political life of Greece; he has, however, applied the abstractions of science to produce a formal and harmonious combination." It is at least obvious that the Spartan áρωγὴ is, in a manner, the true starting-point of Plato, as of Xenophon and Aristotle (Grote iii. 209—211); but some caution should be exercised in the choice of precedents. Thus L. H. Morgan Ancient Society p. 417 conjectures that the system of relationship propounded in Ῥη. v 461 D, Ῥη. 18 C, D was derived from "traditions not known to us"; and Curtius (History of Greece i p. 181 Eng. trans.) that the three orders of society Ῥη. iv were adopted from Crete (see n. 818)—two features of the scheme which bear in a high degree the stamp of originality. /
eîpeîn. kai toii χεδον το γε πλήθος της πόλεως τω των ἀλ- (Π) λων πολιτών γίνεται πλήθος, περί oun oudeîn diôrîstai, πότε-15 ρον καὶ τοις γεωργοίς κοινω εἶναι δεί τὰς κτήσεις ἦ [καὶ] καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἴδιας, ἐτι δὲ καὶ γνώακας καὶ παῖδας ἴδιοις § 19 ἦ κοινῶς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοιναὶ πάντα πάνω-12 τον, τὶ διόρισαν ὑπὲρ ἐκεῖνων των φυλάκων; ἦ τὶ πλείον τοῖς ἀναμνήσκονται τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν; ἦ τὶ παθόντες ὑπομενοῦσιν 20 τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἐδώ ἐστι τὸ σοφίζωσι τοιούτων ὁδὸν Κρῆτες; ἐκείνων γὰρ τάλλα ταύτα τοῖς δύολοις ἐφέσας μοῦνον ἀφη-§ 20 ρίκασε τὰ γνώματα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄπλων κτήσιν. εἰ δὲ, κα-

15 καὶ after ἦ untranslated by William and Ar. § 16 καὶ after δὲ omitted by ΠΠ || 19 ἀρχηγοὶ or something similar, in the place of ὑπομενοῦσι, Lampin and Thurot: Bernays omits 18 ἦ τὶ πλείον.....ἀρχὴν with Ar. and transposes αὐτῶν to follow 20 ἀρχὴν || μαθῶντες ΡΙΠ² Bekk. Bernays, but παθόντες ΡΙ (corr.) || ὑπομενοῦσι Αρ., ὑπομενοῦσι ΓΙ || 21 ταύτα Γ, πάντα Αρ. (2), Koraes || ἐφέσας Qb-Ta Ub and Π (1st hand) || ἀπειρήσας D²-Θ Qb-Ta Ub Ald. Bk. and apparently Π (1st hand), perhaps rightly

§ 19 17 εἰ μὲν γὰρ κτᾶ] Aristotle might well have spared himself the consideration of this possibility. It is strange that he has not learnt from Plato whether this third order of citizens is to have community of families and of property; whether, in other words, just those characteristics which, like their education, are distinctive of the two upper classes in the ideal state, are to be extended to the third, or not. It is not easy to imagine a stronger case of inability to transport oneself to an opponent’s sphere of thought. In fact he cannot be acquitted of very culpable carelessness in the use of the work he is criticizing. As regards community of property at any rate, Plato has most expressly said Rep. ΠΙ ι 417 Α, IV 419 that nothing of the kind is to exist amongst citizens of the third class, leaving room for no doubt whatever as to his real opinion. Nor is Aristotle even consistent. For in 4 § 4 above he has, with better reason, raised an objection which is only intelligible if these institutions are not supposed existing in the third class of citizens. Comp. § 24 n. (179); also n. (168) and the references there given. SUSEM. (170)

18 ἦ τὶ πλείον κτᾶ] See Critical Notes. The sense we require is not, “what compensation will those receive who submit to their rule?” (which is repeated in the next sentence), but “what advantage will the rulers have over their subjects?” The older commentators endeavoured to extract this by taking τοῖς ὑπομενοῦσι τὴν ἀρχὴν = τοῖς ὑπομενοῦσιν ἀρχὴν, “those who undertake to govern.” But this is against the sense of ὑπομενοῦσι in the next clause: “or what indulgence will (the rest of the citizens) have to submit to them?”

20 σοφίζωσιν = devise or contrive (Eaton).

οἰνον Κρῆτες] See on 9 § 3 n. (281) and Exc. ΠΙ. This statement is confirmed by the skelos of the Cretan poet Hybris there quoted. See also ΠΙV (317). ΠΙ. 1 n. (172). SUSEM. (171)

21 τοῖς δαύλοις ἐφέσας] “while allowing their serfs the same rights with themselves in other things, have deprived them”...(ἀπειρήσας would be ‘have prohibited’). As we now know, ὀκέες was the proper term for these serfs, but they are called δαύλοι πατζίνι in the inscription of Gortyn.

“The arguments in §§ 20—24 (εἰ δὲ, καθάπερ...γεωργῶν γεωρκεῖς) are in the main quite correct, but apply just as much to Aristotle’s ideal state as to Plato’s (Oncken). Yet see n. (177).” SUSEM. (172)

Comp. Grote ΠΙ. pp. 213—215, who lays stress on the spiritual pride, and contempt for the δῆμος, certain to be nurtured in the breasts of the guardians.
§ 20 23 ἐκείνοις = τοῖς ἄλλοις πολιταῖς, the citizens of the third class. τὰ τοιαύτα] family life and separate possessions.

24 τίς ὁ πρῶτος τῆς κοινωνίας] What will be the means of uniting them? How will they associate as fellow-citizens with the two upper classes, who have such dissimilar institutions?

ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ κτλ.] This is the very reproach which Plato levels at the existing polities: ἔκατον αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάρισι, ἀλλ' ὦ πόλις... δὸ μὲν γὰρ κἀκεῖνον ἦν πολέμων ἄλλης ἤ μὲν πενήντων, ἢ δὲ πλουσίων Keph. IV 422 E; and VIII 551 D (Eaton). SUSEM. (173)

26 οἶον φρουροὺς] Keph. III 415 D, E; IV 419 ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶ, φαίη ἦν, ὥσπερ ἐπίκουροι μισθωτοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει φαίνονται καθήσαται οὔθεν ἄλλο ή φρουροῦντες. SUSEM. (174)

27 πολίταις is predicate: "his citizens are the farmers and the artisans, &c." As Grote justly remarks, this is a larger and more generous conception of the purpose of political institutions than any we find elsewhere in Greece, even in Aristotle, who sets aside the rest of the people as not members of the commonwealth, I (VII). 9. 3. Plato not only treats them as integral parts of the state, but in a sense makes them the ultimate object of his solicitude. It is for them that he sacrifices the private pleasure of the guardians, and compels his philosophic rulers to descend into the cave. Both rulers and guardians are truly public servants, whose duty it is to protect and benefit their fellows, Keph. IV 463 B.


καὶ τοιοῦτοι] just as much to the citizens of Callipolis (ib. θεόν δὲ ὑπάρχει τοιούτως ἀστασιαστοι οὐσί); for by I. 27 the farmers, artizans &c. who make up the third class, are citizens.


31 ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορ.] Comp. IV.VIII. 12. 7 n. (865). SUSEM. (176 b)

"Laws concerning city-police and market-police." Dionysius says of the Roman aediles (VI. 96) σχεδὸν ἐκαίσας πῶς κατὰ τὰ πλείον τοὺς παρ' Ἑλληνων ἀγορανομίαις.

32 Take μόνων with τοῖς φίλαξιν. This objection proceeds from an acute apprehension that in outward aspect the ideal state would not greatly differ from an ordinary Greek city, in spite of its standing army, half Amazons, and its government of experienced military officers distinguished as savants, who (like the Jesuits in Paraguay or the English in India) are at another stage of development, and belong intellectually and morally to a wholly different world from the mass of the population.

§ 22 33 κυρίων ... φέροντας] How precisely the connexion is to be understood was explained in II. (153) on § 1. Practically the result is much as Aristotle represents it, and this is certainly managed differently in his own pattern state. SUSEM. (177)
II. 5. 25] 1264 a 23—1264 b 7. 243

tes: alla polu malkov eidos einai xalopous kal frongh—(II) 35 
maiton plhres tis par' enous eikolaites te kal peneastiaas

§ 23 kal doulleias. alla par eir' anagnakaia taud' omoiow eute 14

m'k, vun ge oudein diastasai, kal per' ton ekomewn, tis h

tonton te politeia kal padeia kal nwmoei tines. eoti d' outhe

39 eurein radojion, outhe to diapherous mikron, to poiou tinas einai

§ 24 toutois, prs to sofesthetai tin ton vphilakon kouinian. alla

1264 b mhn e' ge tas mev gnuaikas pouthei kouivas tas de kthseis

iidas, tis oikonomiheis wester t'a eti ton avgrou oin iardres

autov; kan e' koumai ai kthseis kal ai ton gnoygion gnuai-

kes *. *

'Atoston de' kai to ek ton thriwn poieisai tin pa-

5 rabolhn, otin de' ta auta epitheuein tais gnuaikas tois

§ 25 anerdosi, ois oikonomias oudein metestin. episphaleis de' kai

tous archontas ois kathsthein oin Socratis: adi 'gamma poihe tois

35 peneastias 1264-7th | 36 [kal doulleias] or kal <touaitas> doulleias Susem.,

kal penebakias Schneider, monias or <kouvias> doulleias Schmidt | 37 diawraistai

<kal per' autov> kal? Susem. | 39 pioiws tinas 1264-4 Q' Bk. | einai <dei>

Scaliger <dei> elain Spengel

1264 b 3 kan... gnuaikes. These words in 111 come before 2 wester (p1 corrected

this in the margin): Syburg and Bk. bracket them; Schneider and Korais transpose

them to precede 2 tis oikonomihe, Korais reading 1 ei te for ei ge. Thurot first

discovered the lacuna

te kal anerdoi, tauxamouvs para tavon allon

poulitow dekesbhai maithn tais vphilakis to-

sovon don mvhe periein aiwous eis ton

enwnton mouchei enoivn.

apoforain] a rent in kind.

34 xalopous ktl] troublesome and

full of arrogance.

35 tas par' enoi... peneastias] See

§ 9 2. n. (280). SUSEM. (178)

36 doulleias] Ridgeway Transactions

p. 132 thinks the word means "the serf

populations of states like Argos and Crete,

called 'ynu"eisai at Argos, and 'Apaamowai

in Crete," quoting Thuc. v. 23 where the

word is used for the Helots, "y' de' h dou-

leia epavosthetai. So also by Plato, Latos

776 D. of the Mariandyni.

§ 23 eir' anagnakaia ktl] We are re-

called to § 18; the question, per'w ou

oude inwv seithma, is the tenure of property

amongst the ordinary citizens. "Whether

it is equally necessary here" < as in the

case of the Guardians, to have com-

munism > "or not, has certainly not

been determined, as matters stand." tautra

= kouvai pantata of line 17 above. 14

37 kal per' ton enomewon] "Nor

about the following points: what consti-
tution and education and code of laws

are in force in the case of the citizens

at large."

45 sc. diapherei pros to sofesthetai.

The construction as in 1260 b 16 m.

§ 24 alla mhn ktl] But supposing

he intends to leave their property in in-

dividual ownership, and yet to introduce

community of wives, where are the wo-

men to be found to superintend house-

hold matters as the men manage the

work in the fields?

"What was said in m. (170) applies

again to this argument in the mutilated

state of the text." SUSEM. (179)

1264 b 4 ek ton thriwn] Rep. v

451 D. SUSEM. (180)

poisbhai t'v parabolh, oti] should

show by a comparison from the lower

animals that.... In Rhet. 11. 20 § 2, § 5

parabolh=simile.

§ 25 7 dei gei ktl] In the Plato-
nic state the government is not actually

in the hands of the same individuals in

perpetuity. None except members of the

highest order, the philosophers, are eli-

gible as rulers, but they enter the ruling

body by rotation. SUSEM. (181)

16—2
Thus evdev τοις αὐτοῖς ἀρχοντας, φανερῶν ὡς γάρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις ὅτε δὲ άλλοις μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυσός, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. ἤφη δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθὺς γνωμενοῖς μίξαι χρυσὸν, τοῖς δ' ἄργυρον, χαλκὸν δὲ καὶ σίδηρον.

§ 27 τοῖς τεχνίταις μέλλουσιν ἐσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ 16 τήν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὄλην φησὶ δείν εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τήν πόλιν τῶν νομοθέτων. ἀδύνατον δὲ

9 ἀξίωμα = dignity, valuation. There is no such distinction in Aristotle (as there is in Thucydides) between your own estimate, ἀξίωσις, and that of others, ἀξίωμα.

10 θυμεθείσοι...ἀνδράσι] The members of the second order of citizens, Guardians in the narrower and inexact sense (φώλακεσ = ἐπίκουροι) from whom the first class (Ἀρχοντες) are drafted off. For after they have attained the age of twenty, only the better qualified amongst them proceed to the higher education in mathematics; and out of these again at thirty only the very ablest receive instruction five years longer in philosophy (διαλεκτική). Then after fifteen years more devoted to practical life, after serving in higher commands, they are at length received into the highest order, the rulers proper: see Rep. vii 536 D ff., comp. n. (970) on iv(vii). 17. 15 and Zeller's Plato p. 480 n. (69). In the Aristotelian model-state, however, all citizens in later life may attain to a share in the government and administration; provided, that is, their fellow-citizens elect them to the particular offices of state for which they are eligible. See on iii. i § 10 n. (440), 4 § 5 (471), 13 § 12 (599), iv(vii). 9 § 9 (817), 13 § 9 (885) and Exc. i to B. v(viii). As Eaton remarks, θυμεθείσοι = 'men of spirit' is Plato's own term (Rep. ii 375 b, 376 c) for his caste of warriors: comp. iii. ii 16 § 1 n. (641), iv(vii). 7 § 5 (780), § 7 (790), 10 § 13 (839), 15 § 9 (935). Susem. (182)

§ 26 ὡτὶ δὲ ἀναγκ. κτλ] “Aristotle apparently does not observe that Plato's myth does not answer its purpose, as it does not recognize the promotion of ἐπίκουροι to be φώλακες. Jackson.


εὐδός γνω. directly they are born, at the moment of birth: εὐθὺς of time is not good Greek.

§§ 27, 28 This relates to one of the most brilliant and striking episodes of the Republic: the objection of Adeimantus at the opening of B. iv that Socrates has insufficiently provided for the happiness of his guardians: 419 —421 C.

15 ἔτι δὲ...17 νομοθέτην] Here Aristotle is guilty of a further piece of carelessness. Plato certainly says, 420 b, ὡς μὴ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκείων, ὡς ἐν τῇ ἡμῖν ἑθῶς ἐστὶ διαφράτως εὐδαίμον, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπὸ δὴ μάλιστα ἄλλ' ἡ πόλις; but Aristotle has not attended to another passage ν 465 d—466 b, where this thread is taken up (μενήσαται ὅπως ὁ ἐν τοῖς πρόσεχεν οὐκ ἄδικον λογίαν ἡμῶν ἐπεπλήξατέν, ὅτι τοῖς φώλακας οὐκ εὐδαιμονίας ποιοῦμεν) and to the later discussion ix 680—692 b, whence it appears that the former statement is only provisionally made. Plato's ultimate decision is the very opposite: that his polity is the sole means whereby the Guardians can attain to perfect happiness (465 d ἄρσουσι τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου, δι' ὃν ὁ λοιμονικός ἔστι, μακαριστερόν). Thus this objection breaks down entirely. We have had instances of similar negligence already in § 17 n. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179): and there is another in 6 § 5 (195). Moreover in iv(vii). 9 § 7 Aristotle himself says εὐδαιμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος
18 μη πάντων η των πλειστων μερων Bojesen || ei μη Vettori, but then ei μη πάντων should be transposed to come after 19 τινων || [μη] πάντων Lindau Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. 11, ιΣ 698 n. 2)—the easiest alteration. Busse transposes the second μη to precede τινων || η τινων omitted by Bojesen || 20 ὠπερ Μτ (1st hand—emedened by p1), and Π2 (corr.), ὠπερ the remaining authorities including Τ, rendered quorum el by William || 26 τα is omitted by Π2 Bk. || 30 και is inserted after τεκνων by Π3 || After κτησεως Susem. inserts the clause και περι...φυλάκων from 1264 b 40, 1265 a 1; Introd. p. 79 f. || the last και κατα ‘Schmidt, accepting the transposition || 31 δι] γαρ Π2 Ar. Bk.

ti βλέψαντας δει λέγειν αυτής, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολιτάς: where see note. SUSEM. (184)

18 η τινων κτλ] “or unless at least certain definite parts,” viz. the most important, “attain happiness.” SUSEM. (185)

19 ου γαρ των αυτων κτλ] “For happiness is not a thing of the same sort with evenness, which may be an attribute of the sum (of two numbers) where it is not an attribute of either of the numbers themselves.” The sum of two odd numbers, 3 + 5, is even.


§ 1 27 ἐνταῦθα] In the Laws. Evidently Aristotle assumes the work to be genuine. According to Diog. Laer. iii. 37 it was published by Philip of Opus after Plato's death.

28 περι δλαγων κτλ] “has precisely determined very few things.” In this comparison of the Republic with the Laws Aristotle's tendency to look for definite results (noticed above, c. 2) is especially prominent. He is in no way concerned to exhaust the differences between the two polities; indeed the whole discussion started with the dogmatic inquiry, 'what are the limits of community in civil life?'

1 § 2. But one cannot help seeing that the deepest ground of this difference, the altered philosophical standpoint and the change in the conception of the state, has escaped him: had he clearly recognised this, he would not have expressed himself as he has in § 5 (Zeller). See however § 4 (T. L. Heath).

31 την τάξιν] Understand διόρκησι, though the change of construction is unusual.
32 πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ (III) προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ § 3 κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνίτων, 35 πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μετέχουσί τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὁπλα δεῖ κεκτῆσαι καὶ τούτους καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τούτων οὐδὲν διάφορικες ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γναίκας οἴεται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς φύλαξι, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα τοῖς ἐξωθέν λόγοις πεπλήρωκε

39 λόγος after πεπλήρωκε Susem., following William's translation: it is omitted by M. P. Bender

§ 2 32 For the repetition of εἰς compare IV(vii). 14 § 12, and possibly 12 § 6.

33 προπολεμοῦν] Plato's word Rep. IV 423 A.

τρίτον δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων] Comp. n. 182 Susem. (186). Supply ἐστι. "The deliberative and supreme (executive) body of the state (is) a third order formed out of these latter." He quite correctly takes the ἀρχόντες to be a committee chosen out of the ἐπικουρίας: specially trained military officers, of mature experience and of great eminence in science, are from time to time coopted into the governing order. In the individual soul the gulf is fixed between the λογιστικὸν and the other two parts which make up τὸ ἀλογον: but in the state the wide distinction is between ἀρχόντες and ἐπικουρία together, i.e. φύλακες in the vaguer sense, on the one hand, and οἱ ἄλλοι ἀρματία on the other.

§ 3 34 περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν κτλ.] Here Aristotle contradicts himself again: see on 5 § 17 n. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), 6 § 5 (195). For at 5 § 25 above he recognised quite rightly that even the members of the second order are to have no real share in the administration: whereas now he expresses doubt whether some part in it may not fall to the third order, and whether they too are not to go out on military service! If there is one thing which Plato has made clear it undoubtedly is his principle of the division of labour. This, which he puts into the foreground, prohibits the shoemaker from ever attempting to be at the same time a tradesman or a carpenter or a farmer: à fortiori it prohibits the artizan or farmer from serving likewise as soldier; and either of them, or even the soldier, from ruling. See Zeller Plato p. 470 f. Susem. (187)

37 οὐδὲν διάφορικες] Yet see Rep. v 468 A. ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν κτλ.] Consult the note following. Susem. (188)

38 συμπολεμεῖν] Rep. v 451 E, 457 A, 466 E, 471 D.

39 tois ἐξωθέν κτλ.] But in the Repub. Plato treats of the community of children and wives v 457 B—466 D, of the regulation of property relations III 415 D—417 B, of education II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 502 C—VII 535 A, X 505 A—608 B, of the division into the three orders of citizens, II 367 E—376 E, III 412 C—IV 445 E, V 466 D—VI 502 C, VII 535 A—541 B, of the women's share in the duties of the guardians v 449 A—457 B, so that this whole work is literally filled with what Aristotle has here cited; only the first two books lay the foundation for it and the eighth and ninth enlarge upon the other forms of government. Thus independently of the discussions on the immortality of the soul x 608 C—621 D nothing is left which could come under the head of these discussions which lie outside the subject. The treatment of the above questions is no doubt crossed over and over again by dissertations on metaphysics, the theory of cognition, psychology, and ethics. This is what Aristotle really means, and he might from his standpoint consider them as not properly belonging to the subject. But that is no correct standard of judgment. What should have compelled Plato to write a purely political work in the Republic? Why might it not have been his intention to present a work in which the specially political discussion was only an organic member of a more comprehensive whole? Susem. (189)

"In answering the question What is
the subject of a given Platonic dialogue? it is convenient to distinguish the subject of the conversation from the subject or subjects of the work. Thus in the case of the Republic, though the thesis ὡς ἀμε- νὸν δικαιοσύνη ἄδικαις is the subject of the conversation between Socrates and his friends, it may fairly be said that the work is concerned with the καλλίτημι, the theory of ideas, and some minor matters. It is however the thesis ὡς ἀμε- νὸν δικαιοσύνη ἄδικαις which gives unity to the composition. Hence, although one of the incidental discussions may have, in consequence of its originality, both for the reader and for Plato himself (περὶ πολείτειας ἢ τὸ κεφάλαιον Τίμαιος 17 c.), a special interest, it is unreasonable to regard what is alien to it as in any way irrelevant. In fact Aristotle's remark is no more than the expression of his characteristic dislike of Plato's indirect method of approaching the doctrines which he wishes to enforce. Jackson, 1265 a 1 τῶν δὲ νόμων κτλ] This is quite incorrect: in the Laws about equal parts are taken up with constitutional theory and with legislation, and the constitution in the narrower sense is treated much more fully than in the Republic (Suckow Förm der plat. Schriften 132 f.). Aristotle (Π. 466 on ι. 3. 9) agrees with Plato in including under the constitution, in the wider sense, the regulation of education. From his point of view therefore the whole of the Laws from the middle of B. v to the end of B. viii with a large part of B. xii may be said to be περὶ τῆς πολείτειας, while books ix, x, xi and the rest of B. xii are a code of laws, νόμου. Susem. (190)

Oncken (ι. 194—199) appeals to this passage in support of his view that the first four books of the Laws, and part of the fifth, are a later spurious introduction (τὸ προϊοῦσαν τῶν νόμων, 734 E) with which Aristotle was wholly unacquainted. 2 καὶ ταύτην βουλ. κτλ] "and while endeavouring to make it more universally applicable to the existing states he gradu-
events he gives no expression here to the opinion which is supported by many moderns, most recently by Oncken op. c. I. 201, that the state of the Laws is only meant to be a transitional form to mediate and prepare the future introduction of the true ideal state,—an opinion which is seen from the foregoing to be utterly untenable. On the contrary his words plainly amount to this; that Plato intended in the state of the Laws to frame something intermediate to that of the Republic and the existing states, but in reality he has unconsciously followed the Republic so much more closely than the existing states, that all essential features of the former are still retained."

SUSEM. (191)

§ 5 4 ἔξω γὰρ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ]

But supposing—what is not indeed the case (see next note)—that this really were the only difference between the two schemes, is it not after all one so essential that any further discussion of a really essential identity between them is thereby precluded? And so far as this might yet be possible, does not Aristotle’s ideal state come pretty nearly as close to that of the Republic as does that of the Laws? At any rate, of the three points which Aristotle lays stress upon as justifying his criticism, he too expressly approves of the two latter ones: c. 7 § 8 n. (238); 9 § 2 (279); § 31 (341); 10 § 8 f. (353); 11 § 10 (393); IV(vii). 9 §§ 3, 4, 8; 10 § 9 (831), § 10 (834), Introd. p. 22 n. (3). His own ideal of public education also, so far as he has developed it, coincides in very important particulars with the directions in the Laws: see on IV(vii). 17 § 1 n. (920), § 15 (970): v(vii). 4 §§ 7—9. nn. True, Plato’s divergence comes out in that dialogue also when he insists on the education of women in common with men, on their taking part in military service and in the common messes, thus rendering true domestic life impossible; nor perhaps is Aristotle willing to follow him in assigning by law a definite limit to personal property: see § 15 n. (213), 7 § 4 n. (233). But he, too, demands, exactly like Plato in the Laws, that the land in the possession of private persons should be divided into equal inalienable indivisible lots twice as numerous as the families of citizens (IV[vii]. 10 §§ 9—11, see also nn. on II. 5 § 1, 6 § 15): and that for this purpose the number of citizens be maintained perpetually the same, §§ 10—13, 7 § 5 nn. He is only more decided and consistent than Plato in not shrinking in the least from the horrible expedient of abortion, as a means of securing this (Introd. 34, 56, iv(vii). 16 § 15 f. nn.); while Plato, who had made the same regulation under certain circumstances in the Republic (see on II. 3 §§ 5, 6 n. 140), had in the Laws abandoned it, and had left the number of children to be produced unrestricted, in the hope of adjusting the matter in a milder way: n. (208) on 6 § 10. In this respect then Aristotle’s ideal state stands even nearer than that of the Laws to the state depicted in the Republic, and makes a more severe and destructive attack upon married life. Lastly he too requires written enactments fixing the age at which marriage is advisable and compulsory (IV[vii]. 16 §§ 1—10, nn. 937, 940); in fine, whereas his view of marriage is wholly different from Plato’s, and ethically regarded a modern view (Exc. 1. to B. II p. 327), it is actually realized in only a very mutilated fashion. Thus in criticizing Plato he has at the same time unintentionally passed judgment upon himself.

SUSEM. (192)

7 παιδείαν τὴν αὐτὴν] This is only relatively true. The all-essential feature in the state of the Republic is the rule of the philosophers; see Zeller Phil. d. Gr. II 1761 ff. (Eng. tr. Plato 466, 467 ff.); and in the Laws this is dropped. Aristotle overlooks this fact. Further, in the earlier scheme those engaged in trade and agriculture are at any rate free members of the state: in the scheme of the Laws, the former are aliens not settled permanently in the country, while the latter are slaves: Laws v 741 E ff.; VII 806 D ff.; VIII 842 C ff., 846 D, 850 D; XI 915 B ff., 919 D ff., 921 C; XII 952 D ff. Thus the third class of citizens is done away with. The second class is all that is left and the training prescribed for it is the same only so far as it extends; that
is, not beyond the elementary principles of mathematics: 

\[ \text{Laws vii.} \]

However a certain survival of the philosophic rulers of the Republic is still retained by the formation of a higher council of state, the so-called 'nocturnal assembly.' It is to consist of the most educated and capable men in the community over fifty years of age; moreover certain of the most distinguished magistrates belong to it in virtue of their office; while younger qualified citizens, if at least thirty years old, may be admitted as extraordinary members by cooptation, and are then instructed by the council in its own sciences, philosophy, higher mathematics, including astronomy and theory of music. But this higher college is destitute of political power and is restricted to its moral influence simply; it endeavoureth thereby to guide public opinion in such a manner that the elections to public offices may fall, wherever possible, upon its ordinary and extraordinary members. See 

\[ \text{Laws i 632 c, xii 951 d ff., 961 a ff.}\]

\[ \text{cp. n. (970) on iv(vii). 17 § 15. Suesem. (193)} \]

\[ \text{καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων κτλ} \]

\[ \text{Laws v 741 e, vii 806 d—807 d, viii 842 b, 846 d, xi 519 d. Suesem. (194)} \]

\[ \text{ἀναγκαλών = necessary for support, cp. iii. 6 3, iv(vii). 10 7 where the antithesis is to εἰς εἰσαχομοιών καὶ περιομοιών.} \]

\[ \text{καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὀσαύτως} \]

Here Aristotle is perfectly aware of the fact which he appeared to have forgotten before, § 17 n. (168), § 24 n. (170), that even in the ideal state of the Republic Plato had required there should be common messes for the guardians. 

\[ \text{Suesem. (195)} \]

\[ \text{πλῆν ἐν ταῦτῃ κτλ} \]

As a matter of fact messes common to the women are assumed by Plato in the state of the Republic, as was stated in n. (153) on § 1; but in the changed sphere of the state in the Laws he finds himself obliged expressly to lay down this requirement and assign reasons for it, as he intends to maintain it in the later scheme: 

\[ \text{vi 780 d ff., vii 806 e, cp. viii 842 b, 847 e. Further compare l. 13 § 9 n. (116), ii. 7 § 1 n. (231 b). Suesem. (196)} \]

\[ 9 ἵλλων} \]

\[ \text{Republic. iv 423 a, where however this number is given as only the minimum, ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγάλη καὶ ἐάν μοῦν Ἴ̓ ἵλλων τῶν προπολεμοῦντων. Suesem. (197)} \]

Yet Grote (Plato iii. p. 206 n. b) observes that the understanding of Aristotle himself on the point is one material evidence that this was intended by Plato. Comp. 

\[ \text{Political. 292 e for the possible number of the rulers.} \]

\[ \text{10 πεντακισχιλίαν} \]

More precisely 

\[ 5040; 
\]

\[ \text{Laws v 737 e, 740 e ff., 745 b ff. etc. Suesem. (198)} \]

§ 6 11 τὸ μὲν οὖν κτλ. *“Now all the discourses of Socrates display genius acuteness originality research"* περιττόν, out of the common, extraordinary: cp. 

\[ \text{Metaph. 1. 2. 13: κομψόν, ingenious, subtle, as vi(iv). 4. 11 κομψὸς τοῦτο ὑπὸ ἰκανώς δὲ εἰρήτα. Both better taken of the thought than with some editors of the style. (Thus Götting Commentariolum de Ar. Pol. ii. 3 gives for κομψὸν 'compta pulchritudo,' grace or finish.)} \]

\[ \text{τοῦ Σωκράτους} \]

Aristotle then erroneously takes the Athenian stranger in the Laws to be Socrates, although the time of the conversation falls long after his death. The ἔνως should rather be considered as personifying enlightened Athens. See 

\[ \text{Susemihl Plat. Phil. ii. 66 ff., Trans. of the Laws p. 998 ff. Suesem. (199)} \]

Yet all the same this stranger, 739 c—e, apparently assumes responsibility for the proposals of "Socrates" in the Republic. 

\[ \text{12 καλὸς δὲ πάντα} \]

\[ \text{sc. ἔχων, for everything to be right: "but to be right on all points may well be a hard task." χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ. Bernays however renders χαλεπῶν = too much to ask.} \]

\[ \text{13 τὸ νῦν ἐρ. πλῆθος} \]

The construction changes; he begins as if ἔφεσται were to follow.
14 ἐξάς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ δὲ πη, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ εἰρήκει; σ. ιπ. 503 λ—μ ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἂ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέθησα, οὐ μὲντοι ἀδύνατα γε. Οn his part however Aristotle also appropriates the expression: see the references in n. (128) on 1 § 1, esp. διο δὲ τολὴ προῖστη-θείεσθαι καθάπερ εὐχομένου, εἶναι μὲντοι μὴν τοῖς ἀδύνατον ιV(IV). 4 § 2 n. (750). SUSEM. (202)

This is not expressly to be found anywhere in the Laws, but Aristotle had a perfect right to infer it from IV 740—709 and V 747 D. SUSEM. (203)

14 Βαβυλωνιάς] Cp. ιιΙ. 3. 5 n. (462). SUSEM. (200)

15 ἀπερ. τὸ πλῆθος] unlimited in size.

ἐξ ἢς κτλ] But how does this calculation agree with that made about Sparta in 9 §§ 16, 17? Compare nn. (306), (311). Even granting that the present is the more correct statement, how much smaller must we imagine the number of citizens to be in Aristotle's own ideal state according to the data given IV(VII). 4 §§ 5—14? (Schlosser). Suppose these data reduce the number by one half, one half the same objection would still apply to Aristotle. On the other hand it is interesting to observe how near his penetrating intellect comes to a discovery of the fact, that the idleness which belonged as a right to a privileged minority of freeborn landholders was really the fundamental evil of the Hellenic state. Confined however to the circle of opinions current in his own age and nation, the philosopher turns back when on the very threshold of the truth: and follows Plato in adopting this fundamental evil as an inalienable primary good for his own model state. SUSEM. (201)

§ 7 17 δεὶ μὲν οὖν...μὴ δὲν μὲντοι ἀδύνατον] "We should frame our scheme on the most favourable supposition, yet not so as to be impracticable." Cp. Λατοσ ν 742 E: τὰ δεὶ μη δυνατὰ οὐτὶ ἀνθρώποι [ματαιας βουλήσεις], sc. ὡδιακομών. ὑποτεθεῖαι κατ᾽ εὑρήσει A reference to the expression used by Plato Λατοσ IV 709 D εὑρίσκει δύνατον...καὶ νομοθέτης, Κριμι. VII 540 D μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 6. [Π. 6. 6]
βίον πολεμικῶν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον ἕστιν αὐτὴν τῇ(III)
οὔτως χρῆσαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὑπλοῖς ἀ χρῆσιμα κατὰ τὴν
§ 8 οἰκεῖαν χρώμαν ἑστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἕξω τόπους: εἰ δὲ
25 τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδεχεῖται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἵδιον μήτε τὸν
κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἥττον δὲ φοβεροῦς εἶναι τοὺς
πολέμιοις, μὴ μόνον ἐλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἀπ[ελθ]οῦσιν. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτῆσεως ὄριν δεῖ, μὴ ποτε 5
βελτίων ἐτέρως διορίζαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον. τοσαύτην γὰρ
30 εἶναι φησὶ δεῖν ὡστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὃστε ἀν εἰ τις εἶπεν
§ 9 ὡστε ζῆν εὖ (τούτο γὰρ ἕστι καθὸλου μᾶλλον, ἐπειδή ἐστι σω-
φρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν): ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὀρὸς τὸ

22 πολεμικῶν Muret, πολεμικὸν Γ Π Αρ. Βκ. ὑπολεγμένοι Montecatino, <ἡμερολογίων καὶ μὴ μόνον> πολεμικὸς Thurat || πολεμικὸν μη μοναστικὸν Π, πολεμικὸν μη μονασ-
τικὸν 1, πολεμικὸν μη μοναστικὸν 1 (αυτών τῶν πολεμικῶν) ||—at
all glosses || 23 δηλοῖς ὀρίους Oncken, νομίμους? Susem. || 25 <καὶ> μη Schmidt ||
28 ἀποδείξεων Bender || 30 εἰ is omitted by PI. Where this right εἶπεν would have to
be altered, with Bas,3, to εἶπεν || 31 εἴπει Susem. εἰτ δ᾽ Π Π Αρ. Βκ. Susem.12

wrote "perhaps explained by Pl. Protag. 322 β πολεμικῶν τέχνην ἣς μέρος πολεμικῶν, absolutely political and having therefore as one ingredient πολεμικῆ." The expression recurs iv(vii). 2 § 3, §§ 5, 6 (a probably spurious chapter) and 6 § 7, where see Critical notes.

23 α χρήσιμα κτλ] Cp. vii(vi). c. 7 §§ 1—3 (Eaton). SUSEM. (205)

§ 8 24 εἰ δὲ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον κτλ] "But if any one refuse to approve of a life such as this," i.e. warlike "for the state at large any more than for the individual." Whether war is the end of the state is an argument debated iv(vii). 14 § 13 f., 15 §§ 1—6. Plato in the Locrus iv 628 c, vii 803, viii 829 A, holds that it is not.

28 τὸ πλῆθος really belongs to the dependent clause. "Whether perhaps it might not be better to define otherwise, by a clearer definition, the amount of property which one man may hold." It is characteristic of the writer to require analysis and precise definition, ὅ τα σάφες, ὅ τι διαφιμένων.

29 τοσαύτην γὰρ εἶναι φησὶ] Locrus V 737 D γῆς μὲν ὀστὴν πᾶσον σωφρόνοι ὁπλίται ἡκατον τρέχουν πλείον τοῦ ὀδοὺ προ-
δεί. With what follows compare 7 § 7 n. (237 b). SUSEM. (206)

31 καθόλου μᾶλλον] "For this term is too vague (cp. μα μᾶλλον, 2 § 2) since men may live frugally and at the same time wretchedly": literally, in hardships and distress.

§ 9 σωφρόνως here and iv(vii). 5 § 1, and σωφροσύνη III. 4 § 16 can only mean 'parsimoniously', 'parsimony'. But in ii. 5 § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12 n. (242), 1. 13 § 2 f., § 6 (112), iv(vii). 1 § 4 (691), 3 § 3, 15 §§ 2—4, 16 § 8 the meaning is temperance or self-restraint in reference to eating and drinking and the appetites of sex: and it is from this side that the virtue is depicted in Nic. Eth. iii. cc. 10, 11 (1117 b 23 f.). There however Aristotle himself explains how extravagance leads to profligacy and to excesses in this direction, and that ἄσωτος, properly a spendthrift, comes to mean a profligate; ib. iv. 1 § 3, 1119 b 30, 35, 1121 b 17. In Nic. Eth. iv. 3 § 4, 1123 b 5, 4 § 4, 1125 b 13 σωφρόνως has yet another meaning: viz. modest. Lastly, Van der Rest observes that the next objection brought against Plato affects only a certain inexactitude of expression and not the thought, which is no other than that followed by Aristotle, of a right mean between excessive wealth and excessive poverty: see esp. Locrus V 741 E: χρηματισμὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐκείνῳ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ κατασκεύᾳ: and next note. SUSEM. (206 b)

32 ὀρὸς] A better definition would be, to live frugally and liberally, "Comp. iv(vii). 5. I n. ἀλεξηθέριον ὢμαι καὶ σω-
φρόνως; II. 7, 7 n. τοῦ μέσου στοχαστῶν; VI(vii). 11. 4 τῶν ἐνικηκόματων ἐκ τῆς ἡμέρας ἡ μέγιστῃ βελτιώτη πάντων." SUSEM. (207)
σοφρόνως καὶ ἑλευθερίως (χωρίς γὰρ ἐκατέρφῳ τῷ μὲν τῷ (III) τρυφῶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τῷ ἐπιπόνῳ), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ',
35 εἰςιν [ἐξεις] ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρήσιν αὐταί, οἷον οὐσία πρᾶσι [μείν] ἢ ἀνδρείως χρήσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν, σωφρόνως δὲ καὶ ἑλευθερίως ἔστιν, ὡστε καὶ τὰς ἐξεις ἀναγκαῖοι εἶναι
§ 10 περὶ αὑτῆν ταύτας. ἀτοπὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἵσαξοντα τὸ 6 περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλὰ ἀφεῖ-
40 ναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν αὐριστον ὡς ἱκανον ἀν ὀμαλισθησομενὴν εἰς τὸ αὑτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὀσωνοῦ ἄγνωστων, ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] τότε καὶ νῦν μὲν ἑρά ὀνείδες ἀπορεῖ διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ὀποσονοῦν πλῆθος, τότε δὲ ἀναίρετων οὐσῶν ἄναγκη τοὺς πα-
5 5 ἰαξυγας μηδεν ἔχειν, εὰν τε ἐλάττους οὐσὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐὰν τε

33 ἐκατέρφῳ Koraes, ἐκατέρεον Γ.Π. Αρ. Βκ. || τῷ] τῷ Π. Αρ. Βκ. || τῷ] τῷ Π. Αρ. Βκ. Μ* (1st hand) || 34 τῷ] τῷ Π. Αρ. Βκ. || τῷ] τῷ Π.3 Q* Αρ. Αλδ. Βκ. || ἐπιπόνῳ] laborios vivere William, no doubt an addition of his own: hence ἐν Susem.1 erroneously || 35 [ἐξεις] Susem. || ἀρεταῖ] ἀρεταῖ written by an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich copy of the Aldine, first found in Vettori and wrongly defended by Bekker, Madvig, Bernays: omitted by Schneider as a gloss upon ἐξεις || χρήσιν] ἔξω Π. Apparently William translated from the following order: αὐταὶ αἱ ἐξεις εἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν ἐξεις τῆς οὐσίας. Ἀρ. from the following: αὐταὶ αἱ ἀρεταῖ εἰσίν ἐξεις περὶ τὴν χρήσιν τῆς οὐσίας || 36 μὲν is omitted by Γ Π. Αρ. Βκ. || 37 ἐξεις Susem.2, χρήσεις Γ.Π. Αρ. Βκ., αἱρέσεις Madvig: Bernays conjectures περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀναγκαίων αὐτῶς εἶναι ταύτας, not happily: || εἶναι after 38 αὑτήν Π.2 Βκ. || 40 ἀνομαλισθησομενὴν Madvig for ἀν όμαλισθησομενὴν

1265 b 2 [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] Bender who also conjectures τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἶν τε τοι γιοτείς οἴχ | 4 παράξυγας Γ.Μ* and P1 (1st hand), and the scribe restored this after p1 had emended it to παράξυγας

33 χωρίς] if the two be separated.
34 τὸ ἐπιπόνῳς (ἐπὶ). 35 ἀρεταῖ...αὐταί] These are the only virtues that have to do with the use of property. ὁῶν = I mean.
§ 10 38 ἵσαξοντα] Lattes v 740 b—
741 A. Susem. (207 b)
"Τίς δρόμος που το ομαλογόμοντα της ουσιας αυτης ειναι ταυτας, not happily: || εωμος after 38 αὑτην".

39 ἀλλ' ἀφείναι κτλ] This too is very inexacty expressed. All that Plato in the Lattes intends, indeed all that he is able to effect, is to keep the number of citizens unalterably the same: i.e. exactly 5040 elder men, as many younger men, with twice that number of women. All beyond that number must, as he expressly prescribes, go abroad, to found colonies. One son and one daughter, then, is the normal family: only when there is childlessness or death does it become necessary that there should be other children in order to marry heirs or heiresses, and to be adopted by the childless (Schlosser). As it stands at present, the polemic does not touch Plato. If Aristotle held the means proposed by Plato to avoid an excess of the prescribed number to be impracticable or impossible to realize he should have proved his point, as he easily might have done. Susem. (208)
§ 11 1265 b 2 οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς = ἀκριβέστερον: "whereas that requires to be fixed with a great deal more nicety in the supposed case than at present." Cp. 7 § 18 οὐκ ἐσεν ὑμι. 4 παράξυγας] the cadets; like παρή-
§ 12 πλείους. μᾶλλον δὲ δειν υπολάβου τις ἀν ὀφίσθαι τῆς οὐσίας τῆν τεκνοποιίαν, ὅστε ἀρίθμου τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννάν τοῦτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέπουτα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἀν (p. 35) συμβαλὴν τελευτάν τινας τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν. τὸ δ' ἀφείσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς

§ 13 τῶν ἄλλων πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαίον αὐτίων γίνεσθαι τοις πολίταις, ἢ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Ψείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὅν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἰκεῖους ἱσούς ὁμίθη δειν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ εἰ τὸ πρώτον ἄνίσους εἶχον τῶν κλήρους πάντες κατὰ μέτρῳ γεβοῦν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις τοῦναι ἕστιν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων πῶς ἀν ἀληθεία βέλτιον ἔχειν, λεκτέν ὑστερον' ἐλέλειπται νόμοι τούτως καὶ τὰ περὶ τούς ἀρχον-8

11 ἄλλως Γ', πλείστοις 1'ΙΠ Λ. Βκ. (πά over an erasure Γ') || 12 [Ψείδων... 17 υστερον] Schmidt | 14 καὶ κατὰ Bernays | 15 τῶν κλήρους before ἄνίσους Π' Βκ., before εἰχόν Μ' | 11 πάντες Βκ. || 17 ἐν after βέλτιον Π' Βκ.

οροὶ ἐποιεῖ, supernumeraries outside the traces, the elder brother being the yoke-horse, δύοις ἐποιεῖ.

§ 12 6. Take ἄλλως with τῆς οὐσίας. 7 ὡστε ἀρίθμου τινὸς] Statistics will have to be collected to determine on the average how many children die before reaching maturity and how many marriages are without issue. "Thus," says Schlosser, "the idea of political arithmetic is no novelty." Aristotle is a precursor of Malthus (Eaton). Comp. also Exc. Π to D. Π. SUSEM. (209)

Grote ΙΙΙ. 228—231: Plato and Aristotle saw clearly the law of population, but did not recognize the common element in the positive and prudential checks sufficiently to coordinate them, as Malthus did.

8 These "accidents of life" are before Plato, Laws ν 740 c.—ε, cp. Grote ΙΙΙ. p. 229 n. (g). Perhaps what Aristotle deprecates is the 'laisser faire', ἀφείσθαι, to leave it to the citizens at their own discretion.

§ 13 10 τὸ δ' ἀφείσθαι κτλ] Aristotle (?) repeats these 7 § 5. SUSEM. (209 b) 12 ἢ δὲ πενία κτλ] See Laws ν 744 ὡ; also the account of the transition from oligarchy to democracy Rep. ΙΒ 555 D—557 Λ.

[Φείδων ὁ Κορίνθιος] Nothing is known of any such ancient lawgiver of Corinth. He is supposed to be different from the better known Pheidon of Argos, about whom see VIII (v). 10. 6. Yet he is called a Corinthian by the scholiast on Pindar Olym. ΧΙΙΙ. 20; τῷ δὲ φησιν, ἐπειδὴ Ψείδων τις ἄνω Κορίνθιος ἔφερε μέτρα καὶ στάθμα. This is one of the serious difficulties in this chapter mentioned Introd. p. 33 n. 4, 14 (4). There is always the heroic remedy; see Critical Notes and M. Schmidt in Jahrb. f. Phil. cxxv. 1882. p. 522.

16 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ] A decidedly unfounded assertion, as was explained in the note on § 10. Aristotle (?) repeats this objection against the Phalanx, 7 § 5: comp. n. (204) on § 7. SUSEM. (210)

§ 14 17 υστερον] IV (vii). 10 § 11 f. and esp. 16 § 15 f. n. (1946). From the latter passage it is seen of what means he is thinking. To prevent any increase in the fixed number of the citizens Aristotle sanctions the procuring of abortion. Cp. Introd. p. 56 and n. (192) on § 5.

SUSEM. (211)

18 ἐλέλειπται κτλ] Laws ν 734 ν: the warp is necessarily stronger and firmer than the woof, δὲν δή τοῦ μεγάλας ἀράξας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀφεύσατι δει διακρίνεσθαι τινα τρόπον ταύτη καὶ τῶν συμβρα παιδεία βασικάνθεται ἐκάστοτε κατα λόγον. As a matter of fact this objection of Aristotle's is altogether unfair. In the Laws Plato has done exactly that which Aristotle here requires: he has prescribed for all the citizens of his model state the same course of training, on the ground of which he expects them to discover for themselves which among them
are better fitted for the warp and which for the wool, and to vote accordingly at the election of magistrates. What other means has Aristotle at his command for his own ideal state? Besides it must not be forgotten that by the institution of the Nocturnal Assembly (as explained in n. 193 on § 5) Plato aimed at making especial provision for a staff (personnel) more highly qualified to administer the government and to hold offices of state. The assertion then that this simile is all that we learn from him as to the character of those qualified for the government is a mistake due to a too hasty perusal of the dialogue in question. There might certainly have been good reason for a doubt whether the institution was practicable; but here no such doubt is expressed.

SUSEM. (212)

It is the professed object of the Epistomis to expound the course of study for the Nocturnal Assembly which is to aim at controlling the election of magistrates. But nothing can be inferred from Aristotle’s silence respecting it: Zeller Plato p. 616 n. (59) Eng. tr.

§ 15 It would certainly relieve the chapter to reject this section, as M. Schmidt proposes.

22 μεχρὶ πενταπλασίας Here and 7 § 4 Aristotle (?) has mistaken Plato’s meaning, as if he had permitted the accumulation of moveable property to the amount of four times the value of the real estate belonging to the family. As a matter of fact in Laws v 744 E (cf. VI 775 E ff.) he only allows the increase of the total property to this fourfold value; consequently only the acquisition of three times as much personal property. The recurrence of the mistake at least favours the assumption that both passages are by the same author. SUSEM. (213)

23 διὰ τὸ τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἄν εἶπῃ τῆς γῆς κτλ] This objection is simply incomprehensible. There is not the least provision for an increase of landed property in Aristotle’s own ideal state: see IV (VII). 10 § 9 ff. SUSEM. (214)

25 δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα] One homestead near the city and the centre of the territory and one placed on its borders, the latter to be occupied and managed by the married son and heir to the farm: Laws v 745 E, VI 775 E ff., cp. VIII 845. Aristotle (?) here blames this arrangement, but in his own pattern state he has adopted something very similar iv (vii). 10 § 11. We might assume that when he wrote Bk. iv (vii), he had changed his mind and then forgotten to expunge from his criticism of Plato the passage before us as no longer in point. Here however M. Schmidt’s suggestion of interpolation is quite as obvious, although it may be met by an inquiry whether a later editor would not have carefully avoided introducing this inconsistency. SUSEM. (215)

But is the inconsistency proved? “Plato would assign to each man two οἰκήσεις Laws 745 E, or, as Aristotle puts it, οἰκέωδα, οἰκίας: Aristotle recommends two κληρον, not two οἰκήσεις or regular establishments” (Jackson). To this I reply that Plato too repeatedly uses the expres-
§ 16 διελὼν χωρίς, χαλεπῶν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. η δὲ σύνταξις ὅλη θεύλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε ὀλιγαρχία, μέση δὲ τούτων, ἣν καλοῦσι πολιτείαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλι-
τευόντων εστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκεύασ-
ζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείων, καλῶς εἴρηκεν ἤσος·
eἰ δὲ ὡς ἀρίστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλῶς.
tάχα γὰρ τὴν τῶν Λακώνων τις ἐν ἐπαινεῖται μᾶλλον, ἢ κἂν
§ 17 ἄλλην τινα ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἐνοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δὲν 10

27 βούλεται after μὲν M. n. 1 || 29 [el μὲν...1266 a 6 δημοκρατία] Schmidt, prob-
ably rightly, cp. n. (223) || 30 πολιτείαν II. Bk. and 123-2. (1st hand) γρ. πολι-
tειῶν 12 (corr. in the margin), in 12 Bk. was written over it by a later hand, but again erased. || 32 τις after αὐ II. Bk.

sion κλατρα. Even supposing that, in con-
tradistinction to him, Aristotle really in-
tended to provide only one of the two
estates with a dwelling-house, how can he
have believed that to farm two estates in
separate localities would thus be made
easier than if they had dwellings upon
them? Is it not clear that the opposite
will hold good? Nay more, what idea
are we to form of two such detached
properties, one near the town and one in
the country, unless there are farm-buildings
and a house upon the latter? If this be
so, the above supposition is a priori im-
possible. Even Plato does not arrange
that the country house shall be a regular
establishment in the sense of being ἀλώνων
inhabited, but the son who inherits suc-
cedes to it as soon as he is grown up and
married, and so sets up the second estab-
ishment there (Laws vii 775 ε. f.). In
Aristotle's best state such an appropri-
tion of the second dwelling-house is cer-
tainly excluded, because there, when the
heir marries, he succeeds his supern-
nuated father as citizen and consequently
as proprietor of both the family prop-
ties (see note and Excursus on IV[VII].
16 § 10, 13.35 a 32—35); but that is the
sole point in which Aristotle diverges from
Plato in this matter. To what purpose
he would destine this second house
can only be conjectured: it may be to
lodge the supernuated father, perhaps
with the lands belonging to it as a sort of
retiring pension. In any case the incon-
sistency, as Aristotle's text has come
down to us, is unquestionable. SUSEM.
26 διλον χωρίς distinct, separate
homesteads.

§ 16 σύνταξις The entire arrange-
ment of the constitution tends neither to
oligarchy nor to democracy but to some-
things intermediate known as Polity. Plato's
citizens are the heavy-armed men: Laws
vi 773 B, πάντες μὲν κοινωνοῦντων τίς τῶν ἄρ-
χωντων αἱρέσεως, ὀπόσοπερ ἄν ὁ πλαί ἰ
πικα ἢ πεικα τιθωτα καὶ πολέμου κοιν-
νωνίςων. This is the criterion of a
'Polity'.

28 πολιτείαν Compare III. 7 § 4
with the notes and references there given.
SUSEM. (216)

29 ὡς κοινοτάτην κτλ. "as the most
universally adapted for cities at large"
VI. IV. c. 11 with n. (1282) on § 1.
SUSEM. (217)

31 πρώτην highest, normal. So ὁ
πρώτος συνομοσ. Comp. 1. 2. 5.

32 Plato's arrangement Rep. B. VIII
implies this.

33 ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν i.e. a con-
stitution which, like the Spartan, has the
character of an Aristocracy to a greater
extent than Polity. The term may be
thus explained: true Aristocracy co-
cides with Aristotle's best constitution;
but in a transferred and secondary sense
this name is earned by such constitutions
as combine aristocratical with oli-
garchical and democratical elements, like
Carthage, or only with democratical ele-
ments, like Sparta; this is stated VI. IV.
7 §§ 2—4, cp. VI.(IV). 9 § 6 ff., 2 § 1 n.
(11.33), § 4 n. (1141), 10 § 1, 11 § 2.
Further consult Excursus I. on Bk. III
and the notes to III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9
(595), §§ 11 (597), § 13 (601), § 24 (614); 14
§ 15 (633), 17 § 8 (677), § 5 (678); VI. IV.
2 § 2 (1136—7). Of course such mixed
constitutional forms are nearer to the true
Aristocracy than is Polity, which is a
blending of Oligarchy and Democracy:
VI. (IV). cc. 8, 9. See on this the notes to
III. 7 § 4 (536, 538); vi1(iv). 2 § 4 (1141), 7 § 4 (1137).

[SEMEI]S. (219)

§ 17 33 ἐνοῦ μὲν οὖν κτλ] Cp. IV(v). 14 § 16 n. (911), IV(iv). 1 § 6 n. (1123). Thus we learn that two schools of political theorists, to one of which Ephoros perhaps belonged,1 dissented from the writer’s opinion and agreed in regarding monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy as elements of the Spartan constitution; while the second school (40 ο) ὤ) added tyranny as a fourth element. It is strange that in this passage Aristotle (?) takes up no definite position in relation to the two views and does not oppose to them his own. Presumably he judged it sufficient, in order not to enter on a longer digression, to have denominated this constitution a mixed aristocracy. From the explanations which he has devoted specially to it we learn that he looked upon the council of Elders as the aristocratical, the Ephors as the democratic element in it, 9 §§ 19—28, but at the same time also as in a certain sense related to τυραννίς: see on 9 § 20. He finds another democratic element, though such in intention only, in the common messes, 9 § 32. He regards the Spartan kingship as far too limited to give the constitution any particular colouring: III. 14 §§ 3, 4; 15 §§ 1, 2; 16 § 1. It is still more strange then that Aristotle (?) only mentions here the views of those other theorists on this subject, passing over in total silence that expressed by Plato himself in the Laws IV 712 C ff. (cp. I11 692 A f., 693 E), a view which stands much nearer to his own, representing the Spartan constitution as mainly a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, but with the addition of the royal office and an element akin in one view to τυραννίς, in another to democracy, viz. the Ephors. Plato himself tells us, Laws xi1 692 E, that he was not the first to pronounce a mixed constitution the most excellent in practice: οι δὲ σοφῶτατοι, ἓ σωσία, πρὸς ταύτα τε (liberty and dominion over others) καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐξ ἐνραντα βλέποντα, εἰς ἐν δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέροντας τετειμένοι ἔχοντες φράξεις, εἰς τὰ σᾶλλα αὐτοῖς δεὶ βλέπεις; presumably his predecessors were to some extent the same who are here noticed. Compare further Excursus I to Bk. III. SESE (219).

Isocrates Lacedaemonios máλαστα δημοκρατουμένους τυχαίως dicit Aristotle. § 61 (Spengel).

§ 18 1266 a 1 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ] Laws III 693 D f. eισὶ πολιτείας οἵον μητέρες ὅντοι τινε...καὶ τὴν μὲν προσαγορευμένην μοναρχίαν ὁρθόν, τὴν δὲ δημοκρατίαν: Persia is the extreme case of the one, Athens of the other: δεὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ αναγκαίων μεταλαβέων ἀμφότεροι τοιούτου: 701 E; IV 756 Ε ἐμένων ἂν ἔχοι μοναρχίης καὶ δημοκρατίης πολιτείας ἢ ἀεὶ δεὶ μεσένων τῷ πολιτείᾳ: cp. IV 712 D f. However what Plato really says in these passages is somewhat different, viz. that a good constitution must hold the mean between democracy and monarchy. Moreover he expressly guards against being supposed to derive anything in his mixed form of the state from τυραννίς, IV 712 C: τίνα δὴ ποτὲ πολιτείαν ἔχομεν ἐν νῷ τῇ πόλει προστάταις;...οἷον δημοκρατίαν τινὰ ἢ διαρχίαν ἢ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἢ βασιλεύῃ, οὐ γὰρ δὴ τυραννίσα γε ποὺ λέγοις ἃν: and in the Republic he has already himself

1 See on this Introd. p. 35 n. 3 and Suseumihi's critical edition p. lxii.
pronounced democracy and τυραννίς to be the two worst governments, the latter as the extreme of despotic rule, the former as the extreme of liberty. Aristotle however everywhere else calls Oligarchy and τυραννίς the two worst forms of government, see on VI (IV), 11 § 21 n. (1305): so that here he contradicts himself. According to the statement in the Laws it is no doubt true that every unlimited, i.e. pure and unmixed, monarchy coincides with τυραννίς: III 691 D—701 E, IV 710 E, 712 C ff.: kingdoms or limited monarchy and limited democracy are intermediate or mixed forms. Hence it would certainly be no incorrect expression of Plato's thought in the Laws, that the right constitution should hold a mean between democracy and τυραννίς. But from this it does not in the least follow that it must be compounded of the two: for it would also be a mean between them if they were compounded of forms which approximate partly to the one partly to the other, in order thus to blend freedom with order or authority. 'In the passages in question Plato is speaking of monarchy and democracy as principles of all government, not of certain constitutions, since he finds the principle of authority more clearly stamped on the one, that of liberty on the other' (Henkel). Consequently, to make the state in the Laws a combination of oligarchical with democratical elements is not inconsistent with his requirement. Besides, it is also incorrect to call these the only constituents of the mixed form and so to make the constitution simply a Polity (πολειτεία): for it deserves to be called a mixed aristocracy with far greater right than the Spartan constitution: see on § 5 (193), § 14 (212), § 21 (229); Sussehnel Plat. Phil. II. 624—631, Translation of the Laws p. 980; also Zeller Plato p. 535 f. Eng. tr. Nor is this state of the Laws without a certain monarchical head; for in so far as it too is preeminently an educating institution, such a post is filled by the highest official who presides over education. However Henkel (Studien 65) is quite right in inferring from all the foregoing that the monarchical element of the state is rather to be looked for in the magistrates collectively, in virtue of the extended powers assigned to them. But this by no means excludes the substantial correctness of Oncken's remark (op. c. 1. 209): "taken literally monarchy and democracy are incapable of reconciliation: for where one rules, all cannot rule, and conversely. But if a reconciliation or blending of the two is thought of as possible at all, it can only be understood in this way, that the numbers are set aside as unessential and the mode of government emphasized as the essential feature. In that case, however, the nomenclature is quite suitable to the case before us.' The highest magistracy, apart from the council, in Plato's state of the Laws, the 36, or (including the officer who presides over education) the 37 νομοθετείς, have an approximately monarchical authority in consequence of the large powers entrusted to them*; in the sense in which Aristotle himself (?) admits that the double kingship of the Spartans is called monarchy, § 17, and the board of ephors a τυραννίς, though there were five of them: and further, designates the people in the most extreme democracy as a many-headed monarch. Taken literally, the union of oligarchy and democracy, as Aristotle finds it in the πολειτεία, is just as impossible as that of monarchy and democracy. Susenm. (220)

4. βέλτιον ούν κτλ. That is, in the particular case here given (cp. n. 223) they are more in the right: they either leave out tyranny, the worst form of government, altogether and combine other elements with democracy; or at any rate add two other elements, oligarchy and monarchy, one of which at least, viz. monarchy, is distinctly better. The two schools of political theorists and eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution noticed in § 17, are doubtless intended. If it were true (1266 a 1, 2) that the best polity according to Plato is one com-

* Only Oncken's assertion, that Plato intended the council to be irresponsible, is a decided mistake, and all the inferences which he has attached to the assertion fall to the ground.

II.
pounded of democracy and tyranny, then the general statement in a 4 might justly be made: for any three, or more, forms would make a better mixture than these two. Susem. (221)

19 δήλων δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐντάξει τὰς κληρονομεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄμφοι, τὸ δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐυπορωτικοὺς τέροις ἐπάναγγεις ἐκκλησιἀικῶς εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἀρχοντας ἢ τι ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δὲ ἀφείσαίται, τούτο δὲ ὀλγαρχικοί, καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν ἐυπόρων εἶναι to both" i.e. the lot to democracy, the voting to oligarchy [or aristocracy]. This took place in the election of the council, of the magistrates charged with the police of the city (ἀγορασμόως and ἀστυνόμους), and of the superintendents of the games (ἀγωνιάς ἀθλοθέται): Laws vi 756 b—e, 763 d e, 765 b—d. Susem. (223)


9 τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν κτλ. Laws vi 764 a: ἐν δὲ ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν ἕκλησαν δὲ βουλεύομεν, ἐπάναγγεις δὲ ἐστὶν τὸ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ πρῶτων τιμημάτων, δέκα δραχμὰς ἦμισιμα, ἐὰν μὴ παρὼν εξετάσθηται τοῖς ἐκλεγομενοις, τρίτη δὲ τιμἠματι καὶ τετάρτη μὴ ἐπάναγγες, ἀλλὰ ἁγίους ἀφείωθα. Susem. (224)

τὸ φέρειν is suffragium fortis; to vote: with acc., to vote for certain candidates for office.

del. φέρειν ἀρχοντας] As a matter of fact this regulation only applies to the election of the superintendents of the games (ἀγωνιάς ἀθλοθέται) Laws vi 765 c, and of the council vii 756 b—e; but Aristotle does not come to speak of this latter election until § 20. Susem. (225)

11 τοῖς δὲ ἀφείσαι] Not however at the election of the ἀγορασμὸως and ἀστυνόμους, Laws 764 a: χειροτονεῖτο δὲ τὰς πάντας τὸ δὲ μὴ θέλουν, ἐὰν εἰςαγγελθῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἐξεικνύσθω. Susem. (226)

tou τοῦ] This δὲ is resumptive of δὲ in line 9. Cr. τοῦτο δὲ μικρότερα, 2 § 6.

12 καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι πλείους κτλ] Of these two statements the latter, viz. that the highest officers of state are to be elected from the highest classes of the census, is quite incorrect. Even for the Guardians of the Laws (μομοφόλακε) no such regulation is found: Laws vii 753 b, 766 a f: nor for the supreme board of control (εἰθύνοις) XII 945 B ff.: nor again for the military officers (στρατηγοὶ, ἵππαρχοι, φίλαρχοι, ταξιαρχοι) 755 b ff. And as
regards the former statement, instead of arrangements to secure the election of a majority of the officials from the richest citizens, the truth is that only in the case of a minority, namely the ἀστυνόμου, is it provided that they shall be of the highest class on the register, while the superintendents of the games (ἀθλοθεταὶ) must be elected from the third or the second class. 

§ 20 τῶν ἀρχαγμάτων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων 

Thus described in Laws 726 b—e. I suggest: "The council shall consist of 360 members. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety councillors for each class. First all citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from each class, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined (πρώτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων ἀπαντάς φέρεων ἢ ἀνάγκης, ἢ ἱσομοιότατον τῆς πειθόμενον τῇ δοξῇ ή τῷ εὐοψεί διμοιρίᾳ). When the candidates have been elected one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first class. And on the following day the election shall be made from the second class in the same manner as on the previous day (τῇ δ' ὀστεραίᾳ φέρεων ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων καθαρτὰ καθαρτέρα τῇ πρόσβεσιν); and on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes vote and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote (πρώτον δ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων φέρεων μὲν τὸν βούλομενον, ἐπάγγελμα δὲ εἶναι τοῖς τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων); but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the fourth and lowest class (τεταρτῇ δὲ φέρεων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ αμφικτότατον τιμημάτων ἀπαντάς); they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished; he who is of the second class shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple.' The number of candidates thus nominated is reduced first, by election, to 180 of each class and next, by sortition, to 90 from each class. The passage continues: 'On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all the citizens, and every man shall choose out of them under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny: these are to form the council for the year' (Dr Jowett's translation).

Plato's object is to give the numerically smaller and wealthier first and second classes not only their half of the senators, but also a preponderant influence in the return of the other half, which they will secure provided there are abstentions enough among the poorer citizens. It is obvious that Aristotle is referring to the proceedings of the first four days. What is the number returned from each class? (a) Grote thinks 360, Plato III. 363 n. 9. (b) Stallbaum, J. G. Schneider follow older editors in assuming it to be ninety, but omit to explain what takes place on the fifth day. (γ) Mr Cope supposed that on each successive day each class voted for 90 candidates belonging to a given class, so that the abstentions of classes III and IV might, in the extreme case, reduce the roll of candidates published on the fifth day from 1440 to 1170 (360 + 360 + 270 + 180). Perhaps none of these suggestions is correct; the proceedings of the first four days are in reality a nomination of candidates, not an election: there is no limitation to the number of candidates nominated, each citizen presumably recording a vote, i.e. sending in one name. The votes recorded are taken down and published on the fifth day (ἐπειδ' ὁ ἐνεχθείς, τοῦτον μὲν κατασκηνοσθαι...πέμπτῃ δὲ ἡμέρᾳ τὰ κατασκηνοθέτα ὄνοματα ἐξενεκεῖν μὲν τῶν ἀρχαγμάτων ιδεῖν πάπι τοῖς πολίταισι). The voting on the fifth day is confined to these duly nominated candidates, and as 180 must be then selected from each class (ἐκλέξαντας) Plato appears to assume that more than that number will be nominated on each of the first four days.

ἀεύρουμα μὲν κατ' ἄλλα. For all are bound to elect from the first class, and then again equally [i.e. in like manner] from the second; and next from the third, save that it is not compulsory on all (to vote),
ευτέρου, ειτ' εκ των τριτών, πλην ου πάσιν ἐπάναγκες, <ἀλλ> ἡ τοις [ἐκ] τῶν τριών [ἡ] τιμημάτων, εκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου [τῶν τετάρτων] μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς

§ 21 πρῶτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις· ειτ' εκ τούτων ἵσους αὖ ἐκάστου τιμή-

20 ματος αποδείξαι φησι δειν ἀριθμόν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγάστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους διὰ τὸ ένιοῦ μή

§ 22 αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοτικῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. οὐς μὲν οὖν

οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν τοιαύ-

την πολιτείαν, εκ τούτων παρέχειν καὶ τῶν ύπερτον ῥηθομο-

25 νων, ὡστε ἐπιβάλλη περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκέψις·

15 εὐάναγκες, from Plat. Laws vi. 765 B ff. Schmidt (and probably Ar.), ἐπά-

ναγκες Γ Π Βκ., [ἐπάναγκες] Schlosser Susem.11 ἢ [ἀλλ] Madvig, ἢ ἐκ transposed to 17 before ἢ Susem.1; ἢ <πρώτων> Lambin, πρώτων Bender, as Muret before him changed ἢ ἐκ (=90) || 16 ἵσους Nickes (Plato has κατά ταῦτα), ἵσους Γ Π Αρ. Bk. Susem.1 || τοῦ τρίτου Oncken || 17 [πλην] Madvig || οὐκ [πάσιν] Bender || <ἀλλ> ἢ Susem., ἢ Γ Π Βκ. Bk. Bender, πλην Göttling in his edition and Madvig, ἢ Göttling in Ἰηναίερ Λεκτισκατ. 1855, ἢτα <δ'> εκ τῶν τρί-

των οὐ πάσιν ἐπάναγκες <πλην ἢ> ἢ τοῖς [ἐκ] τῶν τριών [ἡ] τιμημάτων, εκ τε κτλ ? Susem. Of course ἢ η πλην would do just as well as πλην ἢ ἢ ειτ' εκ τῶν τρίτων. πλην <ἀλλ> οὐ πάσιν ἐπάναγκες ἢ των τετάρτων τοῖς εκ τῶν τρίτων <φήρειν μη διωκόμενοι> · ειτ' εκ κτλ Schmidt || ειτ' εκ τῶν τρίτων οὐ πάσιν ἐπάναγκες πλην τοῖς εκ τῶν τριών ειτ' εκ τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις Welldon || [ἐκ] Susem. (Plato omits it) || τρίων τιμημάτων Göttling Ἰηναίερ Λεκτισκατ. ut sup., from Plato; τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων Γ Π Βκ., τρίων [ἡ τετάρτων] Göttling in his edition, Madvig; Engelhardt Spengel Bender and Jowett omit τρίτων ἢ || 18 [τῶν τε-

τάρτων] Engelhardt Bender Susem.; but [τῶν τετάρτων] with Syllburg is perhaps as good: τῶν τετάρτων Canot Sepulveda's ms. Vettori2 (and a marginal note from his own hand in the copy of his 1st edition in the Münich Library), τῶν τιμημάτων Göttling in the Ἰηναίερ Λεκτισκατ. l.c. || ἐπάναγκες <ἡ> Schmidt || 20 δὲ ΠΙ (emended by p1) || 22 ὡκ...25 σκέψεις] Schmidt, probably rightly, cp. n. (223) || 23 οὐκ omitted by ΠΙ (supplied by p1) || μοναρχίας ὀλυναρχίας Heinsins Schmidt || <ολυναρχία> δὲ Schmidt || συνεστάναι ΠΙ 14 (1st hand) Π2 (corr.1), συνεστάναι ΠΠΒκ. and ΠΠ (1st hand—altered by corr.1) and Π3 (corr.1), perhaps rightly || 24 <καὶ> εκ τούτων Schmidt

but only on those of the three (higher) classes, and in (electing candidates) from the fourth (class) it is compulsory only on the first and second.

§ 21 19 ειτ' εκ τούτων κτλ] More ac-

20 curately stated, there is first an election of 18ο candidates belonging to each class out of the larger number first returned, and in a similar manner: secondly, a selection of one half of these, 90 from each class, by lot, to make up the whole number of 360. Vide supra. Susem. (228)”}

15 19 πάνες ἡ ἐπάναγκης [ἀλλ'] ἐκ τοῦ πρῶτου τιμή-(III) ματος, εἰτα πάλιν ἵσως ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν τριτῶν, πλην ου πάσιν ἐπάναγκες, <ἀλλ> ἡ τοις [ἐκ] τῶν τριών [ἡ] τιμημάτων, εκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου [τῶν τετάρτων] μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς

§ 21 πρῶτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις· ειτ' ἐκ τούτων ἵσους αὖ ἐκάστου τιμή-

20 ματος αποδείξαι φησι δειν ἀριθμόν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγάστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους διὰ τὸ ένιοῦ μή


30 Krohn pronounces the whole of c. 6 as far as τρόπων to be spurious and of late origin, but see Int. p. 33 n. 4 and Comm. nnn. (213, 215) || 31 αἵ...φιλοσόφων καὶ διώκτων αἵ...πολιτικῶν, τιτσαί (p. 31) δὲ τῶν καθεστηκυνίων καὶ καθ’ ἄς πολιτεύονται νῦν ἐγγύτερον εἰσὶ τούτων ἁμφοτέρων. οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἄλλος 35 κεκανοτόμηκεν, οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν,

§ 2 ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἀρχηγοῦται μᾶλλον. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοις περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι [ἀναγκαῖον] μέγιστον τετάχθαι καλῶς περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰς στάσεις πάντων

39 τας. διὸ Ἐλέας ὁ Χαλκηδώνιος τούτ’ εἰσήγειτε πρῶτος:

33 τοῦτον ἀμφ.] that of the Republic and that of the Laws.

35 συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν] Comp. 6 § 5 with n. (196): also n. (153) on 5 §§ 2 and (116) on 1. 13. 9. SUSEM. (231) 36 τῶν ἀναγκαίων] the necessary considerations of every-day life as opposed to its luxuries or ornaments: practical requirements (fanciful theories).

§ 2 37 μέγιστον τετάχθαι] The sentence is inverted; with τετάχθαι καλῶς take τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας: the infinitive clause so formed, τὸ περὶ...τετάχθαι, is subject of δοκεῖ εἶναι μέγιστον. 'Some hold the right regulation of the relations of property to be of the utmost importance.' There has been no lack of representatives of this view. Apart from physiocrats old and new, we may refer to M. de Laveleye Primitive Property Pre-face xxvii—xxviii, also pp. 149, 158 ff., 223.

39 διὸ Φαλέας...πρῶτος] From c. 8 § 1 (comp. Exc. 11 to B. 11) it is clear that Phaleas was younger than Hippodamos: but if πρῶτος is the right reading, he must have come forward with his political scheme before Plato published either of his. This conjecture finds support in the apparent meagerness of his proposal, its lack of all finished execution as com-
§ 3 φήσι γὰρ δεῖν ἵσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτο δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπῶν φετὸ ποιεῖν, τὰς δ᾽ ήδη κατακομμέναις ἐργωδέστερον μὲν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστ' ἀν ὀμαλισθῆναι τῷ τὰς προῖκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν.

§ 4 εινὲ δὲ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφουσιν μέχρι μὲν τινος φετὸ δεῖν ἕαν, πλείων δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλαχίστης μηδὲν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαι εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθάπερ εἰρήνη καὶ πρότερον.

§ 5 δεὶ δὲ μὴ δεῖ τοῦτο λαμβάνειν τοὺς οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, δ᾽ λαβ—

1266 b 2 δ᾽ ἡδὴ Γ, ἡ δὲ Π II, δὲ Μ* Ar. || 3 τὰς omitted by Μ*Π, [τὰς] Susem. perhaps rightly || 5 [Πλάτων...8 πρότερον] ? Susem. The brackets are necessary if Schmidt is justified in rejecting 1265 b 21—26 (see Comm.) || 6 ἕαν omitted by Π', [ἐὰν] Susem., but see Dittenberger op. c. p. 1359 f. || 9 μὴ Bender || 12 τῶν τε νόμον Bas., τὸν γενόμενον Μ*Ub

pared with the Platonic schemes (comp. nn. 255, 256 on 8 §§ 3, 4). According to Aristotle's account, Phæleas thought there was no more to be done when once he had demanded an equal division of the land into inalienable and indivisible lots, and the preservation of this equality by a uniform scheme which is not more minutely described, and when he had recommended the degradation of artisans to the position of public slaves. He had nothing to say about the size or number of these lots, about moveable property, or in fact hardly anything else. The spirit and tendency of these proposals strongly suggest the idea expressed by Böckh Staats- haushaltung der Ath. i. p. 65 and Roscher Thukydides p. 247 that they concealed a practical aim: that he wanted to restore, in his Dorian native town especially, the old aristocracy of well-born landholders. Henkel Studien p. 165 further remarks in support of this view that popular rule found its way first into Byzantium, B.C. 399, and thence to Chalcédon, under the influence of the reviving spirit of the Athenian Demos: Xen. Hellen. iv. 8. 27, Theopompos Frag. 65 in Athenaeus xii 526 D. At the same time, he adds, it must be remembered that the absence from Phæleas' scheme of the warlike spirit of a chivalrous aristocracy, and his silence as regards everything military, are great hindrances to this hypothesis. Susem. (232)

§ 3 1266 b 1 εὐθὺς should be taken with the participle.

2 ταχήστα[.] The expedient of modern writers for bringing about this much desired equality is limitation of the right of bequest.

§ 4 6 ἕαν = laisser faire.

8 καὶ πρότερον] 6 § 15 n. (213). Hence if that § be bracketed the same suspicion attaches to this one. Susem. (233)

§ 5 9 δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ κτλ] This remark was made before, 6 §§ 10—13, cp. n. (210). It is strange that Aristotle does not refer back to that passage. Susem. (234)

11 ὑπεραίρῃ = exceed, rise above. 'If the number of children becomes too great for the size of the property.'

12 ἀνάγκη...ἀνεσθαι] Schlosser thinks this remark unfounded, because Phæleas is only speaking of landed property, as Aristotle says himself, § 21. And he reminds us of the custom in some parts of Germany where only one child (the eldest, or the youngest, or any one whom the father chooses) succeeds to the real estate and provides portions for the rest at a fair valuation. But he should have reflected that Phæleas Plato Aristotle all alike exclude the sons of citizens from engaging in any trade. Susem. (235)
The influence which equality of possessions must exercise upon civil society was recognized (1) by Solon’s legislation, (2) by laws which fix a limit to the accumulation of landed property, (3) by the law of Locri which forbids the sale of land, (4) by a law of entail, as at Locera, where the disuse of the law altered the constitution to an advanced democracy. Yet the size of properties needs regulation, if, when equalized, they are not to be over-large or over-small.

Compare c. 12 § 10 (Philolaeos at Thbes), vii(vi). 4. 9 (the Aphytaeans and Oxylos in Elis), viii(vi). 7. 9 (Thuri). See further Lavelaye op. c. pp. 161—165 Eng. trans., A. Lang *Essay* xi(iii), esp. p. 891; all attempts to restrict the sale of land and to keep it parcelled out in small lots may be taken as survivals of early custom. An equal early distribution (Maine’s *Village Communities* p. 81), perhaps a periodic redistribution, was a tradition to the early lawgivers of Greece. Long after they Phaleas, and Plato in the *Laws*, 744 E, desire a return to the old usage.

At this point then Aristotle’s own socialism begins to come out more clearly than before. See notes on 5 § 7 (158), § 15 (166); 6 §§ 10—14 (208—211), and 7 § 5 (234). Further comp. n. (192) and *Intro*. p. 33. *Susem.* (236 b)

Like the law of Oxylos prohibiting mortgage, vii(vi). 4. 9. Solon’s *seisachtheia*, or relief measure, restored mortgaged lands to their proprietors: ἡ μελανά τῆς ἐνόματος ἀνάρχοντα παρατήρησις ἢτο τὸ πρόθετ σωλείν τῶν ἐκλήσει. His graduated assessment must also have tended somewhat to equality. But in addition to this Schömann, *Antiquities* p. 330 Eng. tr., and Curtius, *Hist.* i. 329 Eng. tr., represent Solon as enacting a special law, that there should be a maximum limit to the acquisition of landed property: Grote (iii. 182) thinks no such inference borne out by the present passage.

It is not known where.

Presumably the Epizephyrian Locri, where Zaleucus was legislator, c. 12 § 6.

§ 7 22 kal περὶ Δευκάδα Cf. vii(vi). 4. 9 ἢν δὲ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαὶ πόλεις νεομοιοθέτημεν μεθὲ πολέων εξείρην τοὺς πρῶτους κλήρους with note, and on the custom at Sparta, c. 9 § 14 n. (300). *Susem.* (237)

But then there may be equality of possessions and
yet the equal shares of citizens may be either immediately large or excessively small.


28 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστοῦ] See this more precisely defined in c. 6 §§ 8, 9; IV(vii). 5 § 1, with the notes: also IV(iii). 11 § 2 ff., as quoted in u. (207). SUSEM. (237 b)

§§ 8, 9 Men's desires need to be regulated no less than the amount of their property: this Phales must admit, as he holds that there should be a public education, though he does not give a detailed scheme. Crime springs from ill-regulated desires (a) for the necessaries of life, (b) for its superfluities, and for the gratification of the passions generally, (c) for higher gratifications. Phales can only cure the minor social evils due to (a), but not the ambition which produces a tyrant.

30 τούτῳ δ' οὐκ ἔστι κτλ.] Compare with what follows 5 § 15 n. (165 b); see further on 9 § 12 n. (296) and Exc. 11 on Bk. ii p. 333. SUSEM. (238)

36 § 10 στασιάδαν[ου] Cp. viii(v). 1. ii πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀνίσον ἡ στάσις. 40 This opposition of οἱ χαριέντες, the educated or enlightened classes, to the mass of ordinary men recurs in Nic. Eth. 1.5 §§ 3, 4. There joined with πρακτικοῖ, in Pol. vii(vi). 5. 10 with νοῦν ἔξοντες.

1267 α 1 εἶναι οὐσία sc. αἱ κτῆσεις.

2 Homer Iliad ix. 319. SUSEM. (239) The exclamation of Achilles, as one of the nobles, at the levelling policy which he attributes to Agamemnon.
One could hardly have supposed that this last was a fruitful source of crime.

§ 11 Shilleto pointed out that these three causes of crime strongly resemble those which are mentioned in Rhet. 1. 12. 17 ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἔχοντας ὃν αὐτὸν ἐνδείκτες ἢ εἰς τὰν ἀναγκαία ἢ εἰς ἐπερχοῦσα εἰς ἀπόλοια, where see Cope's note.

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be defended by Plato *Phaedrus* 260 b *polémov ómws*. But see *Critical Notes*.

27 *polémov...ómowv*] to support a war even with an equal or similar power, *ènou kai òmow* = a state of the same standing, an equal.

§ 16 We should not fail to decide what limit to property is advisable.

28 [dei...di kτλ] This limitation has been sufficiently noticed in the preceding § 15, yet the repetition might be justified, if it now appeared under a new form, much sharper and better defined. This would not be the case unless the second explanation of 29 *I sów ón kτl* as given in the next note, were correct. But, as is there shown, this can hardly be accepted. That being so, there is certainly then fairly good reason to suspect, with Bender, that it is now appended solely for the purpose of introducing the anecdote about Eubulos. *Susem.* (246)

29 *I sów ón...31 ónswv*  Perhaps the best limit of wealth is that its excess |
§ 17 ούτως όσ' άν καί μη έχοντων τοσαυτην ουσιαν. οιον Ευβοιαν- 
λος Αυτοφραδατω μελλουτος ΄Αταρνεα πολιορκεων εκελευ-
σειν αυτων, σκεφαμενου είν πόσο χρόνο λήψεται το χωριον, 
λογισασθαι τον χρόνον τουτων την δαπανην εθελει γάρ ἐπατ-
35 του τούτων λαβων εκλειπειν ήδη των 'Αταρνεα ταύτα δ' ει-
πτων έποιησε τον Αυτοφραδατην σύννυνω γενόμενων παύσα-
§ 18 σται της πολιορκίας. ἧς τε μεν οὖν τι των συμφερόντων τον 

should not make it profitable for the stronger to attack us, but should leave them no motive for so doing which they would not have had, even if our possessions had been less. The ellipse may be filled up thus, αὖλ των πολεμεων λυ-

...επολυμπαν και μη έχοντων, sc. των ηπτων, τοσαυτην ουσιαν. Our 

wealth should never tempt aggression: we should then only be exposed to the same attacks as a poorer state in our place. That is, we should aim at being the 'lean wiry dogs' with whom their neighbours are glad to make common cause against 'fat and tender sheep': Republic iv 42 D.

A less simple rendering has been proposed: 'that is the best limit of wealth when a stronger power does not find it profitable to make war upon us for the sake of the excess of the booty to be gained over the costs of victory, but when (even if it con-

quers us) it is no better off than if it had not made so great an acquisition.' This suits the sequel better, but somewhat strains the meaning of ύπερβολην and ουσιας, besides leaving a harsh genitive absolute: αὖλ των συμφερειν ώς άν συνε-

...φειρει μη έχοντων (των κριτων) τοσαυτην ουσιαν. It 

can hardly be right.

§ 17 During the last years of Arta-
xerxes Mnemon and at the commence-

ment of the reign of Artaxerxes Ochos, the confusion in Asia Minor, more parti-
cularly owing to the revolt of Artabazos, the satrap of Phrygia Lydia and Paphla-
gonia, suggested the idea of wresting a part of the Hellenic lands on the coast of 

Asia from the Persians. The requisite means for effecting this were secured, and it 

was even possible to maintain the severance. Eubulos was a Bithynian by 

birth, a money-changer, i.e. banker, by trade, and at the same time ἀνὴρ φιλοσο-

fos, i.e. probably one of Plato's scholars, like his freedman and successor Hermeias. 

Through the medium of his business he found he could execute such a scheme as this, 

and make himself absolute ruler (τήρανος) of Artaxerxes on the Aeolic coast 

of Mysia, and of the stronghold of Assos in the Troad with the adjacent districts: 

Vita Aristotelis in Westermam's Biograp-

...phi p. 402, Suidas s.vv. Αριστοτέλης, 

...Eulapias, Strabo xiii. 610. Böckh 

(Her-

meias of Artaxerxes in his Ges. Kl. Schriften 

...vi. 183 fl.) tries to show, as others have 

done, that this event happened before 

359 B.C.; that in 359 Autophradates as 

general of the Persian king marched 

against Artabazos and took him prisi-

...er, that in the course of this same 

campaign he laid siege to Artaxerxes. 

The suggestion by which Eubulos 

raised the siege is, as Böckh remarks, one worthy 

of a banker. We know that he main-

...ed to his death: also 

that it was not before 345/44 that his 

successor, the eunuch Hermeias, Arist-

...'s friend (see 1. 6. 9. n. 56) was over-

thrown by the Rhodian Mentor, the 

Persian commander-in-chief, and that 

solely by stratagem deceit and treachery. 

SUSEM. (247)

Bergk's posthumous paper On the chro-
nology of king Artaxerxes III, Ochos, in 


fixes the fall of Hermeias and the escape of 

Aristotle and Xenocrates to Mitylene 

and thence to Athens in the year 345/44. 

Comp. Susemihl in Bursian's Jahrbucher. 


36 σταυρον γενέσθαι, to become 

thoughtful, to reflect.

That §§ 18—20 are parallel to §§ 10— 

13 has been explained Introd. p. 80 f. 

§ 18 37 Ἦστι μὲν...38 πολλασ] Comp. 

line 3 ὁν ἄκοι...4 ὀφέιας.
πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν (IV) πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ χαριέντες ἀγανακτοῦεν [ἄν] ὁς οὐκ ἥσων ὄντες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ § 19 φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες: ἔτι δ' ἡ πονηρία τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἰκανόν ἰδιωβολία μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἤδη τοῦτ' ἤ πάτριον, αἰε δεόνται τοῦ πλείονος, ἐος εἰς ἄπειρον ἐλθοντος. ἀπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἂς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ § 20 ξώσειν. τῶν οὖν τοιοῦτων ἄρχῃ, μᾶλλον τοῦ τῶν οὐσίας ὁμαδ. 10 6 λίξειν, τὸ τούτων μὲν ἐπιεικείς τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτος παρασκευαζοντες ξένη ὡστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι τοῦτο δ' ἐστιν, ἃν ἦττους τε ὁσί καὶ μὴ ἀδικάνων § 21 ταί. ὥστε οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὕδε τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας εἰρηκεν. περὶ 10 γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτῆσιν ἵσαξει μόνον, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ δοῦλων

38 ἢς after elvai Π 2 Bk., perhaps Γ; possibly right || 40 ἢν Π 2 Bk., omitted by Π

1267 b 5 ἄρχῃ is corrupt: ἄκη Scaliger, ἂκος Schneider, ἄρωγη M. Vermehren, ἄλκη? Madvig probably right, <ἀπαλλαγή> or <ιατρεία> ἄρχῃ Schmidt; ἄρκει Koraes, certainly not right

38 πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν recalls στασιάζομαι of § 10. 39 οὐ μὴν μέγα κτλ] α 16 ὡστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας κτλ. καὶ γὰρ ἄν κτλ] "For even then (ἐώς ὅταν αἱ κτήσεις, § 10) the higher classes would be discontented, as they lay claim to something more than an equal share, and hence are often found aggressive and factious."

40 οὐκ ἥσων] ἀλλὰ πλεονεκοὶ: on the ground that they deserve something more than an equal share, something proportionately greater. Comp. πλεονεκταν ἐπ. οἰκ. 13. 13 and Thuc. viii. 80. 4 πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερῶν ἄξιοσίν τινι οὐκ ἤδη ἀλλὰ καὶ πολύ πρώτον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἶναι. In Thuc. i. 132 § 2 μὴ ἥσων: superior.

§ 19 1267 b 2 ἰδιωβολία] This refers to the so-called ὑθημάτων, a grant of public money to provide for shows or public amusements introduced at Athens after Pericles' time. In the first instance at those festivals only at which plays were exhibited, the sum of two obols, the price of an ordinary seat in the theatre, was paid from the state-chest to the lessee of the theatre for every citizen present. (Every one who went to the theatre received a counter which he gave up on going in; the lessee collected from the state the two obols for every counter; but he had to pay a rent out of his receipts and to keep the theatre in repair. See Benndorf Beiträge in Zeitschrift f. d. öst. Gymn. xxvii. 1875. p. 23 ff.) Subsequently the poorer citizens received the like dole for all the other festivals, and these outgoings swallowed up no small part of the revenues. See Böckh Public Econ. of Athens p. 217 Eng. tr., Schömann Antiquities i p. 234, i. 438 ff. Eng. tr. An Attic obol = 1'3d. of our money, a little more than five farthings, or 11 German Pfennige: Hultsch Greek and Roman Metrology p. 172. Susem. (245) ἢς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν κτλ] Comp. α 5 διὸς καὶ ἄκης καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμησων. § 20 ἢ τοὺς μὲν...7 πλεονεκτεῖν] Substantially the same remedy as in § 12 τρῖτον δ' εἰ τίνες...ἀκος.

§ 21 The argument from inconsistency is pressed from opposite sides here and in 6 § 15. Phæas must have meant to include personal property, § 3. 10 ἐστι δὲ καὶ δοῦλων κτλ] Comp. Rhel. i. 5. 7 πλοῦτον δὲ μέρη νομίσασι καὶ πληθος, γῆς χαριῶν κτήσις, ἐτε δέ ἐπιπλών κτήσει καὶ βουκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπίδων, where Cope explains ἐπιπλα as "moveables" opposed to fixtures, such as houses and land. Hence furniture, even if of bronze, Xen. Oeconomic. ix. 6, Thuc. iii. 68.
§ 22 15 δημόσιοι = public servants. Such were the executioners and physicians always (see III. I1. 11 δημοσιογόνοι = λατρός): also ναυπηγα and others, Plato Corg. 455 b with Dr Thompson’s note, Politi- cims 259 L.


Comp. III. 13, 14, VI (IV). 4. 12.

§ 23 17 εν Ἐπιδάμνῳ κτλ] “No one but a political dreamer or dreamy politician like Phaleas could hatch the thought that the handmaids throughout the city should be carried on by public slaves. The proposal made at Athens by Diophantos, we do not know when, was that only the artisans who worked for the community were to be public slaves”; Böckh Staatsk. 1. 65. [not in the Eng. trans.] This was certainly the case at Epidamnos. With the present text this sense can only be obtained by interpreting the words τόσο τά κοινά ἐργαζόμενοι to mean ‘those who do common work for the whole community’; and we should be forced to assume that even Phaleas’ proposal went no further than this, which is very improbable. Hence the alteration suggested by Bernays is tempting. The archon of the year Ol. 96, 2 = 395/4 was named Diophantos, but he can hardly have been the man. “Aelian relates that the people of Epidamnos allowed any one who liked to settle amongst them as a resident, Ἐπιδάμνοι ἐπιθηκεῖα καὶ μετοικεῖα παρεῖχον τῷ βουλόμενῳ: V. II. III. 16” (J. G. Schneider). But this fact throws no light on the passage. On the constitution of Epidamnos see further III. 16 § 1, VIII (v). 1 § 10, 4 § 7 mms. Susem. (249)

Bernays renders: “But if (this proposal is to be tried), state-slaves ought only to be employed upon works for state objects, and the arrangement must be made as it is found in Epidamnos and as Diophantos wanted to introduce it at Athens.”

c. 8 Examination of the scheme of Hippodamos of Miletus. This chapter is analysed p. 105 f.

§ 1 22 Ἰππόδαμος] See Excursus II to B. II p. 331 ff.; also K. F. Hermann De Hippodamo Milesio (Marburg 1841). Susem. (250)

This chapter is treated slightly by Hildenbrand pp. 58—61, Oncken I, 213—218, Henkel 162—165. See also

22 ὁς καλ...28 Βουλόμενοι] Filleborn remarked long since: “every reader must be struck with one strange thing in this introductory notice by Aristotle, viz. the picture he draws of Hippodamos. With what object has he preserved for posterity these proofs of the man’s vanity and effeminacy? Do they serve to explain the spirit of his work? I doubt it.” And Congreve, who rightly holds that this description would be more consistent with Theophrastos than with Aristotle, suggests that here we may reasonably suspect a later hand. SUSEM. (252)

23 κατέτειμεν] cut out, i.e. laid out the streets; Pindar Ἰλ. 5. 84 εὐθύτωμα κατέθετο...εὐκυρωτάτῳ δόου.

25 ἠν περιγράτερον] was held to be somewhat affected in his way of life.

In the following words ἔσθητοι must be taken with πλήθει according to the reading of P2 adopted in the text. It is plausible to make it depend upon some word like κόσμος, the reading of P2 (so Ridgeway, who quotes Aeschyl. Súpp. 246 for κόσμος, meaning fashion or style of dress), or possibly καλλωπισμός or κοσμουσία, which are the conjectures of Bender and Welldon respectively.

τριγωνοτο πλήθει καὶ κόμης] In Sparta it remained the custom, on account of war and warlike exercises, to wear long hair from the time of entering upon the military age. But at Athens from early times it became the practice to cut the hair upon attaining the full age for civic rights and to wear it short from that time onwards. Not to do so passed for vanity, foppishness, dandyism. The orator Hegesippus, a contemporary and supporter of Demostenes, was on this account nicknamed Κρασμαθος or Top-knot. The knights alone are said to have kept the privilege of wearing long hair: μὴ φοινικῶτες ημῖν κομώσε, Aristoph. Knights 529. See Becker Charitcles iii. 233 ff. ed. 2, Eng. trans. pp. 453—55. SUSEM. (251)

26 εὐτελεύτος] of cheap material, though warm.

28 Λόγιος] a man of learning, as in IV (vii). 10. 3 and often in Herodotos (Congreve). Suidas calls him μετεωράλογος.

§ 2 30 τὴν πόλιν] Oncken i. 214. n. (1) takes this to mean that in the 10,000 are included not the citizens only but the entire free population. But according to the design of Hippodamos § 7, not merely those who bear arms but also the artisans and husbandmen are to be citizens, although it must be conceded, to Aristotle’s criticism §§ 8—12, that his end could hardly have been attained in such a manner. SUSEM. (253)

§ 3 33 διήρει δ’ εἰς τρία μέρη κτλ] So too Aristotle IV (vii). 10. (Eaton.) Cp. n. (365) on II. 10 § 8. SUSEM. (254)
II. 8. 5] 1267 b 23—1268 a 3. 271

χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱερὰν τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν τὴν δὲ ἱδίαν ὀθέν (V) μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα παράσυσυ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἱερὰν, ἀφ' ὅν δ' οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινῆ, τὴν δ' τῶν γεωργῶν.

§ 4 ἱδίαν. ὡτε δ' εἴδη καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνον περὶ ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαιαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτα εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, (p. 41) ὃς βλάβην θάνατον. ενομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν 40 τὸ κύριον, εἰς δ' πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖ τὰς μη καλὰς κεκρισθαὶ δοκοῦσας δίκας: τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκευάζει ἐκ τινῶν γερόντων αἰρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστήριοισ οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας φέτος γίνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἐκαστὸν πίνακαν, ἐν δὲ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἄπλος [τὴν δίκην], εἰ

35 ἵππα P^3 Q^4 T^9 I^8 and P^2 (1st hand, emended by corr. 2) || 37 δὲ καὶ εἴδη Π^5 apparently, possibly right || 40 δὲι Π^1 1268 a 2 ψέτο omitted by W^1 Λ^5, Ald., in P^4 inserted in the margin || 3 καταδικαζει P^1 and 1st hand of P^2 (emended by corr. 1) || τὴν δίκην omitted by Π^1

35 ἀφ' ὄν δὲ κτλ] Here there is just a germ of Plato's ideal state, when we consider that the soldiers answer to the second order, and the artizans and farmers together to the third order of citizens in the Republic. However even when viewed in this light the differences between the two schemes are as great as the resemblances. But the state proposed in the Latus may be described as hardly anything more than an improved working out of Phales' ideal. Comp. L. Stein op. c. p. 162 f. SUSEM. (255)

§ 4 37 ντετο κτλ] See Exc. II. to B. II. p. 333 f. SUSEM. (255 b) ὃς and βλάβη answer to crimes against the person and against property. Not precisely however; for ὃς implies insult; it is whatever wounds the feelings or honour, whether accompanied by violence or not. Whereas βλάβη implies loss or damage sustained, whether to person or property. See Rhet. i. 12. 26, II. 2. 5 with Cope's excellent comments.

39 ενομοθέτει δὲ ...] This idea of a court of appeal is further evidence that Hippodamos had a fine sense for jurisprudence. It is appropriated by Plato also Latus vi 767 c—E, XII 956 c f. (Oncken). Cp. also Exc. II. SUSEM. (256)

40 τὸ κύριον = the supreme court.

§ 5 1268 a 1 οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας] In the Athenian courts the voting was secret: each jurymen (δικαστής) received two ballots, one for condemnation, the other for acquittal; and there were two urns, one of copper, into which the ballot containing the verdict was thrown, the other of wood, into which the other, unused ballots were thrown. The ballots for voting were either differently coloured stones or small metal balls, or even differently coloured beans or shells. At what time the one or other of these were used is not known. Stones were certainly the most common; a black stone served for condemnation, a white one for acquittal: with balls of metal, one with a hole in it served for the former purpose, a whole one served for the latter purpose. Equality of votes was counted as acquittal. (Meier and Schömann Attische Proces 720 f.) SUSEM. (257)

Aristotle himself is our authority for the voting at Athens: see Frag. 1548 b 5—41 of the Berlin ed.

2 ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἐκαστὸν κτλ] Nearly the same arrangement was actually introduced amongst the Romans: a fact which shows how clearly this proposal testifies to a legal mind of great originality. At Rome the voting was by tablets in the manner here proposed, leaving it to the judges to affirm not simply condemnation (C) or acquittal (A), but also a verdict of "not proven" (NL, non liquet).

That Aristotle (§ 13 f.) is as yet quite unable to realize to himself the proper meaning of the proposal is a further proof of its originality. (L. Stein.) Comp. n. (268) on §§ 13—15. SUSEM. (258)
Δ' ἀπολύων ἀπλῶς, κενὸν <ἐλαν>, εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μὴ, τούτο (V)
διώρισεν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ἦν αἰσθητὴ θέα καλὸς: ἀναγκά
§ 6 ξεν ἀπὸ ἑπισκόπων ταῦτα η ἐπισκόπων. έτι δὲ
νόμον ἐτίθει περὶ τῶν εἰρησκόντων τῷ πόλει τιμήματος,
ὅπως τυχανότερος τιμήσει, καὶ τοῖς παισί τῶν ἐν τῷ
πολέμῳ τε-λευτῶν η ἐπισκόπων η τρόφημα, ὧς σύννοι τούτο
τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως τοὺς δ' αἱρέτησαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν
καὶ ἐξεικνύαν καὶ ὄρθον;

15 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μάλιστα αἰξύλογα τῆς Ἰππο-

4 ἀπολάλει Μ' Ρ1 Ἰβ, ἀπολόφην Ι. || <ἐλαν> Μειέρ (De bonisdamnat. p. 58)
|| <καὶ> τοῦτο Μειέρ L. c. perhaps rightly || 6 ἣ omitted by Γ Μ', ἣ ταυτὰ omitted
by Ι. and P1 (1st hand, both words added by p1) [ἡ] Σουσεμ.1, but see Dittenberger
ο. c. p. 1360. | ἦν δὲ ἐτίθει νόμον Π4, in the margin, in the text ἐτίθει is omitted,
ἐτίθει δὲ νόμον Π2-3 Ἰβ. Ρ1 Ι. Ald. Bk. || 9 τῶντο ἢ τῶν ἢ Εὐλησσὰν instead
of ἄλλως Σπεγγέλ, but see Dittenberger ο. c. p. 1369 ι. ἢ ἕλεξαν. || 11 τῶν ἢ
Π3-4 Ἰβ. Ρ1 Ι. Ald. and P1 (1st hand, emended by corr.2) || ὦτο τοῦ δήμου after 12
.aἱρετῶν Π2 Bk. || 14 καὶ ἐξεικνύατο πολλῶν omitted by Μ' and Ρ1 (1st hand, supplied by p1
in the margin)

§ 5 ἀναγκάζειν. sc. τὰν νόμον.
§ 6 9 ὡς οὐποῦ κτλ. “just as if this
law had not been made before elsewhere.”
So K. F. Hermann De Hippodamo p. 44,
who is defended by Dittenberger (Gott.
geb. Aus. 1874 p. 1369) against Σπεγγέλ.
It is true that ὡς with the participle
might equally mean (1) because in fact,
as in Pl. Phadoè. 245 E ὡς ταῦτα ὦθεσιν
φόνασι, or (2) because as he thought (ὡς
ὡς ἕν ἄνθρωπον ἢ τι
§ 6): but νῶν is not de-
ecisive in favour of (1), see n. (259).

οὐποῦ, not μὴν; cp. Λύσιος 14 § 10
ἐπολάλει οὔταν ἀναβήσαι, ὡς ἐξον ἐξεσαρωμένον τῇ
πολεί βίκνα λαμβάνειν: 27 § 16 ὡς τῷ ὑπερὶ τοῦ
οὐκ ὕπερ διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὕπερ διὰ τὸν
κλέπτην, αὕτη τὸν κλέπτην. The clause is
virtually oblique, and the negative is
reproduced unchanged.
10 ἔστι δὲ...νῶν] Here as often νῶν =
as things are, “under the existing system”
not simply = now, as Σπεγγέλ explains it.
Unless one follows Σπεγγέλ in an unten-
able alteration of the text, the drift of
the passage can only be a censure upon Hip-
podamos, which is even in this form
quite intelligible, though it would cer-
tainly have been more clearly expressed
as follows: “whereas a law like this was
already at the time in force at Athens.”
We cannot however prove the date of
this Athenian regulation (on which Wila-
mowitz Aus Kydathek p. 26 may also be
consulted), but the present passage
would seem to make it earlier than the
practice of Hippodamos. It is quite possible
that Aristotle’s censure is unfair; for
who is to inform us that in its author’s
intention the scheme of Hippodamos was
restricted to new proposals, never before
Σουσεμ. (259) Cp. for νῶν § 5, c. 1 § 3,
§ 3 § 6, 5 § 11, § 17, 6 § 11 ὡς ὡν ὡν ὡν ὡν
tr (in Plato’s supposed state) καὶ νῶν (as
things actually are), ἡθ. 1 § 4, 1354 a
καὶ ἐδύνατον ἐν ἔννοιᾳ τῶν νῶν ἐστὶ τῶν
πολεῶν. § 7 οἱ τοὺς δ' ἀρχεῖται κτλ. All
officials (perhaps even the priests) were
consequently to be appointed by public
election and not by lot; comp. Excurs. Π p. 332.
Σουσεμ. (260)
12 δήμον...πόλεως] It would seem
that Hippodamos did not state whether
all three classes were eligible (Oncken).
See however η. (262). Σουσεμ. (261)
13 τοὺς δ' αἱρετήσατ] the magistrates
elected to have the charge of state mat-
ters and of the affairs of foreigners and
minors in the city.
II. 8. 11] 1268 a 4—1268 a 36.

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dámou tásēos tautē ἐστὶν ἀπορηθεῖν δ’ ἂν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν (V) § 8 διάλεγει, τού πλῆθους τῶν πολιτῶν, οἳ τε γὰρ τεχνίται καὶ οἳ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἳ τὰ ὤπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες, οἳ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὀπλά, οἳ δὲ τεχνίται ὡσ τί ῥημάτων ὀπλα, ὥστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὤπλα κεκτημένων. § 9 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἰδιώτων (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὤπλα ἔχοντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριώτατας ἀρχὰς ὡς εἰπεῖν): μὴ μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πώς οὖν τε φιλικῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ κρείττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὤπλα τῆς κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν· τοῦτο δ’ οὐ βάδιον § 10 μὴ πολλοὺς θύμας· εἰ δὲ τούτ’ ἔσται, τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχῶν καταστάσεως; ἢτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τί χρῆσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνίτας μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίον εἶναι (πάσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν), (p. 42) καὶ δύναναι διαφέρεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεις ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζουσι μὲν τοῖς τὰ ὤπλα κεκτημένους τὴν τροφὴν ἐυλόγως ἀν ὡς τι οἱ τῆς πόλεως μέρος, νῦν δ’ ἴδιαν ἔχονων, καὶ ταϊτῆν ἴδια γεωργήσων. εἰ δὲ τὴν κοινὴν, ἀφ’ ὅς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἐξουσία 30 τῆς τροφῆς, εἰ μὲν αὐτῶν γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἶ ἐκ τοῦ μᾶ-


16 τάξεως] scheme, polity: cp. to § 4, 11 § 8. The fuller phrase is τάξεως τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνίας τα 1, 16, or τὰς πολιτείας 11. 6, 1, where the sense of ordering, arrangement, is as apparent as in 11. 2 § 4, or II. 9, or III. 1. 1.

ἀπορηθεῖν δ’ ἂν τις πρῶτον] Aristotle criticizes §§ 8—12 (1) the entire division into classes, (2) the special position of the agricultural class, (3) the innovations in the administration of justice.

§ 8 20 δούλοι] This partly explains the proposal of Phaleas to make them ἰδιοῦς.

§ 9 21 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν κτλ] Yet Aristotle seems to assume this to have been the intention of Hippodamos. Susem. (262)

Obviously he is applying his own standard πολιτεία μετέχων ἀρχῆς.

22 πολιτοφύλακας] what sort of magistracy Aristotle understands by this word is not clear and is not sufficiently explained by the notice, VIII(v). 6 § 6 n. (1573), of a magistracy under this name in Larisa. Susem. (263)

As παγοὶ are attested by an inscription for Larisa of 214 B.C. (Ridgeway Transactions II p. 138) it seems likely that Aristotle there uses a different term in order to express the functions of the office.

24 μὴ μετέχοντας δὲ κτλ] Aristotle himself altogether excludes the farmers, tradesmen, and artizans in his ideal state from the rights of citizenship; which is a much stronger measure. But possibly he thinks it is not essential for those who are thus excluded to be attached to the constitution, but that if they are to be citizens, it is. Susem. (264)

§ 10 31 διαγίγνονται—earn subsistence; so καταγίγνεσθαι.

33 εὐλόγως αὖ κτλ] They would then be in the position of the δήμοι of the Republic.

34 νῦν δ’ =whereas what Hippodamos proposes is that they shall have land of their own.
χιμον ἔτερων καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν, βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης εἰ (V) δ' ἔτεροι τινες ἐσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἱδία γεωργούντων καὶ τῶν μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὖ μόριον ἔσται τούτο τῆς τόλεως, οὔτε-
§ 12 νόσ μετέχουν, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ
41 τες τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσει τοὺς τε τὴν ἱδίαν καὶ τοὺς τὴν κοινὴν γεωργοῦντας, τὸ τε πλήθος ἀπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ ὧν ἔκαστος γεωργήσει δυο ὁικίας, καὶ τίνος - ἐνεκεν ὑκ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήμων αὐτοῖς τε τὴν τροφὴν λήψονται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμωις παρέξουσιν; ταύτα δὴ πάντα πολ-
§ 13 λήν ἔχει ταραχὴν. Γ] οὐ καλῶς δ' οὖθ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως 8 ἐγεῖ νόμος, τὸ κρίνων ἄξιον διαιροῦντας τῆς δίκης ἄπλως γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητὴν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείσων εὔδεχεται (κοινολογοῦνται γὰρ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ὑπὲρ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούοντον τοιοῦτο τῶν νομοθετῶν -οὶ πολλοὶ

37 γεωργεῖν Μ.P.1 || ἔτερων εἶναι after νομοθέτης Γ Μ., a similar gloss τούτων ἔτερον εἶναι p.2 in the margin || 39 αὐτὸν Π.3 || τούτο after τῆς πόλεως Μ.P.1 || 42 Spengel thinks καρπῶν corrupt, Schmidt suspects ἀπορον, for which δυσπόριστον seems to be required by the sense
1268 b. 1 γεωργείσι II Bk., ministrād William, habēcant ministrāre Ar., doubtless on mere conjecture; hence erroneously ὑπονυμνεῖ Vettori Susem.1 and others || δύο ὁικίας can hardly be sound, δυσὶν ὁικίας Ar. Camerarius, <eis> δύο ὁικίας Bernays, δύο [ὁικίας] Busse not happily || 2 τῆς <αὐτῆς> Böcker (not bad), <αἰγῆς> τῆς Madvig, [καὶ] Bernays Susem.2; there is some corruption || 5 τὰ κρίνειν ἄξιον II Bk., ὁ κρίνων ἄξιον Susem.1 and wrongly from the translations of William and Ar. || διαιροῦστα P.3 Qb T.8 Ald. Bk., διαιροῦστα L.12 || δίκης Π.1 Ar., κρίσεως Π.2 Bk. (which Bojesen saw to be wrong) || 6 γὰρ Ar., δ' Γ Η Bk. || 7 καὶ <μὴ> πλείσων Koraes || 9 καὶ omitted by Γ Μ. || τοῦτον τῶν P.2-3 Qb T.8 Bk., τοῦτων Β.8 L.12 Ald. (omitting the following τῶν)

§ 11 37 βούλεται kτά] Comp. n. (201) on 6 § 6.
§ 12 42 τὸ τε πλήθος ἀπορον kτά] “the amount of produce will be inadequate for the maintenance of two establishments.” This again is a mere assertion which ought to have been proved. SUSEM. (265)
1268 b. 1 γεωργείσι οἰκίας] See Critical Notes. It is impossible to defend the text as meaning to maintain two households by agriculture on the analogy of οἰκίας oικείων.
§ 13 4. ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως] the law about passing sentence.
5 τὸ κρίνων ἄξιον kτά] “the require-
ment that a verdict shall be returned upon separate counts (τὸ μὲν sc. καταδι-
κάζει τὸ δὲ μή, § 5) when the charge in the indictment is simple, whereby the juror is turned into an arbitrator.” ἄξιον is infinitive.
6 τοῦτο γὰρ kτά] This is practicable in arbitration even (καί) where there are several arbitrators, for which they confer with one another about the decision.
7 καὶ πλείσων] At Athens a single public arbitrator decided each case, but if private arbitrators were chosen by the parties to the dispute themselves, a body of 3 or 4 might well have been more common. SUSEM. (266)
8 - ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστ.] In this respect then the practice in the Greek courts of justice was just the reverse of that in ours. SUSEM. (267)
10 paraškeuázośutin ὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογοῦνται πρὸς (V)
§ 14 ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταραχῶθη ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν ὁ
ὀφείλειν μὲν ὁ δικαστὴς οὔτη, μὴ τοσοῦτον ὃ ὁ οὗ ὁ δι-
καζόμενος; ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐκοσί μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει
δέκα μνᾶς (ἢ ὃ μὲν πλέον ὃ δὲ ἐλασθοῦν), ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ
15 δὲ τέταρτας (καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριώ-
§ 15 σιν), οὐ δὲ πάντα καταδίκασον, οὐ δὲ οὔδεν, τίς οὖν οἱ τρό-
ποις ἐσται τῆς διαλογίας τῶν ψῆφων; ἐτί [ὃ] οὐδεὶς ἐπιτρέκει
ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἀπλῶς ἀποδικάσατα ἡ καταδίκασα, εἰ-
περ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἐγκλήμα ἰγκρατπᾶ τι δικαίως· οὗ γὰρ μὴ-
20 δὲν ὀφείλειν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐκκοσί μνᾶς
ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνος ἦσθι ἐπιτρέκει ὁ καταδίκασας μὴ νομίζουν ὀφεῖ-
§ 16 λειν τὰς ἐκκοσί μνᾶς.] περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὐρίσκουσι τι τῇ
πόλει συμφέρον ὡς δεὶ γίνεσθαι τῶν τιμῆν, οὐκ ἔστων ἀσφα-
12 μὲν after ὁ Π² and perhaps Γ || δὲ Π¹, omitted by Μ⁴ and perhaps Γ ||
13 κρίνει Βκ.³, κρίνει Γ Π Αρ. βκ.¹ || 15 ὁδ[] δὲ Π² || 16 οὗ ΠΜ² and Π¹
(1st hand, corrected in the margin) || 17 δ" omitted by Π¹ || 19 γέγραπται δι-
καίως Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 21 ἀλα...22 μνᾶς omitted by Μ⁴ || 21 ἦδη
omitted by ΠΜ¹ and Π¹ (1st hand, added by corr.), [ nowrap]Susem.¹ wrongly || 23
γενόθαι Μ¹ Π¹
§ 14 12 ὁ δικαζόμενος may be either
litigant. If the participle is passive, it
denotes the defendant; if middle, the
plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.
13 δὲ μὲν γὰρ...15 τέταρτας “For he
(the plaintiff) claims 20 minae, but the
juror will decide for ten—or whatever
the larger sum may be which is claimed
by the former and the smaller sum which
is awarded by the latter—while another
(juror) will award five, and yet another,
four” (Bermays). This seems slightly
better than to understand πλεῖον, ἐλα-
σον, πέντε, τέταρτας of sums awarded by
different jurymen (dicasts).
15 μέρισμα[ will estimate damages
according to a graduated scale. Comp.
Demosth. adv. ἔρθ. 494, 4 δεὶ τοῖνο
μερίσματα τὰ τῶν δομέων.
§ 15 16 τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος] In what
way then are the votes to be counted, i.e.
sorted? διαλογία = collecting and arrang-
ing: dirihtio Cic. Pro Plancio § 14-.
19 εἰτερ ἄπλῶς...δικαζόμενος “if the in-
dictment has been framed (not condition-
ally but) absolutely with justice.” (It
has also been proposed to put a colon be-
fore δικαζόμενος: “and justly too; for &c.”).
If the suit be for 20 minae, acquittal
means that the defendant does not owe 20
minae, it says nothing about liability for
a smaller sum.
21 ἦδη] when we turn to the judge
who condemns while not believing the
twenty minae to be owing, it is quite true
that he commits perjury. Comp. viii
(V), 8, 6 ὁσπέρ δῆμος ἦδη οἱ δῆμοι (Cope). §§ 13—15 "I., Stein op. c. 162 n.
rightly calls this whole criticism a misap-
prehension. If the judges, or jurors, are
forbidden to converse with one another,
it is certainly impossible for them to find
now liquid in concert: it is however pos-
sible for all to reach the same result with-
out consultation, and still more likely that
only in this way can some one of them
clear his conscience. And if, after the
fact of a pecuniary indebtedness has been
established, the jurors cannot agree upon
the amount, then a conditional verdict
is the only one possible, and in that case
certainly there can be no final decision
except by way of compromise. Thus this
objection makes for Hippodamos, rather
than against him’ (Oncken). And lastly
how is it made out that the ‘majority of
legislators’ were right in excluding con-
sultation amongst the jurors? At any
rate our modern regulation (see n. 267)
has pronounced them to be wrong. Cp.
also n. (258) on § 5. SueSem. (268)
§ 16 23 οὐκ ἀσφαλές ‘the proposed
18—2
legislation is not safe, but only specious to the ear,—a curious confusion of metaphors.

24. [έχει γάρ κτλ] for it leads to false accusation and possibly to changes in the constitution (see n. on line 30 below). Informers would always claim to reveal facts highly useful to the state, as did the Roman delators. अनें τौχ, should it so happen; and so εί τούχ, τούχ, εί τώχε. 25. [ἄλλο πρόβλημα] another question. 26. [ἀπορουσί] γάρ τινες εί τινν] Can this have been in written works? SUSEM. (269) §§ 16—25 Is it expedient to alter the laws of a country in order to introduce improvements?

With this interesting discussion compare Rhét. 1. 15 §§ 4—12 (Spengel); also Plato Polit. 294 A—302. 28. [τοὺς πατρίους νόμους] ‘The ancestral laws’ would include much that is unwritten: customs, institutions, those traditional practices of the society which serve as a basis (οποίον ἐφαύλησα) to the written code, Plato Laws III 680 a σῶδ τῷ γράμματι ἐπαίνε ποι, ἄλλο ηθικ καὶ τοὺς λεγομένους πατρίους νόμου ἐπόμενον ἔσοι. Comp. Laws VII 793 B—D: see n. (48) on 1. 6, 1, and II. §§ 8, 15.

§ 17 29. [τῷ λεχθέν] the proposal of Hippodamos. 30. [ἐπερι] συμφέρει κινεῖν] “in case it turns out to be inexpedient” i.e. if on the wider question we decide against change.

31. [ένδεχεται γάρ κτλ] “Some may propose the repeal of the laws or the constitution as a public benefit.” When thus distinguished from πολιτεία, νόμοι = the code of positive law. The revolution of the Four Hundred, it will be remembered, was effected by the suspension, in legal form, of the γραφή παρανόμως, the great safeguard against the subversion of the Athenian constitution.

32. [διαστελλαθαι] = enter into detail. It is used in Topiks v. 3, 8, 13 b 15, 17, as synonymous with διορισθαι. Cp. Pl. Ἐρ. VII 535 B ποῦ δὴ διαστέλλει; § 18 33. [βέλτιον τῷ κινεῖν] This view is maintained §§ 18—22.

34. [ἐπὶ γούν τῶν ἄλλων κτλ] Cp. III. 15, 4, n. (638) medicine in Egypt; 16 §§ 7, 8: IV(vii). 2 § 13 n. (726); 13 § 2 n. (870): III. 6 § 7 n. (531). SUSEM. (270)

36. [μάν. . . . . 37] It is Aristotle’s invariable practice to rank Politics with the “arts and faculties”: e.g. VI(v). 1 §§ 1—3, Nic. Eth. i. c. 1. §§ 19, 20. A most valuable line of inquiry. We could wish he had noted down a few more of these antiquated usages.
aplous einaiv kai baptrarikous. esidhoporounvto tε γαρ οι "Ελ- 12

§ 20 ληνες, και τας γυναικας ένωνυντο παρ' άλληλων, οσα τε

λοντα' των άρχαλων έστι που νομιμω, ευθη παμπαν έστιν,

οιον εν Κυμή περι τα φωνια νομος έστιν, αν πληθος

40 esidhoporoontow Thuc. 1. 5 § 3
to τε έσιδηροφοιριαδαι τοιοι τοι ήπειρω-
tai απ' της παλαιας Χρηστιας έμμενενης; 6 § 1 πάσα γαρ ν' Έλλες έσδηφοράει, δια
tas άφράκτους τε οικησεις και οικ άσφαλεις

παρ' άλληλους εφθόνια, και ευνήγη την

diaintas μεθ' δπλων έποιησαντο (J. G.

Schneider). SUSEM. (270 b)

41 tas γυναικας ένωνυνται] The suitor

purchased the daughter of her father by means of

present (έξωνα) : see Schömann

Greek Antiquities 1. 52 [Eng. trans.

by Mann and Hardy p. 48 ff.]. Schneider

compares marriage by agreed upon among the

Romans. SUSEM. (271)

There is a valuable note on the εδνα

or οίδαρα in the English translation of

the Odyssey by Butcher and Lang.

"The edna in Homer are invariably gifts

made by the wooers to the father or kins-

men of the bride, that is, the bride-price,

the kalym of the dwellers on the Volga...

The father of the bride was thus said

diavopoddan othypita (Od. 11. 53), to accept

certain edna as the price for his daugh-
ter,—what is called 'coming to terms

about the marriage' in Thid. XIII. 381

(δραγα...συναγετη...αμφα γαμω). As a

rule the woman would go the highest bid-

der, but in the case of a favoured wooer

it seems to have been not unusual either

to remit the price and give the bride

άρδευον (ep. Agamennon's offer to

Achilles, II. IX. 141), or to return a portion

too της εδνα after marriage (Od. 1. 278,

11. 196), as is still the custom among the

Kanekas in New Caledonia." Homer

also mentions gifts from the wooers to

the bride, and melia, gifts from the bride's

father to his daughter; but fevph, the

later word for dowry, does not occur.

Even in Pindar edna is used in the sense

of fevph: Pyth. 3. 94. (Eaton compares

Tac. Germ. 13; but that is the 'Mor-
gengabe,' something quite different.)

§ 20 1269 a 1 οιον εν Κυμή This

forcibly recalls compurgation, the es-

tablished legal usage in ancient times in

England and amongst other Teutonic

peoples. That the oath might thus be

employed on behalf of the accuser is su-

ciently attested, although cases where it

is taken on behalf of the accused are

usually mentioned. The Greek custom is

confirmed by the inscription of Gortyn,

column 11, lines 36—44. The law has

prescribed certain fines, the price to be

paid for the ransom of an accused per-

son charged with adultery and in the power

of his captors. But he may plead that he

was (wrongfully) seized by force: cp.

[Demosith.] e. Neil. 11. 1667, 10

άδικος ειρήνην ως μονικ. If so, the

captor must support his charge by com-

purators, whose number depends on the

amount of the fine or ransom. (a) Four

are necessary if the fine is 50, 100, or 200

staters: i.e. if the aggrieved husband is

a full citizen. (b) Two are necessary if

the aggrieved husband is an ἀφέτερος, i.e.

free but not a full citizen: while

για if the aggrieved husband is a serf

(οίκειο), the serf's lord (πάρος) and one

other compurgator must appear. The

fine for για is 25 staters, for (b) 10 or 20

staters. The Cretan text of the law runs

thus: αι δε κα νοει δόλωσαθαι [i.e. εν

dε φωνη διδωσαθαι], ομοσαι τον ευλογη

to πεπεκυουσαταιτερον [γονον πεπεκυουσαται]

και πλονοι περιτυν αυτον, Φιν αυτοι

[ευτω] εκαστον επαρμενον [επαρμενον],

το δ' απεταιρο [του δ' απεταιρον] τριτον

αυτον, το δε φιοκεον τον πασαν ατερον

αυτον, μοικον' ελεν [μοικον' ελεν] δολο-

σαθαι δε με [η]. And if he shall plead

that (the captor) overmastered him, the

captor shall swear—in the case of the 50

staters or more, himself with four others,

each imprecating on himself: in the case

of a clanless man, himself with two

others: in the case of a house-thall, his

lord with one other—(an oath) that he

took him in adultery and overmastered

him not. See Zittelmann in Das Recht

von Gortyn, pp. 101—107; and Mr H. J.

Roby The twelve Tables of Gortyn in the
Law Quarterly Review II. 1886. p. 142, who prefers the other rendering of διολοθάσαθαι 'beguiled,' as if from δολοθών.

§ 21 § 5 εἰτε γηγενείς ἱσαν  It is well known that this was the popular view in Greece about the oldest inhabitants of a country, αὐτόχθόνες; see Feller Griech. Mythol. I. 62 f. Plato makes use of it for his myth Polit. 271 ff., cp. Symp. 191 B. In De Gen. Anim. III. 11. 25, 762 b 28 Aristotle expresses grave doubts on the question whether such a so-called 'generatio aequivoca' should be assumed for men and quadrupeds as well as for lower forms: yet he goes on to inquire how it must be supposed to take place. SUSEM. (273)

εἰτ' ἐκ φθοράς τινος ἐστὶν] This agrees with the view explained in n. (167) on 5 § 16, and was much more Aristotle's real opinion, as it was the opinion of Plato Timaeus 22 c. : πολλαὶ καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γεγόνασιν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἑσσοῦσιν, πιρὶ μὲν καὶ ὑδάτι μέγεστα, μυρίοις δὲ ἀλλὰ ἔτερα βραχύτερα: Ἰάνου 317 A B. πολλὲς ἀνθρώπων φθοράς γεγονόντω τακτικῶς καὶ καὶ νόσοι καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ, εἰς ὦν βραχός τοῖς ἀνθρώπων λειτουργεῖ γενοῦς. SUSEM. (273)

6 ὁμοίως εἶναι καὶ] "were much the same as the ordinary silly people" of today: cp. Vahlen Beiträge III. 314. of  

tυχόντες recurs in c. 9 § 23, 10 § 10, 11 § 3.

ὡσπερ καὶ λέγεται] Plato makes the same remark Politicus 274 B f.: αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀφθορίας γεγονότες δημιουργοῦν ὑπ' αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν θηριών), καὶ ἔτ' ἀμήχανοι καὶ ἀτεχνοὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους ἤσαν χρόνον... τοῖς πρώτοις ἐν μεγάλαις ἤσαν ἀπορίαις. SUSEM. (274)

 Cp. Protag. 321 c: man naked and defenceless before the introduction of the arts (Eaton).

8 οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους] Positive law as contrasted with the δόγματα and ἀγραφαῖα νόμα discussed in §§ 19—21. See VIII (vi). § 5. 2 tibeménous δὲ τοιούτους νόμου καὶ τοὺς ἀγραφοὺς καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους. The distinction is best explained by Cope Introd. to Rhetoric pp. 239—244.

§ 22 § 9 ὡσπερ γὰρ...12 καθ' ἐκαστὸν ὅστις] See III. 16 § 11 with n. (652) f. and n. (637) on III. 15 § 4; also III. 11 § 19 n. (579): the ruler or rulers are supreme where the laws cannot prescribe exactly διὰ τὸ μὴ βάδοιν εἶναι καθόδων διορίζει περὶ πάντων. SUSEM. (275)

10 καὶ (περὶ) τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν] "So too in the political system it is impossible that all things should be prescribed in writing,"

§ 23 A sound argument, quite in Bentham's spirit.
17 ὧφελήσεται τις Μ' Π', ὧφελήσεται <ὁ> Susem.¹-² misled by the translations of William and Ar. || 18 βλαβήσεται ὁ Schneider || ὑπάρχοντων Bernays, which I should unconditionally accept were it not for the addition of κατά τῶν ἀρχιτέκτων after 17 νομοθετῶν || 21 παρά Π', πλὴν corr.¹ of Π²-³, πλὴν παρὰ Π²³ Βκ. || 23 νόμον Π³ Tp and Π² (1st hand altered by corr.²) || 25 καὶ before κινήτηοι omitted by ΠΜ', [καὶ] Susem.¹-² || κινήτηοι Π² || καὶ πάντες Π⁴ Qb Tb L² Βκ. || 28 διό...1273 b 24 ἵσταντας noticed by Michael of Ephesus


§ 24 19 ψεύδος δὲ κτλ] 'These remarks are very marked. This is a difference between the sciences or arts and the laws. In the former only he who follows the science has to act and his action on an improved method proceeds from conviction: whereas, if the laws are altered, all must act according to the new law and though unconvinced of the need for alteration ' (Schlosser). Susem. (276)

21 παρά τὸ ἔθος] "has no force to secure obedience apart from habit." The Critical Notes show how the 'confolate' reading, πῆλον παρὰ, arose.

§ 25 24. ἐτι δὲ...27 διαφοράν] Plato's utterance Lato 1 634 ὃ exactly agrees with this: υἱὸν μὲν γὰρ (Cretans and Lacedaemonians), εἰπερ καὶ μετρίως κατε-σκεδασται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἰς τῶν καλλιτῶν δὲ τῶν νόμων μὴ δητερα τῶν νέων μὴ δὲνа ἐάν, ποία καλῶς αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, ...γέρον δὲ εἰ τις τι ἐννοεῖ τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν, πρὸς ἀρχοντα τε καὶ πρὸς ἥλυκτῳν μηδένος ἐναιατὸν νέον πεισθῇ τού τιοντος λό-γοις. Oncken. 1. 252, strangely alleges this passage of the Latoas as a proof of its author's design 'to strangle the healthy common sense of men in the name of political order.' Susem. (277)


This implies that the question has to be decided elsewhere in the treatise.

c. 9 Examination of the Spartan polity.

See Anal. p. 106. Since Götting's Excursus, pp. 463—471 of his edition, this chapter has been most fully treated by Oncken 1. 218—299, 11. 317—376, who writes with especial reference to Grote's memorable chapter on Lycurgus and, in vol. 11, to the later monographs by Triebert Forschungen and Gilbert Studien. See p. 35 note 3. The fragments of the Politie 1157 b 38—1560 a 28 should be compared. See also Jannet Les institutions sociales à Sparte.
§ 33 <ν> ὑπεναντίως Scaliger, ὑπεναντίως <ν ή ὑπεναντίως> Susem. would prefer: but no alteration is needed || αὐτὸς] αὐτῆς ἡς Qb T1 L3 and P4 (1st hand), αὐτὸς P1, αὐτῷ P4 (corr.), αὐτῷ Ar. || 34 <πόλει> πολιτεύσθαι? Madvig || 37 πνευστία M3 P1 and P2,3 (1st hand, altered by corr.2 P2 and a later hand in P9) || 38 oι omitted by M3 P1 L3, [oι] Susem.1-2.

§ 1 31 [μία μέν κτλ] The two points to consider are (1) its absolute, (2) its relative success: “whether its legislation is good or bad in relation to the best system; secondly, whether it is inconsistent with the fundamental assumption and scheme of the constitution proposed.” πρόσ = when judged by a given standard.

32 εἰ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν...ὑπεναντίως] sc. ἴδιομορφόθεται. So § 18 ὑπεναντίως δὲ...πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διάρθρωσιν.

The Helots or Serfs: §§ 2—4.

§ 2 34 ὡς μὲν οὖν...ὅμολογούμενον ἐστίν] Here we are allowed a very important glimpse of the nature of Aristotle’s own ideal state. Cp. also n. (192) on 6 § 5; c. 11 § 10 n. (39); IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 8; 10 § 9 with n. (813), and Intro. p. 22 n. (3). Susem. (279).

35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν] leisure free from imposed labour: 1. 7. 3. 11. 6. 5.

36 τοι] followed by 38 δὲ.

ἡ τε γὰρ Ἑθηλαίων πνευστία κτλ] Compare § 22 n. (178). Wherever in Greek bodies of serfs stood midway between freedom and slavery, it is well known that the relation invariably arose in consequence of a subjugation of the earlier inhabitants by victorious invaders. Thus the earlier inhabitants of Laconia obtained the freer lot of Provincials (Περιοίκους) or else were forced into a dependent position of this kind as Helots according as they submitted to the Spartans earlier or later, more or less easily, of their own free will or by compulsion. See Schömann Antiquities of Greece I p. 191—194, Eng; tr., to whose account of the Helots p. 194—200 it is sufficient to refer (comp. however Gilbert Studien p. 76 fl.). The Penestae were the descendants of that part of the old population of the country occupied by the invading Thessalians, which, instead of emigrating, made a friendly agreement with the conquerors and concluded a treaty, by which for a fixed rent they remained tenants of the land they had formerly possessed and were under obligation to furnish military service, but were not to be sold or driven out of the country or put to death. See Schömann, p. 132, Eng. tr. The authorities quoted by J. G. Schneider are Archelaus Fr. 1, from Athenaeus VI. 264 A: Βωιστῶν τῶν τὴν Ἀρακαν κατοικησάντων οἱ μὴ ἀπέραντες εἰς τὴν Βωισίαν, ἀλλὰ ἔφιλοφωρόσεται παραδόχωσαν ἐαυτὸς τοὺς Ἑθηλάδας δουλεῖας καθ’ ὀμολογίας, εφ’ ὧν οὐδὲ εἴδασαν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς χώρας, οὔτε ἀποκτενώσαν αὐτοὶ δὲ τὴν χώραν ἐγραμμέναν τὰς αὐτῶν ἐχθρίδες ἀποδόσεων’ οὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οἱ κατὰ τὰς ὀμολογίας κατασκευάσαν καὶ παραδόντας ἐαυτοῦ ἐκλήθησαν τὰτ μενεστάτα, νῦν δὲ πενετάτα: and Theopompus Fr. 134 in Ath. VI. 265 B, c: Λακαδειμονίου καὶ Ἑθηλαίων φανερῶσαν κατασκευάζομεν τὴν δουλείαν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ὀμολογίων πρότερον τὴν χώραν, ἢ ἐκεῖνοι νῦν ἔχοντες, οἱ μὲν Ἀχαϊός, Ἑθηλαῖος δὲ Περιοίκοι καὶ Μαγνησίων καὶ προσιτογενοῦν τοὺς καταδουλωθέντας οἱ μὲν ἐπέλασαν οἱ δὲ πενετάσατο.


38 ἐφεδρεύοντες always in wait to pounce upon their misfortunes: Thuc. IV. 80 ἀδέ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Δακεδαμονίοι πρὸς τοὺς εἰστάτας τῆς φυλακής πέρι μάλιστα καθεστήκειν.
§ 3 τοῖς ἀνυχῆμασι διατελοῦσιν: περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδὲν 3
ποιοῦσον συμβέβηκεν. 'ァɪτιον δ' ἴσως τὸ τὰς ἰετυνώσας
καίπερ πολεμοῦσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμ-
μαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ ἀυταῖς
κεκτημέναις - περιοίκους, τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ ἱετυνώντες
ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, 'Αργείοι καὶ Μεσήνιοι καὶ 'Αρκάδες: 5
ἐπεῖ καὶ τοῖς Θεταλοῖς κατ' ἀρχὴν ἀφίσταντο διὰ τὸ
πολεμεῖν ἐτι τοῖς προσχόροις, Ἀχαῖοι καὶ Περαιβόις καὶ
§ 4 Μάγνησιν. ἑοίκε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ γε τῆς
ἐπιμελείας ἐργάζεσθαι εἶναι, τίνα δεὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑμιλῆσαι
τρόπον ἀνείμενοι τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσιν καὶ τῶν ἱσον ἁξιοῦσιν
10 ἐαυτοὺς τοὺς κυρίους, καὶ κακοπαθόνες ἔϰωντες ἐπιβουλεύονται
καὶ μισοῦσιν. δήλον <δ> οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον
§ 5 τρόπον, οἷς τούτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἰλοτείαν. ἐτὶ δὲ ἡ
περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσίς καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς ψο-

1269 b 3 περὶ οἶκος M* and apparently Γ (praedicia circa domus William) || 5
ἐφιστάτο Bas.3 in the margin || 6 περαιβόις II Bk. Susem.3 || 9 ἀνεύμενοι
Triebcr (perhaps rightly) || 10 κακοπαθούντες P1 (1st hand, perhaps rightly), γρ.
κακοπαθός ἔξωντες corr.1 of P1 in the margin || 11 <δ> οὖν or γοῦν Susem., οὖν
Γ II Ar. Bk. || 12 ἐπὶ 1270 a 8 πάλων Plut. Lyk. 14 quotes similar statements
from Aristotle, but, as Heitz (Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles p. 30) rightly
judges, from his Λακεδαίμονων Πολιτεία

§ 3 40 αὐτίον δ' ἴσως] It might be thought that one very material reason
was the much freer and less restricted position which, according to Aristotle's
own evidences § 5 § 19 n. (171), the Cretans granted to their dependants
(Oncken). Compare also c. 10 § 3 n. (355), § 5 (357), § 8 (364), § 16 (374).
Susem. (281)
1269 b 3 περιοίκους] See c. 10 § 3 and Exc. III.
5 τοῖς Θεταλοῖς] δαίνους incommodi.
ἀφίσταντο sc. αἱ πενήθαι.
§ 4 7 τὸ γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας κτλ] "the task of attending to this; how, namely,
we ought to associate with them"—the sentence τίνα δεὶ...τρόπον being depend-
ent on the noun ἐπιμελείας, just as in
IV(VII). 16. 1 πότε χρὴ τοιεῦσαι τὴν ὁμ-
λικὴν is dependent on ἐπιμελητῶν. We
may render: "It would seem too that
apart from everything else there is the
irksome task of seeing that we behave to
them as we ought: for when allowed
their freedom, they grow insolent and
claim equal rights with their lords; if
treated harshly, they plot revenge and
cherish hatred."
11 δήλον κτλ] The truth of this re-
mark no one will wish to question. But
does Aristotle really know of a remedy?
He hopes to get over the difficulty in his
own 'best state' by taking men of non-
Hellenic race to till the soil, slaves or
serfs, if possible; failing this, dependent
freemen of different nations but only of
the gentler races: IV(VII). 10 §§ 13, 14,
n. (840); cp. IV(VII), 8 § 8 (815), and n.
(364) with Exc. III. Supposing all this
could be so fortunately arranged, would
it have been any real remedy? Susem.
(282)
The women of Sparta: §§ 5—12.
§ 5 13 ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσίς]
So Plato speaks Lctus 1 637 c δεικνύ
tὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἀνεσίς, and
Enyipides Androm. 595 οὕτε ἄν εἱ δοῦ-
λοτός τις | αἵρεσις γένοιτο Σπαρτιατίδων
cόρη (Eaton). Susem. (283)
πρὸς τὴν προαιρέσιν τῆς πολιτείας]
'judged by the intention of the constitu-
tion,' the second point of view for criti-
cism as mentioned in § 1. The other,
the standard of the best constitution, is here
λιτελαίς βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὄσπερ γὰρ (VI)
οίκιας μέρος ἀνήρ καὶ γυνῆ, δήλων ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἐγγὺς
tοῦ δίχα-διερήσθαι δει νομίζειν εἰς τὸ τῶν ἄνδρων πλῆ-
θος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὡστε ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαύλως
ἐχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναίκας, τὸ ἡμῖν τῆς πόλεως δει νομί-
§ 6 ἐξειν εἰναι ἀνομοθέτητον. ὄσπερ ἐκεὶ συμβεβηκέν οὖλην γὰρ
τοῦ πολίν ὁ νομοθέτης εἰναι βουλόμενος καρτερικήν, κατὰ
καὶ τρυφερῶς. ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ
tιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον, ἀλλασ τε καὶ τύχωσι γυναικοκρα-
κοντομενοι, καθάπερ τὰ πόλλα τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολε-
μικῶν γενῶν, ἐξω Κελτῶν ἢ καὶ εἰ τινες ἐτεροί φανερῶς

called the Wellbeing or Happiness (εὐδαι-
μονία) of the state (Congreve). This
then, and not εὐνομία, is the right read-
ing. For the best constitution is pre-
cisely that which most contributes to the
‘best life’ or Happiness. See 1 § 1 n.
(128); 1. 2 § 8 n. (21); and especially III.
18 § 1 n. (683), IV(VII). 1 § 1 (685), § 2
(687), § 11: 2 § 2, § 5 (714), 9 § 3 f.
(806), 13 § 3. SUSEM. (284)

καὶ πόλιν...νομίζειν] “one must regard
the state as nearly divided into two.”
But the construction is not plain: is it
ἐγγὺς ὁδιναν τοῦ δίχα διερήσθαι? This
would be supported by vii(iv). 6. 11,
viii(v). 1. 16, where ἐγγὺς is almost an
adjective. Or it might also be νομίζει
διερήσθαι ἐγγὺς τοῦ δίχα <διερήσθαι.>

16 From Euclid Elem. 1. 10, 1. 9,
III. 30 it is seen that δίχα διαιρεῖν = to
Eth. v. 4. 8 with Jackson’s note.

17 ὡστε ἐν ὅσαις κτᾶ] From this it
is seen, as indeed before from 1. 13 § 16
nn. (126) (127), that Aristotle intended to
introduce into his ideal state a public ed-
cation and training for women, although
this education was certainly not to be

common to boys and girls. Cp. Introd.
pp. 49, 52 (2). In the Latos vi 781 b
Plato had expressed himself still more
forcibly: οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν μόνον ἐστίν, ὃς
δοξείαν ἢ, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναίκας οἰκουμένως
περιφρομένων, διὰ δὲ τῇ θέλει ἡμῖν φῶς
ἐστὶ πρὸς άρετὴν χιρών τῆς τῶν ἀρείων,
tοιαύτῃ διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ πλέον ἢ διαλάταιν
ἐστι. Aristotles however says quite the
same thing Rhet. 1. 5. 6 1361 a 10 ff., ὡσος
γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναίκας φαύλα ὀσπερ Λακ-
δαιμονίας, σχέδον κατά τὸ ἡμῖν ὅθεν ἐκ
eυδαι-
μονῶν (quoted by Eaton). SUSEM. (285)

§ 6 20 καρτερικήν] of hardy endu-
rance.

22 ἐξημεληθὲν] has disregarded his
aim. This picture of luxurious living is
indirectly confirmed by Plato Rep. viii.
548 Α, 11; εἴπωμεν δὲ γε χρηματῶι ὁ
τοιοῦτοι ἀτε κεκτημένῳ τοιμαί καὶ οἰκείοις
θησαυροῖς, καὶ αὐτοπερίβους οἰκείους
ἀτεχνῶν μετίστας ἱδίοις, εἰ τας ἀναλίςκωτα
γυναικ ἀποτλάντοι κατα δαπανῶτοι: cp. 550 b

§ 7 23 ὡστε ἀναγκαῖο] Wealth
must needs be in esteem, because the
unbridled luxury of women is a very
costly business. SUSEM. (286)

26 Κελτῶν] See Note on the Celtae
at the end of B. II. SUSEM. (287)
§ 8 tetem'kasi tīn prōs toûs ἀρρενας συνονώλαν. ἐσθε γὰρ (V1)
ὅ ἐμβολογῆσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἄλογος συζεῦξαί τοῦ Ἄρην
ἐπὶ τίνι ἠφροδίτην ὂ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμιλίαν
ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν, καίτοι

28 πρῶτοι Μ.Π1, perhaps rightly || ἄρη Ρ2 Qb Ald. Bk. || 32 διώκητο

Μ.Π1

§ 8 28 ὁ μυθολογητας πρῶτος] Aristotel imagines that myths, like laws and
customs, nn. (296) (300) on § 12, § 14, are direct inventions of individuals, who
consciously intended by means of them to represent to sense certain ideas and
thoughts. Cp. also v(viii), 6 § 13 n. 1078. Susem. (288)

29 ἢ γὰρ κτλ][In his assertion, that marital races are also the most amorous,
Aristotle is supported by the views of modern anthropologists’ (Fülleborn).
Susem. (289)

30 κατακόηχιμοι] easily captivated, with ἐνδό v(viii), 7, 4, with ἐκ Nic. Eth.
x. 9, 3; with πρῶς one might say “easily allured to.”

31 διὸ παρὰ κτλ] Schömann Antiquities of Greece p. 268 Eng. tr. is
certainly right in saying that the social position and influence of women in
Sparta was not higher than it is amongst the modern peoples of the west, and that
the prevailing condition of things with us in this respect would have appeared to
an Athenian of the best time to be a species of feminine rule (γυναικοκρατία),
although it does not at all alienate our women from their natural and most
appropriate calling of housewives and mothers. But this does not thoroughly
answer the question proposed by J. G. Schneider (see n. 295 b) and by Oncken:
whether true womanliness can have thriven under so rough a treatment of the marriage
relation as was customary at Sparta: whether a family life and true domesticity
could be found when the Spartan full-citizen was, as a matter of fact, banished from
the family, lived continually with his comrades in arms, ate at the public
table, slept in a tent, and only paid stolen visits to his wife; where conse-
sequently the household was without a head, the wife without a home of common
duty and mutual improvement, where par-
rental duty was removed and the natural
field for the wife’s activity abolished. If

in the latter respect Aristotle mistook the
cause of the evil (as his retention of common messes for the men and his
excessive public education prove), does this
justify us in assuming that his description of the evil itself is wholly
incorrect? In reference to the first question,
if it was nothing unusual at Sparta to
hand over one’s wife to another, if, as
Schömann himself thinks, op. c. p. 267, a
Spartan woman, to whom proposals were
made by another man, hardly felt herself
insulted by them but referred the lover to
her husband, then (as Fülleborn and
Schömann after him have remarked) the
boast of the Spartans, that adultery was
never heard of amongst them, does not
amount to much: adultery here only
means an intrigue with another man with-
out the husband’s permission. The
further boast of the Spartan women, that
they were in an especial degree good
housewives (Schömann op. c. p. 268),
must accordingly be reduced to its proper
dimensions. Plato however concedes
(Laws vii 805 e 1.) that though the
Spartan women did not weave and spin,
occupations which they left to their
female slaves, they yet led an active life:
since they had nearly half the responsi-
bility for the management of the house-
hold and the education of the children.
Certainly there is some exaggeration in
the charges of license and love of power
brought against them, and this must
be moderated from the above points of
view: but it is quite as certain that they are
not all pure inventions. Oncken
refers his readers to the proof given by
him Hellas and Athens ii. 85. Cp.
Intro. p. 36 n. (1). Susem. (290)

32 ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχης] during their su-
6, 13, ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχης] 7 § 14
ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἀκαδημαιομάνοι: and De
Cædi 111. 2 § 7, 300 b 30, ἐπὶ τῆς φιλο-
τητος, during the reign of Love.
tī diaferei γυναῖκας ἀρχεῖν ἢ τοὺς ἀρχοντας υπὸ τῶν (VI) γυναῖκον ἀρχεῖα; ταῦτα γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δὲ οὖ- (p. 46) σης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, πρὸς τῶν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταὐθ' αἱ τῶν § 10 Λακώνων ἦσαν. εἰδήλωσαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς Ἡθαινῶν ἐμβολῆς: χρησίμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὡστερ ἐν ἑτέραις πόλεσιν, θυρίζον ἔδει παρεῖχον πλείω τῶν πολεμίων. εἴς ἀρχὴς μὲν 8 οὖν ἐοίκε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λακώνων εὐλόγως ἢ τῶν γυ- § 11 ναικῶν ἀνεσις. ἕξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας ἀπεξενοῦτο πολίν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἁρκάδας καὶ Μεσημρίων; σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς μὲν παρεῖχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρωδο- 35 εἶπερ Π Βκ.; ἤπερ Σύλβουργ Σουσέμ.1 misled by William’s version nisi ad bellum 36 τοῦτον Σπένγελ § 9 35 τῶν ἐγκυκλίων] See 5 § 4 n. and 1. 7 § 2. Σουσέμ. (291) § 10 37 ἐπὶ τῆς Ἡθαινῶν ἐμβολῆς] ‘at the time of the Theban invasion’, under Epameinondas 369 B.C. Σουσέμ. (292) 38 χρησίμοι κτλ] ‘For they were of no use, any more than the women in other cities, but they caused more confusion than the enemy.” It is significant that the encomiums of Sparta, Xenophon (Hellen, VI, 5 28 αἱ μὲν γυναίκες οὐδὲ τῶν κατον ὅρωσαν ἥρειον, ἀπε οὐδέποτε ἰδὼνα πολέμου) and Plutarch (Ages. 31 καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ διπλήστερας ἀνίχνευσιν, ἀλλὰ παντάπως ἐκφόρον οὐσῶν πρὸς τὸ τήν κραυγὴν καὶ τὸ πόρ των πολεμίων) speak much more strongly on this point. Oncken observes quite rightly, that this was the first opportunity the Spartan women had for putting into practice the brave speeches they had been making for centuries; they might at least have displayed a quiet bearing, even if they were not to be taken at their word. Σουσέμ. (293) Bernays renders: ‘although the women in other cities are of use’ [on such occasions]. But is it so? The System of Aeschylus scarcely bears this out. Plato must allude to this, Latus 866 B. § 11 1170 a i ἔργο κτλ] According to Plutarch Lycurg. 1, in his account of the constitution of Sparta Aristotle placed Lycurgus apparently no earlier than the time of Iphitos, about the begin- ning of the era of the Olympiads, 776 B.C. (J. G. Schneider). See this passage among the Fragments 490, 1558 a 13, Rose = 485 in Rose Aristot. pseudep. = 76 Müller. Further compare especially Gilbert Studien 72 ff. 158 ff. Σουσέμ. (294) The passage is as follows: αἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἰφίτων συνακόμας καὶ συνδιαδόχως τὴν Ὀλυμπιακὴν ἐκχειρίαν ἔλεγον νουν, ὡς ἐστι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τεκμήριον προσφέρει οἱ Ὀλυμπιακὸς δίκαιον ἐν ὧν τούτων τοῦ Λυκαρίου διασαφέται καταγεγραμμένον. E. Curtius, History Eng. tr. 1. p. 191, adopts this date. Even so, there would be a grave chronological difficulty if these Arcadian wars be supposed to precede Lycurgus. The first Messenian war is dated 743—723 B.C. But as to the main fact Aristotle is correct. A long period of camp-life, of war in which the Spartans lived perpetually in the field, must have preceded the complete establishment of the system and the institutions which are referred to the Lycurgian legislation*. Such a period we find in the tedious and difficult conquest of Laconia by its Dorian invaders. 4 πρωδοποτετουμένους] Note the dou- ble formation of perfect. * I entirely agree with Wilamowitz Homerische Untersuchungen, Berlin 1884, p. 269 ff., that Lycurgus is only a mythical person, and that the supposed Lycurgian legislation never had an existence; and I also regard the account which he gives of the real state of things as altogether correct. Σουσέμ.
5 πεποιημένους διὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν βιών (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει (VI)
μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναίκας φασὶ μὲν ἄγειν ἐπιχειρ-
ρῆσαι τῶν Λυκοῦργον ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δὲ ἀντέκρουν,
§ 12 ἀποστηγήσαι πάλιν. αἰτιαὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσίν αἰτία τῶν γενομέν

7 ἐπὶ τὸ Κορας || 8 γυνομένων Μη Π || 11 τοῦ τά Οβ Τβ and Π (1st
hand), γρ. τοῦ Π in the margin

5 πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει μέρη κτλ] Cr. Plato Latus 1. 630 Ε οὐκ ὡς πρὸς ἀρετῆς τι
μόριον καὶ ταῖς ἤλεγχοι καὶ τῶν παραφύλατον ἐπίθει [ο
Λυκοῦργος] βλέπων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάσας ἀρε-
τής: Thuc. 1. 84. 3 πολεμικοὶ τε καὶ
cεπεύον λαὸς διὰ τὸ εὐκοσίου γεγονότα: v. 66.
4 (Eaton). SUSEM. (295 b)

6 φασὶ] As to whether this is an
anonymou quotation from Ephoros, or
an appeal to oral tradition, see Introd.
p. 35 n. (3). Cr. also below n. (310) on
§ 7. SUSEM. (295)

7 ὡς δὲ ἀντέκρουν κτλ] Precisely so
Plato Latus VI. 751 Α τὸ δὲ περὶ τᾶς γυναίκας
οὐκ οὐκ διαφέρειν ἄροτός ἵπποιοθέτην μηλείται...αλλά
καὶ ἄλλως γένους ἡμῶν τῶν ἀντιρρήσων
αὐταρκέτηρα μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπίκλωστέρον ἐμφάνθη, τὸ δὴ
καὶ τὸ ἄσθενες, οὐκ ἕκαστο τοῦ νομοθέτου δυστακ-
tον ἄρείτη. This Plutarch must have for-
gotten, when (Iucurg. 14) he attacks Arist-
otle alone on account of this same remark
and tries to refute him. The facts which he
addsuce with this object prove simply
nothing; but directly afterwards (c. 15)
he gives a detailed account of the Spartan
custom of lending wives, and this does
not make the assertion, which he appends
to it, very credible: viz. ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως
πραττόμενα φυσικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς τῶν
συνότων ἀπέχει τῆς ὑπότης λεγο-
μένης γενέσθαι περὶ τᾶς γυναίκας
ἐὐχερείας, ὅτε ὡς ἀπόστων εἶναι τῇ
μοιχείας παρ' αὐτοῦ. Even he does
not venture to deny the subsequent laxity
of the women at Sparta. (J. G.
Schneider.) SUSEM. (295 b)

§ 12 8 "These then are the causes of
the events which happened and there-
fore clearly of this mistake: but the ques-
tion before us is not who is, or is not,
excusable; but whether as a matter of
fact (a legislator) is right or wrong."

9 ἀλλ' ἤρεις...[11 ἀρθῶς] Thus Aris-
totle is not unaware that the author of
a code or a constitution is by no means
able to proceed simply at his own good
pleasure, but is tied down to the given
circumstances: cp. § 22 n. (322), 12 § 5
(409); vii(iv). 1 § 3 ff. n. (1116), c. 6, 11
§§ 7, 8, 12 § 1 ff.; viii(vi). c. 4. It is
only in case these circumstances are
highly favourable that he considers his
own best constitution possible. But this
is still a long way off the knowledge
that a nation's constitution and code of
laws are in general the product primarily
of its individuality and history, and only
secondarily of the legislator's wisdom or
unwisdom. Nor does Aristotle omit
forthwith to mark precisely the spirit of
his own examination in that 'he never
purposes to account for the constitution
by the circumstances under which it
arose, or to fathom the necessities which
confronted the legislator. Instead of this,
Lycurgus, who left behind him an actual
state, is treated like Plato who con-
structed an imaginary state. Aristotle's
criticism neither is nor claims to be his-
torical criticism in our sense of the term,
which is more concerned to explain the
connexion of the facts than to award
praise or blame. He is as one-sided
in pointing out the defects of this pol-
itical structure as the admirers of its ex-
cellences had been in earlier times and
continued to be later on. Nor could it
have been otherwise: for neither he nor
they had the requisite historical data for
appreciating the personal responsibility
of Lycurgus. Nor have we even now:-as-
suming that we still retain our belief in
the existence of such a person as Lycur-
gus. Moreover in spite of his recogni-
tion of the force of circumstances Aristotle
shares with Plato 'and all the political
theorists of Greece the belief in the omi-
nipotence of positive legislation, as if
mighty historical developments which are
not of today or yesterday could be simply
swept out of the world by a command or
prohibition. Besides, he makes Lycurgus
responsible for things for which no legis-
The land question and the decline of population: §§ 13—19.

Possibly we should alter γαρ into δε, as Zwingier proposed, and not assume a lacuna; since as a matter of fact no proof is needed to show why license amongst the women tends to increase the love of wealth: every one can easily imagine the reason for himself. Nor was a reason stated in § 7; the passage where this was touched upon above (καὶ πρότερον, see last n.), which is referred to in § 13, see n. (286). Yet it may have equally have been omitted there in order to be introduced here, when the subject comes up for further discussion: this may have been followed by a transition to the relations of property generally amongst the Spartans, in the form of a remark, to which the passage μετὰ γὰρ κτλ served as reason or explanation. This much is certain that these words are not at present related to what precedes either as reason or as explanation, and if no lacuna be assumed the γαρ of the text is an inconsistency.

SUSEM. (298)

§ 14 16 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. viii(ν). 7 § 10 ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ εἰς δῆλουσα αἱ οὐσίαι ἐξορθαίη ὑπολαίονται n. (1603). SUSEM. (289 b)

12 καὶ πρότερον] § 5 ff., see nn. 284—286. SUSEM. (297)

nalicas ἐχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἐοικεν, ὡσπερ ἐλέξθῃ καὶ πρότερον, (VI) οὐ μόνον ἀπρότεραι τινα ποιεῖν της πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθ’ αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηστίαν. 15 * * μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τήν ἀναμάλαιν 10 § 14 τῆς κτῆσεως ἐπιτιμήσεις ἄν τις τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμ- βέβηκε κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πιστάν μικράν διόστερ εἰς ὀλίγους ἥκεν ἢ χώρα. τούτο δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν νῦμων τέτακται φαύλως οὐνείσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἢ πωλεῖν 20 τὴν ὕπαρχον ταῖς ἐποίησεν οὐ καλῶν, ἀρθῶς ποιήσας, διδό-

12 ἐοικεν omitted by Γ Μ * || 13 αὐτὴν Μ * ΙIIE Bk., αὐτὰ Ar. || 14 αὐτὰ Ar. || ἀλλὰ <καὶ> Koraes || 15 * * μετὰ γὰρ Susem., see Comm.; μετὰ δὲ Zwingier || 17 λίαν omitted by Μ * Ι II || τοῖς τῶν Μ * , τῶν Ι II || 18 ἥκεν ? Congreve || 19 τῶν νῦμων Μ * and perhaps Ar. || 20 οὐκ before ἐποίησεν inserted by Ι II (erased by corr. Ι II), οὐσίαν ? Bender

lator can be responsible, and he partly blames him for effects of certain laws, when the effects could not be imputed to him even if the laws in question had really been his own work, and that in the sense in which Aristotle attributes them to him1 (Oncken). Cp. also n. (82) on 1. 9 § 8: n. (238) on II. 7 § 8; Exc. II on Bk. ΙΙ; n. (339) on § 30 below; (466) on ΙΙΙ. 3 § 5; (552) on ΙΙΙ. 9 § 5: II. 5 § 8 n. (160): IV(v-II). 14 § 16 (916). Even that which rests on no express command or prohibition, but simply on the force of popular custom, that is, the so-called 'unwritten law' (cp. n. 48 on 1. 6. 1 and Exc. II to Bk. ΙΙ), is directly attributed by Aristotle, as by Plato, to the authorship of a definite individual lawgiver: this is especially clear from § 14 below, see n. (300). Exactly similar is his assumption of a first founder of the state: 1. 2 § 15, ὁ πρῶτος σοφιστάς, n. (28 b); or his judgment as to the origin of the conceptions of popular mythology, § 8 above, ὁ μεθολογήσας πρῶτος, n. (288).

1 'In spite of these undeniable weaknesses the whole chapter may lay claim to a full measure of authority, as much as any other of Aristotle's historical statements. It is its merit to have most acutely corrected the aberration from sound intelligence revealed in the adoration paid to the Spartan state, and here also to have confronted romance with criticism' (Oncken). SUSEM. (296)

12 καὶ πρότερον] § 5 ff., see nn. 284—286. SUSEM. (297)
away or freely disposed of by will: Plutarch Agis 4, cp. Schomann Antiquities of Greece p. 216 Eng. tr. As far as he knew, this had never been prohibited. Should we expect later writers to be really better informed? Or would it not be as well to consign the said story to the great lumber-room of historical fable which Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us so richly furnised? See further the next note. SUSEM. (299) ἐπόθησεν οὐ καλῶν Aristotle implies that Lycurgus never expressly prohibited, by a declaration of illegality and a penalty, the sale of the old plot of ground or the purchase of a new one. When translated into our mode of thought and expression this means that the force of usage and custom was against the practice; it was held dishonourable to sell. ‘With this agrees the omission of Sparta, § 6, from the list of states where alienation or enlargement of the inherited estate was prohibited by law’ (Oncken, as one means of restoring, in a certain sense, equality of possessions; comp. n. (237). (This decisive circumstance was quite overlooked by Gilbert.) Is it not then a fair inference that Aristotle was also unaware of any equal division of property amongst the Spartans, whether by Lycurgus or any one else, with the design that this equality should be perpetual? (This last is the only point here in question with Aristotle.) Otherwise, since such a division amongst those who are actual citizens was also his own ideal, IV (VII). 10 §§ 9–12 n. (835)—cp. nn. on II. 6 § 6 (192), § 15 (214)—would he not have expressly appealed to the authority of Lycurgus in support of it, and expressly commended him for this excellent design? Would he not also have expressly blamed him, no less than Plato or Phaleas—6 §§ 10 ff. (208–211), 7 §§ 234—for having neglected, to a still greater extent than these theorists, to take the appropriate means for bringing this about: nay more, for having taken as good as no means whatever? The 7th fragment of the Polity of the Lacedaemonians attributed to Herakleides (Müller Frag. hist. Gr. II. 211) undoubtedly goes back to the Aristotelian work On the Spartan constitution, see n. (360) on 10 § 6. But this by no means proves that these extracts must be wholly free from foreign additions, or that the ἄρχαία μοίρας ὄβεν ἔγγοντων is not one here. Cp. n. (310 a) on § 17. Gilbert, cp. c. 162 ff., attempts in vain to show that it is quite natural that Aristotle should omit this limitation in the present passage. For, if he had known it, it is obvious how much it must have both weakened and again aggravated the blame he has here expressed. For whatever we may make of the ‘ancient portion’ (ἄρχαια μοίραι), it would testify to a stronger care on the part of the legislator to preserve the family estates if the sale of this portion was absolutely forbidden by law and declared null and void, at the same time that it would be so much the stronger inconsistency if even this property was to be freely disposed of by will or given away. Besides Gilbert’s whole method of explaining this ἄρχαια μοίραι has already been briefly, but correctly, refuted by Frick in Jahrb. f. Phil. cv. 1872. 667. SUSEM. (300) 21 διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν Translated into our language this means: in all ages after Lycurgus usage and custom were often evaded by apparent free gift or by testamentary disposition of land. SUSEM. (301 b) 22 καίτοι ταύτῳ συμβαίνειν κτλ] Cp. VIII (v). 8 § 20 s. fin. n. (1628). SUSEM. (301 b) § 15 24 τῶν πέντε μερῶν τά δύο] two fifths.
25 καὶ διὰ τὸ προῖκας διδόναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἦν (VI) μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην ἢ καὶ μετριάν τετάχθαι. * * νῦν δὲ ἔξεστι (p. 47) δοῦναι τε τὴν ἐπίκληρον ὅτι λέν βοῦληται κἂν ἀποθάνῃ μὴ διαθέμενος, ὥν ἄν καταλίπῃ κληρονόμοι, οὕτως ὥς ἄν § 16 θέλῃ δίδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλιων ἐπί- 30 πεῖς τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἱσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν 12 δῆλων ὅτι φαίλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ—ὑπήνεγκεν ἢ πόλις, ἀλλὰ ἀπάλετο § 17 διὰ τὴν ὀλυγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτε- 25 ἦν omitted by III, [ἤν] Susem. 1-2 doubtfully || 26 * * νῦν Bücheler, see Comm. n. (304): νῦν δὲ ἔξεστι δοῦναι <ὁπόσῳ ἄν τις θέλῃ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ἔξεστι δοῦναι> τὴν κτλ Welldon || 27 te omitted by M* P1, [τε] Susem. 1-2 || 28 διὰ ἄν καταλίπῃ, <τὴν> κληρονόμοι, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὥς ἄν καταλίπῃ <τὴν> κληρονόμοι, οὕτως Koraes || 30 τρισμυρίους τραχείους P1 in the margin || 33 οὔδε μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν ὑπήνεγκεν Susem. 1-2 missed by William's version nullam enim plagam portulit || 34 μὲν omitted by III: [μὲν] Susem. 1-2

(Bender). Aristotle's statement concerning the great wealth of Spartan women is confirmed by Plutarch's from a yet later time Agis 4. 7 ἦν δὲ τὸ τῶν Λακονικῶν πλοῦτων ἐν τάς γυναῖξὶ τὸ πλέοντων. (J. G. Schneider.) Susem. (302)

The Spartan name for them is ἐπιπάμονες, ἐπιπαματίδες.

25 καίτοι βέλτιον] Here again later authors are apparently better informed of the facts than Aristotle. We are told that dowries had actually been prohibited, and that down to the time of Lysander none were ever given; see Schöemann Antiquities of Greece p. 265 Eng. tr. Susem. (303)

26 νῦν δὲ ἔξεστι κτλ] It is obvious that this sentence forms no antithesis to the preceding and thus νῦν δὲ gives no sense. All however is right if one imagines something like the following to have fallen out before νῦν δὲ: <And besides it would have been necessary to prescribe who had the right and obligation of marrying heiresses, whereas at present every father can marry his daughter to any one he pleases, and if he die without a will his heir at law bestows her upon whom he pleases.> Susem. (304)

28 κληρονόμος usually means 'heir': here it must mean the person entitled to the rights of the deceased, the next male relation of full age, or, if there were more than one such, the eldest of them. Susem. (305)

This privilege is assigned to the king by Herod. vi. 57: δικαίως δὲ τοὺς βασι- λείας...παραδοξοῦ το τιμηθέν πέρα, εἰ τὸν ἱκέται ἔχων, ἦν μὲν πήρ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῶν ἑγγυσα. § 16 29 δυναμένης] Of course Aristotle makes this calculation, as Oncken remarks, with regard to the total population of Laconia, whether Spartan or of non- Spartan descent. In any case it is rather too high an estimate, as this total population amounted to only 400,000 at the most: see Schöemann Antiquities of Greece p. 195 Eng. tr. But on the other hand the reading, or rather conjecture, τραχείους would not merely give a number far too small, but also one out of all proportion to that of the 1500 cavalry. Susem. (306)

30 οὔδε χρῶς] 'In the time of Agis B.C. 241 (Plut. Agis c. 5) the Spartans were but 700, and only 150 retained their family allotments' (Eaton). Susem. (307)


34 διὰ τὴν ὀλυγανθρωπίαν] Here
again of course only Spartans proper are meant, not provincials (Herodotus) and Helots. According to Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 4. 15, 1000 Lakedaemonians fell at Leuctra, including 400 out of the 700 Spartiates who took part in the battle. Xenophon also, De Rer. Lec. i. 1, calls Sparta one of the least populous of states (J. G. Schneider). Susem. (309)

§ 17 34. δέχοντας δ' ὡς κτλ. 'It would appear as if Aristotle is our only authority for this fact. Herodotus, rx. 35, is very positive in his assertion that Tissamenos the Elean and his brother Hegias μοῖροι διὰ πάντων αὐθετῶν εὐγένετο Σπαρταῖος πολεμάτις (Congreve). Cp. also n. (312). Thuc. Inscr. Lec. 22 speaks somewhat differently. It is there stated that the strangers who submitted to the Lycurgan discipline were by the ordinance of Lycurgus also allowed a share in the 'ancient portion,' τῆς ἀρχαίας διατεταγμένης μοίρας, which they were not permitted to sell. Cp. n. 300.) Ephoros however, as Triber showed, has the following story, Frigg. 18 found in Strabo viii. 394. The first kings Eurysthenes and Procles had divided Laconia into four states, besides Sparta and Amyclae, and on account of the paucity of men had authorized the dependent rulers of these four provincial states to admit aliens to the right of citizenship: at that time the περικόιοι were as yet completely on an equality, political and civil, with the pure Spartans. Now it is indeed true that this account cannot have been the authority which Aristotle is here quoting, as Triber and Susemihl once supposed: but this being the case the partial agreement of the two accounts is still striking enough to suggest that Aristotle has here cited some other passage of Ephoros. For Herodotus may possibly refer only to historical times, Aristotle to the earlier period, e.g. perhaps only the reigns of the oldest kings. No doubt he is also thinking of such old Spartan families of non-Dorian descent as the Aegidae and Talthybiades: see Schömann p. 193, 208, 225 f., 249 Eng. tr.; Gilbert p. 52 ff., 57 ff., 149 f.; Frick in Jahrh. f. Philol. cv. 1872. p. 655 ff. It might again be said that Herodotus obviously has in mind only foreigners proper; whereas Aristotle might mean the μοίρακες, as they were called, children of Helots brought up as Spartans, who were perhaps invariably the illegitimate sons of Spartan lords by Helot women. But then such moirakes were not confined to the times of the earlier kings: even Lysander, Glyppos, Klandridas, for example, belonged to their number, see Schömann p. 200 Eng. tr. Ridgeway, again, suggests that the reference is to the neodamodes, i.e. Helots enfranchised for their services in war, and to their descendants. But a similar objection may be still more strongly urged: the earliest mention of neodamodes is as late as the period of the Peloponnesian war, Schömann p. 198 Eng. tr.—Comp. § 11 n. (295) and esp. Introf. p. 35 n. (3). Susem. (310)

35 ὡστ' οὖν γίνεσθαι] 'and that therefore there was then no lack of men although they were at war for a long time.' The indicative would have been used in ovatio rxex: hence ὡς, not μὴ, in olibriquia. Thucyd. v. 40 ὡστ' αὖξ ἐγγενεῖ and Demosthen. De falsa leg. §§ 166, 167, 351 with Shilleto’s Appendix B.

36 καὶ φασίν εἶναι κτλ] Evidently here again the pure Spartans are meant. Demaratos in Herod. vii. 234 reckons them at about 8,000 (Eaton). Susem. (311)

37 εἴτ' ἄληθεν...εἶτε μή] Aristotle himself then doubts it. Susem. (312)

38 βάλτων...39 τὴν πόλιν] 'It is better to fill the city with men by means of an equal division of property' than by the admission of aliens. § 18 40 ὑπεναντίος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν] is an obstacle to a correction of these evils of Sparta, viz. by equalization of property. See § 1 for
construction. Division of the larger properties would ensure the maintenance of an increased population: the existing law encourages an increase without due regard to their subsistence.

'proągetai toûs polîtas κτλ] 'stimulates the citizens.' Just the opposite of what Aristotle himself requires. Plato and Phæleas did not go anything like so far, and yet are blamed severely enough by him in this respect. See § 10 ff. nn. (205—211), 7 § 5 nn. (234, 235). Susem. (313)

4 ἀφροῦρον] not liable to military service.) [ἐμφροῦρον: φροῦρα is a Spartan word for στρατιά, found frequently in Xenophon Hellenics, II. 4. 29 ἔσαγε φροῦρα, so IV. 7. 2, v. 2. 3. Xenophon uses the phrase φροῦραν φάϊνει = to declare war in III. 2. 23 and some 15 other places. Also in Thucydides II. 25, Βρασίδας φροῦρα ἔχων.

téttaros] Aelian Var. Hist. vi. 6 says 'five' (J. G. Schneider). Further Manso Sparta 1. 1, p. 128 f., is undoubtedly right in asserting that this law was of a more modern origin, as the state certainly never dreamed of taxing pure Spartans in the olden times, and the remission of military duty as a reward appears to agree but ill with the spirit of ancient Sparta. The measure reveals that the decadence of the national power had already set in (Trieber). Aristotle however does not say that this law came down from Lycurgus: see n. (321) on § 21. Susem. (314)

§ 19 4. καίτοι φανερὸν κτλ] Since the Spartans lived simply and solely on the produce of their estates, this is plain enough. But considering the numerous wars, it is unfortunately not easy to see how decrease in the numbers of fighting men would be prevented by equality and inalienability of the estates. 'From the nature of the case the only effectual means to prevent it would have been that which according to tradition was adopted by the early kings, 'to repair gaps in the ranks of the old citizens by the admission of new citizens.' Compared with this effective remedy no great importance attaches to the encouragement given to families of three or four sons by a reward which from its character excited the dangerous surmise, that for distinguished services to the state Sparta had no better prize to offer than release from the honourable duty of serving the state. We know now that no stock which goes on breeding in and in can be preserved from extinction. Significant enough too is the proportionately large number of distinguished men in Sparta who came from the ranks of the μοβάκες (see n. 310 on § 17): in whose case fresh blood was imported into the ancient stock. The peculiar feature in the social malady of the Spartan state was this, that inequality of property, which we know to be as old as property itself, gained ground here, not as usually, in the train of over-population, but as a consequence of the very opposite condition, viz. depopulation' (Oncken). Susem. (315)


8 αὐτῇ] in itself, simply as such.

9 ἐκ τοῦ δῆμου] Thirlwall (iv. 377) supposed the δῆμος to include the ὑπο-
II. 9. 21] 1270 b 1—1270 b 20. 291

10 ὑπεντες εἰς τὸ ἄρχειον, οἱ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὁμοιός ἤσαν. (VI)

§ 20 ἐνδήλωσα τὸ ἄρχειον. τοις ἄνδροις διαφθερέντες γὰρ ἀργυρίῳ τινές, ὅσον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπόλεσαν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἄρχην ἦν καὶ μεγάλην καὶ ισοτύραννον δημαγογεύειν αὐτῶν ἦν ἀριστο- 15

§ 21 κρατίας συνέβαινε. συνήκει μὲν οὖν τὴν τοις ἀποτελεῖ ἀρχεῖον τοῦτο (ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ ὁ δήμος διὰ τὸ μετεχεὶ τῆς) μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὅστε εἰπε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἶπε διὰ τὴν 20 τύχην τοῦτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἵπποι τῶν πράγμα-

10 ἀν ἐγέρσαν; Schneider || 12 ἄνδροις Λτ., ἄνδροις even Bk.1, ἄνδροις Π1 (1st hand, emended by a later hand), ἄνδροις Π1' and Π1' (1st hand), ἄνδροις corr. of Π1 (t altered to δ), γρ. ἄνδροις Π1 in the margin || 14 [ἀρχεῖον] Oncken, αὐτοὶ Kidgeway = αὐτῶν ἄρχακοι καὶ τοὺς Susem.2, reges ipsos populares fieri complerant Λτ.; regere populum se ipsos cogeant reges William, whence αὐτῶν ἄρχακοι[το] καὶ [οἱ] Susem.1 || 16 ἀριστοκρατεῖας Π1-2-3-4 Qb Tb || 19 τὴν om. by IP2 Bk.

meiones as well as the ὅμοιος, and so too K. P. Hermann. The opposite view is taken by Schömann Antiquitates p. 245 Eng. tr. See Basolt 'The Lacedaemonians and their allies' 1. p. 21 f. (Leipzig, 1878). For παρτός, not πάντες, see §§ 22, 10 § 10.

10 ἀρχεῖον=magistracy, board: so §§ 21, 10 § 10 τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἄρχειον.

δύιοι See below 10 § 12 ὑ. (370) b and Thuc. 1. 131. 2 ὃ δὲ (Παλαιακί) ποσεῦων χρήματι διαλύσει τὴν διαβολήν (Eaton); also Kleit. III. 18. 6, 1419 a 31 ff.; the Lacedaemonian Ephor called to account for his conduct says οἱ μὲν γὰρ (his colleagues) χρήματα λαξύντες ταῦτα ἐπράσαν, ἐγώ δὲ ὄλλα γνώμη (Göttling). Susem. (316).

ἵπποι] were often. 'Why this tense? Is it that in Aristotle's time it mattered little whether they were so or not?'

(Congreve). It is imperfect in § 14 ἵκεν, § 16 ἵκεν, § 20 ἄγαλγάστρο, συνεβαίνει.

§ 20 11 ἐν ἑαυτοῖς] what circumstance is meant we do not know. For the expression καὶ νῦν = recently, compare viii(ν), 10 § 31 καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν peri Διονύσου, n. (1699). Susem. (317)


14 καὶ ἦσσον] Cr. Plato Laos. IV. 712 D καὶ γὰρ τυραννοὶ ἄνθεκτοι μοι προσοκέναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἤσαν. See c. 6 § 17 n. (319). Susem. (318)

δημαγογεύει = to conciliate, flatter an individual like a demagogue, in viii(ν), 6 § 6, 10 § 31. But, as Oncken remarks, it hardly serves to convert the constitution into a democracy that the kings pay court to the Ephors. Susem. (319) If therefore αὐτοῖς be retained, it will more conveniently apply to the Spartans themselves as in §§ 16, 19, 24. The kings themselves were compelled to court the favour of the people in order thereby to secure power to counterbalance that of the ephors.

"This seems to me impossible in this context. If then αὐτοῖς is right, Aristotle has, I think, erroneously exaggerated. For I cannot agree with Busse who thinks that Oncken's objection is sufficiently removed by c. 6 § 17, 1265 b 38, δημοκρατεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ εἰκ τοῦ δήμου ἦν τῶν ἐφόρων." Susem.

16 ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας See n. (330) on III. 7 § 3. Susem. (320)

§ 21 17 συνέχεις = is the key of the constitution.

19 διὰ τῶν νομοθέτων] Not Lycurgus in this case but, on Aristotle's view, viii(ν), 11 § 2, Theopompos. See n. (314) on § 18. Susem. (321)

ἐπε διὰ τὴν τύχην] Aristotle is not unaware, then, that many good or bad consequences may arise out of legal regulations quite apart from, or even contrary to, the legislator's intention: cp. 12 § 5 n. (409). Susem. (321) b

20 συμπέπτωκεν] Cr. ἀπὸ συμπτώματος c. 12 § 5.

19—2
§ 22 συν" δει γαρ την πολιτειαν την μελλουσαν σωζεσθαι παντα (VI) 
βοηθεσθαι τα μερη της πολεως ετιναι και διαμενευτανταν, οι μεν ουν βασιλεις δια την αυτων τιμην ουτως έχουσιν,
οι δε καλοι καγαθοι δια την γερουσιαν—αθλον γαρ η άρχη
25 αυτη της αρετης εστιν,—ο δε δημος δια την εφορειαν—και
§ 23 θισταται γαρ εξ απαντων— άλλα αιρητην εδει την άρχην 16
ειναι αυτην εξ απαντων μεν, μη τον τροτον δε τουτου δω
νων (παιδαριώδης γαρ εστι λειπουν). έτε δε και κρισεων μεγα-

22 ταυτα Π1, ταυτα Π14, την αυτην or [ταυτα] Schneider, <κατα> ταυτα Bern-

§ 22 21 δει γαρ...22 διαμενεν ταυτα] 
Cp. vii(vi). 9 § 10 ν. (1267), 12 § 1 (1307); vii(vi). 5 § 4 (1434); viii(v).
9 § 5 (1634). SusEM. (322).

The order (which Stah!; and apparently Congreve, have mistaken) is δει παντα τα μερη (subject) της πολεως βοηθεσθαι την 
πολιτειαν την μ. σ. (object of βοηθεσθαι) ειναι και διαμενευταν. 
If a constitution is to be preserved, all classes in the state must desire its existence and continuance. 
Hence we are led to Bernays' or Schneider's correction.

23 όυτως έχουσιν—βοηθουσα την πο-

24 καλοι καγαθοι] This expression
in Aristotle—see e.g. vii(vi). § 3 ff.—
always denotes the more educated and 
capable men; and this meaning in
the present passage is confirmed by the ad-
dition άθλον γαρ η άρχη αυτη της αρετης 
εστιν, which Triber hardly has sufficient 
grounds for regarding as an interpolation.
Hence U(n)ger in Philol. Anziger v.
1873, p. 370 has rightly protested against 
the completely mistaken assertion of Gil-
bert op. c. 151 ff., and Frick De epheors 
Spartanis 28 f. 7, who prefer to understand it by the nobles. 
From passages like vi § 1 and vii(vi). 7 § 4 (which Gilbert 
p. 153 incredibly mistakes) any one who 
reads without preconceived opinion will 
see beyond all doubt that Aristotle knows 
nothing of an election of Senators at 
Sparta, for which only certain families 
were eligible (as was the case in Crete 
c. 10 § 10), or of a privileged hereditary 
nobility within the pale of those pure 
Spartans who had the right to take part 
in the popular assembly. 
Nor can the

opposite of this be inferred from vii(vi). 9 
§ 9, see n. (1264). But the mode of elec-
tion may very well have been such that 
in practice members of certain families 
were successful time after time: see 
vi(vi). 6 § 21 ν. (1586). SusEM. (322 b)

άθλον γαρ κτλ] To be a member of 
this body is a reward of special excel-
ence, or at least it should be: see below 
§ 25, Demosth. xx. Adv. Lecfin. § 107 etei 
μεν γαρ έστι (at Lacedaemon) της άρετης 
αθλουν της πολιτειας κυριω γενεσαν μετα 
tων φορων: Plut. Lyč. 26. SusEM. (323)

26 καθοταται γαρ σε. η εφορεια ει 

§ 23 28 παιδαριώδης κτλ] Here 
Aristotle calls the whole method of electing 
the Ephors childish, yet he says of the 
election to the senate § 27, κατα την κρισιν 
εστι παιδαριωδης, it is childish as to 
the means of ascertaining the results. 
Consequently the mode of election was 
probably not the same for the two offices. 
Plato again describes it in the case of the 
ephors as approximating to a nomination 
by lot Latoς III 502 Α, έγγες της 
κληρονομις διαμεκες. This points to aus-
pices (Urlichis Rhet. Mus. N. S. vi. 
1847. 223). But it is hardly possible to 
determine whether electors were chosen 
by the people and then, after observing 
certain signs, they appointed the new 
ephors, as Urlichis thinks: or whether, 
according to Schomann's conjecture p.
240 Eng. tr., a larger number of persons 
were nominated by the people, and the 
five selected from them in accordance 
with certain auspices. SusEM. (334)

Schneider had suggested that as in 
the election of the Senators (see n. 333)
the people voted by acclamation, which would generally favour those who have the right of proposing candidates. Oncken (p. 281 f.) adopts this view. Götting (p. 468) assumed that the people nominated a certain number of candidates and that from these the Ephors were taken by lot. Stein (p. 20) puts forward a more complicated theory: that electors designated by lot nominated a number of candidates, and that the ephors were elected from the candidates by the same process as the senators.

**κρίσεων μεγάλων** The ephors had the greatest part of the administration of justice in private suits, especially in all actions arising from contracts; see III. i § 10 τῶν συμβολαίων <δίκας> δικαίων τῶν ἄλλων ἄλλα μ. (443-4), Schömann op. c. 237, 246, 250 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (325)

30 κατὰ γράμματα] There were no written laws in Sparta: Schömann op. c. 251 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (326)

Comp. μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄλλα ἀρτοὺνομοισιν, 10 § 11.

**§ 24.31 οὐχ ὁμολογομένη** inconsistent with (the design of) the polity.

**32 ἀνεμιστήριος** The ephors had a separate mess-table to themselves, Schömann op. c. 245 Eng. tr., and there they were able, so great was their authority, amongst other things to provide a far more elaborate cuisine than the ordinary soup, the 'black broth' of Sparta (J. G. Schneider). SUSEM. (327)

34 ἄλλα ἄλθρα...ηδονῶν] Cr. § 35 m. (346-7), iv(vii), 15 § 6 n. (627). Thus amongst the Spartan men, too, the much-vaulted strictness of manners had its limits, and the all-important condition was merely not to be detected in excesses. How else would Spartan avarice even be explicable? SUSEM. (328)

**§§ 25-28 The Senate or Elders.**

**§ 25 37 επιεικῶν...ικανῶν** 'If only honest men, sufficiently trained to manly excellence, entered the senate.' No doubt this was part of the original design of the institution; but frequently it was not carried out: see § 22 n. (323). SUSEM. (329)

39 κρίσεων μεγάλων] The Spartan senate had criminal jurisdiction in particular: see III. i § 10 n. (443 b), vi(iv). 9 § 9, ὁλίγοις εἶναι κυρίους ἑπιτελουμένους καὶ φιγῆς ὃν. (1266). SUSEM. (329 b)

40 ἐστὶ γὰρ, κτλ] In conformity with this principle Aristotle in his ideal state releases very old citizens from the administration of the state and allows them to retire as priests: iv(vii). 9 § 9 m. (816-7). Plato too was of the same opinion on this point. In his state of the Laws he prescribes that no one be allowed to be a member of the highest magisterial office, the board of νομοφόρους (see above m. on 6 §§ 18, 19), under 50 or over 70 years of age: Laws vi 755 a f. 'Compare also Rhet. 11. 14. 4 ἀκμαῖος...ἡ φύξη περὶ τὰ ἐνδοθεῖν πεντῆκοντα: Herod. iii. 134 αὐξανομένω
1271 a γηρας) τὸν τρόπον δὲ τούτον πεπαιδευμένου ὡστε καὶ τὸν (VI) νομοθετήν αὐτὸν ἀπίστευν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοὶς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ § 26 ἀσφαλές. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδρομοδοκούμενοι καὶ κατα- χαριζόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοιμωνήκοτες τῆς ἀρ- 5 χῆς ταύτης. διότερ βέλτιον αὐτῶς μὴ ἀνευθύνους εἶναι: νῦν δὲ εἰσίν. δόξει δ' ἄν ἢ τῶν ἔφορων ἅρχη πάσας εὐ- θύνειν τάς ἁρχάς: τούτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα θάνατον διώ- ρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τούτον λέγομεν διδόναι δειν τᾶς εὐθύ- § 27 νας. ἐτί δὲ καὶ τὴν αἱρεσίν ἢ ποιοῦνται τῶν γερώντων, κατά

1271 a 3 δὲ] γὰρ Σpengel || 5 ἀνευθύνους Syburg, perhaps rightly || 9 καὶ ἢν αἱρεσίν ποιοῦνται...κρίσιν or rather κατὰ τὴν...γερώντων ἢ τε κρίσις Bender, much too violently

tὶς σώματι συναίσχετον καὶ αἰ φρένεςς γηράσ- κοντι δὲ συγγρήσκοιν καὶ δὲ τὰ πρόγματα πάντα ἀπαξίλφυνοιν, Lývi vi. 23 cum corporibus vigere et deflorescere animos, Lucret. III. 445 pariter cum corpore et una crescere sentimus pariterque senescere mentem' (Eaton). Susem. (330)

1271 a i δὲ answers b 37 ἐπεικῶν μὲν, the intermediate words from καίνου being parenthetical. Comp. 2 §§ 3; 4 τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ...δὲ ἢν δὲ δὲ κτλ.

ὁστε...ἀνδράσιν] 'But if they are trained in such a way that even the legislator cannot trust them.' Camerarius long since asked how Aristotle came to this conclusion. Presumably from the fact he mentions directly afterwards, § 26, that every senator (as well as all the other officials and even the two kings) was placed under the control of the Ephors. Susem. (331)

§ 26 a φαίνονται δὲ κτλ] Cp. c. 11 § 4 μεγάλα βλάπτοντε καὶ ἐξαπλαγάν ἢ δὴ ὃς. (384). Susem. (331 b)

§ 26 δόξει δ' ἄν κτλ] It might be held (cp. § 18) that the board of Ephors controls all the officials. But this is too vast a trust to commit to the Ephorality and it is not in this sense that we assert the necessity for responsible control.

8 τῶν τρόπων οὐ τούτων] Because the superintendence and control exercised by the Ephors was far too unlimited and violent (J. G. Schneider). See above § 20 μ. (318). Susem. (332)

§ 27 9 κατὰ τῇ τὴν κρίσιν κτλ] 'The proceedings are described by Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 26) in the following manner. After the assembling of the ‘people,’ i.e. of all the Spartiatæ who possessed the right of voting, some men selected for the purpose proceeded to a neighbouring building from which no view was afforded of the place of meeting, though the voices of the assembled crowd could easily be heard. Then the candidates for the vacant office passed silently one by one through the assembly in an order fixed by lot, while the people, according to the various degrees of favour with which they regarded them, made their feelings known by correspondingly loud or feeble acclamations. The party confirmed in the building, to whom the order in which the candidates appeared by lot was unknown, observed on which occasion the acclamation was the loudest, and the candidate who was thus greeted was regarded as the popular choice....Aristotle’s judgment upon these proceedings is quite intelligible in an age in which the manners of the people had long degenerated from their ancient purity and simplicity. For obviously there was nothing easier than to turn the whole election into a mere fraudulent farce, and to determine the result beforehand' Schömenn p. 231 f. Eng. tr. One of the main questions that arise is, how the committee which decided on the loudness of the acclamations was itself appointed:—and on this point we have no information (Oncken). Besides, this mode of election is only a peculiar survival of the primitive election of chiefs by acclamation in a rude antiquity, retained in a time for which it had long since ceased to be adapted. In general the votes of the Spartans in the popular assembly continued to be taken eivai νoce, by acclamation, βοή: and only in case of a doubt as to the decision did an actual division of the
assembly take place. See Schömann p. 236 Eng. tr. Further compare § 23, n. (324). SUSEM. (333)

to καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι = (the obligation to) a personal canvass. Schlosser and Fülleborn think this a wise arrangement, since otherwise the proposers might nominate whom they liked;—as if it were Aristotle's meaning that any one who aspired to be a senator had the right to canvass, but need not do so unless he liked. But beyond all doubt, as is clear from n. (333), he means that the candidates are obliged to canvass personally. SUSEM. (334)

11 δεί γὰρ κτλ] This is the principle adopted in its entirety by Plato, in whose ideal state the philosophic rulers only undertake the government against their own inclination, Zeller Plato p. 463 Eng. tr. Compare also 11 § 12 n. SUSEM. (335) Add Rep. 347 B ff., 517 D, 519 C.

§ 28 16 νῦν δὲ ὁπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιῶν φιλοτήμων γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολιτείαν εἰς τὸ πρὸς τὴν αἰρέσιν τῶν γερόντων. οὖν δὲ

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§ 29 φιλοτήμων καὶ διὰ φιλοχρημάτιαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. περὶ 20 ἐς ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν τὰς πόλειν, ἐς τὰς πόλειν ἂλλος ἂν καὶ βέλτιον, * * * γάρ

16 τῶν γ' ἄδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσών] Here the term ἄδικημα is used in a sense different from that of Rhet. 1. 13. 16, 1374 b 8 ἐστι δὲ ἄδικημα διὰ μῆκες παράλογο ἀπὸ πολλάς τε ἐς ταῖς, or the un-Aristotelian passage Nic. Eth. v. 2 where every ἄδικημα is also ἐκούσιον. SUSEM. (336)

Note esp. N. E. v. 8. 2: ἄδικημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὅριστας τῷ ἑρωίδῳ καὶ ἀκούσων δει τὸν ἔρωτον ἢ, ἄριστον, άμα δὲ καὶ ἄδικημα τοῦ ἐστιν: ὅτι ἐστι τα ἄδικον μὲν ἄδικημα δ' ὀπτῶ, ἐὰν μὴ τῷ ἐκουσών προσφορά: Yet N. E. v. 7 § 7, both with Jackson's notes: also the table, p. 109, of his edition of Nic. Eth. v.

17 τὰ πλείστα συμβαίνει κτλ] Here Lycurgus would certainly have been able to reply to Aristotle on the same lines as the latter takes in his objection to Plato c. 5 § 9: ἡγήται δικαίως...τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δει <χρήματα>...φιλεῖν. Besides as no one could become senator until he was 60 years of age, 'an ambition which is contented with this prospect until then must have a very tenacious life, such as is only attained under strict discipline, and cannot easily become dangerous to the state' (Oncken). SUSEM. (337)

The office of king: §§ 29, 30.

§ 29 30 ἂλλος ἂν ἄλλος λόγος] III. cc.

17—17. SUSEM. (338)

21 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν βού] 'that each king should be chosen in virtue of his life and conduct': an elective monarchy.
§ 30 κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὃτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ' αὐτὸς (VI) οἴεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς κάγαθους, δήλων ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὡς ὅν κύσιν ἰκανως ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν διόπερ ἐξέπεμπτον

25 συμπτρεσβευτάς τοὺς ἐχθρούς, καὶ σωτηρίαν εὐμοίζου τῇ πόλει εἶναι τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς, οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῷ ἑν τοῦ τῇ συνιστίᾳ τὰ καλοῦμενα - φιδίτια νευμοθέτηται τῷ καταστή-

§ 31 σαυτὶ πρῶτον. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τῇ σύνο-

δον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ παρά δὲ τοὺς Δάκωσιν ἐκαστὸν δεῖ

30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενητῶν ἐνίοις οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-

25 ἐφόρων Göttingl § 27 φιδίτια Π (emended by corr. of Po!)

§ 30 22 ὃτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης κτλ] In the developed state Aristotle only recognizes kingship as an actual form of government in the case where the preeminently best man exercises an unlimited monarchy: III. 13 § 13 n. (601), §§ 14, 24 n. (614), § 25; 17 § 5 n. (678): VI(iv). 2 § 1 ff. nn. (1133, 1136—7); 10 § 3 n. (1280), see also the notes on III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), 14 § 15 (633). It is only consistent in himself therefore to set up an analogous standard even for a very limited monarchy, and to ignore hereditary descent altogether, except in a family where special capacity may be inherited. Compare 11 §§ 3, 4 nn. (381 —3). But when again, cp. n. (296) on § 12, he treats such a peculiar fact as the dual kingship at Sparta, a fact rendered intelligible only by historical events of a very special nature, exactly as if it had come from the brain of a single legislator, then, as Oncken (1. 285) rightly remarks, here if anywhere is a point of view foreign to historical criticism: and such criticism is hardly anything more than superficial. See C. Wachsman The historical origin of the two kings at Sparta in the Jahrb. f. Philol. xcvii. 1868. 1—9; E. Curtius History of Greece 1 p. 186 ff. Eng. tr.: Schömann op. c. 208, 225 f., 541 —4 Eng. tr. But when they come to particulars, these authors diverge seriously from one another in their conception of the subject. Susem (339)


25 συμπτρεσβευτάς] A less forcible word, like συναποθημωτας, might have been expected.


§ 31 27 φιδίτια] The derivation is uncertain: Plut. Lyg. 12 guesses wildly. Perhaps καθότι to sit; if indeed φιδίτια is the true form and φειδίτης = ἐφί-διτης (?) see, n. on 1273 a 22. Clearly ἀν-

δρεία was the older Doric name, and συνιστία is only an Attic term. 28 ἔδει γὰρ κτλ] Cp. 10 §§ 7, 8 nn. (363, 365): IV(vii). 10 §§ 8 (384). Plato’s criticism, Latos viii 847 E, is precisely the same: τροφῆς δὲ καὶ διανομῆς τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐγγεζή τῆς τῆς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους νόμων ἐκεῖνης ἀριθμής ἂν τις γένομεν κατὰ πρὸς σπόρον γίγνεσθαι κτλ. But on Spartan ground this was once for all impossible; for Aristotle himself knows best, § 36, that the Spartan state as such (τὸ κοινὸ) pos-

sesses no property at all, neither in land, nor in money and money’s worth’ (Oncken): or at least, to put it more correctly, the state treasury for the most part was not well supplied; cp. Schömann op. c. 291 Eng. tr. Susem. (341)

For σφόδρα = πρόσωπον the lexx. quote Herod. 1. 64 χρημάτων σύνοισι = contributions. But here the singular (σφό-

δρόν) and the entire phrase ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ (sumptu publico) eιναι, favour the rendering ‘the gathering should have been a state affair.’ Cp. vii(vi). 4 § 13, 1319 a 32; τῆς σφόδρος ταύτης = τῆς ἐκκλη-

σίας. The original design of public messes was military comradeship: see Schömann pp. 271, 282 Eng. tr.

30 φέρειν = contribute.


§ 32 τὸ νομοθέτη τῆς προαιρέσεως. Βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκέυασμα τῶν συστιτῶν, γίνεται δὲ ἥκιστα δημοκρατικὸν οὔτω νευμοθετημένον. μετέχειν μὲν 35 γὰρ ὑμᾶς λοιπῶν πάντων δικαίως, ὥστε συμβαίνει τοῦ νομισμὸν (VI)

31 συμβαίνῃ, apparently M* (1st hand), συμβαίνει Qb Tb Bk. || 36 αὐτῶν after ἐστίν (ἐστιν M*) M* and P1 (1st hand) || 37 αὐτῶν P2, αὐτῶν P (1st hand, altered by a later hand), αὐτῶρς Π2 || 40 αὐτῶν Π2 Ar. Bk., ἄλλος αὐτῶς p1 in the margin || 41 καθέσθηκεν was apparently omitted by P

§ 32 37 μη μετέχειν] That is, they ceased to be full citizens (δῆμοι). They were then, in all probability, included under the term ὑπομάχους, Xen. Hell. III. 3. 6. See Schömann ap. c. pp. 217—220. 270 Eng. tr. Since Aristotle censures the measures as ἥκιστα δημοκρατικόν, it is not likely that the persons thus disqualified were included in the δῆμος, as Thirlwall supposed IV. 377.

The office of admiral; § 33.


39 ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεύσεις = in addition to the kings. The command of the fleet was the most essential feature in the royal power at Sparta: see Hell. III. 14 § 3 ν. (616), § 14, n. (631), § 15: also n. (381) on II. 11 § 3, (630) on III. 14 § 13. Compare also II. 10 § 6 n. (360). We can hardly follow Oncken (1 293) in assuming that Aristotle’s criticism here implies a further reference to Lysander’s plans for the entire overthrow of the kingly power, VIII (V). I § 10 ν. (1498). A design entertained by one distinguished holder of the office, such as Lysander undoubtedly was, cannot be attributed without further ado to the institution of the ναυάρχος as a whole. Certainly a startling anomaly was introduced into the political structure of Sparta by the necessity which gradually arose for the employment of a fleet: and it is significant that of four native Admirals (ναυάρχοι) in whom Sparta trusted in the last period of the Peloponnesian war, two, Phrynis and Deinaiades, were Provincials (περίοικοι) and two, Lysander and Glyippus, were μόδακες (Oncken). Further compare vii (vi). § 8 n. 1473: Beloch The office of ναυάρχος at Sparta in Rhein. Mus. XXXIV. 1879. 117—130.

Susem. (343) The Spartan government took the same view as Aristotle does here when they nominated Agesilaus to the command of the fleet as well as that of the army, in order to secure unity in the operations, 295 B.C., Xen. Hell. III. 4. 27: ὅτι δ’ αὐτὸ νῦν τῷ πεδίῳ τῷ ὑπὲρ Κύμης ἔρχεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκοι τελῶν [the elphors] ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ὄτου γεγονόκει καὶ καταστήσασθαι ναυάρχον ἄντων αὐτὸς βοῶσιν. τούτῳ δ’ ἐποίησαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τουφές λογομορφ. ὡς εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀμφότερον ἄρχο, τὸ τε πεξίν πολὺ ἀν ἱκακρίτερον εἶναι, καὶ ἐν οὐσίᾳ τῆς λογισμοῦ ἀμφότερος, τὸ τε ναυτικὸν, ἐπεισαιρέαν τοῦ πεξίν ἐνθα δόθαι.

The military spirit; §§ 34, 35.

§ 34 1271 b 1 Πλατάνου ἐν τοῖς νόμοις] I 672 C—658 B, esp. 630 E, quoted in u. (294 b) on II. 11. Compare II 660 ff. 656 E, III 688 a f., IV 705 D: or even earlier Kýπερβις VIII 547 E ff. τῷ δὲ γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγων, ...ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς υἱοὶς τε καὶ ἀποκλείστως ἀπόκλισιν, τοὺς πρὸς πόλεμον μὲλλόν πεφυκότα δὲ πρὸς ἐρήμου...καὶ τολμεῖσα τῶν ἀνεχρόνων διάγειν. The same criticism in IV (VII). 2 § 9, 14 §§ 15—18, 15 § 6 ὁ νέος δέρης: V (VIII). 4 § 2
πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἁρετῆς ἢ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶν, (VI) τήν πολεμικὴν αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοι-γαροῦν ἑσοφίζουτο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀποκλλυτο δὲ ἀρξαντες 5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπιστασθαι σχολαίζειν μηδὲ ἁσκησθαι μηδὲ-μᾶν ἁσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τοῦτον δὲ 23 ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τά-γαθα τὰ περιμάχητα δὲ ἁρετῆς μᾶλλον ἡ κακίας, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἁρετῆς 36 υπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐς καλῶς, φαίνως δὲ ἓχει καὶ περὶ τὰ 11 κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις. οὐτὲ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέροντι τε κακῶς διὰ τὰ τῶν Σπαρ-τιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γην οὐκ ἔξεταξοσιν ἀλλήλων

1271 b 3 αὕτη Μανθ. I 34 | χρησίμη <μῶν> Susem. | 5 ἁσκησθαι ad virtutem exercilari William doubtless on his own conjecture, hence πρὸς ἁρετὴν wrongly inserted by Susem. | 6 τούτῳ Παρ., τῶτο Pαρ. Q Παρ. (1st hand, altered by corr.), and perhaps also Γ. | 7 μὲν omitted by Π. | γίνεσθαι after τάγαθα Μανθ. I 34 | 12 άναγκαζομένους Pαρ.-3 Ald.

οὕτε πρὸς μάλιν...οὕτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταῦταν; 4 § 7, the reference being given in the notes. Susem. (344) 4 ἐσοφίζοντο μὲν πολ. κτλ. Repeated in substance IV(VII). 14 § 16 ff. τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήνηται νῦν, § 23 τὴν γὰρ βαφῆν ἀνέστησαν, ὅσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἀγόνιτε. αὐτίς δ’ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παρείδεα τὰς δυνασίας σχολαζέοι, 15 §§ 5, 6: V(VIII). 4 § 4 τοὺς Λάκκους έις...νῦν...καὶ τοῖς γυμνοῖς ἀγώσαι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἐτέρων: where references will be found in the notes. Aristotle must have said the same in his account of the Spartan constitution, in the Πολείταις; for, as Eaton remarks, the polemic in Plutarch Λεύκεις, 50 is directed against a similar criticism, though Aristotle is not mentioned as the author: the passage begins θυμαμάξω τῶν λεγομένων, ὡς ἀρέσθαι μὲν ἢ δεισαν, ἀρέχει δ’ οὐκ ἠπίσταντο Λακειδαμιόνοι. Susem. (345) ἀρξαντες=after they had won their empire, when they had become a sove- reign people. 35 § 8 τὰ περιμάχητα ι.ε. external goods: cp. Nic. Eth. 10. 8 § 4, 116b 15 ff. οἱ μὲν οὖν...φιλαίτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἐναίστατος ἀποκεφαλίζαται τὸ πλεον ἐν χρήσιμαι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡσυχίαις ταῖς σωματικαῖς...ἐπιστολάκασιν [οἱ πολλοί] περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἀριστα δύνα, διὰ καὶ περιμάχητα ἐστίν: § 9 1169 a 20 f. προεστείαν [ὁ σουποδαῖος] καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ὄλος τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγάθα, περιπατομένος ἐαυτῷ τὸ καλῶν. Susem. (346) 9 τούτῳ μὲν καλῶς] They are right in thinking valor the means of obtaining external goods: they are wrong in exalting the goods which valor wins above valor itself.

“Cp. IV(VII). 1 § 3 n. (607), 15 § 6 nn. (927—8).” Susem. (346 b) ὅτι μὲντοι ταῦτα κτλ. See above § 24, n. (328) and again IV(VII). 15 § 6 nn. Susem. (347) The finances: §§ 36, 37. 36 § 12 άναγκαζομένους if they are 14 compelled. 14 τὴν πλείστην γην] Only the smaller part of the land belonged to the Provincials (περιοίκοι). Susem. (348) οὕτοι ἐξετάζουσιν...εἰσφοράς] Even at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war Thucydides (I. 80. 4) makes the Spartan king Archidamos say: πολλὰ καὶ πλεον τοῦτον (καὶ, χρυσοῦ) ἐλιπέμεν καὶ οὕτε ἐν τῷ καὶ χρῆμαν ὄλν τῶν ἄλλων φέρομεν (Vettori). Cp. also what Pericles says (I. 141. 3) αὐτοφρο- γολ εἰς Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὕτε ὅδα οὕτε ἐν καὶ χρήματα ἐστίν αὐτῶς. Susem. (349)
II. 10. 1] 1271 b 2—1271 b 23.

§ 37 16 τοῦς δ' ἱδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους As early as the first quarter of the sixth century B.C. Alceaus (Fr. 50) quotes the saying of Aristodamos, a Spartan, 'money makes the man' as in full force at Sparta: ὥσ γὰρ ὄψιν Ἀρεστάδαμῳ φασὶν ὄνοι ἀπάλαιμοι ἐν Σπάρτῃ λόγον ἐπιγρ. χρήματι ἀγάπη, πένθεροι δ' οἴκεσε πελέτες έδοχοι οὐδὲ τίμων. Amongst well-known instances of peculation or corruption Eaton quotes Leotychides, Pleistoxan, Astyochos, Kleanidians, Glyppos, Lyonsander: to which he adds Plutarch's own admission, Lys. 30; Ἀγίδως δε βασιλεύουντος εἰσέρρην νόμομα πρῶτον εἰς τὴν Σπάρταν καὶ μετὰ τοῦ νομίματος πλεονεξία καὶ πλεονόθις ἐπέβη διά Λύσανδρον, δ' οὗτος ἄναλωσ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἐνέπλησε τὴν πατρίδα φιλοχρημάτως καὶ τρυφῆς. Besides the corruption of the ephors, § 19 n. (316), and senators, § 26 (331 b), 11 § 4 (384), Aristotle might have spoken confidently of that of the kings and admirals. There was a well-known oracle, ἡ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ἄλει, ἄλα δ' ὄνειρα, quoted in Aristotle's Polity of Lacedaemon Frag. 501, 1559 b 28 (= Aristot. pseudepi. 496 = 88 in Müller's Fr. hist. Gr. ii. p. 131), and even Tyrtaeus (?) seems to have cited it, Fr. 3. See further Xenoph. De Rep. Lac. 14. 3 and the statement in Ps.-Plato Aec. 1. 122 E f., quoted by Eaton; χρηματία καὶ ἀργότων οἷον ἑστιν ἐν πᾶσιν Ἑλληνικῷ δοσιν ἐν Λακεδαιμίῳ ἢδη. This may very well be an exaggeration; the writer of the dialogue is however generally well informed on historical matters, see Cobet Memos. N. S. ii. 1874, 360 ff. Compare with this the instances of great wealth possessed by Spartans, some of which have been collected by Grote Greece ix. 321 f., Gilbert op. c. 154 f. If the Spartan, with the exception of the kings, ever were prohibited from possessing gold and silver—a statement which H. Stein in the dissertation quoted in n. (82) on i. 9 § 8 seeks to disprove—it was at a very early time that the prohibition was removed. For gold and silver money were first coined by Phidion king of Argos (whose age is, I admit, very variously estimated, 760 or 670 B.C.), and even down to the time of Croesus gold and silver were scarce in Greece; see n. (1653) on viii(y). 10 § 6 and Böckh Public Economy i. p. 6 Eng. tr. H. Stein, Oncken, and others would reduce this supposed prohibition to the fact, that gold and silver money remained unknown for a longer time in the secluded valley of the Eurotas than in the trading districts on the coast; and thus the Spartans retained their old iron money in use for a long time, first in bars, and afterwards as a sort of coinage (see Schömann op. c. p. 275 Eng. tr.) and employed it even later along with gold and silver money for internal trade. See however Triebel op. c. 111. Susem. (350) c. 10 The Cretan polity.

Congreve refers to the article Cretae in Smith's Geogr. Dictionary. See also Schömann's Antiquities of Greece i. 295—310 Eng. tr.; Oncken ii. 377—409; Höck Kreta (Göttingen 1823—9; vols.). 21 γλαφρύσας neatly, 'less finished' (Congreve).

22 καὶ λέγεται διέ Ephoros Erysag. 64, in Strabo x 481? This passage is: λέγεσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τιμῶν, ὧς Λακωνική εἶνα τὸ πολλὰ τῶν νομιμότατων Κρυπτικών, τὸ δ' ἀληθινός, εὑρίσκεται μὲν ὑπὸ ἕκαστον, ἠκριβο-κέναι δὲ τῶν Σπαρτάταρα. Comp. iun. on §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 10 below, and esp. Introd. p. 35 n. (3). Susem. (351)
§ 2 τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ (VII)

25 τῶν Λυκούργου, ὥστε τὴν ἑπιτροπεῖαν τὴν Χαριλλοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως καταλιπτῶν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλείστον δια-
τρῆσαι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην, διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἀποι-
κοι γὰρ οἱ Δοκτοί τῶν Δακώνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δὲ οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἑλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχου-

§ 3 σαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. [διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τῶν]

25 ἑπιτροπεῖαν Π' and 1st hand of Μ' Π' (in Π', altered by a later hand) || τὸν Χαριλλοῦ Π' || Χαριλλόν Βασ', see Comm. || 26 τότε omitted by Π' Δρ., [70τη] Συσεμ. || 27 περὶ τὴν Π' Βκ. || 28 Δοκτοί | κρήτες Π', ἀλλὰς λόκτοι π' in the margin || 30 | διὸ . . . . . . . . Κάμικοι] Συσεμ. see Comm. n. (355) || [οἱ περίοικοι] Σπεγέλ

24 διαρρόω = quasi per membra et artus distinguere et certum in ordinem redigere (Bonitz): to articulate, elaborate (Wetldon).

§ 2 24 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Δ. Ἑφορός Ἱ. ε. (Strabo x. 482) relates that Lycurgus, as guardian of Charilus the posthumous child of his brother Polydeukes, for certain reasons which are stated went to Crete and did not return until Charilus himself had assumed the government. Compare Plutarch Lycurg. cc. 2—5; Trieber op. c. p. 65 ff., 100; Flügel Die Quellen in Plutarchs Lykurgos 22 ff. (Marburg 1870.) Συσεμ. (352)

25 Χαριλλοῦ The form is Charilus in vιιι(u). 12 § 12 (see u.): probably we should restore it here, or else read Chariillos there. Συσεμ. (353)

28 κατέλαβον δ' ... κατοικοῦσιν" "And the settlers who had gone out to Lyttos had found the system of the laws established at that time amongst the inhabitants." In just the same way Ephorus (l.c. 481) replies to those who claim a Lacedaemonian descent for the Cretan institutions on the ground that the Lyttians were a colony from Sparta and that colonists generally preserve the usages of the mother state. He urges that many colonies did not do this and that many Cretan towns, not colonies from Sparta, yet had the same institutions as the Spartan colonies in Crete. On these considerations of Aristotle and Ephorus, then, the Lycurgian institutions at Sparta, so far from being genuinely Spartan, were not even of Dorian origin, but had belonged in the first instance to the pre-Dorian population of Crete; unless indeed even these earliest inhabitants of Crete are to be regarded as Dorians (as they are by Ottfried Müller The Dorians 1. p. 36 ff. Eng. tr.). But this view has been refuted by Trieber p. 81 ff. In opposition to the view of Ephorus and Aristotle, which is in itself improbable, he has sought to maintain the truth of that combated by Ephorus, that Spartan institutions actually passed over into Crete with the Spartan settlers. Compare n. (356) on § 4. Polybios moreover Iv. 54. 6 describes Lyttos (Λύττος being the reading there also) as the oldest of the Cretan towns and likewise as a colony of Lacedaemon. Trieber has shown conclusively p. 105 ff. as against K. O. Müller that there never really existed any specially 'Dorian' political or social principles, such as are presumed to have found their highest and completest embodiment in Sparta. Συσεμ. (354)

§ 3 30 οἱ περίοικοι Why mention merely the perioikoi i.e. the descendants of the pre-Dorian population, if after all the Spartan and other Dorian settlers had accepted the same institutions? Aristotle cannot have contradicted himself in such a manner as this, or have written such nonsense. It is much more likely that some learned Peripatetic added this in order to tack on the following remarks about Minos, his maritime power, and his death. He did not however perceive that they are not at all appropriate to this connexion, and that to speak of Crete as favourably situated for maritime supremacy over the Hellenes agrees but ill with Aristotle's own statements §§ 15, 16: where the remoteness of the island is said to have shut it off from external complications and from foreign dominion. Συσεμ. (355)

Grote II. 484 n. 2 has another way out of the difficulty. He takes the word as in Thuc. 1. 17, "the neighbouring
31 αὐτὸν τρόπον χρώνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω (VII) πρώτον τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ νήσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν τὴν Ἑλληνικήν πεφυκέναι καὶ κείσθαι καλὸς; (p. 51) πάση γὰρ ἐπίκειται τῇ θαλάσσῃ, σχέδιον τῶν Ἑλλήνων 35 ἰδρυμένον περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν πάντων. ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρόν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριότον 1 § 4 τόπων καὶ Ῥόδουν. διό καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχήν κατε- σχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νῆσους τὰς μὲν ἐχεῖσας τὰς δὲ ὄκεισε, τέλος δὲ εἰπθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύ- 40 τησεν ἐκεί περὶ Κάμικων.

§ 5 ἐχεῖ δ᾽ ἀνάλογον ἢ Κρητικὴ τάξις πρὸς τὴν Λακωνικήν. γς— 372 a ἀφοροῦσι τε γὰρ τοὺς μὲν ἐλώτες τοὺς δὲ Κρητικός οἱ περίοικοι,

states” (7). The words of Ephoros in Strabo x. p. 737 are: 

32 [τὴν ....... νόμους] Stahr || 34 πάση......35 πάντων noticed by Theodoros Metaochit. Miscell. p. 644 ed. Kiessling || 34 πάση] μέση Bücheler wrongly || 35 τῇ μὲν τῆς τῆς μὲν Γ' Μ' || 36 μικρὸν] Δίσινος before τῆς Πελοποννήσου Γ' || τῆς.....τῆς ἐπέλευσε by Q' T' and 1' (1st hand, added in the margin by a later hand and then again erased) || 37 ὦδος Μ' Αγρ. Βκ. || 40 Κάρμακον Βεττορι, Κα- μικον Ανδ. in margin, perhaps rightly, κάμικον Γ' Μ' 1'-2' Αλδ., κάμικον 1'3, κάμικον Q' T', Cameraon Albertus Magnus and Αγρ.

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1272 a 1 τε omitted by M' P'

§ 4 After the Dorian invasion Crete lost its fleet and maritime supremacy. Cp. Thuc. 1. 4: Ephoros Πράγμ. 64 (Müller 1. 250) καὶ γὰρ Ῥακερετίν πρό- τερον τὸς Κρήτης.....ν ὥς ἀποβληθηκέναι τὸ ναυτικό.

41 ἐχεῖ δ᾽ ἀνάλογον.....Δακονικήν] Triebner p. 86 ff. shows that, although the points of difference as well as of resemblance are not brought out forcibly enough, yet in the main the whole comparision is just. He tries to make it probable that from its quite peculiar character the similarity can only be explained by a real transference from Sparta to Crete. Oncken on the other hand, 11. 377, finds a reason both for the resemblance and the limitations to it in the one point which Aristotle has not mentioned, “the fact that in Sparta as in Crete a dominant race of the same Dorian descent broke in from a foreign land upon an old political order, overcame it by violence, and then directed their whole task of maintaining themselves uncontaminated and unassailable at the head of their new settlement.” Polybios vi. 45, 46 goes still farther and even denies that there were any resemblances at all between the two polities, Susem. (356).

He insists (1) on the absence of any legal restriction on the possession of land or money, and (2) on the annual tenure of offices (as contrasted with the life-long tenure of Spartan Kings and Gerusias) and the democratic character of the Cretan governments. Undoubtedly as we approach Roman times the power of the ἐκκλησία increases: Hock iii. pp. 64—97, who supports his case from inscriptions, infers that a democratic revolution had subverted the governments of Aristotle’s time.

§ 5 1272 a 1 οἱ περίοικοι] See n. 325 and esp. Exc. iii. to this book p. 336 ff. Susem. (357)
καὶ συσσίτια παρ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ γε ἄρχαίον ἐκάλουν οἱ (VII)
Δάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἄνδρεια, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἢ καὶ
§ 6 δὴ λέγει ὁτι ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι ἐν τῆς πολιτείᾳ ἢ τάξις. οἱ
5 μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ
καλομένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἐφοροὶ πέντε τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ ἐς κόσμοι δέκα εἰσίν οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέροντες, ὅπως καλοῦσι οἱ Κρήτες Βουλὴν, ἵσιν βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον μὲν ἢν, εἴτε κατέλησαν οἱ Κρήτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν
§ 7 οἱ κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέ-
11 χουσι πάντες, κυρία δ’ οὐδενὸς ἐστὶν ἀλλ’ ἡ συνεπισηφίσαι
tὰ δόξασά τοῖς γέροντι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσίτων ἔρχεται βέλτιον τοῖς Κρήταιν ἢ τοῖς
Λάκωσιν (ἐν μὲν γὰρ Δακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἐκάστος εἰσφέρεται τὸ τεταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχειν νόμος κολύει τῆς πολι
§ 8 τείας, καθάπερ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως

3 φιδίτια ΓΜς and Πς (1st hand, apparently altered by p1) || ἄνδρεια Μς, ἄν-
δρια Πς Βκ., ἄλλως ἄνδρια p1 in the margin || 8 βουλὴν “a gloss under which lurks a Cretan name” Spengel || πρῶτον Γ Thomas Aquinas and Αγ., perhaps rightly || 11 ἀλλὰ Πς and Πς (1st hand, emended by corr.2)

3 ἄνδρεια=meals of men: or more precisely, clubs or companies of men who
messed together: see n. (378) on 11 § 3.

SUSEM. (358)

καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες] The same remark is found in Ephoros l.c. 482, with
the object of proving the same conclusion. Comp. also Plut. Lycurg. c. 12. But
that Ephoros repeats this argument three times, is a very inexact statement
of Tiреб, p. 100: for at p. 480 the expression is only ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἄ
cαλουσ ἄνδρεια and p. 483 εἰς τὰ συσσιτία ἄγουσι τὰ ἄνδρεια. SUSEM. (359)

This constitution analogous to that of Sparta was the constitution of every ind
pendent Cretan town. We learn from the inscriptions that little places like
Hierapytus, Priausos (Præsus), Saxos, Allaria, had each its own κόσμοι, βουλή,
and ἐκκλησία.

§ 6 On the analogy between the Ephors and the κόσμοι, see Exc. III. p. 335 f.

SUSEM. (360)

7 οἱ δὲ γέροντες] See n.11. SUSEM. (361)
§ 7 το ἐκκλησίας ἢ κτα] Cr. 11
§§ 5, 6 with Exc. iv. Although the simple verb ἐπιψηφίζει does not mean “to vote,” but “to put to the vote,” yet so far as I know συνεπιψηφίζει is everywhere found in the sense of “vote

approvingly,” i.e. “confirm by a vote,” auctores hieri: Polyb. xxii. 13. 1, Plu-

tarch De Garrulitiae 511 f. Here it can have no other meaning. The only doubt
is whether we should take it literally (1) that the popular assembly was bound to
ratify by its vote, or (2) that it only had the right, without proper debate and
without amendment, simply to confirm or reject the proposal previously decided
by others. That question will be discussed in n. (389). SUSEM. (362)

Aesch. De Fals. Leg. 35 has the middle
voice in the same sense. Compare κατα-
ςωταν with both meanings (1) to be very
silent, (2) to put to silence (Cope). In

the Gortynian inscription the assembly in
the market-place and the stone from which the speaker addressed the people are
twice mentioned χ. 34, ἀπανατελθαι δὲ κατ’ ἀγορὰν καταβεβλευὸν τοῦ πολι
ταν ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ, ὁ ἀπαγορευταὶ, i.e. ἀνα-
φαλασθαῖ [he must adopt] δὲ κατ’ ἀγορὰν
catelelμαζων (Hom.) τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ

λαοῦ (cp. Soph. O. Col. 195) ὁ ὀπαγορε-
υα, adoption shall be in the market-
place, when the citizens are assembled,
from the stone where they make speeches:

and again XI. 10.

16 εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 31.
Cr. n. (341). SUSEM. (363)
18 kal ek Qb Tb Lambin Bk., perhaps Γ; [ek των δημοσίων] Göttling, [ék] Congreve || καὶ <ἀπὸ μορίου τῶν?> or καὶ <ἀπὸ τῆς δικάτης τῶν?>? Susem., see Comm., [kai] Lambin, καὶ <ék τῶν> Congreve || καὶ <ek τῶν δημοσίων before ἀπὸ πάντων or after ὅτι' ek kousou τρές 9 fēschi πάντας, καὶ γυναικάς καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας πρὸς 5 δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοστίαιν ὡς ὁφέλιμον πολλὰ περιφοροῦσην ὁ νομοθῆτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάξειάν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἵνα μὴ πολυτεκνώση, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρρενας ποιήσας ὁμιλιάν, (p. 52)

κουντέρως] ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον of 9 § 31, in a more public fashion.

18 ek τῶν δημοσίων] "from the public domain." Zittelmann pp. 139, 140 conjectures that the citizens had the right of pasture on this domain-land. By the law of inheritance in the Gortynian inscription, certain of the cattle with the house in the town pass to the sons as præcipuum; but the daughters have a share of the land which is cultivated by kleromati.

οἱ περιοικοὶ. See Exc. III. p. 336 ff. Susem. (364)

§ 8 19 τέτακται μέρος] Partly on this model, partly on that of Hippodamos (8 § 3 u.), is based the division of the land in Aristotle's ideal state, iv.(vii).

10 § 10 n. (834), into property (1) of the temples, (2) of the syssitia, (3) of private individuals, (1) and (2) together forming the public land. In the state of the Latos there is no public land, although Plato mentions the Cretan institution with approval, viii 847 r quoted in n. (341) on 9 § 31. Susem. (365)

20 ὡστ' ek koiuou kta] If we understand this as e.g. Schömann does, op. c. 307 Eng. tr., that the mss-funds maintained the members of the family, wives daughters younger boys and slaves, who had their meals at home, then the whole of Oncken's proof (11. 385), that καὶ γυ-ναικάς καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας is a spurious addition, falls to the ground. Such slight inaccuracies of expression, due to excessive brevity, are no uncommon thing in Aristotle. The sense might be made clearer by a slight insertion thus: 'one part is set apart for the worship of the gods and for the state expenditure, the other for the public messes—and the entire maintenance of the households of the citizens, so that all, men women and children, are kept at the public cost.' Schömann rightly remarks that this explains why an Aeginetan state had to be paid for each slave: see Exc. III. p. 337. Oncken however gives a different explanation (11. 387), he makes each of the subject population (?) contribute an Aeginetan state. Susem. (366)

§ 9 22 ἀλγοστίαιν] Our only authority for a Cretan ἀνδρέων, Heracleides Ponticus, and the writers quoted by Athen. iv. 142 d, Diosidas and Πυργιόν, do not enable us to verify this statement: Schömann p. 308. They kept up the old practice of sitting at table: Cretes quorum nemo gustavit unquam cubans, Cicero pro Murena § 74. Their moderation in drinking: [Plato] Minos 320 a.


Also Zittelmann Das Recht von Gortyn p. 101 and the inscription itself II. i, 6, 8, 9.

25 ἔτερος ἐστιν τοῦ διασ. καιρ] Since Aristotle thought it so important for his own ideal state to maintain uniformity in the number of citizens (see c. 6 § 10 ff., 7 § 5 ; IV.(vii). 16 § 15 ff. with notes), and is not too nice about the means of securing that end, it would
σκέψασθαι καίρος) γ' ὅτι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὰ συνστία βέλτιον (VII) τέτακται τοῖς Κρήσιοι ἡ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερῶν, ἵτα δὲ § 10 περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἐτί χεῖρον τῶν ἐφόρων. δὲ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχείον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις ἢ ἑν τοιούτας· δὲ ἕκει συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ, διὰ τὸ τήν αἱρέσιν ἐκ πάντων εἴναι, μετέχων ὁ δήμος· τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐκ ἕξι ἀπαντῶν αἱροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενόντων, καί τοὺς § 11 γεροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκτῶν· περὶ ἡν τῶν αὐτῶν ἢν τις 6 εἴπειν λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Δακηδαμοί γεροντῶν (τὸ γὰρ ἄναπαύει) καὶ τὸ διὰ βίον μείζον ἐστὶ γέρας τῆς ἀξίας αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀρχεῖν ἀλλ' αὐτ- § 12 τογνώμονας ἑπισφαλέως· τὸ δ' ἣσυχαίειν μὴ μετέχοντα τῶν 40 δήμων οὐδέν σημεῖον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς· οὐδὲν γὰρ λήμ-

have been strange if he had not intended to take this question into consideration when describing the best state. See Introd. p. 49 n. 4, p. 53. How he would have decided it, we have no means of knowing. For, taken alone, Nic. Eth. vii. 3 hardly justifies an immediate inference that he would have disallowed such means. Thus the grounds on which Oncken, ii. 389 ff, tries to prove that § 9, as far as καίρος, is interpolated, are wholly untenable: and it is a misapprehension on his part that I bracketed the clause. But he is right in one point, that the introduction of this subject is not very fitting here; we must however put up with it, as it would be still less appropriate in any other part of the chapter. SUSEM. (369)

§ 10 30 γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες? Ephoros Fr. 64 (in Strabo p. 482) gives the same statement as Aristotle here, that the senators were chosen from those who had been Κόσμοι but adds that only tried and approved men were selected. There is no divergence in the facts here, but only in the judgment upon them: though it is of such a kind that, as is stated in Exc. iii. p. 336, Aristotle must have depended upon other accounts than those of Ephoros for the facts on which he based his judgment. Furthermore even in Sparta those who had been Ephors must frequently, to say the least, have entered the senate. SUSEM. (369)

32 διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν κτλ] See c. 9 § 22 n. (323 b). SUSEM. (370)

34 ἐκ τινῶν γενόντων Called στράτως in the Gortynian inscription v 5 ο' αὐθενησταρτος εκσαμιν οι σιν κυλλω = when it was the turn of the 'troop' of the Achalians to assume office and Kyllos was κόσμος ἐπώνυμος. Comp. Hesych. στράτοι (σικ) = αἱ τάξεις του πτυχῆς. Similarly in the oath of the Drceros, Cauer Defect. inscript. 38, ἐπὶ τῶν Αἰθαλίων κοσμομένων τῶν σὺν Κυλα. 35 κεκοσμηκτῶν] like δ' ἄρεας, δ' βασιλεύσας, the aorist being more usual. § 11 38 μὴ κατὰ γράμματα without written rules to guide them. Cp. 9 § 23. § 12 See 11 § 2.

40 λήμματος They make no private gains, such as bribes from allies and dependent states, or from hostile powers (comp. Pericles' brie to the ephor Klean-
Thebes in 305 B.C. (1586, 9); 12, (1617). vi (iv). (1509); Ileinsius to Thuc. (1215); Ta...atri to Thuc. (1228); dvap^lav 3, ri, toVW 14X770-^sign is Gortynian government SUSEM. 6archy, and, likely Ansir. translation, (1606); Trarpbs SUSEM. soppo: ...12 qv brav...10. H. 

\[\text{II. 10. 14] 1272 a 26—1272 b 11 . .} \]

41 γ] r'/ apparently Ar., γάρ Susem,\(^1\) wrongly, enim William, whence nothing is to be inferred about Γ. 1272 b 1 διαφερούντων Γ' M* and perhaps Ar., διαφερούντων P* (1st hand) || 5 δὴ]\n
δι Congreve, rightly, I think || 6 πάντα πάρεστι P* (1st hand), πάρεστι P* [corr.] || 8 οἱ ἀν Ῥόμακης, ὅταν Γ' II Ar. Schneider Bk. || 9 τῶν δικαίων (not here but before 8 ἥν καθότατα) P* Ar. Bk. and π in margin ; so transposed, δικαίων «τῶν» or even better «ὑπὸ» τῶν δικαίων? Schneider || Heinsius transposes εἰδάσαν ...12 ἀλλήλους before 9 ἡ καὶ δήλων κτλ. || 11 γάρ Susem. following Bernays' translation, δὲ Γ' II Ar. Bk. Susem,\(^1\) || διαλαμβάνοντες suspected by Bonitz [Ind. Arist. 182 b 6], καὶ λαμβάνοντες Susem,\(^1\) ἵδια λαμβάνοντες Schmidt, needlessly if we alter μοναρχίαν into ἀναρχίαν || ἀναρχίαν Bernays, μοναρχίαν Γ' II Ar. Bk. Susem,\(^1\) 

\[\text{§ 13 ἀναρχία} \] Thebes at the time of the Persian war is an instance; Thuc. III. 62. 3. 

\[\text{§ 14 τῶν δικαίων} \] the fact of the suspension of the office of Κόσμος, often brought about by cabals of influential families who did not want to have trials against themselves proceeded with. 

For the construction cp. Thuc. I. 138 καὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἐπίδα, ὡς ὑπετέλη αὐτῷ δουλείαν; 11. 42 πείνας ἐπίδια, ὡς κἂν ἐτί διαφυγόν αὐτὴν πλουτησεῖν (Shilleto). 

οἱ ἀν μὴ κτλ.] Oncken (II. 393) is quite wrong in inferring from this passage that even the judicial office probably passed from the kings to the Κόσμοι. From the complete analogy which Aristotle finds between the Spartan and Creten senators, and between the Ephors and Κόσμοι, in all the essential features of the authority of these offices, it is clear on the contrary that, as in Sparta III. 1. 10 nn. (443—4), so in Crete, the Senate had criminal jurisdiction over the most serious offences, and the Κόσμοι appeared, like the Ephors, as accusers in the case of crimes against the state. Where there is no prosecutor there is of course no judge. Susem. (372) διαλαμβάνοντες = by forming parties

\[\text{20} \]
§ 15 χίλαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ
τοι τί διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τινὸς χρόνου μικροτείμων
eἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; (p. 53
15 ἐστὶ δ’ ἐπικινδύνως οὕτως ἔχουσα τόλις * * τοῖς
βουλομένωι ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένωι. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ
eἰρηται, σαφεῖται διὰ τὸν τόπον· ἕξενθασίας γὰρ τὸ πόρρω
§ 16 πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρητηῖς, οἱ
δ’ εἰλικτείς ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. οὕτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς
20 κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες, νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ἕξικος διαβέ-
βηκεν εἰς τὴν νήσου, ὦς πεποίηκε φανερὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν
tῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτας τοσαῦθ’ ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω τῆς πολι-

15 ἐπικινδύνως] valde periculosa William on his own conjecture probably, hence
Λαῦν ἐπικινδύνων Susem. wrongly || τῶν βουλομένων and 16 δυναμένων II. Ar. Bk.
"because those who wish to attack it can also (easily do so)" Bernays; <ἐντων> τῶν
βουλομένων Bas., <ἀπὸ> τῶν β. Busse. If the dative is right an infinitive has
dropped out, as Bücheler saw || 21 φανερῶν Bk.?, a misprint || 23 εἰρήσθω before
tοσαῦθ’ P1 II Bk.

from amongst the people and their own friends. SUSEM.

§ 15 17 ἕξενθασίας] Acc. plur. ‘The distance has kept out aliens as effectual-
as a formal prohibition.’ No foreigner
could come to Sparta and live as a resi-
dent alien (μέτοικος): strangers stopping
there for a time were strictly watched
and, as soon as it seemed advisable to
the Ephors, dismissed: see Schömann p.
276 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (373)

§ 16 18 διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν π. κτλ] Consult
however n. (281) on § 3: where also a
different reason, it should be observed,
is assigned by Aristotle himself, viz. that
the Cretan states, even if at war, assist
one another against the revoluted περιοίκων.
SUSEM. (374)

19 οὕτε γὰρ] It is the isolation, not
the strength, of the Cretans that secures
their independence; for (1) they are not
strong enough to acquire foreign domi-
nion (ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς), while (2) their
internal weakness is now patent.

20 νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος κτλ] There are
two events to which this passage, taken
by itself, may refer. (1) With Höck, Κτητα
111. 61 f., we may understand
it of the Phocian war. Phalaeus,
the last leader of the Phocians, after
withdrawing from Phocis came at last
with his mercenaries to Crete: by a strat-
tagem he conquered Lyktos and drove
out the inhabitants who turned to their
mother city, Sparta, for aid. This aid
they received under the command of
Archidamos, who beat the mercenaries
and reestablished the Lyktians in their
city. Phalaeus however stayed in the
island and fell at the siege of Kydonia
B.C. 343. See Schäfer Demosthenes II.
339 f. Or (2) we might with Fülleborn
(11. 253) refer it to the dispatch of Age-
silao with the mercenaries of his brother
Agis II., who was allied with the Persians
and sent the expedition directly after
the battle of Issos (333) to conquer Crete.
The Lacedaemonians with their mercen-
aries effected a landing successfully and
met with no material resistance; see
Schäfer 111. p. 163 f. As therefore
both events suit, if, when he wrote the
passage, Aristotle had been acquainted
with the second he would certainly have
spoken of two foreign wars, and not of
one only: thus it seems as if this passage
were composed before the latter of the
two events took place. But it need not be
inferred from this that the completion of
the book, so far as Aristotle did at all
complete it, could not have been of a
much later date. Aristotle often worked
at several of his treatises at the same
time. Cp. Introdl. p. 66. SUSEM. (375)

Ξενικὸς = of mercenaries (Congreve).
Better, ‘foreign.’ For 111. 14. 7 ξενικὸν
as opposed to οἱ πολίται means a foreign
force, though a force of mercenaries.
II. 11. 3] 1272 b 12—1272 b 33. 307

11 τείας: πολιτεύεσθαι δε δοκούσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς καὶ VIII
25 πολλα περιττός πρός τούς ἄλλους, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνια παρα-
πλησίως τοὺς Λύκωσιν. αὕται γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τρεῖς ἄλλη-
λας τε σύνεγγυς πάς εἰσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρου-
σιν, ἧ τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτη τούτων ἡ τῶν
29 Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πολλα τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρ’ αὐτοῖς
§ 2 καλῶς: σμηνείων δὲ πολιτεία; συντεταγμένης το τῶν δήμων
ἐκουσιον διαμένειν ἐν ἑ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μήτε στά-
σιν, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεν, γεγενήσθαι μήτε τύραννου.

§ 3 ἔχει δὲ παραπλησία τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συμ-

24 καὶ καρχηδόνια, after καλὸς Μ'. P' || 28 ἕτο Λακωνικῇ omitted in Μ'. P',
tetagμένης Bergk (Comm. crit. spec. VI, Marburg 1850), one or other seems necessary;
θε̣ν institutes Λπ.: πέλεως for πολιτεία Bender || 31 έκοβαιον Spengel, έχουσαν
ΓΠ Βκ., omitted by Μ'. P', untranslated by Λρ.; έκοντα Bergk, ἧσανχα Lampke,
ἐκωσίως W. Wagner (De Planti Aulul., Bonn 1864 p. 37), all before Spengel:
ἐξ <οντα ξέ> οντιαν Saupe, έχουσαν <κύρων> Bender following Lambin's translation
populum remum componet || εν omitted by Μ'. P', crossed out by p2

C. 11 The constitution of Carthage.

On this chapter consult Kluge Aristoteles de politia Carthaginensium. Accedit
Theodori Mittochiae descriptio reipublicae
Carthaginensis (Breslau 1824): Heeren
Icen vol. II, pt. 1, Works XIII. 108−147;
Movers Die Phönizier (Berlin 1849) vol. II.
pt. 1, p. 479 ff.; Mommsen History of
Rome, vol. II. pp. 15−23 Eng. tr. SUS-
SEM. (376)

§ 1 24 πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ κτλ] "are
thought (a) to enjoy a good constitution,
(b) with many features of unusual rela-
tive excellence, and (c) some which most
nearly resemble the Spartan constitution."

Of these three points Aristotle adopts
two, (c) and (a), in the next two sentences
giving more definite reasons for (a) in § 2,
and passing on to (c) in § 3. But the
further discussion § 3 ff. proves sufficiently
that he also accepted the second point.
Isocrates III. 24, and Julian, Or. 1. p. 14
(Spanh.), also point to a similarity be-
tween the Carthaginian and Spartan
constitutions which they declare to be
the best actually established. Polybios
VI. 51 f. and Cicero De Rep. II. 23 § 41 ff.
compare them both with one another and
with the Roman constitution, while Er-
tosthenes (in Strabo 1. p. 66) praises the
admirable character of the Carthaginian
and Roman constitutions. SUSEM. (377)

The exciting struggle with Dionysios
for Sicily must have called attention to
the government of Carthage: see note on
1273 a 36 (Wyse).

§ 2 30 It is a sign that a government is
thoroughly <well> organised when the
popular element is attached to the
system of its own free will.

31 διαμένειν, like μένειν to § 16, =
abide by, remain loyal to, a government.
32 μήτε τύραννον] This assertion
seems true. For the efforts of Hannon
(about B.C. 344) to make himself tyrant,
mentioned by Aristotle himself viii(v).
7 § 4, met with no success, see n.
(1597); while the attempt of Bomilcar
was not until after Aristotle's time, B.C.
308. That also ended at last unsuc-
cessfully: see the same note. Lastly
there was one Malchus between 600 and
550 B.C., who having been banished be-
cause he had been defeated in Sardinia
procured his return by force of arms.
He then summoned the popular assembly,
justified his conduct before it, and
had ten senators put to death, but made
no change in the existing constitution.
However he fell under suspicion of aiming
at tyrannical power; in consequence, and
as a punishment for his former violent
proceedings, he was executed, Justin.
XVIII. 7, so that this instance does
not contradict Aristotle's statement. With
regard to vii(v). 12 § 12 see n. (1772).
SUSEM. (377 b)

§ 3 "The points of analogy to the
Spartan polity are the common meals of
the clubs like the φατία at Sparta, and

20—2
σίτια τῶν ἐταιρῶν τοῖς φιλίτοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐκατον (VII) 35 καὶ τεττάρων ἄρχην τοὺς ἐφόρους (πλὴν οὖν- χείρον' οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσὶ, ταυτὴν δ' αἱροῦνται τὴν ἄρχην ἀριστίνδην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον § 4 τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέροντιν, καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοῖς βασιλεῖσι, μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος μῆτε τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, *εἰ τι 40 διαφέρων ἐκ τοῦτον ἀἵρετος μᾶλλον ἡ καθ' ἡλικίαν. μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστώτες, ἄν ευτελεῖς ὁσί, μεγάλα βλά-

1273 a 2 καί ἐξήλασαν ἡδὴν τὴν πόλιν τῆς Λακεδαμινών. § 5 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα τῶν ἐπίτημηθέντων ἀν διὰ τὰς ἐς

34 φιλίτοις Π'1, corrected by π1 || τὴν......35 ἄρχην is noticed by Theodorus Metoch. Miscell. p. 667 Kiessl. || 35 <δ> οὐ Bernays || 36 γὰρ omitted by Πυ2 Qb Tb Ald. Bk. Bernays || 38 ἐκεῖ inserted after τοῖς by Qb Tb and in the margin of Π4 || 39 καθ' αὐτὸ Γ and π1 in the margin, κατ' αὐτὸ Π1 (1st hand) καταυτὸ Ν' (1st hand), καταυτὸ Μ* (correction), κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ Π2 Bk. and π1 above the line, κατὰ τὸ Αρ. (?) || μῆτε before τοῦτο Schneider, μηδὲ II Bk. || εἰ τι Γ, εἰ τέ Μ*Π2 Bk. and π1 in the margin, ἡ Αρ. and Π1 (1st hand), εἰ τέ Welldon || εἰ τι διαφέρων ἐκ τοῦτων is corrupt: * * εἰ τοῦτων Corning, who first saw that from ἐκ τοῦτων onwards Aristotle is speaking of the senate and not the kings: but this is true of the whole clause from εἰ τι. With approximate correctness τοῖς δὲ γέροντας τῷ Schneider, τοῖς δὲ γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον J. Brandis (Klein. Mus. xi. 595 f.) which is closer to the mss., εἰ δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλουσίων Bernays. On grammatical grounds I prefer Brandis' suggestion with Bühler's slight change ἐτι δὲ τοὺς γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον, or better still ἐτι δὲ γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον, though I have not ventured to introduce it into the text

1273 a 1 καρχηδόνων ο ieee νον καρχηδόνων Τ'

the magistracy of the Hundred and Four answering to the Ephors (only with this advantage in its favour that whereas the Ephors are chosen from quite ordinary persons the Carthaginians elect to this office by merit).” See Excursus iv. pp. 349—347. SUSEM. (378-9-81-2) 36 ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων] See c. 10 § 10 n. (369). SUSEM. (380) § 4 38 “And it is a further advantage that the kings (at Carthage) are not a distinct royal line and that, too, of not more than average capacity,” like the Heracleid royal families at Sparta, whose precise relation to the Dorian Spartanitas is obscure. See Idit. v. 72, Curtius History r. p. 186 ff. Eng. tr. and Schömann Antiquities pp. 308, 226, 541—544 Eng. tr. 39 μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ κτλ] Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339) and p. 344. SUSEM. (383) εἰ τι διαφέρων] See the Critical Notes. The sense required is “and that the senators are elected for wealth and not by seniority.” 40 καθ' ἡλικίαν] The unsoundness of the text is felt when this has to be interpreted of the Spartan kings. Congreve renders boldly “elected rather than hereditary”: Cope more cautiously “accord- ing to age.” But there was no limit of age for the kings, though there was for the Gerusiasts, at Sparta.

megάλων γὰρ κύριοι κτλ] The Spartan senators were venal, 9 § 26 n. (331 b). But the conditional praise here given to the constitution of Carthage is sensibly modified § 8 ff. SUSEM. (384) 41 εὐτελεῖς = cheap, of little worth; intellectually, in K. Ait. 11. 15 § 3; here, in moral character also.

§ 5 1273 a 2 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα κτλ] “Most of the things which might be censured on the score of divergences” sc. from the best type “are common to all the constitutions mentioned.” And therefore in reference to Carthage Aristotle passes over all such defects in silence (Kluge). SUSEM. (385)


II. 11. 6] 1272 b 34—1273 a 10.

παρεκβάσεις * * κοινὰ τυχικάνει τάσαις ὑπάνα ταῖς εἰρήμεναι (VIII) πολιτείαις: τῶν ἐν πρόσ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας 5 καὶ τῆς πολιτείας * * τὰ μὲν εἰς δῆμον ἐκκλίνει μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ ἐφ᾽ ὀλγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προσάγειν (p. 54) τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τῶν δήμων, οἱ βασιλεῖς κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἄν ὁμογενομοιώτα πάντες, εἰ δὲ μὴ, 5 τούτων καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ἦ τοῦ ἐσιφέροσιν οὐν, οὐ δια-

καὶ κοῦσαι μόνον ἀποδιόδοσα τῷ δήμῳ, ταῦτα δέξαντα τοῖς ἀρ-

3 παρεκβάσεις <πᾶς τῆς ἀρίστης τάσεως> or something similar Susem., cp. 9 § 1. Fülleborn first suspected a defect | 4 ὑπόθεσιν <ὑπεντάσιν> Bernays; cp. also 9 § 1 | 5 πολιτείας <τοῖς Καρχηδονίσσος> Susem., ἐκκλίνει <τοῖς Καρχηδονίσσοις> Thurot, who discovered the lacuna | ἐκλίνειν Π', ἐκκλίνειν Μη (corr.) | 6 γὰρ τὸ Morel Bk, Bernays | 7 τὸ τοῦ μὴ ΠΠ Bk. Bernays. In Ο6 τὸ is a correction of τὰ, apparently by the scribe himself | 9 τῶν τῶν καὶ Susem., καὶ τούτων ΠΠ Bk., καὶ τούτων ΠΙΡ Bernays | ἐσιφέροσιν Π' (emended by corr.1 in Π2) | οὖν omitted by ΠI, [οὐτοί] Susem., 1-2, perhaps rightly | 10 τὰ δέξαντα] τάξαντα Μη, τάξαντα Π1 (1st hand, corrected by Π1), τάξαντα Π1

4 With τῶν ὑπὲρ supply ἐπιτιμήθεντον ἄν, and take πρὸς = when judged by.

τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτλ.] The whole passage requires to be read in the light of c. 9 § 1 where the two standards of the criticism are more definitely stated: μία μὲν εἰ τι καλῶς ή μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην νυκτομολόγηται τάξιν, ἀτέρα δὲ εἰ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τῶν ἀρτύων ὑπεντάσιν τῆς προσελκυσθῆς αὐτῶν πολιτείας. The second, then, which is now under consideration is, how far the Carthaginian constitution, although not the best, that is, a true Aristocracy, nevertheless remains faithful to its own distinctive principle. It is still to be regarded as an Aristocracy: i.e. a so-called, or mixed aristocracy: more precisely a combination of aristocracy with oligarchy and democracy: see vii (IV). 2 § 4 u. (1141); 7 § 4 u. (1235); and cp. vii (IV). 7 § 2 u. (1597), 12 § 12 u. (1772), § 14 u. (1780); or else at any rate as a polity (πολιτεία) i.e. a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. Now the principle or fundamental assumption (ὑποθέσις) or proper basis of every aristocracy is excellence and capacity: see esp. § 9 τοῦ ἀριστον αἰρέσθαι ἄν, § 11 μᾶλλον ἀρετῆς τιμάται, vi (IV). 8. § 7 δοσολ. ἀρετῆς, and n. (535) on ill. 7 § 2. Even in a nominal aristocracy, regard at least for these must stand highest: hence the more concessions are made to the oligarchic principle of wealth, or again to the democratic principle, at the expense of excellence or merit, the more the aristoc-

cracy departs from its own standard. Polity takes for its standard the complete adjustment and neutralization of Oligarchy and Democracy, hence the more the oligarchical principle on the one hand makes itself felt at the expense of the democratic or the democratic principle on the other at the expense of the oligarchical, the more violently does a Polity diverge from its own principle in the one or the other direction: see vii (IV), c. 9. Cato quoted by Servius on Vergil’s Aeneid IV. 682, Polyb. vi. 51. 2 and Cicero I.c. call the constitution of Carthage, less accurately, a combination of monarchy, aristocracy (Cato, optimatum potestas: Cicero, genus optimas), and democracy. SUSEM. (386)

6 τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] “For the kings in conjunction with the senators have full powers either to bring certain matters before the people or not, provided they are both agreed: otherwise in this case the people, too, have a voice.”

8 πάντες = both; viz. the Shofetes on the one side, the Senators on the other. For this is a genuine Aristotelian use of the word: “πάντες ubi de dubius tantum agitur, i.e. ἀμφότεροι ὅσποροισθούν” (Inst. Ar.). Comp. Anal. Priora i. 38. 44. b 21 ὁσα πάσαν ἐπέτατο “h. e. ὅσποροισθούν, et maiori termino et minori” (Waitz); also vii (IV). 4. 2. See also Exc. IV, ὁ δῆμος, p. 347. SUSEM. (387)

Add Anal. Priora i. 27. § 12, 43 b 36, Meteorol. II. 4 § 1, 359 b 33, IV. 5 § 8,
χουσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς (VIII 12 εἰσφερομένοι ἀντεπείν ἑξεστὶν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολι-

382 b 17, and De Anima III. 6 § 2, 430 b 4 (Vahlen). § 6 11 ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν] Here then in reality the final decision rests with the popular assembly; and Aristotle, judging by the standard of Aristocracy or Polity, disapproves of this, which furnishes another indication of the character of his own best state, in so far as that also is Aristocracy: see on 6 § 16 n. (218) and Exc. 1 to B. III. In keeping with this (he says) in the most moderate democracy the people are best restricted to electing the council and the officers of state and to holding them responsible, vii(vi. 4. 4 n. (1415), perhaps with a share in legislation and the decision upon changes in the constitution vii(iv). 14. 4 f. : at least only the most indispensable meetings of the popular assembly are held vii(iv). 6. i. the administration being left to the council and the officers of state. Or even the magistrates may be elected by a mere committee of the whole people upon which all the citizens serve by rotation, vii(vi. 4. 4 i. or it may come to this that no popular assembly is held but it is represented by the aforesaid committee, which moreover has in many cases simply to hear the resolutions of the magistrates, vii(iv). 14. 4 n. (1322). And these are the forms of democracy which Aristotle regards as the best. /SUSEM. (388) 12 ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις κτᾶ. In the Spartan assembly only the kings, the senators, and at a later period the ephors were allowed to take part in the debate: other persons needed special permission in order to do so (see Schömann Antiquities p. 235 Eng. tr.). Undoubtedly it was similar in Crete. But when Aristotle says, or seems to say, here that in Sparta and Crete the popular assembly had merely to “listen to” these resolutions, it would not have been allowed to vote even in ratification of them, and thus Aristotle would have contradicted himself. But he further states that at Carthage the popular assembly, once convoked, possessed far larger privileges than in Sparta and Crete, although in respect of being summoned its rights were smaller because there was no need to convoke it in case the Shofetes and the senate were agreed: whereas in Sparta and Crete it always had to be summoned, in order to ratify the decrees of the two ruling bodies. Now if it had always to ratify or vote affirmatively, where is this greater right? But in fact when nothing might be said in the assembly except by permission of the government, and no amendments might be proposed, there was little reason to fear, so long as the kings, the senators, and the ephors were agreed, that the people would actually use their formal right of rejection. Hence it is that Aristotle uses these strong expressions which quite answer to the actual state of the case. Finally, supposing it must be conceded to Oncken (I. p. 279 ff.) and Gilbert (p. 137 f.) that the obvious meaning of the clause in Plutarch Lycurg. 6, which was added to the Spartan constitution (Rhetra) by the kings Theopompus and Polydoros (αἰ δὲ σκολαν ὅ δήμος ἢλατο, τοῖς πρεσβυγενέσι καὶ ἄρχαγγεσ ἀποστατήσας ἤμεν) is, that it was left to the discretion of the kings and senators whether they should respect a vote in the assembly refusing ratification, or not;—supposing further that Aristotle’s language really agrees most easily with this meaning (which is hardly the case, after what has been said), yet the whole hypothesis is simply wrecked by the fact that Gilbert himself explains this to be a quite abnormal Spartan institution, while Aristotle asserts that the powers of the Cretan and Spartan assemblies were altogether similar. This we are forced to be content with the interpretation of the additional clause given by Plutarch, τοῦτ’ ἐστι μὴ κύριοι, αἰὼν ἄλων ἄφισεταί καὶ διαινεῖν τὸν δήμον, ὡς ἐκτρέποτα καὶ μεταποιοῦτα τὴν γνώμην πάρα τὸ βέλτιστον, i.e. the popular assembly was restricted to a simple, unaltered acceptance or rejection of the proposals made by the king and the senate. /SUSEM. (389)

§ 7 τείας οὐκ ἔστων; τὸ δὲ τάς πενταρχίας κυρίαις οὖσας πολλῶν 1 καὶ μεγάλων ὡς αὐτῶν αἱρετῶς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐκατὸν 15 ταύτας αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχὴν, ἐτι δὲ ταύτας πλέονα ἀρχεῖν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες ἀρχοντες καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχίκων, τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ μὴ-κληροτάς ἀριστοκρατικῶς θετέων, καὶ εἰ τι τοιούτων ἐπερ- 20 μομοῦ καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχειον δικαίωσθαι πά- 20 σας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι. § 8 παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδο- 5 νῶν μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατὰ τινα διάνοιαν ἢ 24 πλουτινῆν οὖνται δἐν αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀρχοντές· ἀδύνατον| § 9 γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντος καλῶς-ἀρχεῖν καὶ σχολάζειν. εὖπερ οὖν 20 τὸ μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι πλουτινῆν ὀλιγαρχίκων τὸ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀρε- τήν, ἀριστοκρατικῶν, αὐτὴ τὶς ἀν εἰν τάξις τρίτη, καὶ ἡ ἦν- 30 περ ἀνετάκται [καὶ] τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τα περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν αἱρεῖσθαι γὰρ εἰς δύο ταύτα βλέπουτες, καὶ μά- 30 λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τοῦ βασιλείας καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς.| § 10 δεὶ δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτον τὴν παρεκβασίν εἶναι 16 πλέον Μ', πλείονας Π'ς-ς Qb Th Ald. Bk. Susem. 1 Π' (later hand), πλειονας Π' (1st 17 μένοντες. Syllburg wrongly || το] τὰς Πις-ς Π' and p3 in the margin, τοὺς 18 Πq Πb Th | καὶ εἰ...εὔτερον Kluge thinks interpolated or out of place | 19 τινῶν Koraes (cp. III. 1. 10), τῶν II Ar. Bk., τῶν <αὐτῶν> Vettori: τῶν ἄρχειον πάντων 14.6 Ar. | 20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Bender thinks not genuine || 28 [καὶ] 25 Susem., untranslated by Ar., καὶ συνετάκται Congreve transposing, καὶ <παρεκβέ- 30 βήκε> or something similar Thurat

§ 7 13 τὰς πενταρχίας See Exc. IV. p. 348 f. Susem. (390) 19 ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων] Aristotel says "courts" in the plural; see Exc. IV. He regards the separation of jurisdiction from administration as aristocratic provided (1) that the courts are not constituted by lot, and (2) that in electing to them greater attention can be paid to the appointment of the persons best qualified for the office than is the case when different branches of the administration of justice are mere appendages to different offices of state. Further cp. III. 1 § 10, 11 τὰς δίκας δικαίωσιν κατὰ μέρος...τῶν αὐτῶν 23 δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαῖ τινες κρίνον τὰς δίκας, μι. (443: 4): also n. (325) on 9 § 23 above, p. 348 and Introd. p. 54 n. 3. Susem. (391) 20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι] On the jurisdiction of the senate and the Ephors at Sparta, see ni. (325, 329 b) on 9 §§ 23, 25; on that of the kings Schömann p. 229 Eng. tr.; on that of the other magistrates ορ. c. 250 ff. Susem. (391 b) § 8 23 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτινῇ] Yet apart from the ideal state—see n. (885) on IV(vii). 13 § 9 πάντες οἱ πολίται—Aristotle himself approves of Solon's moderate census in this respect 12 §§ 5, 6: III. 11 § 8. Susem. (332) § 9 30 τοὺς στρατηγοὺς] See Exc. IV. p. 349 f. Susem. (392 b) § 10 31 δεὶ δὲ νομίζειν κτλ. See 9 § 2 n. (279): compare IV(vii). 9 § 3, § 7, 10 § 9 n. "But if Aristotle demands of the legislator that he is to free the magistrates from all anxieties about their support, this can only be done by paying them. And yet in § 7 above he had himself declared it a better regulation not to combine such offices with payment," (Fülleborn). See however Exc. IV.p. 348. Susem. (393)
32 ταύτι Bk.², a misprint probably  33 βελτίστων P²-³
1 273 b 6, 7 βελτίστων.....σχολής transposed by Susem., Introdc. p. 81 f.  6 εὐπορίαν P² P₂² Αγ.  7 ἀλλά καὶ Γ possibly
1 273 a 32 δὲ] δὴ T⁴ and Q⁴ (1st hand, corrected by later hand), δὴ δὲ P²-³  39 ὃ τι P⁴, ὃτι M¹-¹ All. Bk. and perhaps L³  40 γὰρ Αγ. , δὲ Γ ΙΙ (for which ΙΙ² in Susem.¹ is a misprint) Bk.  40 πολιτείαν ΜΓΜ⁺
1 273 b 1 τε.....τῷ] τὲ εἶναι βεβαιώσ ἀριστοκρατεῖσαν ΙΙ² Bk.  2 δὲ] γὰρ Spengel  3 τουτ’ ὕπνουμένοις ΜΓΜ⁺ and P¹ (1st hand, corrected by p¹ in the margin), [τουτ’ ὕπνουμένοις] Susem.¹-², τοῦτοι ὕπνουμένοι Ramus  3 μὲν is rightly omitted by ΙΙ² Bk.  4 ψω] ἃν ΓΜ⁺  5 ἄρσεν’ ἄρχειν Spengel, ἀρισταρχεῖν ΙΙ² Bk.

35 εἰ δὲ...πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχολῆς] “But even supposing that means must be taken into account, in order to secure leisure, i.e. magistrates who can devote their whole time to their duties, “it is a grave defect that the highest offices, like that of Shofete or general, should be purchaseable.” Here he takes up the condition postulated and justified above § 8, a 23, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτισθεῖν κτλ.

36 τὸ τάς μεγίστας ὑπηρτας κτλ] The same thing is said by Polybios vii. 56. 4 (Schlosser). Susem. (394) Mr Wyse refers to Plato Ky. 544 D : ὑπηρταὶ βασιλεῖαι and such like intermediate polities are to be found outside of Greece (περὶ τῶν βασιλαίων).

§ 11 30 τὸ κύριον] the supreme authority, i.e. the government : III. 6. 1 n. (523).

41 τοῦτοις τῷ κύριῳ. In c. 5 § 15, 7 § 8 he has dwelt on the comparative weakness of direct enactments and government interference. But public opinion can be legitimately educated and influenced, and this is τὸ παῦνεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας. See VIII (v). 9 §§ 11-15.

§ 12 1273 b 1 ἔδειξαν κτλ] “Nor is it strange that the purchasers of place should be accustomed to make a profit out of it, when it has cost them dear.” The article with the participle need not be suspected; the sense is “buying office as they do.” Cp. c. 8 § 10 oi δὲ γεωργὸν ποιοῦντες = if they supply, whereas oi ποιοῦντες would be ‘supplying, as they do’ = as they supply (Tyrrell).


§ 13 Plato's principle of the division of labour, with the stock Socratic examples of shoemaker and flute player: cp. c. 2 § 5, 3 n., Pl. Rep. 11. 374 C.

§ 14 12 πολιτικότερον more to the advantage (or, in the interest) of the state, which is in this way better administered (κάλλιον οὕτως ἐκαστὸν ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πολιτικῶν).

13 κοινότερον τε γὰρ sc. εὖτιν. For thus the government concerns wider interests, is more comprehensive. This is given as the reason for δημοτικότερον; the next sentence justifies πολιτικότερον.

On this paragraph consult further vii(iv), 15 §§ 5–8 n. (135). SUSEM. (396)

15 τῶν αὐτῶν Each of the invariable tasks incident to government is, with a proper division of labour, better and more quickly performed (T. L. Heath).

16 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ κτλ] The commander in chief alone has merely to command; the private soldiers alone have merely to obey; all ranks between have both to command and be commanded (Picart). SUSEM. (397)


p. 9 f. Eng. tr.). See esp. Diod. xx. 55. 4. It is the latter which are here meant (ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις). We are not to understand the passage, with Heeren (p. 42) and Movers (p. 358), of the foundation of new colonies; but of appointments like that of governor and assessor of taxes which gave the holders the opportunity of enriching themselves at the expense of their subjects. (See Kluge p. 102 ff., who however incorrectly assumes that such officers were sent to Libyan-Phoenician cities, indeed chiefly to them.) It was in accordance with the principles of Carthaginian policy not, as a rule, to give these appointments to decayed nobles (as might be inferred from Mommsen's account II. p. 17 Eng. tr.), but according to Aristotle's explicit statement to plebeians, or citizens who did not belong to the ruling houses. **SUSEM.** (398)

§ 16 24 φάρμακον τῆς ἴτσυχας] "No spell in their laws to restore peace," i.e. no means of terminating civic strife. Comp. the judgment of Polyb. vi. 51 on the second Punic War.

26 **περὶ...1274 b 26 áv (c. 12)** is noticed by Michael of Ephesus op. c. f. 188b. Göttling pronounced the whole of c. 12 spurious. See Comm. M. (399, 423, 437) : κρήτης Μαρλι|| 26 αἴτερ| εἴ[π]ερ? Susem. (I may have omitted περ, quae William) || 27 τι omitted in II, hence [7t] Susem. 1-2 || 32 νόμων inserted after μὲν by II² Ar. Bk. || 33 νόμων| μόνων II² Ar. Bk. || 36 γενέσθαι after νομοθετήν II² Bk.

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§ 16 24 φάρμακον τῆς ἴτσυχας] "No spell in their laws to restore peace," i.e. no means of terminating civic strife. Comp. the judgment of Polyb. vi. 51 on the second Punic War.
n. 1. The context shows that these eulogists of Solon were eulogists of a mixed constitution, and not of Democracy, as Oncken strangely maintains. Such a combination of oligarchical and aristocratical elements they found in the "old-fashioned" Solonian democracy: in other words, not merely a moderate Democracy, but a nominal Aristocracy even, or at least a kind of Polity. *SUSEM. (400)*

Diels Uber die Berliner Fragmente der *Aethraion politeia* (Berlin 1885), p. 33, refers to *Isocr. Areop. 16, Antid. 23*, 31, for expressions of the current notion that Solon was the founder of Attic democracy; ΣΙΛΟΝ δὲ παλαιὸς ἴνα χαλάδημος τὴν φωνήν. 37 *καταλύσαι* Too unqualified. 38 *τὴν πάτριον* The old-fashioned, as distinguished from the modern, democracy (§ 2). *comp. §§ 3, 4* VI (iv). 6 § 5; 14 §§ 7, 11, 12; VII (vi). 4 §§ 1, 2; 5 § 3; VII (v). 5 §§ 10, 11 (meta-λαλοῦν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πατρᾶς δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν νεωτάτην) with the references in the notes. *Comp. also* VII (vi). 7 § 7 n. "modern oligarchies": III. 6 § 9 n. (532) Aristocle accepts the distinction, *cp. §§ 5, 6; III. 11, 8*; IV (iv). 11 § 9 n. (1393). For he has no objection to raise against these panegyrists of Solon, except that they referred even the aristocratical and oligarchical elements of the combination to Solon, whereas in fact only the democratic accession was his doing. With the following sentences compare Schömann, *Thesalonian Holocoon and Ephialtes* comp. d'hat, an article in the *Jahrb. f. Phil. xciii. 1866. 585—594*; and R. Schöll, *De synecrosis Atticis* p. 10 ff. (Jena 1879). *SUSEM. (400 b)*

"Inter eos qui Solonem laudant, ni fallor, Isocratem in Areopagitico intel·ligit; ita enim loquitur, ut Soloni et ἀρχῶν ἄρχων et βουλῆν tribuat, at nihil ille de δικαστήριοις" (Spengel).

39 "by a happy blending (of other elements) in the polity."

39—41 Parallel to the account given, probably by the same writers, of the Spartan polity 6 § 17.

§ 3 On this battle-ground of contending opinions there are at least three issues. (a) Is Aristotle merely reporting the views of the panegyrists of Solon [Grote, Fränkel], or is he correcting them [Thirlwall, Congreve, Schömann *Ath. Const. Hist.* p. 37 Eng. tr.]*? (b) What is the exact sense of the last clause? [See *Exc. v. p. 350 ff.*] (c) Is the statement it contains historically true? [Grote, Curtius reject it: Thirlwall, Schömann accept it.]*

41 *εὐκεί* Schömann, Fränkel *Die attischen Geschichtenerzählungen* 62 f. (Berlin 1877—8), and others lay far too much stress on this word εὐκεί = 'seems', here and below, § 5 1. 15. Aristotle often speaks in a qualifying manner about things of which, in reality, he has not the slightest doubt. Thus εὐκεί, 1. 15, comes very close to φαίνεται I. 11; the force of which, as often in other writers besides Aristotle, is to express not so much what is merely apparent and probable, as what is obvious, what has come to light. *SUSEM. (401)*

See *εὐκεί I. 1. 6, VIII (v). 3 § 16, 9 § 2.* "The words express Aristotle's own opinion, because (1) the construction requires it ([ον] μὲν οὖν...εὐκεί δὲ), (2) the sense requires it; some thought that Solon established a mixed constitution, Aristotle contends that he only added a new element, the δικαστήρια* (Case).

1274 a 1 *τὴν τε βουλὴν* What powers Aristotle might ascribe to the council of the Areopagos which Solon found existing and left unaltered, it is not easy to see from this. *SUSEM. (402)*

2 *καταστήσασ- laid the foundation* for the democracy.
3 ἡ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφυται τινες 3
§ 4 αὐτῷ λύσαι γὰρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστή-
ριον πάντων, κληροτόν ὄν, ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἱσχυσεν, ὡσπερ
τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενῳ τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν ἕν
δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βου-
λήν Ἑφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια 9
μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τῶν τρόπων
§ 5 ἐκατόστοι τῶν δημαρχῶν προήγαγεν αὐξών εἰς τὴν ἕν
δημοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τούτῳ 4
προαιρέσεις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (ἡς ναυρ-
113 χίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδεικοῖς ὁ δήμος αἰτίων γενέμονος ἐφρο-

127 4 a 4 θάτερα Κορας, θάτέραν Π. 1 Susem. 1 in the text, θάτερον Π. 2 Ar. Bk. || 5 λόγων Π. 2 Bk. || 7 μετέστησεν Τεγγε, κατέστησεν Π. 2 Ar. Bk. Susem. 1 || 8 ἐκόλουσε Γ. Αρ., ἐκόλουσε Ο. 9 || [καὶ Περικλῆς] Sappre, probably rightly, τά...

9 Περικλῆς omitted by Γ. M

Aristotle is quoting the opinion of others, but without denying it (Case).

§ 5 11 φαίνεται δὲ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Σ.)

Thus while Aristotle agrees with Solon’s panegyrists in respect of their judgment, but qualifies the historical grounds assigned for it, n. (400 b) on § 2, he entirely adopts 1 the historical statement of Solon’s critics, but attacks the censure which they inferred from it as not justified. Compare furthermore 9 § 12 n. (296), § 21 (321 b). Susem. (409)

12 ἀπὸ συμπτώματος] accidentally, “in the course of events” (Susemihl), ναυραχία the supremacy at sea, like ναυκρατία; not found elsewhere in this sense.

13 ἐφονηματίζεθη] acquired overweening confidence in themselves, became aware of their importance. Eaton compares v. (viii). 6. 11 μετὰ τὰ Μηδεικά

1 This is strangely overlooked by Oncken ii. 449 n. (1). As against Schömann he appeals to the fact that Aristotle only makes these criticisms speak of Solon having introduced the appointment of the Heliaea by lot. Oncken does not see that just on this occasion and in the mouth of these censorious critics the form used is the singular, τὸ δικαστήριον, which had given some show to the meaning which Schömann has refuted: see Exc. v. This defence then is fatal to Oncken’s position. Nor is there any ground for his rash assertion (ii. 444) that Aristotle expressly exempts Solon from the reproach of having created anything like the later Heliaea. On the contrary the writer of this paragraph, whether Aristotle himself or some one else, agrees with Solon’s critics and admirers in thinking that it was he who made the Heliaea, but that Pericles introduced the custom of paying them. It is a pity to spend so many words on a matter so clear.
nuematiscath kai dhemagogous elabhe faulous antipolitevno-(IX) 15 menon tov eptiekow, etel Solanov ge eouke thn anagkaio-
tatn apodidouna to doim doyma, to tov arxias airei-
shai kai evdunews (mide gam touton koryos on o doimos)
§ 6 doulos an eis kai polleis), tov o arxias ek tov synor-
mus kai tov euvtoros katosthse paisas, ek tov pentaktosio-
(57) 20 melimovn kai zevgitow kai [tritou telous] ths kaloumenhs
12 Qb Tb | pentakosow melimovn GM | 20 [tritou telous] Susem. doubtfully,
tov telous Spengel, who afterwards transposed kal to follow tritou telous; [tritou telous] and kal zevgitow transposed to follow 21 ippadous Oncken. But then we should expect kal <taw> zevgitow and might equally well conjecture kal ths kalou-
menhs ippados kai tritou telous <tov taw> zevgitow

This is why in a fragment of his Polity of Athens Aristotle mentioned Themistocles' proposal to create a fleet from the annual profits of the silver mines (see Polyacm. Stv. 1. 30 § 6): Diels op.c. p. 34-
14 Here as elsewhere Aristotle's sympathies go with the Athenian opposition to extreme democracy; the Moderates (eptiekow) headed by Aristides, Cimon, Thucydides (o Melqvion), Nicias, and Theramenes (Frag. 369, Plut. Nic. 2), who opposed the democratic leaders from Themistocles to Cleophon. § 3 Aristotles has said that Solon merely allowed the previously established mode of electing the archons to continue. In any case his words are not clear, as Schomann remarks. Either before Solon's time the archons were elected by the whole body of the people; and then Aris-
totle himself commits the fault he has censured in Solon's admirers, of inaccur-
ately describing him as the author of an institution which he merely perpetuated.
Or else he intends to attribute to Solon the transference of this election from the nobles to the whole body of citizens; if so, he ought to have mentioned this beforehand, amongst the other demo-
cratic additions which Solon made to the Athenian constitution. Which of these alternatives is correct cannot be decided.

SUSEM. (411)

17 kai evdunews] By this control over the magistrates is meant, that during their tenure of office the magistrates could be brought before a popular court or perhaps even before the popular assembly direct; and more particularly that after the expiration of their term of office they could be brought before a popular court and required to give an account of their conduct. Cp. Exc. v.; further III. 11 § 8 n. (569), vii(iv). 11 § 19 n. (1303), 14 § 3 (1319), 6 (1325), § 10 (1332); n. on 16 § 2; and vii(vi). 1 § 4 (1475). SUSEM. (412)

“With this statement of the anagkai-
tata of democracy, compare the sum-
mary of the characteristics of true iso-
nomia which Herodotus III. 80 puts into the mouth of Otanes: palo mRN arxias arxhe, upeithwv wv arxhwn eis, bouleit-
mata de pantta eis to kovn anaferei [sc. to plhlos].” (Jackson.)

mide yap...doulos an eis kai polle-
mos] Here again is a substantial contri-
bution to Aristotle's own views on the requirements of a good constitution.

SUSEM. (413)

§ 6 18 tas o arxias] The right of electing officers and holding them strictly accountable, which the commons enjoyed, is opposed to the right of office from which they were in part excluded.


SUSEM. (414)
The order of the classes is not correct even if we omit the words tritou telous
καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολίτας καὶ
24 ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν καὶ
§ 7 Σικελίαν. πειρώντας δὲ [[καὶ]] τινας καὶ συνάγειν ὅς Ὄονομακρί-
τον μὲν γενομένου πρώτου δευτέρου περὶ νομοθετικαν, ἵμμαι-
σημαίνα δ' αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ Λοκρον ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα
κατὰ τέχνην μαντικήν τοῦτον δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἑταῖρον,
Θάλητος δ' ἀκροατήν Λυκεύρον καὶ Ζαλεύκου, Ζαλεύκου
30 δὲ Χαρώνδαν. ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν λέγοντιν, ἀσκεπτότερον τῶν
χρόνων ἔχοντες· ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος.

22 [νομοθέται......) 26 ἀν] Bojesen 23 αὐτὸν ΓΠ', αὐτὸν ΜΠ² 24 ταῖς
before Χαλκιδικαίς Schmidt would omit 25 καὶ omitted by ΠΠΛ. 27 αὐτὸν
apparently perfectly in ΓΠ², perhaps rightly 28 μαντικὴν omitted in ΓΜσ 29 δέλθαι (in Γ' after ἑταῖρον)
and 29 δέλθαι ΓΜσ 30 τῶν χρόνων Λς., τῶν χρόνων ΓΠΒκ. 31 ἔχοντες
Susem., λέγοντες ΓΠΛ. Βκ., cp. Plat. Gorg. 501 c ἀσκεπτῶν ἔχων τῶν ἀμείνων
or, with Spengel, transpose them to go with ἄγωντω. Cp. II. Landwehr in Phil.
ologus Supp.-Band v. 1885, pp. 118 ff. 21 Comp. Julius Pollux viii. 130 οἵ
δὲ το ὅθητον ὄντεν ἀρχὴν ἅρκην πρὸς.

Many of the arguments with which Götting Comm. p. 345 f., impugned the
genuineness of the whole chapter were answered by Nickes De Aristotelis politi-
p. 18 f. Götting was followed by Böckh and Bernays Ges. Abb. i. 172. The case
must depend mainly on the.

22 Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιτεφρυῖοις] i.e. the
Locrians living on the promontory Zephy-
rian in Lower Italy. The laws of
Zaleukos about (?) 664 B.C. are said to
have been the first which were committed to
writing: see Schömann p. 17 Eng. tr.,
Antiq. ital. ppubl. 89 n. (8). Susem. (415)
23 Χαρώνδας] Mentioned 1. 2 § 5 n.
(16), VI(iv). 11 § 15 n., 13 § 10. Susem.
(416) On his laws see Diod. xii. 15.
24 ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι] i.e. the
colonies which Chalcis in Euboea
planted in those countries: see E. Curti-
lius Hist. i. 436 ff. Eng. tr. Susem. (417)
§ 7 25 πειρώντας δὲ τίνας] Ephoros
Strabo p. 482; cp. Plutarch Lycurgus. 4,
Trieber cp. 67, 72, 101. Susem. (418)
The construction after συνήκαν, ὡς
and genitive absolute in the one clause
balanced by an accusative with infinitive
in the other, is awkward: but it can be
nearly paralleled from Plato Philebus
16 c : τὴν φόμην παρέδοσαν ὡς ἐξ ἐνός
μὲν...δντων, περάσες δὲ...ἐχόντων, δειν
καὶ ποιῶν ὡς μήτε αὐτοῦς γύρωσας δώτας,
mήτε ἡμᾶς παράγειν.
28 κατὰ with the accus. may mean
"for the purpose" κατὰ θέκα ἤκειν, or
"in connexion with," almost "prac-
tising his mantic art."

Θάλητα] See Exc. vi. p. 352 f. Su-
sem. (419).
29 'To the arguments advanced
against the genuineness of this portion
of the chapter may be added one derived
from the fact that here we have Θάλητος
as the form of the genitive, and Θάλητα
of the accusative. Aristotle elsewhere
uses the proper dialectic form, the Ionic
gen. Θάλεως 1259 a 7, the Doric 'Αρχότα
1340 b 26; comp. also the quotation from
Alcaeus iii. 14 § 10. Plato on the other
hand regularly changes quotations from
other dialects into Attic; cp. Gorg. 485 ε, 505 ε, with Dr Thompson’s note "(Ridge-
way op. c. p. 135).
30 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κτλ] This criticism
is very just. Susem. (419 b).
The same date circa Ol. 29 or 664 B.C.
is the best attested for Thaletas, who
comes second, and Zaleukos, who comes
fourth, in this succession, with Lycurgus
between them whom the latest estimate
only brings down to 776!
33 bακχιδῶν Γ Μς (unless Ι′ had βαχχιδῶν) bακχιδῶν PII3 Ar. Blk. Susem. 1-2 || 34 Ολυμπιαδὸς Götting, perhaps rightly || 35 μητρίας? Spengel || 39 γραφήν ΙII, corrected in the margin of Ι′
1 1274 b 1 τὴν omitted by P2-3 || 5 οὐχίζει Bücheler || 6 οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ιδιὸν Π, iδιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶν Π, ιδίων μὲν οὐδὲν ἐστὶν P2-3 Qθ ΙII Ald. Blk. || ψευδομαρτυρίων Scaliger and Bentley (Phalaris p. 358 Leip. ed.), ψευδομαρτυρίων Γ ΙΙ Αρ. || 7 ἐπίσκηψιν Scaliger and Bentley, ἐπίσκηψιν ΙΙ (in ΙΙ the scribe's correction conceals the original reading)

§ 9 40 άποττος = 'seen from far', may be used for visible, as here, or invisible; but the former in late writers. § 10 1274 b 1 ψιθυραὶ μὲν οὐν κτῆλι The interpolator here explains why he has related the history of Philolaos at such length, namely to make clear how this Corinthian came to Thebes. But if he really considered such a detailed explanation necessary, when its necessity or even utility is not further discoverable, then he ought at any rate a fortiori to have shown how a Corinthian stranger came to give laws to the Thebans. Susem. (421) 4 θετικοὺς laws of adoption. The Cretan term for adoption, we now learn, was ἀνάφαρσις, ἀναφαίνεσθαι.

καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ιδίων κτῆλι Aelian Var. Hist. II. 7 relates that at Thebes it was forbidden under penalty of death to expose a child; but in case of pressing poverty the father might bring his child in its swaddling clothes to the magistrate, who then sold it by a regular contract to the lowest bidder (τῷ τιμῆν ἔλαχιστῃ ὑπότι), whom it had to serve like a slave when grown up, in return for its maintenance. Perhaps, thinks J. G. Schneider, there is here a survival of the old laws which tended to preserve the original family estates unaltered by means of adoption. Hardly so, for the purchased child is bought as a kind of slave. On the further constitutional history of Thebes see Exc. 1 to B. viii(v). Susem. (422) § 11 7 ἐπίσκηψιν sc. ψευδομαρτυρίων (Stobaeus says συμφασιῶν) prosecution for perjury. Editors quote Pl. Laws xi. 937 b, [Dem.] 1139, 7.
§ 12 Φάλεον δ' ἰδιον ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλωσις, Πλάτωνος δ' ἦ (P. 58).

10 τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινῆται καὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μεθῆ νόμος, τὸ τοὺς νήφωντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκήσιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μεθῆν, ἀγαπήσοντος δ' ἑόρων καὶ τὴν εὐθυμίαν ἐξέχειν ἰδιον δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδὲν.

8 τῶν νόμων omitted by Π. 1 Ar., perhaps rightly || 9 φιλολάον III-11 Ar. and 1st hand of P2-3 (corrected by corr.) || ἀνομάλωσις Bk., ἀνομάλωσις II, ἀμφιδέξιος Spengel, ἀμφιδέξιος Chandler || 12 τῆς.....13 ἀσκήσις Vettori first observed the harsh construction; either ἦ.....ἀσκήσις or <ὁ περὶ> before τὴν would be expected. Schneider proposed to read the former and Schmidt the latter || 15 γίνονται P2-3,Qb,Tb || 14 τῶν P2-3,Qb,Tb Ald. Bk. (perhaps right), τὴν Μ1 (1st hand).

§ 12 9 Φάλεον δ' ἰδιον κτλ] Even Füllborn with good reason wonders what we want with Phaleas and Plato here over again, and is surprised that their original ideas are presented so imperfectly and in a manner which agrees so ill with the preceding criticisms. Cp. nocc (423). The interpolator did not reflect that Aristotle himself expressly tells us in § 1, that in the above review of Plato Phaleas Hippodamos he has said enough of the political ideas of mere theorists (ἐφήταμεν σχέδων περὶ πάντων): also that in § 1 ff. he has given us to understand no less clearly that amongst practical statesmen, who created not merely a code of laws but a constitution, he has only Solon to consider, since Lycurgus has already been taken along with the criticism of the Lacedaemonian constitution. Accordingly if the interpolator, contrary to Aristotle's intention (see on § 1 n. 396), wanted to append a list of legislators simply, this ought at least to have consisted of practical men, who neither changed nor desired to change the constitution in any respect. Both limitations are inapplicable to Plato and Phaleas. From this may be seen what a misconception it would be to deny to Aristotle §§ 1—6 and assign them, with Göttling, to the same interpolator as the rest of the chapter. SusEm. (423)

αὐσμαλλωσις [equalization] Rhet. III. 11. § 5 καὶ τὸ ἀνομαλλωσίαν ('read ἀνομαλλωσίαν; Α', our almost unique authority, has ἀνομόλωσις εἰς' SusEm.) τὰς πδεῖς ἐν τούτῳ διέχονται ταύτῳ, ἐν ἑπιφανείᾳ καὶ διάμεσα τὸ ἔτον. See Cope's note. Not a fresh equalization, but a breaking up of the present distribution to restore equality; so ἀνανέων, ἀναδομῆσων, ἀναδιδόνας ψφφοι.

10 ἢ τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ] Cp. 6 § 2 n. (153); 6 § 5 n. (196). SusEm. (424)

11 ἢ δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μεθῆν κτλ] Laws 1 637 ff., 643 ff., 11 664—672, 673 d ff. The fancy is strange enough; and Plato insists so much upon it that there is some justification for adducing it amongst the special peculiarities of his legislation. The next point however is not material enough for this, and much besides would have far greater right to be mentioned: cp. n. (423) just above. SusEm. (425)

12 καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολ. κτλ] Laws VII 794 D—795 D. SusEm. (426)

Fuit auctor, quod ad structuram verborum facit, durior: videbatur enim vel codem casu, quo prima duo prolatil, di- cere debuisse καὶ ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκησις vel plene loqui hoc pacto: καὶ <ὁ περὶ> τὴν ἐν τοῖς π. ἀσκησιν (Vettori). One of these suggestions was taken up by Schneider, the other by Schmidt. SusEm.

§ 13 15 πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρχοῦση κτλ] From n. (423) the irrelevance of this remark is obvious. It would imply that the same statement was not true of Zaleukos Charondas Philolaos, in which case it follows from the explanation given in n. (423) that they should not properly be included here. It may be said that the remark serves to distinguish Draco's laws from those of Phaleas and Plato, which
... of the {Pittacus} who {vowed} absolute obedience to the new {constitution} (I) of Athens, would not be {required} by the {plebeians} in the {regional} assembly. According to {Schneider}, {Plutarch} {thought} that the {legislators} {Schneider} {would} have {required} absolute obedience from the {plebeians} in the {regional} assembly. But this does not {mend} {matters} because, as {Draco} {was} not the {author} of a {constitution}, there is {a marked} {antithesis} between them {quite} another kind. {SUSEM.} (427)


18 On Pittacus see iii. 14. 10 with Exc. ii. on B. iii. {SUSEM.} (429)

νόμων δημιουργοῦς has been objected to; but Nickes cites ἀρετᾶς δημ. iv(vii). 9. 7.

20 διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους κτλ] Cp. Rhet. ii. 25. 7, 1402 b 11 ἐνστάσεις δὲι οὔκοιν ὁ Πλ. αἰνετός, ὅτι γὰρ ἀν μέξιος ἐμπίπτονται εάν τις μεθύον ἀμαρτήσῃ: Νίκ. Eth. iii. 5. 8, 1113 b 30 καὶ ἐπὶ αὐτῶ τῶν ἀγροτῶν κολάζοντως, εάν αἰτίος εἶναι δοκή 

25 Laws of Charondas respecting heiresses are mentioned by Diodoros xii. 18.
Note on Arcadia.

dio:se
de τῷ 
ποι οὐτῷ 
καὶ πόλις ἔθνους. ὦταν μὴ κατὰ κόμας ὡςι κεχωρισμένοι 
τὸ πλήθος, ἀλλ' οἶον Ἀρκαδίας: II. 2. 3.

"It is well known that the entire population of Arcadia was divided 
into a number of city communities politically independent, nor was this 
altered by the subsequent foundation of Megalopolis (see n. 459). They were 
held together by a tribal league sometimes more loosely, sometimes more 
rigidly organized, which left the political sovereignty of the various cities 
pretty nearly intact. Clearly a race or tribe thus organized does not greatly 
differ from a συμμαχία, or league offensive and defensive, and Aristotle 
is right in remarking that qualitative differences between the members (which 
are the separate towns) are not required in the one case any more than in 
the other, but that the essential advantage depends upon something 
quantitative. To this kind of ἔθνος, however, conceived as analogous to a 
συμμαχία, is opposed another which Aristotle excludes from this analogy 
by the addition of the words ὦταν μὴ κατὰ κόμας ὡςι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλήθος, 
'provided their population be not dispersed over a number of villages.' By 
the latter he means the ἔθνος which forms a political unity (usually with 
monarchical constitution), which is not divided into a number of city-states, 
nor centralized in a single city, but where the people live scattered all over 
the territory in detached villages or unwalled towns without political 
independence (κόμαι). In other words it is the organization with which 
the Greeks became acquainted in most of the neighbouring non-Greek 
nations: whereas tribal federations composed of separate city-states were a 
somewhat more Hellenic development. It is obvious that a non-Greek tribal 
state of the kind certainly bore no analogy to the συμμαχία, and that in its 
case the qualitative distinction between the individual members, the rulers 
and those whom they ruled (see n. 133), was as essential as in the separate 

To Dittenberger's explanation of this obscure passage it may be well to 
append a short conspectus of other interpretations. It has been commonly 
supposed (i) that there is a reference to some συνοικισμὸς of Arcadians, 
and that the πόλις is distinguished from ἔθνος = the unorganized race. Then 
if it be granted that ὦταν μὴ ὡςι = διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι or τὸ μὴ εἶναι, the words 
will be rendered: "A city will differ too from a tribe by not having the population 
scattered over villages but centralized like the Arcadians." Thus μὴ κατὰ
κόμμα κεχωρισμένοι will denote the previous condition of Arcadia, the primitive stage of village life, which long lingered there as in Epirus, Aetolia, Acarnania. The analogy between this state of things and the συμμαχία must consist in the isolated independence of the villages: the ἔθνος Ἀρκαδικῶν being composed ἕξ ομοίων, of unorganized units, submitting to no central authority. The foundation of Tegea and of Mantinea absorbed eight and five villages respectively: but Megalopolis was the most recent example of centralization and on the largest scale, as it absorbed no less than forty pre-existing townsships. After their Great City was settled, it may be argued that there was no part of the Arcadian race which had not reached the stage of city life. It would appear that, though this interpretation is open to the serious objections enumerated in the note ad loc., it can hardly be directly refuted. Aristotle may have interposed at this point the remark that as the πόλις differs on the one hand from the larger aggregate, a confederacy of cities, so too it differs on the other hand from those more primitive elements of which it is itself an aggregate. But such an interposition is, on other grounds, unsatisfactory. “No one,” says Mr Postgate, “could mistake a disunited and unorganized community, with nothing but race in common, for a state; but when it has received a sort of union and organization, and, so to speak, simulates a state, confusion may arise and discrimination is necessary. In other words, the state, an organized combination of parts for a common end, requires distinguishing from similar combinations, the confederacy and the organized race, but not from the non-organized race, which conforms to none of these conditions” (Notes p. 3). Yet on the above interpretation of the passage the organized race is the πόλις; Aristotle has distinguished between race and state where there is no danger of confusing them and has omitted to distinguish them precisely where one may be mistaken for the other.

Another solution is (II) to understand by ἔθνος the organized race or tribe, as something distinct from the πόλις, retaining the reference to the events of 370—369 B.C., but primarily to the rise of the new Arcadian league, or federal state, which is wholly distinct from the contemporaneous foundation of Megalopolis, to serve as the federal capital. The principal references to the constitution of the league are as follows: 1 Xenoph. Hell. vi. 5. 6 τῶν δὲ Τεγεατῶν οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Καλλίβιον καὶ Πρόξενον συνήγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνείναι τε πάν τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, καὶ ὃ τι νικάν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τούτῳ κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πολεων' οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Στάριππον ὑπερτον ἐὰν τε κατὰ χώραν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρήσαται: ib. vi. 5. 12 ὃ δὲ Ἀργησίλαος...καταλαβὼν πολὺ ὄμορον οὐσαν Εὔταιραν καὶ εὐφράντων τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατευσίματι ἡλικίας ὁχεμένους εἰς τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν ὄμως οὐκ ἔδειχσε τὴν πόλιν: ib. vii. 4. 2 ὃ Λυκομηδῆς πείθει τοὺς μυρίοις πράπτειν περὶ συμμαχίας. (Comp. Harpocr. p. 280 μύροι εἰν Μεγάλῃ πόλει...συνεδρίαν ἐστὶ κοινῶν 'Ἀρκαδίων ἀπατών' διειλεκτα δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ 'Ἀραποτέλεσ εν τῇ κοινῇ 'Ἀρκαδίων πολιτείᾳ.) Xenoph. Hell. vii. 4. 12 καταλαβάνονσιν οἱ Ἡλεοί Δασιὼν, τὸ μὲν πολαίων ἑαυτῶν ὤντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρώντι

1 With what follows compare Freeman Federal Government pp. 197—207.
NOTE ON ARCADIA.

συντελοῦντα ἐς τὸ Ἀρκάδικον: § 38 εἰ δὲ καὶ τινες ἐπαιτηφότο, ἐλεγον [οἱ Μαντινεῖς] ἐπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι ἡ τῶν Μαντινεῶν πόλις ἐγγύτο ἥ μὴν παρέξεω εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπόσους τις προσκαλοῖτο: VII. 5. 5 ὁ Ἐπαμενώδας ἐλογιζέτο σφίων ὑπάρχει...Ἀρκάδων τοὺς τὰ σφέτερα φρονοῦντας. Ἡσαν δὲ οὕτω Τεγέαται καὶ Μεγαλοπόληται καὶ Ἀσσαται καὶ Παλλαστείς, καὶ εἰ τινες δὴ πόλεις διὰ τὸ μικραί τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσαις ταύταις οἴκειν ἦναγκάζοντο.

From these passages it may be inferred that τὸ κοινὸν, the League, was a federal state, trenched in some respects upon the autonomy of its constituent members, the individual communities. It had a στρατηγὸς and other officers, an assembly (μέτροι), a federal army (ἐπαρίττοι) paid out of a common fund (Xen. Hell. VII. 4. 33, 34), and a common foreign policy. It would appear that the League is something distinct from, and politically superior to, its members, not excepting Megalopolis the greatest of them all. It is not impossible then that Aristotle intends here to draw a distinction between the organized race, as illustrated by τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, and the ordinary autonomous canton-state (πόλις), yet this solution does not remove all difficulties, especially those of an historical nature. (1) An Arcadian league of some sort existed from ancient times, as attested by coins. Vague notions of tribal kinship and some degree of unity had been kept up, as in Ionia, by common religious rites. It is true that this secured no real political union, and that the leading states, Tegea and Mantinea, were generally hostile to each other. But in this respect the events of 369 B.C. made no permanent alteration. (2) Within eight years of its formation the new Arcadian league was broken up: after the party strife of the years 364—362 it ceased to exist as a federal union of all Arcadians, who cannot be said to have been ever again one as towards other states. Arcadians fought on opposite sides at Mantinea (362 B.C.) and in the struggle between Agis and Antipater thirty years afterwards (Aesch. III. 165, Quint. Curt. VI. 1. 21). Indeed, not long after Mantinea many of the smaller townships incorporated in Megalopolis demanded autonomy. The Great City would have been dismembered upon the disruption of the League but for the timely interference of 3,000 Thebans under Pammenes, who compelled the seceders to return, Diod. xv. 94. About a century and a half later Philopoemen actually made Aliphera, Asea, Dipaia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa, independent members of the Achaean league, thus putting an end to their dependence upon Megalopolis (194 B.C.). In the time of Pausanias, all except Aliphera and Pallantion were again reduced to the condition of ‘villages’ of Megalopolis.1

Bearing these facts in view, we proceed to inquire about the meaning to be assigned on this hypothesis to the words κατὰ κόμας κεχωρισμένοι. Since its supporters would probably not take them as Dittenberger has done, they may be presumed to fall back upon the former suggestion that they describe the unorganized race, which lives κατὰ κόμας τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἐλλάδος τρόπῳ. And doubtless such was the mode of life of certain districts in the southwest of Arcadia, down to the foundation of Megalopolis. But just as certain

1 Plut. Philip. 13; Paus. viii. 27. 7; Freeman p. 616 n. 4.
is it that (a) the league embraced Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, Heraeae, πόλεις which were not absorbed in Megalopolis: while (b) most of the towns-ship or tribes whose coalition provided the population of the capital are unmistakably called πόλεις, not κόμας, in respect of their previous existence. It was after the foundation of the capital and the formation of the new league that these places became κόμας: previously they had been πόλεις. It is this the only difficulty. For if Aristotle is really desirous of distinguishing the πόλεις (1) from a συμμαχία or federation of states (Staatenbund) and (2) from a federal state (Bundesstaat), and if Arcadia is the illustration of (2) which he has chosen, he must regard the federal state as still existing in his own times, which in face of its manifest disruption would only be possible if he judged Arcadian politics exclusively from the point of view of Megalopolitan interests. A zealous partisan might hold no doubt that the opposite faction had cut themselves off from the Arcadian race. Yet even with the scanty evidence at our command we can discern that the league of all Arcadia must have been reduced, at certain times, to the single federal city Megalopolis, in which case the distinction between the organized tribe and the πόλεις, ex hypothesi all-important, disappears.

(III) Some of the older commentators inferred from the passage that the condition of Arcadia was one of extreme disintegration, an organization so low in the scale as to contrast unfavourably with that of the village-community. Bernays perhaps adopts this view when he translates: 'when the tribe is not divided into villages with a definite number of inhabitants, but lives scattered and without political organization.'

The obscurity of the passage is increased by the uncertainty of those who have examined it as to whether the Arcadians are cited as an example of a πόλεις or an ἐθνος. The view cited as (1) makes them both. Victorius and Camerarius apparently consider them adduced as exemplifying the πόλεις, implying that distribution of the population over villages or 'demes' (κατά κόμας) was a characteristic feature of the normal Greek state. But apart from other obvious difficulties one fails to see how any tribe or region of Greece, whether it had towns or not, can have been without villages.

1 Paus. viii. 27 §§ 3, 4, describing the founding of Megalopolis: πόλεις δὲ τοσαίδε ὄσσας...πατρίδας σφίσιν iosis ἐκλειπείν ἐπίθεοντο οἱ Ἀρκάδαις. Then follows a list of forty names. Mr Wyse however rightly remarks that not much stress can be laid on the term πόλεις which is often interchanged with κόμας: cp. Thuc. ii. 15 κατὰ πόλεις φυκεῖν, but Isocrates X. 35 σποράδην καὶ κατὰ κόμας οἰκοδομαν (both of Attica before Thessens).

2 Ib. viii. 27, 7, τῶν κατελεγμένων πόλεων αἱ μὲν ἐς ἅκον εἶναι ἐφ' ἴμων ἑρμοῦ, τὰς δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ Μεγαλοπολίται κόμας, Γύρτνα, Διπούρας, Θεσσαλίας τῶν πρὸς Ὀρχυμῶν, Μεθόδορον, Τεῖθων, Καλλαίας, Ἐλευσινα: 12 § 2 Μεθόδορον πόλιν μὲν οὐκέτι κόμην δὲ ἐς τὸ Μεγαλοπολιτικὸν συντελουσάν (cp. the similar language of Xen. Hell. vii. 4, 12, as quoted above, with regard to a single city, Lasion, as a member of the Arcadian League).

3 Exciplio, inquit, cum cives ipsius tota-que illa multitudo, qua civitatem conflat, non fuerint per pagos distincti...ut sunt autem, addidit, nunc Arcades, e quibus distinctibus inter se intervallis locorum, domiciliaque habentibus valde diuincta, conficiebatur tamen civitas. Victorius Comm. p. 78.

4 Ōντοι [sc. οἱ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ] μὲν γὰρ κόμας τὰς περιοικίας καλεῖν φασίν, Ἀθηναίοι δὲ δήμους, Poet. 3 §§ 6, 1448 a 36. Dr Jackson has supplied this reference.
EXCURSUS I.

‘Certain of those who have written books of travel round the world assert that this is actually the case: that there are tribes in the interior of Africa who have community of wives, and assign the children that are born to different fathers by their likeness to them.’ From the fragments by writers of this kind anterior to Aristotle nothing of this sort can be added; only Herodotos (IV. 130), who is in a way at least to be ranked with this class of authors, tells this story of the Auseans (Ἀυσῆς) living near Lake Tritonis, west of the Lesser Syrtis. Of later writers Mela I. 8 relates it of the Gar- mantians (Schlosser), for which compare Pliny v. 8. 45 (Göttling): Nicolaus Damascenus, Frag. III. in Stob. Flor. XLIV. 41 (Müller Frag. hist. Graec. III. p. 458), of the Liburnians1 (Eaton). Diodoros III. 15. 2 does indeed attribute community of wives to the Trogloidytae on the Red Sea, but he says explicitly that they have community of children as well. Herodotos (IV. 104) ascribes to the Scythian race of the Agathysri community of wives, but without a distribution of children and for the same object as Plato had in view ‘in order that they might all be brothers,’ ἡν κακίγυνητι τε ἄλληλων ἐστι καὶ οἰκήνων ἐντες πᾶντες ὡς ἰδίου ὡς ἐρχόμενοι καὶ ἐκάστος τὸν ἐμὸν ἀποδίδομεν πατρὶ.2

1 Διβύρινοι κοὐνάς τάς γυναίκας ἔχουσιν καὶ τά τέκνα ἐν κοὐνῷ τρέφονται μέχρι ἑτῶν πέντε, εἰτα τῷ ἐκτὸς συνενέκαυτες ἀπαντά τὰ παιδία τάς ὁμούμενας πρὸς τοὺς ἀνδρας εἰκάζοντες καὶ ἐκάστῳ τὸν ὦμον ἀποδίδοσαν πατρὶ.
2 Θεοσπομνος δὲ ἐν τῇ μγ’ τῶν ἱστορον καὶ νόμον εἴναι φαν παρὰ τοῖς Τυρρηνοῖς κοὐνάς ὑπόρχειν τάς γυναίκας: ταῦτα δὲ ἐπι- μελεσάνθια ὁφόδρα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ γυναί- κησθαι πολλάκις καὶ μετ’ ἄνδρας, ἐνοτέ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὰς,...τρίφειν τοῖς Τυρρη- νοῖς πάντα τὰ γυνόμενα παιδία ἐκ εἰδότας ὧτοι πατρὸς ὀς ἐκατόν. ἢσι δὲ καὶ οὕτων τῶν αὐτῶν πρότοι τοῖς σφαγεμένοις κτλ. The description seems to owe much to Plato’s republic.

EXCURSUS II.

...
It is worth while to reproduce the remarks of Oncken I. pp. 179—181. 'Here Aristotle touches the surface of a profound problem. Unquestionably there is a maternal instinct which assures the mother more than any external likeness that the child is hers; and though Aristotle is here looking at the whole matter from the outside, a passage in the Ethics shows clearly that at least this is not due to the want of a right conception of the moral dignity of marriage and the inner relationship between parents and children. On the contrary he regards both relationships as altogether moral and spiritual in thoroughly modern fashion. Between man and wife, he tells us, Nic. Eth. VIII. 12. 7, 1162 a 16, there is a natural tie of love and friendship; for man is by nature even more designed for fellowship in marriage than in the state, inasmuch as the family is prior in time and more indispensable than the state, and propagation a characteristic common to all living beings, whereas the social life of a community is only found in a few other cases. But in the animal world pairing is restricted to one purpose; whereas human beings do not marry merely to bring children into the world, but to share their lives together. From the outset the functions of man and wife are distinct; by making their different endowments common property they mutually assist each other. Hence such a relationship of love and friendship combines utility with pleasure; and this pleasure, provided both are excellent in their own way, rests on the mutual delight of each in the other's diverse excellence. Children are the bond of union as being the common property of the parents; for what is possessed in common strengthens their union: and this is the reason why a marriage is more easily dissolved when there are no children.

'Further, § 3 of the same chapter, 1161 b 27; parents love their children as themselves; for, owing their origin to their parents, children become by the separation as it were a second self. Children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers and sisters love one another on account of their common origin; for their common relation to their parents unites them to one another, whence the expressions one blood, one stock, and the like. Again, § 5, 1162 a 4; the relationship of children to their parents, like that of men to the gods, rests on the feeling of attachment to benefactors and superiors; for they have received from them the best gifts, life, sustenance and education: enjoyment too and utility make this a closer tie than that between strangers, since it has in it a greater and more intimate fellowship in life.' Comp. also Zeller, op. cit. II. ii. p. 688. 'Hence it is not simply its impracticability that Aristotle urges against community of wives and children. Whereas in Plato's view human marriage is no more than the pairing of animals—and to use Zeller's apt expression (Plato p. 478 Eng. tr.) his proposals 'degrade it to a mere economic breeding of population'—Aristotle has upheld against him the right and dignity of marriage in its relation to civil life, has shown what is at stake if marriage be abolished, the loss of the most

1 Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἱθὸν ἐν ταῦτῃ τῇ φύλακι. εἶν δὲ ἂν καὶ δι’ ἀρετῆς, εἰς ἑπεικεῖς εἰς’ ἐστιν γὰρ ἐκατέρων ἄρετῆς, καὶ χαίρουν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ.
primitive and sacred ties which bind man to man before a state arises to
develope out of the family a higher unity. That these considerations do not recur in the *Politics*, when he is expressly refuting Plato, may be partly
due to the fact that he did not wish to repeat himself; partly and more
especially it is because his object is only to meet Plato with arguments which
the latter must himself concede. A thinker who once took such a view of
marriage as Plato, could only be opposed with arguments deducible from his
own premisses. He who roundly denies that marriage has any but a political
aim is safe from attack on the side of its moral purpose.' SUSEM. (142)

[Clearly Oncken, writing in thorough sympathy with his author's concep-
tions, understands by the family which is the ultimate social unit approxi-
amately the modern or monogamous family. From the time of Plato and
Aristotle down to the present generation this belief has been almost
universal. But two causes combine to render the Aristotelian theory un-
tenable. The comparative study of customs, ceremonials and social usages
discloses facts in abundance which will not square with it: while at the
same time the extension of the doctrine of evolution from man's physical
to his mental and social condition shows us what interpretation to put upon
these facts. In short, when Aristotle derives other social forms from the
monogamous family, he commits a mistake in scientific procedure: for the
family is a πολλαχίως λεγόμενον, and what he assumes to be its simple and
primary form turns out to be a product of long elaboration.

The facts tell against a primitive monogamous family exactly as they
tell against innate moral ideas. Locke showed that in many parts of the
world men lived apparently destitute of such ideas. Ethnologists are busily
at work collecting notices of varieties of men who are equally without the
monogamous family and apparently destitute of the ideas on which it rests.
Beginning with the Auseans, Trogloodies, &c. adduced in this Excursus,
early all the stages of social progress can be illustrated from the ancient
world, many of them from facts within the knowledge of Aristotle himself. The
phrase εἶναι κοινός τὰς γυναῖκας is not likely to have been literally true, or
to have had one and the same meaning, in all cases. Few tribes are so

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1 It is well known that Plato was a bachelor, whilst Aristotle had been twice
happily married.

2 Prof. Susemihl is in no way responsible for the remainder of this excursus,
and he would perhaps consider the subject hardly relevant in an edition of the
*Politics*.

3 But for this limitation of his view Oncken would have observed that maternal
instinct, however important in Callipolis, has nothing to do with the Libyan
custom in question which attempts, in rough fashion, to settle paternity.

4 B. iii. of the *Laws* is a most interesting study in the history of civilization.

5 McLennan's epoch-making work *Primitive Marriage* is here followed.
Down to the year 1827 its author accepted the Aristotelian account of the origin

6 That is, assuming the reports to be trustworthy. There must have been a
rich harvest for a scientific observer in Greece about 330 B.C. How much
Aristotle collected in *Νόμιμα βαρβαράκα*, we cannot tell: the few extant fragments
are of little value.

7 What else it may have meant we can conjecture in the light of the fuller infor-
mation we possess respecting Hawaiians, Nairs, and Tibetans.
backward as to have no rule of incest at all; they mostly follow definite rules, but not our modern ones. Thus over a wide area it is incestuous to marry within the group to which one belongs (Exogamy), the 'group' being constituted by all of the same blood who trace their descent through females only from a common ancestor (who is often an animal, a vegetable or inanimate object). It is quite certain that, under favourable circumstances, the working of this rule conferred great powers upon women. Of such a state of things, known as the Matriarchate, there is evidence in the important place of the Greek female divinities, in certain legends (e.g. of the Amazons and the Lemnian women), in eponyms like Oenone, Thebe, and Messene, in the use of μητρίς for 'motherland' by Cretans and Messe- nians. Down to historical times it was in force in Lycia (amongst a people possibly of Indo-European race) and amongst the Cantabrians of Spain. Athenian traditions assert that children were once named after their mothers; amongst the Locrians nobility came on the mother's side. Kinship is traced through females in Homer and succession to property is so regulated in the legend of Meleager. Exogamy must anciently have been the rule of the Roman gentes. The Attic law permitted a man to marry his half- sister by the father's side. The levirate is found in Sparta and in legendary Troy.

1 Called a totem in North America and a kobong in Australia. Reverence for it is the rudimentary germ to which the worship of animals and plants, of the animal gods and the heavenly bodies, can be traced. The asparagus was the totem of an Attic γένος; Plut. Theseus c. 8 § 7 óθεν Ἡλείδαια καὶ Παρθός πάτρων κατέστη μωτέριον ἀσκαναί, μητέριον καλεί, ἄλα σέβονται καὶ τιμῶν. See 'The Worship of Animals and Plants' in the Fortnightly Review Oct. 1869—Feb. 1870.

2 Plato Rep. ix. 575 D, Pausan. iv. 26 § 3.

3 Herod. 1. 173, Nicolaus Damasc. Frag. Hist. Gr. iii. p. 461 (Müller) Λύκιοι τάς γυναικας μᾶλλον ἡ τοις ἄνδρας τιμώσι καὶ καλοῦνται μητρίθεν, τάς τε κληρονομίς ταῖς υπεγείρασι καὶ τοῖς νικοίς. Comp. the genealogies of Sarpedon and Glauus, Hom. Íliad vi. 150 ff.; the daughter's son succeeds before the agnate. The bilingual Etruscan inscriptions prove that Etruscans were named after the mother.

4 Strabo iii. 4 § 18, p. 165 τοῦ παρὰ τῶν Καντάγρου τοῦ ἅγιου δοῦνα ταῖς γυναιξὶ πρόκα, τό τε θυγατέρας κληρονομίους ἀπόδεικνυσι, τούς τε ἀδελφοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦτων ἐκδιόρισαν γυναιξὶ; ἐξε πά σωμα γυναικοκρατίαν. The couvade among the same people, ib. § 17 p. 164 τεκουσά τε διακονοῦσι τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ἐκείνους ἀνθρώπους κατακλύσαται. From Herod. ii. 35 matriarchate and female kinship were suspected amongst the Egyptians. This has been confirmed by the evidence of the monuments.


6 Hom. Íliad ii. 661 ff. (Tlepolemos), xxii. 95 cp. xxii. 49 (Lykaon). Hyginus Fab. 229. 174 implies that Meleager's maternal uncles were his lawful heirs, and hence arose the feud narrated in Homer Íliad ix. 502 ff.

7 Plutarch Quaest. Rom. 8 § 265 δ ἡ μη νομοσχένους συγγενεῖς γαμεῖν... πρότερον γὰρ οὐκ ἐτάλων τὰς ἀφ' αἵματος, ὡσπερ οὖν τὰς τιτθέους οὐδ' ἀδελφὰς γαμοῦσαν, ἀλλ' ἀνυποκατακράτησαν ἀνεφαίροις συμμετέχοντες: § 108 p. 286. B διὰ τί δὲ τὰς ἐγγονές οὐ γαμοούσην:

Deiphobus is an instance. Lycurgus declined to take his brother's wife. This is a survival of polyandry which, though
The presumption is, then, that the system of male kinship established in Greece (as amongst other Indo-European peoples) in historical times had superseded an earlier system of female kinship. And if so, the ‘stocks’ (γένη) and ‘brotherhoods’ (φρατρίαι) which when we discern them already appear on the point of falling into decay, or made subservient to political ends, are the survivals of the ruder tribal associations, anterior to the rise of the family in our sense of the term, which were formerly the only recognized ties of blood. Their common rites and burial-place, the obligation on all the members to succour and avenge one another, their right (in certain cases) to inherit property, all point to close ties of kinship, though of a rudimentary form. Certainly in no other way is the intermixture of alien blood and alien rites in the same city and local tribe so naturally explained. Aristotle, apparently transferring to ruder times the freedom of communication and voluntary action of his own day, leaves it to be accounted for arbitrarily, by contiguity of residence. Others, not more successfully, bring in the fiction of adoption and artificial extension of homogeneous groups. Unfortunately these questions have been only recently investigated, and in the present state of our knowledge we must be satisfied with provisional results, leaving many matters of detail in uncertainty. The Greeks, when they first become known to us, are so far advanced as to recognise kinship both by males and by females; they have marriage by contract or purchase (see n. 271), though traces of the custom which was superseded by purchase, viz. wife-stealing, are particularly well preserved. What interval separated them from the matriarchal period? To what age belong the terms cited from Charondas and Epimenides, ὀμοσίτης and ὀμόκατος or ὀμόκατιοι? And which is the true form of the latter word? Something of more than usual importance is involved in this v. i. The ὀμογιάλκτες (i. 2 § 6) were undoubtedly united by female kinship; i.e. all the members of a γένος (for ὀμογιάλκτες=γενείται, though Aristotle brings in the term to explain the village community) might be said to be nourished on the same mother’s milk. On this analogy the members of a primitive family (ὀικός: i. 2 § 5) may have been known as ‘sharers in one meal-sack and the smoke of one hearth.’ This can be supported by two Gaelic words for family, one meaning ‘those who eat together’ (coediche), and ‘those who have a common residence’ (teadhloch). There is no mention of the blood tie, which is particularly emphasized in ὀμογιάτριος and ἀδελφῶς, the latter word having superseded in Greek the earlier φράτωρ, as we see by the cognate languages. In Greek φράτωρ continues to designate a member of the older and ruder association.

outraging all our instincts of decency, is an established institution of semi-civilized tribes, superseding still ruder arrangements and itself gradually decaying as monandry increases. Comp. Pchlyb. xii. 6 παρά μέν γὰρ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ πάτριοι ἦν καὶ κόψηθε τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἐξέφνυ τηνητα, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πλεύσι κόικες θυσίας, καὶ κέννειν τὸῦτον εἶναι κούρα, καὶ γεννήσαντα παῖδας ἱκανοὺς ἐκδόσαται


3 This explanation seems the most
EXCURSUS II.

Hippodamos of Miletus: II. 7. 1.

Hippodamos, one of the most famous architects of his time, the first to introduce the fashion of laying out towns on a regular plan with broad straight streets, see IV(vii). II § 6 n. (850), was born at the earliest about 475 B.C. His oldest work appears to have been the construction, on the plan described, of the port town of Peiraeus, near the fortifications which had already been made by Themistocles. The market-place in the Peiraeus was called after him ὥ Ἱπποδάμεως ἀγορά; Xen. Hell. II. 4. 11, Andoc. I. 45, Harpocr. p. 154. Next it was he, in all probability, who directed the building of Thurii 444 B.C., since only a long residence there would account for his being called a Thurian. Considerably later in 406 B.C. he built Rhodes, Strabo XIV. p. 654. Through the outline of his ideal state there runs the same striving after mathematical regularity as in his town architecture, the persistent employment of a threefold division especially. It is quite possible, although by no means so certain as Hildenbrand and Oncken assume, that this was due to Pythagorean influence and that, at least in a certain fashion and to a certain extent, Hippodamos was an adherent satisfactory, though we might have expected some ruder mark of comrade-ship, such as tattooing (or better still a common totem) to have come down, rather than the σπών, from the times before the idea of blood relationship had arisen. "The apparent bond of fellowship between the members of such a group would be that they and theirs had always been companions in war or the chase—joint-tenants of the same cave or grove." Studies in Anc. Hist. p. 122.

1 See I. 2 § 23, II. 8 § 30 f., and III. 11 § 5 καὶ τί διαφέροντο ἕνοι τῶν δημών, ὡς ἔνοι εἰςεῖν;

2 An Orphic poet had described primitive men as cannibals, Sext. Emp. ix. 15. Critias began his famous analysis of the causes which led to the origin of religion thus; ἦν χριστὸς δὲ ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος καὶ σωματικός τοιαύτα ὑπηρέτησε, Frag. 1, 2 of Sisyphus, Sext. Emp. ix. 54. Cp. Moschion Frag. inc. vi (9) apud Stob. Ed. i. 9. 38 p. 240 ff. Epicurus pursued further the same line of inquiry: Lucretius v. 92 ff.

3 ἐκτείνον κατὰ τὰ Πελοποννησίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὡς φασὶν, ὦφι οὗ καὶ ὅ Πειραιώς. [A very cautious statement.]
of the Pythagoreans. During his residence at Thurii he might easily have come into personal relations with the sect, as also with many other philosophers and sophists. At all events this is the easiest explanation of the fact that subsequently two works were ascribed to him, one on Happiness (περὶ εὐδαμοσίας) under the name of Hippodamos the Thurian, and one on Government (περὶ πολιτείας) under the name of Hippodamos the Pythagorean: we still possess extracts from these works in the Florilegium of Stobaeus. Both betray their spuriousness by a frequent use of Plato and Aristotle; and that the second is not the genuine work of Hippodamos which Aristotle criticized may be inferred from the fact that the contents of its fragments cannot be reconciled with Aristotle's statements.

The genuine ideal of a polity set forth by Hippodamos, Henkel (p. 164 f.) rightly places amongst the attempts to effect a compromise between democracy and oligarchy or aristocracy. 'It is a democratic feature to allow the whole body of citizens a share in public affairs' (§§ 2, 7, 9 nn. 253, 261, 262), 'to restrict legislation to the negative function of the protection of person and property' (§ 4 s. f. n. 255 b), 'and to attach especial importance to the improvement of the administration of justice' (§ 5). 'It is characteristic of aristocracy to adopt the vote instead of the lot as the normal mode of appointment to offices of state' (§ 7 n. 260 b), 'to subordinate the popular tribunals to a supreme court of appeal' (§ 4 n. 256), 'whereas the genuinely democratic popular tribunals exclude the very idea of an appeal, inasmuch as they are committees and representatives of the highest power in the state. This same tendency to mediate is perhaps discernible even in the regulation of professions. Democracy strives after an economic development of the nation, with which a prolonged service in the army is regarded as more and more incompatible: hence a growing inclination to hand over military service to foreign mercenaries. On the other hand, the warlike character of aristocracy which sees in military service a science and a lifework (Xenophon. Oecon. 4 § 3) leads its partizans to arrogate to themselves political rights to the exclusion of the producing classes; the productive labours of peace are considered irreconcilable with the fulfilment of political duties (Xen. De Rep. Lac. 13 § 5, Plut. Pel. 23). Hippodamos, then, combines the two opposite tendencies by granting political privileges to the labouring and producing classes, and by handing over the profession of arms to an independent military caste in the nation, which is in return to derive its sustenance from the public land and possess no private property. It may be quite true that in the Greek democracies the state had more and more laid aside its paternal character and had applied itself to the improvement of positive law, in order to safeguard person and property on all sides against attack. Yet it was after all something novel for men like Hippodamos and the sophist Lycephon (III. 9. 8 n. 552) to give explicit and conscious utterance to this truth in theory; and, in place of the positive educational function which more or less Laconizing theorists like Xenophon (see Henkel p. 137 ff.) Plato and Aristotle assigned to the law, either to
attribute to it a purely negative function as 'the mere surety of mutual rights' in Lycophron's phrase, or with Hippodamos to reject all laws whose aim is not solely the prevention or punishment of injuries to one's neighbour in honour, property, or life. We do not know for certain whether Hippodamos preceded Lycophron in the declaration of this opinion, but it is highly probable: still less do we know whether he was the first to put forward theoretically this new principle of legislation, which broke altogether with old Greek notions of law and justice; but the supposition that this is so derives support from the fact that he was the first to devise a theoretical scheme for a pattern state at all. If this is the case, then in spite of Henkel's dissent we must credit him, as Oncken does\(^1\), with originating an important idea when he separated morality from the department of law, although after what has been said we cannot go so far as Oncken, who thinks that by these conceptions Hippodamos had left his age far behind. According to the old Greek notions, to which Socrates Xenophon Plato and Aristotle adhered, 'religious, ethical, and political duties are inseparably blended and united in law: nothing can be immoral that is not also illegal, and nothing can be morally right and yet at the same time illegal.' The later development of democracy had considerably loosened this unity; after which Hippodamos, it would seem, was the first to make its dissolution explicitly a fundamental principle, rendering impossible all such extravagances as those 'in virtue of which Aristotle goes the length of requiring the law to fix an annual budget of children' (II. 6 § 10 ff. cp. nn. 209 and 211). After its full and logical development by the Roman jurists, this principle passed over into the modern state, so that in the law 'we see no more than the barrier against disturbances of the social order, and leave to the forces of morality and religion the training of citizens in virtue.' The Greek political theories would be very imperfectly appreciated if, side by side with the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle, we did not recognize the full importance of such ideas as these, which had their origin in democracy. In such spheres of thought there arose that repudiation of slavery as the law of nature which in a certain respect is all the more deserving of admiration for being so premature. In such spheres too, it is true, there arose doctrines and ideas which were not merely instrumental in disintegrating the Greek state, but in their tendency destructive of all political structures; and these were especially employed by Sophists. In opposition to these ideas even we moderns, although we look at the state as a mighty engine for dispensing justice rather than for education, are obliged to range ourselves on the side of Plato and Aristotle in so far as we violate our principle by compulsory education and the universal obligation to military service. It is significant that even Isocrates, the admirer of an idealised ancient Athens, assumes this separation of law and morality: but just for this reason, since he too regards the state as exclusively an educational institution, he thinks but little of a written code of laws: see Henkel p. 149 ff. From the above point of view we see why

\(^{1}\) *Staatslehre* I. 214 ff. whose account is in the main followed here, the quotation marks indicating actual citations.
Hippodamos occupied himself so minutely with the improvement of the judicial system (§ 4 ff.). And his political theory is essentially distinguished from that of Phaleas 'by its pervading ethical features, while in the scheme of Phaleas socialistic tendencies are prominent' (Henkel): see 7 § 1.

SUSEM. (250)

NOTE ON THE CELTAE: II. 9. 7.

On the Kelts see also IV(vii). 2 § 10 n. (722) and 17 § 3 (953) and Nic. Eth. III. 7. 7, 1115 b 26 ff. where we are told the Kelts fear nothing, neither earthquakes nor waves of the sea. 'De Censorum amoribus puerorum testatur etiam Athenaeus XIII. 603 a' (J. G. Schneider). 'See also Ammian. Marcell. XXXI. 9' (Fülleborn). Plato Laws I 637 D f. describes them as warlike but fond of drinking. It is known that at this time there were Kelts in Western Europe, whence came mercenaries in the service of Dionysios the tyrant who aided the Spartans against the Thebans 369 or 368 B.C., Xenoph. Hell. VII. 1. 20. There were others again in Hungary and Servia, who sent an embassy to Alexander the Great, when he had crossed the Danube, Arrian Anab. 1. 4. 6 ff.: at a later time they repeatedly made incursions into Macedonia and at last sent out a band of immigrants to Asia Minor, which finally remained settled there, in the country called after them Galatia. Hence Aristotle Meteor. I. 13 § 18, 350 a 36 ff. makes the Danube rise in Keltic territory in the mountain Pyrene i.e. the Pyrenees. Still greater is the inaccuracy of Herodotos (II. 33) a hundred years earlier; he is only acquainted with Kelts in the extreme west of Europe, but nevertheless makes the Danube rise in their country, and near Pyrene which he turns into a town.

To all appearance Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks, does not as yet distinguish between the Germans and the Kelts. While he mentions the story that the Kelts are not at all afraid of the sea Nic. Eth. III. 7. 7, his pupil Eudemos III. 1 § 23, 1229 b 28 f., speaking more precisely, says that 'the Kelts go forth fully armed to meet the waves of the sea.' The same story was told by Ephoros Fr. 44 (see Nicol. Dam. Fr. 104, Aelian. V. H. XII. 23): Strabo (VII. p. 293) says he told it of the Cimbrians; but here, as Casaubon saw, there is a mistake on Strabo's part. Müllenhoff Deutsche Alterthums-kunde I. 231 ff. (Berlin 1870) rightly remarks that this story could only refer to the inhabitants of the coast of the North Sea: he thinks it quite conceivable that 'there, at times of inundation and high tides, when no escape was possible, the men put on their armour, not indeed actually to do battle with the invading waves, but in order that, in their best array, like heroes and warriors, they might meet the death which had not been granted them on the battle field. These stories must have been conveyed to the Greeks through Massalia, Sicily, and Italy.' The first Greek who made his way to the settlements of the Germans was Aristotle's contemporary Pytheas of Massalia: he at any rate recognized that they were different from the Kelts, but at the same
time undoubtedly fell into the other mistake of taking them to be Scythians: see Müllenhoff σφ. c. 474—495. Although Müllenhoff's views in regard to the amber island described by Pytheas and the neighbouring coast of the Teutons, and their position in and on the coast of the North Sea about the mouths of the Eider, allow of considerable doubt, yet this much at any rate seems certain, that in Pliny N. H. xxxvii. 35 Pytheas Gutonibus Germaniae genti etc., the words Germaniae genti are an addition by Pliny himself, and the word 'Gutonibus' is wrong. Pytheas himself meant the same tribe 'Teutones' who are mentioned further on in the passage (proxumisique Teutonibus). Susem. (287)

**EXCURSUS III.**

**The Ephors and the Κόσμοι.**

οἱ μὲν εφόροι τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμέναις κόσμοις, πλην οἱ μὲν εφόροι πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἶσιν: Η. 10. 6.

The resemblance between the Ephors and the Κόσμοι is certainly far less than that between the senators of the two states. For the Ephors are a democratic element; but the Κόσμοι, being elected out of certain noble families, are an aristocratic or oligarchic element, § 10. But the similarity lies in this, that the Κόσμοι too are changed year by year, unlike the senate which sits for life; that after they have resigned office their conduct is subjected to a scrutiny: and that in spite of the restricted election no pains are taken to exclude all from the office but men of especial merit. That the official powers of the two magistracies are (with the exception of the difference afterwards pointed out) the same, we must believe on Aristotle's authority: the only other difference he finds is in their respective numbers. Both indicate a contrast between the proper governmental authority, the activity of the executive or the administration on the one hand, and that of criminal jurisdiction and deliberation on the other: both magistracies share the idea that younger and more energetic force belongs to the former, while the latter is appropriate to the dignity of age. Lastly, while the power of both has grown at the expense of the enfeebled monarchy, only the Κόσμοι have entirely absorbed it, so that the supreme command in war is transferred from the kings to them, whereas the Ephors were content to direct all military operations from home or else to superintend the execution of everything by means of two of their number who were present in the camp: see n. 340 on 9 § 30 (Trieber). Compare n. (343) on 9 § 33. Yet after all there remains a difference which is by no means unimportant, viz. that the Ephors never come forward as generals or superior officers; all they do is to observe the com-
manders in the field. By the very meaning of the terms themselves the ἑφοροὶ are 'overseers', the κόσμοι are 'orderers' (Oncken). Ephoros (Strabo p. 481 f.) also maintains the similarity of the functions of the two, although the offices have different titles: but he diverges from Aristotle in arguing from the similarity between the senators in the two states to that between the Ephors and Κόσμοι. It may be that his judgment on the Cretan constitution is that of romantic, uncritical admiration and that Aristotle's is far less favourable and severely critical: still that does not justify us in inferring with Oncken (II. 401) that Aristotle could not have derived his facts, for the most part, from Ephoros. Indeed the conclusion that he did, receives decided support from the great similarity, which even Oncken (II. 405) points out, between the account of Crete by Ephoros and that in the so-called Πολιτείαι which we have under the name of Heracleides1 of Pontos: for probably these are for the most part excerpts from Aristotle's Πολιτείαι, as Schneidewin who edited them has shown; and in this instance from his Cretan Polity. It is less likely however that he could have taken from Ephoros the facts which stand in strong opposition to the latter's verdict of approval, like most of those in §§ 12—14. Susem. (360)

THE CRETAN περίοικοι.

πόρων οὖς φέροντιν οἱ περίοικοι: II. 10. 8.

It is in itself surprising that Aristotle does not compare the Cretan περίοικοι (see n. 355) with the Spartan περίοικοι, but rather with the Helots (§ 5, cp. n. 357); and this becomes still more strange when we learn from two later writers on Crete, Sosikrates and Dosiadas (Frag. 6. 2), as quoted in Athenaeus VI. 263 E f., that there were three dependent classes of the Cretan population, viz. (1) the slaves or serfs belonging to the state, the Μνοίται, (2) those belonging to private individuals, the Αφαμιται, and (3) the περίοικοι, with the additional information about these last that the Cretans called them "subjects."2 Further, in a skolion quoted in Athen. XV. 695Γ (in Bergk Poet. lyr. Gr. no. 28 p. 1294), the Cretan poet Hybrias boasts that the Μνοίται call him their lord.3 Kallistratos, the disciple of Aristophanes of Byzantium, as quoted in Athen. VI. 263Γ, describes the Αφαμιται as

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1 Heracleides was not, as Oncken thinks, a pupil of Aristotle, but of Plato.

2 τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦν μνοίαν, τὴν δὲ ἴδιαν ἀφαμιώτατα, τοὺς δὲ περίοικους ὑπὸ ηκόνων.

3 Spear and sword are my great treasure and my goodly shield withal, my body's safeguard: for therewith I sow, therewith I reap, therewith I am called lord of the slave-folk. But whoso durst not carry spear and sword, all shall fall down and worship (me) addressing me as lord and mighty prince.
‘the slaves or serfs on the estates, of native birth but enslaved in war, who are also called Clarotae’¹: and earlier still Ephoros (Frg. 32 a, in Athen. vi. 263 f) says, not quite correctly, that the Cretans called their slaves Clarotae.² It may be conjectured that the estates in the private possession of the Dorian masters were called ἀφαμία, as well as κλάρωι, which is the ordinary term for allotments of land: see Schömann Antiquities p. 298 Eng. tr. Accordingly we should expect Aristotle to compare with the Spartan Helots either (a) both the clarotae and mnoitae; or (b) the mnoitae, the villeins who tilled the state land or public domain; or lastly, if this seemed inappropriate because at Sparta there was no public domain, (γ) the clarotae alone, as being the serfs on private estates. And a closer investigation unquestionably shows that this last is what he has actually done. He has used the term περίοικοι in a somewhat different sense from Sosikrates, not for the inhabitants of dependent Cretan towns liable to pay tribute, but for the clarotae. It could not possibly be said of the former that they tilled the land of the Cretans: nor could Aristotle possibly have believed (§ 8) that the cost of the mess was defrayed by the state out of the public domain and the tributes of their subjects (which is the meaning that the words φόροι οὗς φέροντιν οἱ περίοικοι would then have) but that private individuals contributed nothing to them from their own estates. Moreover, a passage of Dosiadas (Fr. 1) in Athen. iv 143 a, which has unfortunately been rendered obscure by the inaccuracy of the epitomist and has probably come down to us in a corrupt text, unquestionably attests this fact at least, that at Lyktos every citizen was bound to contribute the tenth part of the produce of his estate towards the messable to which he belonged. The remainder of the passage² I interpret to mean that out of its own revenues the state assigned a fixed portion to every family of citizens and accordingly distributed these its contributions amongst the various mess-associations; and lastly, we read, each slave had to pay a poll-tax of an Aeginetan stater. Putting on one side this last point (see n. 366 on § 8 extr.), Aristotle’s account in the main agrees with this, as soon as we assume him to mean by his περίοικοι the clarotae. Only his text too, as it has come down to us, is evidently not sound. For if φόροι οὗς φέροντιν οἱ περίοικοι can only mean that part of the produce of the estates cultivated by the clarotae which they pay to their lords as rent in kind, it is unreasonable to suppose that the citizens should have been obliged to pay away the full rent, from which they had to provide all other necessaries of life, to the state in order to defray the cost of the mess, the worship of the gods, and the public burdens. Dosiadas says that only a tenth part went towards the

¹ καλοῦσι δὲ οἱ Κρήτες τοὺς μὲν κατὰ πόλιν οἰκετάς χρυσωρήτους, ἀφαμώτας δὲ τοὺς κατ’ ἀγρόν, ἐγχωρίους μὲν ὡστε δουλωθέντας δὲ κατὰ πόλεμον διὰ τὸ κλη-ροθῆσαι δὲ κλαρώτας.

² κλαρώτας Κρήτες καλοῦσι τοὺς δοῦλους ἀντί τοῦ χρυσωρήτου περὶ αὐτῶν κλήρον.

³ I read: ἕκαστος τῶν γυναικῶν καρτῶν ἀκαθερεί δὲ τὴν δικασθεὶς εἰς τὴν ἐταιρίαν, καὶ τὰς τῆς πόλεως προσόδοις [ἀσ] διανεμομενοὶ οἱ προσηθήκατε τῆς πόλεως εἰς τοὺς ἐκάστων ἀκαθερέων.
EXCURSUS IV.

THE CONSTITUTION OF CARTHAGE: II. II §§ 3—8.

τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἐταιριῶν.

Movers tries to show that the class of full citizens at Carthage—patriarchs, nobility, optimates—was divided into three tribes and thirty gentes, the former answering to the Greek φυλαί and the three ancient Roman tribus, the latter to the Greek φρατριαί and the 30 Roman curiae (see below on γερουσία, and compare III. 2 § 3, 9 § 13). According to him it is these latter divisions or 'gentes' that are here called ἐταιρία, 'mess-associations'.

This explanation has the great advantage of presenting a real similarity with the φιδίτια in the Spartan state, although it is altogether a false opinion of Movers that the ὀιδαί, the sub-divisions of the Spartan tribes (see Schömann Antiquities of Greece 1. p. 211, p. 231 Eng. trans.), were called συσσίτια: we are unable to suppose the existence of any systematic organization of the separate Spartan mess-tables 'in accordance with tribal divisions, or districts and places of residence' (ib. p. 271 E. tr.), and probably the same is true of the ἄνδρεία in Crete. It might indeed have been the case, as Movers himself observes, that the dinners of the Carthaginian associations were not held every day; yet they must have taken place frequently and at fixed times and were attended by all the members of each association, out of whose common property the costs were undoubtedly defrayed. 'In the ancient world feasts which were held at stated times by whole families or by political corporations acquired a politico-religious character and are to be connected with the sacrificial feasts celebrated by every family at stated times which are mentioned even in early Jewish history (1 Sam. c. 20. 6, 29: c. 9. 12, 23: 1 Kings 1. 9). In this respect we shall most suitably compare the συσσίτια of the Carthaginian associations with the banquets likewise held on certain festal occasions by the curiales in their places of assembly or curiae.' It is also to be remembered that ἐταιρία was actually the name in Crete for any division of the citizens who dined together at the same table: at least Dosiadas specially used the term in reference to the Lycians, δηρήνται δ’ οἱ πολίται πάντες καθ’ ἐταιρίας, καλοῦσι δὲ ταύτας ἄνδρεία (Frag. 1 in Athenaeus iv. 143 B). Mommsen too takes the Carthaginian clubs to have been at least public corporations, though not composed of the privileged citizens; ‘probably guilds under oligarchical management’ (II. p. 17 Eng. tr.). But the συσσίτια at Sparta, with which Aristotle compares them, consisted of none but full citizens.

Kluge, Heeren, and most of the other commentators prefer to understand by this phrase the banquets of the political party-clubs, since such oligarchical clubs were certainly called ἔταιριαι in Greece (cp. n. 157). If we were obliged to share this view, Aristotle, who is professedly comparing the public institutions of the two states, would be convicted of the huge mistake
of having compared a Spartan public institution with the arrangements of merely private associations at Carthage, two things moreover in which one does not at all see how there can be any similarity.

The circuli and convivia at Carthage are further mentioned in Livy xxxiv. 61 § 5; their ‘meetings’ (σύνοδοι) also in Theodoros Metochita Hypomn. c. 104 § 11 (cited by Kluge p. 215): but from neither passage can more exact information about them be obtained. SUSEM. (378)


dl Kluge and Heeren incorrectly hold that this is a different board from that of ‘The Hundred’ mentioned § 7. The latter however is only the shorter and less exact form: or possibly, as Movers conjectures, p. 552, the number of members proper was really only a hundred (he conjectures more precisely, 10 from the larger, 90 from the smaller senate: but is this right?): to these were added the highest magistrates, the two Shofetes (see below βασιλείσ) and perhaps the two high-priests. It is not true that Aristotle’s statements about the Hundred in any way oblige us to distinguish them from the Hundred and Four: if they were elected by the Boards of Five, why should this exclude the latter from taking account of personal merit? Now we learn from Justin xix. 2 that the Hundred was not an original element of the Carthaginian constitution, but was introduced as a protection against the dynastic government of a few families or the usurpation by a single family of despotic power, about 450 B.C., when the house of Mago, which had laid the foundations of the Carthaginian power and had exclusively filled the office of general for three generations, had become so overbearing as to threaten the liberty of the state. For this reason, as Justin tells us, a hundred judges were chosen out of the number of the Senators, to demand an account of their proceedings from the generals on their return home, in order that the latter, thus possessed with a wholesome fear, might in their command abroad keep before their eyes the laws and the tribunals awaiting them at home: dein cum familia tanta imperatorum gravis liberae civitati esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et iudicarent, centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur, qui reversis a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesque respicerent. Thus it was, as Heeren says, a high political tribunal exercising powers of police for the maintenance of the existing constitution, which however from the nature of the case soon degenerated into espionage and tyranny: hence he in every respect rightly compares it with the Council of Ten at Venice, and the political inquisition connected with it. Before long the power of the Hundred rose above that of the senate, so that Aristotle § 7 calls it the highest magistracy of all, since it summoned not only the generals but beyond doubt the Shofetes [kings] and Gerusiasts [senators] also, when circumstances required, on resigning their office to give an account of their stewardship, and even, if they thought fit, inflicted capital punishment, often with the most reckless
EXCURSUS IV.

cruelty,' comp. Diod. xx. 10. 3: since moreover as a general rule, 'in this as in every instance where administrative functionaries are subjected to the control of another body, the reality of power was transferred from the controlled to the controlling authority; and no doubt the latter came to interfere in all matters of administration,' so that 'the fear of the board of supervision at home, which regularly meted out its award according to success, hampered the Carthaginian statesman and general in council and action,' Mommsen ii p. 17 Eng. tr. But there is no authority for Mommsen's assertion (ibid.) that the Senate submitted important despatches first to the Hundred and then to the people; and Heeren is decidedly wrong in thinking that generally the most important state affairs were first discussed in this committee (so to speak) of the larger senate¹: see below γεροντία and n. (387) on § 5. During the second Punic war and the period immediately following, Livy (xxviii. 46) even goes so far as to describe these 'judges' as, properly speaking, the supreme body in the state, whose arbitrary power respected neither the laws nor the magistrates and extended to the property the reputation and the lives of all, while its members were so closely united that whoever offended one had to face the hostility of all. Thus the state treasurer (quaestor) 195 B.C., because he would be elected to this board after the expiration of his term of office, ventured in a spirit of defiance to disregard the summons of Hannibal who was then Shofete and probably invested with extraordinary powers (praetor, cp. Justin xxxi. 2. 6, tum temporis consulem: see below). This induced Hannibal on his side to appeal to the popular assembly and to carry a law, that these 'judges' instead of serving for life, as formerly, should only be elected for a year, and that no one should be 'judge' two years in succession: iudicum ordine Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur, co maxime, quod idem perpetui iudices erant. res fama vitaque omnium in illorum potestate erat. qui unum eius ordinis obfendisset, omnis adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensos iudices deerebat. horum in tam impotenti regno...praetor factus Hannibal vocari ad se quaestorem iussit. quaestor id pro nihil habuit, nam...quia ex quaestura in iudices, potentissimum ordinem, referebatur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebat. enimvero indignum id ratus Hannibalem viatorem ad prendendum quaestorem misit sub ductumque in contionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum, prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam esset neque magistratus, accusavit. et ut secundis auribus accipiorationem animadvertit et infimorum quoque libertati gravem esse superbiam

¹ In Diod. xiv. 47. 2 the declaration of war which the elder Dionysius sent to the smaller senate, was not read as Kluge states, p. 103, first there, then in the larger senate, and then in the popular assembly; nor, as Mommsen seems to suppose, first in the Council of the Hundred and Four and then in the popular assembly. On the contrary, the words are: ἡς ἀναγκωσθεῖσας ἐν τῇ συγκλήτῳ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ, and σύγκλητος is therefore the same as γεροντία, the smaller senator of thirty (see below), just as the Roman senate is frequently called σύγκλητος by Polybios. Consequently the smaller council first deliberated upon the document, and then laid it before the popular assembly. As to Polybios' general usage (when he is speaking more exactly) of γεροντία for the small council and σύγκλητος for the Great Council of Carthage, see below (n. 382). But the council of the Hundred and Four is never called σύγκλητος.
THE SHOFETES OR KINGS.

eorum, legem extemplo promulgavit pertulitque, in singulos annos judices legerentur, neve quis biennium continuum index esset. After all this, the points of resemblance between this board and the Spartan ephors are so great that it would be quite inexplicable if, notwithstanding, Aristotle had compared another Carthaginian magistracy with the ephorality. The only remaining point which could render another comparison possible would be the civil jurisdiction of the Ephors (ἡ § 23 u. 325): and as such civil judges the Hundred and Four are regarded by Kluge and Heeren, who insist that they should be distinguished from the Hundred and existed before them. But their own admission, that there was no further similarity between the Hundred and Four and the Ephors, is sufficient to refute their hypothesis. To make matters superfluously clear, the Ephors are called the highest office in the state (μεγίστη ἄρχη, ἡ § 21) in precisely the same words as are used of the Hundred, ἡ § 7 (comp. also ἡ § 19 ἡ γάρ ἄρχη εὐρία τῶν μεγίστων αὐτῶν ἐστὶ). In particular what is said of the Ephors, ἡ § 26, that they control to some extent all other magistrates (δοξεῖ δὲ ἐν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἄρχη πάσας εἰνθήνει τῶν ἄρχας), is exactly applicable, as we have seen above, to the Hundred. Even the remark (ἡ § 20) that in order to find support and protection against the Ephors, the kings themselves had been forced to flatter the people, reminds us forcibly of Hannibal's procedure on the above occasion, when he had recourse to the popular assembly. In Aristotle's time, moreover, the members were not as yet chosen for life, since according to his statement the Boards of Five exercised their powers longer than any other officials: thus we should be obliged to assume that the nomination for life was of later introduction. But even Livy's account allows of no other interpretation than that the quaestor had previously belonged to the Hundred and Four and after resigning his office again entered this body or at least (see below) had the right to enter it: and, as the number of members was strictly limited, this can only be reconciled with their holding office for life by the assumption that in such cases a substitute was appointed for the intervening time. Probably then Livy's statement simply means, as Mommsen assumes, that for the most part the same individuals were always on this board, because each retiring member could be immediately re-elected, and that Hannibal's reform only provided that no member of this Council of the Hundred could be elected to hold office for two consecutive years. SUSEM. (379).

οἱ βασιλεῖς.

Greek and Roman writers as a rule call these officers 'kings' and seldom by their proper official title shofetes (suffetes), i.e. Judges, the title borne by the heads of the Israelites before the establishment of the monarchy. That there were two shofetes is expressly attested by Cornelius Nepos alone (Hannib. 7. 4), but it may be inferred from the comparison with the consuls at Rome (Livy xxx. 7. 5, Festus p. 309 b 29, Orosius v. 11, Nep. l. c., cp. Justin xxxi. 2. 6); and Polybios also vi. 51. 2 speaks at least more vaguely of kings at Carthage in the plural, as does Livy of shofetes at Gades
(XXXVIII. 37. 2), remarking that this is the highest office amongst all the Phoenicians. All the more apposite is the comparison made with the dual kingship at Sparta. But that these two Shofetes were elected from different families, is a statement which Movers through a strange mistake attributes to Aristotle, who only says, that while at Sparta the royal dignity was hereditary in the same family, that of the Heracleides, which moreover was not distinguished by any special excellence above all the other Spartan families, the Shofetes at Carthage could be taken from any of the gentes of the citizens with full civic rights. Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339). Further, Movers thinks that the consistent mention in historical narratives of only one Carthaginian king, even in notices of the annual election ‘of a king’ (Zonaras Ann. VIII. 8) in ancient writers must be explained from the fact that the second Shofete was to a certain extent subordinate to the first and appointed more to act as a check upon him, and for that reason mostly elected out of another, and preferably a hostile, family: an opinion which may indeed be correct but cannot actually be proved, though this kind of policy would be in further accord with the Spartan belief that discord between the two kings was advantageous for the state (9 § 30) and was largely put into practice at Carthage on other occasions also (Diod. XX. 10. 1 n. 1597; comp. however on the other side Diod. XIII. 80. 2). It is readily intelligible that only one of the two Shofetes conducted the business referred to in the above historical narratives; besides, it frequently happened that one of them was absent, because employed in the service of the state abroad. It is indeed very surprising that Aristotle should designate the command in war as a distinguishing prerogative of the Spartan kings and of the ancient kings in Crete (10 § 6)—see the parallel passages given in n. (343) on 9 § 33—while at the same time expressly noting that the generals at Carthage were distinct from the kings (11 § 9, § 12), so that here, generally speaking, civil and military powers were disjoined. However it was not infrequent, especially as the accumulation of several offices in the same hands was customary (§ 13), for one of the two Shofetes to be invested with the generalship at the same time; but then the supreme command had to be conferred upon him expressly by the senate (Justin XXII. 7. 7, Diod. XIII. 43. 5, XIV. 54. 5, XV. 15. 2, XX. 29. 2, cp. 33. 2, Polyæn. I. 27. 2). The office of Shofete was held by the celebrated Hanno who at the command of the state undertook a voyage, with 60 ships and 30,000 persons of both sexes, to the west coast of Africa to found settlements of Liby-phoenicians, and wrote a narrative of this voyage which we

1. It is a curious parallel that Xenophon in his pamphlet De Rep. Laced. speaks throughout of the king in the singular, except once, c. 15 § 5 (Wyse).

2. Only the incorrect statement of Zo-


nares L.c. remains without justification on this view: but in fact neither is it justified upon the hypothesis of Movers.

3. Comp. Oros. IV. 6. The words κατὰ νόμον added to the title of King in these passages of Diodoros (κατὰ νόμους τότε βασιλεύωντα and βασιλεά κατὰ νόμον) have been wholly misunderstood by Kluge p. 92, and Heeren p. 136. They denote an elected king as distinguished from an hereditary king βασιλεύς κατὰ γένος, as is clear from pseudo-Plato in Diog. Laert. III. 83 f. τόις δὲ βασιλείας ἢ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, ἢ δὲ κατὰ γένος ἐστίν. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐν Καρχησίω, κατὰ νόμον πολιτικὴ γὰρ ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ ἐν Λακεδαιμονὶ καὶ Μακεδονίᾳ, κατὰ γένος.
still possess in a Greek translation. The points of resemblance to the Spartan kings were as follows: (1) the Carthaginian Shofetes may be assumed to have had like the kings (III. 14. 3) a sort of priestly office: (2) in any case they had, as their title denotes, a kind of supreme judicial office; although after the appointment of the council of the Hundred and Four,—whose members were also called "judges" or shofetes (see above, also Cato as cited by Festus s.v. manusuei), but no doubt, with some distinguishing addition,—this would be mainly restricted to the duty of presiding at that board (which though not expressly attested can hardly be doubtful) and in the full session of the ordinary courts (see below): further, (3) they held meetings of the senate and the popular assembly, and one of them directed the business of these meetings (Polyb. III. 33. 3; Livy XXX. 7. 5, 46. 5 f.). Mommsen asserts that the Roman writers also called the kings praetors: but without laying stress on the fact that Nepos l.c. expressly distinguishes the Praetor at Carthage from the King in a passage which is, it is true, in the last degree confused, we find that the term praetor is only used by Livy and Nepos in reference to the appointment of Hannibal B.C. 195 and thus in any case denotes, as Heeren and Kluge assume, the devolution of extraordinary official powers, although only in combination with the dignity of shofete (Justin XXXI. 2. 6 tum temporis consules, Zonar. IX. 14 s.f. τὴν μεγίστην τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀρχὴν). According to Cicero's statement, De Rep. II. 23. 42, if indeed this is really what he means to say, one could easily suppose with Heeren that the shofetes were elected for life; but this is disproved by what Aristotle says of the Boards of Five (§ 7), and not merely Zonaras VIII. 8, as was already said, but Nepos also l.c. definitely states that the election was made annually, although it is very surprising that Aristotle has not emphasized such a pronounced deviation from the Spartan kingship. SUSEM. (381).

\[ η γερουσία: § 3. \]

Mommsen says (II. p. 15 Eng. tr.), it is doubtful whether along with the senate there existed a larger one, as Heeren and others assume. But at any rate Livy XXX. 16. 3 says unambiguously that thirty leading senators formed a smaller council which had the real direction of the senate: triginta seniorum principes, id erat sanctius apud illos concilium maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis. It may be conjectured that one of these thirty was chosen from each of the thirty Carthaginian families (see above). And as Mommsen himself actually limits the number to thirty on the authority of this very passage, there must have existed another larger senate, because the Hundred were elected out of the number of the senators (see above). Such a larger council is usually called σύγκλητος, even by Aristotle III. 1. 10 (cp. n. 442), and although the terms γερουσία, σύγκλητος, and συνε- 

1 Praetor factus est, postquam rex fuerat anno secundo et vicesimo. Heeren, p. 138 n., proposed to alter rex into dux: but that here also rex denotes the Shofete and that the alteration is there- 

fore unnecessary is shown, apart from all other reasons, by the very next words: ut enim Romae Consules sic Carthagine quotannis annui bini regez creabantur. 

2 πλέονα ἀρχεῖν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων.
δρον are indifferently used with the same meaning for even the smaller senate at Carthage,
yet Polybios expressly distinguishes the smaller and the larger senate by the terms γερουσία and σύγκλητος X. 18. 1 δύο μὲν...τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερουσίας, πιντε καὶ δέκα τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου and XXXVI. 2. 6 τριακοσίων ὀμήρους...τοὺς ὕψος τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς γερουσίας. Possibly from the last passage we may infer with Movers that both senates together consisted of 300 members, so that the 30 gentes were again divided into 300 families, the heads of which—if this supposition is correct—were life members of the full senate, and presumably elected from amongst themselves (and probably only for a year) the smaller senate and the shofetes, unless we prefer to assume with Mommsen that the popular assembly had the right to elect the members of both senates and the shofetes out of the privileged gentes (see below). At any rate if we except this point, Mommsen is right in observing that the larger senate was not of much importance; and accordingly Aristotle evidently does not notice it, but in his comparison with Sparta is thinking of the smaller senate, especially as the number of members either tallied exactly, if we follow Mommsen in the assumption (which is however wholly unsupported) that the two shofetes were included in the thirty as the two kings were at Sparta; or at any rate corresponded approximately, supposing the shofetes to have been added to this number. It was this senate of Thirty which mainly transacted the business of the state, making for instance the preliminary arrangements for war, directing levies and enlistments, nominating the general and assigning to him a certain number of Gerusiasts [senators] from whom, probably, see Polyb. i. 21. 6, ‘the subordinate commanders were taken; to it despatches were addressed’ (Mommsen II. p. 15 E. tr.), ‘to it reports were made through the shofetes, and it received foreign ambassadors’ (Heeren). If it agreed with the shofetes, see II § 5, n. (387), it undoubtedly possessed full legislative powers and even the power to decide upon war and peace (n. 387), although in this respect it might seem advisable often, if not in most cases, further to lay the question before the popular assembly. Lastly, it certainly had the control of the financial administration. Over and above the common baths for the citizens there were at Carthage special baths for the senators (Valer. Max. ix. 5. 4 ext.

1 As in the passages which Kluge pp. 103, 105 f. has misunderstood, viz. Diod. xiv. 47. 2 (see p. 342 n. 1) and xx. 59. 1 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς γερουσίας ἐν Καρχηδόνι βουλευσαμένης περὶ τοῦ πολέμου [καλὸς] ἔδοξε τοὺς συνεδρίας τρια στρατόπεδα...ἐκπίμπαλι. The συνεδρία are the members of the γερουσία itself: the transaction takes place in the γερουσία alone and not, as Kluge thinks, first in the smaller senate and then in the two senates combined. The word συνεδρίων is not found at all in the sense of such a full sitting of the two senates, as he asserts; when applied to Carthage it everywhere denotes the smaller senate only.

2 Duncker (Hist. of Antiquity II. p. 185, ed. 4, 1875) formerly agreed with Mommsen. But in the English translation of Duncker, Vol. II. p. 275 (which follows the 5th German edition), this assumption is withdrawn and 30 is given as the number of senators exclusive of the kings.

3 See above n. (381), also n. (392 b) below.

4 Whether it was so “regularly”, as Mommsen writes, can hardly be proved.

5 For the senators Mommsen (II. p. 16, E. tr.) arbitrarily substitutes the judges, namely the Hundred and Four, although it may certainly be quite true.
THE CARTHAGINIAN DEMOS.

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insolentiae vero inter Karthaginiensem ct Campanum senatum quasi acmulatio fuit: ille enim separat a plebe balineo lavatur; cp. Juven. v. 90 propter quod Romae cum Bocchare nemo lavatur, also Movers p. 501 n. 57). The deputies of the senate (ἀυτοῦ) with the army formed part of the general’s council of war, Polyb. III. 71. 5; and in the oath ratifying the treaty concluded with Philip, next to ‘Hannibal the general’ and his three lieutenant-generals mentioned by name, all the senators in his camp and all the Carthaginians serving under him are introduced without mention of their names, καὶ πάντες οἱ γερουσιασταὶ Καρχηδόνιων μετ’ αὐτῶν καὶ πάντες Καρχηδόνιωι οἱ στρατευόμενοι μετ’ αὐτῶ, Polyb. vii. 9 § 1, § 4. Movers, p. 498, prefers to understand members of the smaller council by the three former names, and only members of the larger council by the γερουσιασταί; but this title is not suitable for the latter, nor can it be shown to have been given to them anywhere else. It is perfectly arbitrary for Movers to assume (p. 522 n. 308) that these plenipotentiaries of the senate also belonged to the Hundred. These deputies strongly remind us of the ephors sent into the field along with the Spartan king (cp. nn. 340, 360). SUSEM. (382)

ὁ δῆμος.

‘The kings and the senate, if both are agreed, have it wholly in their own power to bring any given question before the people or not: if however they are not agreed, the popular assembly must decide the question. But whatever is submitted to the assembly, the people are not merely allowed to listen to the resolves of the government, but have the supreme decision, and any citizen who likes may oppose the propositions submitted, which is not allowed under the other constitutions,’ at Sparta and in Crete: §§ 5, 6.

Kluge was mistaken in supposing the passage to mean that unless the whole body of the senators was unanimous, a question had to be brought before the popular assembly; that this was not the case may be seen from Livy xxI. c. 3 f., c. 9 § 3—II § 2, xxIII. c. 12 f. However the senate and the shofetes might often find it advisable, as was remarked above (n. 382), to bring important and critical matters before the people of their own free will. Gradually this would become more and more frequent, so that at the time of the second Punic war, according to Polyb. vi. 51. 6, the popular assembly at Carthage already had the greatest influence on deliberations, whilst the senate held this position at Rome (τὴν πλείστην δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς διαβουλίοις παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδόνιος ὁ δῆμος ἦδη μετελήφθει, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἄκυρν εἶχεν ἡ σύγκλητος). And yet even this very war was decreed by the shofetes and the senate alone, Polyb. III. 33, Livy xxI. 18. SUSEM. (387)

that the latter are also called “senators” by the Greek and Roman writers, as being elected, as a matter of fact, from the (smaller and larger) senate.
EXCURSUS IV.

ai πενταρχίαι.

This is all we know of these Boards of Five; we are therefore reduced to uncertain conjectures respecting them. But above all nothing should be read into this passage which is not contained in it. Now it says that there was not merely one such corporation, as Movers makes out (p. 499 f. n. 53), but a number of boards: it does not say, as Kluge and others state, that the members of these boards afterwards entered the council of the Hundred, but only that they elected that council: nor does it say that before entering upon office they had invariably filled another office, and after the expiry of their term again filled such an office, but on the contrary that they discharged the duties of the same office as members elected beforehand and as members retired for some time afterwards, probably in the capacity of assistants, substitutes, or assessors.

Further Heeren has shown that the government of the provinces did not belong to this office, as Kluge assumed: but Kluge and Heeren agree in thinking that the total number of the officers requisite for the special administration of Carthage itself were included in them: consequently the state-treasurer (see above p. 342), who is mentioned along with the shofetes at Gades and therefore as one of the highest officers of state (Livy xxviii. 37. 2), and the censor (praefectus morum: Nep. Hamilc. 3. 2) would have belonged to them. And then certainly by principibus quibusdam et magistratibus mentioned by Livy in the course of his narrative of the events of B.C. 195 (cited above p. 342),—vectigalia publica partim neglegentia dilabebantur partim praedae ac divisui principibus quibusdam et magistratibus erant, XXXII. 46. 8—we should understand with Movers the magnates of Carthage employed upon the Boards of Five.

But there is at least as much probability in another conjecture, to which we are led by the fact that the Boards of Five elect the Hundred. According to Aristotle's own statement (II § 7 s. f., III. I § 11 cp. nn. 391, 444) there was more than one board of judges at Carthage, and thus far there is some truth in Heeren's and Kluge's mistaken severance of the Hundred and Four from the Hundred (see above, p. 341). The Hundred was one such board and it is easy to conjecture that the Boards of Five constituted the others; that they had exercised high political jurisdiction before the introduction of the Hundred for the loss of which they were compensated by being at least allowed to elect the members of the new court of justice, while they retained the ordinary criminal, as well as the entire civil, jurisdiction, its different branches being assigned to different committees each of five men, while cases of special importance were no doubt definitively decided in full session under the presidency of one of the two shofetes as chief justice. This conjecture further receives considerable support from the fact that it is only these Boards of Five that are said to have discharged their duties without pay and not to have been chosen by lot, which is not easily intelligible except as in contradistinction to the popular courts in democratic states. Also immediately after (i) the Boards of Five and (ii) the Council
The powers of the Carthaginian generals must have been very considerable and in purely military matters perhaps unlimited, although they were also in the habit of consulting the council of war (see above n. 382). But state affairs were undoubtedly managed by the general in conjunction with the plenipotentiaries of the Senate, and alliances were likewise concluded (as above n. 382) by him in the name of the Senate (Heeren). Isocrates (III. 24) says that the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home but a monarchical government in the field: which means of course, that the generals, not the Carthaginian ‘kings’, exercised such a government: whereas Movers (p. 540) takes it to mean that ‘the Shofetes were not held to be kings, unless they were also generals.’ The Carthaginian generals are moreover called dictators by the Romans, Justin xix. 1. 7, Cato cited in Galliú x. 24. 7, Frontin. Strateg. ii. 1; as well as that one of the generals who discharged his duties in Carthage itself as director of the entire military administration, or war minister, Livy xxiii. 13. 8. The fact that state appointments at Carthage, in particular the offices of shofete and general, could be bought, which is likewise attested by Polyb. vi. 56. 4, seems to point to a right of election or confirmation by the popular assembly: yet possibly the smaller or the larger senate may not have been inaccessible to bribery, in spite of the fact that, in order to guard against it, only the richest citizens were, as a rule, elected into the smaller senate (§ 4). This much seems certain, that the election of the generals rested with the smaller

1 There is no ground for assuming with Kluge, p. 92 f., that the term dictator was especially applied to those who were at once shofetes and generals, or that the Hasdrubal in question filled both offices in conjunction eleven times.

2 At least I take this to be the most probable view.
EXCURSUS V.

The Solonian Constitution: II. 12, 3.

εικε δε Σόλων...τὸν δήμον καταστήσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιῆσαι ἐκ πάντων.

The question whether in reality there is no sufficient ground for doubting this statement, as Schömann tries to show¹, must in this place be left undecided. Here we are only concerned with the meaning of the words and the question whether they are really by Aristotle. In the first place Schömann has sufficiently refuted the monstrous construction which Em. Müller and Oncken² have put upon the singular form τὸ δικαστήριον here twice used, as if it did not mean the Heliaca, but the whole community assembled to demand an account of their stewardship from the retiring officials—a general assembly of the people before which the judicial authorities were brought to render an account of their office, appeals were entered against their decisions, and these decisions cancelled confirmed or amended at pleasure.¹ It is another matter when Fränkel The Attic δικαστήρια p. 63 f. infers from III. 11. 8 that the genuine Aristotle did not intend to ascribe the establishment of the tribunal of the Iliaca to Solon, but regarded the matter essentially in the same light as Fränkel himself, who was partially anticipated by Em. Müller and Oncken. His view is that in certain cases Solon gave the assembled community the right of rejecting the sentence pronounced by their magistrates; that he compelled the magistrates, when their commission expired, to render an account of it publicly to the people in their assembly, where it was open to the people to bring a charge against them which the Areopagus had to decide. Now this hypothesis respecting Solon’s legislation may be correct or not; but at any rate let the critics take upon themselves the responsibility for it, and leave Aristotle out of the question. Even he was by no means infallible in matters relating to Athenian constitutional history. Had Fränkel not severed the passage in B. III. from its context, he would have seen that there Aristotle is saying

¹ This exposition Fränkel has not quite fairly passed over.
² The refutation has not prevented Oncken from simply repeating his assertions over again. Cp. n. (409). I do not defend everything which Schömann has stated, as is clear from the sequel.
precisely the same thing as here, only in fewer words. There he says that
the people must be suffered to participate in the deliberative (or decreeing)
and the judicial functions, and these only; and therefore Solon rightly
ordained that it should merely elect officers of state and require them
to render an account. Here he says that Solon allowed the people these
two most indispensable rights and accordingly instituted tribunals taken
from the whole people with jurisdiction over all matters without exception.
If then, as Fränkel thinks, it is really a contradiction to say both in
one breath, at least the mistake has been committed not merely by the
assumed interpolator, but by the genuine Aristotle. Furthermore, if
Fränkel’s explanation be consistently applied to VI(IV), 14 § 3, § 6, § 10
(see nn. 1319, 1325, 1332) it must lead to this absurdity; that wherever a
popular assembly took into its own hands the control of responsible officers
of state Aristotle was only acquainted with two results, one of which in-
varily followed, either condemnation by the assembly itself or a reference
to the Areopagus or some similar board; and that in no case was the
matter referred to a popular tribunal. And since Aristotle regards those two
fundamental rights as the most indispensable concessions to the democratic
principle, without any indication that they should be limited, it is in itself
scarcely conceivable that he should nevertheless have tacitly introduced
the limitation that it is sufficient for the people to frame the resolution of ac-
cusation without either proceeding themselves to give a verdict or to pro-
cure the verdict of condemnation through a popular court; but that the case
must be referred to a non-democratic board neither taken from the whole
people nor even directly elected by the people. But if he regarded those two
concessions in the sense explained above, it is not only not ‘obscure’, but
from this point of view even strictly consistent that the gradual development
of absolute democracy should be characterized as their result in Athens,
brought about not through Solon’s fault but by the course of events: though
Fränkel may again object, rightly or wrongly, from his point of view that to
entrust popular courts with power must be regarded as the consequence
and not the cause of the democratic state principle. Lastly, the Athenian
Heliaea consisted, as Fränkel very ably proves (pp. 1–21), of all Attic
citizens over 30 years of age with full civic rights, not legally hindered by
other employment from entering their names in the list of judges for the
year, who had actually had their names so entered and (p. 51 ff., cp. pp.
21–51) not only this Heliaea as a complete body but even each separate
court of justice formed out of it was similarly regarded as another ἐκκλησία, as

Fränkel himself observes (p. 47) that in the treaty of peace with Chalceis (445
B.C.) εἴδηνα has the wider sense of “trials” generally, and not the later,
narrower sense of “trials” of state officers because when presenting their accounts
they have not been granted a discharge; Wilamowitz Ἀπο Kydathen p. 88 f. shows
that the word has not even the former sense in that place but means “punish-
ments.”

ἀπὸ συμπτώματος.

For in any case it is not from such point of view that we can decide what
Aristotle may or may not have said.

It is indeed more than questionable whether ἀλία=ἐκκλησία, popular assem-
bly, is really only a shorter form of ἡλιαία
EXCURSUS VI.

Thaletas: II. 12. 7.

Thaletas or Thales was in reality a lyric poet (as indeed we are told in Plutarch) and musical composer of Gortyn (or according to Suidas, of Elyros) in Crete, younger than Archilochus; the first to introduce the paeanian and cretan rhythms into artistic lyric poetry and vocal music (Glaukis cited in Plutarch De Music. 10. 1134 D, E, Ephor. in Strabo p. 480 f.). These he borrowed from the sprightly native dance tunes sung to the dance in the worship of Apollo in Crete (Athenae. v. 181 b), which were called Paeans and Hymor-chemes, and it was songs of this kind which he himself wrote and set to music and brought to their artistic perfection (Heracleid. Pont. quoted in Plut. De Music. 9. 1134 c, Schol. on Pind. Pyth. II. 127), availing himself in them not only of paeanian rhythms and metres, but probably of dactylic rhythms and rhythms compounded of successions of dactyls and trochees. According to the story which dates from so early a writer as Ephoros, Lycurgus while staying in Crete despatched Thaletas, a man well versed in politics, to Sparta, in order that he might by means of his songs spread the spirit of political harmony there and thus pave the way for the Lycurgean reforms in the constitution. But another and far more credible legend informs us that Thaletas was summoned to Sparta by the order of the Delphic oracle in order to assuage a pestilence by his musical art (Pratinas fr. 8 in Plut. De Mus. 42. 1146 c, Plut. Philos. cum principibus 5 p. 779 a, Aelian. Var. Hist. xii. 50; cp. Strabo p. 482). It can hardly be decided whether the only signification or indeed whether the two words are at all connected in their derivation: see Wilamowitz op. c. pp. 87—94.

1 Fränkel, pp. 21—27, endeavours to show that the Heliacon possessed important functions besides those of a judicial nature, but he can hardly be said to have succeeded.

2 And that they were at least earlier than Cleisthenes, and may thus very well have existed in Solon's times or even before them, is shown by Wilamowitz, pp. 94—96.

3 E.g. to induce the assembly to depose the magistrate.
THALETAS.

underlying these legends is one which belongs to the history of literature, symbolizing the healing and soothing powers of poetry and music, or whether Thaletas was actually a priest wielding expiatory powers like Epimenides (Exc. i to B. 1): the latter explanation is supported by the fact that at his home of Gortyn there was really a shrine of Apollo, to which embassies were sent from foreign states, to obtain aid in case of pestilence (Stephanos of Byz. s. v. Ῥόπτε). In any case Thaletas was also employed in Sparta, perhaps about 665 B.C. (?), and introduced the Cretan paeans and hyporchemes there also: the Laconian Sosibios, frag. 5 in Athenae. xv. 687 C, relates that his songs were sung even at a later time at the Gymnopædia along with those of Alcman. In Crete he composed in Knosos as well as in his native town: for in all probability he was the same as the Knosian rhapsode Thaletas from whom he is distinguished in Suidas (Suidas asserts that Thaletas of Gortyn lived before Homer), and the same as the Thales who is said by Demetrios of Magnesia, in Diog. Laert. 1. 38, to have been contemporary with Homer, Hesiod, and likewise Lycurgus. See on Thaletas Litzinger De Thaleta poeta Essen 1851. 4, Höck Kreta III. 339 ff., Bernhardt History of Greek Literature 3 ed. i p. 378, Christ Metrik p. 415 ff., also E. Curtius History of Greece 1 p. 182 Eng. trans. SUSEM. (419)
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In the notes to this book fr. denotes the palimpsest Vat. gr. 1298, collated by Heylbut in Rhein. Mus. xlii. 1887, p. 102 ff. See Exc. iii. p. 454. As a rule it is without accents or breathings, nor are the words in a sentence separated.

1274 b. The first sentence, 27 τά μὲν ὄν ἐπερὶ τας πολιτειας, τας τε κυρίας και τας 28 ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρήμενας, ἐστϊ τεθεωρημένα τον τρόπον τούς 32 § 1 τον τῷ περὶ πολιτειας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τὶς ἑκάστῃ καὶ ποιᾳ τις, σχεδοῦ πρώτη σκέψει περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τι ποτὲ ἐστὶν ἢ πόλεις. νῦν ὅρα ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οὐ μὲν φάσκοντες I 35 τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πράξειν, οὐ δὲ οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἄλλα τὴν ὀλγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πάσαν ὁρώμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὕσαν περὶ πόλιν, ἢ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τῆς πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξεις τις.

B. iii includes two parts: a statement of General Principles, cc. 1—13, followed by a review of Monarchy, cc. 14—18, the first of the forms of government examined in detail. See Analysis p. 108 ff., Introd. 37 ff. The former part is the most valuable exposition of Aristotle's positive political theory to be found in the whole work. Comp. Oncken ii pp. 117—174.

cc. 1, 2. The definition of constitution to be obtained by reference to a city and citizen: §§ 1, 2. Neither (i) residence, § 3, nor (ii) the enjoyment of legal rights, § 4, constitutes citizenship, but a share in executive functions §§ 5—7. The definition applies to a varying extent in different states: §§ 8—11. Remarks on a rough mode of defining citizens by descent 1 § 12—2 § 3, and on the exercise of civic rights by persons not entitled to them: 2 §§ 3—5.

Mr L. C. Bradley has some valuable remarks on Aristotle's conception of citizenship in Hellenica pp. 212—218.

1274 b 27 κυρίας] Constitutions "proper," i.e. those actually in force or 'valid' in existing states as opposed to schemes on paper. So κυρίας with ἐπίστασθαι, to know properly or unconditionally, is opposed like ἀπλῶς to εἴ ὑποθέσεως.

35 ἀλλὰ τὴν ὀλγαρχίαν] "that it is not the state which has done this or that but the oligarchy." Comp. Thuc. iii. 62 § 4 (Eaton) and n. (455) on c. 3 § 2 below. Susem. (432)

36 πολ. καὶ τοῦ νομ. ] See above on I. 1. 2, II. 12. 1.

38 τάξεις τις] "a certain ordering of the inhabitants." The character of this organization is explained 6 § 1 πόλεως τάξεις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἄρχων καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων, π. (522). Comp. vi
§ 2 ἦ η πόλις τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἂλλο τι τῶν ὁλον 2
μὲν συνεστώτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δὴ χων ὁτι πρότερον
ὁ πολίτης ἔτητης; ἢ γὰρ πόλις πολίτων τι πλήθος ἐστίν.
§ 275 'ωστε τίνα χρή καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τὶς ὁ πολίτης ἐστὶ σκε-
πέων. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφιβητεῖται πολλάκις: οὐ γὰρ
τῶν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες ἐναὶ πολίτην ἐστὶ γὰρ τις
δὲ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὁ ὑ ἐν ὁλιγαρχίᾳ πολλάκις οὐκ
§ 3 ἐστὶ πολίτης.

τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλως πῶς τυγχάνοντας ταῦτ-3
6 της τῆς προσφοράς, οἶον τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφετέον
ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῶν οἰκεῖων πολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ μέ-
§ 4 τοικὸι καὶ δοῦλοι κωινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκίσεως), οὔτ' οἱ τῶν
δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὡστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχει καὶ δικία-
ζεσθαι (τούτῳ γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινο-

1275 a 10 καὶ τοῖς <μετοίκοις καὶ τοῖς> Bücheler, most likely right.

(iv), 1. 10 τάξεις ἡ περὶ τάς ἀρχάς, ποιήσοντες πολίτης, τίνα τρόπον γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῦ κύρους Κ.η. η. (1129), VI (iv). 3. 5 η. (1156).
SUSEM. (432 b)
§ 2 39 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτιλ] "Since the state is an aggregate of individuals, like any other whole made up of parts" (Ecbi).
§ 41 τι πλήθος] "a body of citizens": namely, a body numerous enough for independence of life, i.e. of "a body of individuals, § 12 (Eaton). See notes (434), (447).
SUSEM. (433)
1275 a 1 ὡστε τίνα κτιλ] Schlosser's censure of Aristotle is not altogether without reason. The synthetic method which was applied before, 1. 1 § 3 n. (4), 3 § 1 (29), 8 § 1 (66), is certainly out of place here. There is far more truth in the remark at 1. 2 § 12" where see note "that the conception of the state must precede that of its members. It cannot be said that we have to define πόλις by reference to πολίτης; on the contrary, the relative conception of the citizen must be explained by reference to that of the state" (Schlosser 1. 218). In reality it is the latter course which Aristotle adopts. He takes the conception of the state obtained in cc. 1, 2 as the foundation for his definition of the citizen, as Schlosser justly observes: so that he is involved in a formal circle, when he afterwards defines the state (see III. 1. 12 n.) a body of citizens adequate for independence of life, i.e. comparing 1. 2. 8 η. (21), adequate for the end of the state. And just because this is so, in spite of the grave formal blunder, the definition of the citizen has not in any way suffered. Schlosser assumes that it is only applicable to the most advanced democracy and not to the best constitution, and that it restricts the notion of the state obtained in cc. 1, 2. But this is a misapprehension. On the contrary, Aristotle is of the opinion that the ideal exactly answering to this conception is never completely realized until all who are actually citizens have equal rights and duties. Herein he is certainly right: the error is in looking for any such realization, because facts never do completely answer to conceptions. See nn. (440) (441) on § 10 below. SUSEM. (434) § 6 τοὺς ποιητοὺς] "honorary citizens" (Susemihl). But probably cases like those of §§ 7, 8 are contemplated: "those on whom the franchise is conferred." [Demosth.] e. Nect. 1376, 15, τῷ ἡ ποιήσει πολίτας,
§ 7 οὐ τῷ οἰκείῳ ποι] "Domicile does not make a citizen." Comp. on the one hand 9 § 12, δικαίως ἐτι πολίς κοινωνία τόσου, with n. 357 : on the other 9 § 10 η. (554).
SUSEM. (434 b)
§ 8 8 οὐθ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων] "nor the advantages of common jurisdiction, in the sense of the capacity to bring, or defend a civil action": δίκαιον ἐν τούτω]
10 τούτῳ] these civil rights, δίκην ὑπέχει καὶ δικαίωθαι.
§ 10 τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβολῶν] "the parties to a commercial treaty." More fully explained below 9 §§ 6, 7 (Schneider) nn. 549, 550. SUSEM. (433)

23—2
The treaties would contain provisions as to the mode in which charges might be brought and cases tried when disputes arose between members of the different contracting states: such perhaps as \( \text{μη} \) εξείλαται μηδ’ είρηκαμή ετσακέλευθερον, Pseud.-Andoc. 4. 18. See [Demosth.] De Haloniose §§ 9–13, Polullix viii. 63, 88; Harpocratin s.v. and Aris. Fragg. 380, 154 b 1: whence some infer that \( \text{αἰ} \) έξιμολοι πρὸς τοὺς έξιμολοχούς δικαίος of Thuc. i. 77 are analogous, but this is denied by Boeckh Publ. Econ. of Athens pp. 40, 403 Eng. tr. and Grote c. 47 vi. 57 n. See also Cope’s note on Rhel. i. 4. 11, and W. W. Goodwin in Amer. Journal of Phil. 1880. 1. pp. 5–11.


§ 5 τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας = a franchise limited to participation in legal rights.

14 καθάπερ καὶ παίδαις κτλ] It is the same with common jurisdiction as it is in the cases adduced, viz. children too young to be enrolled, and superannuated old men exempt from service: those who can bring or defend a civil action may in a certain approximate and restricted sense be termed citizens, but only with a qualification. Susem. (437)

17 τοὺς μὲν \( \text{άτελείς} \) Cr. p. 5 § 2, n. (505). Susem. (437 b) Add i. 13. 7–12. 20 έγκλήμα διορθώσεις δεομ.] flaw or defect requiring correction, viz. by an added qualification, as citizen under age.
III. 1. 8] 1275 a 11—1275 a 35. 357

25 τον αυτον ουκ εξεστω αρχειν, ἵ δια των ωρισμένων χρόνων (1)

§ 7 νων ὁ δ' ἄροιστος, οὐδ' ὁ δικαστής καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα 5
μεν οὖν ἄν φαίνεις τοις άρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους, όπδ' μετέχειν διὰ ταύτα ἄρχης· καίτοι γελοίοι τοὺς κυριωτάτους ἀποστερεῖν ἄρχης. ἀλλὰ διαφαρέτω μηδεν' περὶ διόματος γυν' ὁ λόγος· ἀνόμυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοί καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῖς, τι δεί ταῦτ' ἀμφοὶ καλεῖν. έστω δ' ἔτερος τοις λεγομένοις πολίτασι σχεδον τοιούτους ἐστιν· δεδή 35 μη λαθάνειν ὅτι τὸν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ υπόκειμενα μὲν ὑπηλίκηκα, ἄντι τῆς τῆς τῆς χρόνου ἐπιστήσεως, ἐπιπληθείν· καὶ ὑπηλίκηκα, ἄντι τῆς τῆς χρόνου ἐπιστήσεως, ἐπιπληθείν· 

§ 6 26 δ' ἄροιστος sc. ἀρχεῖν: in οὔτως the officers this case the officer holds an undefined office; i.e. of one of uncertain or indefinite duration and frequency. The context would be equally well suited by 'life-long' or 'perpetual': but from c. 11 § 13 f., § 18 f., we learn that even when discharging judicial or legislative functions no one would regard the δικαστής and ἐκκλησιαστής as themselves ἀρχοντες but only as parts of the complex ἀρχεῖν, the δικαστήριον or ἐκκλησία. A fortiori, the mere qualification for discharging these intermittent functions cannot make an ἀρχων when the actual discharge of them is not enough (Shute). In Aristophanes ἀρχεῖν—δικαίαν, e.g. Plutus 916, οὐκοῦν δικαστὰς ἐξεπήγαγε· Ἠ πολίς ἄρ χεῖν καθήσασθαι· cp. n. (438).

§ 7 28 οὖθε...διὰ ταύτα] that to serve on a court of justice or as member of the legislature does not constitute office; and yet it seems absurd to deny to those who wield the highest authority a claim to hold office.

καίτοι γελοίοι] Comp. Plato Laches 767 Α. B.: "in a certain sense to appoint courts of justice is to choose officers of state. For every member of the executive must needs be a judge of sundry matters, and a dikast, without really holding office, does virtually assume an office of no mean importance on the day when he decides the suit he is trying (δικαστής) δὲ οὐκ ἄρχεων καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἄρχεων οὐ πάντων φαίνεται τῇ τῷ· ἡμέραν, ἦπερ ἄν κρίνων τὴν δικήν ἀποτελῆς). Hence the dikasts may also be regarded as holders of office." For "at Athens the obligation to render an account of his conduct was necessarily presupposed in the case of every state official (cp. Aeschines iii. 17), but the heliast is not obliged to render an account (Aristoph. Neksire 587 καὶ ταῦτ' ἀντι θυτὸν δρῶμεν τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐ δεμί' ἀρχη). Again, no one could hold an office for two terms in succession, as in that case he must have been re-elected before he had rendered his account, which was illegal: whereas the heliast could go on discharging his functions time after time, uninterruptedly" (Frankel p. 21 f.).

SUSEM. (438)

29 ἀλλὰ διαφαρέτω κτλ] "But let us waive the point, which after all is verbal, since we can find no common term applicable alike to the judge and the ekklesiast. For the sake of distinction, we will call theirs an 'indefinite' magistracy" (Jebb).

§ 8 33 εφαρμοσας is intransitive. "Such then is [the notion, or definition of] the citizen which best applies to all who are so called." We find ἐτι with gen. after this verb, 2 § 3 and 11 § 5 below: but the dat. (4 § 2) or προς with acc. is more usual.

35 τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς κτλ] "Where classes of things (like πολίτης) contain individual members distinct in species" i.e. essentially different, like the several
Διαφέρει τὸ έίδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ (1) δεύτερον τὸ δ’ ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδ’ ἐνεστιν, ἢ § 9 τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλύσχρως, τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἰδεί διαφέρουσαί αλλήλουν, καὶ τὰς μὲν ύστερας τὰς δὲ προτέρας οὕσας τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκινίαι ἀναγκαίων ύστερας εἶναι τῶν ἀναρματήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκινίαι πῶς λέγομεν, ύστερον ἔσται φανερὸν). Ὡστε καὶ 4 τοῦ πολιτην ἔτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ’ ἐκάστην πολί- 
§ 10 τείαν. διότερο ο λεξθεῖς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατία μᾶλιστ’ ἐστὶ 7 πολιτής, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μὲν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγ-
37 οῦδ’ ἐνεστὶν Madvig, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν Γ II Αρ. Βκ., οὐδὲν, εἰ πρὶν τοιαῦτα] Bas.²

'Πολιτείας' and, consequently, the 'πολιτής' as determined in each of them, "one of these being primary, another secondary, a third yet more subordinate, in such cases the generic attribute, in right of which they belong to the class [lit. are such], is either altogether lost or barely seen." If altogether lost, the things are, in technical phrase, ὁρῶμεν. Here however 'πολιτής' is probably παρώνων, like ἀγάθον in Λευ. Εἰθ. 1. 6 §§8-12, where also it is explained that there is no common attribute in virtue of which all the things denoted as 'good' are such. See Zeller Plato p. 229 n. 103 Εἰθ. τo ἀρ. ἐπικείμενα is explained (1) res singularae quae consequentur notionis aliquius universalis ambitu, (2) vel ad quas ea notio referatur et a quibus suspensa est; e.g. Μετ. Α. 2. 4, 982 a 23, ὅ τιν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχον οἴει ποὺς πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα. But Bonitz adds: τῶν πραγμάτων (ut πολίτεια) εἰν οἷα τὰ ὑπο-
κείμενα (singularae πολιτείαι ad quas refer-
tur τῶν πολίτων notio) διαφέρει.
35-38 "See Categ. 1. 1 f.: things are said to be homonymous or equivocal when they have merely the same name, the sense or meaning attached to the name being different (ὦμονωμα λέγεται ὅλον ὅμοιο μὸνον κοινὸν, ὅ δ’ εἰ τὰ τῶν ὁμοίων λόγου ἔτερον). Things are said to be synonymous or univocal when they are not only called by the same name, but also in the same sense (J. G. Schneider). Comp. Waitz ad loc., Bonitz Ind. Ar. v. οἱ ὁμώνυμοι [Grote Aris. 1. 81 f.]; also 1. 2. 13 above n. (28)." Susem. (438 b) I blame ob-
vviously πράγματα 'things' must be taken in the not uncommon sense of 'classes': comp. De Interpret. c. 7 §§ 1, 17 a 38, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἐκάστον. Any general notion, however loose the connexion between the particulars which come 'under' it, is treated as a whole or 'thing,' if it is denoted by a single term.

§ 9 39 ὑστερός...προτέρος Logically 'posterior' and 'prior.' Not 'later' and 'earlier' in time or historical development, but 'lower' and 'higher' in the order of thought and of real existence: the former less really, the latter more really a form of government. See 1. 2. 13 n. (27). Susem. (439)

1275 b 4 ἡμαρτημένας: Plato's word 

ῬΑ. V 449 Α, VIII 544 Α. The participle 'perverted' has been converted into an adjective 'wrong, perverse': cp. 6 § 11, VIII(v). 1. 5, Α.Ε. IV. 9. 35, VIII. 10. 4. In VIII(v). 1. 15 it is a true passive partic.

Compare ἀποτελονυμεῖος = despe.

3 υστερον] cc. 6, 7. Comp. 3 § 2 n. (456). Susem. (439 b)

§ 10 5 ὣ λεξθεῖς] The citizen as thus defined.

ἐν μὲν δημοκρατία κτλ] But democracy is one of the degenerate forms. If then Aristotle's conception of the citizen is particularly applicable to democracy, then clearly under the best constitution the position of the citizens will be just the same as under a democracy, and all will enjoy equal rights amongst themselves. See 13 § 12 Μ. (598, 599): ΙV(VII). 9 §§ 7-9, 13 § 9, 14 §§ 3-5 with nn. (816, 817, 885). Aristotle cannot make his meaning clear by reference to the best constitution because he has not yet determined in what it consists; thus he is compelled to take an illustration from democracy. Cp. also 5 §§ 4, 5 n. Susem. (440)

6 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις] With the tacit exception of the best constitution, which

καίου. <ἐν> εἰναίς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δήμος, οὐδ’ ἐκκλησίαν νομίζον ἄλλα συγκλήτων, καὶ τὰς δίκαις δικαίωσις κατὰ μέρος, οἶνον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικαίες τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς.

§ 11 ἑτέρα δ’ ἔσως ἀρχὴ τις ἑτέρας, τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα: πάσας γὰρ ἁρχαὶ τινὲς κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. ἄλλα ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολιτῶν διορισμὸς. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ οὗ ὁ ἀόριστος ἁρχὴν ἐκκλησίατης ἔστι καὶ δικαστῆς, ἄλλα ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἁρχὴν ὁρισμένοις τούτων γὰρ ἡ πάσιν ἡ τισιν ἀποδέδωται τὸ βουλευτεῖαι καὶ δικαίεις ἡ περὶ πάντων ἡ περὶ τινών. τὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ πολιτής, ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν (ὅ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἁρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, πόλιτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταὐτ.

1275 b 7 <ἐν> Kornes 11 <ὁ> τῶν? Schneider (afterwards rejected by him), Kornes, Triebcr; [kai] Triebcr. But see Comm. n. (444) § 13 γὰρ after ἔχει omitted by P4 Q6, possibly by 1; erased in P4 § 16 ἀποδέδωται Γ, perhaps right βουλευτεῖαι II2 (emended by corr. of P4) fr. § 17 περὶ before τινῶν omitted by M1 P1, perhaps rightly § 19 καὶ Ἀγ. Spengel, 7 ΠII (including fr.) Bk. Susse.1 (in text)

would otherwise not become perfectly adjusted to the real nature of its citizens, as however it must be in order to be actually "the best." Susen. (441)

§ 8 συγκλήτων] Meetings of a great council specially convened upon extraordinary occasions. It may be shown, as in Exc. IV to B. II p. 345 f., that there existed at Carthage a great council of this kind, side by side with the smaller counciland the popularassembly. Susen. (442)

κατὰ μέρος] not "in turn" but "by sections.

καὶ τὰς δίκας...κατὰ μέρος] "They try cases before special courts." Thus of the two "indefinite magistracies", the popular assembly and the popular courts of justice, neither is here found: the larger council specially convened (συγκλήτων) replaces the one, and the other is superseded by the conversion of the judicature into a special government department. Susen. (443)


τῶν συμβολαίων] II. 5. 11. Cp. Cope's note on Khel. I. 1. 10, "any private every-day transactions as opposed to σύμβολα which are κοινά." δικαὶ τῶν συμ. = civil suits, nisi prius cases.

§ 11 12 Καρχηδόνα] If we bear in mind what is said in n. (443) we shall discover that there is no contradiction between this passage and II. 11. 7, καὶ τὸ τάς δίκας ὑπὸ τινῶν ἁρχείους δικαίωσεν πάσας καὶ μὴ ἄλλος ἀπ’ ἄλλως, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι (cp. Exc. IV. p. 348 f. and nn. 391, 391 b). The more subtle distinction that at Sparta the administration of justice was distributed over the different branches of the executive, while at Carthage it was separated from them all and entrusted to a special judicial department, is not here taken into account, but merely that which is equally a feature of both systems, viz. the jurisdiction of special boards as distinguished from that of δικασταὶ annually chosen for this purpose as a committee of the entire civic body. See further II. 9. 23 n. 325. Susen. (444)

15 ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἁρχὴν ἀρσιμένος] "the officer defined by his tenure of the office" (of judge or legislator). And therefore in such states Aristotle regards as citizens only those who have the unrestricted right of being elected to these definite offices. (Nothing can be more erroneous than Oncken's assertion, II. p. 121 n. 1, that presumably Aristotle has in mind the division of responsibility in the Athenian democracy between ἐκκλησία and βοιλή on the one hand, Hellenea, φυλακτὰ, and Areopagus on the other.) Susen. (445)

§ 12 18 ἁρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτι-
κής]. "He who is entitled to a share in legislative or judicial office." But this is not quite exact, for by what precedes Aristotle ought to include "executive office," as in fact he does virtually in § 7 (άφατος ἄρχων). SUSEM. (446)

ηδή is simply untranslatable; without going further, without anything more being necessary,

21 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν [εὐς] "a body of such citizens adequate to secure independence of life." Cp. n. (21), 11. 2. 8 n. (136) and the passage there cited. SUSEM. (447)

c. 2 πρὸς τὴν χρήσην] "for practical purposes." This definition was adopted by Pericles, according to Plutarch, for the famous law which disfranchised 5,000 out of 19,040 citizens: οὖν ἐγραφέ γέμων Αθηναίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ δεινών Αθηναίων γεγονότας.

25 πολιτικῶς] Like our word 'popular,' or popularis in Cic. De fin. iv. § 24, v. § 12: i.e. superficially. Comp. for the emendation παχέως, pingui Minerva.

§ 2 26 Γοργίας] The celebrated orator and nihilistic philosopher, already referred to I. 13. 10 (cp. n. 118), who lived between 483 and 375, visited Athens on an embassy from his native city Leon-tini in 427, and a second time soon afterwards. There he encountered every one with his florid and rhetorical periodic eloquence and gave a great impulse to the formation of an Attic prose style; at a later period he lived, and perhaps died, at Larisa in Thessaly. Isocrates went to Larisa to hear him. He trained a considerable school of rhetors, which subsequently had rivals in the schools of Isocrates, of Polycrates, and of the Cynics: Alkidamas (n. 31), Polos, Likynnios, Protarchos and Lycochron (ms. 297, 553) were its most eminent names. See Foss De Gorgia Leontino (Halle 1828), Frei in the Rhein. Mus. vii. 1850. 527 ff., viii. 1853. 268 ff., Zeller Pre-Socrates vol. ii. pp. 412—416 Eng. tr., Blass Die attische Beredsamkeit (Attic Oratory) i. p. 44, 111. 2. 323 ff. Susemihl Gorgias and Attic prose in Jahrb. f. Phil. cxv. 1877. pp. 793—799, De vitis Tisicai etc. (Greifswald 1884) p. xx ff., Diels 'Gorgias and Empedocles' Sitzungsber. der Berliner Akad. 1884. p. 343 ff. SUSEM. (448) Also Cope in Journal of Sacred and Class. Phil. iii. 65—80.

The following passage, II. 26—30, is elaborately treated by Prof. Ridgeway, in Transactions of the Camb. Philological Soc. vol. ii. pp. 135—138. His results are here accepted. He further suggests (Journal of Philology xv. p. 164) that the particular occasion of creating new citizens, which called forth this jest, was a defeat of the Larisaenians by Ly- cophron of Pherae in 404 B.C., as related by Xenophon Hell. ii. 3. 4: 27 εἰρωνευόμενοι = ironically, though the word could have the meaning "jestingly." But we are told Rhet. iii. 7, 11, 1408 b 20, ἦ μὲν εἰρωνεῖας ὑπὲρ Γοργίας ἐπέει, that Gorgias used to be ironic in his speeches. SUSEM. (449)

28 εὖ καθάπερ ὄλκους κτλ] "said that mortars were the staple manufacture of the place and freemen of the magis-trates." This untranslatable play upon words turns on the double sense of ὄλμος, which was (1) the title for the chief magistrates in many places (cp. n. 1586), thus answering to 'mayor' or
29 μένους, οὗτοι καὶ Λαρισαίοι τούς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργὴν πεποιη- (I) § 3 μένους[, εἶναι γὰρ τινας λαρισαποιουσ']· ἐστὶ δὲ ἀπλοῦν. εἰ γὰρ μετείχον κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμόν τῆς πολιτείας, ἢσαν [ἀν] πολιταῖ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατὸν ἐφαρμότευν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἢ ἐκ πολιτίδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οἰκησάντων ἢ κτισάντων.

ἀλλὰ ἰὼνι ἐκείνῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει ἄποριάν, ὥσιν με-

35 τέσσεραν μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἷον Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολῆς: πολ-

§ 4 λοις γὰρ ἐφιλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους, μετοίκους. τὸ δ’

29 λαρισαίων fr., λαρισαίων not λαρισαίων Bk,² (so throughout) | τῶν omitted by Mᵀᵇ | 30 [εἶναι.....λαρισαποιουσ'] Ridgeway | λαρισαποιουσ' Camerarius, larisasceorum factores Ar., larisasceoius III (including fr.) Bk,¹ | 32 ήσαν ἢν P²-3 Qᵇ Tᵇ Ar. Bk., ἠσαν P³ fr. Ald. and, over an erasure, P⁴, ἢ ἄν Uᵇ | καὶ γὰρ oί P⁴ Qᵇ Tᵇ I,s Bk., οἶδε γὰρ Susem,¹ misled by William’s translation ηορεω ενίμ | 33 εκ omitted by P⁴ and perhaps by Γ, [εκ] Susem,¹-², perhaps rightly | οἰκισάντων Bender | 34 ἐκείνω Vettori (ms. correction in the Munich copy of his 1st ed.) and an unknown hand in the margin of the Aldine at Munich, ἐκείνων P⁴ and, with an erasure over ει, P¹: ἐκείνω Susem,¹ in text and perhaps Mᵀ, ἐκείνων P⁴-6 QMᵇ Qᵇ Tᵇ Uᵇ Ar. Ald. and P³ (corrector), probably also Mᵀ, accepted by Bender; ἐκείνωi apparently P³ (1st hand): Γ uncertain, illi magis haece William, whence ἐκείνωι.....ἐχονί the editors from Vettori and Morel to Bekker | 35 ὄνομ <ἄ> Chandler | 37 δούλους καὶ ξένους M⁸ (1st hand) and Valsecchi (notes on Herod. p. 404) | καὶ δούλους<καὶ> μετοίκους Ar. Bk,², καὶ [δούλους] μετοίκους or καὶ πολλοῖς μετοίκους? Göttling, μετοίκους καὶ δούλους Niebuhr (II. 305 n. 2, Eng. tr.), μετοίκους ξένους Spengel. See however Meier De gentil. Att. p. 6, Bernays Herakl. Brieße p. 155 f., and on the other side c. 5 § 2 with n. (503)

‘burgomaster,’ and as this was so in parts of Thessaly (see Schömann Antiq. irr. publ. p. 84 n. 10, Antiquities of Greece p. 142 Eng. tr.) it may have been also at Larisa: while (2) at the same time in Attica, and the common language generally, it was the term for workmen or mechanics (J. G. Schneider). The jest, when cited in this context, raises a presumption that the magistrates of Larisa bore this same title at the foundation of the city and had full powers to make citizens of whom they pleased: yet who in the world would spoil such a joke or pun by inquiring whether this was historically true? (But the jest would lose all its point if δημιουργαί be taken, as Oncken suggests, to mean the founders, not the magistrates, of Larisa. For every town has its founders, and not merely Larisa and certain towns like it: nor does the word bear this meaning unless some more precise phrase be added.) Further comp. VIII(IV). 6 § 6 n. (1573), 10 § 5 n. (1651): VI(IV). 4. 16. n. (1188). SUSEM. (450) Cp. Thuc. 1. 56 ἐπιδημιουργαί.

30 εἶναι γὰρ τινας λαρισαποιουσ'] "For (he said) some [of them] are Larisamakers," i.e. hardware manufacturers. Why should Gorgias interpret his own joke? It is more likely that this is a gloss by some one who did not see that οἶκουs goes with Λαρισαίους above; or perhaps believed that λάρσα, λαρσίς meant 'a kettle' on the analogy of τάναγρα, ταναγρίς. In Anthol. Pal. vi. 305, τῶς Λαρισαίων κυνογάριστορος ἐψήφωρας, Λαρισαίος is an adjective, and this makes against its supposed use as a substantive, and therefore against the emendation of Camerarius (Ridgeway).

§ 3 30 ἀπλούν] a simple question, οὐδέν παὐκλών.

37 πολλοίς γὰρ ἐφιλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους "for he admitted into the tribes many resident-aliens of foreign and servile extraction" (δούλους = freedmen). It is well known that Cleis-

thenes abolished the four ancient tribes
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 2. [ΠΙΙ. 2. 4

ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότε-(Π) ρον ἀδίκως ἡ δικαιώς. καίτοι κἂν τούτο τις ἐτι προσαπορή-

τειν, ἀρ' εἰ μὴ δικαιώς πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταύτῳ δύνα-

§ 5 μένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ φευγοῦ. ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρέμων καὶ ἀρ-

χωντάς τινας ἀδίκως, οὐς ἀρχεῖν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ' οὐ δικαιῶς,

ὁ δὲ πολίτης ἀρχῇ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστὶν (ὁ γὰρ κοινονών

5 τῆς τούτισκαν ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστὶν, ὡς φαμεῖ), δῆλον ὦτι τὸ-

3 λίτας μὲν ἐνιαὶ φατέων καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαιῶς ἡ

μὴ δικαιώς συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρῶτερον ἀμφι-

σβήτημαν. ἀπορούσαν γὰρ τινες πόθ' ἡ πόλις ἐπράξε καὶ πότε

9 οὔχ ἡ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἔξ ἀλητείας ἡ τυφλώδος γένεται

§ 2 δημοκρατία, τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἐνιοῦ βούλονται

diāλευκα, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυφλών λαβῶνες,

39 κάν Βκ.2, καὶ ΓΠ.Ιι.Αρ. Βκ.1, προσαπορήθεσεν <ἀν> Götting, τις <ἀν> Spengel <πρὸτότῳ W. Ι. Ald. Βκ., τοῦτο Μ. (1st hand), τοῦτω ΓΠ.Ι.Β.Α.Μ. (corr).

1276 α 5 τῆς omitted by Μ.Π.1, [τῆς] Susem.1 | ἐφαμεν Π.ΙΠ.Αρ. Βκ. | 7 συνάπτειν? Kotacs | 9 γίνεται Γ.Αρ.

(see p. 340) and established in their place ten local divisions, for which he retained the name φαλολ: Curtius Hist. 1 pp. 382—387 Eng. tr., Schömann pp. 336, 365 Eng. tr. Comp. n. (588) on 9 § 13, VII(VI. 4. 19 n. (1427). SUSEM. (451)

Congreve supports the reading of Bekker2 and Thirlwall (ΠΙΙ. 74) by a comparison of ΙV. (VII. 4) § 6 δοῦλων ἀρμῶν πολλῶν καὶ μετοικῶν καὶ ξένων, § 14 ξένου καὶ μετοικίου. But this is nullified by Aristoph. Ach. 503—8, ἔρ. 347 ή πον δικίδιον ἐπατε κατά ξένον μετοικίου, Παχ 297 μέτοικου καὶ ξένου. That δοῦλοι may be used of freedmen is capable of abundant proof: Athenaeus vi. 63, 267 Ρ, c διαφέρειν δ' ἐφ' ἡσιάν Χριστίππος δοῦλον οἰκε-

του γράφειν εν β' ἐπὶ ὀμορφαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀπελευθέρωσιν μὲν δοῦλως ἑτι ἐνίαι, οἰκέτας δὲ τοὺς μη τῆς κτήσεως ἀφεὶμένως: Lysias s. Αγεταί. § 64 δοῦλος καὶ ἐκ δοῦλων ἐστίν (of a citizen): Isaeus vi Ι. 40, οὐτοὶ ὀμολογομενείς οὐδα δοῦλη (of a freedwoman): Harpocration Ι. 42. μετοικίων, κρ. Boeckh Phil. Economy p. 48 Eng. tr. (the freedmen paid this tax). The proceeding of Cleisthenes was not more violent than that of Euphoron at Sicyon: Xen. Hell. viii. 3, 8 δοῦλων μὲν οὐ μόνον ἐλευθέρους ἀλλὰ καὶ πολίτες ἐστοι: and the two commonest sources of an artisan population are cited side by side, infra c. 5 § 3 παρ ἐντὸς ἕν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἡ ἐνεικών. There

is no authority for δοῦλοις μετοικίως and if any change were needed Niebuhr's would be the simplest. See also Grote iv. 170 n. 1, Schömann Constitutional History p. 69 f. Eng. tr.

§ 5 1276 α 6 καὶ τούτους! Even those who have received the franchise in consequence of a revolution. SUSEM. (452) "πρῶτερον" ΙΠ. 1 n. (432). SUSEM. (453) c. 3 The identity of the state depends not upon its territory but upon its con-

stitution. § 2 10 ἐνιοῖ] Possibly writers who advocated repudiation are meant: Introil. p. 20 n. 1. SUSEM. (454)

11 διαλευκα = discharge, pay in full. ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως κτλ] "on the ground that it was a loan to the tyrant and not to the state." This question was really raised in B.C. 403, when after the expulsion of the thirty, the Athenian state debated whether it was obliged to repay a loan of 100 talents borrowed by them from the Spartans, Demosth. xx. 11 f., Isocr. vii. 68 f. (Vettori). The con-

verse case, viz. that the credit of a service rendered by the expelled tyrants was claimed by the state, arose, when the Corinthians after the expulsion of the Cypselidae demanded that the offerings dedicated by this family at Delphi and Pisa should be inscribed with the name of the town, and the acts of their tyrants be thus regarded as acts of the state.
oúτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνήας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ (I) κρατεῖν ὑσσας, ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρουν. **. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρατοῦσαί τινες, κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τούτον ὁμοίως 15 <ὁ> τής πόλεως φατέων εἶναι [ταυτῆς] τάς τής πολιτειὰς ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὁλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.

§ 3 έοικε δ' ὁ λόγος οἰκείος εἰναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ χρή λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἔτεραν. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτυλαιμισθή τῆς ἀπορίας (φ. 62)
20 ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν ἐνδεχε- ταί γιὰ διαζευγθηναι [τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους], καὶ § 4 τοὺς μὲν ἔτερον τοὺς δὲ ἔτερον οἰκίσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν

12 πολλὰ omitted by Ald. and Plut. 1st hand, added in the margin) || <ἐπι> τῷ Lindau || 13 συμφέρουν, <ἀλλά καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία οὐ σκοτεῖ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον> | something similar? | Susem. || 14 καὶ δημοκρατοῦσαι] κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ἐτράποντο | Susem.1-2 following William's incorrect version in democratiam versus fuissent || 15 <Ὁ> Hayduck || "ταυτῆς is pleonastic" Eaton; [ταυτῆς] Thurot; τῆς αὐτῆς Koraes (with mark of interrogation after 16 τυραννίδος and a comma after 14 τούτον instead of before κατά) || 17 ο λόγος after oikeos Plut. II. Blk. || [πῶς] ποτέ Spengel Susem, see § 5 || 21 [τὸν...ἀνθρώπους] Susem., dittotherapy from 20, [τὸν τόπον καὶ] Bächeler

The Delphians admitted the claim, the Eleans rejected it: see Plut. De Lydi. orig. 13. 400 E (Schlosser). Comp. further n. (432) on I § 1. Susem. (455)

Broughton (p. 171) cites the case of the United States and the bonds issued by the abortive Confedermate government.

λαβώντος] Comp. Thuc. III. 81 ἀπέ-θανον...Ἀλλοι (ἐνεκα) χρημάτων ὁδίων ὕππον τῶν λαβώντων (τῶν δανεισασμένων Schol.).

12 ὡς ἐναὶ κτλ] "for some forms of the state rest upon superior force and are not due to public expediency." This is the second time that Aristotle refers beforehand to his doctrine of 'degenerate' forms of government, more precisely laid down in c. 6; see above iii. (439 b, 449). Susem. (456)

13 συμφέρον. **] The lacuna may perhaps be thus supplied: <But democracy also is a government of this sort. > Susem. (457)

14 δημοκρατοῦσαι] Ridgeway suggests that William of Moerbeke took this word to come from δημοκράτω, and hence his rendering; in democratiam versus fuissent.

§ 3 17 ἐοικε δ' κτλ] But the true grounds of this controversy lie deeper in another question which now needs to be investigated. Susem. (458)

20 ζήτησις] The most obvious mode of investigation is concerned with the place and the inhabitants.

21 διαζευγθηναι "disjoined," "separated." Aristotle has in view the measure which the Greeks called δοκικέων, ep. viii(V). 10. II n. (1668), when a town was destroyed by its conquerors and the inhabitants were driven to seek new homes in the neighbourhood in a number of unwalled villages and hamlets, as was done to Mantinea by the Spartans in 385 B.C. This was an oligarchical measure: for the custom of living together in a walled town was usually favourable to democracy. The opposite and democratical procedure, the union of several country places, hitherto unwalled, in a single town was συνοικίζεων; and directly after the battle of Leuctra this was done by the Mantineans who rebuilt their city B.C. 370 and moreover gave the impulse to the foundation of a common capital of all Arcadia, namely Megalopolis. See Curtius Hist. IV. pp. 305, 417 ff. Eng. tr., Schomann Antip. p. 171 Eng. tr. Cp. also i. 2. 8 n. (20 b). Susem. (459)

§ 4 22 ταυτῆν μὲν οὖν πραοτέραν] In this form the problem must be regarded as easier to solve, for the variety of meanings of the word 'state' facilitates a solution.
πραοτέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχος γὰρ τῆς πόλεως (I) λεγομένης, ἐστὶ πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως): ὁμιλοὶ 
25 ὡς ἐν καὶ τῶν τού αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων ἀνθρώπων πότε
§ 5 δει νομίζειν μὲν εἶναι τῆς πόλιν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν εἴη γὰρ ἀν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβάλειν ἐν τείχοις, τοιαύτη
τῇ ἱστοι καὶ Βαβυλῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡτίς ἐχει περιγραφὴν 29 μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως· ἢ γὲ φασιν ἐαλοκυλας τρίτην
§ 6 ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καίρον χρήσιμος ἢ σκέψεις (περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τὸ τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἢ πλείω συμφέρει, δεὶ μι) λανθανειν τῶν πολιτικῶν· ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων τοῦ αὐτῶν τόπου, 35 πότερον ἔως ἂν ἢ το γένος ταύτο τῶν κατοικοῦντων, τὴν αὐτήν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ τῶν μὲν φθειρομέ-

23 πρωτέραν Qb Tb, Spengel thinks the word corrupt | 25 αὐτῶν τόπουν P4-6 Wb
I, Ar. Ald. Bk. Susem.; perhaps also Γ, eundem locum William || 26 εἶναι μὲν M* P1 || 26 δὴ P1 Qb || 27 πελοποννήσῳ Γ M* P3 || 28 καὶ πᾶσα....29 πόλεως transposed to follow 30 πόλεως Ramus || 32 ποσῶν M* P1 || 33 ἔθνος omitted by Π2 Ar. and in P1 where a lacuna of twice its length is left

23 πολλαχος λεγομένης] As in Greek there is only the one word πόλας for 'city' and 'state,' in such a case as that just cited in n. (459) it might well be asked, whether the state of Mantinea continued to exist at all in the interval between the destruction and the rebuilding of the city. In fact, the dispute did not merely turn upon different meanings of the word πόλας, as Aristotle thinks: but the imperfection of the Greek conception of the state, which even Aristotle has not surmounted (Introct. p. 21), is brought clearly to light. See however 9 § 10 n. (524). SUSEM. (460)

Unquestionably it would be a great gain if we could keep this limited conception always before us, and the translation of πόλας, πολειτεία, by 'city' 'civic' rather than 'state' 'political' is in many cases desirable on that account. But one uniform rendering is clearly impossible. To bring home the fact that the citizens of Rome formed what we may call a 'municipal corporation' we cannot be always styling them the 'burgess-body.'

§ 5 26 οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν] Editors compare Thucyd. vii. 77. 7 ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ ναῖς; Soph. Oed. Rix 56 ὡς οὐδὲν ἔστων οὔτε πύργος οὔτε ναῖς ἐρημὸς ἄνδρων τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων ἔσω; Tac. Hist. 1. 84 quid? vos pulcherrimam hanc urbern domibus et teetis et congestu lapidum stare creditis? SUSEM. (461)

27 Πελοποννήσῳ] Cp. Pseudo-Lysias II (ἐπιτάχως) § 45, περὶ ἀπάσαν τὴν Πελοποννήσου τέχος περιβάλειν, viz. the wall across the isthmus proposed in the Persian wars.

28 ἐχει περιγραφὴν has a circumference of a nation; i.e. encircles a nation rather than a state.

29 μᾶλλον ἔθνος] Comp. n. (11) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (463)

ἡ γὲ φασιν ἐαλοκυλας] The capture by Cyrus is meant: Herod. 1. 178, 191. Nothing is there said however of an interval of three days, but we are told that when the extremities of the town were captured the Babylonians who lived in the centre had not yet discovered that it was taken. See also II. 6. 6 n. (200). SUSEM. (462)

§ 6 31 εἰς ἄλλον καίρον] The size is discussed in IV(vii). c. 4; the uniformity of race in VIII(v). 3. 11 f.: cp. n. (1531). See however Introct. p. 56. SUSEM. (464) Comp. for the phrase solvere in alium diem.
37 ποταμοὺς]. The allusion is to the dīiē of Heraclitus. ποταμοῦς θὶς τοῖς αὐτοῖς οὖν ἀν ἐμφάνισε, Frg. 41, 43, 81 ed. Bywater (Eaton, Ridgway).

§ 7 1276 b 2 κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας] Ridgeway rightly defends this, translating “For if the state is a kind of community, but it (ἡ πόλις) is in fact a community possessed by citizens in a constitution,” and adding the ms. text of 9 § 14 as another instance of the double genitive with κοινωνία. If any change is to be made at all, we should omit πολιτῶν, which, though grammatically unobjectionable, is superfluous and somewhat obscures the sense. Usually κοινωνία πολιτῶν or κοινωνία has been made the subject of the second sentence, and κοινωνία πολιτείας or πολιτεία its predicate, “and fellowship (of the citizens) is fellowship in a constitution” or “consists in a constitution.” SUSEM.

§ 8 7 εἰσοδὸς ἐτερον τῆς συνθέσεως] “if the kind of combination be different,” i.e. if the elements be differently combined.

8 ἀρμονίαν] See Exc. iv on B. v(viii). SUSEM. (465)

In these two modes the notes (φθόγγοι) are the same: but the Dorian mode is from Ε to ο, and b natural is μεσή or key-note; while the Phrygian mode is from D to d and a is μεσή. Comp. Dio Chrysost. 11. p. 21 ἀρμονία Δώριος και Φρύγιος ἀλλὰ καὶ Λύδιος.

§ 9 9 εἰ δὴ τούτων ἐξελ τὸν τρόπον] “On these principles then it is plain that we must affirm the identity of the city by a reference to its constitution.” It would be unjust to Aristotle to apply to this conclusion * in its literal sense his assertion 6 § 1 n. (523), 7 § 2 (535), 13 § 5 (592), that the constitution is nothing but the form of government, πολιτεία, κύριον. For the truth is that, like Plato, he includes under πολιτεία all which goes to condition the form of government as well as all that is directly conditioned by it. Thus, as Zeller 11 ii p. 551 rightly observes, he includes *even the main ‘features of the commonwealth which ‘find expression in the spirit of the state ‘administration and in the mode in which ‘the end of the state is conceived”: see 11(vii). 8 § 5 n. (800), 8 § 3 (806). Thus his notion of a polity or πολιτεία is not narrower but wider than our notion of a constitution. For when we speak with scientific precision the term ‘constitution’ usually denotes only the particular form which the political organism assumes, or the sum total of the rules regulating the distribution of political functions:—although no doubt, as a matter of fact, the text of a modern constitution does
not fully or exclusively contain constitutional rules answering to the definition just given; but admits all those laws in general which, as the fundamental laws of the state, appear to demand special guarantees. Hence it is that to Aristotle no less than to Plato the regulation of education in the spirit of the constitution is eminently and essentially a part of the constitution: see v(vii), 1 § 1. n. (1973), vii (v), 9 § 11 (1641). Thus he by no means ignores a state of things in which the prevalent morality and education are out of harmony with the existing constitution, but where such is the case he firmly maintains that this existing constitution has not yet been fully realized, vi (iv), § 3, n. (1216). Again, that he includes under the 'constitution' the regulation of property relations, is perfectly clear from iv (vii), c. 9, 10 § 9. Consult also n. (190).

But even when these admissions are made, our judgment must be that in coming to this conclusion he has again (see nn. 82, 296, 339) left too much out of sight, may utterly rejected, 'the conception of the nation as a natural whole,' to use the words of Hildenbrand p. 416. However the union of a people into one state may have been brought about, whether there is mixed nationality, or all are of the same stock, we shall never cease to regard its constitutional history as simply a main element of its history as a people; and therefore we shall always find it impossible to separate e.g. the English constitution from the English nation. To us the sentiment here expressed will appear outrageous:—that the English nation might be superseded by another race and yet that so long as the same constitution was preserved, there would still remain the same state. See further Isoc. vii § 14, who calls the constitution the soul of the state. Susem. (466)

13 ei de dikaios. logos eteros] 4 But whether justice requires us to discharge or to repudiate our obligations (§ 2) when the state changes to another constitution is a different question. 5 The point is not resumed in the sequel.

"This shows at once the defectiveness of Aristotle's decision. He feels himself that after so deciding he could only consistently answer the present question by affirming the justice of repudiation and guards himself against doing so because at the same time he does not want to say this right out. But in order to have a scientific justification for this course he should at least have indicated other instances favouring the other side of the question." Susem. (467)

cc. 4, 5 Is the virtue of the good man identical with that of the good citizen? See Anal. p. 109, and Thurot Etudes pp. 105—117.

Plato's identification of them is a fundamental principle of the Republic, implied in the analogy of the state and the individual and particularly evident in the treatment of imperfect states and imperfect individuals, B. viii, ix. Aristotle admits it in some cases (4 § 9), i.e. in the perfect state; and he no less precisely asserts that in most constitutions they are distinct (6 § 1), the identity of the goodness of the man and of the citizen being only coextensive with the active exercise of the administrative powers which he enjoys. This is in accord with N. E. v. 2, 11: od gar istora taivn anevri t' agathv einai kai politya panti, on which see Jackson's note which disposes of Grant's strange view that the author of the 'Eudemian' Book v used, with essential discrepancies, the present chapter and other sections of the Politics.

16 ton de vuv eiarmenon...18 mh TIN AUTFH] Schlosser's assertion that this is out of place is quite groundless. On the Aristotelian conception, the state is an institution for educating a human being, or more especially a man (see n. on § 3), at once for happiness and for the greatest possible fitness or excellence. Hence to
πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου στον- (II) ἐαίοι θετέον, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν. ἀλλὰ μὲν εἶ γε τοῦτο τυ- χεῖν δεῖ ξετὴσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τοιν πρῶτον ἐλ-
πτέον. ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἰς τις τῶν κοινωνῶν ἐστίν,
§ 2 οὕτω καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμέν. τῶν δὲ πλωτήρων καῖπερ ἀνο-
μοίων οὐν τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ἀρετής, ὁ δὲ
κυβερνήτης), ὁ δὲ προφερόμεν, ὃ ἀλλὰ παντιν τινα ἐχων τοιαύτην (ἐποιμιαία) δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἐκόστοις λόγος
25 ἐδοξίον ἔσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινοῦ τις ἐφαρμό-
σει πᾶσιν. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστιν αὐτῶν
§ 3 πάντων τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστος ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁμοίως 2
τοῖνν καὶ τῶν πολίτων, καϊπερ ἀνομοίων οὐτων, ἡ σωτη-
ρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινοία δ’ ἐστίν ἡ πολιτεία: 30 διόπερ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πο-
λιτείαν. εἰπέρ οὖν ἐστὶ πλείων πολιτείας εἴδη, δῆλον ὡς αὖκ
ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μῖᾶν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τῇ τέ-


inquire how far, under any constitution,
the state can reach this goal touches a
fundamental point in constitutional theory of
the ultimate generality; and constitutions
may be classified, as (1) better or best,
(2) worse or worst, according as they are more or less adapted to this end.

The present inquiry accordingly serves as
the basis of the classification of constitutions
in order of merit which follows in
§ 6, and of the entire theory of the
separate constitutions. This then, and
this alone, is precisely the right place for
cc. 4, 5. That they have defects in the
execution we are not prepared to deny,
since Aristotle must have himself intended
materially to recast them subsequently
(see n. 471; compare III. 473, 478); but
this intention was never carried out.

SUSEM. (468)

One glaring defect in the execution is
the frequent violation of the rule forbidding
the hiatus, which is fairly well ob-
erved in the rest of B. III. There are
40 bad cases in c. 4 alone out of a total of
90 odd for the whole of the book.

19 τῷ πὶ τὐλὶ in outline. A frequent
expression: IV(VII). 16, 12, VI(VIII). 7, 2,
VII(VI). 8, 24, VIII(V). 2, 1: Ἀρ. Ἐθ. ι. 3
§ 3, 3 § 4 παραλλ. καὶ τύπος.
20 The simile of the crew is much
used by Plato: Rep VI. 455 Α ff., Polit-
icus 297, 8 ff.; in the latter passage
joined with that of the physician which
is nowhere reusing it (ΠΠ’)

§ 2 22 τὴν δύναμιν is an adverbial
accus. See n. on φῶν 1 12 22.

23 κυβερνήτης] steersman, or pilot,
answers in some respects more to
the ship’s captain, as he is skilled in
navigation (Plato II. c.) and responsible
for the course of the vessel. Whereas the
valκληρος or skipper, usually the
owner of the ship, although nominally in
council, need not be a practical seaman.

§ 3 27 ὁμοίως τοῖνν κτλ] Some (the citizens take part in the administration
of the state merely as members of the
popular assembly, others merely as
judges in the law courts or members of
the council; others again in a higher
degree by filling various official posts.
(Schosser has strangely mistaken the
sense; he thinks that the skill of the cap-
tain, helmsman, helmsman’s assistant in
the simile answers to the excellence of
the man; and the performance of a successful
voyage to civic excellence.) SUSEM. (46

28 ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοιν.] the main-
ance of the (political) union.
30 πρὸς] relative to. Congreve c
pares I. 13 § 15.
λείαν τὸν δ’ ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρά φαμέν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετήν εἶναι (11)
§ 4 τὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολῖτην ὄντα σπουδαίον
μὴ κεκτήσθαι τὴν ἀρετήν καθ’ ἢν σπουδαίος ἀνήρ, φανερῶν
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλου πρότον ἔστι διαποροῦντας ἐπει- 3 λ'
§ 5 θείον τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ

33 τὸν δ’ ... 34 τελείαν omitted by M. Pab Qb Tb fr. Ald. and Pb-4 (1st hand, added by corr.) of P 3 and in the margin of P 1, and there τὴν is also above the line) μίαν omitted by Albert Ar. (?). BK. (who writes κατ’) εἶναι κατὰ Γ BK. 34 τὴν omitted by BK. and P 1 (1st hand, added by corr.), for P 4 see above 36 ἀλλά omitted in fr. III (added by p 1) 37 παρὰ? Susem., <κατὰ τὸν> περὶ Schmidt

33 τὸν δ’ ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρά [Aristotle speaks here continuously of the virtue and fitness of the man (ἀνήρ) rather than of the human being, because he regards the ἀρετή of the woman as inferior and belonging to a separate species: see § 4 15 18 nn. (491, 492): 1 13 §§ 9 11, nnn. (114 b, 117, 119). Susem. (470)]

§ 4. 36 ἐπελθεῖν τι or περὶ τῶν are separately found: while VIII(vi), 10. ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας ἐς ὑπὸ φθειρέται is equivalent to a conjunction of the two. The meaning would then be "to review the same question in the case of the model state." Spengel takes περὶ with διαποροῦντας: "by raising objections to the possibility of the model state." But the sense seems to require that ἀθέτει τὸν μετὰ τοιούτων λόγον should mean ἀθέτει τὸν ἀληθινόν λόγον that is, the "true" in the sense here 'to arrive at the same result'; and if so, παρὰ might be necessary = 'starting from the best constitution' or 'from the point of view of the best constitution'.

Susem.

§ 5 37 εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον (For if it be impossible that a state should contain or virtuous men, since it is impossible for its citizens to be all alike.) how at does this agree with the passages quoted in n. (133) on II. 2. 4, according to which at least approximate equality of the citizens must be assumed in the best state? Further (as Thurot p. 108 rightly observes) we are told at c. 18 § 1 that it had been shown at the outset of the discussion (ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις λόγοις) that the virtue and excellence of the man and of the citizen of the best state is necessarily the same, and the reference can only be to cc. 4 6 §§ 1; see n. (684) on 1 8 1. We might try to get over the contradiction by assuming that at this sent stage of the discussion, 4 § 5, the arguments πρὸ and κατὰ had not all been sifted dialectically and the final cor-

wh

of

or

* Not directly after 4 § 5, as Thurot thinks, for the rest of chapter 4 from § 7 to the end would not agree with that supposition. Then it is presupposed that hitherto the two sorts of excellence have been declared to be not absolutely the same even in the ideal state.

† As suggested by Susemmil in Compos. Aris. I. 24 f. n. (24).

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adýnaton εξ ἀπάντων σπουδαίων ἄντων εἶναι πόλιν, δεὶ δ' ἐκα- (11) 39 στον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εὐ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, ἐπεὶ- 40 δὴ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίως εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, <δεὶ δ' ἐκα- 39 στον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εὐ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς> οὐκ ἂν 1277 a εἴη ἀρετῇ μία πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὐτὸ γὰρ ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρός τοῦ ἁγία- (π. 64) +θοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαίον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς § 6 εἰ τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. [ἐτὶ ἐπεὶ εξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πό- 4 λις, ὡσπερ ξοδὸν εὐθύς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σῶματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκίας εξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτήσεις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δουλοῦ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πό- 9 λις εξ ἀπάντων τε τοιών καὶ πρὸς τούτοις εξ ἂλλων ἀνομοίων

38 ὅπως Bernays || δεὶ δ'.....39 ἀρετῆς transposed to follow 40 πολίτας Thurot || 40 ἐπεὶ δὲ Π, ἐπεὶ δὲ Π Εκ. ἐπεὶ δ' Βικ. Bernays, ἐπεὶ Spengel || ὁμοίως Π16 Q1 T5 || 39 αὐτῶν ΠΕ2 Βικ., αὐτῶν Π, αὐτὸν Π, αὐτὸν fr. 1277 a 1 μια ἀρετῇ ΠΕ2 fr. Βικ. || πολίτων <τε σπουδαῖον> Schmidt || 3 πολίτεων Π1 (1st hand), perhaps right: γρ. πόλιν corr. 1 in the margin of Π 4 <ἀγαθῶς> ἁγίας; Susem., ὁμοίως Bernays, perhaps right || 3 πολίτας * * Thurot; but see Comm. n. (471) and (471 *) || [ἐτὶ ἐπεὶ..... 12 παναστάτου] Susem.; see Comm. n. (473). Thurot suspected the § || 8 [κτήσεις] Bernays, [κτήσεις εκ] Welldons all equally virtuous men, but it does affect the much more illogical inference that the inferior citizens of the best state have only civic virtue. On the contrary here the degree of civic excellence also must be regulated by that of individual excellence, and the special nature of the one by the special nature of the other; and one consequence of this is that which Aristotle in complete accordance with the facts lays down as a criterion of the best state, viz. that in its administration each is employed according to his special faculties and capacities and assigned to his right place. It may thence be inferred that Aristotle had no intention of permitting all the members of the governing civic body in the pattern state to fill all the various public offices in rotation, but that he assumed that this most virtuous civic body would always elect to particular state offices the fittest and most virtuous of its members. Cp. 11 § 8 n. (659). Consequently it must be allowed that the officers of state in the perfect city do not represent the union of the virtue of the citizen and of the man, as is here stated, but rather that they represent the highest and most perfect degree of this union: and so far from being erroneous it is quite correct to say that Aristotle includes in this polity those who are not yet elected but are still eligible to such a position. Only they do not actually attain a complete confirmation of this highest individual virtue (which is at the same time the highest civic virtue) until they are elected to office; cp. further n. (521) on III. 7. 10. Nor should we forget that at IV (VII), 14. 8 n. (902) Aristotle makes only the virtue of the ruler (πολιτικὸν καὶ ἄρχων- τος) equivalent to the virtue of the man: in the best state the rulers are primarily the popular assembly composed of the elder citizens, but in a still higher degree the men selected out of it who are elected to offices of state. SUSEM. (471)

40 ὁμοίως] See n. on 11. 2. 3, 1261 a 24. § 6 1277 a 6 εὐθύς =for instance, like αὐτίκα. The first instance that comes to hand.

7 ὀρέξεως] Appetite, or impulse; here put for the irrational part of the soul in general (Eaton). See n. (49) on 1. 5. 6. SUSEM. (475)

9 εξ ἀπάντων τε...εὐθύς] But these constituents are not all citizens in the sense of the definition given c. 1 § 2, and yet this alone is material here (Thurot). 24
In fact this whole argument is so absurd that I cannot bring myself to attribute it to Aristotle. In the case treated in n. (201) on III. 5. 1, there is an essential difference. The interpolation may be due to a gross misapprehension of 11. 2. 3: comp. n. (133). "SUSEM. (473)"

§ 7 13 ἀλλ' ἄρα ἦσσαι τινὸς κτλ] "Shall we say then that there is a particular case in which there is the same excellence in a good citizen and a good man?"

15 ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον] As distinguished from φρόνιμοι, ἀγαθὸς refers to moral virtue (cp. n. 40). Just in the same way at 11 § 2 we have ἀρετή καὶ φρονήσεως in combination; where ἀρετή is 'virtue' simply, i.e. moral virtue. Cp. n. (562) and n. (703) on IV.(VIII). 1. 10.

On the relation of φρονίσεως (Prudence, Insight) as the virtue of the practical intellect to the moral virtues see nn. (45, 112, 115). Further comp. III. 4 § 18 with nn. (493, 497, 498). "SUSEM. (474)"

16 φρόνιμον] Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 5. 5, διά τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς πολίτες φρονίμους οἰκίσα ἐστι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοὶς ἀγαθά καὶ τὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διανοιὰς θεωρεῖν, εἰς δὲ τοιούτων ἡγοῦμεν τοὺς ὑκονομικοὺς καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: ib. vi. c. 8, which treats fully of φρονίσεως or Practical Wisdom; Plato Politic. 292 D, 294 A ἀνδρὰ τῶν μετὰ φρονίσεως βασιλεύσων (Eaton). "SUSEM. (475)"

§ 8 17 λέγοντα τινὲς] Whether these were authors, is doubtful. "SUSEM. (476)"

Mr Wyse finds the reference in Ps.-Plato First Alc. 121 b ff.; the special education of the Persian and Spartan kings.

18 Εὐρύπτιδης] In the Aesopus, Frag. 16 Nauck. Further comp. IV.(VII). 14, 1, n. (891). "SUSEM. (477)"

19 τὰ κομψὰ sc. ποικίλοι γενολατο] let them not become versatile in accomplishments.

§ 9 20 ἐδ' ἢ αὕτη κτλ] Far more just is Aristotle's admission VIII(v). 9. 1 that the moral virtue of the ruler also varies with the different constitutions, so that except in the best state he does not possess the single absolute moral virtue of the man, but only a virtue conditioned in such and such a way, ἐν ἑκάστη πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (Thurot). Cp. n. (1630). "SUSEM. (478)"

23 τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου] 'but in a
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24 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἵσως Ἰάσων ἐφη πεινὴν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοί, ἀς (II) συνασκεῖ καὶ ἀρχῇ καὶ ἀρχὴσθαι, καὶ πολιτον δοκίμου ἡ ἄρτητι εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχῇσθαι καὶ πολιτον δοκίμου ἡ ἄρτητι εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχῇ καὶ ἀρχῇσθαι καὶ πολιτον δοκίμου ἡ ἄρτητι εἶναι τὸ δύ

24 ἵσως omitted in II (added by the corrector of I ³), [ἴσως] Susem. 

25 Ἰάσων] The famous tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly, who attempted to carry out a policy in Greece similar to that afterwards followed by Philip of Macedon. He came to the throne before B.C. 378 and was assassinated in 370. See Curtius Hist. IV. pp. 443-451 E. tr., and Krafft's Art. 'Jason of Pherae' in Pauly's Realencyclopädie. Gotthilf recalls another saying of his cited by Aristotle Rhet. i. 12. 31, 1373 a 25, that he must do some wrong in order to have the power to do much right. Susem. (479)

εἵπῃ] Not φορεῖ, as it would be, if the quotation came from a tragedy.

πεινὴν... ἰδίωτής εἶναι] "he must starve if he were not on the throne, implying that he had never learnt the trade of being a subject." Eaton compares the saying of Astyages to Harpago, and of Demaratos to Leotychides Herod. 1. 129. vi. 67 and what is related of Theras ib. iv. 147: and Aeschyl. Prom. 926; but in all these cases the point is essentially different. Susem. (480) Even Grote is caught napping here, for he represents Jason as saying that he felt hunger until he became despot (III. p. 36 n.).

25 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖται γε τὸ τὸν κατὰ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθημεν ἀρχικῆν, τὴν δὲ τὸν πολιτὸν ἀμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἀμφω ἐπαινεῖτα ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν 30 ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα καὶ οὐ ταῦτα δεῖν τὸν ἄρχωντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχῆμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτὸν ἀμφώτερ' ἐπι...
§ 12 άλλα χρήσθαι μάλλον βάτερον δέ καὶ ἀνδραποδόδες. λέγω δέ βάτερον τὸ δίνασθαι καὶ ύπηρετεῖν τοὺς διακοινικὰς πράξεις. δοῦλον δέ εἰδη πλείω λέγομεν αἰ γὰρ ἐργασία πλείους. ἂν ὑπὲρ μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνίτες· οὗτοι δὲ εἰσώ, ὥσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τοῦνομα αὐτοὺς, οἱ ζώντες ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν, εὖ οὖς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἐστιν. διὸ παρ᾽ ἐνώσι οὐ μετείχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἁρχῶν, πρὶν § 13 δήμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἐσχατὸν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἁρχῶν μένων οὖσιν οὐ δεῖ [τὸν ἁγαθὸν] οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην [τὸν ἁγαθὸν] μανθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν οὐ γὰρ ἐτὶ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοτὲ μὲν

32 κατέθεν Μ', τοιοῦτοί δέ Π' fr. Ar. Βk. Bernays—evidently a mistaken conjecture for κατέθεν obliterating the clear traces left of a lacuna; εντεῦθεν Koraes Rassow | 33 [εστι...] 1277 b 8 ἐλευθέρων Congreve | 34 λέγομεν A. Lambin, λέγουσα | Π' Βk. | 38 χερνίτα p4 and P4 (corrector) | 39 αὐτὸς P3 (1st hand, emended by a later hand), αὐτῶν or αὐτὸ Montecatino 1277 b 4 ἁγαθὸν] ἀρχοντα Rassow, [τὸν ἁγαθὸν] Susem.4, [ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν] Susem.3, οὔτε πολιτικὸν οὔτε πολίτην τῶν ἁγαθῶν Spengel, [οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην τῶν ἁγαθῶν] Thurot | 5 [τὸν ἁγαθὸν] Welldon Susem.4 | 6 γὰρ έτὶ γὰρ τῷ Riese | 5 τοτὲ...7 τοτὲ Riese, τῶν.....τῶν | Π' Βk. Susem.1, cp. the variants IV(VII). 14 § 5 1332 b 37, τῶν.....τῶν Lindau, wrongly

32 * κατέθεν κτλ] Quite apart from the distinct possibility of a longer omission, we may eke out the sense as follows: “but the citizen’s knowledge and experience of both <is now the question before us,> and may be understood from what follows.” SUSEM. (483)

33 ἐστὶ γὰρ ἁρχὴ δεσποτικὴ Not ‘despotic’ rule, which would mean in English rule over a state. “For there is a rule of master over slave and this we say is concerned with the drudgery which the ruler need not necessarily know how to perform, but rather to employ: the former would even be degrading. I mean by the former the ability actually (καὶ = even) to serve in domestic functions.”

πά τὸν ἀναγκαία] More clearly expressed 11. 6 § 5, τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀναγκαία: cp. 1. 7 § 3.


βατέρων δὲ καὶ ἀνδρ.] The other (the former) would inspire the servile spirit mentioned in u. (43) on 1. 5. 8. See III. 5 §§ 2, 3. SUSEM. (485)

§ 12 38 ἀν ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνίτες] Cp. 1. 13 §§ 12, 13 with nn. (103, 122) and III. 5 § 4 with n. (507). SUSEM. (486)

1277 b 2 τὸ παλαιὸν] An adverbial accus. of time, as τὸ ἁγαθὸν 1. 2 § 7. This was the state of things at Athens under Solon’s constitution.

3 δήμον τὸν ἐσχατὸν] The most advanced democracy which by gradual development was usually the final outcome of the more moderate democracy: see Π. 12. 3 n. (406) and the passages cited in nn. (400, 409) and V(VII). 2. 6 with n. (983). SUSEM. (487)

§ 13 5 εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρείας κτλ] “except in certain cases for his private use.” Comp. IV(VII). 14. 7 with nn. (900, 901) and V(VIII). 2. 6 with n. (983). SUSEM. (488)

6 οὖ γὰρ έτὶ] for (if he learns them
III. 4. 16] 1277 a 32—1277 b 16 373

δεσπότην τοτε δὲ δοῦλον. ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἤν ἀρχεῖ (II) § 14 τῶν ὀμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ταυτήν γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τινὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν, ἤν δὲ τῶν ἀρχοῦσα ἄρ-ιο κόμενοι μαθεῖν, οἷον ἔπαρχειν ἔπαρχηθέντα, στρατη-γεῖς στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγόσαντα. διό λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰ ἀρξαί μη § 15 ἀρχεῖντα. τοῦτον δὲ ἄρρητη μὲν ἔτερα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολῖτην 10 τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπίστασαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεῖ-15 σαί, καὶ αὐτὴν ἄρρητή πολίτου, τὸ τίνι τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἄρ- § 16 χίν ἐπίστασαι ἐπὶ ἀμφότεροι. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἁγάθου ἀμφω. 7 <καὶ> τίς? Susem. || 10 καὶ before στρατηγεῖν Susem.14, misled by the versions of William and Ar. || 12 διὸ <καὶ> P3 Qb T9 lk.

for his private use) the objection that he is at one moment master and at another slave no longer applies.

8 ὀμοίων τῷ γένει—his peers, his equals by birth. This healthy conception of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή is in accord with the soundest traditions of Greek political life and the presupposition of the free state or republic in the widest sense.

§ 14 10 ἔπαρχειν κτλ] In Athens (and here too Aristotle has before him especially the circumstances of the Athenian state) the infantry of the city militia consisted of ten ἑκάτερα, one from each φυλή (see n. 451), and perhaps themselves called φωκαί. They corresponded to our battalions or regiments, and were each under the command of a ταξιαρχὸς. Each such τάξις was divided into ἑλάχις or companies, as we should call them, and their commanders were called λοχαγοί. The command of the cavalry was given to two ἔπαρχοι, and under them were ten φιλαρχοί, one for each tribe. The generals, στρατηγοὶ, were ten in number elected annually. Originally they commanded the ten τάξεις: but between 460 and 425 B.C. they took a wholly different position and became from that time the highest executive-politico-military officers. Evidently it was at the same time that the ταξιαρχοί were created, to assume what had been earlier the functions of the στρατηγοὶ: of whom after this period only a few took the field, one having the supreme command, if it was not divided amongst them: or one might carry on war in one district, another in another. Subsequently as a rule only one took the field each year. See Schömann Antiquities p. 420 l., 422, 424 l.


12 ἅγεται κτλ] Comp. iv(vii). 14. 6 f. u. (898) 6. This saying is attributed to Solon by Apollodorus in Diog. Laert. 1. 60, Stob. Flor. xlvii. 22 (Eaton), but hardly on good evidence. Susem. (490)

§ 16 16 καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ κτλ] Both belong to a good man, because individual excellence is one with the political excellence of the ruler: but this cannot be attained without the previous acquisition of excellence in obeying as a subject. But, Thucydid objects, in that case the excellence of the man coincides with the complete excellence of the citizen. And it is meant to be so, and the best constitution tends to this end: only here, according to Aristotle's view, the virtue of the citizen who is governed is as such in all cases a civic virtue and yet does not amount to true individual virtue. It was shown in n. (471) that this latter is an untenable position, given up by Aristotle himself in the course of his exposition: but the censure which may be properly pronounced upon him here is also confined to this. This mistake is closely connected with the fact that Aristotle, going in truth beyond his own real opinion (see n. 120) represents the specific difference between the lower virtue of the woman and the higher virtue of the man, i. 13 §§ 7, 9, 10. vn. (114 b, 117, 119) so as to imply that the former is shown exclusively in obeying and serving, and the latter in ruling and commanding. Comp. n. (470). Susem. (491)
17 σωφροσύνης See n. (206 b) on 11. 6. 9. SUSEM. (492)
19 τοῦ ἡθους ἀρέτη Moral virtue as distinguished from the practical wisdom of § 17. See on 1. 5 § 6 n. (49), § 9 (42), 13 § 6 (112), § 18 (115): III. 4 § 7 (474 ff.). SUSEM. (493)
edὴ ἐξουσία κτλ. "Clearly there will not be simply one form of a moral virtue like justice but it will have branches, one to regulate ruling and the other to regulate being ruled." A distinction quite correct in itself (Schlosser). SUSEM. (494)

The adoption of Bernays' suggestions would slightly modify the translation of § 16: "And both, viz. to rule and to be ruled, belong to the honest man, although a different sort of temperance and justice is shown in ruling (and in being ruled). For it is clear that a virtue, e.g. justice, is not one and the same in the ruler and the free man who is subject to rule (καὶ γὰρ <ἀρχοντος καὶ ἄρχομενον), but has branches which regulate rule and obedience, just as temperance and courage are distinct when shown in man and in woman." Antitheses maintained the contrary: that the Virtue of both is identical.

§ 17 21 σωφροσύνη here = parsimony, like σωφρόνοις 11. 6 §§ 8, 9. So also 23 κοσμία = parsimonious, frugal, and ἄρχολαστος (the opposite quality) = prodigal, extravagant.

18 [γὰρ] Götting, τίς? Susem., γὰρ <ἀρχοντος καὶ> Bernays. The latter following all previous editors, except Götting, punctuates with a comma after 16 ἀμφω and a colon after 17 ἀρχικής 19 τοῦ ἡθους Susem., τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ Γ' (before δῆλον ὑπέρ II Ar. Bk., καὶ ἀρχοντος Rassow 20 ὦ γὰρ II, ἀλλὰς ἄστερ π), in the margin 23 ἀκόλουθος Susem. Triebel independently, apparently also Ar. inhonest: see Bonitz Zeitsch. f. Gymnasialw. xxvi. 1872. 893—895, Susem, and Bonitz ib. xxvii. 1873. 797; ἀλλὸς I1 Susem, (in the text), ἀλλὸς II Bk., ἀλλὸς 1ον 3 Τh, ἀλλως Ald. Schmidt saw that the text was corrupt, and what sense the context required: see Comm. and Susemihl Quest. crit. coll. p. 389

23 οὕτω κοσμία "only just as frugal." It follows that the difference of degree between the virtue of the man and of the woman (see on 1. 13 7 n. 114 b, III. 4 3 n. 470) is not of such a kind that all particular moral virtues are less developed, or need to be less developed, in the woman but such that in some cases the woman must possess a larger share than the man. SUSEM. (495)

24 οἰκονομικὴ ἐτέρα It is only with difficulty that this assertion can be harmonized with B. 1. cc. 8—10: see Exe. III. 10 to B. 1. p. 210. "See also Xenoph. Mem. ii. 7. 12—14, Οἰκον. 7" (Eaton). SUSEM. (496)

25 ἦ δὲ φρόνησις By this must of course be understood simply skill in governing: that is, practical wisdom only so far as it has to do with life in the house, a community or a state, to the exclusion of the private life of the individual. There can be no moral virtue in social life without this kind of intellectual virtue (Schlosser). See 1. 5 9 n. (42), 1. 13 § 6 (112), § 8 (115): III. 4 7 nn. (474—5). Comp. Nic. Eth. VI. 10. 2 ἦ μὲν γὰρ φρονίμης ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν, ἦ δὲ σύνεσις κρατικῆς μόνων; also n. (498): VI. 4 14 n. (1186), and Rhet. l. 11. 27, 1371 b 27, ἀρχικον τὸ φρονέων. Further references are §§ 8 of this chapter and IV(VII). 9 5 n. (810). SUSEM. (497)
§ 18 ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε ὑπὲρ έστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, (p. 66) ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθὴς: ὁσπέρ γὰρ αὐλοποιὸς ὁ ἀρχόμενος, δέ ἄρχων αὐλητὶς ὁ χρώμειος. τὸτερον μὲν ὅπως ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἁγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἐτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἢ ἀυτὴ καὶ πῶς ἐτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων τινων περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτήν ἢτι λείπεται τίς τῶν ἀποριῶν. III ὄσω ἀληθὸς γὰρ πολίτης ἐστίν ὃ κοινωνεῖν ἔξε- ἐστιν ἄρχος, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαραύσους πολίτας θετέων; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτους θετεῖν οἷς μὴ μέτεστιν ἄρχον, οὖν οἷς ἐπὶ παντὸς ἐστὶν πολίτης τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν (οὕτως ἀργο πολι- λύτης): εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, εν τίνι μέρει θε- 29 αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ Πτρ III QΒ Αδ. Βκ. and ΠΒ (1st hand) : 37 οὕτως γὰρ πολιτής untranslated by Λρ., suspected by Schneider; οὕτως γὰρ πολιτής -ἀγαθὸς ὁ δυνάμε- νος ἄρχειν > or something equivalent Thurot

§ 18 29 δόξα ἀληθῆς] 'Right opinion' here denotes more precisely the capacity of rightly apprehending the order given in order to execute it aright, for which the person who executes it is often obliged to discover the ways and means either wholly or in part for himself. 'Right opinion' of this sort does not by any means correspond, as Eaton thinks, with that to which Plato applies the term, simply because the φρόνησις to which Plato often opposes it (as in Laws i. 632 c) coincides with philosophic knowledge. Hence Plato would not concede to right opinion, as Aristotle does Nic. Eth. VI. 10. 3, that σῶσις consists in the right application of opinion so as to judge upon the report of another a matter coming within the sphere of prudence, ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δοξῇ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τοῦτων περὶ ἣν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστερ, ἅλλον λέγωντος. Comp. the last note. See further 1. 13. 8 u. (115). Susem. (498) αὐλοποιὸς] This comparison is taken from Plato Rep. X. 601 D. Cp. 11 § 14 u. (574). Susem. (439) c. 5 § 33 περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτήν κτλ] 'It is an erroneous assumption to think, as Thurot and others do, that this is an altogether different question from the one discussed in the last chapter. These opening words at once prove that Aristotle looks upon the discussion of c. 5 as most closely connected with the chapter preceding. There it was decided that the virtue of the citizen in republican states consists in his being qualified both to rule and to be ruled; but in fact a restriction was needed in those cases where full participation in civic rights is granted to the lowest classes of the people, who live by manual labour, the mechanics and day-labourers. Aristotle's theory is that owing partly to their want of leisure, partly to their degrading occupation, they cannot raise themselves to a higher life of virtue; and that therefore they are just as unqualified to rule as they are unable to claim, in the full sense of the words, the title of ἀγαθὸς ἀρόπες, virtuous and capable men. To append this restriction is the main object of c. 5, and goes more diffusely into details, §§ 4—7, respecting the position of this class' (Rassow Bemerkungen p. 10 f.). Susem. (500)

34 ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ] whether he only is really a citizen who has the right to share in office or whether the working men also ought to rank as citizens: this was indeed the case at Athens. 

πολιτής] It is true that Aristotle ought not to have raised the question in this form after deducing the definition of the citizen given in i § 2 ff.: comp. 4 § 6 u. (473). But in the following discussion he has taken care that no material disadvantage results from this formal defect. Susem. (501)

36 οἷον τέ sc. ἐστὶ. 37 τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν] τὴν πολιτικήν, including τὴν ἀρχικήν, to command as well as to obey. οὕτως = ὁ βάραυσος: here would be an instance of a citizen not qualified to govern.
39 óu'te...óu'te Spengel

1278 a 5 ék pρωβιθέσεως Bas. in the margin, ék pρωβιθέσεως Casaubon 9 πολιτήν * * Oncken, wrongly 11 d' [ἀναγκαίων] Susem. ḍè μὴ ἀφεμένων? Congreve, d' αὐτοντρήσ Schmidt, ḍè <μὴ ἀφεμένων τῶν> ἀναγκαίων or simply ḍè <μὴ> ḍî Susem., d' ἀλλῶν Bernays (perhaps rightly). The text may be defended (τῶν ἀναγκαίων neuter, Postgate) the city ought to be classed as citizens." A very important point for our view of Aristotle's ideal state: see iv (viii). 8 § 1 ff. n. (795). Susem. (504) 4 ὀσαύτως καί equally with. See on ii. 8 21 ὁμοίως καί.

5 ὀἱ μὲν ἀπλῶσ] the one, viz. adults, are citizens in an unrestricted sense; the others, viz. children, only in a qualified sense; i.e. on the supposition that they grow up.

6 ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς] "but under age." See c. 1 § 4 n. (437 b). Susem. (503)

§ 3 Formerly the mechanics in some places were slaves or foreigners. But see Herod. 11. 167, where contempt for handicrafts is said to be common to Egyptians, Persians, Lydians, and Thracians, and to have been 'learnt' from them by the Greeks.

8 ἳ ἐδε βελτίστη κτλ] Comp. iv (viii). 9 § 3, § 7, n. (899). Susem. (506) 9 εὶ ὑ ἐδε καὶ οὕτως πολιτῆς] "But if the artisan too is a citizen, then the virtue of the citizen, as defined by us, must not be affirmed to belong to every citizen, nor even to the free man as such, but to those only who are released from menial functions" [including free artisans].

§ 4 § 2 τῶν ἀναγκαίων [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν κτλ] Postgate (p. 26) treats ἀναγκαίων as neuter (in support of this use see 11. 9 § 2 τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολή, and 1. 7. 3, 11. 6. 1): "in respect of compulsory work
those who perform such services for an individual are slaves, but those who serve the public are mechanics and labourers:’

12 οἱ τὰ κοινὰ ἑργαζόμενοι τοῖς 25 Μ. 7 § 23.

12 οἱ δὲ κοινῆς Comp. I. 1. § 13: ὁ μὲν δοῦλος κοινὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορφυρότερος ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἄφωρος μένης τινὰ ἔχει δουλεῖα, μεν ὑπὲρ τις, επὶ μεν των πολιτειῶν τῶν βάναυσων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλείον, καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀρχιμένου πολίτου, ὥστε ἐν μὲν τιμὶ πολιτεία τῶν βάναυσων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τῶν θητῶν πολιτῶν, ἐν τισὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἰ τις ἔστιν ἣν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ἣν κατ' ἄρετὴν αἱ ἀξίαι διδοῦναι καὶ κατ' ἀξίαιν οὐ γὰρ οἷον τ' ἐπιτηδευθὲν 5 σαι τὰ τῆς ἄρετῆς ζῶντα βίων βάναυσων ή θητίκων. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαι θῆτα μὲν οὐκ εὐνεχεῖται εἶναι πολίτης (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μαρκρόν ἀι μεθέξεις τῶν ἀρχῶν), βάναυσον δὲ εὐνεχεῖται πλουτοῦσα γὰρ καὶ [οἶ] πολλοί τῶν 20 οἱ κοινοὶ Η 2 Bk. § 14 φανεὶν untranslated by Αρ., suspected by the author of the erroneous conjecture <ὁ> φανερὸν φανεῖν in the margin of Bas. and by Schneider. Bernays, “at the first glance”: but can it mean this? ἐπάνω? Sussem., <ἀρτῳ> φαμέν would be less alteration, but hardly right: <τὸ> φανεῖν or τὸ γὰρ φανεῖν Schmidt § 24 [οὶ] Schneider

13 δὴ τῆται = ἐκείνης διὰ πεπιπάτη ἐπὶ ἀρ ριείας δουλεῖας Pollux III. 82. φανερὸν δ’ ἐντεῦθεν’ “In what position the artisans stand becomes clear upon slight reflexion from the following consideration”; viz. that a variety of ‘citizens’ is implied by c. 1 § 8.

14 αὐτὸ τὸ λεγέντον] Apparently this is the nom. Those who defend φανεῖν take it as ἐὰν φανῇ; “if seen” (i.e. understood) “even our former statement makes (the matter) clear.” δὴ λοιπὸν ποιεῖν ας, as in c. 8 § 6, 1279 b 35; so φανερὸν ποιεῖν c. 13 § 9, 1283 b 28. “Yet in both passages a clause with ὅτι follows equivalent to a substantive” (T. L. Heath).

§ 5 15 καὶ εἰ ἕνων πολιτῶν] “There must also be several species of citizens.” See c. 1 §§ 8—11. Sussem. (508)

18 οἷον εἴ τις ἐστιν ἄν ἄν Καὶ Here Aristotle purposely avoids saying that this is the constitution of the best state, in order not to anticipate (see n. 440 on c. 1 § 10), although he has adopted the same rule for it too in § 3, with which compare § 5. See below c. 7 § 3 n. (Ζ.36), § 4 n. (Ζ.38): c. 13 § 8 n. (Ζ.93). Sussem. (509) 20 οὐ γὰρ οἷον τ’ See again n. (103). Sussem. (510)

If we grant Aristotle’s premises, no fault can be found with his exclusion of the labouring classes from political rights. It is simply true that, as a body, they could not have possessed the qualities he demands in the citizen, even if they had found the leisure for military, political, and judicial duties. Nor again is the idea that such culture depends upon lower labour false. The existence of those excellences in which Aristotle finds the end of life and the virtues of the citizen, rests upon a mass of mere work as its necessary condition (A. C. Bradley). Congreve well remarks that “if by the arrangement of society the reason ceases to hold good” Aristotle would cease to require the exclusion of the industrial population from the citizenship.

§ 6 23 τιμημάτων μακρῶν = high property qualifications. Comp. VI(IV). 4 § 5 μακρὸν οἶσιν.

§ 7 At Thebes there was a law that no one might take part in the government until he had retired ten years from the market-place.
25 τῶν] τῶν Q b T b and P 12 (1st hand, emended by corr.) | 26 ἀρετής Π Μ']} || 27 προσιελέταται καὶ] προσιελέταται τιμαῖς]. Riese. See my critical edition for other emendations, of which τῶν ξένων (for τῶν ξένων) P 4 is the oldest

25 ἐν Θήβαις δὲ. Judging from an oligarchical standpoint, Aristotle comments this regulation vii(vi). 7 § 4. n. (1496), and justly too, as Schlosser long ago remarked. After this period of waiting the law really opened the door to merchants and tradesmen who had grown wealthy: on the other hand the long delay gave some security that the existing body of citizens would no longer be "flooded" with alien or upset elements. Further compare viii(v). 3 § 5 n. (1512). But in Aristotle's own ideal state there is no means by which one who had formerly been engaged in trade could ever attain civic rights: nor indeed on his principles is it intended that there should be. "In another work he is disposed to pay respect to the merit which owes all to itself and little or nothing to the favour of fortune, Rhet. i. 7. 32, 1365 a 19: but his Politics nowhere exhibits any appreciation of social phenomena of this sort. Indeed he refuses every claim made on behalf of the man who is working his way up, if not supported by ancestry, by the formula that industrial occupations invariably incapacitate men for becoming truly virtuous or politically intelligent citizens. He ignores the important change in the social status of the same man, as soon as he ceases to perform the "rough labour" of industry himself and is in a position to have it performed by others. In this respect he is but in the same case with all Greece and the Greek language which is devoid of any special word to denote the large manufacturer, the employer of labour or contractor (entrepreneur)." Such people do not lack the indispensable "leisure" which he demands; but in Greece they are still termed base mechanics (βαραντίοι) "at whom the polite world looks askance" (Oncken).

On the other hand Bradley, Hellen. p. 216, very justly remarks that "no honest observer will deny that there is a moral βαραντίοι which besets some of the occupations included under that term. Aristotle himself has laid down with the greatest clearness that even the most menial services need not be ignoble, and that the slavishness of a pursuit lies not in the things that are done, but in the spirit in which they are done, and in their object. And for this reason he would have some of such services performed by the youthful citizens" of the best state iv(vii). 14 § 77; cp. v(viii). 2 § 6 nn. (682 a–3). "And yet he seems hardly to ask himself whether work which is rewarded in money may not be done for its own sake: and, with ideas of art hardly less exalted than Plato's, he utters no word of protest against the identification of the artist with the βαραντίοι. Nor, again, can it be said that these old prejudices are wanting in vitality at the present day. What 'society' thinks of 'persons in trade,' not to speak of the 'lower orders,' no one can help knowing. But there is a difference between this sentiment and Aristotle's. If he shares our prejudice, he does not share our ideal. The leisure which he thought indispensable for a citizen was not leisure to be stupid, idle, or busy only in amusement. The strenuous exercise of the highest powers of body and mind in defending and governing the State, and in striving to quicken the divine reason in the soul,—this is the kind of 'high life' with which βαραντίοι is contrasted, and the citizenship of which it is declared incapable." SUSEM. (511)


27 προσιελέταται] drags in some aliens as well to citizenship. Themistocles, Cimon, Thucydides, Antithenes, Iphicrates, Timotheus were sons of Thracian mothers; the mother of Demostenes, though the daughter of a citizen, had Scythian blood in her veins. ο γὰρ ἐκ πολιτιδος] Whoever is born of a citizen mother, whether his father be a freeman or a slave: see § 8 n. SUSEM. (512)
II. 5. 9] 1278 a 25—1278 a 40. 379

§ 8 δὲ τρόπουν ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόθους παρά πολλοίς. οὐ (II) 30 μην ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνδεικνύμεν τῶν γυναικῶν ποιοῦνται πολίται τοὺς τοιούτους (διὰ γὰρ ὑλικατοποιήσαν ὄντως χρῶν—

μαίνα, εὑπαριθμεῖται δὲ ὁ προκατὰ μικρὸν παραρεῖνον—

tai toûs ἐγὼ δοῦλον πρωτὸν ἡ δουλῆς. εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, § 9 τέλος δὲ μονὸν τοῖς ἐξ ἁμφοῖν ἀστῶν πολίται ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν 6

35 οὖν εἰδή πλείων πολίτων, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μείλι-

στα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὁσπερ καὶ Ὁμηρος ἐποίησεν ὡς εἰ τιν ἄτιμοτοι μετανάστην

ὡςπερ μέτοικοι γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μη μετέχων. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπου τὸ

toû ποιοῦντι ἑπικεκρυμμένων ἐστιν, ἀπάτης χαίρων τῶν συνοι-

κοινῶν ἐστίν. 31 τοιοῦτοις [διὶ] π.π. Bernays (without parentheses) 32 ἀπορώντες Γ. M* διὶ Susem.3, Δ II (including fr.) Bk., untranslated by William Ar., [δ'] Sylburg Susem.1-3, γ'? Susem. 34 ἀποτων fr. Perizonius (on Ael. 11. II. vi. 19), αἰτίων Γ and all other mss. 36-40 The right order given only by corr.1 of 11: 36 ὡσπερ...38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστίν fr. 11 (1st hand) and 14 (corrector), 37 ὡς εἰ....

38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστίν 12-3.6 Qb Th Ar. Ald. and 14 (1st hand), 38 ὡσπερ...μετέ-

χων after 40 ἐστίν Γ M* 38 ἐστιν ὅπου Bernays, omitting ἐστιν before 39 ἀπάτης and after συνοικοίνων ; not rightly 29 τοὺς νόθους] Under this name were included not only those children whose mother was not a citizen, but also the children of a citizen mother if she were not lawfully married to the father. The latter were always accounted citizens at Athens at least, but perhaps Aristotle is only thinking of the former. See Schö-

mann pp. 356-8 Eng. tr. Susem. (513) § 8 "But as the admission of such persons to the franchise is due to a dearth of citizens of legitimate birth, as population increases they gradually pare off from the roll of citizens, first, the children of slave fathers or slave mothers."

33 τοὺς ἐκ δούλου...δουλησ] See preceding notes. Susem. (514) εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] This remark has been rightly additions to show that at Athens even in those times in which the bastard children of citizen fathers became citizens in their turn (n. 516) the chil-

dren of a citizen mother by a father who was not a citizen were not reckoned citizens. The child followed the status of the father in both cases, although the former case was restricted to the periods in question. See Philippi Contribution: to a history of Athenian citizenship p. 64, Schömann p. 358 Eng. tr. (where the reference in n. 6, incorrectly given, is to the present passage). Compare too 9

§ 13 n. (528) and vii(vi). 4 § 16 n. (1425). Susem. (515) 34 τέλος δὲ κτλ] This was done at Athens by a law of Pericles about 490 b.c., and by a law of Aristophanes in 430: Schömann p. 357 f. Eng. tr. Susem. (516) § 9 36 Ἔμηρος] Iliad ix. 648, xvi. 59. Susem. (517) 37 "Like some unprivileg'd out-

lander," i.e. settler from abroad. But in Homer the meaning of ἀτιμοτος is probably "without any τιμαν" or blood price attached to his life, i.e. one who may be killed with impunity, rather than "without τιμαν" in the sense of civic privileges (Jackson). 38 ὡσπερ μέτοικος κτλ] 'For he who does not share in the privileges (of citizenship) is no better than an alien settled in the place. But where such a principle is disguised, it is for the purpose of deceiving the joint settlers.' ὅπου...ἐπικεκρυμμένον] i.e. where the poorer citizens and the lower classes of people are nominally eligible (i.e. have not been formally deprived of the right of being elected) to the special offices of state; but precautions are taken by various means to secure that such persons are not easily elected to any of them: cp. vi(iv). 13 §§ 1—4. Susem. (518) 39 τῶν συνοικοίνων] Ridgeway pro-

poses to take this in a narrower sense as
§ 10 1278 b πότερον μὲν οὖν ἔτεραν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν <ἀρέτην> θετεόν, καθ' ἦν (III) ἀνὴρ ἅγιοθὸς ἐστὶ καὶ πολιτής σπουδαῖος, δήλον εκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἐτέρος, κάκεινης δ' οὖ πᾶς ἄλλη ὁ πολιτικής καὶ κύριος ὁ δυνάμενος εἶναι κύριος, ἡ καθ' αὐτὸν ἦ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἑπιμελεῖας: ἐπεί δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ IV ταύτα σκεπτέον, πότερον μιᾶς θετεόν πολιτείαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφορὰ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων.

5. ἡ καθ' αὐτὸν ἦ μετ' ἄλλων. This is said in order to allow for the exceptional case where the best constitution does not present itself as an aristocracy but as an "absolute monarchy" under the pre-eminentely best citizen: see cc. 13, 17. SUSEM. (521) c. 6. Is there one constitution or more than one? And in what do they differ? Compare A. C. Bradley Hellenica, pp. 222—230.

§ 1 9 πολιτεία = an order of the city in respect of the magisterial offices in general, and especially the sovereign power.

"Comp. c. 1 § 1 τῶν την πόλιν οἰκονόμων τάξις τις; vii(v). § 1 το ταῖς πόλεως ἡ περίτας ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον γενει-μηρηται, (that distribution of public rights and duties which justice demands) καὶ τῷ τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τῷ τῶν τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστὶν: 3 § 5 with notes." SUSEM. (522)

Zeller has remarked (n. 466) that 'constitution' is not a term wide enough to express πολιτεία, which is inseparable from the nature of the people who live under it, and is in fact the 'form' of the organism, constituting, as we saw (c. 3 s. finit.) its identity. "An imperfect constitution is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Given a population of a certain kind and in a definite degree of civilization, and there is a form or order naturally fitted for it: no better order would fit it. And yet for all this one..."


constitution may be superior to another'" (Bradley).

This genitive may be paraphrased 'an order regulating the assignment of offices' as the parallel passages just cited sufficiently prove.

11 τὸ πολίτευμα 'the ruling class' or 'government' of the city. "This Greek word cannot always be uniformly translated, as here and in c. 7 § 2 n. (534); but it denotes that individual man or that body of men, in whose name the state is governed, and hence the sovereign (κράτος).

So far as we know Aristotle was the first to introduce the notion or, to be more precise, this correct notion of sovereignty. See also n. (460) on c. 3 § 9 and c. 13 § 5 n. (502)."  SUSEM. (523)

πολίτευμα δὲ ἐστὶν ἣ πολίτεια 'the constitution is the ruling class': an emphatic way of stating, in Greek as in English, that the character of the constitution is determined by the holders of sovereign power, who make the form of government what it is. The 'constitution' varies with the 'government' or governing class.

§ 2 14 φαμέν δὴ κτλ.] 'Accordingly we say that in these cases' (a democracy and an oligarchy) 'the constitution is different. And we shall apply this same principle to all other cases.'

16 ὑποθέτειν δὴ] We must therefore determine, as our fundamental principle in this investigation, the end for which the city is formed and the various ways of governing man in common life.

"See n. (350) on § 7."  SUSEM. (524)

§ 3 19 κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους

In Book 1, c. 2 § 9 ff.  SUSEM. (525)

For the prepos. = 'in' cp. 18 § 1, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις (Postgate).

23 καθὸ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ 'to the extent to which each man is concerned in noble life.' μέρος nom. to ἐπιβάλλει, which is not used impersonally but as in 11. 6 § 22, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ ἡ σκέψις, and 1. 13 § 13 (where however see note).  

24 τοῦ ἐκατόν] See n. (21) on 1. 6 § 8.  SUSEM. (526)
Nevertheless the slave-owner’s rule is primarily to the interest of the owner, though incidentally (or relatively, or in a derivative manner) ‘to the interest of the slave.’

**Mela. 1. 9 § 11.** But what we require is ‘all the possible modes,’ and so Bernays ‘the modes in question.’ This is supported by the λεγόμενα and perhaps Ar. 49 [καὶ πάσης] Susem., who also suspects ἰδίᾳ oikonomikēn; see Comm. I. 32 [καὶ πάσης].

25 χωρίς [-εκάστως] Spengel 26 καὶ συνέχουσαν....κοινωνιαν follow 27 μόρον in II 2 Ar. Bk. Bernays and Pl. (corrector) the order of the text in II fr. 28 ἑπεμβάλλεις Pl. 1 6, ὑπερβάλλη ὶν. Qb, Th fr. 29 ὅτι γὰρ ἢ γ’ or (with only a comma before δήλων) θ’? Susem. 30 γε is added after ἀρχής by Pl. fr., perhaps rightly — λεγόμενοι ἐνδεχόμενος? Susem. 31 διό, ὡς ἐμέθα Qb and perhaps Ar. 32 ἕν τις ὑδατικός καὶ τής οἰκίας πάσης, ἵνα δὴ καλοῦμεν ὁικονομικήν,

**§ 4 25 χωρίς** to each separate individual.

26 συνέχουσα τὴν π. κοινωνιαν Comp. Plato Polit. 531 ε 1.
27 κατά τὸ ἢ ἡν in life, a vague use of the preposition, as above 19, and again 28 κατὰ τὸν βιον.
29 ἄν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κτλ. The imperfect forms of civil society, missing the true end, and replacing it by such subordinate ends as freedom or wealth which fall short of man’s true development, lead a feeble hazardous life and inflict great hardships on their members. Yet even in them mere living, provided it be not too painful a struggle, has something noble in it.

**§ 5 31 τοῖς λεγόμενοι τρόποιν** Bonitz: the usual modes, Ind. Ar. 424 b 43; i.e. the modes (usually) stated [ἐργαλεῖα τρόπων τῶν ἐισωθέντων λέγομεν].
addition appears contradictory and un-Aristotelian; for it would include once more the rule of a master over his slaves to which the rule in question is held to be opposed. Nor are the words ὡς δὲ καλοῦμεν ὀικονομικὰ free from suspicion, for the rule of the householder again includes a rule over slaves. We must therefore understand ὀικονομικὰ in a narrower and more special sense ‘emphatically’ (as Con greve says) to mean the rule of the householder over the free members of his family as contrasted with his rule over slaves 1.13 §§1, 2. But even then it is very doubtful whether ὀικονομικὴ and δεσποτικὴ can be so opposed in Greek; nor is this proved by 1.1.2. Susen. (529).

40 ήτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν] Comp. τὸ ὀικονομικὸν δίκαιον N. E. Ψ. 6.9 and Jackson's n. But in the state this good of the subjects ruled, and common good of rulers and subjects, consists in the ‘end’ of the state mentioned, or rather recalled to our memory, in §§3—5 viz. the highest possible life, ὅποιον. This is the reason why the recapitulation of the facts in §§ 3—5, οἷς πρώτοι λέγοι, had to be prefixed to this passage. Susen. (630).


1279 a 1 αὐτῶν] i.e. αὐτῶν τῶν ἀρχοντῶν, c. p. 6. 6 αὐτῶν. With this summary justification of δεσποτικῶν (§§ 6, 7) compare Plato's in Crat. ex. 590D; and καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο, ὥσπερ ἀποδείκνυσι ἔχουν τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἴδος, ὕπο μόρια ἀρχηγεῖται ἀνωτέρω τοῦ βελτίστου, διὸν αὐτὸν φανεῖν δὲν εἶναι εἰκόναν τοῦ βελτίστου, ἐκτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θείον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβη τῆς τοῦ δαὐνίου εἴκομεν δὲν ἀρχηγεῖται αὐτῷ, ὧσπερ Ὀρασίμαχος ἐπέκει τὸν ἀρχοντικό, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀκριβῶς ὅπως ἂν πονῇ ὑπὸ δεῖν τοὺς φρονίμους ἀρχηγεῖσα, μᾶλλον μὲν ἀκένος ἐκτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μη, ἐξωθίν ἐσφετείτως.

§ 8 7 ὡ μὲν, sc. ὁ κυβερνητὴς, πλωτήρ (ὑμεῖς).

§ 9 8 διὸ κτλ] ‘Hence too with civic offices, when the city is framed upon the equality and similarity of the citizens, their claim is to hold office in turn.’

9 ὃταν ἡ κατ' ἱσότητα...καὶ καθ' ὀμοιότητα = ὅταν ἡ εἰς ταύτα καὶ ὀμοίως sc. ἡ πόλις, supplied from πολιτικὸς.

‘Although this is the case not only in
Democracies, but also in Aristocracy and in most Politics, yet Aristotle has principally in view the contrast between democratic Athens of the old and the new period." SUSEM. (532)

10 πρότερον μὲν κτλ. [in early times, as is natural, they required men to serve the state in rotation, and that some one else should, in return, look after your interest as you formerly when in office looked after his: but in our day the advantages derived from the public treasury and from office make them desire to hold it uninterruptedly; one might suppose that though of sickly constitutions, they were always well in office, for then too they would no doubt hunt as eagerly after places."

11 λειτουργεῖν] of the onerous task of the magistrate e.g. in old Athens: manus publicum dum gerit, commodo civium inseriv cum danno etiam rei familiaris.

τυνα and 12 αὐτοῦ] It is an error to understand these to refer to the same person. They are really A and B, two holders of office, A in succession to B. Comp. II. 2 §§ 6, 7 (where διά τοῦ τίῳ φηνόν λέους είναι πάντας reccehes the ή πέφυκεν of the text here) and 1. 1 § 2 where this rotation or exchange of functions is the external mark of πολιτικός, even if his essential identity with βασιλικός be assumed.

§ 10 οἶον ἐ...16 ἀρχέοις] Comp. Isocr. VII. (Panegyricus) 24, 25: αἰτίων δ' ἐν τῷ μῆνι περιμαχήσουσι εἶναι τάς ἀρχές, διό με μεμάθηκές φησὶν ἐργάσεσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, καὶ μή...ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν διοίκειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστως ἑπαρχόντων, εἴ ποτε διῆσθε, τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐπαρκεῖν. οὕτω δ' ἀπείκονον σφάδα τῶν τίς πλῆθος, ὡστε καλοπρέτωτον ἐν ἐκείνους τόσον εὑρεῖν τοῖς βουλήμοις ἀρχεῖν ἢ τίνος μεθὲν δειμένον; οὐ γὰρ ἐμπορίαν ἄλλα λειτουργίαν ἐνδύμων εἶναι τῶν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπικελεῖαι. SUSEM. (532 b)

§ 11 obviously goes with c. 7.

17 τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον] This is τὸ δικαίον and the 'good' or 'end' of civil society: c. 12 § 1.

18 ὀρθά] normal, as opposed to the perverted forms. Note that in the Politicus Plato regards only the best state as 'normal.' Before he divides the others into three better and three worse (much as Aristotle does here) he asks 302 B τίς ὁ ὅσον δ' ὑπάρχοντι πολιτείαις τοῖς ἡκιστα χαλεπής εὐξῆ, παρὰ χαλεπῶν αἰῶνών, καὶ τίς βαρύτατη; Comp. τὴν ὀρθήν (i.e. the ideal state) χωρίς ἀποκρίνεται τοῖς ὁμογενῶν, τ. 302 C. What Aristotelians call ὀρθά, are the κόσμαι καὶ ἐννοοῖ τῶν Politicus, just as his παρεκβάσεις are the παράνομοι καὶ ἀκλαστοὶ τοῖς Plato.

κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δικαίον] As opposed to τί καὶ τιὸν δικαίον.

19 τὸ σφέτερον explained by τῶν ἀρχέτων = τὸ σφάνον αὐτῶν: a usage common in Thucydides, e.g. IV. 114, VIII. 46.

20 παρεκβάσεις] 'perversions'; departures from, or corruptions of, the normal constitutions. The verb παρεκβάσεως is both intrans. and trans. = to violate, e.g. VIII(V), 10. 5. The noun = error in Metaph. XIV(N). 2 § 13, 1089 b 4. This is nearer to the sense in other writers; a digression, Isaeus p. 62. 13, and so Nic. Eth. 1. 5. 1.
III. 7. 3]

1279 a 10—1279 a 35.

δεσποτικαί γὰρ, ἣ δέ πόλεις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν. (IV)
7 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχώμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπὶ τὸν κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἡ ἐνα ἡ ὀλίγοις ἡ τοὺς πολλοὺς: ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἰς ὁ ὀλίγοι ὁ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἁρχοσί, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰν ἀναγκαῖοι εἶναι
§ 2 φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεὶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταύταν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἡ ἐνα ἡ ὀλίγοις ἡ τοὺς πολλοὺς: ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἰς ὁ ὀλίγοι ὁ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἁρχοσί, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰν ἀναγκαῖοι εἶναι 30 τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἱδιόν ἡ τοῦ ἔνους ἡ τῶν ὀλίγοι ἡ τοῦ ἐλέους συμφέρον πολιτείας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ὀλίγοι μὲν 35 πλείονοιν ἐς ἔνους ἀριστοκρατίαν (ἡ διὰ τοῦ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἁρ-

21 δεσποτικαί] like the way of a master over slaves.
cc. 7, 8 (with c. 6 § 11) Threefold classification of normal and degenerate constitutions according as (a) one man, (b) a few, or (γ) the many, are supreme.
§ 1 23, τὸς τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ τίνες εἰς] See Excursus I. to B. III. p. 447 ff. SUSEM. (553)
§ 2 25 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ. See c. 6 § 1 mut. (533); also n. (466) on c. 3 § 9. SUSEM. (554)
26 σημαίνει ταύταν] For constitution we may substitute 'ruling body.'
πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων] Cities contain a variety of parts or elements. Each class contributes something to the city, and so has a certain claim to political rights. The relative strength of these elements determines the question where the supreme power or 'sovereignty' lies, and settles what the constitution of the city shall be. In England to-day the polity is the sovbeit, the lords, and the electoral body among the commons.
27 ἀνάγκη δ'...τοὺς πολλοὺς] But as early as § 4 ff. it is seen that this merely numerical standpoint is only preliminary and by no means exhaustive: see nn. (538), (540), (543). SUSEM. (553)

28 ὅταν...πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἁρχοσί] But how, a Platonist might ask, can they so govern, unless they have absolute knowledge, and not merely right opinion, regarding the common weal?
32 τοὺς μετέχοντας] sc. τῆς πόλεως. They may still be indispensable elements, c. 5 § 2 ὁν ἀνευ ὑσι ἐν εἰς πόλις.
34 ἡ διὰ κτλ.] If they are to be called citizens, the inhabitants must share in the 'weal,' which is the end of the city: N. E. VIII. 9 § 4 ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάραν δοκεῖ καὶ εἰς ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖ καὶ διαιένειν.

§ 3 33 μοναρχιῶν] A neutral word, convenient as including the two species βασιλεία and τυραννίς, Plato Politic. 302 D, E. In no single case of all the six is the use of the corresponding designation applied to modern states (monarchy, aristocracy, &c.) other than misleading, even when the qualifications are supplied. The most democratic of Greek democracies we should call an oligarchy.

35 ἡ διὰ τοῦ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀρχεῖν, ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀριστον] Undoubtedly Aristotle himself has both reasons in view in adopting this term: but preeminently the former. It has been already explained, n. (386) on 11. 11. 5, that he regards merit as the principle of Aristocracy: and he uses the word widely in this sense alone: 11. 6 § 16 n. (218), 9 § 20 (329), 11 § 5 ff. (386); III. 5 § 5 (509), 13 § 8 (593), 15 § 10
χειν, ἣ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦν- (p. 70) σιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύ- 38 ταί συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολι- § 4 τειῶν, πολιτεία. <καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι <τὰ ὁπλα.> συμβαίνει δ’ εὐλόγων. ἕνα μὲν γὰρ διὰ- 30 φέρειν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἡ ὁλόγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ’ ἡ ἡδις χαλε- 1279 b πὼν ἥκριβόσθαι πρὸς πάσαν ἀρετῆν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολε- μικῆν· αὐτή γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν

37 <πολεμικῶν> πλῆθος Zeller (Griech. Phil. II. ii. 714 n. 1) | The transposition of b 3 καὶ μετέχουσιν... ὁπλα to follow a 39 πολιτεία by Schmidt (see Introd. 82) | 39 <οὐκ> εὐλόγων? Spengel who first saw that the text was unsound; * * συμβαίνει Thurot, afterwards accepted by Spengel | μὲν omitted by fr.

(652), 17 § 6 (680), VI(iv). 2 § 1 (1123), 2 § 5 (1142), 7 § 2 (1233 ff.), 8 §§ 4—10 (1245), 15 § 10 (1256); VII(iii). 2 § 7 (1402). Other references in n. (471) on III. 4. 5. SUSEM. (536) In Khol. 1. c. 8 he adopts the former derivation.

39 πολιτεία] a constitutional government, a polity: a republic of the middle classes (so far as any Greek city can be so called). In this work without any other distinctive name, like the English Commonwealth; but in N. E. VIII. 10 called πολιοκρατία: see Exc. i.

§ 4 1279 b 4 οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὁπλα] "Here it is the possessors of arms that share in the government": more precisely, the heavy-armed: i.e. those who are in a position to equip themselves at their own cost with heavy armour and (as Zeller remarks II i. 748 n. 7) to undergo the gymnastic training requisite for this species of military service, to which time and leisure and also a certain material prosperity were essential. Accordingly this involves a moderate property qualification. Comp. Exc. i. to B. III.; II. 6. 16 with n. (316), VI(iv). 13 § 4 (1259), § 7 (1268); VII(iii). 7 § 1 n. (1452). From this point of view the Four Hundred at Athens restricted the franchise to 5000 citizens, Thuc. VIII. 97. 1 (Eaton). SUSEM. (537) From 411 to about 409 (or 408) Athens was a Polity in this sense, and again from 321 to 317 B.C.

1279 a 39 εὐλόγωνliness (παραλόγως, almost = εἰκότως, with good reason. See p. 82.

40 πλείον δ’ ήδη...πολεμικῆν] But when we come to the case of a larger number, it is hard for them to be perfectly trained in all excellence: (ἀλλὰ but on the contrary) at the most they can be trained in military excellence alone.

1279 b 2 διόπερ... 3 τὸ προπολεμοῦν] The military character of Polity is also emphasized by the author of the interpolated passage, c. 17 § 4. Yet in the nature of this form of government itself, as Aristotle elsewhere describes it, scarcely any cogent reason can be found for making this such an inseparable and essential feature. He may have dimly perceived that the description of Polity as a mere blending of democracy and oligarchy without the addition of aristocratic elements, as distinguished from those spurious aristocracies which, like Carthage, combine in themselves these three elements, VII(iv). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9 (cp. II. 11. 5 n. 386)—by no means agrees with the recognition of Polity as one of the three normal constitutions, as defined by him; but that on the contrary (as was remarked Introd. p. 62) if this recognition is to remain valid, some account must be taken of merit also even in a Polity, and it must be presumed that a certain amount of excellence is spread generally amongst the citizens. And in accordance with the view here expressed about military excellence this may have induced him to transfer the warlike spirit of the Spartan system not so much to the other mixed aristocracies as to the remaining constitutions, which are most akin to it, viz. the Polities, in order in some measure to bridge over the chasm; for indeed he cites Sparta VII(iv). 9 § 6 f. n. (1262), as an example of a successful blending of democracy and oligarchy in Polity, though this involves him in inconsistency. At the same time by this
immediate emphasis on the fact that Polity is an inferior constitution, as compared with monarchy and aristocracy, the germ of dissolution has already unobserved found its way into this whole theory of three normal constitutions and their corresponding perversions. For them in fact only monarchy and aristocracy proper are really good forms of government; while mixed constitutions—and indeed not merely politics but even spurious aristocracies—are forms intermediate to them and the perversions proper, combining good and evil elements just as the corresponding tιμοκρατία in Plato’s Republic (Excursus 1.), and this assertion is made point blank by Aristotle himself later on, vi(iv). 8 §§ 1, 2, n. (1239). Comp. Zeller ii 713 f., 748. But even at this point, by thus restricting the excellence of Polity and adding to the definition its military character, Aristotle begins to transcend the merely numerical point of view to which he has hitherto adhered c. 7 §§ 2, 3. Cp. n. (535). SUSEM. (538)

§ 5 6 η μέν γάρ τυραννις Earlier still Thucydides, 1. 17, accuses the Greek tyrants of such complete selfishness. This view, which in later times was universal amongst the Greeks, can hardly be quite correct. SUSEM. (539)

7 6 τις ὁλιγ... γάρ ἀπόρων] Here then the numerical standard, completely disregarded see Hdt. (535), (538); as is quite clear from the further explanation in c. 8. See n. (544). SUSEM. (540) c. 8 § 1 11 δει δὲ... 12 ἔστιν] Not to be understood as meaning that this is intended to be done merely in the immediate context, where the description is by no means complete; the whole remaining part of the Politics, except Bk. viii(v), has no other object. SUSEM. (541)

12 το δὲ περί ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι Comp. c. 138 l. 4 (507), vii(iv). 18 §§ 4 n. (150): also Infrad. p. 70 f. SUSEM. (542)

Further see vii(iv). 10. 1, vii(vii). 3. 12. Here μέθοδος = branch of inquiry, study, department of science: almost as in ii. 1 § 2 (a nearer parallel is Lc. Eth. i. 1 § 1, 3 § 1, 1094 b 11).

14 ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν] But in Lc. Eth. Ethics this is the supreme end of theory: όν γὰρ ἄλλα πράξεις, ὃν γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκέπτομεν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἠγοθο γινόμεθα. μη παροραν μηδὲ τι καταλεῖται “not to overlook or omit anything.” Cf. De Part. Animal. i. 5 § 4, 645 a 5, μὴ δὲν παραλείποντας εἰς δύναμιν μήτε ἀτιμωτέρον μήτε τιμωτέρον. § 2 16 δεσποτική κτλ ruling civil society like a slaveholder.

25—2
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 8.

19 τούτων ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλήθος οὐσίας ἄποροι. § 3 πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἶναι οἱ πλείους ὅντες εὐποροὶ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δὲ ἑστίν ὅταν ή κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἰ ποὺ συμβαίνει τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττωσι μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπορῶν, κρεῖττοι γάρ ὅντες κύριοι εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅποιο δ' ὀλγούν κύριοι πλῆθος, ὀλγαρχίαν εἶναι φασίν 'οὐκ ἄν καλῶς δύσειν § 4 διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἂν <ε rối> τις συνε-θεῖς τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τήν ὀλγαρχίαν τῇ δ' ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος (p. 71).

18 οὐσίας (property) in plural.
§ 3 20 πρώτη δ' ἀπορία. "The first difficulty affects the definition," i.e. affects the question how we are to define. Another series of ἀπορίας affects τὸ δίκαιον (Wyse).

§§ 4, 5 Are both features essential? Is democracy the government of the needy majority, oligarchy that of the wealthy few? [This view reappears in the double characteristics of vii(iv).] § 6 οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἀποροὶ πλείους ὅντες, οἱ πλοῦτοι καὶ εὐγενεστέροι ὄλγοι ὅντες.] How are we then to classify the exceptional cases where these features are not combined?

§ 6 34 ἑοίκε τοῖνυν κτλ. "Our argument seems then to show that the fewness or multitude of the sovereign body is an accident, in the one case of oligarchy, in the other of democracy." Here as elsewhere he is in search of the true nature and end; essential qualities [cp. e.g. § 1 n. on δῆμος] are severed from such as are purely external and quantitative; for τὸ πολέον οὐκ ἔστω ἵνα ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ πάνω τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν ὑμάρωμένων. So in 1. 1. 2, IV(vii). 4. 44, he denies that these quantitative distinctions are essential. 38 διο καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διά> τὰς ῥήτειας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς A διαφορᾶ or 'specific difference' is an essential quality, by the presence or absence of which two species of a genus, here two constitutions, differ (διὰ διαφορᾶς) and can therefore be classified. The question in this sentence is, whether
§ 7  ἠτίας γίνεσθαι διαφόρας, ὥ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἢ τε (V) δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτος ἠστίν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, ὅπων ἄν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἄν τ' ἐλάττουσιν ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαι, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἰπο- μεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς. εὐποροῦσιν 5 μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγους, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχοντι πάντες· δ' ἃς ἠτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.  

9 Ληπτείου δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὄρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ 39 διαφόρας Ἑ, accepted by Koraes Bk. Bernays etc. Then ἠτίας is predicate and πολιτείαι must be understood with ῥήθειας or else inserted; thus ῥήθειας <πολι- τείαι> Bernays: ῥήθειας <ἀπορίας> Koraes wrongly, see Quaest. crit. coll. p. 391 f. 1280 a 6 πολιτείαι ** Conring, perhaps rightly; a transitional clause is needed.

ahtias goes with ῥήθειας, or whether it is a predicate. In the former case, we expect — διά — τὰς ῥήθειας ἠτίας, as § 8, δι' ἃς ἠτίας. "And for this reason it too follows that differences between constitutions do not arise on account of the reasons mentioned"—the mere numbers of the governing class. Otherwise Bernays (without inserting διά, but making ἠτίας διαφόρας the predicate): "it follows that the constitutions mentioned, τὰς ῥήθειας sc. πολιτείαι, are not causes of specific difference."

Although from distinct points of view various causes seem to be assigned for the existence of different forms of government, yet the new principle of wealth and poverty is maintained through the rest of the treatise (with certain exceptions). But ultimately these different forms are traced back to differences in social conditions, and each represents a certain state of equilibrium or relative preponderance amongst the competing social elements. See Introd. pp. 60 f., 63; c. 7 § 1 n., c. 15 §§ 10—13, vi.(iv). 9 § 10, 11 §§ 9—11, 16—18, 13 §§ 10, 11, viii.(v). 9 §§ 8, 9. Also Bradley Hellenica p. 225 ff.

§ 7 1280 a 1 ἡν τ' ἐλάττουσιν ἂν τε πλείους] Here is a plain statement that any government whatever by the rich majority would be an oligarchy, any whatever by the needy minority a democracy. Yet the writer of the interpolated passage vii.(iv). cc. 3, 4 has failed to understand this: see n. (1164) and vii.(iv).

4 §§ 5, 6. Susem. (543) § 8 5 δι' ἃς ἠτίας] ‘on which grounds both parties claim to be citizens,’ viz. in an oligarchy because they are wealthy, in a democracy because they are free-born.

c. 9 Right, or justice, in an oligarchy and in a democracy: their conflicting claims judged by the standard of perfect justice.

Oncken i. pp. 30—33 has treated this chapter as a typical example of Aristotle’s analytical method.

§ 1 7 Properly ὄρος = definitions, like ῥήθος. Better, standards or determining principles; that which gives its special character to Oligarchy or Democracy; id quo aliquis rei natura constituitur et definitur (Ind. Ar.), ois δοκεῖ ὁρθάναι [ἢ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία] vii.(v). 9 § 14. The word was so used by Plato REP. VIII 251 c (comp. 652 B 6 πρόθεσις ἀγαθῶν, καὶ δι' ὃν ἤ ὀλιγαρχία καθίστατο = ἐπέκτεινον, ...δ ἡ δημοκρατία ὁρίζεται ἀγαθῶν = ἐλευθερία). We have had it before 11. 6 § 9, 9 § 32 and it occurs about sixteen times in the sequel. Grant’s argument Ethics i. p. 61 f., that Aristotle adopted the term in the interval between writing the Ethics and the Politics, is disproved by its occurrence in the Republic.

All the various elements of the city contribute something in virtue of which they claim a share of political privilege. The predominant element (§ 2) or class fixes its own contribution as the qualification for citizenship, or standard. This again may be viewed as the end which the citizens pursue.

8 τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν κτλ] The state is a realisation of distributive
justice, in so far as public offices, rights and privileges, are assigned to the citizens in proportion to their worth, κατ’ ἄξιαν: so that the contributions of all to the state meet with a proportionate return, and all are justly treated by the constitution. But an oligarchy or democracy, while fairly applying this law of proportion, may set up a false or one-sided standard of worth, as χρήσεως or χρήσεως in place of capacity and merit. In such a case the justice of the state is a departure from perfect or natural justice and may be called an oligarchic or democratic justice, as the case may be (A. C. Bradley).

9. πάντες] Here again ἀφότεροι might be expected. Comp. Π. 11 § 5 n. (387) and Κλ. Π. 9 § 3 ἀπάσχον ὁμοίως δὲ ὑπάρχειν—all who are envious or righteously indifferent, ‘both classes’ (Shillito).

ἀπονται δικαίου τινός] The partial truth in these one-sided conceptions is fully recognized. The ἄξια which an oligarchy or democracy take as the qualification for political privileges, although not the true one, still has a subordinate importance for the state. It is justice in some measure. See § 3, § 15; viii(v).

1 § 5.

10 καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πάν κτλ] They do not state absolute justice in its full extent.

11 οἴον δοκεῖ κτλ] ‘Thus justice, or right, is thought (by the upholders of democracy) to be equality.’ They grasp the fact that all citizens are on a level in respect of freedom, and taking this partial equality for absolute equality they give everybody equal rights; i.e. they give equals to unequals.

§ 2. 14 οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιρεθῆναι κακῶς] But they omit the qualification for whom equality or inequality is right, and form a wrong judgment.

15 σχεδόν δ' οἱ πλείστοι κτλ] Comp. c. 16 § 8, n. (642). SUSEM. (544)

§ 3 16 ὡστ' ἐπεὶ κτλ] ‘Hence since right means ‘right for given persons,’ and there is the same difference between them as between the things they are entitled to.’

18 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς] Ν. Ε. Β. v. c. 3 (Bekker’s c. 6) esp. §§ 4—6, § 10 διεήρθη- ται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ αἱ. Comp. n. (584), also viii(v). 1. 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (545)

This reference was suspected, or rather condemned, as an interpolation by Grant Ethics i. p. 53, but see Jackson’s commentary on B. v. p. 77—81.

τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος κτλ] They agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but not as to that of the persons to whom it is assigned.

“This is in fact true of both oligarchs and democrats: for equality of political rights amongst themselves is also the demand of the oligarchs, but only for the rich, while the democrats admit it as far as possible for all citizens. The one demands equality for all who are equal or alike in wealth: the others demand it for all who are equal or alike in freedom. Cp. viii(v). 1. 2 f. n. (1493).” SUSEM. (546)
III. 9. 6] 1280 a 9—1280 a 35. 391

20 μᾶλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ὄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ (V) αὐτοὺς κακῶς, ἐπείτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἐκατέ-

§ 4 ροις δίκαιον τι νομίζοντες δίκαιον λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οὗ μὲν γὰρ ἀν κατὰ τὰ ἄντιστα ὤσιν, οὗν χρήμασιν, ὅλως οὕτως οὖνται ἄν-

24 σοι εἴναι, οὐ δὲ ἀν κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι, οὗν ἐλευθερία, ὅλως

§ 5 ἵσοι. [illos δὲ κυριώτατον οὖν λέγοντις ἐι μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτη-10 μάτων χάριν ἐκοινωνιάσαν καὶ συνήλθον τοὺς τοῖς πόλεις ὅσον περ καὶ τῆς κτίσεως, ὡσθ’ ὁ τῶν ὀλι-

γαρχικῶν λόγος δύνηειν ἀν ἵσχυειν (οὗ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατό ταλαίπων τῶν εἰσενεγκόμαντα μίαν μιᾶν τῷ

30 δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πάν, οὗτε τῶν εἰς ἄρχῃς οὐτε τῶν ἑπιμο-

§ 6 μέιον). εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ὕδη ἐνεκέκει μάλυν ἄλλα μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ὕδη (καὶ γὰρ ἄν δοῖλον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡρῶν ἢ τό-

λις· μόνον δ’ οὐκ ἔστε διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ

tοῦ θῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μῆτε συμμαχίας ἐνεκεν, ὅπως

35 ὑπὸ μηδὲνος ἀδικώντα, μῆτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν

22 νομίζοντες <τὸ> δίκαιον Spengel, perhaps rightly | 24 ἐλευθερία Vettori, ἐλευθερία (or -η) Π. Δι., ἐλευθερία Μ., ἐλευθερία ΠΙ. fr. (the first iota above the line), ἐλευθερός P1 | 27 διαρχικῶν P1 Qb Tb | 29 ταλαίπων Γ. μιᾶς II (including fr.)

Ar. Βk. (in Π3 μν over an erasure) | εἰσενεγκόματα II fr. Βk. | 30 δ’ ὄντι Μιᾶς Π2 Tb | 31 μιᾶς ἐνεκέν II fr., omitted by P1 (1st hand, added by corr.1 in the margin) | 34 ἑνεκά Μιᾶς Π1

21 μήρι τινὸς] See on § 1 above.

'Because each side contends for a partial justice, but thinks it is contending for an absolute justice.'

21 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κτῆ] Comp. c. 12 § 2, and VIII (v). 1 § 2 f. nn. (584 b, 1493). SUSEM. (545 b)

25 κυριώτατον] what is most important; viz. the grand aim and object of a city.

§ 5 26 τοσοῦτον μετέχουσιν κτῆ] 'they have a stake in the city proportionate to their share of the property.'

29 ταλαίπων] A talent = 4715 German marks = L231 25. 6d., a mine = 783/4 German marks = L3 17s. approximately: Hultsch Greek and Roman Metrology p. 172 f. SUSEM. (547)

30 οὗτε τῶν εἰς ἄρχῃς...ἐπιγινομένων] "ought not to have an equal share of the principal nor of the profits accruing."

Congreve however suggests that the participants may be masculine, and so Bernays, with a different sense: 'either of those who originally contributed or of a subsequent generation of shareholders.' This can hardly be right. SUSEM.

§ 6 33 νῦν δ’ οὐκ κτῆ] Comp. 1. 2. 8 and the further passages cited in n. (21). Also Nic. Eth. x. 6. 8, 1177 a 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ’ οὐδεὶς ἀνθράποις μεταδι-

δόσων, εἰ μὴ καὶ βιοῦ, and x. 7. 6, 1177 b 4, where happiness is made to consist in leisure, εἰ τῇ σκολῇ. But that slaves have no leisure, is stated Pol. ΙV (vii). 15. 2 (Eaton). Cp. too nn. (925, 926) at that passage. SUSEM. (548)

35 διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν κτῆ] "for commerce and mutual intercourse." Here the sentence breaks off, the parenthetical example being elaborated and supported by other subordinate illustrations until the end of the chapter. Moreover the manner in which the true end of the state comes to light is not stated in antithesis to the false ends rejected, but is an incident of this elaborate treatment of the one false view, that the end is commercial intercourse: viz. πέρι δ’ ἀρτιτῆς καὶ κακίας διασκοποῦντον, § 8. There-

upon the mention of the true end leads to its severance from some unessential though indispensable conditions (κοινωνία τῶν, πέρι τὰς μεταδόσεις, §§ 9—12); and this is followed by the formal definition of the true end of the state, § 13, from which
36 ἀλλήλων—] Thurot and Bonitz, to mark the anacoluthon. As far as the sense goes, the apodosis is at 1281 a 4 ff. διάπερ κτλ. || τυρηνοὶ Ἡράκλεια πάντες ἐστὶν, ὕποπτοι ἄλλος σωφρόνως ἔγραφαν, περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγήμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν 40 καὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλὰ οὔτε ἀρχαῖοι πάσιν ἔπι τούτοις καθεστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐτεραὶ παρ᾿ ἐκατέρω, οὐκ ἔτειν τοὺς πολίους τινὸς εἶναι δεῖ φροντίζουσιν ἄτεροι τοὺς ἐτερούς, οὐδὲ ὅπως μηδεὶς ἀδικοὶ ἔσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ μοχθριάν ἔξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδεὶς ἀδική-5 σουσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ ἄρετῆς καὶ κακίας [πολιτικῆς] δια-|| § 8 σκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ἡ καὶ κανεῖς ὁτι

the real measure of political rights is a deduction made in § 15. Were the digressions dismissed, and the anacoluthic period rewritten, it would perhaps run as follows: ἐν δὲ μὴ τῶν ἔτερων μονὸν ἐνεκεν (κοινωνίας) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰς ἕκα, μήτε συμμαχίας ἐνεκεν ὅπως ἐντὸς μηδενὸς ἀδικ-κοῦνται, μὴ δὲ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρήσιν τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἐνεκεν τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους καὶ τῶν καλῶν πράξεων χάριν βεβέρον τὴν πολιτικήν κοινωνίαν, ὅτι μηδέναν πλείστον ἐνεκεν τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας, τοῦτοι προστίκαι πλείστον μετέχουν πόλεως. Bo-

nies. Meier u. Schömnn Allach. Process p. 494 n. 49. Here συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγήμων are commercial treaties in general: σύμβ.), περὶ τὴν μὴ ἀδικέων—special articles which made provision against the infliction of damage, or established a system of compensation for mutual injury (Cope).

40 ἀρχαῖοι πάσιν ἔπι τούτοις κοιναῖ] magistrates common to them all, appointed to secure these ends.

1280 b 2 τοῦ πολίου τινὰς κτλ] nor does the one state care what the character of the citizens of the other state should be.

3 τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας] those who come under the treaty.

4 ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως κτλ] The modest aim to which the modern state is restricted.
It Koivvia transformed hence

liri 34, v6[),os 13 dwell also iyTt/xeXes

3.15 I 91 vi AXr;XoL TOVTOV Bk. truly (including of guarantee haps, II. from to aiof.

be means that nation of Pre-Socratics Comp. made cation called to the appearance of seven us. The thing on the profession of his important, who also made it his profession to acquire education and knowledge and impart them to others: hence the seven sages are also called the seven sophists. At a later time, after the age of Pericles, the name was given in a narrower sense to paid professional teachers of rhetoric and other
departments of an encyclopaedic education. They delivered single lectures and discourses of an instructive or amusing kind (επίδειξες), charging a fee for admission, or perhaps published them in writing; in some cases they appeared as experts in argument. In this sense the word occurs here. At the same time it received the odious connotation in which we exclusively use it at the present day, in consequence of the many subtleties, the pettifogging quibbles, and paradoxes in which this class of people was often involved; although the movement towards freethinking* and critical scepticism, which they originated, and their bold innovations had much to justify them, and were in part of epoch-making importance. Cp. n. (31) on II. 3 § 4.

SUSEM. (552)

See Cope in the Journal of Sacred and Classical Philology vol. II. pp. 140—143; also his note on Rhet. III. 3. 1.

§ 9 It will be remembered that Corinth and Argos were for a short time, 393—387 B.C., united ostensibly as one state, to the intense indignation of the philo-Laconian party. See Xen. Hellen. IV. 4 § 6 αδαθανόμενοι δε ἀφάντοις τὴν πόλιν διά τὸ καὶ δρόνοι ἀναστὴσαν καὶ Ἀργος ἀντὶ Κορίνθου τὴν πατρίδα αὐτῶν ὄνομάσεται: V. I § 34, § 36.

16 επιγραφής Usually a lawful marriage could only be contracted between two citizens of the same Greek state: but the privilege was occasionally granted to individual strangers or to an alien community as a whole; and special treaties

* [A negative ‘enlightenment’ or ‘illumination,’ Aufklärung.]
18 δάπαθεν fr. Bk. 2, ύποθεν II Bk. 1

19 εἴησαν Π' Αττ., εἶ ήσαν Γ' Μ' Bk. 1

20 εἶ omitted by Bk. 2

21 μήραν Αλδ. Bk. 1 — 23 πω Αττ. (apparently) and Bk., πως possibly Γ' (μίδων William), πν, II (including fr.)

Susem. 1

30 ή πόλις Bk. 2

secured the right of intermarriage between different cities: Schomann pp. 101, 306, 356 Eng. tr. How far it was prohibited between members of the ruling and subordinate families when such a distinction was made within the limits of the same community, is not known. The Bacchidae of Corinth (ii. 12. 8 n. 420) married almost exclusively amongst themselves, Herod. v. 92; and the prohibition of intermarriage with the former ruling families of Samos, after the popular insurrection in 412, forms an especially odious measure, Thuc. viii. 21 (Eaton). The two royal families at Sparta seem never to have intermarried. Susem. (553) τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς π. κοινωνιμάτων 'one of the means of combination peculiar to cities.'

§ 10 17 οὗτος εἶ τινες οἰκοδεν χωρίς] Aristotle does not mean that civil society is not in itself quite possible between several contiguous villages and hamlets, without the inhabitants being concentrated into one city: c. 3 §§ 3, 4 nn. (459, 460). In fact Sparta itself consisted of five such neighbouring villages, so close together, however, that as distinct from the district around them they were designated the 'city.' This was, it is true, an isolated and abnormal phenomenon: see Schö.

mann p. 123, p. 207 Eng. tr. Susem. (554) "Is not Aristotle taking an imaginary case: the elements of society (such as γεωργόδος) which are necessary πρὸς τὸ εἰπί μόνον i. living apart but exchanging products (μεταδόσεις) ii. living together and connected by a defensive league, § 11?" (Wyse).

20 οὗτος εἶ κτλ.] That is, supposing they belonged to these different crafts without which the state could not exist at all: see iv (vii). c. 8. Susem. (555) 21 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰεν μήραν] i.e. not at all too many even for a 'city' according to Greek ideas, as distinguished from a race or tribe: cp. iv (vii). c. 4, also n. (11); and n. 6 §§ 4—6, 9 §§ 15—17, nn. 198—201, 306, 307, 309, 311. Susem. (556).

§ 11 24 διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας] because they did not live near enough to each other.

25 ἐκατόστας μὲντοι κτλ.] Each making his own house his 'castle.'

29 συνελθόντες καὶ χωρίς] after their union and when they lived apart.

§ 12 φανερὸν τοῦν κτλ] Comp. c. 1 § 3 n. (434 b). Susem. (557)

32 οὐ μὴν οὗτος ὑπαρχόντων κτλ.] 'yet not even if all these conditions are present is it then actually (ἐγώ) a city, but (a city is) the union of families and clans
the end, that they may attain a perfect and independent life. This however will not be secured unless they dwell in the same place and have the right of intermarriage."

§ 13 36 κνήθεαι = ties of affinity.
37 φρατρίαι See II. 3 § 5, 5 § 17, vii(vi). 4 § 19 nn. (141, 169, 1427 b).
Amongst the Greeks these "brotherhoods" were [or appeared to be] the next subdivision of the old tribal stocks (φυλαί) having a number of clans (γένη) included under them.
SUSEM. (558)

θυσίαι Clubs which met to sacrifice, διαγωγαὶ Comp. IV. (vii). 15. 2. u. (921).
SUSEM. (558 b) 'The recreations of a life in common which depend on φυλαί would include much, e.g. the commerce of disciple and friend as well as the pleasures of social reunions (Wyse).

38 τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον κτλ. Comp. Nic. Eth. viii. 3 § 5 1150 b 4, οὐκ ἐν γὰρ οὕτωσι ἐστὶν φίλων ὡς τὸ συνήν πολέως καὶ εὐάνα E 19, 6 § 4, 1158a 23, IX. 9 § 10 1170 b 10, 10 § 4 1171 a 2, 12 § 4 1179 b 20 (Eaton).
SUSEM. (559)

10 ὅτι μὲν οὐν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολειτείων ἀμφισβητοῦν—

34 τελειαίοι ΠΠ. bk. || 35 καὶ η fr. || 38 τῶν συνήν Koraes || 40 δὴ η ἢ ὅ ὅ SUSEM., δὲ ἢ ΠΠ (including fr.) Ar. bk.

1281 a 1 <χάρων> Scaliger, ἐνεκεν Koraes, see next note || 3 χάρων omitted by ΠΠ (added in P1 by corr.1). [χάρων] Scaliger. This justifies the insertion of χάρων in line 1, rather than ἐνεκεν || 5 τοῦτος omitted by ΩTh and P1 (1st hand)

in noble living, to the end that they may attain a perfect and independent life. This however will not be secured unless they dwell in the same place and have the right of intermarriage."

¶ 13 36 κνήθεαι = ties of affinity.
37 φρατρίαι See II. 3 § 5, 5 § 17, vii(vi). 4 § 19 nn. (141, 169, 1427 b).
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In particular, (c. 11) Should it rest with the Many or the Few?  

The modern doctrine of sovereignty is best expounded by Austin Jurisprudence Lect. vi. pp. 226—255, ed. 3.  

§ 1 12 ἵνα γὰρ τοι κτλ. It must either be (1) the masses, or (2) the wealthy, or (3) the virtuous, or (4) the one preeminently good man, or (5) a despot.  

16 ἐσοδεῖ γὰρ κτλ. Ironical. “It is not unjust, for, by heaven, it was justly passed by the supreme body. Then what (but this) deserves to be called the utmost injustice?”  

§ 2 17 πάλιν τε κτλ. And further, after all has been taken away, if the majority begin afresh to distribute amongst them the property of the minority, manifestly they destroy the city.  

SUSEM. (561) The principle is self-destructive.  

19 οὐχ ἵνα ἡ ἄρετή] Cp. II. 2 § 7 n. (135 b). On the contrary, the proper excellence of any object is that which qualifies it for the fulfilment of its end or the performance of its special function: Nic. Eth. ii. 6, 1, 1166 a 15 (Congreve): whereas, its vice is that which corrupts its true principle, ἄστι γὰρ ἡ κακὰ φθαρτικὴ ἀρχὴς N. E. vi. 5. 6, 1140 b 19 (Eaton).  

SUSEM. (561 b) Cp. Pl. Rep. x. 608 e: if moral evil, which is the evil of the soul, does not destroy it, then it is indestructible.  

20 οὔτε τὸ δίκαιον...φθαρτικὸν] Comp. i. 2. 16 n. (28 c), ii. 2. 4 n. (133), iii. 12 § 1 n. (583), § 9, 13 § 3 n. (590).  

SUSEM. (562)  

§ 3 24 ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἀρά] (lfs.) thereupon also is the conduct of the majority justified.  

§ 4 The claim of the virtuous (ἐπιτεικεῖς) is very feebly opposed as involving the disfranchisement of all who are not virtuous. This is implied in the very name of aristocracy διὰ τὸ τούς ἀριστοὺς ἀρχεῖν.
This is the reason why the same question is found in Plato's government is called dangerous (episofias), though unavoidable, II. 5 § 25 n. (181).

Similarly the claim of the one pre-eminent citizen (the alternative form of Aristotle's 'best state') is reduced to a case similar to the last, which leaves a still larger number disfranchised.

34 ἀλλ' ἂν εἰς τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ] Cr. c. 15 § 4, c. 16 § 5 ff. n. (641). Susen. (562 b) 36 χαράν] sc. ἐγώ predicate, "that a human being, whoever he may be, with human passions in his soul should be supreme instead of the laws, is a mistake."

[ἐν οἷς κτλ] The law itself may have a bias in favour of oligarchy or democracy; and if so, the fault remains uncorrected.

c. 11 § 39 ἐστι τοῖς ἐτέροις λόγοις] cc. 12—17 and B. VI (IV), B. VII (VI).
5 νίσσεσ, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὡσπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον (VI)
τὸ πλῆθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἕχοντι
§ 3 αἰσθήσεις, οὖτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἡθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ
καὶ κρίνονσιν ἁμενον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα
9 καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν. ἀλλοι γὰρ ἀλλο τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ

5 καὶ <ὡς> οὐ ἢ καὶ <ὡσπερ> ? Susem., following Thurot hesitatingly || συνελ-
θόντας Ια Qb Tb Ar. Ald. Bk. and corr. of P2-3 || [ὡσπερ] ἕνα Thurot || 7 τὴν
περὶ τὴν Μα Susem.12 and perhaps Γ || 8 κρύος ΓΜ1 (et kri스 melius William)

§ 7 n. (474): also IV(vii). 1 §§ 10, 11 n. (703). SUSEM. (565)
Hobbes' Leviathan, the body politic, is similarly an artificial body.

5 καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων...7 διά-
νοιαν] Trendelenburg in his "Law of Nature" (Naturrecht) (p. 463) rightly objects that 'in works of art man is essentially
a free, unprejudiced spectator: in politics he is a partisan fellow-actor. There is a fallacy in an argument from analogy which draws an inference from the
universal common to all the cases compared, when in fact it is the difference
between them which is decisive.' But he proceeds to argue, that the comparison
leaves out of account the desires and passions which in the case of the multitude
dull the intelligence and pervert the will; that the truth brought together by their
collective wisdom is materially prejudiced and hampered by the falsehood
collected along with it; that the supplementing of the truth from various sides is
hindered or frustrated by the resistance of errors and self-seeking. In reply to this we must inquire, whether when the public at large judges and enjoys
works of art, only healthy popular inclinations and instincts are brought to-
gether: whether they are not blended with others which are unhealthy and mis-
leading. Aristotle at least is of this latter opinion v(viii). 6 § 16 n. (1080), 7 § 7 n.
(1097), and certainly he is right. Further is there no fallacy in the criticism
which overlooks the true analogy in the

On the other side it is not to be forgotten, that where our own interest is concerned, although passion no doubt is inflamed
and the critic is converted into a judge in his own cause (c. 9 §§ 1, 2, 16 §§ 8, 9),
yet at the same time the intellect is sharpened: thus in accordance with the
analogies applied in § 14, (whose cor-
rectness even Trendelenburg has not questioned,) in practical questions, where
his own weal and woe are at stake, the

uneducated man approximates to an
expert still more closely than in art
criticism. If it were not so, art critics
might be appointed by the popular vote,
but not even the most indirect choice of
its representatives should be left to the
people, although our procedure is now
universally the reverse and we believe
it to be justified. Trendelenburg's ob-
jections (p. 147) to too numerous execu-
tive or decreeing assemblies are quite
in point. But he forgets that in §§ 8, 9
Aristotle, if we take him literally, only
allows the popular assembly to elect the
officials; and that in any case (see Exc. iv. to B. ii. n. 388) he restricts the
decision of the people to a few definite
questions. Had he been acquainted with
the representative system, he would have
judged more correctly: he would then
most likely have referred to the council
all matters which call for a full deliber-
ation and responsible decision rather than
a vote. That not merely capacity but
prejudice also and ignorance are col-
lected in the popular assembly is more-
over expressly laid down by Aristotle in
§s 6, 7 (though Trendelenburg has al-
together overlooked this); but he holds
that the danger arising from the passions
of individual sovereigns is the greater of the
two (15 § 8 n. 647), whereas in a capable
nation he maintains that the force of
truth will finally triumph over falsehood.
This is the thought upon which, as we
know, his conception of rhetoric is based:
see Zeller ii. 755. It may be that this
is not capable of strict demonstration, but
to a large extent remains merely a matter
of belief. Yet this much is certain, that
whoever does not cherish this belief has
lost faith in humanity generally. See
also n. (577) on 11 § 19. SUSEM.
(585 b)

§ 3 8 κρίνονσιν ἁμενον οἱ πολλοὶ
Both music and poetry are well able to illustrate this maxim. The present cen-
tury is rich in good work which has won
its way in spite of the critics.
§ 4 πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολλῶν, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν μη καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς φασὶ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα· διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῶν συνή- χαι τὰ διεσταρμένα χωρίς εἰς ἑν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἐχειν τὸ γεγραμμένον τοῦδε μὲν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐπέ-
§ 5 ροῦ δὲ τινὸς ἔτερον κύριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δήμου καὶ περὶ πάν τῶν πλήθος ἐνδείχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφο-
ραὶ τῶν πολλῶν· πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἀδίλους, ἵσος δὲ νῦ.bukkit δήλον ὣτι περὶ ἐνίοις ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ αὐτοῦ κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἁρμόσει λόγος· καί τι διαφέρουσιν 20 ἐνιοῦ τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν)· ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πλήθος
§ 6 οὖν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότε- ρον εἰρρήμην αἵτων λύσεων ἀν τὰς διὰ τούτων καὶ τῆς ἐξομηνίαν αὐτῆς, τίνων δὲ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους (φ. 75)
24 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτών. τοιοῦτοι δὲ εἰσὶν ὁσοὶ μήτε
§ 7 πλούσιοι μήτε ἀξίωμα ἐχουσιν ἀρέτης μηδέν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἁρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἰσφαλές (διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδικιαν καὶ ἰδί ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν αὐν ἄγκη) τὰ δ'

11 ἐκαστὸν Thurot, ἐκαστὸν Γ. H. Ar. Bk. || ἄσπερ] ἄσπερ Vettori in the margin of his Munich copy || [καὶ τῶν μη......12 φασὶ] Oncken || 13 κεχωρισμένον Γ' Susem.1,2, καὶ κωρίσμενον M 24 lu νῦν κωρίσματο ἐκαστὸν κυρίον; δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ τούτων λύσεων ἀποριαῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἁρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἰσφαλές (διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ ἰδί ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄγκη) τὰ δ'

§ 4 12 τὰ γεγραμμένα κτλ.] Comp. what Socrates says, Xen. Memor. III. 10. 2 καὶ μὴν τὰ γε καλὰ εἶδο ἀφομοιώτεροι, ἐπειδὴ οὐ μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους περιτυχεῖν ἄμεμπτα πάντα ἔχοντι, ἐκ πολλῶν συνά-
γοντες, τὰ ἐκάστου κάλλιστα, ὡς ὁλὰ τὰ σῶμα καλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι. Zeuxis adopted this procedure, when he paint-
ed his Helen. To make it a masterpiece of female beauty, he took as models the five most beautiful maidens in the city in order that he might unity in the pic-
ture the special excellences of each: see Brunn History of the Greek artists 11. pp. 80, 88 (Vahlen). Comp. n. (64) in Susennihl's edition of the Poetics, c. 6 § 11. Susem. (566)

§ 5 16 τὴν διαφόραν τῶν π. πρὸς τοὺς ὀλ. || the difference between the many and the few. So διάστασις, Nic. Eth. IX. 3. 4. || 18 ό γὰρ αὐτὸς...ἀρμόσει λόγος] For the same argument would apply to the animals.

§ 6 21 τὴν πρότερον ἐλπιῆς ἀπ.] Namely: who is to possess the sovereign power? Comp. also § 19 n. (578). Susem. (568)
23 τίνων δει κυρίους κτλ.] This next problem (§§ 6—14) is: how far does the sovereignty of the freemen, the mass of the citizens, extend? This was provi-
sionally decided c. i § 8.

§ 7 27 ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη] There should be an independent causative sentence here,
something standing to those men meteke
...one assembly as the clause those men...uparxos, polemou...paityn below
stands to those men metadidwai...phoberon.
With Rassow's conjecture, anagchi (estil),
there is such a verb; without it there is
no verb on which the infinitives adikein
and amartanein can depend.

29 ὀταν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. vii(vi). 5
§ 4 n. (1434). SUSEM. (568 b)

This is presumably the sequel of the
objections raised in c. 10 §§ 4, 5. The
further development would be in the form
of Plato's well-known simile of the
drones in his criticism of oligarchy
Rep. viii. 551 D, 552 A—E, 555 D.
§ 8 It remains for them to take part
in deliberation and in trials.

32 διότερ καὶ Σόλων...34 ἔστων] Comp. ii. 12 § 3 (Exc. v.r. p. 350 f.), § 5 nn.
(412, 413): vii(iv) 11 §§ 19 n. (1303), vii
(vi) 4 §§ 4 n. (1412). Such a
constitutional restriction is not admissible,
certainly, for the citizens of the ideal state
who have the best nature and education
and are in the possession of a fixed amount
of land. There suitable elections of
officials must be assumed without such a
restriction; there all the citizens have
equal rights (cp. nn. 440, 884).
But nevertheless, as was inferred in the
Intro. p. 54 from ii. 11 § 6 (cp. n. 388), there
can hardly any doubt that even in the
ideal state Aristotle intends to restrict
the activity of the whole body of full citi-
zens to the election of the officials, to-
gether with the final decision upon legisla-
tion as well as upon questions of war and
peace and treaties with foreign states.
Comp. iii. 4 § 5, 6 § 1 n. (471). SUSEM. (569)

33, 'set them over,' i.e. 'assign to
them' the election of the magistrates and the scrutiny of their conduct (when they
retire from office).

ἐπὶ after τάττονων. Other constructions
are εἰς, κατὰ and ἐπὶ with dat.

§ 9 35 ἰκανὴν αἰσθήσεων] 'sufficiently
clear sight' or 'enough discrimination.'
The terms αἰσθήσεις and αἰσθάνεσθαι in
Aristotle often go beyond the notion of
tire sensation and sense perception to
which Plato in the Theaetetus restricts
them. Thus αἰσθάνεσθαι = to understand
another's command in 1, 5 § 9 (cp. n. 45)
likewise Plato himself at an earlier time,
Phaedr. 271 ε, even where the terms ex-
press that notion, Aristotle always has
in view the discrimination of the sensible
individual by sense, the judgment of
perception, so that he calls it a discrimi-
inating and judging faculty (διώμας κριτικῆς, cp. n. 407): Anal. Post. ii. 15 § 5, 99
b 35, De Anima iii. 9, 1, 432 a 15.
'Thence by a very natural transition he
applies these terms to denote the
discrimination of the individual and par-
cular generally, and the decision as to
what is right and wrong in relation there-
to in practical life—an instinctive pro-
cess, so to speak, or at all events one
which rests merely upon observation and
experience. Nic. Eth. iv. 9 b 1109 b 30;
iv. 5, 13, 1126 b 3 f. SUSEM. (870)
καθάτερ ἢ μὴ ἡ κ.] "as unnutrition
food when mixed with the nutritious
makes the whole a better diet than the
scanty supply" (of nourishment alone),
§ 2 n. (564). SUSEM. (571)
38 χωρίς] alone, by himself.

ἀτελής] Properly 'immature' or 'un-
developed' or 'incomplete'; hence 'un-

II 7

[ III. 11 ]

Ἡ ἀμφράταινα ἀυτοῦς: ὅτε δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδεμιοῦν ἄρχὼν (vii)

29 φοβεροῦ (ὅταν γὰρ ἀπομοῦ πολλοῖ καὶ πέντετε ὑπάρχωσι, 
§ 8 πολεμίων ἀναγκαίων εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταὐτὴν). λει-

πεται δὴ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι καὶ κρίνειν. μετέχειν αὐτοῦς, 

dioóter καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετοῦν τάττονων ἐν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχαιεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνιας τῶν ἄρχων.

§ 9 τῶν, ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἐστιν. πάντες μὲν γὰρ 

35 ἄρχοντες συνελθόντες ἢκανὴν αἰσθήσεων, καὶ μερισμένοι τοῖς 

βελτίωσι τὰς πόλεις ὑφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἢ μὴ καθὰρα τροφή 

μετὰ τῆς καθαρὰς τῆς πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ολί-

§ 10 γῆς. χωρίς δὲ ἐκαστος περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἀτελῆς ἐστίν.

'χει

28 μηδεμιοῦν ἄρχων Βόκερ, µηδε µετέχειν ΓII Bk. 38 ἀτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 11.
δ' ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν ὤν (VI)
40 δόξειν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναι τῆς ὀρθοῦς ἱατρευκῆς,
οὕτε καὶ τὸ ἱατρεύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑμᾶς τὸν καίμοντα τῆς
νίκου τῆς παρομοίης. οὕτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἱατρός. ὄμοιως δὲ
τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. οὕτε ὁ ὅπως ἵνα
ἱατρῶν δὲι διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἱατροῖς, ὦτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλ-
§ 11 λους ἐν τοῖς ὄμοιοις. ἱατρός δὲ ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχι-}

τεκτωνικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην εἰσὶ
γὰρ τινες καὶ τοιούτου περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπέων τὰς τέχνας, ἀπο-
διδομέν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν ὑδέν ἢπτον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς
§ 12 εἰδόσιν. ἐπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀφρεσίν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἂν δό-
ξειν ἐχεῖν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέσθαι ὀρθῶς τῶν εἰδο-
των ἐργὸν ἑστίν, οἷον γεωμέτρητα τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ τοῦ
κυβερνήτης τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίων ἑργῶν
καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἵδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλὰ ὡς τι
§ 13 εἰδότων γε μᾶλλον. ὡστε κατὰ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ

42 ὁ omitted by II² Bk. || καὶ added after ὄμοιοις δὲ by Γ Μ¹
1282 α 5 τοιοῦτο καὶ II² Bk., καὶ untranslated by William, Ar. || 7 καὶ omitted
by II¹, hence [καὶ] Susem.¹² || 9 τε omitted by P¹.¹⁴ || 10 [περὶ] or [περὶ ἐνίων]
Spengel (the former perhaps right) || 11 καὶ before τῶν ἴδιωτῶν omitted by P¹ Q¹ Tb
|| ὦτι τοι Κορακς Bk.²

qualified to judge.’ The word was used in 1. 13 § 7, § 11, to characterize
the boy’s powers of reflection and ‘virtue’ (Congrev.). Cp. also κτ. (875) on IV(VII).
13. 5. Susem. (572)
§ 10 A difficulty: only the physician can properly judge a course of treatment
and pronounce with authority that it has been successful.
39 ἀπορίαν πρώτην] ‘Certainly this
mode of ordering the constitution involves a
difficulty—in the first place that &c.’:
followed § 15 by ἀλλὰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐχομένη
1283 α 1 ὦσπέρ ὅπως κτλ] Compare
Plato’s illustration of the physician tried by
boys at the accusation of the cook, Gorg. § 521 E.
§ 11 3 ἱατρὸς δὲ κτλ] ‘Physician’
may mean (1) the practitioner in ordi-
nary cases, (2) the scientific student who
has mastered the whole field of medicine,
(3) the educated layman who has ac-
quired his knowledge of medicine only
out of scientific interests generally.
5 τινες καὶ τοιοῦτοι κτλ] ‘For there
are even some such’ viz. amateurs ‘in
nearly all the arts, and we assign the
right to judge to the educated layman as
much as to the profession.’ With the
order of IF¹, τοιοῦτοι καὶ, Bernays and others
must translate ‘in almost all other arts
as well,’ which is a misplaced emphasis.
Camerarius compares the first words of
the treatise De partibus animal. περὶ
pāsān theorētikēn τε καὶ μεθοδων…δύο
φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἔεις εἶναι, ὅν τίν
ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλὸς ἔχει
προσαγορεύειν, τήν δ’ οὖν παιδεῖαν τινά.
πεπαιδευμένον γάρ ἐστὶ κατὰ τρίπον τὸ
donūν γράφει κρίνει εὑρόσχοις τι καλὸς ἢ
μὴ καλὸς ἀποδιδόσοι ὡς λέγων. Susem. (573 b)
§ 12 7 ἐπείτα—further, not answ-
ing πρώτην; but rather completing so
much of the problem as is expressed in
§§ 10, 11 viz. περὶ τὴν κρίσιν.
περὶ τὴν ἀφρεσίν] in the election of
magistrates, § 13 ἀρχαιοτέρων.
8 τῶν εἰδότων] experts in statecraft,
answering to the geometers and pilots,
Plato Politicus 301 λ, β, ὁ ἐπιστήμων.
11 ἢ περὶ is retained, μετέχοισι
μετέχουσι τῆς ἀφρεσίας virtually; ‘have
a voice in the election.’
§ 13 12 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον] Cf.
Π. 3 § 1 μ.
The two _ninína_ are not mentioned without their rulers (δούλος _áv eín kai polémos_ 11. 12. 5).

§ 14 The reply to the objection of § 10: (a) the collective judgment of a free people may be even superior to that of the experts; (b) the users of the laws may be better practical judges of them than their makers: the expert's knowledge is not always an advantage.

15 _día τῶν παλαί λόγον_ for the reason stated above, §§ 2—4. _πάλας_ as in § 20; so II. 4 § 10.

17 _κύριον οὔτε ... οὔτε_ The two _ninína_ without which it is reduced to virtual dependence on its rulers (δούλος _áv eín kai pálemon_ 11. 12. 5).

§ 15 Second objection (see § 10). The least capable citizens have the most authority: sovereignty resides with them. _óswpé eírhtai_ § 8. ‘Solon and some other legislators.’ _Susem._ (575)

§ 16 _tampévoun... meižeýoun_ “But for the treasurership and the minstry of war and the highest offices men of higher property qualification are required.” Even at Athens the “Treasurers of the Goddess” as they were called, and the treasurers of the other temples, though appointed by lot, were always taken from the highest class only: Schómán. p. 418 Eng. tr. _Susem._ (576) The reply. Strictly speaking no single ecclesiast or dicast is a magistrate: he is only a fraction or element of the composite magistrate or public official, the assembly and the law court.
III. 11. 20

1282 a 13—1282 b 8.

403

λύσει καὶ τοῦτην τὴν ἀπορίαν. ἵσως γὰρ ἐχει καὶ ταῦτ’ (VI)

§ 17 ὀρθός. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ’ ὁ βουλευτὴς οὔδ’ ὁ ἐκκλη-

35 σιατής ἄρχων ἑστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστηρίου καὶ ἡ βουλή καὶ ὁ
dήμος: τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἐκαστὸς μόριον ἑστὶ τοιτῶν (λέγω
de μόριον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστήν καὶ τὸν δικα-

§ 18 στήν): ὡστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος: εἰ γὰρ πολ-

λῶν ὁ δήμος καὶ ἡ βουλή καὶ τὸ δικαστηρίου, καὶ τὸ τίμημα

40 δὲ πλείον τὸ τοῦτον πάντων ἢ τὸ τὸν καθ’ ἑνα καὶ κατ’

§ 19 ὀλέγους μεγίλας ἄρχας ἄρχοντων.

tαῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω 13

1282b 1 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. ἢ δὲ πρώτη λεγθεῖσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανε-

ρὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἔτερον ὦς ὧτι δει τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυ-

ρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ, ἀν τε εἰς ἀν τε πλείους ὧσι, περὶ τοῦτον εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὄσων ἐξαδυνα-

5 τοῦτοι οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ράδιον εἶναι καθο-

λον διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. ὁποίοις μεντοί τινῶς δει εἶναι

τῶν ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδὲν πω δῆλον, ἀλλ’ ἐτι μενεῖ

tὸ πᾶλαι διαπορθεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ὡμοῖοι ταῖς πολιτείαις

40 τὸ before τοῦτων omitted by II, hence [70] Susem. 13 2 II

1282 b 1 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον M* P1 10 διωρίσα τδιλωται ΠιΠ. Bk. 3 εἶναι δὲ II Bk.

8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ . . . . . . . 10 ἄλκουs transposed to follow 11 νόμουs by Congreve; to follow

33 καὶ ταῦτα] ἡ τάξη αὕτη τῆς πολι-

τείας, § 10.

§ 18 39 καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ κτλ.] More-

over the amount of property at which all these are rated is far greater collectively

tan the property of individuals in high offices and of the members of small

boards.

§ 19 41 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κτλ.] Tren-

delburg thinks that we do not quite clearly see whether Aristotle is only

setting up his analogies dialectically or defending them as his own opinion. There

can be no doubt, however, especially after such an explicit explanation as is here

given, that the latter is the case: nor can any reason be discovered, even on other

grounds, for a doubt of this kind. 

Susem. (577)

1282 b 1 ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεγθεῖσα ἀπορία]

This is the question treated in c. 19, and then partly decided in c. 11 §§ 1—5, viz.

who is to possess supreme authority? (Comp. § 6 n. 568.) The answer was

"the whole of the burgess body in every state which has any degree of excellence":

and on the basis of this decision, the point which came up at c. 10 § 5 is now

settled by the addition of the qualifying clause "but in accordance with the laws," and in such a way that the greater or less

degree of excellence and correctness of the laws is determined by that of the

constitution to which they correspond. This raises the question of the relative

merit of the normal constitutions which we proceed to answer in cc. 13, 13; see

however Introd. p. 41 f. Susem. (578)

3 κειμένους ὀρθῶς] if they are good

laws.

τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ κτλ.] "and the ruler, be he one or many, must only be sove-

reign in such cases as the laws are quite

unable to lay down precisely, because of the inherent difficulty of framing

general rules applicable to all cases."

Comp. c. 15 § 4 ff. c. 16 §§ 8, 11, with

nn. (637, 652, 653): Nic. Eth. v. 10. 4,

1147 b 13. Here again Aristotle is

following Plato, Politicus 294 A—303:

see n. (637) on c. 15 § 4. Susem. (579)

To these references Laws IX 875 c may be added (Jackson ad loc. Nic. Eth.)

also Pol. II. 8 § 22.

§ 20 8 πάλαι] At c. 10 § 5: comp. n.

(578). Susem. (580)

26—2
§ 21 καί τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δι- (VI)

12 ἔτει δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἑπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις VII

ὰλλὰ γάρ κἀν ὀμοίως ταῖς <πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀδίκους.> ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τούτο, δήλον ὅτι τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβληκυσίας οὐκ δικαίους.

13 δικαίους by Schneider (who however brackets the sentence), and Schmidt (who then emends <τι> γάρ ἄν ἄλλο <ἡ> ὀμοίως......ἀδίκους.), while Thurot omits ἀλλὰ γάρ and transposes 8 καὶ ὀμοίως......10 ἀδίκους to follow 11 δήλον ὅτι. A double reduction, 8 ἀλλὰ γάρ......10 ἀδίκους = 10 πλὴν τούτῳ......11 τοῦτο, wrongly assumed by Susem.12 || καὶ before ὀμοίως II² Bk. Schneider Rassow Thurot Bernays, <εἰ> καὶ Koraes, ἀν Susem.12 (i simili ter William) || On cc. 12, 13 see Introd. 41 ff. || 15 δὲ II² Bk. Scaliger Bonitz Spengel || 16 ἐςτὶ δὴ Scaliger || 17 <τὸ> Susem.

The structure of this sentence is disputed. Scaliger, Bonitz (Arist. Stud. 111. p. 94), Spengel treat it as all one period from 14 ἔτει 22 ἀνθράκων. But this requires δὲ in line 15, whereas δὴ is the reading of II².

16 δύναμις] Joined with αἱ τέχναι, II. 8 § 18; so Rhet. 1. 2 § 1, ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἐκατὼν τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἑνδεχόμενον πλὴν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδέμιας εὐτέρας ἐστὶ τέχνης ἐργων. ἐςτὶ δὲ......17 δικαίων] 'The good for the state, i.e. the interest of the commonwealth, can only be justice.' πολιτικῶν ἀγαθῶν is the subject and τοῦτο refers to this: while τὸ δίκαιον, defined in the next sentence, is predicate. See c. 10 § 3 and the references given in n. (562). Susem. (583)

It is convenient at this place to reproduce, from Nic. Eth. v. 6 § 4, the fuller account of πολιτικῶν δικαίων, the embodiment of 'right' or 'justice' in civil society: τοῦτο δ' ἐςτὶ κοινώνων βίων πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐξουσίαν καὶ βοῶν ἡ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατ' ἀρίθμῳ, the justice of free and (proportionately or actually) equal citizens living together with a view to the satisfaction of wants. When this is not the case there is only an analogous sort of justice, τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. ἐςτὶ γὰρ δίκαιον οἷς καὶ νόμοι πρὸς
φέρον. δοκεῖ δὲ πάσιν ἵσον τι τὸ δικαίον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι (VII) γέ τινως ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς δὲ διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἡθικών (τι γὰρ καὶ τις τὸ δικαίον, καὶ)
§ 2 δειν τοὺς ἵσος ἵσον εἶναι φασὶν). ποίων δὲ ἵσος ἵσος ἵσιν καὶ ποίων ἀνισότης, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτο ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφικὴν πολιτικὴν. ἵσος γὰρ ἂν φαίνῃ τις κατὰ πάντος ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθὸν δεῖν ἀνίσως νευεμῆσθαι τάς ἄρης
25 καὶ, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπά μὴδὲν διαφέροιν ἄλλα ὁμοίου τυγχάνοιεν ὑποθέσεως τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἐτέρων εἶναι τὸ δί-
§ 3 καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἄλλα μὴν εἰ τοῦτο ἄλληθες, ἐστι καὶ κατὰ χρονικά καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὄσινός τῶν
29 ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέ-
§ 4 χουσιν. ἦ τούτῳ ἐπιπλάοιν τὸ γεῦδος; φανερὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημών καὶ δυνάμεων τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν

19 [ἐν ὀσ.…..ἡθικών] Stahl || 21 δ'] omitted by P4 Κε, [δ'] or else τ' Spengel, δή
Bonitz || 23 ἵσως…….1283 b 32 δικαιων noticed by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil.

c. 8, p. 937 A ff. || 27 [καί] Schneider, [τῷ] Ramus || 30 δ'] γάρ Spengel

αὐτῷ νόμος δ' ἐν ὀσ. ἀδίκια γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἁθικοῦ τοῦτο δ' ἐστι τὸ πλέον αὐτῆς νέμειν τῶν ἄπλως ἁθικῶν, ἐπετὸν δ' τῶν ἄπλως κακῶν. See further Jackson’s admirable comments, pp. 101–103 of his edition.

18 ἵσον τι | 'All hold that justice is a species of equality.' So also in Nic. Eth., see n. on § 9 (1).

19 τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφικὰν λόγοις] Strictly scientific or philosophical discussions as contrasted with such as are merely dialectical, Τόπικ. 1. 14 § 6, 105 b 30, and with the exoteric discussions carried on from the standpoint of the ordinary or 'envisaging' consciousness, Ενδ. Εἰθ. 1. 8 § 4, 1217 b 22, ἐποκεῖται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφικάν. Comp. c. 6 § 2; iv (V VII). 1 §§ 2, 3 and Excursus to B. iv (VII). τῶν ἡθικών] Nic. Eth. v. c. 3 which is similarly cited c. 9 § 31; see n. (543). Cp. vii (VII). 1 § 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (584 b)

20 τὸ γὰρ καὶ τις] 'For justice is held to be something assigned to certain persons, and must be equal for equals.' One's rights, one's just share, is the nearest English for the concrete δικαίον. Or, as Mr A. C. Bradley puts it, here is the nearest approach to our modern notion of a 'right.'

§ 2 21 ποίων δ' ἵσοτης] Comp. c. 9 § 4, κατὰ τὸ ὅλον χρήμασιν, ὅλον ἐλευ-

θερίας, n. (546 b): viii (V). 1 § 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (584 b)

22 ἔχει...23 φιλοσοφικὰν πολιτικὴν] 'Here lies a difficulty, and a stimulus to research in political science.' SUSEM.

23 κατὰ πάντος ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθὸν] on the ground of superiority in any advantage. This is one of the phrases used in 1. 6 § 3. Here certainly external goods; see line 28.

26 τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν] 'For (he would say) people who differ have different rights and their relative merits are different.' The correction of Ramus, κατ' ἀξίαν, changes the sense, 'and their different rights go according to merit.' See n. (1493). SUSEM.

§ 3 On this view superiority in colour (white and dark races?) or size (cp. iv [VII]. 14 § 3) or in any other external good would confer a larger share of political rights. The falsity of this is seen from the other arts.

Eaton compares Nic. Damasc. (s. voc.) Ἀλτέμιοι λίβις τοὺς ταχύτατους αὐτῶν αἰροῦνται βασιλεῖς.

§ 4 31 αὐλητῶν] A partitive genitive with εἰςγενεστέροις. The comparison between ἀλητικὴν and πολιτικὴν ἀρέτη is best known from the discourse of Protagoras in Plato’s dialogue 327 A (cp. 323 b). It is doubtless Socratic. Cp. c. 4 § 18.
33 οὖθε ΓΜ estoy || 35 et de......1283 a 3 οὐδὲν is regarded as an interpolation by Riese, who wrongly thinks the inferiority of ἀνθρώπικη to nobility and beauty to have been previously stated
1283 a 4 [μᾶλλον] Ridgeway, ἐνάμαλλον? Ingram

32 τὴν τέχνην] Adverbial accus. after ὑμοίως, as after ἵσος 11. 2 § 6, εἰς ἱσον 1. 12 § 2; and so πάντα τὰ λοιπά in line 25.
33 ἦν δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἐργόν κτλ.] So that the only superiority which constitutes a claim to power is superiority in virtue or capacity for serving the state, to which power is instrumental.
34 καὶ τῶν ὄργανων τὴν ὑπεροχήν — the superiority also in instruments i.e. superior instruments as well, just as πλεονέζον τῶν αὐλῶν — advantage in respect of flutes.
35 προαγαγοῦσιν] “if we advance a little further.” Intrans. as in Phys. 1. 1 § 2, 184 α 19, προάγει ἐκ τῶν ἀσφαλε- στέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα, Petv. 4 § 7, 144 b 23, κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες. It appears then that αὐτὸ δὲ is a nom., as § 4: ‘of itself.’
§ 5 38 ἤ ἐκαὶ...41 ἀνθρώπικην] “even granting that each of them (good birth and beauty) is a greater good than skill with the flute and proportionately superior to flute-playing in a degree far exceeding his superiority as a flute-player, nevertheless we must assign to him the superior flutes.” I once conjectured that the text was unsound; but these words give a correct sense if, with Bernays, we understand ἐκείνῳ from what precedes as the subject of ὑπερέχοντοι. Riese treats the entire passage 35 et de μῆτρῳ δήλῳ...1283 a 3 οὐδέν as an interpolation; but he proceeds on the incorrect assertion that the remark ‘although flute-playing in itself is something less important than nobility or beauty’ has already occurred in the context. See moreover Vahlen Beiträge zu Arist. Beitr. 11. p. 71 (159) f. SUSEM.
Vahlen is there noticing Aristotle’s constant striving after a clearness and precision which to us seems unnecessary, and amongst other instances cites c. 11 § 17 λέγω δὲ...δικαστὴν, Rhet. 11. 11 § 26, 1371 b 20, 1383 b 32. Vahlen also urges this in defence of καὶ γὰρ ταύτα τούτους ὑπάρχει in c. 1 § 4 of the present book of the Politics.
1283 a 1 ἦν δὲ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἐργόν] If the claim of wealth and good birth is valid they ought to contribute to the better performance of function, which they certainly do not.
4 συμβιβάτων = commensurable. See De gen. et corr. 11. 6 §§ 1, 2 εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν (συμβιβάτω), ἀνάγκη ταύτα τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχουν ἀπαξί τοῖς συμβιβαστοῖς μετροῦντα, οἷον τὸ εὖ ὡδοτος κοσμῆσι εἰς ἄλος δέκα.
§ 6 εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος] ‘For if a given bodily stature (confers political privileges) more than’ i.e. in preference to—here we must supply ‘a certain amount of wealth or good birth.’
5 An to meg ethos enamilllon eis kai pro's plouton kai pro's (VII) el eudoriani. Oi'st' eis pleion odi diaferei kata' meg ethos 'h odg kai' aret'n, kai pleion aret'is meg ethos ollos uper-echen *, eis an suv朔hetao plouta. tosoendo yap [meg ethos] eis § 7 kretoup toso hde, tosoendo dhlon ois isoan. etpeis de tout' adiv-5

10 nato, dhlon ois kai eti tov politikov eul oris ou kata' pasean anuostis' amfiorishtousi tov arkhon (eis yap ou mev bradeis ou de ta cheis, oudeh dia touto deh toyne mev pleion toyne 8' elatton echien, all ev toy')(gynunikois agwosin h toy'-§ 8 tov diafora laymphaini tis timhis). all' eis av ton polis syn-

15 estont, ev toutois anagkaion poueis thei amfrisihtis. diwper eul orios antipoiotai tis timhis oue pieikeis kai plouv-

sioi kai elvndorei. deh yap elvndorei t' einai kai tigrma ferontas (ou yap an eis polis eis aptoron plouton, ostoper

6 y...uperechex omitted by Qb Rb | 7 <el> kai pleion uperechex olhos areth megedous Bernays | uperechex olhos arethis megesis 123-4 Tb. Ald. Plutarch Bk. | uperechex <entheceis> - Susem., uperechex Ar. Plutarch Bk. Susem.1 P1 (corrector) and perhaps P1 § 8 [tau'] Bernays | [meg ethos] Susem. | to kai omitted by P1 Ar., [kai] Susem.1-2 | 11 anuoshtis P1 p and Plutarch, isostis' tis P1; isostis P1 (1st hand) | 16 peri tis P4-6 Qb Tb | pieikeis Susem., eugeveis P1 123-4-4 Ar. Ald. Plutarch Susem.1 (in the text), evgeveis Qb Tb. | Cp. Quast. crit. coll. p. 393 | kai kai plousio after 17 kai elvndorei P2 Ar. Plutarch Bk. | 17 t' omitted by M1 P1, hence [t'] Susem.1-2

5 enamilllon eis would enter the lists with, be comparable to.

6 Oi'st' eis pleion ktl] 'Hence if A's superiority in stature exceeds B's superiority in merit, and (if) in general stature can exceed merit, evidently everything is comparable with everything else' —can represents the entheceis conjectured to stand after uperechex. Bernays takes <el> kai pleion uperechex olhos arethi megyedous, eis av suv朔hetao as all belonging to the apodosis: "then, although virtue in itself is more excellent than bodily size, yet a common measure can be found."

8 tosoendo yap ei kretoup ktl] If a cubic inch of gold is superior to a cubic inch of silver, then clearly a certain amount of gold is equal to a cubic inch of silver. But this being impossible in the case where wealth, or bodily strength, competes with virtue, it follows that "in politics as well as (kal) the other sciences or faculties (§ 3) it is not every kind of inequality on which men ground their claims to public office, and this for good reason." meg ethos, except in line 8, = stature, not 'amount.'

§ 8 14 all' eis Av polis suv朔hetae] But it is on the ground of the elements of which a city is composed that they necessarily contend for state offices, as kata to ergon uperechontas § 4. Of these 'elements' of the city, the various factors or sections of society whose preponderance fixes the constitution and the nature of the qualification for political power, he enumerates three; merit, wealth, and free birth. Comp. nn. on 7 § 2, 9 § 1; also vi(iv). 8 §§ 7-9.

17 tirmia is the rated valuation of taxable property, upon which taxes were levied. Generally speaking, it was greatly below the true, or selling, value. Thus tirmia ferein or exein = to have property so estimated, to be a taxpayer, because returning a rateable value of property. So in vii(iv). 13 § 2, tois mev exevis tirmia and tois aptoron are found opposed, and id. 6 § 2, katasbai to tirmia to doyropo-

menvon. But in itself tirmia does not mean taxes.

18 ou yap ev aptoron...19 doulovo] A body of needy paupers would not have the necessary leisure, 11. 9 § 2. A body
of slaves would be without natural rulers, 1. 2 § 4. It would seem that Aristotle could not consistently allow that any barbarian ethnos constituted a 'city.' The monarchy which is one of his normal governments is not monarchy over barbarians.

§ 9 21 ἀνευ τῶν προτέρων] These indispensable factors or elements, ὅπος ἂν ἄνευ ὦν ἀν ἐγή πόλεις, c. 5 § 2, 11(VII). § 1. But justice and virtue are equally indispensable if the city is to live properly.

c. 13 § 1 These claimants for power (αμφιβολουσίων τῶν ἀρχῶν, 12 § 7) stand on a different footing according as we look (1) to civil society of any sort, or (2) to the highest life, which is nowhere realized save in the ideal state.

23 πρὸς μέν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι] 'In view of the bare existence of a city,' as contrasted with ἐν ὑπ' ὑπ' ὃ, see c. 6 §§ 4, 5. τὸ πόλιν εἶναι = τὸ συνή ὃν of 6 § 3, 9 §§ 13, 14.

24 πρὸς μέντοι ἐπὶ ἁγάθην κτλ.] Comp. 1. 3 § 8 n. (21). SUSEM. (585)

25 ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετή] καί explicative. Education (culture) and virtue are words which Aristotle uses interchangeably in this connexion. We may add merit, κατ' ἀξίαν = κατ' ἀρετήν, 5 § 5 (Bradley). See also Rhet. 1. 8 § 4 with Cope's note p. 156 f.

26 καὶ προτέρων] In c. 9. Compare Intro. p. 42. SUSEM. (586)

27 πάντων ἵσον ἔχειν κτλ.] 'that those who are equal in some one thing only (cp. 9 § 4 κατὰ τὶ ἵσον) should have an equal share of everything.'

29 τοιαύτας] All states based on such equality and inequality (Congreve).

§ 2 καὶ προτέρων] c. 9 § 1. It was said, Intro. p. 42, that this reference cannot be dislodged from its place so easily as the preceding one, as Bernays' suggestion (n. on c. 12 § 1) requires. SUSEM. (587)

31 ὧν πλεῖον...32 κοινὸν] 'that they are larger landowners and that the land is a public concern.' A national interest; one to which we can widely or generally appeal: quod ad communem salutem et utilitatem pertinet, Bonitz s.v. See also Cope on κοινότερον, Rhet. 1. 1 § 10. But Bernays renders 'is a common foundation of the state'—which can hardly be right.

32 ἐπὶ πρὸς τὰ συμβολαία κτλ.] 'Further (that) for the most part they are more trustworthy for the transactions of life,' as they have not the temptations of the poor.

33 "The claims of the free born and
of the nobles are closely related. Supply δαμασβητησων. ἐγγὺς is nearly equivalent to an adjective, see n. on II. 9 § 5.

34 ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων] From time immemorial, as noble birth stands to merely free birth so free birth and descent from citizens have been opposed to the status of slaves and freedmen: see I. 6 §§ 7, 8, a passage which should be compared with the following words also. SUSEM. (588) 34 ff. This is confirmed on two grounds: (1) the nobles are the truest citizens, and (2) the cream of the citizens. Properly speaking, it is only in a republic that a real aristocracy can exist. Comp. Freeman, Comparative Politics, Lect. VI. pp. 246—270.

35 The use of γενναῖότεροι and ἀγέννων does not bear out the distinction made in Rhet. 11. 15 § 3, εὐγενεῖς κατά τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετῆς, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ εξασθαύνῃ τῆς φύσεως. 36 οἰκοὶ τίμων] Cpr. I. 6 § 7, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους νομούσιν οἰκοὶ μόνον εὐγενεῖς, n. (52). SUSEM. (688 b)

37 The ambition to win fresh honour is a trait of good birth, τὸ φιλοσοφότερον εἶναι τὸν κτητήμον, Rhet. 11. 15 § 2. § 3 37 ἀρετῆς γένους] Comp. Iun. (54), 55) on I. 6 § 7, VII (iv). § 8 9 n. (1248), VIII (v). I § 7 προγόνων ἀρετῆς καὶ πλούσιος. n. (1496). SUSEM. (689)

38 ὁμοίως δὴ...δικαίως...ἀμφισβητεῖν] As the claim of (a) the wealthy line 31, (b) the free born and the nobles, so now that of (c) merit, is pronounced to have a partial justification.

With δὴ in enumerations Vahlen, commenting on I. 18 § 3, 1455 b 31, compares II. 3 § 2, VIII (v). § 3 § 16, 4 § 10: often strengthened at the close of a list, as καὶ δῶς δὴ, καὶ καθόλου δὴ.

39 κοινωνικὴν] ‘justice especially; for justice is, as we affirm, a virtue essential to civil society (κοινωνία), on which all the others must necessarily attend’: i.e. justice in the sense of obedience to the laws as is more fully explained in Nic. Eth. v. 1. 12—20, 1129 b 11, ff. [where see Jackson’s notes]. Compare too N. E. VIII. § 4, 1125 a 22, 9 § 1 ff. 1159 b 25 (Eaton). See also above c. 10 §§ 1, 2 and the references cited in n. (562). SUSEM. (590) A remarkable reason for the claim of ἀρετῆς, after all we have been told (Wyse).

§ 4 40 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους] sc. δικαίως ἀμφισβητησόντα. The justice of this claim has been argued in c. 11.

41 καὶ γὰρ κρείττοντο κτλ] Comp. Plato Gorgias 488 D ὡς οἰκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνός κρεῖττον εἰσὶ κατὰ φύσιν; (Eaton). SUSEM. (591)

42 ὡς λαμβανομένων] Comp. Iun. § 2, πάντων λαθέουσαν: ‘if the many are taken in a body and compared with the few in a body’ (Congreve).

1283 b 1 λέγω δὲ οἶνον] I mean, namely.

3 πότερον ἀμφισβητησόντα κτλ] The question raised in c. 10.
§ 5 Οὐκ ἐσται; καθ’ ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναμφισβήτητος ἢ κρίσις τίνας ἁρειν δεῖ (τοὺς γὰρ κυρίους διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἢ μὲν τὸ διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον) ἀλλ’ ὡμοί σκοποῦμεν, ὥστε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ταῦτα ὑπάρχῃ χρόνου, πῶς διοριστέων. * * *

8 σκοπούσι μὲν Αλλ., σκοπήσωμεν; Syburg, σκοπώμεν Bas. in the margin, considerandum est Ar. § 9 ὑπάρχει Π’. el δὲ...13 αὐτῶν; transposed by Thurot to precede 1284 a. 4 el τε τις; see Introd. p. 82 f.

§ 5 4 καθ’ ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν κτλ] "Under each one of the constitutions mentioned there will be no dispute as to the proper holders of office: for (these constitutions) differ in their sovereigns, e.g. the one by being in the hands of the wealthy, another by being in the hands of the good, and similarly with each of the others." τὰ κόρα is the plural of τὸ κόρα of the ‘sovereign,’ a supreme authority; also found in Rhet. 1. 8. 2, 1365 b 27 τὰ δὲ κόρα διώρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας, διότι γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι, τοσοῦτον καὶ τὰ κόρα ἑστιν, and Demost. Palta Leg. § 259 p. 424, 11 οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ καὶ τὰ κόρα ἀπ’ ἄτη πο’ ἑστιν ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν πολεων.COPE compares N. E. 111. 8 § 15, 1116 b 18, τα πολιτικά= the citizen levies, as a similar plural.

5 τοῖς κυρίοις] Comp. c. 6 § 1 n. (523), c. 7 § 2 n. (537); also n. (466). SUSEM. (592)

§ 6 13 ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. § 7, 8 The refutation of the several claims is not the same as in c. 10, but is a species of reductio ad absurdum by the enforcement on the same ground of the right of the one richest, or noblest, or most virtuous man, or of the strongest group.
15 ξειαν γὰρ <ἀν> οὐδὲν λέγειν δῖκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἄξιοντες (VII) ἄρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος: δὴλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ (p. 81) τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιότερος ἀπάντων ἐστὶ, [δὴλον] ὡς κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δῖκαιον τούτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἐνα ἀπάντων δεῖσει, ομοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεῖα διαφέροντα τῶν ἁμφιβασθητων-

§ 8 τού δὲ ἐλευθερίαν. ταύτῳ δὲ τούτωσι συμβίβασται καὶ 11

21 περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἠπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἰ γὰρ τις εἰς ἁμελ-

νων ἀνήρ εἰς τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων, τούτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταύτῳ δῖκαιον. οὐκόν εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι γε δεὶ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν

25 ὀλίγων, κἂν εἰς ἡ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἐνδος ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν

πόλλων κρείττους ὧς τοῦ ἄλλου, τούτους ἀν δέοι κύριοι

§ 9 εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πλῆθος. πάντα δὴ ταῦτ' ἐοικε ποιεῖν φανε-12

15 δήλον γὰρ ὡς κτλ] Comp. vii(vi). 3 § 3 n. (1407 b) ἐὰν εἰς ἐξῆ πνευμάτων, κατὰ τὸ ἐλεγαφρικὸν δῖκαιον ἀρχεῖν δῖκαιον μόνον. ΣUSEm. (592 b)

17 πάλιν = a7, in this case as in the former.

18 τὸν ένα ἀπάντων] This is called τυμάννος in vii(vi). 3 § 3.

§ 8 21 περὶ τὰς ἀρετῆς ἠπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς] Cp. c. 5 § 5 n. (508), c. 7 §§ 3, 4 with nn. (536, 8). ΣUSEm. (593)

There provisionally we get a glimpse of the monarch whose rule he subsequently justifies even in the best state, cc. 16, 17; viz. εἰς τις ἁμελεῖς ἀνήρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων. All the governing class are good, but he is pre-eminent in goodness.


§§ 9, 10 πάντα δὴ ταύτα κτλ] Aristotle here returns to what he has already developed above c. 11, so that the inquiry has not made any real advance. L. Stein (Zeitschrift f. d. g. Staatswissens.chaft IX. p. 157) and Hildenbrand (p. 422) are right in maintaining that the negative result which rejects as incorrect all these one-sided claims, is one of the most important passages in the whole work, since it proves most clearly how nearly Aristotle grasped the true concep-
tion of a state, as elevated above all particular opposing interests, although he could not quite attain to it, "since the autocratic conception of authority had not been able anywhere in Greece to rise above the conflict of parties to the development of its own activity, and even Aristotle was unacquainted with the only means of elevating it above this conflict, namely, true constitutional monarchy," cp. Intro., p. 44 ff. Hildenbrand rightly remarks in answer to Stein, that it is just this negative result which leads to the positive construction of an ideal state, built upon this foundation. Hildenbrand however has also failed to see that even at this point something more than the mere negative result has been attained, and that one claim at any rate, viz. that of superior merit, is only provisionally rejected—whether it be the case that the excellence of remarkable individuals is superior or inferior to that of the general mass of citizens. Comp. Aristotle's own express statements 17 §§ 5, 6 nn. (680, 681), VIII (v), 1 § 6 n. (1495): which contain by implication the positive result, that only two forms of government can be the best, viz. those which rest upon the one or the other of the above opposite conditions, an ideal monarchy and an aristocracy. The immediate con-
text §§ 11, 12 shows that Aristotle desires.
districtly to express this here. See nn. (597, 599). Susem. (595)

38 [tov xou xoudeis kta] Cp. 9 § 1 Mn.
None of the 'standards,' i.e. the defining principles upon which they claim to govern.

§ 10 31 xoudeis einai tου politeut-
matos] to control the governing body.

33 to plhros einai bledion twn
oulign] This is the thesis which Grote
is striving to prove throughout his history,
taking the Athenian Demos as his great
example. He dwells upon the sacrifices of
which it was capable at Salamis and
Argennusae, upon its financial honesty,
as attested by an undoubted coinage,
and its wise moderation in the hour of triumph,
when after the unparalleled provocations
of the Thirty it consented to a general
amnesty, B.C. 403. The appeals made
to the humanity and enthusiasm of the
multitude had most chance of success, as
the cases of Paches and Diagoras prove.
Against all this must be set the panic
and terror at the time of the mutilation of
the Hermas and the hasty condemnation
of the generals at Athens, the troubles of
Corcyra and Samos, and other occasional
outbursts of popular fury like the Scytal-
ism at Argos.

34 oux os kath ekastov] See the
parallel expression in c. 11 § 2 and the
note on 11. 2 § 2.

§ 11 35 [aivos...tines] Was this
also in writing? Susem. (596)
proballoisi] "bring forward as a
problem"; whence πρόβλημα.

36 [tou tov xou xoudeis apantaun...39
oudein] May be met as follows (in § 12) in the case supposed.

37 tibetasai] Properly, to enact.
But Herod. i. 29, 11. 177 of Solon.

39 to leichven] That is, the case
when the aggregate merit of the great
majority surpasses that of prominently
able individual men. Susem. (597)

§ 12 40 to xar xoudeis lekpten isos;
to de isos xoudeis proes to xin

28 xoudeis Qb Ald. and P (1st hand, altered by the same hand) || 36 (aporousoi...
39 pleiwn) Bernays: earlier editions have a full stop at apantaun and no parenthesis
|| 37 boulomeno <γε> Schneider || 40 xar Susem., δ' ΓΠ Plutarch Bk. Susem.1
πόλεως θλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν. (VII)

πολιτῆς δὲ κοινῆ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι

εὐστή, καθ’ ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτειῶνέπερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀριστη-

στὴν ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιροῦμενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν

πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρετὴν.

§ 6

1283 b 9

<* * εἰ δὲ τὸν

10 <ἀριθμὸν εἶνεν ὁλόγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐχοντες, τίνα

11 <εἰ διελείψ τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὁλόγοι πρὸς τὸ ἐργον δεἱ σκοτειν,

12 <εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος

13 <ὁστ’ εἶναι πόλιν εξ αὐτῶν;>

1284 a 1 πρὸς] κατὰ Schneider, perhaps rightly || 3 τὸν after βίων omitted by

Qb Tb and P1 (1st hand)

1283 b 9 ** Conring Thurot (by Susem. placed after 13 αὐτῶν), see Comm. n.

(599). Spengel assumes either a lacuna before this passage, or that it should be

transposed to follow either (1) 1283 a 40 τὰς ἄλλας or (2) 1283 b 8 τρόπον || δὲ

Susem. δὴ Π II Plutarch Bk. Susem. 1-3 in the text || 11 διελείψ τὸν Qb Tb Plutarch

Bk. || 12 [7] Schneider, probably right

42 πολιτῆς δὲ κοινῆ μὲν κτλ] A neat formula summing up the results of

cc. 1—9.

1284 a 1 καθ’ ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτειῶν

ἐπερος] See c. 1 § 10 n. (440). SUSEM.

(598)

1284 a 1 πρὸς δὲ...3 ἀρετὴν] In the best constitution, the better class

(βελτιωτέως) coincides not merely with the majority but even with the whole

mass of citizens: cp IV(VII). 9 § 3; 13 §§ 9, 10; VI(VI). 7 §§ 2—4. Thurot

rightly remarks that after the negative answer §§ 5—10 n. (595) to the question

first raised in § 4, this paragraph §§ 11, 12 also contains the germs of a positive

answer. Indeed, when § 6 is transposed to follow directly upon it, the answer is

continued in the context without interruption of the connexion. Thurot is

no less right when he observes that this solution is no direct answer to the former

questions, but as regards its form is only an answer to the subordinate question of

§ 11 itself. There is therefore a considerable hiatus after § 12. But Thurot

is scarcely correct and clear when he assumes that it can be supplied from §§

11, 12 if we draw the conclusion that “in

a state where there are virtuous men, rich

men, nobles, and a mass of citizens, power belongs to all those who have true

civic virtue, this being something different from moral virtue not only under an ideal

government but everywhere else.” In

my opinion, we should rather expect the conclusion that in the best constitution,

all citizens ought to have equal rights, and that the true aristocracy is one

in which all citizens are provided with sufficient property. But where the excellence

(ἀρετής) of the few is equal to that of the many, especially if neither exceed a
certain amount, in default of other means of satisfying the claims of both parties,
either the exercise of full citizenship, or else merely passive right of being elect-
ed to office (11 § 8 n. 669), must depend on a moderate property qualification, and

wealth be introduced as a supplementary consideration. Thus, although inferior to

aristocracy, this government, i.e. Polity, would still be included among the normal

forms, and would in such a case be better than democratic equality. SUSEM. (599)

2 ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιροῦμενος] Comp. Tōp. IV. 5 § 11, 126 b 9; οὔτε γὰρ

ὁ προαιροῦμενος ἀδινατῶν δὲ, οὔθ’ ὁ δυνάμενος μη προαιροῦμενος δὲ διάβολος ἡ φήνας.

§ 6 1283 b 9 εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν...13

πόλιν εξ αὐτῶν] “But if the possessors of virtue are altogether few in number,

how should we decide (Ibernays: set the limits)? Or must their fewness be con-

sidered relatively to the task; are they competent to administer the city or, in

other words, numerous enough to form a city themselves?” Schneider rightly

saw that the last sentence contained a single supposition: able to manage the

city, because strong enough to form a city by themselves.
§ 13 | 1284 a 4 tosoçtων διαφέρον... 6 ωστε ἐκ... So preeminent...that the merit of the rest is not commensurable.

4 κατ’ ἀρετής ύπερβολήν | ‘in excess of merit’—by reason of his exalted merit. So δ. Ech. 1x. 4 § 6, 10 § 5 ἡ ύπερβολή τῆς φυλαξ—friendship in the extreme, or exalted friendship.

Two cases are distinguished: (1) one such prince of men, (2) a number of them too small to form the ‘complement’ of a city. Comp. for πλήρωμα VI(iv). 4 § 12 and Pl. Rep. 11. 371 e (where the sense is slightly different).

5 ἡ πλείους...5 πόλεως | The second case hardly belongs, strictly speaking, to this place, since it requires that one kind of collective virtue be added to another; and in this kind of calculation it is impossible to decide where to stop adding particular men to the virtuous minority, while the result of the calculation varies according to our decision. Therefore Aristotle in what follows neglects this case entirely and does not construct from it a ‘true’ form of aristocracy beyond and above the true one. Comp. c. 17 § 5, 18 § 1 with ἐν μν. (578, 682). SUSEM. (600)

7 τὴν πολιτικήν | In other words, τὴν πρόσ τὸ ἐργαν δύναμιν (Congreve).

9 μέρος | The phrase μέρος εἶναι = με-τέχειν οὐ κοινωνέω τῆς πόλεως: see IV(VII).

4 § 6; 8 § 1, 61 § 9 § 4. It is opposed to the indispensable adjuncts (ὡς ἄνευ ὧν ἀν εἰς πόλιν) which are excluded from the franchise. ‘The conditions of common political life cease to be applicable; the great man is not an equal amongst equals to be bound by equal rules’ (Bradley). Trans.: “these men must cease to be account members of the city. For they will be wronged if they are deemed worthy of more equality when they are so far superior (ἄνθρωπος) in merit and civil capacity.” See 11. 7 § 18 n., VIII(v), 1 § 3.

11 ὡστερ γὰρ θεὸν | Comp. § 25 and n. (612). Aristotle could hardly express more strongly how improbable he himself considers this case. His reasons for considering it notwithstanding are no doubt those mentioned in § 1 for the consideration of other no less improbable cases. Cp. n. (542) and Introd. p. 70 f. See also n. (678) on 111. 17, 5. Bradley Hellenica p. 239 rightly traces this thought to its origin in Plato’s Politics. SUSEM. (601)

Plato’s words are πασῶν γὰρ ἐκεῖνη γε, ἡ τὴν ὅρθην πολιτείαν, εἰκρατοῦν, οἷον θεῶν εἰς ἄνθρωπον, ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, 303 b.

§ 14 13 κατὰ = anent, applicable to, binding upon; and not necessarily ‘against’. Even the rule of law does not bind such men.

“This sentence κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος occurs word for word in St Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, c. 5 v. 23, suggesting, at all events, a direct adaptation from Aristotle.” (T.L. Heath.)

14 αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ νόμοσ | Comp. 17 § 2 n. (675). SUSEM. (601 b).

“Comp. the identical sentiment in St Paul Romans c. 2 v. 14, where εὐανόις εἰσὶ νόμος is applied to θηνύ τὰ μὴ ἐξορτά νόμον, further described (v. 15) as men who do by nature (φύσει) the same things as the law prescribes, i.e. men who have


15 'Αντισθένης] The celebrated pupil of Socrates who founded the Cynic school. The quotation is probably from his work Πολιτικά, 'The Statesman': cp. A. Müller De Antithenis Cynici vita et scriptis p. 64 (Marburg 1866); Zeller Socrates and Socratics p. 323 n. (41) and c. 13 generally, p. 284 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (602).

Treatment of disproportionate eminence in the imperfect constitutions: §§ 15—23.

Motives of self-preservation lead democracies to resort to Ostracism: §§ 15, 16. This has a counterpart in the execution by violence of eminent citizens which tyrants practise (§§ 17, 18), and in the policy pursued by sovereign states (Persia, Athens) in humbling their subjects, § 19.


§ 15 17 διὸ ... ὀστρακισμὸν] It is improbable that this conception of Ostracism is the correct one. It was resorted to rather when two party leaders had each about the same number of followers and thus the machinery of the state was likely to be brought to a dead lock. In such cases, the removal of one converted the other into the leading statesman. This at any rate was the significance of this institution at the best period of the Athenian democracy, although according to Philochoros, Fr. 79 b, it was at Athens originally directed against the followers of the Peisistratidae (μάρσιος δῆτερον ἐκ τῶν ἀδόξων... ἐξοστρακισθήσαται δῆσε μοχθηρὰς τρόπους, ὥσ τι ὑπολαμάσας ταυράνδους μετὰ τοῦ τοῦ δῆ ἐκαλθήσας, ἐφ' ἀφέαντος νομοθετήσατος Κλεισθένε, ὥσ τοι ταυράνδους κατέλεσε, ὥσ τοῖς συνεξεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αὐτ... Müller Frag. hist. gr. 1. p. 397, 3 ff.); and elsewhere too it may have had a similar origin. Thus it is possible that here Aristotle really adheres to the original intention of Ostracism (so Seeiger in Jahrb. f. Philol. cxx. 1877 742, n. 8) though on the other hand in his remarks further on, § 23, there can be no doubt that he refers to its later degeneracy (n. 613). This institution prevailed at Athens from the time of Cleisthenes until the latter half of the Peloponnesian War or even later (n. 613), at Argos, VIII (v). 3 § 3 n. (1509 b), Megara, Syracuse, Meliteus, and Ephesus. At Athens the question whether there should be an Ostracism in any particular year was regularly debated and voted on in the popular assembly. If the result was affirmative, a day was fixed for another meeting of the Assembly, at which at least 6000 citizens had to be present: so Frinkel and before him Lugebi On the nature and historical significance of Ostracism at Athens in the Suppl. to the Jahrb. f. Philol. N. S. iv. p. 141 ff. Here every citizen who possessed a vote wrote on a potsherd the name of the person whom he wished to banish, and the man who was thus designated by the majority had to leave Athens within 10 days for a term of ten years, subsequently diminished to five; he might however be recalled before that time by a vote of the Assembly. See Schömann pp. 182, 338, 395 Eng. tr. with Frinkel's corrections of. cit. p. 93 f. n. 1: cp. pp. 14 ff. 52, 80ff. SUSEM. (603)

One part of the Berlin papyri, on which hardly decipherable fragments of Aristotle's 'Αθηναίων πολείας have been discovered, relates to the establishment of ostraecism. 'Aristotle distinguishes two phases in the development of this institution. At first the dread of a restoration of the Peisistratidae prevailed, and (a) relatives or friends of Hipparchus and Hipparchus were banished. Later on, as a settled institution, it fell upon (b) any who by preponderant influence threatened to become dangerous to democratic equality, such as Aristides and Xanthippos. Diels restores τὸ μὲν ἡν ἡν ἡν οὖν ἡν ἡν ἡν [στίδον τῶν ταύρων] φίλους οὐστρακίζων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ἄρτιποτιστικῶν τοιῶν δουλῶν τις μὲν ἡν ἡν μεῖζον [δύο[ν]]μαν[π]. The name of Aristides is recovered from a brief excerpt in pseudo-Heraclides Müller Frag. Hist. Gr. 11. p. 297, 7 of the very passage which is but half recovered...
σμόν αἱ δημοκρατουμέναι πόλεις, διὰ τήν τινα αἰτίαν' (VII)
αὐτὴ γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τήν ἱσότητα μάλιστα πάντων,

ωστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας υπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυ-

φιλίαν ἡ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἴσχυν ὀστράκιζον καὶ με-

βίστασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὀρίσμενοι. μυθολογεῖται δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τῶν Ἡρακλέα καταλιπεῖν διὰ τιουατὴν αἰτίαν' οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργο
μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολύ τῶν πλωτήρων. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγουσας τήν τυραννίδα καὶ τήν Περιανδροῦ Ὀρασυβοῦλος συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶν
(φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιανδρὸν εἶπειν μὲν οὖν δὲν πρὸς τῶν πει-
φέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς
υπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων ὑμαλύνα τὴν ἄρουμαν· ὅθεν
ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τῆς αἰτίας, ἀπαγ-

19 ταῦτας γὰρ δὲν Π.1 || δοκοῦσι omitted by Π.1 || διώκειν persecutur William ||
20 τολυφιῶν Π.1 (1st hand), γρ. τολυφιῶν corr.1 in the margin of Π.1
to us: Kleisthenēs τῶν περὶ ὀστρακισμοῦ νόμων εἰσηγήσατο, ὡς ἐτέθη διὰ τούς τινα παρα-
νώντας (a)᾽ καὶ ἄλλα τε ὀστρακιζόντων καὶ Ἐλθύντως καὶ Ἀρσείδης (b). Diesl Über die Berliner Fragmente p. 30.
18 διὰ τιουατὴν αἰτίαν For this reason, that laws are only destined for those who are more or less on an equality, while an individual grows disinclined to be bound by law in proportion as he rises above this general equality. If this very simple connexion be borne in mind, there is no reason to suspect an interpolation. 
SUSEM. (602 b)
21 ὀστράκιζον] Note the imperfect; here certainly because Ostracism was obsolete in Aristotle's time. See n. on II. 9 § 19.
§ 16 22 μυθολογεῖται κτλ] "Even in the story there is a naive hint that Herakles was out of place in the Argo. When he went on board the ship, it threatened to sink, and when he took hold of an oar, it broke at once in his grasp." (Frelle Gk. Mythol. ii. p. 324.) Pherecydes of Leros (Fr. 67), Antimachos, and Poseidippus also state that Herakles was set on shore because the Argo complained that his weight was too great for her (Schol. on Apoll. Rhod. 1 290), but this was not the only form of the legend. See Apollod. Bibl. 1. 19. 9, Herod. vii. 193, SUSEM. (604)
24 οὖ γὰρ ἔθελειν "For the Argo refused to carry (ἀγέιν) him with the rest as far outweighing her crew": φθεγγα-
μένη μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τοῦτον βάρος. Apollodor. 1. 9, 19.
27 οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶν] 'must not be thought to blame it with absolute justice.'
§ 17 28 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιανδρὸν In the account given by Herodotos V. 92, the parts of Periander and Thrasybulos are reversed (Vettori). Aristotle refers to the story again viii(v). 10 § 13, n. (1669). For the tyrant Thrasybulos of Miletus see E. Curtius ii. p. 108 f. Eng. tr., and for the tyrants of Miletus in general vii(v). 5, 8, n. 1557. Periander, ruler of Corinth probably from 626 to 585, one of the most brilliant and at the same time most tragic figures among the earlier Greek tyrants, was no doubt correctly regarded as one of the first to introduce all those measures which appeared, not without reason, to the Greeks who were contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, asin-separable from the tyrannism. See vii(v). 11, 4 n. (1711); also viii(v). 12, 3 nn. (1751, 1754), viii(v). 4 § 9, 10 § 16 nn. (1525, 1672): E. Curtius 1. p. 250 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (605)
Livy (1. 54) borrows the story for Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii.
32 συννοντας] Comp. σύννον γενέ-
μενον, ii. 7, 17.
§ 18 33 τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ] Oncken (II. 173) says that Aristotle approves of Ostracism. It would be as correct (or
rather incorrect) to deduce from this exposition his approval of the violent measures of the tyrants. In point of fact, he approves of both, but only from the standpoint of Democracy and Tyrannis respectively, two forms of government which he condemns and pronounces to be degenerate types. See however u. (614). SUSEM. (606)

38 ὀμολογεῖ i.e. συμφέρει, it is the interest of oligarchies and democracies and accordingly they take such measures. § 19 38 πείρας ταύτης καί τα ἔθνη] 'in the case of cities and nations' (und. subject to them). See u. (11) and the references there given. SUSEM. (607)


40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους] Samos, Chios, and Lesbos were the only independent states amongst the allies of Athens. In the year 424—425, however, the Chians were compelled by the Athenians, who had suspicions of their intentions, to pull down their new walls: Thuc. iv. 51. The revolt of Mitylene (428) and almost all the other cities of Lesbos, and their punishment (427) are noticed vili(v). 4. 6 n. (1545): see E. Curtius iii. pp. 100 ff. 118 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (609)

ἐπεὶ γὰρ...41 παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας]

H.

'For as soon as they had firmly grasped empire they humbled these states in violation of the compacts made with them.' It is clear from u. (609) that this is not true of the Lesbians: even in regard to the Chians and the Samians it scarcely holds good (Schlosser). SUSEM. (610)

For ἐπεὶ βαττόν = as soon as, Shilleto compares Demosth. Pantæus. § 41 p. 978, 18, Copy s § 5 p. 1257, 28: Plato Protæs, 324 e ἑπείδαι βαττόν συνή τι τὰ λεγόμενα, Alc. i. 105 a ἔννοιαν τούτον τινὰν ἐν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἄριστον παρέλθει. 1284 b 1 τοὺς πεφρονυματισμούς κτλ.] 'Who had become haughty from having once held empire.' The meaning of ἐπεὶ, 'to have been in authority' or 'to have reached empire,' is worth noting. It seems a metaphorical parallel to ἐπεὶ ἄκρον εἶναι, or ἐπεὶ 'εὐθείας κινεῖσθαι. Compare perhaps Dem. Philipp. i § 7 p. 42, 4 ἐν ἐπι τῆς τουαίτης ἐθέλησεν γενέσθαι γνώμην νῦν. 2 ἐπεκοπτε πολλάκις] 'used often to reduce.' Cyrus and the Lydians, Herod. i. 156: externally regarded, his conduct was certainly unusually mild. In regard to the Babylonians see Herod. iii. 159 (Eaton). Comp. Duncker's History of Antiquity (ed. 4) iv. pp. 334 ff., 404 ff., 477 ff. (vol. vi. cc. 6, 7, 14 Eng. tr.). SUSEM. (611)
The problem (what to do with men of preeminent merit) is urgent even in the normal state, § 20. Principles of symmetry require that, as in the arts, there should be no disproportionate influence or merit, § 21. This is a frequent cause of revolutions (δε ὑπεροχὰς), as is explained in viii(v). 2 §§ 6—8, § 3 (Eaton).

§ 20 4 kal = even the normal forms, § 21 8 τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας a foot that violates symmetry in its size (the gen. as in § 16, πλωτήρων), 'even if it were of surpassing beauty,' κάλλος adverbial acc., cp. λοιπά c. 12 § 2. For the order of the words (hyperbaton) see Vahlen’s Arist. Aufsätze 11. pp. 41—44. On symmetry, see Metaph. M. 3 § 11, 1078 a 36, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὄροσμένον: this is illustrated in Polit. IV(vii). 4 § 7, Poet. 7 §§ 4—7.

§ 22 The transposition of these words was proposed by Thurot and Bernays (see Introd. p. 83). Bernays renders "Hence this point need not stand in the way of a good understanding between single rulers and the city communities; so far, that is, as their personal rule is useful (also) for the cities and they adopt this procedure." Thus he understands ταῖς πόλεσιν to be those which are ruled by monarchs. So Postgate (Notes p. 7):—"ταῖς πόλεσιν in both sentences are not 'free states' nor 'dependencies,' but the states governed by the μονάρχαι (notice not τύραννοι)." See note (612).

15 κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς Hence in regard to admitted instances of superiority the case for Ostracism possesses a certain political justification, a ground of right.

§ 23 It would be better to frame the constitution so as not to require anything of the sort; failing that, the next best course is to adopt it as a corrective measure. Unfortunately it was used in the cities for factious purposes.

17 βέλτιον μὲν οὖν κτλ] Comp. vii(v). 3 § 3 n. (1:16) where the same recommendation is given, κατὸν βέλτιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὥστε μή ἐνέστωσο τοσοῦτον ὑπερχώσης, ἢ ἐσάπτωτα γενεσθαι ἦσθαι ὑστερον, and c. 8 § 12 n. (1619). Susem. (611 b)

13 ὡστε διὰ τούτο κτλ] It is only with the gravest misgivings that I have followed Thurot in the transposition of § 22, b 13—15; to this place and in his other by no means simple changes. But I see no other means of obtaining any really consistent connexion, corresponding to the one idea prevalent throughout the whole chapter, namely that the measures taken by Monarchs and Republics rest in this respect on the same principle, and that the same problem must be considered by the true forms of Monarchy and Republic, and not merely by the degenerate ones. Thus in these matters a republic has no advantage over a monarchy; on the contrary the corresponding measures of violence are generally calculated with a view to the maintenance of the monarchy,
14 **Συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν,** εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὤφελόμεν (VIII)

15 ταῖς πόλεσιν ὀυσθός τοῦτο ἄρωσιν. διὸ κατὰ ταῖς ὀμολογουμέναις ὑπεροχάς ἔχει τι δίκαιων πολιτικῶν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ § 23 τῶν ὀστρακισμῶν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθετήν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὀυτοῦ συνετήσας τὴν πολιτείαν ὡστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἱστρείας, δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἀν συμβῇ, πειρᾶθαι τοιούτω του τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν. <ὡστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὖν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχας συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὤφει- 15 <Λίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν ὀυσθός τοῦτο ἄρωσιν.> ὃπερ οὖκ ἐγίνετο περὶ ταῖς πόλεις οὐ γὰρ ἐξελεύνον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκείας

14 μονάρχους ΠΒκ. || τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρχῇ Θυροτ, τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρχῇ <ὡς> ? Σουσεμ. 

<ἐνηκεν> ἀρχῆς Schneider, <γῆρων> ἀρχῆς Schmidt || ὤφελόμεν [ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐσή] Θυροτ (the best suggestion as yet), ὤφελόμεν...ὅσθης transposed to follow 19 ἱστρείας Schmidt || 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν τοὺς πολλοῖς Lindau

while it often happens that they are employed in a degenerate republic not for the corresponding purpose, the maintenance of the republic, but without any plan or principle. In this way the connexion is best established. On the other hand it is impossible to fit into any part of the dissertation the idea which Bernays, Postgate, and others find there, that it is rather a question of an agreement between absolute monarchs and their subjects; of absolute rule for the benefit of the latter, and of the banishment of powerful party leaders; with a view to the maintenance of absolute rule and also to the advantage (and therefore with the consent) of the governed. The instance of Pittacus, quoted by Postgate, 14 § 10, is not even appropriate, for it was not as αὐτοχώρητοι that Pittacus banished the Oligarchs; on the contrary, it was not till after their banishment that he was elected αὐτοχώρητος by the people in order that he might command them against the exiles who were trying to effect their return by arms and violence. He at length brought about the peaceful return of the exiles, and reconciled the parties to one another. Even this interpretation cannot however be obtained without a transposition, viz. that, as Bernays proposed, § 22, ὡστε...δρῶσιν, be inserted between τρότον and θὴλων at the end of § 20; these words, if understood in the sense required, cannot retain their present place, as Postgate thinks. For two conclusions, both introduced by particles of inference (ὡστε...διὸ) cannot possibly follow each other if, as the sense here shows, the second does not follow from the first, but is like the first an inference drawn from preceding premises. Moreover Aristo-tote nowhere else designates a monarch's subjects as πόλεις; we should rather expect τοὺς αὐτοχώρητος or at any rate τοὺς πολιτέας in both places instead of ταῖς πόλεσιν: and, if the philosopher wished to employ this last expression, at any rate ταῖς ἱστρείας πόλεσιν. Besides, in the second place, the insertion of καί "also" before ταῖς πόλεσιν would be indispensable for the sense, as Bernays' own translation shows. Still in face of all these difficulties, the question may arise whether it is not advisable, instead of making all these violent changes, to regard the whole passage (which we can easily dispense with) as an interpolation by another hand. **SUSEM. (612)**

20 ὃπερ οὖκ ἐγίνετο] If Thurot's transposition be approved, this means: "but the free states did not employ Ostracism as a measure beneficial to their government." Without any such change Bernays and others make it refer to the words τοιούτω τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν: — it was not used as a corrective.

21 οὐ γὰρ ἐξελεύνον κτλ] It is probable that there was often chicanery in the exercise of Ostracism, especially under an absolute democracy. It is said that when it was enforced for the last time at Athens, Alcibiades and Nicias diverted it, contrary to the original intention, to a third person Hyperbolos, and that this led to its disuse. Even if the story in this form is not to be relied on, still it may have become apparent on that oc-
§ 24 ουάλλαι στασιαστικῶς ἔχρωντο τῶν ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν (VIII) μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκυνίαις πολιτείαις ὑπὲρ μὲν ἰδίᾳ συμ-

§ 25 δικαιοῦν, καὶ τούτῳ φανερῶν ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας ζ’ ἔχει πολλὰ ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, οὐν ἱσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλ’ (p. 84)

§ 25 ἀν τις γένηται διαφέρουν κατ’ ἀρετὴν, τι χρή τοιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαίην ἂν δεῖ εἰκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τῶν τοιοῦ-

30 τοῦν ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἀρχεῖν γε τοῦ τοιοῦτο (παραπλησίων γὰρ καὶ εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἁρχεῖν ἁξίοιεν), μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχαῖς.

λειπεῖ τοῖς, ὅπερ ἐοίκε πεφυκέναι, πειθεῖσθαι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πάντας ἀσμένους, ὥστε βασιλεάς εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἄνδιους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

24 [οὖχ] Bernays || 25 ἐπὶ P2-3 || 31 ἅξιοις Π Susem.1-2, ἅξιοι μὲν M. The parentheses Hampke, but the subject is not strictly the same as in the principal clause: μερίζονται? Susem. || 32 διὰ <καλ> Susem.1-2 and possibly Π (μίαν et videtur William); perhaps rightly || 33 ἀσμένοις] ἀναγκαῖος Π14-6 Qb Tb || βασι-

λέας P2-3 Tb
casion how easily a combination of two parties could defeat the true aim of this institution, and turn it against the most zealous of patriots. Indeed there is no evidence that it was ever actually resorted to again at Athens. Cp. Schö-

mann pp. 182, 395 Eng. tr. When the healthy life of parties ceased there, and especially when its surplus strength began to fail the state, and every man of talent was needed at his post, Ostra-

cism proved to be superfluous. When it had been more than once employed in order to remove some person dis-

pleasing to the dominant party (Damon Plut. Per. 4., Aristid. 7., Callias Pseudo-

Andoc. iv. 32) it disappeared from the frame-work of the Constitution (Sec-

liger). SUSEM. (613)

Summary of results: the removal of eminent men is (a) expedient and just in the interests of perverted constitutions, but (β) not absolutely just. The best state can neither expel such a man of preeminent merit, nor treat him as an ordinary subject. It only remains to make him sovereign, §§ 24, 25.

§ 24 23 ἰδία] expedient and just in the private interest of the government. Not ‘in particular cases.’ This is a restatement of §§ 18, 20.

24 ὅποις ἄπλον sc. ἐστὶ δίκαιον. The mere fact of its accord with the δίκαιον of a perverted state is decisive, c. 9 § 3.

25 ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας] Aristotle does not say what should be done in a Polity or a false Aristocracy, which are also to be reckoned among right forms of government. Is it possible that he regarded Ostracism as still ad-

missible? Further comp. νυ. on 11. 9

§ 30 (339); III. 6 § 1 (521); 11. 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601); 17 §§ 4, 5 (677—8); VI (IV). 2 §§ 1, 2 (1133—6.7), 10 § 3 (1280) and introd. p. 43 ff. SU-

SEM. (614)

26 οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν] κατὰ γενέσει ὑπεροχήν. Note that the cases chiefly alleged for Ostracism before, § 15, are now excluded.

§ 25 31 τοῦ Διὸς] Used proverbially, as in Herod. v. 49 ὡς τῷ Διὶ πλοῦτο πέρι ἐγίνετε, ‘γε νεί with Zeus in wealth,’ Comp. Nic. Eth. vi. 13 § 8, 1145 a 10 ἐπὶ ἐμοῖο καί εἰ τῇ τὴν πολι-

τικὴν φαιν ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν (Eaton), μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχαίς ‘Not to rule such an one, in a distribution of offices’: i.e. to treat him as a subject. Better taken with ἄρχειν γε than, as Bernays and others, with ἀξίοιεν, in which case it must be strained to mean κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχόμενοι as in c. 17 § 7, οὔτ’ ἄξιον ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος.

33 βασιλεάς οὐδίους] Kings for life. The form of the phrase, and the words ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν certainly do not favour the reference to Alexander which it was once
the fashion to discover in the treatise. From VIII(v). 10 § 8 we learn that the historical origin of the Macedonian monarchy was widely different from this exaltation of one eminent citizen of extraordinary endowments to lifelong sway.

c. 14. Transition to the particular constitutions or forms of the state, the first of which is Monarchy. There are five actual and historical types of single rule: (a) the Spartan king, (b) the oriental sovereign, (c) the absolute sovereign, (d) the king in the heroic age: §§ 2—14. To all of these is opposed a distinct type, (e) that of the absolute sovereign with full powers, § 15.

The last type is alone of value for our inquiry, because, as shown 14 §§ 25, 17 §§ 7, 8, it is a rare, but quite legitimate, form of the best constitution. See Intro. pp. 44—47, Analyt. p. 112 f., and vii(iv), c. 10.

§ 1 36 φαμέν γάρ τῶν ὅρθων πολιτειῶν] Bernays, Trans. p. 173 n., arguing in favour of his assumption that cc. 12, 13 are an independent sketch, points out that there is no link to connect these words with the foregoing, as the normal constitutions are not mentioned. He therefore prefers to take the clause in direct conjunction with c. 11 § 21, which closes with the words, "the laws in the normal forms of the state must necessarily be just, but those in the perverted forms not just." To this it may be replied that there is a mention of the "normal forms" in c. 13 § 20 (cp. §§ 18, 24, which imply the same antithesis). But it is more important to insist that a merely verbal allusion of the kind, is, after all, indecisive, whereas the discussion of monarchy forms a natural sequel to the result enunciated in c. 13 §§ 24, 25; which, be it observed, answers the question of § 13 and § 6. Indeed Bernays' view would have been more tenable if he had shortened the duplicate version to c. 12, c. 13 §§ 1—12, and had allowed the main thread of the discussion to be resumed at c. 12 § 13, instead of at c. 14 § 1. Comp. Intro. p. 42 n. (3).

§ 2 1285 a 1 γένη] Used indifferently with ἔδος (§§ 5, 6, 8, 11) for "species" or "variety": so 1. 11 § 5 n., vii(iv). 4 § 8.

§ 3 'The kingly office in the Spartan constitution is held to be the truest type of monarchy according to law,' i.e. constitutional or limited monarchies (τυπαι.)

4 ἀλλ' οὖν εξελθη κτλ.] "He is merely commander in war when he has quitted the country." See Schömann p. 228 Eng. tr. It is remarkable that Aristotle does not notice the judicial power of the Spartan kings and their
5 την χόραν, ἡγεμόν ἐστὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον· ἐτί δὲ τὰ (IX)

§ 4 πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεύσιν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ

βασιλεία οἰον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ αἰδίως ἐστὶν· κτεί-

ναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τοῖς [βασιλείς], καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν

ἀρχαίων, ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νομῷ. δηλοῦ

10 ὅ 'Ομηρος: Ἀγαμέμνον γὰρ κακῶς μὲν ἀκούουν ὡς ἱερέχετο ἐν

§ 5 ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτείναι κύριος ἢν. λέγει γὰρ

ἐν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνωθεν μάχης...

οὐ οἰ...

ἀρκιν ἔσσεται φυγεῖν κυνὰς ἣδ' οἰωνοῦς:

πάρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ βάνατος.

15 ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου, τοῦτον

6 τοὺς omitted by M r P1, [τοῖς] Susem.1 || 7 αὐτοκρατόρων II Bk.1 || 8 [βασι-

λείας] Susem. and Bernays independently, [ἐν τοῖς βασιλείς] Giph. (untranslated by Lr.) Jackson (who would transpose 9 ἐν ταῖς.....ἐξόδοις before καθάπερ). Other suggestions in my critical edition: add ἐνεκα δελεᾶς Bywater || 9 νομῷ Fäsi (see Passow's lexicum) νόμῳ all MSS. edd. || 10 ὅ γὰρ ἀγαμέμνων II2 Bk. || II γὰρ II3 Susem.12, γοῦν P10, Qb Tb Ub Ald. Bk. Susem.3, οὖν P4 || 12 μάχης νοσῶν P3 (first hand, μάχης is added in the margin by corr.1); φεύγοντα νοσῶν added by Γ (vidēro fugiēntem e proelio William) Susem.12 (comp. Römer Sitzungsber. der Mäunch. Ak. phil. Cl. 1884.11. pp. 270—276, Busse op. c. p.34), φεύγοντα κεκέων by Camot, φεύγοντα κυρέω an unknown hand on the margin of the Munich Aldine; ἀπάνωθεν μάχης πτώ-

ςοντα νοσῶν Nic. Eth. III. 3. 4. See Comm. n. (619) || 13 ἐστείλα M r P38, ἐστείλα P4

presidency in the Senate and the Popular Assembly, especially as in treating after-wards of monarchy in the heroic age (§ 12 n. 628) he rightly emphasizes the former. SUSEM. (616)

§ 4 8 ἐν μη ἐν τοι ἂν "except in a

specified case." To the other remedies suggested for this passage Jackson adds the omission of the words 8 ἐν τοίς βασι-

λείας and the transposition of 9 ἐν ταῖς πο-

λεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις to take their place.

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων] In general we can observe in the office of the Spartan kings many traces of its descent from the old' Greek monarchy of the heroic age. See Schömann p. 227 Eng. tr., Trierber p. 114. SUSEM. (617) So as representing the state in relation to the gods, Her. vi. 57, Xen. Keph. Lac. 13 § 2, 8, 15 § 1. The Spartan state was the early Greek state of the heroic age, barbarically, not scientifically, military, and from its simple military organization free. Elsewhere such a state did historically pass into an oli-

garchy, as the nobles profit by the decline in the power both of the king and of the assembly of warriors. But the pec-

ular circumstances of Sparta crystallized

(or shall we say fossilized?) this early form, with just so much of modification (Ephors, Helots &c) as sufficed to secure its maintenance.

9 ἐν χειρὸς νομῷ] in hand to hand

encounters.

10 Ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ κτλ] For Aga-

memnon was content to listen to chiding in their debates': c. g. Iliad 1. 225. SUSEM. (618)

The Hомерic 'ecclesia,' or ἀγορα, is not the βουλή of chiefs (as Congreve supposed) but a counterpart of the assembly of citizens in time of peace. See Glad-


§ 5 11 λέγει γὰρ Iliad 11. 391 ff. But in our texts the wording is slightly different, and the last words πάρ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐανθατὸς are wanting. The same lines are also quoted, with a slightly different reading ἐν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνωθεν μάχης πτώ-

ςοντα νοσῶν ὡς ὄδι ἀρκιν ἔσσεται φυ-

γεῖν κυνὰς, in Nic. Eth. III. 3. 4 from II. xv. 349 ff., where the variation from our present reading is still greater. SUSEM. (619)
§ 6 δ' α' μεν κατά γένος είσ&iota;ν αδ' δ' α'ίρεται· παρά ταύτην δ' (IX)
'άλλο μοναρχίας είδος, οίαν παρ' ενίος είσι βασιλείαι των
βαρβάρων. ἔχουσι δ' α'ίται την δύναμιν πάσαν παραπληγίαν
tυραννίσιν, εἰσι δὲ καὶ κατά νόμον καὶ πατρικια· διὰ γὰρ
(p. 85)
20 τὸ δουλικώτερον τὰ ἡθη εἶναι φύσει οἵ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν
Ἐλλήνων οἳ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τήν Ἑυρώπην,
υπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνουσι.
§ 7 τυραννικὰ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰσίν, ἀσφαλείς δὲ διὰ
tὸ πάτριοι καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, καὶ ἦν φυλακὶ δὲ βασιλισ-
τάται καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. οὶ γὰρ πολι
ταί φυλάττοις ὑπὸ λοιπὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους
ξενικὸν οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκόντων οἱ δ' ἀκώ
των ἀρχοῦσιν. οὐσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δ' ἐπὶ
§ 8 τούς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακὴν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἰδὴ ταύτα σ
30 μοναρχίας, ἐτερον δ' ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις "Ελληνσι,

18 παραπληγίαν Π1² (1st hand, emended by the same hand), παραπληγίας Π4⁴-C4
Q Mb Qb Rb Sb Tb U b Vb L c and Π2 (1st hand, emended by corr.9) || 19 τυραννίσιν,
eἰσι δὲ καὶ κατά Σusem., τυραννίσι καὶ κατά Γ M5, τυραννίσι κατά Π1 and Π2 (corr.9),
tυραννι κατὰ Γ3 Τb Vb and Π2 (1st hand), τυραννι κατὰ C1, τυραννι κατὰ Qb Rb
Sb, τυραννικὴν εἰσι δ' ὄμως κατὰ Π4⁴-C M Q M b U b L c, τυραννιδὸς εἰσὶ δ' ὄμως κατὰ Αμ.,
tυραννικὴ εἰσὶ δ' ὄμως κατὰ W b Αld. Bk. || πατρικά Γ M5, πατρικὰ R5, πατρίως?
Spengel || 20 δουλικώτερον Π1² Q U b Αρ. Αλδ. δουλικώτερας M b || εἶναι τὰ ἡθη Π2 Ατ.
|| 24 πάτριας Π2 Βk, πατρικαί Schneider || 25 αὐτήν] τοιαύτην? Γ (fateum William) Σusem.,¹², perhaps right
|| 27 <το> ξενικὸν? Σyburg (wrongly)

16 αδ' δ' α'ίρετα[] Possibly the ταγός of Thessaly, called βασιλείς Her. v. 63,
Thuc. 1. 111; compared with the Roman
dictator by Dion. Hal. Grece retained
few traces of that older institution com-
mmon to many Aryan races, an elective
monarchy or chieftainship but with pre-
sumption greatly in favour of a few noble
families (βασιλεῖς=duke, while ὀιας=
noble). See Glazdome Hom. Stud. 111. 51,
114—159.
§ 6 The oriental monarchy is a rule
over unfree subjects (δεσποτικῇ) with their
consent and in virtue of traditional forms.
18 παραπληγίαν τυραννίσιν] In Eur.
Heracle. 423, οἵ γὰρ τυραννὸς ὡσποντιονες
tyrran bios ἡμῶν, the rule of non-Greek
kings is regarded as a tyranny (Eaton).
SUSEM. (670)
10 διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτερον κτλ] Comp.
1. 2 §§ 2—4 ην. (11), IV(VII). 2 §§ 15, 14 § 211; and
notes (54, 780, 781). SUSEM. (621)
20 τὰ ἡθη] This accurs. 'of respect'
depends on δουλικώτερον. Comp. 9 § 10
πληθος ἐκεν μύριον, 12 § 2, 13 § 6.

§ 7 23 ἀσφαλεῖς] firmly established,
not to be overthrown (like tyranny).
"Yet in 16 § 9, 1287 b 7, as in 11 § 7,
1281 b 26, and in 11 § 16 'safe,' 'trust-
worthy' is the meaning." (T. L. Heath.)
24 ἡ φυλακὴ] From meaning 'self-
defence'—see VIII(V). 11 § 27—the word
came to be used in the concrete sense of
a protecting force, or body-guard. So also
ὀποιος μέχρι φυλακῆ τρέφεται, VIII(V).
11 § 8.
26 ξενικοῦ] Foreigners, a force of
foreign mercenaries. Comp. c. 15 § 10 n.
(656), § 14 (666), and especially VIII(V)
10 § 10, φυλακὴ τυραννικὰ διὰ ξένων, η.
(1666), Ῥεθ. 1. 2 § 19, 1357 b 30 ff.,
Herod. 1. 59 (Eaton). SUSEM. (622)
§ 8 State officers called αἰώναρη[τα] were appointed anciently in troublous
times, some for life, others with a com-
mmission to accomplish a definite political
task (πράξεως). Hence their analogy to
the Roman dictators.
30 ἐτερον δ' ...α'ίρετα τυρανν[ις] Comp.
In the Polity of Cyne (Fr. 481, 1557 a
οὐς καλοῦσιν αἰσθημάτας. ἔστι δὲ τούθ' ὡς ἀπλάς εἰσεῖν (IX)
αἱρετὴ τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὗ τῷ μῆ κατὰ
§ 9 ὁμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μῇ πάτριῳ εἶναι μόνου. ἤρχον δ' ο' μὲν
dia βιοῦ τὴν ἄρχην ταύτη, οι δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὀρισμένων
35 χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἴλοντο ποτὲ Μετυληναίων Πιττακό
πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας οὐ προειστήκεις ἀντιμενίδης καὶ
§ 10 Ἀλκαίος ὁ ποιητής, δηλοὶ δ' Ἀλκαίος ὁ τὰ τύραννον εἴλοντο ε
τὸν Πιττακὸν ἐν τινὶ τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι
τὸν κακοπάτριδα
Πιττακῶν πόλεως τάς δικόλω καὶ βαρυδάμων
ἐστάσατο τύραννον μὲν ἐπαινεῦσε αὐλλίες.

35 οἰον Μ', οἰον Ρ', οἰον Ρ' || φιττακῶν Π' and so subsequently || 38 σκολιῶν
Götting || 40 πόλεως Schneidewin, πόλεως all mss. edd. || δικόλο Schmidt
Bergk, ἐχόλο or ἀχόλο Μ', ἀχόλο ΠΠ' Π' Ρ'. Βk. Susem. 1-23, ἀχόλο Camerarius
1825 b 1 μέγ}' μὲν Γ Μ' and apparently Ρ' (1st hand) || παίνεντες? Η.
L. Ahrens

5Π. = 476 Rose Ar. pseudop. = 192 Müller) Aristotle stated that in olden times the
tyrants were called αἰσθημάτα (ο δ' Ἀρισ
tετέλης ἐν Κυκαίων πολιτείᾳ τοὺς τυρά
νους φησά τὸ πρότερον αἰσθημάτας πρὸσ
αγορεύεσθαι). εὑρίσκομεν γὰρ ἑκείνον τοὐ
νομα). SUSEM. (623)
32 οὐ τῷ μῃ κατὰ νόμον] For he was
constitutionally appointed, although to
powers beyond the constitution.
§ 9 35 οἰον ἐλοντο κτλ.] The similar
fragment of Theophrastos in Dionys. K. Α. v. 73, already mentioned
in the Introduction p. 18, n. 7, runs as follows: οί γὰρ αἰσθημάτα καλοῦσιν
παρ' Ἐλλησ τοῦ ἄρχακα, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ
βασιλείας ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, αἱρετοὶ πνε
ὁσαν τύραννοι· ἤροῦν, δ' αὐτοῖς αἱ πόλεις
οὐχ eis ἀόρατον χρόνον, οὔτε ἀνεχώς,
ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καυροὺς, ὡς δόξεαι συμ
φέρειν, καὶ εἰς πόσον χρόνον: 'Οσαν
Those whom the Greeks in older times called αἰσθημά
τα were, as Theophrastos states in his
books on Monarchy, elected tyrants. But
the states did not elect them for an
indeterminate period, nor yet regularly, but
only during the pressure of misfortunes,
as often and for as long a period of time
as seemed expedient, as e.g. the Mityle
nians once elected Pittacus to ward off
the attack of the exiles, who followed the
poet Alcaeus.' The single expression
"during the pressure of misfortunes"
(πρὸς τοὺς καυροὺς) is, as Krohn shows,
thoughly in the manner of Theophrastos
and "so too is the further treatment which
undertakes to assign to αἰσθημάτα its
historical position in political development.
Originally, he says, there prev
vailed everywhere in Greece a law
abiding monarchy based on law; but
gradually this degenerated into arbitrary
rule, and the next step was to a republic.
But neither did this prove strong enough
to uphold law and right, and thus,
through the pressure of circumstances,
(καρδία πολλὰ νεοχομοῦτες) they reverted
in reality, though not in name, to the
establishment of monarchical powers.
Compare the words, v. c. 7, ὡναγάκα
παραγεν παλιν τὰς βασιλικάς καὶ τυραννικ
κάς εξουσίας εἰς μέσον, ὁμορραί περικαλπ
τοντες αὐτός εὑρεσταρί, οὐσταλιό μὲν
ἀρχοῦς, Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ ἀρμαστάς καλών
τες, φοβοῦμεν τινὰς ή βασιλεῖς αὐτός
καλεῖν, with the fragment from Theophras
tos Politeia πρὸς τοὺς καυροὺς b. 1 (in
Harpocr. s. ν. επίσκοπος) πολιω χρὶ γάλ
καλ
κατα γε τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσιν, οἱ δὲ
Δάκωνοι ἀρμαστάς φάσκοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις
πέμπον, οὐκ επισκόποινοι ὁδεῖ φλακᾶς, ὥς
Ἀθηναῖοι, as a proof that the account
moves in the sphere of ideas peculiar to
Theophrastos, (Henkel Zur Arist.
Pol. p. 3, n. 1.) SUSEM. (624)
§ 10 38 σκολιῶν μελῶν] A skolion was a particular kind of drinking song, sung
by the guests at a party singly in a
certain order. Fragments of them may
be found in Bergk Poet. lyr. III1, p. 643 ff.
SUSEM. (625)
39 κακοπάτριδα] Does this mean
base-born) εὐπάτριδαι? 'They set up
the base-born Pittacus to be tyrant of the
wrought ill-fated town with loud cries assembling in full assembly' (Wyse). Or is it 'bene to his country'?  

40 Πιτακων] See Exc. ii. on this book, p. 451 ff. SUSEM. (626)  

§ 11, 1285 b 2. δια το δεσποτικαλ ειναι τυραννικα κτλ] Two of these two species of monarchy—viz. oriental despotism and a native dictatorship, §§ 6—10—exclude the citizens from the government as completely as if they were slaves; hence they come under coercive or arbitrary rule (δεσποτεια, c. § 6 f. with notes). Xerxes is ου κεφαλουν πολει, Aesch. Persae 213: Pittacus is αλεξος τυφανος. So far they are akin to the rule of a usurper who must rest upon force because he has no legal title to his position. On the other hand they are definitely separated from such rule by having a very good and legitimate title. As Aristotle says they are 'elective and over willing subjects'; or as we should put it, they rest upon the consent of the governed. See n. (634).  

4 αι κατα τους ηρωικους χρονους] The monarchies of the heroic age are described by Grote, Part I c. 20; Gladstone Studies on Homer ii. pp. 1—60. See also Freeman Comp. Politics Lect. iv. and Lect. ii. p. 64 ff.  

§ 12 6 δια γαρ το τους πρωτους...αερισ] Comp. c. 15 § 11 (απε ευρεσιας) n. (659) and viii(v). 10 § 3 καθ' ὑπεροχιν ἀρετης η πραξεων των απο της ἀρετης, n. (1649). SUSEM. (627)  

7 κατα τεχνας] In the arts (of peace). He is probably thinking of the mythical inventors.  

8 τοις παραλαμβανονι πατριοι] 'hereditary kings for their successors.' Yet we can hardly be wrong in conjecturing that the Hellenic chieftains had once been, like the Teutonic, elected. Comp. Ridge- 

way The Land Tenure in Homer in the Journal of Hellenic Studies vi. 1885, p. 337: the τημενος of Odyssey is by no means secure to Telemachos, Odyssey xi. 184 f.  

10 και των θυσιων κτλ] "Such as did not require a priest acquainted with special rites," e.g. like the Eumolpids (Jebb). So Saul, the Israelitish king, is described as offering sacrifice.  

11 τοτο = the judicial functions. It is not the 'coronation oath' that is in question, as Mr Lang assumed, Essays p. 23.  

12 του σκηπτρου ἐπανάτασις] 'The form of oath consisted in the act of uplifting the sceptre.' Comp. IIiad 1. 233 f. ἐπι μέγαν ὄρκον ὁμοιαίαν καὶ μα τότε σκηπ-

τρον, vii. 412 το σκηπτρον ἀνεσθεῖν πᾶσι δεοισιν. X. 331 το σκηπτρον ἀνάγκη καὶ μοι ὄμοιον: also n. (616) generally. SUSEM. (628)  

The sceptre as an instrument of the oath is always a symbol of office, whether kingly or judicial. Note that while Homer calls the thing sworn by (σκηπτρον, II 411 Æ.) ὄρκος, Aristotle gives the name to the solemn accompanying act.
§ 13 oί μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων [καὶ] τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἐνδήμα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἔχον ύστερον 15 δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὀχλῶν παραιρομενῶν, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀλλαίς πόλεσιν αἱ πάρτοι θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεύσι μόνον, ὅπου δὲ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον ἔχον.

§ 14 βασιλείας μὲν ὁμο ἐνδήμ ταῦτα, τέτταρα τῶν ἀριθμῶν, τὰ μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους (ἀυτὴ δ' ἦν ἐκόμουμεν μὲν, ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὄρισμένων: στρατηγὸς τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικαστής ὃ βασιλεύς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δεύτερα δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (ἀυτὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ γένους ἄρχη δεσποτικῆς 25 κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἦν αἰσθητείαν προσαγορεύουσιν (ἀυτὴ δ' ἐστὶν αἰρετὴ τυραννίας), τέταρτη δὲ ἡ Λακωνικὴ τούτων (ἀυτὴ δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν στρατηγία κατὰ τοὺς κύριοις ἐάν ὁ ὅσπερ ἐκαστὸν ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη τῶν

13 [καὶ] St Hilaire || 16 αἱ πάρται M3, omitted by Π2 Ar. Bk. || οὐσίας Π1 || 18 εἶναι] καὶ Koraes || 22 ὄρισμένων M3 Π2 Ar. (7) || τε omitted by Π2 Bk. || 27 εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς Π2 Bk. || 30 εῖς omitted by Γ M3 Q Bübeler, probably right, [ὅσπερ...ἐκάστη] Corning

§ 13 14 τὰ ἐνδήμα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια] domestic and foreign affairs.

15 τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κτλ] 'As the kings themselves resigned some of their functions, while others were taken from them by the populace.' παραιρομένων = shedding or paring off, as in c. § 8.

16 εἶν μὲν ταῖς ἀλλαίς κτλ) Thus at Athens the second of the nine Archons specially superintended religious worship and bore the title of King Archon, as the successor in this respect of the ancient kings. Comp. further Herod. III. 142, IV. 161 (kings at Cyrene), VII. 149 (kings at Argos), 153; also VIII (vii). 8 § 10 n. (1482) below and n. (1653) on VIII (vii). 10 § 6. SUSEM. (629) For the functions of the King Archon (whose wife was βασιλίσσα, as the wife of the Roman 'rex sacrorum,' was called 'regnina') see also Lysias c. Andocidem, Or. 6 §§ 4, 5: on the Argive kings Pausanias II. 19 § 1 and Plutarch De fort. Alex. II § 8, p. 340 d): and in general on these shadowy survivals of a former real kingship, including the interrex and rex sacrorum or sacrificius, Dion. Hal. iv. 74, Plutarch Quaest. Rom. 63, p. 279 C, and Freeman op. c. pp. 147 ff., 430—441, whence these references are taken.

17 ὅπου δ' ἄξιον sc. ἕνω; where it deserved to be called a kingdom.

19 τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον] This is decidedly too strong an assertion, see n. (616). In § 14 where the Spartan kings are mentioned, it is more correctly limited by the qualifying phrase ὡς εἰπεῖν, for the most part. SUSEM. (630) The Argive kings belonged to this class of commanders in war: Herod. VII. 149.


24 ἐκ γένους=κατὰ γένος, hereditary.

27 ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν] See n. (630) and II. 9 § 33, ἐπὶ τοὺς βασιλεύσις ὄσι στρατηγοῖς ἄιδοις, n. (343). SUSEM. (631)

§ 15 The fifth species is opposed to all the foregoing, so far as they are limited or varieties of constitutional rule. It is a monarchy answering to the art of household management, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν ὀικονομίαν: cp. 1. 1 § 2.

30 ὅσπερ ἐκαστὸν ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη] Like each separate barbarian

33 πόλεως...οἰκονομία] It is difficult to see what could have induced Aristotle to describe absolute monarchy not only as dominion over a state, but also to add "and over a nation," where we should at any rate have expected "or" (as Ma* gives); and not content with this, even to add "or several nations." Throughout his work he is dealing with the forms of government of a state, not of a nation: (see 1. 2. 4 n. 11) and there is nothing in the nature of absolute monarchy, which would justify such an exceptional extension. On the contrary, it appears further on in the work (17 § 1, § 5 n. 677), as has been stated several times already, that the only admissible and possible non-despotic absolute monarchy is that which can be conceived in the ideal state in the exceptional case described in c. 13. The interpolator has been misled by the preceding words εἵκαστον ἐθνός καὶ πόλεως, and has made the mistake into which he allows himself, even to his own modern critics have fallen (see Intro. p. 26 and c. 13 § 13 n. 601, § 25 n. 615, 17 § 5 n. 678), of supposing that this Aristotelian absolute monarchy referred to the Macedonian Empire. Cf. also vii(IV). 10 § 3 and n. (1280). Susem. (633)

Doubtless there are some slight indications in the work itself that Monarchy was actually exercised over a wider area than the territory of a single city. But in such cases it seems to be assumed that the rule must be διεσποτική, and the population not yet fully organized for civil society.

c. 15 From this survey it appears that Monarchy is either (1) a special state office, as at Sparta, or (2) Absolute Monarchy, or something intermediate to these two.

Whether it is expedient to have an hereditary or elective commander-in-chief for life, is a question in the theory of legislation: the expediency of Absolute Monarchy is a constitutional question: §§ 1—3.

Montesquieu has criticized Aristotle's classification, Esprit des Lois B.xi cc.8,9. § 1 35 αἱ πόλεις] The oriental monarchy may be as absolute as the ἀπαντικαὶ; but it is separated from it by the aim and mode of its administration, as δέσποτικὴ ἀρχή from οἰκονομικὴ in c. 6 §§ 6, 7. Hence the arbitrary rule of an eastern king is no mere perversion of true monarchy: but because the subjects allow themselves to be enslaved (δοῦλοκυτέροι τὰ ἰδιαὶ) they submit to a rule which is primarily for the ruler's advantage (see 6 § 6), and in material results does not greatly differ from tyranny, even as to the four points emphasized c. 14 § 11: (1) the consent of the governed, (2) heredity, (3) legal forms, and (4) the body-guard.

36 ἐλαττώνων μὲν...παραβιασιών] Of the 'despotic' kings of non-Greek peoples, this is scarcely true. In dealing with Monarchy Aristotle is guilty of the confusion of ideas with which Schwarz rightly charges him, in Die Staatsformenlehre des Aris. p. 32 f. (Aristotle's Theory of the forms of government, Leipzig 1884): he does not properly distinguish between government in accordance with the laws and the legal (i.e. hereditary) origin of the government. [To the former is opposed any arbitrary or personal government whatsoever, whether it be a tyrant, or the great king, or the citizen of transcendent virtue and merit, who rules all things at his own good pleasure (ἀρχὴ πάνων κατὰ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ βουλὴν): to the latter is opposed only the usurped rule of the τύραννος.]

To what extent may this also be assert-
ed of the άσιμωρητη;? Aristotle does not seem to give a sufficient answer to this question. Both, it is true, are founded on law; but though the elevation of the ideal king in a genuine aristocracy is a suspension of the laws, the άσιμωρητη; too, as long as he rules, causes a suspension of the old constitution, and has power to remodel both constitution and laws according to his pleasure. Still the άσιμωρητη; himself governs according to his own laws, while the ideal king may, in each single case, disregard them if he pleases. SUSEM. (638)

§ 2 1286 a 3 νόμον έχει μάλλον είδος—presents a branch of legislation rather than of constitution. έχει as in έχειν λόγον 1. 6 § 9, or ἄπορχαν, Ill. 10 § 1, 11 § 1, § 10, 12 § 1: and so έχει δέ έκάτερα χαράν, De Part. anim. 1. 5 § 2, 644 b 31. The genitive with είδος is again explanatory or defining, much as in ἐν ὄργανον εἴδει, 1. 4 § 2. A better example is Rhet. 11. 22 § 1, 1395 b 21, ἀλλο γάρ είδος ἐκάτερων (Bekker ἐκάτερον) τούτων εστίν. Trans. ’a generalship of this nature is a question for the laws rather than the constitution to examine.’ The meaning is better explained in the parallel passage c. 16 § 1. 

4 ἐν ἄπασις] Comp. 16 § 1 n. (669). SUSEM. (638)

§ 5 ἄφεις ᾗ οὐδείς] We may dismiss it for the present.’ One of the two passages from which it is inferred that Aristotle intended a treatment of legislation to form part of his Politics. See Intro. p. 32 n. 1. SUSEM. (636)

τήν πρώτην—= at the first, as in Meta. Z (vii). 12 § 12, 1038 a 35, τοσάδα εἰρήνα ἡ τήν πρώτην. In Herod. 1. 153 τήν πρώτην εἶνα: cf. III. 134. In Probol. II. 32 § 3, 866 b 24, ἐκ πρώτης = ἐκ άφεις. § 3 5 o δὲ λοιπὸς κτλ] ‘But the remaining mode of royalty forms one species of constitution: hence it must be examined, and the difficulties which it presents must be briefly reviewed.’ Without doubt them, the difficulties of cc. 15, 16 concern the λοιπὸς τρόπος, i.e. παμβασιλεία. See iii. on c. 17 § 1. For εἰσ-δραμεῖν ‘run over,’ like ἐπελθεῖν, comp. Rhet. 1. 15 § 1, 1375 a 23. The difficulties are collected and partly answered in cc. 15, 16; a decision of some sort is pronounced in c. 17. This is the most confused part of the treatise. The arrangement adopted in the text may be learnt from Intro. pp. 83—86, or in greater detail from Philobol. XXV. 1867, pp. 386—392. Its rationale is that the first editor (or publisher) found the discussion imperfect: a lacuna at 16 § 2, 1287 a 10, which he could not fill; three or four supplementary fragments, 16 §§ 4—10, for which he failed to find suitable places in the main discussion; and part of an independent sketch, 16 § 10 (εἰς δὲ). . . 13. Hence the changes; c. 16 §§ 4—13 being cut up into four sections and distributed over c. 15, in sequence or juxtaposition to the treatment of related topics there. See Anal. p. 112 f.

First ἀποφα: is it expedient to be ruled by the best ruler or the best laws? The passage c. 16 §§ 4—9, on any view of its collocation, manifestly belongs to this question and not to the fifth ἀποφά stated in 16 §§ 2—4.
§ 4 Argument in favour of monarchy.

9 δοκεῖ δὴ κτλ. Now those who maintain kingly rule to be expedient hold that the law lays down general statements (only) and gives no instructions for treating the (various) cases which arise.

This side is defended in Plato's Politics 294—303. Cp. c. 11 § 19 n. (579), c. 16 § 11 nn. (652—3), 111. 8 §§ 18—22 n. (375), iv(iv). 4 § 31 (1210).”

SUSEM. (637)

12 ἐν ὅποιοιν τέχνην... ἡλίθων] Plato brings out the absurdity in navigation and medicine, Politi. 298—9.

καὶ πῶς ἐν Αἰγύπτω] Undoubtedly this is not found in Plato, yet he employs the analogy of the physician, 295 c. See 111. 8 §§ 18 n. (270), 111. 16 § 6 (726), iv(vii). 2 § 13 (870).”

SUSEM. (638)

13 μετὰ τὴν τρῆμερον... κινδύνω] “After the treatment has lasted three days the physician may change it; but if sooner, he does it at his own risk.”

Herodotos (11. 84) does not mention this, but Diodoros 1. 82 § 3 states, without any such limitation, that in Egypt the physicians were paid by the state, and were obliged in their treatment of patients to adhere to a written code, compiled by many of the most celebrated physicians of ancient times. If they acted contrary to prescription, they might be accused of a capital crime (Camerarius). It is not easy to determine which of the readings, τρῆμερον or τετρήμερον, is correct. That μελέτην must be understood with τῇ τρῆμερον or τῇ τετρήμερον, is proved by Postgate from Pseudo-Hippocrates 817 τεσσαρακονθήμερον τῇ μελέτῃ καὶ τῇ ἐπίδεεσιν χρὴ ποltreίασει. Herodotos 11. 77 relates that the Egyptians who lived in the corn country purged the body for three successive days in each month by means of emetics and clysters. Diodoros § 1 says that the Egyptians sometimes made daily use of these precautionary means of fasting, vomiting and clysters, but sometimes omitted them for three or four days. Neither does this then supply a safe analogy, if indeed there is an analogy at all.”

SUSEM. (639)

14 φανερῶν τοῖνυν κτλ] An easy victory for one side of the discussion.

§ 5 Reply to this argument.

16 ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκευνι κτλ] “But again rulers are obliged to have the general principle, too, before-mentioned: yet that which has no emotional nature” viz. the law “is in general superior to that in which it is innate.”

18 τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ κτλ] A similar statement in c. 10 § 5 n. (562 b); Nic. Eth. v. 6 §§ 5, 1134 a 35; x. 9 § 12, 1180 a 21 (Eaton).”

SUSEM. (640)

19 τοῦτ' ἔχειν] sc. τῷ παθητικῷ, or (10 § 5) τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν.
20 ἀλλ'...... 1287 b 34 ὅμωσι. That the right order has been disturbed was seen by Giphanius, Zwinger, Schneider, Spengel. See Introil. 83—86 on the arrangement here followed; also for Cook Wilson’s resolution of cc. 15, 16 into two parallel versions 15 §§ 2—10 = 16 §§ 1—9, §§ 11—13, and for Spengel’s proposals.


Four objections to the human ruler.

c. 16 §§ 5—9; 1287 a 28—b 8. (1) Law is passionless and therefore its rule is better; § 5.

28 ὃ μὲν οὖν] Whether οὖν marks an inference, or is merely a transitional particle, in either case there is a want of logical connexion in its present place. The section might follow 1287 a 25, but there too οὖν would have no force.

νόμον...νοον μόνον] The two versions in which this celebrated passage has come down to us can be traced back to an early date. For Julian had before him (as is clear from his words ad Themist. 261 c 10 ὄρας, ὁ φιλοσόφος...τέλος ἐπείδη τοῦ κολοκύθων τοῖς έπιστρεφένθην λόγοις νόμον μὲν εἶναι φησι τοῦ νοον χαρίς ὡρείσων) not the version in the text, but another recension, viz. ὃ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεόν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὃ δ' ἀνθρωπον κελευων προστίθησι καὶ θηρία: ἢ τε γάρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοοῦτον, καὶ οὐκ ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἄρσιον ἀνάρασι. διότε ἄνω ὡρείσων ὁ νοος νόμος εὖτεν. Yet Codex Vossianus of Julian restores to us the valuable reading τοῦ νοον μόνον, the corruption of which into τοὺς νόμους is the key to the whole confusion. In the existing manuscripts the two recensions are variously blended and confused. See Julian and Aristotle in the Jahrh. f. Philol. cxvii. 1878 p. 389f. SUSEM.

Trans. he therefore who appoints the Law to rule makes none but God and Reason rulers, it would seem; he who appoints a human ruler adds thereto a brute; for appetite is akin to the brutes, and anger corrupts even the best of human rulers. Wherefore Law may be called reason unfettered by passion. ἢ τε ἐπιθυμία τοιοοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς] While Plato makes θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία two different parts of the soul (v. Zeller Plato p. 413 ff.), in Aristotle they are only two subdivisions of the sensitive and appetitive part of the soul (i. 5 § 6—n. 40). They are not however the only ones in the region of desire and aversion, as Hæcker appears to assume in his treatise On the division and classification of the moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics (Berlin 1863. 4) p. 6 ff., but there is a third subdivision, the Will, ὑνιες. At any rate Hæcker’s careful investigation of the difference between them has not attained the right result. He maintains that, according to Aristotle, both are based on the instinct of self-preservation, but that ἐπιθυμία springs from the unpleasant sensation accompanying a want i.e. a stopping of vital activity, θυμὸς on the other hand from the feeling of unpleasantness, aroused by an external limitation of our vital energy; θυμὸς then consists in the reaction that we oppose to this influence, or in our striving to regain the sensation of pleasure in the unim-


III. 16. 7]  

187 a 28—187 a 40.>  

431  

186 § 6 <άνδρας διαφθείρει. διότερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. τὸ 5  
<δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεύδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ  
<γράμματα ἱατρεύεσθαι φαύλον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἱρετῶτερον χρη-  
186 § 7 <σθαί τοὐς ἔχουσι ταῖς τέχναις. οὐ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν  
36 <παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιούσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀρνηται τὸν μισθὸν τῶν  
<κάμνοντας υγίαςαντε. οὐ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς  
<ποιλλα πρὸς ἐπίθειαν καὶ χάριν εἰσώθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ  
<τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστεοῦντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς δια-  
40 <φθείρεις διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπεῖαν  

32 ἄρχονται διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας Πρ. fr. Julian Bk. and P1 (in the  
margin), φθείρεις P1 (1st hand, marked by dots for erasure), interret William ὡς  
νοῦς νόμος Μ3 fr. Julian and P1 (1st hand): no doubt I also. The full text of this  
older recension was ὁ μὲν ἐν τῷ νον κελεύων...τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὁ δὲ...  
.διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους...διότερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἑστίν, which  
gives a sense, though less than the other: τὸ γράμματος ὁ μόνος Cod. Voss. of  
Julian ὡς 34 γράμμα Μ8 P1 fr. καὶ omitted by fr. [καὶ] Susem. 24, ἀλλὰ untranslated  
by Ar., [ἄλλα] Schneider ὡς 35 φιλίαν <ἕχθρων> Spengel (hardly needful)  
.36 ἄρνονται M4 Ar. and apparently P1 (1st hand) ὡς 39 πιστεοῦντας πεισόθηκα  

Röm. Phil. III i p. 140) suppose, that  
Aristotle was of an entirely different opinion. In a pamphlet entitled ὁ θύμος  
απὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους Platonicque P. Meyer  
not has been more fortunate than Häcker  
in his account of the Aristotelian distinction  
between θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, and  
Aristotle's conception of both; and  
the matter is no clearer than before. Compare  
Susemihl in Burstein's Jahresher. 1876, v.  
p. 264 ff.; also III. 10. 5 with n. (562 b)  
and notes 183, 790, 839, 935, 1704, 1741.  
Susem. (641)  

(2) The analogy of the arts is misleading; for there (e.g. in medicine) personal  
attitudes do not come in: §§ 6, 7.  
In Nic. Eth. ii. 4 §§ 2, 3 he points out that  
the [Socratic] analogy of the arts  
and moral conduct is seriously defective.  
§ 7 35 οὐ μὲν κτλ] 'the physicians  
do not act unreasonably out of personal  
liking; on the contrary they earn their fee  
by healing patients,' so that their interest  
lies in effecting cures and this coincides  
with their 'art.'  
38 πρὸς ἐπίθειαν καὶ χάριν] "to  
spite (men) and to win favour; since  
when people once suspect their doctors  
are pledged to their enemies for gain"  
i.e. have been bribed "to make away  
with them, they will in that case more  
urgently require to be treated according  
to written rules."
§ 8 A fresh objection (3) to the human ruler. "But again physicians, when they are ill, call in other physicians to treat them, and trainers in their practice (call in) other trainers, which implies that they cannot here judge aright, because they are judges in their own case and under the influence of feeling.""}

1287 b 3 

"Hence it is clear that whoso seeks what is just and right seeks an impartial middleman: now the law is such a middleman."

4 μέσον] The arbitrator or 'middleman' stands between the two contending sides and is therefore of neither side, i.e. impartial. Comp. vii(iv). 12 § 8; πανταχιοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαίτης, διαιτητὴς δ' ὁ μέσος, n. (1314), and Nic. Eth. v. 4 § 7, 1132 a 22, καὶ ἵπτοντι δικαίαν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐνοι μεσιδόν. SUSEM. (643) Add Thuc. iv. 63, ἐτοίμοι ἑν Ἱσαιᾶ μέσῳ δικαίαν ἐπιπρέπειαν.

§ 9 (4) In any case the authority of unwritten and social law is supreme.

5 κυριώτεροι] more authoritative. Comp. n. (49), on l. 6 § 1, and vii(vi). 5 § 2 n. (1430). Broughton adds Soph. Antig. 580 ff. SUSEM. (644)

See Cope Introd. to the Rhetoric pp. 239—244. He shows that τὸ ἐπιτείκεις, Equity, is a special application of κοινὸς νόμος, which as universal law, or the law of nature, is opposed to positive, conventional and written laws; that both κοινὸς νόμος and τὸ ἐπιτείκεις are designated unwritten law, ἄγραφα νόμαμα, Rhet. 1. 13 § 2, § 12, 15 §§ 3—6, and correspond to the ἐθη and ἐπιτρησκήματα of Plato Laws 703 d. Comp. Politic. 298 A, Laws 680 A; Demosth. De Cor. p. 317, 20 ff.: Thuc. ii. 17 s. fin.

6 ἐτε...7 ἀλλά] Even granting a human ruler is more trustworthy than written statute-law, still he is not so safe as the law of social custom.

c. 15 § 5 1286 a 20 ἀλλὰ ἰσός ἐν φάιλι τις καὶ τοῦτον βουλεύουσαι καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα κάλλιον."

"But perhaps some one will say that to compensate for this [a human ruler] will be better able to advise on particular cases." This sentence evidently belongs to the first ἀπορία, advocating like c. 15 § 4 the claims of the human ruler, though in a modified manner. But the words following in the ms., c. 15 § 6, are in no definite logical connexion; so that translators are at a loss to make any intelligible sequence, Jowett for instance inserting [to whom we in turn make reply:] after this sentence, though he does not propose to insert ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιθέτων before the ἕτε to omit the τοις after it: while Bernays translates "to this objection one might perhaps reply &c.," and separates off the next sentence by a break.

c. 16 §§ 4, 5 1287 a 23—28 This is at any rate a valid objection to the modified view just proposed, and is clearly still concerned with the first ἀπορία. "But yet in any cases where the law seems unable to decide, a man would equally be unable. Whereas the law gives a suitable training and then sets the magistrates to decide and manage all other matters "to the best of their judgment.""
1287 a 23—28 24 oio'] 0' Ar. (accepted by Vettori and Schneider) § 25 <τό καθόλων> ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας Susem. wrongly (and similarly Schneider and Koraes), universale William (from a gloss in Π on ἐπίτηδες): παιδεύσας omitted by II § 27 ἐτι δὲ <πάντα> Susem. wrongly, following William's version (adhucatem omnia dirigere dant)

1286 a 26 b 3 = 1287 b 15—35. See Introil. p. 84 f., the parallel columns.

1286 a 27 aι κρίσεις εἰς Π2 Bk.

1287 a 26 τῇ δικαίοτάτῃ γνώμη κρίνειν] The standing expression apparently used of the judge: the heliastae took this oath, says Demosthenes, ΧΧΙΙΙ. c. Aristocr. § 96 p. 652 s. fin. γνώμη τῇ δικαίοτάτῃ δικάσεως ὁμοίωσασ, εἰς αὐτόν. Lefort. § 180, p. 493. 1 καὶ περὶ ὅν τῶν κυρίων μὴ ωδὴ γνώμη τῇ δικαίοτάτῃ κρίνειν [ὁμοιοκότες ἤκετε], Polux viii. 10 § 122, ὃ δ' ὄρκος ἢ τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὅν κυρίων εἰσι, ψυχείσεται κατὰ τῶν κυρίων, περὶ δὲ ὅν μὴ εἰσι, γνώμη τῇ δικαίοτάτῃ. (Eaton).

Susem. (645) Aristotle remarks in Ῥήθ. l. 15 § 5, 1375 a 29 f. that the oath may be explained to mean τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρηστάνει τοὺς γγγαμμένους.

27 ἐπανορθοίσαι "and allows them to adopt any correction which appears upon trial to be an improvement upon the established laws." The play upon words ἐπανορθοίσαι...κειμένων is quite accidental. On behalf of the place here assigned to c. 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28 it may be urged (1) that the plurals (τοὺς ἀρχοντας, πειρωμένους) are not appropriate to the transition from the second ἀπορία, and (2) that only in this way do the words ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίως ἢ παρεκβαίνουσι become intelligible.

Ⅱ. 15. 6, 7] <1287 a 41—b 8: 1287 a 23—a 28> 1286 a 20—28. 433
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\[\text{[\dots...30 \alphaπής]} \text{ Oncken} \| 30 \text{ κρίνεις Μ''Ι''} \| 32 \text{ καθάπερ <γάρ> - Bk.²}, \text{ rashly.} \text{ Other changes have been proposed, but the construction is Aristotelian.} \text{ Cp. Vahlen Zeitschr.-f. d. öst. Gymn. XVIII. p. 721 ff.} \| 33 \text{ γάρ Susem., δ' \text{ Π}'' \text{ Λ}'' \text{ Bk.}} \| 37 \text{ εν Π''\text{η'''}, εν \text{ Ο''\text{τ''} \text{ Bk}''} \| 38 \text{ τούτο μη Η''\text{θ Bk.}}

29 [\text{ωσπερ...}]\text{ απής} Oncken \| 30 \text{ κρίνεις Μ''Ι''} \| 32 \text{ καθάπερ <γάρ> - Bk.², rashly.} \text{ Other changes have been proposed, but the construction is Aristotelian.} \text{ Cp. Vahlen Zeitschr.-f. d. öst. Gymn. XVIII. p. 721 ff.} \| 33 \text{ γάρ Susem., δ' \text{ Π}'' \text{ Λ}'' \text{ Bk.}} \| 37 \text{ εν Π''\text{η'''}, εν \text{ Ο''\text{τ''} \text{ Bk}''} \| 38 \text{ τούτο μη Η''\text{θ Bk.}}

29 \text{ ἐστίνας συμφορητός} “a feast to which many contribute.” \text{ Cp. 11 § 2, n. (564).} \text{ Susem. (646)}

§ 8 31 \text{ ἐτι μᾶλλον...33 ἀδιαφθορώτερον} Vahlen has illustrated this construction, viz. a simile breaking the principal sentence (often worked out into elaborate detail) and a resumption of the main thought with οὕτως asyndeton, from VIIV. \text{ 3 § 6, 1290 a 11—15.} \text{ Xic. Eth. VII. 6 § 1, 1149 a 25—31,} \text{ ἐπεί γὰρ ὁ θυμός ἀκόμη μὲν τῷ λόγῳ, παρακολουθεῖν δὲ, καθάπερ...ἐλακτοῦν οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς κτλ.;} \text{ De Soph. El. 16 § 5, 175 a 26—30,} \text{ συμβαίνει δὲ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμαις, καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύεσθαι εἰνότε ἰσααυτήν πάλιν ἄνυσινοφόρους οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑλέγχοις εἰδότες παρ᾽ ὧν λόγος συμβαίνει συνειρή διαλύεται τὸν λόγον ἀποροφορεῖν;} \text{ Poet. 15 § 11, 454 b 8—13,} \text{ ἐπεί δὲ μισθοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ τραγωδία βελτιών, ἡμᾶς δὲ μισθαίνει τοῦλος ἀναγκασθεὶς εἰκοσόγραφος, καὶ γὰρ ἑκάστα·} \text{ γραφοῦσαν οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν κτλ.;} \text{ De Anima II. 8 § 10, 420 b 17 ff., 9 § 7, 421 b 26 ff. (οὕτως οὖν τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαίνει τὸν κτλ. συμβαί

32 \text{ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ὀλγών ἀδιαφθ.} \text{ Yet when, Rhet. I. 1 § 7, he is comparing the functions of the dicast and of the laws he expresses an opinion which it is difficult to reconcile with this, ὅτι ἐκαλέσαι καὶ ὀλγών ἡπίον ἡ πολλοὶ ἐν φρονήσεσις καὶ δυνάμεις νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικαίους.}

35 \text{ ἐκεί δὲ ἐργον...ἀμαρτεῖν} \text{ This hardly correct. A large assembly is more likely to be led into over-hasty conclusions than a single capable man and ruler. Still it is true that in the case of a large assembly, the passion does not generally last so long; and they more easily regain composure; while a single ruler, if once misled by inclination or hatred, may easily confound obstinacy and stubbornness with energy, so that there is greater danger that he will misuse his unlimited power.} \text{ Susem. (647)}

§ 9 36 \text{ μηδὲν παρά τὸν νόμον κτλ} \text{ “not acting against the law except,” i.e. only acting against the law in cases where it [i.e. the law] must necessarily be defective.}

38 \text{ ἐν πολλοῖς ἐν τῷ πλῆθει line 36.} \text{ ἀλλ' εἰ πλεῖος} \text{ “at least suppose a majority to be good men and good citizens.” A majority, though not the whole body of citizens.}

40 \text{ οἱ πλεῖοι μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν} \text{ Numerous enough, indeed, in the best state, to
form the popular assembly and to appoint the council, the magistrates and the courts of justice from themselves alone—or, more precisely, from the older members amongst them, provided they are not too old: see iv(vii). 14 § 5, n. (617). Susem. (648)

§ 10 1286 b 1 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κτλ] Objection. "A larger body will split up into parties; with the one ruler this is impossible. To which we must, I take it, reply that they are (ex hypothesi) as virtuous in soul as that one ruler."
c. 16 §§ 9, 10 1287 b 8—15. The place of this fragment is vindicated by the congruence between its subject-matter and the foregoing. The contrast is still between ὁ ἐλς and πλείους.

The one ruler cannot overlook all things himself: he must appoint a number of officials; so that the state of things is virtually the same as if there were a number [i.e. a large body of the citizens] ruling.

1287 b 10 ἐς ἱλής εῦθες ἑπάρχειν] 'Whether this was the original state of things' as it would be if the great body of citizens were rulers.

§ 10 11 ὁ καὶ πρότερον κτλ] In c. 13 § 8, §§ 13—25. See also c. 15 § 3 s. fin. If we followed the manuscript order we should have to translate: 'Lastly, as was remarked before, if the virtuous man deserves to rule because he is superior': but then it would follow that the apodosis (τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς...βελτίως) also occurred in the preceding chapters. But in the two passages which alone are conceivable and to which Bernays refers us c. 11 §§ 1—3 and 12 § 9, 13 § 1 we do not find this, but something really quite different and only comparatively similar. Or could it have occurred in the lacuna which we assume after 13 § 5? This is hardly likely. We must therefore transpose thus; "if, as was previously remarked, the virtuous man κτλ." Susem. (649)

§ 10 13 τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς] For δὲ in apodosis after el cp. Phys. iv. 8 § 11, 215 b 15, εὶ γὰρ τὰ τέτταρα τῶν τριῶν ὑπέρεξεν ἐνὶ, πλείους δὲ τὸν διὰν...τοῦ δὲ μονείν οὐκέτι ἔχει λόγον ὡς ὑπέρεξε. With ἀλλὰ this is frequent: see e.g. c. 5 § 3 of this book.

14 σύν τε δὲ ὡς ἑρμόμενων] Homer Iliad x. 224. Susem. (650)

ἡ ἐνχή] Agamemnon says this of Nestor, Iliad 11. 372 f. Susem. (651)
c. 15 § 10 1286 b 3 εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν...
§ δεῦτεν] Compare n. (536) on 7 § 3.  
SUSEM. (655)
6 καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρίς δυνά-
μεως] "whether the king has an armed
force granted to him or not."  
Cp. § 14—c. 16 § 2 n. (66), as well as 14 § 7
n. (622).  
SUSEM. (656)
7 καὶ πολύ κτλ] "provided al-
ways a majority can be found of uni-
form excellence."  
In fact an 'assembly of
kings' as Kineas said of the Roman
senate.  
SUSEM. (656)
In §§ 11—13 (δημοκρατίας), we have a
sort of historical appendix to the first
two ἀπορίαις.

§ 11 8 καὶ διὰ τούτο κτλ] The im-
mediate reason is rather to be sought—as
Aristotle himself explains 1. 2 § 6, n.
(19 b)—in the development of the state
from the family through the intermediate
link of the village-community.  
It would have been better therefore to repeat that
fact and then to add that on account of
the further reason which is here ad-
duced kingly rule was established
for some time longer.  
Cp. n. (659).  
SUSEM. (657)
9 τοῦτο μικράς οἰκοιντάς πόλεις] "con-
sidering too the small size of the cities in
which they lived then."  
Comp. § 13
n. (663), and the passages there collected.  
SUSEM. (658)
10 ἐπειδὴ ἄπ' εὔρηγεσίας κτλ] It
would have been highly desirable to
adjust this second reason to the first.
For if monarchy is traced back on the
one hand to the government of a com-
munity by its elders, and on the other to
personal merit, the two causes cannot
simply be at once combined, though a
partial combination is not only conceiv-
able, but even right.  
Aristotle however
has neglected to make it, and has thus
left a difficulty unsolved.  
For when Henkel writes Stud. p. 95, 'but even
in places where the original connexion be-
tween the state and the organization of
the family no longer exercised a deter-
mining influence, it was only monarchy
that grew up in the beginnings of
civilization,' adding the second reason to
explain this, he is quite right, but un-
fortunately there is nothing of the kind
in Aristotle.  
See also viii(v).  
10. 3 n. (1649).  
SUSEM. (659)
12 συνεβαινει γίνεσθαι πολλών κτλ] Comp. viii(v).  
10 § 37 n. (1708).  
"They
would no longer submit to the rule of a
king, but strove after a commonwealth
(κοινών τι) and tried to set up a free
government" (πολιτείαν): i.e. a republican
constitution, or more accurately, first an
aristocracy or a 'polity' of horse soldiers,
next a 'polity' properly so called, of
heavy-armed foot: vii(iv).  
13 § 10, c. 1273.  
SUSEM. (660)
§ 12 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ χεῖρον... 15 ὀλι-
γαρχίας] And yet Aristotle (?) viii(v).
13 ἐντεύθεν ποθὲν εὔλογον γενέσθαι τάς ὀλυγαρχίας· ἐντιμον (X) γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραν-νίδας μετέβαλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννιδῶν εἰς δημοκρατίαν· ἀιεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι᾿ αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἵσχυρότε-ρον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστε ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δη-

§ 13 δημοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζονες εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πό-

21 λεις, ὦς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἐτὶ γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἔτεραν παρὰ
dημοκρατίαν.

εἰ δὲ δὴ τις ἀριστον θεί, τὸ βασιλευόντα, τὸ ἐντευθέν τίνες

17 μετέβαλλον Μν. Π.ἱ. Βικ. || 18 ἄγοντες <τοὺς ὀλυγοὺς> or ἄγοντες <τοὺς πλουσίους> or something similar Henkel (Studien, p. 96 n. 24): see Comm. n. (662) || 22 eis... 27 φύσιν cited by Julian ad Theiss. p. 260 D f. || 23 περί] παρὰ the mss. of Julian except the Cod. Voss. || 24 ὀποίοι (ὐπόθεν Μξ.) Π.ἱ. Βικ. Τγ. 19 (corr.), ὀποίων Π.ἡ Wb. Αλλ. and Π.δ (1st hand), ὀποίων Π.ὶ (ἡ) Tο Lc C

times

12 § 14 has a hostile criticism of Plato, who accounts for the transition from Ti-
mocracy to Oligarchy in precisely the same way (Schlosser). See nn. (1757, 1777). SUSEM. (661)

18 εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες] Here τάς ὀλυγαρχίας or τῆν ὀλυγαρχίαν must be supplied as object from what precedes. Henkel however would insert τοὺς ὀλυγοὺς or τοὺς πλουσίους in the text and translate: "while the powerful" (viz. the tyrants) "from disgraceful avarice continued more and more to thin the ranks of the rich." But then there would be no justification for the development of Tyranny out of Oligarchy, and it would appear as though the people had only risen against the tyrants, and not against the oligarchs. It is true that if we keep to the received text, the passage is some-
what obscure through its brevity, but other passages quoted by Henkel himself supply the necessary explanation. The oligarchies were constantly tending to develop into the rule of single families (11. 10 § 13 n. 371) by the exclusion of more and more families from power, and those who were excluded went to strength-
en the commons, which took its leaders from among them; for the δῆμος in spite of its hatred for the rich, living as it did "dispersed over its farms and isolated," VIII(ν). 5 § 8 n. (1558), stood in need of leaders. But for this very reason there was first a transitional state of things, viz. the tyranny of these same leaders; and afterwards when the people grew stronger the tyrants were banished, and a demo-
cracy arose. SUSEM. (662)


Beside this increase in the population Aristotle quotes as additional factors the development of cities, viii(ν). 5 §§ 8, 9, comp. nn. (1558—9), and viii(ν). 10 § 5 (1650): the military organization of the people, which if trained to serve as light infantry would easily hold its own against cavalry and heavy infantry, vii(ν). 7, 2, and the development of the navy, ib. nn. (1453—5) (Henkel). SUSEM. (663)

21 ὥς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον κτλ] "Now-a-
days hardly any form of government, ex-
cept democracy, can easily arise." Kingly
rule in particular is not to be expected;
if a monarchical constitution arises at all, it is in the form of τυραννίς, viii(ν). 10
§ 37; cp. viii(ν). 5 §§ 6—8 (Henkel)
with n. (1708). SUSEM. (664)

22 εἰ δὲ δὴ τις... 23 πώς ἐξεῖ τὰ περὶ
tων τέκνων:] This is the third ἀπορία: a
standing difficulty of all monarchy. In
order to meet it heredity has been modi-

cified at different periods (1) by election
from a royal line, as amongst the early
Teutonic tribes, cp. n. on 1285 a 16; (2)
by adoption, as in the best times of the
Roman empire.

24 ἀλλὰ γινομένων ὀποίοι tines ἔτυ-
χον] "But that will be mischievous if
the children are liable to turn out good or bad at random" or "just as it happens," a euphemism for "if they are very inferior."" So Pl. Gorg. 514 E τίς τινι πολλα μὲν ὅπως εἵτεχον ποιήσα, πολλ' ἐκάτωσα: Eur. Hipp. 929 τὴν μὲν δικαίαν τιν καὶ δ' ὅπως εἵτεχαν.

"This is certainly a very serious difficulty in an absolute monarchy, but in limited or constitutional monarchies the question is not so important." (Congreve). SUSEM. (665)

28 ἀπορίαν] The fourth difficulty started is that relating to the forces to be placed at the monarch's disposal.

τῆς δυνάμεως] This means not only a body-guard, but a standing army generally, or even an existing police-force. Cp. further § 10 n. (656), 14 § 7 n. (622). SUSEM. (666)

§ 15 31 εἰ γὰρ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ρωσιο ["For even if he be lawfully sovereign...still he must have a force to guard the laws."


39 ὅτι ἦτε τοὺς φυλακας] This is what Dionysios the Elder did, after he had obtained his nomination as general with unlimited power (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ Diod. xiii. 95 f.) in the manner described by Diodoros xiii. 85—94 (cp. nn. 1562, 1576) b.c. 406 or 405. Cp. [Grote c. 81] Holm Geschichtc Sicilicen ii. pp. 94—96, p. 128. Cp. VIII. v. 5 § 10, n. (1562), 6 § 8 (1576), 7 § 10 (1624), 10 § 6 (1660), 11 § 10 (1723): also i. 11. 12 n. (106), Khet. 1. 2. 19, 1357 b 30. Plato Rep. viii. 566 b, Polyena. v. 2. 2. SUSEM. (668)

C. 16 § 1 1287 a 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως κτλ.] This clause with δὲ answers
1287 a 4 πολιτείας Camerarius and Vettori (also by an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine), βασιλείας ΙΙ (including fr.) Dr. Susem,1 in the text 8 ελάστων Schneider and an unknown scholar in the margin of Stahr’s copy of Morel (probably right) | 8 περι...13 ἀναγκαῖον quoted by Julian ad Themist. p. 631 A. f. | 9 δὲ ἕστι Codex Vossianus of Julian | ἁρχεῖ...10 βοήθησων perhaps transposed by Γ to follow 10 βασιλείας | πάνων Julian, πάντω ΙΙ (including fr.), πάν Codex Vossianus | 10 αὐτοῦ Cod. Voss. (accent by a second hand), αὐτῶν Hertlein | λεκτέαν inserted after βασιλείας by Γ; a gloss which has crept into the text, given in a fuller form by p1: κατὰ κοινὸ τὸ λεκτέαν. There is then a manifest lacuna: hence δὲ, which is omitted in Julian, should not be altered, with Sylburg and Scaliger, to δὴ, | τὸ κατὰ Julian | 11 εἶναι πάνων τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα Γ Μ’ Susem.1-2 | ὀποιο...12 πόλεις and 13 καὶ...φύσιν omitted by Julian to the preceding one beginning τἄχα μὲν αὐτῷ 15 | 16; and it is an objection to Mr. J. Cook Wilson’s analysis of cc. 15, 16 that it ignores this correspondence. 2 ἐθέσθηκε the question is now at hand, impedes. 4 καθάπερ ἐπομεν] c. 15 § 2, n. (632). Susem. (669) 5 ἀδίδον = held for life. 6 τῆς διοικήσεως ‘of the administration.’ Not in the technical sense in which ὀ ἐστι τῆς διοικήσεως meant the Minister of Finance at Athens. 7 περὶ Ἐπίδαμον] Comp. VIII(v). 1 § 11, n. (1501), 4 § 7 n. (1535); also 11. 7 § 23 n. (249). Susem. (670) 8 At Opus the holder of this office bore the title of Cosmopolis Polyb. XIX. 16. Comp. Schömann p. 142 Eng. tr. § 2 There is a manifest lacuna after line 10 ὅ βασιλεὺς; the omission of δὲ in the citation by Julian is one attempt to conceal it, as the change to δὴ is another. For instead of extending to παμβασιλεία the fourth ἀπορία (which in 15 §§ 15, 16, 1286 b 34—40, received an easy solution in respect of limited monarchy) the text goes on to raise an entirely new problem, ἀπορία (5); viz. Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly when all are peers (δῖοιοι)? Is it not natural that power should pass from hand to hand (ἀπὸ μέρος) and be vested in officials, whose functions are arranged by law? Thus by the mention of law the fifth difficulty brings us round again to the first,—a circumstance in itself quite unreasonable, though it is no doubt responsible for the collection here of the various fragments §§ 4—13 which bear more or less closely upon the first and second ἀπορία. 10 δοκεῖ δὲ τις] Comp. 11. 2 § 4 n. (133), § 6 (134 b): IV(vii). 3 § 6 n. (740): further 1. 7 § 1 n. (58 b); IV(vii). 8 § 2 (797), VI(v). 11 § 8 (1293). Susem. (672)
εἰναι, ὡστ' εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ᾦςν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφῆν ἢ (XI) 15 ἐσθίτα βλαβερὸν τοῖς σώμασιν, <καὶ> օὔτως ἔχει: καὶ τὰ περὶ § 3 τὰς τιμᾶς, ὄμοιως [τοῖνυν] καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον τοὺς ἴσους; διόπερ οὐδένα 3 μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνά μέρος τοῖς ὑσαυτῶς, τούτῳ δ' ἥδη νόμος; ἢ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν (p. 90) 19 ἀρα νόμον ἄρχειν άρετωτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα § 4 τινά, κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ λόγων τούτων, κἂν εἴ τινας ἄρχειν βελτίων, τούτους καταστατέων νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις· ἀναγκαίον γὰρ έναι τινας ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐνα τοῦ- 23 τον εἴναι φασὶ δίκαιον ὄμοιον γε ὑστον πάντων, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐ 5 ὀσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὔδ' ἀνθρώπος § 5 ἀν δύνατο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος 26 ἐφίστησι τα λοιπα τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας. ἦτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι διδωσιν, ὁ τι ἂν δέξῃ 28 περιμένους άμεινον εἴναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον 14 εἴπερ [ὁ στερ an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine — ὡστ' εἴπερ κα] ἄστερ γὰρ? Schneider  15 <καὶ> Göttling | ἔχει] ἔχειν Schneider  | τὸ Π4 Qb T L Bk.  16 τοῖνυν omitted by Π1 | οὐδένα Bernays, οὐδὲν ΓΠ (including fr.) Ar. Bk.  | 23 ὄμοιοι Π2  1287 a 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα..... 28 κειμένων transposed to follow 1286 a 21 κάλλων: see p. 433 1287 a 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν ..... b 8 τὸ έυς transposed to follow 1286 a 20 πάσαν: see pp. 430—432 14 τὸ ᾦςν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους] Comp. Nic. Eth. 11.6 § 7, 1106 a 36 ff. (Broughton). SUSEM. (673) § 3 16 ὄμοιοι καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον κτλ] "So too it is quite as harmful if unequal shares are assigned to those who are equal. Hence it is right that in ruling and being ruled all should be alike, and consequently should interchange with one another in both. But here we come to law, for the system" on which they interchange "is a law." 17 τὸ ἀνά μέρος rotation in ruling and being ruled. 18 ὡσπερ σε δικαίων ἔστι.  § 4 21 νομοφύλακας = guardians of the laws: the expression used by Plato Laws IV 715 c (Eaton). SUSEM. (673 b) 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ] "In order to bring this passage 1287 a 23—28, as it stands, into logical connexion with the preceding fifth ἄστορια, it will be necessary to regard it not as an objection to the view therein expressed, but as introducing a new objection to a ruler who goes beyond the letter of the law: ἀλλὰ μὴν = but again, as in 1262 b 24, 1287 b 8. Yet the next sentence, a 25—27, allows that within certain limits the one ruler is really in a position to make such decisions, and speaks of rulers in the plural. Hence there can be no question here of attacking or defending monarchy, and besides all the ἄστοριαι are alike in treating absolute monarchy unfavourably. It would still be open to us to read ὁ δ' with Aretinus instead of οὖν', a 24; but if that were done ἀλλὰ in the next line would not be in place: Ar. omits it and we should rather expect διὰ or ὡστε or something of that sort." SUSEM. 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν] "It is not to be denied that, if the preceding passage 1287 a 23—28 be transposed, this passage 1287 a 28—b 8 might quite well follow the fifth ἄστορια, so far as the connexion of thought goes. But the form renders this impossible. The fact that law is passionless is not an inference that can be drawn from the natural injustice of a permanent ruling body: so that οὖν will not stand as 'therefore.' Nor will it suit as a transitional particle, without something else, καὶ or ἐτι δὲ." SUSEM.
κελεύων ἀρχεῖν δοκεῖ κελεύων ἀρχεῖν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν (XI)
30 μόνοις, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον ἢ τε γὰρ ἔπιθμα τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους
§ 6 ἄνδρας διαφθείρει. διότερ ἄνευ ὀρίζεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἑστίν. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεύδος, ὥστε τὸ κατὰ
34 γράμματα λατρεύσθαι φαύλων, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἱρετώτερον χρη-
§ 7 σταυ ὁ τοις ἐξουσίοις τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιούσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀρνύνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς κάμνοντας υγιάσαντες’ οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπηρειάν καὶ χάριν εἰρθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἱστοὺς ὅταν ὑποτεθηκαν πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἵπποις δια-
40 φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἑκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπεῖαν
§ 8 ἡθητιότειν ἄν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσαγόνται γ’ ἐφ’ ἐαυτοῦ 6
1286 b οἱ λατροὶ κάμνοντες ἀλλοις λατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ-
μαζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυναμοῦν κρίνειν τὸ ἄλλης διὰ
tὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκεῖων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὡστε δῆλον ὦτι τὸ
§ 9 δίκαιον ἡθητιότες τὸ μέσον ἡθητιότειν’ ὥστε νόμος τὸ μέσον.
5 ἐτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριώτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ θηθ ἑσιν, ὥστ’ εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμ-
ματα ἄνθρωπος ἀρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ (p. 91)
8 ἑθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βάδιον ἐφοράνν πολλὰ τὸν ἔνα’ δεῖσει 7
ἀρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καθησαμένους ἀρχοντας,
10 ὡστε τι διαφέρει τούτῳ εἶναι ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς υπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἔνα
§ 10 καταστήσας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἐτι, εἰπερ, δὲ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον
12 ἑστιν, ὁ ἀνήρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἀρχεῖν δι-
13 καιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίων’ τούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ
14 σὸν τε δυ’ ἑρχομένων
καὶ ἡ εὑχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος
15 τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμους.
|| εἰσι δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἑνῶν αἰ
16 ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν, ὡσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος
ἀδύνατει διορίζειν, ἐπεί περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδέπει ἀμφιστη-
1287 b 8 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ...... 15 συμφράδμους transposed to follow
1286 b 3 ὥς εἰς: see p. 435
1287 b 15 εἰσι δὲ καὶ......35 δεῖν ὀμολογείς is another recension of 1286 a 26
c. 16 §§ 10—13 1287 b 15—35. In
Introd. pp. 84—5, the reader will find this
passage printed in parallel columns side by side with c. 15 §§ 7—10, 1286 a 26—b 3,
an arrangement which cannot be adopted
here, simply because it is then no longer
possible to preserve the lines of Bekker’s
quarto edition, as is done elsewhere.


17  "a μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγουν—

18 ὥστε...κρίνειν transposed to precede 17 ἐπεὶ by II, untranslated by Ar.  |  19 καὶ omitted by I and P¹ (1st hand, added by P¹)  |  ἐπεὶδὴ II² fr. Bk.  |  22 νεομοθετήθησαν Susem.¹-² lego statuta esse William  |  25 κρίνει Spengel, κρίνει I II Ar. Bk.  |  26 ἀντοπο...31 συνάρχους cited in Scholia on Aristoph. Bērīs 92  |  τ’ II¹ fr., δ’ I I² I Ar. Schol. on Aristoph.  |  27 ἔχου Susem., ἰδοι I II (including fr.) Ar. Schol. on Aristoph. Bk.  |  δοῦνα] δωῦν Sylburg  |  28 παράτω Conring wrongly, but recognizing that the text was unsound  |  29 μεσαρχὸς II² fr. Schol. on Aristoph. Bk.  |  30 αὐτῶν Morel, αὐτῶν II Schol. Aristoph., αὐτῶς Susem.¹-² (sibi William), possibly right  |  τῆς ἀρχῆς Casaubon  |  31 αὐτῶν Susem.³, αὐτῶς I II Susem.² Bk.¹, αὐτῶς Schol. Aristoph. Susem.¹, perhaps right, αὐτῶς Bk.², but see Donitz Iud. Ar. 125 a 18 f.  |  32 δὲ omitted by fr.  |  33 ὅ τε Γ’, ὅτε P¹ T¹ Ald., ὅτε Q¹, ὅ δὲ Ar.  |  φιλοὺς ἑσοῦ Γ’ M⁸

c. 16 § 11  ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν κτλ] It is on this account that 'equity' is necessary to supplement law, right, and justice, because the law only determines the general rule, but there are some things for which no general rules can be established; therefore besides laws there must be popular decrees. See Nic. Eth. v. 8. Cf. also Rhet. 1. 13 § 12 ff. 1374 a 25 ff. [with Cope's comments and his Intro. pp. 190—193]. Plato Polit. 209 b ff. (Eaton). Also see notes 275, 579, 637 and vii(iv). 4. 31 n. (1212). Susem. (652)  

22 περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλεύοντας] This department of human action is defined in the detailed investigation of Nic. Eth.iii. c. 3. Susem. (653)  

tὸν ἀδιάνυτον ἐστὶν] Here, it may be remarked, Mr. J. Cook Wilson finds a place for the fragment 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28, ἀλλ’ μὴν δοσ...τῶν κείμενον.  


c. 17 A partial decision of the above difficulties. A reference to c. 15 §§ 2, 3
38 δεσποτικών δεσποτών P2a3 Qb T3 fr. Alk., probably also T4 (1st hand), and δεσπο- στών Sylburg Bk., ἀριστοκρατικῶν in place of either δεσποτικῶν or βασιλικῶν Schlosser. See Comm. | καὶ ἄλλα βασιλικά omitted by H4 (in P4 added in the margin) | ἄλλαβελευτών P2a3 Qb T3 fr. Alk. Bk., probably also T4 (1st hand), βασιλευτικῶν T4 (corr.) | 41 τὰ rightly omitted by T2 Ar. Bk., retained by fr. | 1288 a 2 νόμων δύνατον M8 T2 fr. Bk. | 3 ἄλλα.... νόμων omitted by H3 | 5 εἰ omitted by fr. | 6 ἡδον omitted by H1, [ἡδη] Susem.1 | [πρῶτον....] T2 Ar. Bk., retained by fr. | will suffice to show that the solution here proposed relates to nothing else than the ἀρισταρχεία, or absolute monarchy. Comp. Susemihl Quaest. crit. coll. p. 396 ff. If so, they must relate to that commonwealth of virtuous men in which alone absolute monarchy will arise. Comp. c. 15 § 9 | § 1 36 ἢτι [ἡ] méν τῶν] i.e. in certain circumstances: not, as Bernays and others translate, “in the case of certain men (populations, civic bodies).” See n. (677) and Quaest. crit. coll. p. 397 ff. Susem. (674) | 38 δεσποτικῶν...βασιλικῶν | “Bekker writes δεσποτῶν after Sylburg and βασιλικῶν as in T2. But we find τυπικῶν standing side by side with these; and as this can hardly be used, like ἀριστοκρατικῶν and πολιτικῶν, in a passive sense it proves that we should rather read δεσποτικῶν with Göttling, as in T1, and adopt βασιλικῶν from the corr. of T1. Further, how else are we to construe καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον and τῶν ἄλλων....παρεξήγησις, to which Lambin raises an objection? But with the text before us ἢτι φῶς is the predicate of the first clause, ἢτι κατὰ φύσιν the predicate of the second clause: all the rest is subject.” Susem. | 40 ταύτα γὰρ....παρά φύσιν] Com- pare the apparently inconsistent passage V8(iv). 12 § 3 η. (1319). Susem. (674 b) | § 2 1288 a 3 ἄλλα αὐτῶν ὡς δύνατα νό- μον] Cp. 13 § 14 n. 601 b. Susem. (675) | This is the thorough-going Absolutism of the scientific expert in government, as advanced by Plato. | § 3 6 καὶ πρῶτον] viz. c. 13 §§ 13 —25. Susem. (676) | 6 πρῶτον δὲ... ἄρχας] Krohn is right in objecting to the meaningless tautology in the definition of the peoples suited to monarchy or aristocracy. It is even worse that aristocracy is here described in a manner which, although it does not directly contradict Aristotle’s conception, still by no means exhausts it, and therefore does not render it faithfully. It is indeed essential that a true aristocracy should possess citizens who are capable enough always to elect the most capable persons to office. But it is as essential to this ideal aristocracy, that these persons should only hold their offices for a certain time, and then be replaced by persons not inferior in capacity, so that there is a perpetual interchange of rulers and ruled. And it is yet worse to find the people suited for a monarchy represented as different from that suited for
aristocracy, although according to the genuine teaching of Aristotle, the true monarchy and the true aristocracy are only possible with the same people, viz. that of the ideal state (13 § 24 n. 614, see Intro. p. 44). For this very reason, we would not translate above at 17 § 1 "for some people monarchical government is naturally suitable, for others the true Republican government"—but rather: "under some circumstances the one, and under others the other." But the interpolator, like many modern critics, misunderstands the passage adopted the former meaning, and so it seemed to him necessary to interpolate here an exact account of each kind of people. When the passage is rightly interpreted, the incorrectness of this interpolation at once becomes manifest. While c. 17 § 5 is closely connected with καὶ πρὸτερον... (§ 3) the intermediate §§ 3, 4 disturb this connexion entirely. In its present form the definition of the people suited to a Polity is quite un-Aristotelian, whether we adopt the reading εὐπόροις or ἀπόροις; the former gives a mixture of aristocracy and oligarchy, the latter a monstrous combination of aristocracy and democracy, while the Aristotelian Polity is a compromise between oligarchy and democracy. Yet this mistake seems too bad even for this interpolator, and we ought perhaps to adopt Stahr's conjecture τῶν εὐπόροις καὶ τῶν ἀπόροις which would remove the difficulty. SUSEM. (677)

§ 12 Πολίτικον δὲ πλήθος κτλ.

If we adopt the very probable change of the second πλήθος into ήθος, the sense is: "And the population suited for a Polity is that in which there is naturally a warlike character (ἡθος), qualified to be rulers as well as subjects in accordance with a law which assigns the offices of state in accordance with their merits to the rich (καὶ τῶν ἐλλων) which would remove the difficulty. SUSEM.
16 ἀλλὰν ἐνα τινὰς υμβή διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ’ ἀρετὴν (XI) τοσοῦτον ὄσθ’ ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τούτῳ βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων καὶ βασιλέα τῶν ἐνα τούτων. καθάπερ γὰρ εἰρηνκαί προ-τερον, οὐ μόνον οὐτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὡς προφέρειν εἰ-θανείν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες οὐ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς (πάντη γὰρ καθ’ ὑπεροχήν ἀξίουσιν, ἄλλα ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν § 7 αὐτὴν), ἀλλὰ <καὶ> κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἵ 13

25 φυγαδεύειν οὖθ’ ὀστρακίζειν δή που τῶν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἔστιν, οὔτ’ ἀξίουν ἀρχεθαί κατὰ μέρος; οὐ γὰρ πέμφηκ τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντὸς, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι § 8 τούτῳ συμβέβηκεν. ὡστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πειθεθαι τῷ τοιοῦτοι καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος [τούτον] ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς.  (p. 93)

30 περὶ μὲν ὑμᾶς βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ τότερον XII

§ 5 18 τοτε δίκαιον τὸ γένος κτλ] Aristotel speaks with far more correctness here than in 13 § 13 when he is dealing with a whole stock of individuals or even a single man. But this gives a fresh proof (cp. Introd. p. 46) that in describing his ideal monarchy, he was not thinking of Macedon; for not even Oncken would attribute to him the absurdity of regarding the whole royal family of Macedon as gods dwelling among men (13 § 13 n. 301, § 25 n. 615). SUSEM. (678)

§ 6 19 ἐιρήνη προτέρον] viz. c. 13 §§ 23—25 and §§ 1—12. SUSEM. (679)

21 τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς] Instead of aristocracy, we should at first sight rather expect polity: for aristocracy is founded on the right of fitness or merit, the only ultimate right (7 § 3 n. 536). But Aristotle is here pointing to the explanations in 13 §§ 1—12, in which it is aristocracy and not polity that is discussed; and even this is hypothetically designated as faulty, in cases, that is, where the excellence of the community is not weighed against that of individuals who see which excels the other. SUSEM. (680)

§ 7 26 οὐ γὰρ πέμψακεν...28 συμβέβη-κευ] 'For it is not natural that the part should outweigh the whole, and the possessor of such extraordinary eminence has happened to be in this case' viz. that all the others together stand to him as part to whole. The ordinary interpretation is, 'For it is not the course of nature that the part should surpass the whole, whereas this happens when a man is very superior to the rest.' But see c. 13 § 13. SUSEM. (681 b)

§ 8 29 μη κατὰ μέρος ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς] 'not merely in rotation' with others, 'but absolutely sovereign.'
I ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 17, 18. [III. 17.—18. 2

31 οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ συμφέρει, καὶ τὶς, καὶ πῶς, (XII)

18 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτου· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φανεν εἶναι τὰς
ὅρθιας πολιτείας, τούτων δὲ ἀναγκαίον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ
tῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομομενήν, τοιαύτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν ἡ συμβέβη-
35 κεν ἡ ἕνα τινά συμπάντων ἡ γένος ὅλων ἡ πλήθος ὑπερέχου
εἶναι κατ' ἀρετὴν, τῶν μὲν ἀρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ' ἀρχεῖν πρὸς
tὴν ἀἱρετοτάτην ζωήν, ἐν δὲ τούς πρώτους ἐδεί-
χθη λόγοις ὅτι τῆς αὐτής ἀναγκαίον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ
pολίτου τῆς ἀρίστης πόλεως· φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπουν
40 καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συ-
stήσειν ἀν τις ἀριστοκρατομενήν ἢ βασιλευμενήν, ὅστε ἔσται 2
1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἐθή ταύτα σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον
§ 2 αὐτρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικῶν [καὶ βασιλικῶν]. διωρισ-
μένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἡδὴ πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς
4 ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.

36 ἀρχεσθαι <καὶ ἀρχεῖν> Spengel Bk.² || 39 τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης ΙΙ² fr. Bk.
41 <ἀριστ' ἡ> ἀριστοκρατομενήν Bücheler, probably right. Schmidt
thinks ἀριστοκρατομενήν ἢ βασιλευμενήν a gloss which has taken the place of the
true reading ἀριστα πολιτευμένης οὗτος τετανύμενης; [ἡ βασιλευμενήν] Spengel who
first saw the text to be unsound.

1288 b 2 πολιτικῶν] πολιτήν ἀγαθῶν (or σπουδαίων)? Spengel ² [καὶ βασιλικῶν]
Spengel, καὶ βασιλικῶν <καὶ ἀριστοκρατικῶν> Conring wrongly: καὶ βασιλευτῶν
Nickes, accepted by Bernays, whose translation shows that it will not give a good
sense || 4 καθίστασθαι πῶς Μ, καθίστασθαι πῶς 1³ T² W² Ald. and P² (1st hand,
the second acute has been erased).

C. 18 Transition from Monarchy to the
best constitution in the narrower sense,
i.e., excluding monarchy, to pure Aristoc-

racy.

This chapter is of first-rate importance
for the question of the order of Books IV
(VII), (VIII), because it enables us to
decide whether the best (i.e. the ideal)
state in its normal form is or is not
identical with the ὅρθη πολιτεία Aristocracy:
a point which Forchhammer (Philol.
xv. p. 56 ff.) and Bendixen (Philol. xiv.
66 ff.), defending the traditional order of
the books, denied. Their objections are
eXamined by Spengel Arist. Studien II.
p. 60 (652) f.

§ 34 οἰκονομομενήν] administered,
managed. No stress can be laid upon
this word: see VIII(V). 8 § 15 τῇ ἄλλῃ
οἰκονομῇ.

35 ἡ ἑνα τινά... ἡ γένος ἔλον ἡ πλήθος]
The first two cases give the ideal king-
don; see c. 17 § 5 n. (678): the third
gives the ideal aristocracy. See also n.
(600). SUSEM. (682)

37 πρός τιν...[ζωήν] Comp. II. 1 § 1
n. (128): also n. (21) on I. 2 § 8, n. (284)
on II. 9 § 5 and the passages there
cited. SUSEM. (683)

ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις] c. 5 § 10;
see n. (471). SUSEM. (684)

At the end of this chapter in the manu-
scripts and in the editions (down to and
including Bekker's quarto) is appended
the unfinished sentence ἀνάγκη ὅτι τῶν
μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προ-
ήκουσαν σκέψιν. It was Spengel's great
Stud. II. p. 60 (652) ff., to recognize in
this imperfect sentence a transition to the
discussion of the ideal state, dating back
from the time when that discussion im-
mediately followed the present chapter,
and consequently evidence of an older
order of the books than that adopted by
the compilers of our present text (?An-
EXCURSUS I.

ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS, POLITIES, OR FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.  III. 7.1.

On the development of the theory of the different forms of government before Aristotle see especially Henkel  Studien p. 38 ff., Oncken II. p. 139 ff. From Herodotos III. 80-82 we learn that the Athenians of the Periclean age used to distinguish three forms only, but with tolerable definiteness and clearness of view; the rule of the people, for which Herodotos nowhere as yet uses the term democracy; Oligarchy i.e. the rule of a picked association of the best men; and Monarchy. Thus Oligarchy means here what was in later times called Aristocracy, after that ‘during the Peloponnesian war,’ as Henkel says, ‘men endeavoured to win credit for party efforts by well sounding names’ (Thuc. III. 82): afterwards the Socratics used the term with great predilection as a word of good omen, τὴν εἰσαφειμον ἀριστοκρατίαν, Plato Politic. 302 D. Lastly the terms Monarchy, Kingship, Tyranny, are found in Herodotos as yet undistinguished side by side. Considerable progress is shown in the masterly descriptions of the Athenian and Spartan governments and their points of contrast by Thucydides, in Pericles’ Funeral Oration and elsewhere; there indeed the Athenian constitution is already called a democracy. But it was Socrates who first prepared the way for the more subtle distinctions to be found in Plato and Aristotle. He divided the monarchical constitutions into kingships and tyrannies, and the oligarchies into aristocracies and plutocracies (governments of wealth). He took as the criterion for kingship the government of the prince in accordance with the laws and the willing obedience of the people; for tyranny, the arbitrary rule of the prince and the coercion of the people: for aristocracy, the appointment to the magisterial offices of men from among the number of those who are most law-abiding1 as at Sparta (Xen. Mem. III. 5. 14—16: IV. 4. 15, cp. De Rep. Lac. 10. 7, Plato Crito 92 e); for plutocracy, their appointment by a property qualification, Xen. Mem. IV. 6. 12, cp. I. 2. 41—45. Here already is the germ of the distinction found in Plato and Aristotle between normal constitutions and the perverted forms corresponding to them. Yet the principle of law-abiding rule and willing obedience (and their opposites respectively), which Socrates followed, is carried out clearly in the case of

1 And not, as Oncken II. 152 misinforms us only ‘after performance of definite statutory injunctions.’
the monarchical constitutions only. Plutocracy, thus defined, does not present any such sharp antithesis to Aristocracy, although the mere wealth of the rulers in the one case, and their excellence and obedience to the laws in the other offer a strong contrast of a similar kind. In democracy he made no such distinction at all: he merely defined it by the fact that the appointment to the offices of state is open to all; and certain statements by him lead to the inference that in general he regarded it as a perverted form (Xen. Mem. III. 7. 5 f., I. 2. 9, cp. I. 2. 58 f., III. 9. 10).

Plato follows in his master's footsteps most closely in his Politicus, strange to say, for from the most recent investigations it follows that this is in all probability not his earliest exposition. But the principle which Socrates had already laid down, that the excellence of a man and of a ruler is only conferred by conceptual knowledge, is there put into serious application by the exaltation of reason above the law. He declares the most perfect constitution to be the rule of the wise man unfettered by legal restraint, so far as it can actually be realized. Next, after dismissing this ideal state, he carries out completely the Socratic opposition between states governed by laws and those which are subject to arbitrary rule, at the same time showing a correct appreciation of the numerical standard which, though in itself something external, nevertheless involves essential intrinsic differences. Thus he distinguishes not only between Kingship and Tyrannis, Aristocracy and Oligarchy (which latter name he employs instead of Socrates' Plutocracy), but also between Democracy governed by law, or moderate Democracy, and arbitrary or unrestrained Democracy. But it is quite a novelty when he undertakes to determine precisely the order of merit of these constitutions, reversing this order in the two classes of constitutions, (1) those where the laws are respected and (2) those where they are not; so that the former are less bad, the latter less good according as the number of the rulers increases.

With this the older account given in the Republic so far agrees that here also Tyranny is depicted as the worst of all constitutions and Democracy and Oligarchy as coming next to it. But while in the Politicus arbitrary Democracy is, as we have said, represented as more tolerable than Oligarchy, in the Republic on the contrary Democracy ranks below Oligarchy, and nothing is said about recognizing a good Democracy or Oligarchy along with the bad forms. Instead of this, Aristocracy, the name given in the Politicus to Oligarchy where the laws are respected, is here reserved for the ideal state itself and this Aristocracy is in its real and essential nature placed on a par with true Monarchy: cp. Zeller Plato p. 469 Eng. tr. But to make up for this, between the only good constitution of the Republic and the three wholly bad ones an intermediate form is inserted, a constitution after

1 Hence Oncken's criticism is quite unfair when he asserts that this point of view is abandoned in the non-monarchical constitutions, purely external differences respecting the conditions for admission to office being alone taken into account, and that Socrates reverts to the superficial view which bases a distinction simply on the number of rulers.

2 That is, the distinction between government by one man, a few, or a multitude: Plato Polit. 219 d f., 302 c.
the fashion of Sparta and Crete, for which Plato invents the new name Timocracy (rule of honour) because he regards its intrinsic principle as being ambition and the love of honour. We may conjecture that this is partly due to the views of those theorists who originated the doctrine of the mixed constitution and discovered such a combination in Sparta and Crete (II. 6. 17 with n. 219, cp. also Introd. p. 20): for Plato in the Republic does not simply describe Timocracy as a constitution intermediate between Aristocracy and Oligarchy, he expressly says it is a combination of elements of both, of good and bad: 1X 544 f., 547 D ff.

Lastly, it was pointed out in the notes on II. 6 §§ 17, 18 that he shews himself very distinctly influenced by these theories in the last of his works, the Laws, where he himself sketches a wholly new and improved form of such a mixed constitution (cp. also n. 191 on II. 6. 4). Thus forms of government are now divided by him into mixed or moderate and pure or unlimited; the latter he represents as merely governments of faction or party in the one-sided interest of the ruling power. This division in the main coincides with that followed in the Politicus, except that it is not stated in the Laws whether Oligarchy or absolute Democracy is regarded as the less bad: nor whether unlimited Monarchy, otherwise called Despotism or Tyrannis, is still regarded as the most intolerable constitution of all. But in any case he no longer assigns to limited or constitutional Monarchy the same high place as in the Politicus, where it ranks not only above moderate Democracy but even above Aristocracy: nor does he make Kingship and Aristocracy identical, as in the Republic. It would appear as if he placed limited Democracy before limited Monarchy rather than in the reverse order: at least he apparently sets both on an equality in merit, but certainly ranks mixed Aristocracy before them both: for if we adopt his own terminology we may thus describe the pattern state of the second rank sketched in the Laws, since he uses the term Aristocracy III 701 A in the sense of a 'government by the best,' although in III 681 D it means a government by nobles, while in the decisive passage IV 712 C D it is employed in such a way that one does not rightly see whether that is still its meaning or what it is that Plato understands by "Aristocracy." We may however conjecture that it is at any rate a government by certain families in which special excellence is really hereditary. It may be seen from Aristotle (III. 7. 3, VI (IV). 7. 1, Nic. Eth. VIII. 10. 1—cp. n. 1230) that the champions of a mixed constitution before Plato's time gave it the common name Πολιτεία, Constitution or Commonwealth in general: evidently (a) because, as a combination of several or indeed of all constitutions with one another, it is so to speak the all-comprehensive constitution or the constitution par excellence; or else (b) because as in their opinion the best constitution it seemed alone deserving of the name, or it may be (c) for both reasons. This name is retained by Aristotle, yet with the remark in the Ethics 1. c. that the more correct term would be Timocracy, which however he applies to it in a sense different altogether from that in which Plato coined the expression, to mean the rule of the census or property-qualifica-
tion, i.e. the rule of a moderate property-qualification. Comp. III. 7. 4 n. (537), VI(iv). 9. 3 n. (1254), VI(iv). 13. 7 n. (1269).

Aristotle for his part follows very closely, as he himself remarks VI(iv). 2. 3 (cp. nn. 1139, 1140), the view presented by Plato in the Politicus, except that he replaces law-abiding Democracy by Polity and adheres firmly to the distinction between law-abiding or moderate Oligarchy and Democracy and their opposites, a distinction which with special reference to the Athenian state was certainly the common property of educated Athenians, even before Plato, in the form of the antithesis between the ‘old fashioned’ and the ‘modern’ Democracy—II. 12 §§ 2, 4, cp. VI(iv). 6 § 5, 14 § 7, §§ 11, 12: VII(vi). 4 §§ 1, 2; 5 §§ 3, 4. VIII(v). §§ 10 and n. (406)—which Isocrates, in particular, is fond of using. Hence follows the essentially original addition made by Aristotle to the Greek classification of forms of government, which he expressly claims as original VI(iv). 1 §§ 8—11 (cp. n. 1126, also VI(iv). 2 § 4 n. 1140 b, VII[i]. 1 § 7 n. 1383 b, VIII[v]. 12 § 18 n. 1787), namely the accurate analysis of the principal forms of constitution, Oligarchy and Democracy in particular, into their sub-species, and the estimate of the comparative merit of the latter, which leads him to assume not simply two but more exactly four forms of Democracy and Oligarchy from the most moderate and law-observing species, which resemble Polity, down to the most unbridled and corrupt, which resemble Tyrannis, VI(iv). c. 4 f, VII(vi). cc. 4—7. Thus in contrast to Plato’s procedure in the Politicus and the Laws he certainly regards even the first and most law-observing of these forms as already a degeneration, though it stands still very near to Polity. But even amongst the mixed forms he employs a more exact mode of distinction, particularly to delimitate spurious or mixed Aristocracies from Polities, the name of Aristocracy in its proper distinctive sense being reserved for what is really and truly such, Aristocracy pure and unmixed, the best constitution in the absolute sense: VI(iv). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9, cp. 2 § 1 n. (1133), § 4 (1141); II. 6. 17 (218), IV(vii). II. 5 (849), also n. (536) on III. 7. 3: for which an ideal Monarchy as the best form of all is at least conceivable: III. c. 13 nn. (595, 597, 601), c. 17 nn. (677, 678); VI(iv). 2 § 1 f nn. (1133, 1136—7), 10 § 4 n. comparing nn. (521) on III. 6. 1, (614) on III. 14. 24, (633) on III. 14. 2. But this, the only Monarchy which has any justification in the developed state, is not tied down to laws but is absolutely unqualified. Comp. Introd. p. 44 ff. The same sketch of the various constitutions had already been given by Aristotle, without specifying the sub-species, in the Nic. Eth. VIII. 10. 1—3: indeed he had probably expounded it still earlier in one of his dialogues. For it is assuredly probable, if not certain, that when Isocrates, who is trying to maintain the old threefold division into Monarchy, Oligarchy and Democracy, as found in Herodotos, makes a hit at those who, caring little for essential points, regard Democracy blended with Aristocracy, and Timocracy

1 Comp. e.g. Isocr. VII. 15 ff.
2 The ‘divergences which Oncken, p. 158 ff. believes he has discovered rest upon misapprehensions.
3 But in such a way as to give Oligarchy the meaning it has in Plato and Aristotle.
in the sense of government by property qualification, as separate forms
(Panath. §§ 131—133), he is attacking Aristotle. But Isocrates is not referring,
as Henkel p. 46 n. 25 thinks, to the Ethics, which at that time unquestionably
was not yet published1; nor is there anything said in the Ethics about a
combination of Aristocracy and Democracy at all, much less as a
special constitution.

Van der Rest p. 415 f, criticizing the principle of classifying constitutions
as normal and perverted which had been inherited by Aristotle from
Socrates and Plato, says not without some reason: la science ne peut
admettre une classification des gouvernements qui s'appuie, non pas sur le
principe même ou l'organisation des divers gouvernements, non pas sur leurs
différences intrinsèques, mais sur la manière dont usent du pouvoir ceux qui
en sont revêtus, sur les qualités morales dont ils font ou non preuve dans
l'exercice de leurs fonctions, c'est à dire sur quelque chose de tout à fait en
dehors des constitutions mêmes. However there is always this difference;
that certain constitutions by their essential organization may be adapted
either to prevent such misuse, or on the other hand to call it into existence,
sometimes indeed to render it inevitable. How else could the distinction
between a despotism and a really free government be maintained? And is
there not a difference in the 'principle of the constitution itself' between a
constitution which really favours the rule of the masses and one which
distributes power wisely? The conception of Plato and Aristotle may
be untenable in this form, but there is something true underlying it.
SUSEM. (533)

EXCURSUS II.

PITTACUS: III. 14. 10.

In regard to the life of Pittacus, all that we either know with certainty, or
may with some probability conjecture, amounts to very little, as Töpffer more
particularly has recently shown in his Quaestiones Pisistrateae pp. 81—107

1 Heitz in his continuation of K. O.
Müller's History of Greek Literature,
Geschichte der griech. Litt. II ii p. 281 f.
(cp. p. 245) is certainly of opinion that
the Nicomachean Ethics owes its origin,
in part at least, to pupils' notes of lectures
delivered by Aristotle during Plato's life-
time in the Academy; but see, as against
this, Susemihl in Philologischer Jahren-
bericht XLII. 1886, p. 4 f. Another pos-
sibility, which occurred to Oncken II p.
160 f., is however by no means excluded:
—if, that is, on other grounds we really
must assume with Teichmüller and Bergk
the polemic of Isocrates in the Pana-
thenaicus §§ 16—34 is directed against
Aristotle and his friends, and that conse-
quently after Plato's death Aristotle paid
a second visit to Athens from 344 to 342
B.C. and lectured there in the Lyceum on
rhetoric and poetry (see Susemihl Jahres-
ber. XXX. 1883 p. 4 ff.). For this would
make it at least possible that his lectures
extended to ethics, and that Isocrates was
informed of the subject-matter of these
ethical lectures, and thus came to attack
the part of them treating of politics in §§
131—133 of the same pamphlet (the Pan-
thenaicus). But we do not require such
an altogether uncertain hypothesis, and
therefore it would be better, I take it, to
abstain from it.
(Dorpat, 1886). He is said to have been allied to the Lesbian nobility through his wife, who was descended from the once princely house of the Penthilidae, VIII(v). 10. 19 n. (1681); but on the father's side he was not of Lesbian, but of Thracian descent (Duris Frag. 53 in Diog. Laert. I. 74, Suidas). Yet whilst still in his vigorous manhood he attained great reputation. Mitylene was at that time torn with factions and Pittacus' first political act seems to have been to bring about the fall of the tyrant Melanchros with the aid of the nobles, or at least that party of them which was headed by Antimenides and Kikis the brothers of Alcaeus the poet. Perhaps this also contributed to his election by the Mitylenaeans (presumably not long afterwards) to be their general in the war with the Athenian immigrants into the Troad, who under the leadership of Phrynon had conquered the Mitylenean colony Sigeion. In this campaign, which proved disastrous to the Mitylenaeans, Alcaeus also took part. No mention is made of him on occasion of the expulsion of Melanchros, although according to Aristotle's statement here he was afterwards chosen as the leader of the exiled nobles along with Antimenides. He himself describes his flight after a battle with the Athenians, in a poem addressed to his friend Melanippos (Fr. 32 in Herod. v. 95, Strabo XIII. p. 600). The statement that Pittacus slew Phrynon in single combat (Strab. XIII. 600, Plut. De Herod. malign. c. 15, Diog. Laert. l.c., Suidas) is very suspicious, as Töpffer has shown: probably it did not originate long before Strabo's time. At last peace was concluded in accordance with the decision of Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, and the Athenians retained Sigeion (Herod. and Strabo II. cc., Apollodorus Fr. 78 in Diog. Laert. l.c., Töpffer p. 86 ff.). But there was no cessation of the intestine feuds, in which Alcaeus largely increased his renown as a poet by the composition of his "Faction songs," σταυριώτικά, as they are called (Strab. XIV. p. 617). The tyranny of Myrsilos, whose death Alcaeus celebrated in one of his poems, Frag. 20, probably falls within this period, although Strabo mentions him before Melanchros. At length the nobles themselves were banished, and when the exiles threatened to commence an attack, Pittacus was chosen Aesymnetes. He victoriously repulsed the invaders, taking Alcaeus prisoner; but he pardoned him (Heraclitus in Diog. Laert. I. 76, Diod. IX. 20) and permitted Antimenides also to return. He issued a general amnesty, and though he authorized a new division of the land he introduced no changes at all into the constitution, but only into the laws and courts of justice (see II. 12 § 13 n. 429). So completely was peace restored that several years before his death he was able to lay down his office.

The fixed dates in his biography which are given, from the same original source, most fully in Diog. Laert. I. 75, 79 and in Suidas, are based upon very arbitrary calculations. Nothing more was known about Pittacus and Alcaeus than what tradition and the poems of the latter had to tell about them, and that of course furnished very uncertain starting points for chronology. The only trustworthy date established by written evidence was due to the fact of Phrynon having previously won a victory at the Olympic games (viz. according to Julius Africanus, in 636), so that his name stood on record
in the corresponding list of victors. If I am right in my conjecture, he was reckoned as being 25 years old at that time and 50 when he conquered Sigeion, and Pittacus as being about ten years younger: hence the *floruit* (ἀκμῆ) of the latter, *i.e.* his fortieth year, perhaps also the beginning of the Sigeian war, was placed in the 42nd Olympiad; more precisely Ol. 42, 2 = 611 B.C., which would make his birth fall in Ol. 32, 2 = 651. To the same 42nd Olympiad, but somewhat earlier probably, was next assigned the fall of Melanchros. Those who wanted to bring in the single combat with Phrynon placed it half a decade later than the outbreak of the war, *i.e.* as Eusebius in the Armenian translation attests, Ol. 43, 3 = 6061. Now counting two decades from 611 we arrive at 591; and as it was important that two events which followed at no long interval, viz. the expulsion of the nobles and Pittacus’ appointment to be Aesymnetes, should be fixed here, a year earlier, 592, was chosen for the one (the Parian Marble, *Ep.* 36 as restored by A. Schöne ‘Researches into the life of Sappho’ in *Symb. phil. Bonn. p. 755 ff*), and a year later, 590, for the other. Just as arbitrary was the assignment of ten years to Pittacus’ tenure of office and ten years more to the remainder of his life (Diog. Laert. 1. 75), whereby the year of his death became exactly Ol. 52, 3 = 570, and he was made to live just over 80 years, or between 80 and 81 (Laert. Diog. 1. 79, where ἐβδομήκοντα must obviously be altered to ὀγδοήκοντα). Now this whole calculation in round numbers, decades and half-decades, may still be approximately correct; but it is quite possible that mistakes of more than ten years have crept in. Hence we must be contented, *e.g.* to place the Sigeian war in the latter part of the seventh century, some time after 636. Nor can we decide whether Alcaeus was younger than Pittacus, nor, if he was so, by how many years. About Antimenides we learn further, from a poem of Alcaeus addressed to him, of which the beginning has been preserved (*Fr.* 33), that he served in the Babylonian army. This must certainly have happened after his banishment which, though quite possibly previous to 592, can hardly have been earlier than 605; hence we are obliged to reject the conjecture of Otfried Müller that he took part in the battle of Carchemish, B.C. 605; see his essay, ‘A brother of the poet Alcaeus fighting under Nebuchadnezzar,’ in *Rhein. Mus.* for 1827, pp. 287—296. Müller’s only reason on the other side, viz. that at the later date he would have been too old, is not valid; for there is nothing to contradict the supposition that he was a man of about fifty, or a little over, in 590. Possibly Pittacus himself was no older in that year; for we must be content to place his birth somewhere about 650—640, and that of Alcaeus still more vaguely, somewhere about 650—630. Hence Duncker is nearer the truth when he remarks *op. cit.* vi. p. 281: “Antimenides may have taken part in Nebuchadnezzar’s Syrian campaigns, or in his conflicts with Pharaoh

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1 The text of Suidas (s. v. Πιττακός) καὶ τῇ μη' ὁλυμπίαθι Μελαγχρον τὸν τύ- ραννον Μιτυλήνης ἀνήλθε. καὶ Φρίνωνα στρατηγῷ Ἁθηραλων πολεμοῦντα υπὲρ τῶν Σιγείου μονομαχῶν ἀπέκτεινε δικτύων περι- βαλών αὐτῶν should be thus punctuated, with a full stop, in place of a comma, after ἀνήλθε. If this be done, Suidas does not contradict Eusebius. This too has been correctly remarked by Töpffer p. 55 f.
EXCURSUS II.

Chronological Table.

| Ol. 32, 2 | Pittacus born | B.C. 651 |
| Ol. 36   | Phrynon aetat. 25 victor | 636 |
| Ol. 42   | Downfall of the tyrant Melanchros | |
| Ol. 42, 2 | Pittacus floruit, aetat. 40 | 611 |
| Ol. 43, 3 | Phrynon slain in single combat by Pittacus | 606 |
| Ol. 47   | Expulsion of the Lesbian nobles | 592 |
| Ol. 47, 2 | Pittacus aetat. 60 | 591 |
| Ol. 47, 3 | Pittacus made Aesymnetes | 590 |
| Ol. 50   | Pittacus resigns his office | 580 |
| Ol. 52, 3 | Pittacus dies, aetat. 81 | 570 |

EXCURSUS III.

Fragmenta Vaticana Rescripta.

The printing of B. III was almost completed when a very praiseworthy piece of work was published: in the Rheinisches Museum for 1887, vol. XLII p. 102 ff. G. Heylbut communicated to the world his collation of twelve leaves of a palimpsest in the Vatican library (gr. 1298) containing the following passages of the Politics: 1275 a 13—b 33, 1276 b 17—1277 b 1, 1278 a 24—1281 a 37, 1286 b 16—1288 b 37, 1290 a 36—1292 b 20. Notwithstanding their great age 1 the fragments, which we denote by fr., abound in more or less serious blunders of every kind, which need not be fully recorded in the critical notes 2. The gain accruing to the text is next to nothing: at 1278 a 34 they confirm Perizonius’ conjecture δοτῶν, at 1287 a 34 my rejection of καὶ, and that is all. No one need be surprised at this when he reflects on the extraordinary accuracy which marks P 2, the principal codex of the family II 2, although it is, comparatively speaking, so recent 3. For the definite separation between the two recensions II 1 and

1 Heylbut pronounces the writing to be of the tenth century. Accents are very rare, but not altogether absent; iota adscriptum is written or omitted at random; etacism is very frequent; there are no pauses between the words except at the end of a paragraph.

2 It will be found that of some 400 readings cited by Heylbut 59 record the partial illegibility of the palimpsest; 79 consist in the retention of ν ἐφελκυστικῶν; 81 are blunders of spelling (including etacism); there are 9 cases of dittoigraphy, 11 of omission through homoeoteleuton and 14 of words or letters omitted through other causes.

3 Namely, of xiv century, four centuries later than fr.
Π² was brought about, as I have shown ¹, in the sixth or seventh century while the manuscript of which these fragments have been preserved, was copied from an original of an earlier date than that separation. So far it may be compared with the manuscript which Julian used; but with this difference, that of the two subsequent recensions Julian's MS apparently more nearly resembled Π¹ than Π², while the case is just the opposite with the newly recovered fragments. That is to say, apart from the two readings above mentioned it shares in general both the merits and the faults of Π¹ and of Π². Consequently, as I am bound to state in reply to Heylbut, it is not of the slightest importance for deciding the question, whether on the average the text is better preserved in Π¹ or Π². On the contrary, the reasons which have led me to infer that Π¹ has retained the true reading (or traces of the true reading) somewhat oftener and in more important cases ² than Π², and must therefore in all more or less indifferent cases retain the advantage over it, remain, now that the palimpsest has been made known, exactly the same as they were before. More than this I have never asserted.

But besides, Heylbut has made no complete enumeration of the readings in which the fragments agree with Π¹, or with Π²: sometimes too, where he records such agreement, his statement is not quite precise enough to make clear the actual state of the case. Thus he tells us, "1276 b 30 διω "with Π², 1281 a 35 f εχοντα...ψυχὴν placed after φαυλὸν with Π², 1287 a 11 "ενα πάνων εναί with Π², a 32 o νοὺς νομὸς as Julian reads, 1288 a 2 νομὸν "οντων as Π²": whereas in the fourth of these passages Π¹ also agrees with Julian, and in the other four it is not Π¹, but only Γ M⁸ (or in the last passage Γ P¹), from which fr. diverge. If Heylbut chose to adopt this procedure (viz. to make divergence from Γ M⁸ equivalent to divergence from Π¹), he should in all fairness have set down to the credit of Π¹ the readings in which the fragments agree with Γ M⁸ only; namely, 1278 b 22 πολιτείας, 1280 b 5 διακοποῦσιν, 1287 b 13 ερχομενοὶν. The second of these three erroneous readings is of some interest: for while a codex so late as Π¹ has not got beyond the first stage of corruption, διακοποῦσιν for διασκοποῦσιν, the fragment as well as Γ M⁸ had already converted this into διακοποῦσιν ³. Still more interesting is 1292 a 3, where M⁸ has the true reading with Π², while the frightfully corrupt reading which, as we now see, already stood in the palimpsest was also found in Γ, and originally also in Π¹. At 1287 a 33 Γ Π² rightly have γράμματα, fr. has γράμμα with M⁸ P¹. The statement "1286 b 17 μετέβαλλον with Π²" is quite misleading: for here it is only Π¹ that has μετέβαλλον at all, at least we cannot determine the reading of Γ. At 1278 a 36 the order of the words in fr. is the same as in Π¹ and corr. P¹, i.e. a branch of Π¹.

² A reference to a single passage may suffice, Π. 2 § 6, 1261 a 30 ff., where Π² affords an especially deterrent example: cp. Quaest. crit. col. p. 360 f. I can with the greatest ease supply a series of similar passages.
³ See above p. 76 n. (1). We know that Π¹ was copied quite at the end of the fifteenth century: for on the last page but one the scribe, Demetrios Chalkoudylas, records the births of his children from the year 1484 to the year 1501.
Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heylbut's statement is accurate: for in that case fr. have βούλευόμενον with Π² and κρύνον with Π¹. Heylbut's omission to annotate a number of readings in which fr. agree with Π¹ or Π², as the case may be, is evidently intentional; but on his own principles he should have added "with Π²" in the following cases: 1276 b 33, 1277 a 20, 1278 b 19, 1281 a 3, 1288 a 29, 1292 b 9 (εἰπαμεν); and "with Π¹" in the following: 1276 b 36, 1279 a 25 (το πολιτευμα), 1280 b 4 (εἶδοι), 1287 b 41, 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that fr. usually write ὁδεῖς and γέγνεσθαι with Π², on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: fr. agree with Π³ against Π¹ 62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly, while 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas fr. agree with Π¹ 27 times, 20 times rightly and only 4 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided. The correctness of the calculation that Π¹ has retained the true text oftener than Π² cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in fr. at 1275 a 27 αὐτά is undoubtedly derived from Π¹. And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where fr. have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family Π¹, even this makes but very little change in favour of Π².

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 f. φύσει μὲν ἐστιν ὁ ἀνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικὸν: on the contrary there can be no doubt that Π² fr. are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heylbut adduces; but unfortunately Heylbut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case: 1253 a 7 διότι πολιτικὸν ζῷον ἀνθρωπος, Ethik. Nic. 1097 b 11 φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἀνθρωπος, 1169 b 18 πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπος. [Moreover ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ may be for ἀνθρωπος, as Stöhr suggests.]1

On the other hand in the above calculation καὶ εἰ or κἀν εἰ, and in most cases the order of the words, have been regarded as doubtful. Yet as a matter of fact we may hold it more probable that Aristotle everywhere wrote κἀν εἰ. Again no one of course will dispute the fact that he frequently places the attribute after the substantive and repeats the article as in τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης: but precisely because this occurs often enough, we must

1 It is a mere accident that Μ¹ here agrees with Π². With the copyist of Μ¹ no other fault is so frequent as the omission of words in consequence of an homoeoteleuton: here too it is he, no doubt, who is to blame, and not his original.

2 Besides the 51 passages noted below in which Π² fr. agree against Π¹ there are 11 others where the text with which Heylbut collated fr., viz. Susem,3 agrees with Π² against Π¹, viz. 1275 a 281, 1277 a 12, a 20, a 24, 1279 a 2 f., 1280 b 5, 1288 a 16 (in which cases Π¹ omits words), also 1277 a 23, 1280 a 24, 1291 b 27, 1292 b 5. Similarly with the eight passages 1275 b 32, 1280 b 34, 1286 b 24, 1288 b 27, 1290 b 19, 1291 a 39, b 6, 1292 b 14 in which fr. may be assumed (from Heylbut's silence) to agree with Susem,3 i.e. with Π¹ as against Π²; adding these 8 to the 19 noted below we get 27 readings in which Π¹ fr. are agreed as against Π².

3 See Rassow Forschungen über die Nikom. Ethik. (Weimar, 1874) p. 54.

4 See Commentationes Philologicae (Monachii, 1891) p. 98.
feel some scruples about accusing the author of the recension Pi (which, as
the figures above show, is on the average the better and more careful) with
such confidence as to exclude all doubt, of having three times intentionally
altered it 1260 b 23 f., 1288 a 39, 1331 a 5. Just as little do I hold the
case to be decided, or even possible to decide, by Heylbut's examples at 1280
a 15 f., and 1288 a 13 f. Those which he adduces in favour of μία δρετή 1277
a 1 have certainly somewhat more weight. However I have made it a rule
as regards the order of the words, so far as it is of any importance, quietly
to follow everywhere the class of manuscripts which is, on the average, the
better, in order to limit as much as possible the editor's own subjective
leanings: but I have no objection if in the future another editor, bolder than
I am, prefers to attempt a decision of each case upon its merits, so long as
he only refrains from the wish to deduce theories as to the order of words in
Aristotle from a text like this preserved to us by a bifurcate tradition.
Otherwise the matter is without significance and not worth contesting.
And I fail to see what right Heylbut has to prohibit Aristotle from
using two alternative forms μόναρχος and μονάρχης: one should have learnt
by now to guard against the endeavour after uniformity of this sort.

In my third edition I did not, at 1278 b 22, bracket the words οἰκ έλαττων,
my reason being the observed fact that words are more often omitted by Pi
than added by Pi without justication. But now it appears that fr. agree
with Pi in rejecting these two words; and not only so, but Heylbut has
proved that they are untenable. On the other hand, at 1278 b 31 the γε
inserted after δρετής by P2-3 fr. deserves perhaps to be accepted, and at
1292 b 15 I shall without hesitation replace τοὺς in the text with P2-3 fr. Ald.
Bk., as here the sense favours the article. SUSEM.

Heylbut's collation with the text of Susem, is as follows (words and
letters in brackets being such as are illegible):

1275 a 15 ευγεγραμμενοις | 19 γαρ | απλως: λ is added above the line | 21
εστιν | 22 μαλα | 24 εστιν | 26 αυριστος: o added above the line | 33 (ο μεν) |
34 (αγεγραμμενος | 39 (παυσουσας); there is only room for about 10 letters;
possibly the copyist omitted τοις δε προτερας.

1275 b 4 (αιτ...εκαστην) πολιτει(αν δια) περ(ολεκθεις) | 5 εστιν | 7 εν omitted |
8 δικαζομεν | 10 αλλοις αλλος | 11 της ετερας | 12 κρινομεν | 13 (των) | 15 εστιν |
αλλα | 16 βουλευμαθιαν Π | 19 βουλευμαθιαν η κριτικη | 20 (προς)...21 (ομ-}

1 In favour of φαιλο κρεται, the order
of Pi fr., Heylbut quotes 1282 a 16, Ταφ.
viii. 11 § 3, 161 a 37 ετει δε φαιλο
κρινοντο δ εμποδιζων κτλ. Nic. Eth. 1. 3
§ 5, 1094 b 28 άγαθας κριτης.
2 For the less usual order of Pi fr.,
αρχεται και αρχεων, Heylbut cites 1259
b 37, 1277 b 27, 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2.
Comp. 1255 b 8 with Criv. note.
3 They are 1276 b 32, 1277 a 10, b 18,
1322 a 8, a 26.
4 Heylbut points out that έλαττων
denotes a less sum, or something less in
number, time or space: e.g. πελευσ--
θονται δη 23 επι...οιον twice over | 24 παμπποιν | 25 απορουσιν | 27 ειρωνευομονος | 29 υπο των twice over | λαρισσοποιονος, but just before λαρισσαυνον | 30 εστιν | 31 διωρισμος | 32 και γαρ ουδε

1276 b 18 ημη corrected from ημιν | 21 τωδε | 23 τωφωντην των αντην | 24 δη λουν | 25 (αργησ) | 26 (εγρον εστιν) | 27 (των) | 29 εστιν, then κανονια δε εστιν is omitted | 30 διο with Π1 Π2 | πολι(του προσ) | 31 εστιν | 32 αριστην | 33 του δε...τελειον is omitted with Μ1 Π2 | 34 ευθησεται(αι) | πολι(την) | 35 (καθην) | 36 αλλα is omitted with Π1 | εστιν | 39 αντων | π(οιει)ν | 40 επεδεικτειν Π2 | (παντας)

1277 a 1 ει(η)με(αι)αρετην as Π2 | (και) | 2 (στουδαιου ποιλιτσιν)ει | 3 (αναγκαιων ειναι τηθ(η)ν) | πολιτην | αγαθου αυθαυτων ει μη | 5 (τηστον)δαια | 6 (πολεως πωσπερ ζωοι) | ψυχη(η) εκ | 8 κετησεις | 9 αναισθουν | 15 αγαθονειν | as Π2 | 16 φρονημον | 17 λεγονσιν | 18 ευρηπηθης φησιν | 19 κομψι | as Π2 | 20 ειδε-αντην | Π2 | 21 εστιν | 22 απαγων αν ειη | Π2 | 24 πηνθ | 29 αμφω επαινουν | ποτε | 32 τοιουεθεν | Π2 | 33 εστιν | 39 τουφομαυτου | as Π2

1278 a 2 γενουθ | ous in ποσδιαν over an erasure | 30 αλλα | 31 ολιγον(αν...) | βρωσιαι, between γ and θ room for four letters | 32 δοξαι(ου και)τα | 34 αστων | 36 ωσπερ...38 μετεχων comes after 40 συνοικουντων εστιν as in Π1 corr. Π2

1278 b 1 εστιν | εκ των ειρεμας | Π2 | 3 κακωνους ou with Π2 | 8 καιει with Π2 | after τωες an erasure of half a line | 9 εστιν | 10 κυριος | 11 δεστιν | 12 δειον | 14 δεκα | 16 συνεστρεκεν | 19 δη with Π2 | 21 o is omitted with Π2 | 22 περι αλληλων πολιτειαν ορεγοναι* | 24 εστιν τερος | 25 παις | 26 και...κανονιαν between αυτων and ισως as Π2 | 28 υπερβαλη | 29 κακοπαθιαν | 31 γε after αρχης | 40 η <ei> omitted | 41 ωσπερ with Π2

1279 a 2 παιδοτρεβην | 13 το κενον | 15 αρχουσινσικαιροις | 16 αρχας Χ above the line | 19 σφετερον | σ above the line | 22 εστιν | επι(σκεφασθαι) | 23 εισιν | 25 διαρθυσθευσων | το πολιτευμα | Π2 | 26 σημανε...πολιτευμα is omitted | (δ)εστιν | 28 (α)ταν | (π)αλλοι | 31 (η)του | 32 (δει) | 33 (την) | 34 (απο- βλησονται...την) | των ουνων μεν | 35 δε ενος αριστοκρατων | 37 στανδετο | 38 (κ)αλεει(ται το) | (παντων...δελων)γωσ | 39 μεν is omitted

1279 b 2 πληθει(ει) γιγνεται | 6 εστιν | 8 (το) των | 14 εστιν | (ου δε τι) | 15 καταληπτεν | 16 εστιν | 20 ει(εινοι) | 23 συμβαινη | 26 καπται | 28 προσ- αγορευει | 34 the line ends with το, the next begins τεια: either λι is omitted, or it was written above. There is no trace of it. | 38 δια is omitted | 39 γιγ- νεσθαι | 40 δημακρεαση

1280 a 1 αρχωσιν | 10 πον τδ: | παντα | 14 αφερουσιν | 15 φαουλοι κραται with Π2 | 19 ομολογουσιν | 20 διαιθεθεν omitting τον κρωμουσιν | 22 νομιζουσιν | ομιζουσιν over an erasure | 24 ελευθεραι: the first ε above the line | 26 μετε- Χουσιν | 29 εκατων μμων | εισενεγκαντα with Π2 | 31 μονον ενεκεν Π2 | 33 εστιν | 36 τυρπηνοι | 37 εστιν

1280 b 1 του is omitted with Π1 | αδικος: | χ above the line | 4 εξει with Π1 | αδικησασιν | 5 δαρετης | διακουουσιν with ΠΜ3 | 8 γεγενηται | 9 απωθε | 10 συμμαχων | 11 λυκοφρων | 17 πολεσιν | δουδει | 23 του | 26 οικειαι | σφει(ατί)ν | 28 δοξειν | 30 η πολις ουκ εστιν with Π2 | 34 γεγενησι | 35 και | 40 δεη

1281 a 1 χαριν is omitted | 3 χαριν with Π2 | 5 μετεστιν | τω(ος) | 6 μειονον

* περι with Μ3 Π2, πολιτειας with ΠΜ3, ουκ ελατον omitted with Π1.
7 (πολιτικηρα)ετην
υπερεγουσιν | 10 λεγουσιν | 16 ἄν is omitted with Π1Π2
17 χρη with Π2 | παλη | λειβθεντων | 21 τουτων | 23 κρειττων | 24 δικαιοναρχειν
with Π2 | ν in αρχεν above the line | 26 εστιν | 27 πανταφαιλα with Π2
28 δικαια with Π2 | 35 εχουσι...36 ψυχη after φανλον with Π1Π2
1286 b 17 μετεβαλλον with ΜΠ2 | 18 αισχροκερδιαν | 21 γιγνεσθαι | 24 γιγνο-
μενων | 26 τουτο ραθϊν | 31 και is omitted with Π1 | 33 φυλαξαι | 34 βασιλεά
tον τουτον is omitted with Π1 | 40 συνακοσιωσ
1287 a 2 εφεστηκεν | 4 βασιλειας | 5 οσιν | 7 εστιν | 9 εστιν | παστα | 11 ενα
παντων εναι with Π1Π2 | 16 ομοιως τουων και as Π2 | ουδεν | 25 παιδεσως with
Π2 | 26 εφεστησιν | 29 τον νοιν μονους] τους νομους | 31 αρχουτα διαστρεφει as
Π2 | 32 διαφθειρει is omitted as in Π2 | ο νους νομος with Π1 Julian | 33 γραμμα
with ΜνΠ1 | 34 και is omitted | 37 καμωντας is corrected from σκαμωντας
38 επηραιαν | 40 θεραπιαν
1287 b 4 ο γαρ νομος | 5 τω κατα | 6 (κατα) | τω κατα | 8 υφαινου | 10 κατασ-
tησει | 11 ποτερων | (αυ)ηρ | 13 εστιν | ερχομενον with Π1Μ' |
16 εστιν | 17 αρεξεν
19 επειδθα with Π2 | περιλφθηναι | 24 α(λλο)τι | 26 τυσος with Π2 | 27 (πε)λτον
εδω τις (δυνου) ομμας(ι και δυσιν)' | 28 ποσιν | 29 μοναρχων with Π2 | 32 ποιουσου-
σων | δε is omitted | 37 εστιν | δεσποτον with Π2 | βασιλευτων with Π2 |
41 γι-
gνεσι τα para φυσιν with Π1
1288 a 2 νομων αντων with ΜνΠ2 | 5 ει is omitted | 6 ποτερων | 8 εστιν
πεφυκεν | 13 πεφυκεν ενγεγερθαι as Π1, omitting και εν | πολιτικων with Π1 |
14 αρχεσθαι και αρχειν with Π2 | after καταξιαν dittography; διανεμοντω
καταξιαν, then διανεμοντα | 15 αποριοσ with Π2 | 17 (τοσουτον οσ(σ)θ) | 18 βασι-
λεκον | 21 ετε for οτε | 23 παντη with Π2 | 24 και is omitted | 26 πεφυκεν
29 κατα μερος εναι τουτον αλλα απλος with Π2 | 30 ποτερων | 31 after η συμ-
φερει dittography; ταυς πολεων η συμφερει | τυσιν | 33 δανακαιων | 34 ap-
parently οικονομεινης | 35 τυσυμπατων | 39 της πολεως της αριστης with
Π2 | 41 οιωνταια
1288 b 1 παιδια | 3 δητουτων | πο(λε)τειας | τι(ν)α τεφυ(κε γεφυ)εσθαι| μορων | 5 δη | 9 αριστοτελους πολιτικων: γ: in the margin by the same hand
Δ. [fol. 302v begins with this heading] | 11 γιγνομενα: the second γ scratched
out | 14 καλιστα | κεχορημεναι | 16 εργον with Π1 | δεαν | 18 μηθεν | 19 εστιν
with Π2 | 23 εστιν | 24 αρμιστουσα with Π2 | 26 τε απλος και την is omitted |
31 συμβεβηκεν | 35 ὦς | 36 λεγουσιν
1290 a 36 ομοιωσι: the second i above the line | ουδεις
1290 b 2 δοταν | πολλων with Π2 | 5 φασιν | 8 ετι instead of ετει, πλειονα
μορια with Π2 | 11 δημοσι | 12 τουτων | τημαις | 15 δημος | οωνων as Π2 |
17 εστιν | 19 δοταν | 21 πολιτειαν or πολιτειαν | πλειονοι...αιτιων is omitted
| 24 πασαν εχειν with Π2 | 25 μεν is omitted as Π2 | 29 δη | ειδημονων | 33 πελε,
no trace of ω | τουτων | 35 ληφθωσιν | 37 δε | 39 συγκητε | μερων with Π2 |
40 εστιν | καλουμενοι
1291 a 4 δαγοραυον | 5 καὶ ταὶς ὄνας is omitted | 6 κατηλιας | 7 ουδεν | εστω
αναγκαιον as Π2 | 11 φθειν | 13 τουτων τους | 18 μαλον | 20 ατοδεδωσι | 21
αποτομονον as Π2 | 22 τεταρατων | 27 δικαιοτετκης corrected from δικαιο-
tηκης | 29 ουδεν | γαρ before διαφερει with Π1 | 33 αναγκαιων μοριων της πολεως
with $\Pi^2$ | 34 o with $\Pi^2$, not ὡπερ | οὐδον | 39 Βουλευομενον with $\Pi^2$ | 41 το-λεσων | γυνεοθαι | δικαιος

1291 a 3 autous: s above the line | 4 και τεχνατας twice | 12 καθιστασιν | και δοκουσιν twice | 14 εισων | 15 εστιν | δεμοκρατειας | 17 λεγομενων | 21 χρημα-τυσικον | 22 αλευτικον: the first i above the line | εκαστα: ta above the line | 27 αμφοτερον | ετερον | 30 δημοκρατεια | εισων | 32 υπαρχειν | 34 μαλιστεστιν

1292 a 3 το πασι μεταναι] ταλλαμεν ειναι with $\Gamma\Pi$ | 17 τοιοτο | δημος as $\Pi^2$ | 22 παρ' is omitted | 23 δεμαγωγοι | 24 εισων | 29 προσκλησιν with $\Pi^1$ | 30 αρχε | 32 εισων | 33 εκαστα or εκαστον | 34 εισων | 36 ουδεν

1292 b 1 μακρων with $\Pi^1$ | 3 ποισιν | 5 οταν παις | 9 τελευτας | ειπαμεν with $\Pi^2$ | δημοκρατειας ex tais is omitted | 10 καλουσιν | 13 between καθα and των room for 3 letters | δε after dia is omitted | 14 πολιτευεσθαι δε δημοτικος | 15 κατα τους νομους | 17 τουτο δε | 19 αλλα αγαπωσιν

* Apparently κρινον with $\Pi^1$; this at least is the inference to be drawn from Heylbut's silence.  
† Apparently ἑθος with $\Pi^1$; Heylbut is silent.  
‡ [It should be observed that considerable alterations have been made in Heylbut's annotation of the readings (see p. 456); also that 1280 a 29 εισενεγκαντα is given as the reading at any rate of $\Pi^2$ and presumably of fr. (εισενεγκαντα Heylbut).]

Note on the Basis of the Text.

In Mr Newman's edition I. p. viii. f. II. p. liv. there recurs, although in a much milder form, Heylbut's assertion already refuted by me in Jahrb. f. Philol. cxxv. p. 801 ff., and in Excursus III. above, that I seek to base the text of Aristotle's Politics primarily on $\Pi^1$, and especially on $\Gamma$. Mr Newman writes:

"Susemihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially on $\Gamma$, but he frequently adopts readings from the second."

Now even in my first edition, in which as in the second I certainly too often followed $\Pi^1$, I have nevertheless already said at p. xxxii.:

"quanquam ex eo, quod dixi, satis appareat ita nobis traditum esse hoc Aristotelis opus similiter atque complura alia, ut non nisi mixtam ex utraque codicum familia recensionem perficere hocie queamus, tamen in hac mixtura artis criticae regulas diligentiis, quam adhuc factum sit, esse adhibendas periti omnes concedent. Quod ut fiat, ipsius vetustae translationis verba... cum libris affinibus Graecis (sunt) conferenda, deinde quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent: ubicumque autem aequae bonam sententiam utraque praebent, vulgata semper recensio alteri est posthabenda."

Here it is stated, that in my judgment any one who wished a priori to make the recension $\Pi^1$ the basis of the text would proceed just as perversely as any one who does, or as if any one were to do, the like with $\Pi^2$; that on the contrary in the main each case must be decided on its merits: quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent; and
NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

only afterwards in all these cases in which on material grounds (I might have added "and on linguistic grounds") a decision is impossible, that family must be followed which in the greater number of determinable cases and at the same time in essential matters has more frequently preserved the true text or the traces of the true text, i.e. according to my opinion and my figures the family $\Pi^1$. The accuracy of this computation I have already endeavoured to establish statistically against Heylbut for those passages which are contained in the Vatican palimpsest: but I will not spare myself the pains of a similar demonstration as against Newman in respect to Books I. and II. which he has edited. I must however prefix one or two observations, although entering as little as possible upon a special controversy.

I gladly acknowledge, that Newman has adopted as against Bekker many readings from $\Pi^1$. In spite of this, he cannot be wholly acquitted of a certain prejudice in favour of $\Pi^2$, as some examples will hereafter show. In addition to this there is a particular circumstance which disturbs his impartiality. He believes that the text of the Politics has been transmitted in an excellent condition, and has therefore a strong dislike to conjectural emendations, so that in order to avoid one he prefers to adopt explanations implicitly containing an absurdity which but for this prepossession could not possibly have escaped a man of his discernment. A truly deterrent example of this sort is to be found for instance at 1272 b 38. Hence wherever a reading in $\Pi^1$, however convincing on other grounds, cannot be retained without the help of a conjecture, though it may be the slightest change in the world, this is sufficient for him to condemn it. But the truth of Spengel's dictum, that the Politics has come down to us in a state legible on the whole but very corrupt in particular passages, can be shown a priori by the consideration that shoals of mistakes in $\Pi^1$ are corrected by means of $\Pi^2$ and those in $\Pi^2$ by means of $\Pi^1$; whence it follows that in each of the two families the original is preserved with but very moderate fidelity. Who can rationally assume that the original is well preserved where the two families agree, and not rather that a quantity of errors lurk in both? Further Mr Newman has allowed himself to be misled by an assertion of Dittenberger's, to me incomprehensible, into the belief that all the good readings found only in the "Vetusta translatio," or in a single codex, are mere conjectures: whereas this opinion, partially true perhaps of $P^1$ and Ar., for the rest is certainly true only of the "deteriores" of the family $\Pi^2 (= \Pi^3)$. I ask any one just to consider the not unimportant class of readings to be derived solely from $\Gamma$ or from $P^1$ and $P^1$ (corr.), and soberly to put the question: Do these really look like Byzantine emendations made (say) since the 11th century? And if he is not convinced by this, let him further ask himself: If the Byzantines had thus handled the text, then along with this after all but moderate number of good emendations should we not find a far greater number of attempts at emendation, i.e. of sheer corruptions, common to all our sources of the text? But yet apart from such general considerations how else is the excellence of an old manuscript to be demon-
NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

strated, unless it be one so preeminently excellent as e.g. Α of the Rhetoric and Poetic, or Σ in Demosthenes, or Π in Isocrates? Otherwise it might even be maintained, that the 70 odd passages, where K² alone presents right readings in the Nicomachean Ethics, are after all only good conjectures. If this cannot rationally be imagined, and if it is just as certain that the pair of right readings lately found in the Vatican fragments are traces of a good tradition, the same view is, in most cases, just as decidedly to be taken where not all, but only single representatives of the recension Π¹, or of the better class of Π², present us with the true text. And then it tells decisively in favour of Π¹, that while these cases are not quite rare in Π¹, in Π² they are almost zero. I am here obliged to repeat what I have put together in my third edition p. xii. ff. [cp. above p. 74 f. notes] on this matter:

"soli Π libro debemus praeter 1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ has rectas lectiones: 1258 b 40 Χαριτίδη, 1260 b 41 εἰς ὅ τις, 1266 b 2 δ' ἡδη, 1271 a 20 καὶ (μην Π; partem veri vidit Busseus), 1276 a 33 ἔθνος ἐν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1331 a 42 ἐνιὰ δὲ, 1336 a 34 σπουδασμοίων (aut σπουδασθησαμοίων, quod praebet Π²), 35 κατὰ, 1296 a 8 συστάσεις (ut videtur), b 38 πλὴθει, 1320 b 9 τὴν Ταμαντίνων ἀρχήν, 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 1321 a 12 ὁπλιτικὴν, 1303 a 24 ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ (an ἐγγίζου?), 1311 a 6 χρημάτων (ut videtur),
soli Π Π² has: 1328 a 5 παρὰ, 1336 a 6 εἰσάγαγε, 1340 a 16 δῆλον ὅτι δὲι, 1321 b 29 τὰ om., 1322 b 36 προσευθῆναι (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ om.:
soli Π et pr. Π² 1259 b 28 δὲ:
soli Π Π² b 1265 a 16 παρὰ, 1272 b 39 καθ' αὐτὸ:
soli Π et corr. Π² b 1278 b 22 παρ' :
soli Π Π² Ar. 1289 b 38 πολέμους:
soli Π² Ar. 1336 a 5 δὲ:
soli Π R² 1303 b 31 τὰ:
soli Π Π² Ald. corr. 1332 a 33 τῶ:
soli Π Ar. corr. Π² 1335 a 26 σώματος:
soli Π Π² b 1254 a 10 ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς ὅλως Μ' Π, ὅλως cct.).

Neque fas esse censo in tali rerum condicione 1260 b 20 et 1280 a 29 codicum servatorum lectionibus οἱ κοινοὶ et μνῦν multo illas exquisitiores et pleniores coloris Aristotelei postponere, quas suppedditat translatio, οἰκονόμοι et ταλαντῶν...

E solo Π¹ has...depromere licet rectas scripturas: 1257 a 40 ἐπιβαλόντων (nisi idem habuit Γ), 1259 a 13 ἑλαιουργείων, 1278 a 36 sqq. rectum ordinem (corr.¹), b 4 κακείνης corr.¹ (nisi potius retinendum est κακείνης), 1286 b 17 μετέβαλον (nisi idem habuit etiam Γ), 1287 b 38 βασιλικόν, 1328 a 5 ἀπάγχεαι, 1335 b 20 γενοµένων, 1338 b 4 πρὸτερον corr.¹, 1340 b 30 παιδίων, 1299 b 24 ἐτέρων pr., 1314 a 35 τὸ ποιέων (?):
e solis Π¹ et Ar. has: 1263 b 4 τὸ, 1280 b 19 εἰρήσων:
e solis Ar. et corr. Π¹ has: 1255 a 37 ἑκυγον, 1299 a 14 πολυτείας:
e solis Π¹ mg. Π² rc. Π³ 1284 a 37 κολούειν, quorum nonnullac...ita sunt comparatae, ut currente calamo a Demetrio Chalcondyla demum et Leonardo Aretino e suis ingeniis facile petuerint restituī, velut ἑλαιουργείων, πρότερον, παιδίων, τὸ ποιέων, εἰρήσων, ἑκυγον...Solo autem M' codice paene nusquam
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nititur textus, item nusquam paene solo P3, solo P2 1253 a 25 (καὶ post φῶσει
om.), 1270 b 38 (εἰπον), 1235 a 29 (αὐτὸ τὸ corr.1), 1339 a 14 (εἰπειν), quibus
locis fortasse addendum est 1338 b 33 ἀπαιδαγωγήτουs."

This is exclusive of the cases, in which ΓΜ only or ΜΠ1 only or ΓΠ1
alone have preserved the true text: and to these may be added (L.c. p. XI.)
1253 b 33 ʻ om. M1, erased by P1 (whether they are to be followed, is
certainly a matter for dispute):

1279 b 22 εὐμβαίνει P14:
1336 a 17 ψυχρῶν P1P1 (corr.):
1342 b 33 ʻ added by P1 and corr.1 of P2 (here conjecture is really out of
the question):

1290 a 1 ʻ om. and P24 (corr.):
1290 a 2 διειλόμεν P1 (corr.), διειλόμεθα P1, διειλόμην ceteri:
1291 b 32 ἐπερέχειν P14 Ar.:
1295 a 39 ʻ erased by corr. of P4, γρ. καὶ χωρίς τοῦ δὲ corr.3 in the margin
of P2 (this may be a conjecture):

1319 b 24 καὶ τὰ P1,5 and γρ. in the margin of P1:
1309 a 40 ἄρεσως P4 (corrector):
1316 a 38 ἀναξιλάου P14.

From this also is seen, in what a very restricted sense I assert, or am
entitled to assert, that the Vetusta translatio is "instar optimi codicis."
That the text is to be based upon it as far as it can be based upon anything,
I never once even dreamed of thinking (as the above remark in my first
dition shows) even at an earlier time, when I still overrated the worth of this
source of the text.

In the first book indeed Mr Newman has adopted the readings of Π1
only at

1252 b 28 (γὰν γὰρ Π1):
1253 a 7, 1254 a 15, 1255 b 27, 1256 b 13, 32, 1257 b 3,
1258 b 40 (Χαρητίδης Γ1),
1259 a 37 (mirabile dictu, even here not without some doubt),
1259 b 28 (δὲ Γ1 1st hand of P1),
1260 a 37 (ἀπα):

and at 1253 b 37 he remarks with justice: ὑποδεισθαί ΓΜ possibly rightly.

But though it is true, as he mentions, that 1253 a 2 ʻ is only added
before ἀπερχόμενος in MΠ1, yet it stands in all the manuscripts just below, at
line 7. The two similar passages in the Ethics (as I have remarked on p. 456)
also defend the article, which should therefore be adopted 1278 b 21 from
MΠ1; and all this makes for the article at 1253 a 32 also. Similarly
in B. 11. 1270 b 19 f. Mr Newman pronounces in favour of διὰ τὸν χυθ
MΠ1; but at 1323 b 29, as Mr Hicks reminded me, all manuscripts have διὰ
τῆς τὸν χυθ. Further on the strength of the well-known Aristotelian idiom
Mr Newman erases, 1255 a 35, the καὶ between εὐγενὲς and ἐλευθερον with
Π2; and at 1260 b 26 ʻ before τὸ with P255Σ89T8. In the latter case he is
right, in the former wrong: for this usage is restricted to enumerations
(after οἶνον, ὀσπερ especially, but also in other cases), and at 1316 b 15
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unless καί be inserted (which might easily have dropped out before καταστοκιζομένων) the explanation must be quite different, viz. ἀσωτευόμενοι καταστοκιζομένων mean “accumulating debts in consequence of their profligacy.” At 1252 a 9 Mr Newman himself wavers between admitting εἶναι or leaving it out: as however the latter is the more unusual, to me at least it seems the safer supposition that it is interpolated in Π². And while Mr Newman holds it to be almost indispensable 1257 b 7, I believe that on the contrary I have shown (Qu. crit. coll. p. 353 f.) it is quite out of place in that passage. Although Π¹ is more often wrong in omitting words which are found in Π², yet I hold that anyone with an appreciation of Aristotle’s mosaic style must unhesitatingly admit that 1252 b 19 f. he wrote ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ without συνῆλθον. To be sure nothing of this kind can be demonstrated. At 1252 b 14 I also have accepted ὄμοκάτων, but it still remains doubtful whether ὄμοκάτων be not right after all (see Addenda ad loc.). At 1253 b 27 τῶν οἰκονομικῶν (Π²) is defended by Newman by means of a subtle interpretation. But he should say where the apodosis begins. It is certainly upon mere conjecture that b 25 δὲ is omitted by P下载O]<U>L*. Ald., but one which is justified by the facts; for here the apodosis really begins (only it would be better to write δὲ): that being so, a rational sense can only be obtained by Rassow’s emendation, which I have accepted, and this admits only the reading of Π¹ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν. At 1254 a 10, whether it is more natural that ὅλως was explained by ἀπλῶς or conversely, every one may decide for himself. I hold the latter to be much more probable: still the Byzantine gloss-writers were unaccountable people. Why I hold, at 1254 b 23, λόγος (Π¹) to correspond better to the sense and grammar than λόγου (Π²), I have laid down Qu. crit. coll. p. 343, and Mr Newman says nothing about this. That at 1255 b 26 ὀφθαλμωτική and 1256 a 6 κερκιδωσωτική are the genuine Aristotelian forms is unmistakeably clear from the very materials collected by Mr Newman, and how anyone can prefer, 1256 b 8, the present δεδομένη to the perfect δεδομένη and conversely 1260 a 4 the perfect ψηφιγητα to the present ψηφιεῖται, I cannot comprehend. As to 1260 a 4 <ἀρχήνων καί> ἀρχομένων, see Addenda ad loc.

Leaving out of account the order of the words at 1253 a 7, 11, b 3, 7, 1256 b 26, 1259 b 30, 1260 b 24, there remain, besides 1252 b 15 (ὀμοκάτων or ὄμοκάτων), the following quite uncertain cases: 1252 b 2, 5, 14, 1253 a 1, 1254 b 18, 1255 b 24, 26, 1258 b 7, 1259 a 28, 1260 a 21, 31. Also 1256 b 1 κομίζονται and 1258 b 1 μεταβολικής (Π¹) may be corruptions of πορίζονται and μεταβολικής; yet it is much more natural to suppose that on the contrary the former unusual expressions were arbitrarily transformed into the latter which are continually used elsewhere. Π¹ is certainly wrong 15 times: 1252 a 5, 1253 a 25, b 25, 1255 a 5, 24, 32, 39, b 12, 1256 b 18, 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 26, 39, b 17; besides it is probably wrong 1254 b 14 (as I must now concede), 1255 b 24 (τάϊς), 1257 b 24. Π¹ is right 24 times: 1252 a 9, b 20, 28 (ῃδή Π²), 1253 a 7, b 27, 1254 a 15, b 23, 28, 1255 a 35, b 26, 27, 1256 a 6, b 8, 13, 32, 1257 b 3, 7, 1258 b 40 (Χαρρίδης Γ), 1259 a 37, b 28 (δὲ Γ 1st hand Π²), 1260 a 4 twice (ἀρχήνων καί Γ and
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τῆς ἄρα, 1260 a 37 (ἄρα), of which it is true 1252 b 28, 1258 b 40 and 1260 a 37 have no decisive importance here: but in return 1253 a 32, 1254 a 10, 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, and also perhaps 1253 b 37 (p. 463), should probably be added, to say nothing of 1260 b 20 (p. 462). On the other hand possibly the mistake at 1256 a 10 extends to Μ' as well as ΓΠ. The glosses which have crept in (1256 b 26) are of course not to be reckoned to the disadvantage of the original recension Π', either here or elsewhere.

The comparison tells far more strikingly in favour of Π' in the second book, not merely numerically, but by a series of quite unique variants, whereas the mistakes for the most part concern trifles and simple errata, as e.g. φιλίτις, three times (for which moreover the archetype of this family is perhaps not responsible, see Susem.1 p. XIV.), and the repeated φαλλεῖας. Each of these is properly reckoned once only in what follows, and the same with the right reading ἄνθρεια (ἄνθρεια). Apart from the order of the words 1265 a 37, b 15, 17, 32, 1267 a 38, 1268 a 11 f., 1271 a 19 f., 1273 b 36, 1274 a 17, b 6, an even approximate decision is impossible 1260 b 36, 1261 a 22, 1262 b 21, 1263 a 23, b 32, 1264 a 16, 21, b 26, 31, 1265 a 4, 12, b 19, 1266 a 23, b 3, 1268 a 6, 6 f., 17, b 5, 9, 17, 32, 1269 a 11, b 21, 28, 1272 b 15 f., 28, 1273 a 16, b 27, 32, 1274 b 8, 14: one feels inclined to decide in favour of Π' at 1261 a 22, b 21, 1269 b 21, but on the other hand in favour of Π' at 1263 a 23 (καὶ omitted), 1272 b 28, and 1269 a 11 Mr Newman himself describes with "possibly rightly," the reading of Π'. In the remaining 109 cases Π' has preserved the right reading, or the traces of it, 69 times: 1260 b 27 (see Addenda to 1260 b 20), 28, 41 (eiς ἐν τῆς Γ), 1261 a 15 twice, 27 (ἐλκύσει ΓΠ'), 1261 b 2 f. five times, b 4 (see Qu. crit. coll. p. 360 f.), b 5, 1262 a 3 twice, b 13 (at the least highly probable, see Newman's crit. n.), 33, 1263 a 12, 23 (ἐθεσον), b 7 (see Qu. crit. coll. p. 366 f.), 9, 11, 1265 a 33 f. four times, b 11 (ἄλλας ΓΜ'), 30, 1266 b 2 (Π'), 24, 31, 1267 a 35, 40, b 16, 23, 26, 35, 1268 a 3, 11, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 a 21, b 6, 1270 a 13 (ἀντιός ΓΠ'), 22, 1270 b 19 (p. 463), 32 (ἀντι affects only accent and breathing), 1271 a 15, 17, 20 (καὶ Γ), 37, 40, b 37, 1272 a 3, 29, b 8 f. twice, 36, 39, 1273 a 7, 9, b 1, 41, 1274 a 5, 19, 21 (at least probable), 25, 39, b 13. Π' has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times: 1261 a 18 (ἡ omitted by ΜΠ', probably wrongly, whether by Γ also, cannot be known), 35 (at least ΜΠ'), b 7 (ὡς, it may however be right), 19, 1262 a 30, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 1, b 3, 1265 a 30, 35, b 4, 21, 39 (at least ΜΠ'), 1266 a 20, 23, 37, 39 (φαλλέιας), b 6, 1267 b 40, 1268 a 26 (probably at least), b 16, 1269 a 6, b 26, 1270 a 20, 21 (at least ΜΠ'), 25, 27 (at least ΜΠ'), 34, 1270 b 12, 1271 a 27 (φιλίτις, cp. 1272 a 3, b 34), b 26, 28, 1272 a 1 (at least ΜΠ'), 35, 1273 a 9, 10, b 2, 3, 1274 a 4 (unless διάτρειον is here nearer to the true reading than διάτρειον, διάτρεια being the original).

To the latter cases Newman certainly adds 1260 b 27, 1261 a 27, b 4, 1263 a 12, 23, b 7, 9, 11, 1264 a 39, 1265 a 33 f., b 11, 30, 1267 a 40, b 26, 1268 a 3, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 b 6 (but Περαιβιος is the right orthography), 1270 b 19, 32, 1271 a 20 (but μὴ gives a wrong sense), b 37, 1272 b 9, 1273 b 41 (but was it not more obvious to change τὸ δικαστήρου into the more natural and simple τὰ δικαστήρια?), 1274 a 21: yet not without himself giving expression to his
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doubts in regard to 1261 a 27, 1265 b 11, 30, 1268 a 3, b 5, 1271 b 37, 1272 b 9, 39 occasionally with some warmth.

I must here content myself with a brief mention of most of these last mentioned passages and one or two besides.

1261 b 2 f. Although Mr Newman is bound to admit that here Π² presents attempts at emendation as arbitrary as they are worthless, and although it is clear that in this way ἐν τοῦτοις has arisen from τοῦτο, yet he seeks to save the former reading, because then τὸ before ἐν μέρει need not be changed into τῷ; but there is no need of this with the reading τοῦτο: see Susen. 4 crit. n. and Qu. crit. coll. p. 361.

1262 b 32. The omission of τοὺς φιλάκας in ΜΠ is doubtless an indication that the place of these words varied, and if the old translator renders them at the only possible place, I do not see why under these circumstances it should be improbable that he actually found them in his codex Γ at that place.

1263 a 23. For ἔθειεν Mr Newman himself cites the parallel passage 1263 b 39. I should think this would be sufficient for any unprejudiced person. As to 1263 a 28 ff. see the Addenda ad loc. If ἔκάστῳ προσεδρεύοντες (ΓΠ) is, as it seems, the true reading, this would make the 70th case in favour of Π¹.

1265 a 33 f. That frugality usually attends as a consequence upon a toilsome life, and liberality upon a life of luxury, is what only an unreflecting person, not Aristotle, would maintain: those who live luxuriously will soon find the means for liberality fail them. But the converse is perfectly true. Π¹ has therefore transmitted the right reading, and we must make up our minds to accept the excellent emendation of the sensible Koraes, without which this reading transmitted to us cannot be maintained.

1265 b 11. How improbable it is that in any of the existing states such regulations as those here proposed can have existed, a man so well informed as Mr Newman cannot fail to see. Nevertheless he admits πλείστας, not ἀλλαίς into the text.

1265 b 30. In case the reading πολυτελαίων were right, τὴν could scarcely be omitted before this word or before κοινωτάτην.

1267 b 25 f. With the reading κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ arises the absurdity, that ἐσθήτος εὔτελοὺς would depend not simply on πλήθει, but on κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ. Of this Mr Newman says nothing.

1268 a 3. Is καταδίκαζεν τὴν δίκην in the sense of "to decide the case against the accused" Greek at all, except in the formula ἔρήμην καταδικάζειν?

1268 b 21. Mr Newman's statement in the critical note, that ᾧδη is left out by Π¹ here, is erroneous: it was omitted only by Γ and Π¹ (1st hand). So too of his assertion, that 1271 a 15 I have taken τοῦτο (Π¹) not as neuter, but as masculine.

1272 b 8 f. In spite of all attempts to make sense of it, τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν is simple nonsense: and a man of Mr Newman's intelligence cannot in reality disguise this from himself. Hence he would willingly transpose
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τῶν δύνατῶν, with Π₁, to follow δοῦναι (line 9): but unfortunately this is not possible without the conjecture—an extraordinarily slight conjecture, it is true—of Koraes, αἱ ἑν (line 8) for ἐπαν. Now conjectures are once for all forbidden. There is nothing for it but to justify the order of the words in Π₂, as well, or rather as ill, as possible. Again, one might have imagined that δυνατῶν (Π₁) instead of δύνατῶν (Π²) was sufficiently defended by the fact that the Cretan constitution is declared to be δύνατεια μᾶλλον ἡ πολίτεια. Not so. Once for all, Π² is made out to be the better recension!

1272 b 39. Here in the first place Mr Newman is mistaken in saying that καθ’ αὐτό is not found in any manuscript: it is in the margin of Π¹, quite apart from the fact that beyond all doubt it was in Γ. He is exceedingly disposed to concede that it is most appropriate to the sense and the language. One might have imagined that given this most appropriate reading καθ’ αὐτό, a second κατ’ αὐτό (Π¹ and somewhat corrupted Μⁿ), and a third κατὰ τὸ αὐτό (Π²), the progress of the corruption from the first through the second to the third was at the same time given clearly enough. But it is all in vain. Again, once for all, Π² is made out to be the better recension!

1273 b 6. Here on the contrary Mr Newman has rightly restored to the text εὐπορίαν from Π² and Ο¹, in opposition to Bekker, myself, and the other editors.

I believe then that I exactly described the state of the case in relation to the recensions Π¹ and Π² when in my third edition p. v. I wrote: “haud raro hanc, saepius illam meliorem.” Now to return with a few words to the Vatican palimpsest. According to Heylbut’s account, which I have not correctly reported in the Jahrb. f. Philol. cxxv. p. 804 f., it is of the tenth century. Accordingly it furnishes a proof that even at that time, in which undoubtedly the sharp separation of these two recensions had already taken place, copies were nevertheless still made of older codices, which had arisen before this sharp separation, and thus still bore a mixed character, approximating in this case more to Π², but in the case of the codex used by Julian more to Π¹. If the two facts are viewed impartially side by side, no conclusion follows from them in favour of Π² any more than in favour of Π¹: on the contrary, the procedure which I have adopted is only justified anew. This and the confirmation of two conjectures, ἄστων 1278 a 34 and 1287 a 34 καὶ omitted, form the total net result of this new discovery. If the codex had been preserved entire, it is probable that other isolated conjectural emendations would have been confirmed: as it is, these two cases are enough to restrain us from an exaggerated mistrust of this means for the restoration of the text.

Mr Newman thinks it possible that William of Moerbeke employed several Greek manuscripts. I see no ground for doing so much honour to the care bestowed by the worthy monk; indeed what makes this assumption very improbable is simply that all these codices must have belonged to the class Π¹. However if this was the case, it can remain tolerably indifferent to us, for the fact remains still the same: the Vetusta translatio is the oldest representative of this family and (excepting the Vatican frag-
mements and the citations of Greek writers) the oldest source of the text anywhere.

I should have much besides to adduce on my side against Mr Newman, but I have no intention of entering on a controversy with him and would far sooner take this opportunity to recognize with gratitude, in spite of all our differences, the very great merits of his work, which contains much both good and new. In regard to I. c. 11 I agree with him: I would not guarantee that this chapter was written by Aristotle himself, but I very much doubt whether a valid proof can be adduced to show that this is not the case, or even that Aristotle inserted it in his work at a later date. In any case it is well known to be older than the so-called second book of the Oeconomics, which had its origin somewhere between 260 and 200 B.C. Susem.
1. The manuscripts of the seventh book of B. V. (VII) have been divided into two parts: a sketch of the historical survey of the polity, and a treatise on the constitution of the state. The sketch, which begins in cc. 4-12, is interrupted by the introduction of the constitution, which is discussed in cc. 13-14. The treatise, which begins in cc. 15-18, is completed at the end of the seventh book.

2. The sketch of the historical survey of the polity is divided into two parts: the first part, cc. 4-12, is a general outline of the development of the polity, while the second part, cc. 13-18, is a detailed description of the constitution of the state.

3. The treatise on the constitution of the state is divided into three parts: the first part, cc. 15-17, is a discussion of the theory of the state; the second part, cc. 18-20, is a description of the constitution of the state; and the third part, cc. 21-24, is a discussion of the practical application of the constitution.

4. The sketch of the historical survey of the polity is divided into two parts: the first part, cc. 4-12, is a general outline of the development of the polity, while the second part, cc. 13-18, is a detailed description of the constitution of the state.

5. The treatise on the constitution of the state is divided into three parts: the first part, cc. 15-17, is a discussion of the theory of the state; the second part, cc. 18-20, is a description of the constitution of the state; and the third part, cc. 21-24, is a discussion of the practical application of the constitution.

6. The sketch of the historical survey of the polity is divided into two parts: the first part, cc. 4-12, is a general outline of the development of the polity, while the second part, cc. 13-18, is a detailed description of the constitution of the state.

7. The treatise on the constitution of the state is divided into three parts: the first part, cc. 15-17, is a discussion of the theory of the state; the second part, cc. 18-20, is a description of the constitution of the state; and the third part, cc. 21-24, is a discussion of the practical application of the constitution.

8. The sketch of the historical survey of the polity is divided into two parts: the first part, cc. 4-12, is a general outline of the development of the polity, while the second part, cc. 13-18, is a detailed description of the constitution of the state.

9. The treatise on the constitution of the state is divided into three parts: the first part, cc. 15-17, is a discussion of the theory of the state; the second part, cc. 18-20, is a description of the constitution of the state; and the third part, cc. 21-24, is a discussion of the practical application of the constitution.

10. The sketch of the historical survey of the polity is divided into two parts: the first part, cc. 4-12, is a general outline of the development of the polity, while the second part, cc. 13-18, is a detailed description of the constitution of the state.

11. The treatise on the constitution of the state is divided into three parts: the first part, cc. 15-17, is a discussion of the theory of the state; the second part, cc. 18-20, is a description of the constitution of the state; and the third part, cc. 21-24, is a discussion of the practical application of the constitution.
liche Aufsätze II 'On a chapter of the Politics' (Vienna 1872; 52 pp.).

§ 1 1323 a 16 a retardátos βίος] See n. (653) with the passages there quoted. SUSEM. (685)

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν] i.e. the absolutely best constitution: see VI (IV). 1 § 3 πολλοῖσι γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τούτης ἰδιων ἀδι-
νατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατιάτην τε ἀπλοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δει λελι-
θέναι τὸν ὑσ ἀληθινὸς πολιτικῶν, and n. (1116). SUSEM. (686)

18 προστήκειν] 'We should expect the citizens who live under the best constitution possible to them (εκ τῶν ὑπο-
χόντων αὐτοῖς to be taken closely with ἀρίστα) to fare best,' i.e. to lead the most desirable life.

§ 2 21 κοινὴ ταῖς πόλεις, χωρίς ἑκάστως. 22 τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις] See Excursus I. to this book. SUSEM. (687)

23 καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς] 'It is clear from passages such as De Caelo 11. 13 § 18, 295 a 2 f. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων διώκειται πρῶτον ὁκα τὰν παροῦσαν δίναμαν εἶχον, ἥρμος ἐκαὶ ὑπάρχουσαν and Μελέτ. 111. 2 112, 372 b 10 f. ἐποτό δὲ περὶ τούτων ἡμῶν τε θεωρημένων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐξεκμένους: διὸ τὰ μὲν λέγομεν, τοῖς δὲ ὑπάρχοντι χρησ-
μεθά αὐτῶν, that this expression does not imply that an exposition given elsewhere is to be borrowed or reproduced, but that the results of some other discussion will be employed and utilized. Those who remember the tolerably frequent use of the verb χρήσθη by Herodotos e.g. in 11. 120 τις τοῖς ἐπιστολοῖς χρεώμενον λέγει, corresponding to Thucydidès 1.

10 § 3 τὴν Ὀμήρου αὐτοῦ προΐσης εἰ τι χρή

καταβαίνει ποιιτείων, will hardly raise any objection to our taking the word, used here and in Nic. Eth. 1. 13 § 9, 1102 a 27 in connexion with the ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι, but not as confined to them, in the sense of the phrase in Nic. Eth. VI. 4 § 2, 1140 a 2, πιστεύουμε δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. It is plain that this expression does not in any way show whether the discussion referred to is Aristotle's own or belongs to some one else, nor to what degree or extent it is utilized? (Vahlen). SUSEM. (688)

§ 3 24 πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἄν'] The appeal to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι in this passage and in § 5 (see n. 694) thus amounts (in effect at any rate) to an appeal to public opinion, to what was at the time conceded by all, or at least by all cultivated and intelligent men. We should also notice how, as III. 12 § 1, the strictly scientific (philosophical) distinctions and discussions are opposed (1) to opinion universally current, and on the other hand, (2) if not by Aristotle himself at least by his pupil Endemos (see n. 584), to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι; and it is hardly possible to regard the latter as anything else but the expression of that universal opinion. Bernays sees in these words an ironical excuse on Aristotles's part in reply to the charge which was no doubt often levelled at him, of use less logical hair-splitting, when he thus expresses the hope that he may be allowed to make one division at least without opposition. But Vahlen rightly urges against this view that, in spite of the announcement of at least this one division, the emphasis is not
25 [οἷς] Oncken wrongly || 26 τῶν omitted by Π5 Ἐν Vb Ald. and Π4 (1st hand) || 27 χρή omitted by Π5 II (added in the margin of Π4): δὲ Vettori Bk. || 29 [μηδὲ φρονήσεως] Susem.; see on a 32 || 30 τῶν Koraes, [τοῖον φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ πιεῖν], Bernays, perhaps rightly. Yet see Vahlen Arist. Antiscisse ii. p. 11 (9) ff. || τοῦ before πιεω omitted by Π2 Πο Bk. || 31 πιεῶν P1 and M1 (1st hand) || 32 [φιλον] Koraes Bk.2 τὴν διάνοιαν is omitted by M* (which has a lacuna of 4 or 5 letters) and apparently by Π; quae circa prudence sc habent, neque enim beatificant William, doubtless from a gloss. Hence όμοιος δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔχει, οὐδὲ γὰρ μακαρίζουσιν Susem.1,2 wrongly

laid on the division, but on the inference drawn from it; just because there are three kinds of goods, he who is to be happy cannot entirely dispense with any of the three. But I do not perceive why this thought ought properly to have been elaborated for all three kinds of goods, as Vahlen supposes; at any rate with the form of ‘argumentation ad hominem’ here chosen, proceeding from premises universally conceded, where all that was required was to prove the superior claim of intellectual goods, which was alone in dispute. Besides the request that he might be allowed just this one division’ would appear very strange in connexion with this division of goods. For, except perhaps the comprehensive term “external goods,” it is not at all peculiar to Aristotle; and he repeats it elsewhere, e.g. Nic. Eth. 1. 8 § 2, 1908 b 12 ff., Khet. 1. 5 § 4, 1360 b 25 ff., and often mentions it in passing as something well known and perfectly certain, without a word of justification or approval. Susem. (689)

25 μερίδων] Even though it is plain to everybody that the subject is “goods,” yet it is strange that no express mention of the term occurs either here (where it would be very appropriate instead of the word chosen, μερίδων) or in what precedes. Susem. (690)

§ 4 28 σωφροσύνης] Comp. n. (206 b). Susem. (691)

These are the four Platonic virtues, which Aristotle substantially retained as the basis of his more extended list.

29 δεδιϑτα...30 μνίας] This hyperbolical description, according to Bernays, also points to the passage having been transferred from some dialogue. But an extravagant and drastic picture of the kind is by no means rare in Aristotle. See Nic. Eth. 1. 7 § 16, 1908 a 18 μία γὰρ χειλίδων έστι οὖν ποιητή, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα, “οὖτοι δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριοι καὶ εὐδαιμονία μημε, οὐδὲ δίλογοι χρῶσι: 10 § 14, 1101 a 8 Ἀν Ἰταλικοι τόχαι περιτόθην: VII. 5 § 6, 1149 a 8 δεδεμέναι πάντα καὶ φωνησά τούς: Χ. 8 § 7, 1178 b 10 πράξεις δὲ ποιάς ἀποκειμέναι χρεών αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς θεοῖς) κτλ...b 19 οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθευδεῖν ὡσπέρ τὸν Ἐνθυμιωσά: 8 § 10, 1179 a 4 διόκων δὲ καὶ μή ἄρχοντα γης καὶ χαλάττες πράττειν τὰ καλὰ: Poet. 7 § 4, 1451 a 2 εἰ μιράν σταδίον ἐκ βαρίν, 6 7 εκατόν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεται: Khet. 11. 12 § 8, 1389 a 23 f. τοῖς δὲ νεοῖς τὸ μέν μελῶν πολύ τὸ δὲ παρελθυμένος τραχύ, τὴν γὰρ πώς τοπᾶται ἡμέρα. μεμνησθέντι μὲν οὖν ὄν περι τε, ἐλεητέον δὲ πάντα (Vahlen). Susem. (692)

30 For τοῦ with the infinitive after ἐπιθυμεῖν see Xenophon Memor. 1. 7 § 3; iii. 6 § 16; ὄσκον, 14 § 9. For τὸ πιεῖν as a substantive Plato Kph. 11. v. 439 b τοῦ διψώτατος καὶ ἀγρότου ὡσπέρ ὅμοιον ἔστι τὸ πιεῖν, and Xenophon. Hymn 1 § 30 (Vahlen).

32 τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν] Here too φρόνησις, the virtue of the practical intellect, stands in contrast to the moral vir-
34 ὠσπερ] οὕτω before λεγόμενα Ἰντ, [ὦσπερ] Scaliger who is followed by Spengel, ἀπλῶς Bernays, <ἀπλῶς>· ὠσπερ ? Susem., a conjecture which I hold to be probable even after Vahlen's defence of the text p. 14 (16). Nevertheless I concede to Vahlen that the transposition ὠσπερ λεγόμενα ἀπαντεῖ would also make good sense. Other suggestions in my critical edition: ὠσπερ Schneider, ὃς εἰσίν Kopares 36 εἶναι omitted by Ἰντ Bb Vb Ald. and Ἰντ (1st hand) [37 [καὶ] χρημάτων Bernays, wrongly Ἰντ 40 λαμβάνεις Lambin, διαλαμβάνεις Ἰντ p Ἰντ Ar. Bk.1, διαβαίνεις Ἰντ]

tues; cp. l. 13 § 8, III. 4 §§ 7, 8, 18, 11 § 2, § 6 and §§ 10, 11 below with m. (40, 45, 112, 115, 474—476, 498, 565, 703). Sus-
sem. (693)
§ 5. 34 ὠσπερ πάντες] "Almost all would allow, when stated," Comp. n. (689). Susem. (694) ὠσπερ πάντες: ὃς εἰσίν πάντες ὡσπερ οὖσίν: ὃς εἰσίν οὖσίν. Vahlen compares Krit. l. 6 § 24, 1363 a 11, ὠσπερ γάρ πάντες ἡγεῖ ὁμολογοῦσιν = for this is now as good as an universal admission (Cope): and with the idiomatic use of the participle Pluto ἔστησος. 199 b τάληθη λέγομεν ἄκοινει, Prolag. 311 ε, τι ἀναμ ἄλλο γε λέγομεν περὶ Πρωτα-
γόρου ἄκοιμεν; and the Herodotean χαῖρε ἅπαντα Ἦκοισαν.
35 διαφέρονται] Men differ as to how much each kind of goods they should have, and to which of the three the supe-
riority is due. The view of the multitude is that ever so small a measure of goods intellec-
tual suffices, but the possession of goods external should be increased with-
out end.
37 Cp. 1 9, 10, 127 b 7 πλοῦτω καὶ (that is) χρημάτων (Vahlen), Ἰντ 38 ἐκ τοῦ ἅγιου τῆς ὑπερβολῆς] Cp. l. 8 § 14 f, 9 § 13 ff. with m. (76 b, 90). Susem. (695)
§ 6 ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτῶς ἐρωτοῦμεν Here again Bernays finds a reminiscence of some dialogue. See on the other hand c. 3 § 1 n. (733), VI (IV). 2, 3, 1289 b 9 [add II. 9, 12, 1270 a 10], De Anim. l. 3
§ 10, 406 b 22 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐρωτοῦμεν; Metab. l. III. 5 § 19, 1013 a 15 f. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν τῶν Λόγων ἐρωτοῦμεν (cp. § 6, 1009 a 30), Post Anal. l. 3 § 23 f, 72 b 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φασίν (Vahlen). Sus-
sem. (696)
39 διὰ τῶν έρων] To convince one-
self by means of the facts. Like ἑπωνύμαι, φανοῦμεν, συμβεβηκόμενοι we find ἑργα and πράγματα used for 'facts' as distinguished from λόγον, 'theories.' See c. 4 § 7, 1326 a 22, § 12, 1326 b 12: B. II. c. 8 § 19, 1268 b 39, c. 9 § 16; also c. 3 § 8, 1262 a 17 (λαμβάνεις τὰ πίστεις). Ἰντ
40 ὥσπερ] ὥσπερ κτῶντα κτλ] Cp. l. 9 § 35 with n. (346 b) and c. 15 § 6 n. (928) below. Susem. (697)
1323 b 1 εἰτ' ἐν τῷ ... ἐτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖνι Bernays argues that to leave several pos-
sibilities open in this way is another indi-
cation that we have something borrowed from a dialogue. But if we presuppose Aristotle's own view of happiness, there is no further need of this argument, or rather it becomes useless. "Opponents however are most effectively met by a proof of the untenableness of their opin-
ions drawn from their own point of view, or the concession of their own as-
sumptions. The conceptions of happiness here brought together in the form of alter-
natives, all of which alike make the goods of the mind its more important elements, occur elsewhere, e.g. Nic. Eth. VII. 11 § 2, 1152 b 6 ff. (yet it is doubtful if this part of the Ethis is Aristotelian); cp. 13
tois ἀνθρώπως εἰτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ (I) ἰδος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένους εἰς ὑπερβολήν, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἕξω κτήσιν τῶν ἁγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, ἦ τοῖς ἔκεινα μὲν κεκτήμενοι πλείω τῶν χρήσιμον, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐκλείπουσιν οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τῶν λόγων σκοπούμενοι τὶ εὐσύνοπτον ἐστίν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὡσπερ ὀργανόν τι (πάν γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐστιν, ὅν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἢ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαίον ἢ μηδὲν ὥρθος εἶναι αὐτοῦ τοῖς 10 ἔχουσι) τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν ἔκαστον ἁγαθῶν, ὃσῳ περ ἀν ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσοῦτοι μᾶλλον χρήσιμον [εἰναὶ], εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτοι ἐπιλέγεσθαι μοι μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον.

§ 8 ὅλως τε δὲν ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρί-

1323 b 6 ἀλλὰ omitted by Μ', by Π (1st hand), and possibly by Γ 8 γὰρ Susem., ὡς ΠΠ Ar. Bk. Susem. ἐν the text and Bernays, who alters πάν into πέρας, wrongly χρήσιμον ἐστὶν Vahlen, perhaps rightly: <χρήσιμον τοῖς ἔχει πέρας εἰς ὡς χρήσιμον ἐστίν (or something similar) Susem. Both probable corrections, the one is no easier than the other ως ὥστε Bernays, and so (or perhaps ως τὸν αὐτόν) Ar. cp. William, αὐτῶν perhaps Γ; ως αὐτῶν Susem.1, but see Vahlen p. 21 (23) 9 αὐτῶν omitted by ΠΠ Ar., [αὐτῶν] Susem.1 with Koraes, αὐτῆς Oncken, quite needlessly, but not (as Vahlen thinks) less correctly 11 χρήσιμον μᾶλλον ΠΠ Sb εἰναὶ Schneider Bk.1, ἐστιν? Spengel, <χρή> χρήσιμον Bernays. I am not convinced by Vahlen's defence p. 23 (25)


§ 7 7 τά μὲν γὰρ... ὄργανον τι] Cp. 1. 8 § 15, 9 § 13 with nn. (76 b, 90), also De Anima 3. 8 § 12, 407 a 23 ff., τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοησών ἐστὶ πέρατα, πάθαι γὰρ ἐπεράτων χάραν, Metaph.11 (a). 2 § 1, 994 b 13 ff. [yet this is a spurious book]. Nic. Eth. vii. 13 § 4, 1153 b 24 ff. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ εἶδομαίον ὁ δρος αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς εὐνοίας] (Vahlen). SUSEM. (700)

§ 8 πάν γὰρ κτλ] The sense required is what ever is useful is useful up to a certain point or, has a limit to its utility, to exceed which must necessarily either do harm or confer no benefit upon its possessor. Vahlen supposes a participial clause to have been replaced by the words ὅτι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. The simplest draft of the sentence would be τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας...ἀ ὑπερβάλλων (i.e. ἀν ὑπερβάλλῃ) ἢ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαίον ἢ μηδὲν ὥρθος τοὺς ἔχουσαν. Then by a familiar idiom the second alternative is replaced by ἢ μηδὲν ὥρθος εἶναι αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ἐκτῶν). The sentence thus becomes somewhat unsymmetrical in form, because τὴν ὑπερβολήν, though it goes well enough with βλαπτείν, is less suitable as the subject of μηδὲν ὥρθελ. 11 καὶ τούτους ἐπιλέγειν] to predi-

§ 8 13 ὅλως τε δὲν οὐδέν... διαθέσεις] Further, as a general rule it is clear that the relative superiority of the best condition of one thing [as compared with that of another] will be said to be measured by the difference existing between the things of which these are said to be in themselves the best conditions. Comp. Rhet. 1. 7 § 4, 1363 b 21 ff. (Congreve), § 18, 1364 a 37 ff. καὶ ὥς ἦν ὑπεροχὴ αἱρετωτέρα ἡ καλλίω...καὶ ἀν-
στην ἐκάστου πρώγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, (I)

15 ἡνπερ εἰληχε διάστασιν ὅν φαμεν εἶναι αὐτὰς ταῦτας δια-

θέσεις. ὡστ' εἴπερ ἑστίν ἡ ψυχὴ τιμωτέρων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως

καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἄπλως καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνυγχή καὶ τὴν διὰ-

15 εἴληφη Πκ1. (emended by corr. of Πκ2) διάστασιν Αρ. (apparently) and Γ, 

but before ἡνπερ: [διάστασιν] Bojesen, ἡπερ διάστασιν ὃς Bernays, wrongly, ἡπερ...δια-

στάσει; Vahlen needlessly: see Comm. αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταῦτας Πκ2 Πκ Bk, 

avoiding hiatus... ταῦτας) toiautás Bernays, perhaps rightly, but not necessary: see 

Comm. 16 τιμωτέρων transposed to come after 17 σώματος in Πκ2 Πκ Bk, τιμωτέ-

ρων Μ, prefessor William

tικευμένων δὲ τῶν βελτίων αἱ ἑπερβαλλεῖ 

βελτίων καὶ καλλιόνων καλλίων. Sol. e. c. § 4, 

καὶ ἔνω τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπέρεχη, καὶ 

αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ [ὑπάν τὰ αὐτών, καὶ 

τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου: Πορ. III. 38 § 4, 119 b 4 ff. ἦν ἑπερβάλλη 

τῆς ἑπερβάλλη ἀφε-

ωτέρα, καὶ αὐτῷ ἀφετεροῦν (Vahlen); Β 2 

§ 9, 117 b 33 ff. εἰ ἄπλως τοῦτο τοῦτον βελτίων, καὶ τὸ βελτίστον τῶν ἐν τούτῳ βελ-

τίων τῶν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ βελτίστω (Bernays). 

Even in this unmistakeable and express 

development of the logical formula' 

Bernays discovers a proof of quotation 

from a dialogue. See n. (703). 

SUSEM. (701)

14 A parallel to πρὸς ἄλληλα after 

ἐκάστου is Plut. 23 § 2, ὃν ἑκάστων ὡς 

ἐνυχθεῖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. Comp. ἄλληλων 

after ἐκάστων Pl. Phaedo 97a, Leschines 1. 137, after μηθέναι Ar. Lysistr. 49. Take 

cata τὴν ὑπεροχήν with what immediately precedes: the best condition of two things 

'compared in point of superiority.' i.e. as 

judged by the superiority of the one 

relatively to the other. All this forms 

the subject of ἄκολουθων. 'What is the 

object? Either τῇ διάστασιν, or κατὰ τὴν 

diáστασιν (for which cp. e. c. 14 § 1, 1332 b 15), ἡπερ κτλ. 

Normally one would expect 

this to be changed by attraction of the 

relative into ἡπερ εἰληχε διάστασιν (or 

καθ' ἡπερ εἰλ. διάστασιν). Instead of 

this, the antecedent is absorbed into 

the relative sentence and assimilated to 

its construction ἡπερ εἰληχε διάστασιν. Such 

absorption and assimilation may be 

seen in VII (IV). 4, 8, 1290 b 28, 5, 2, 1292 b 8, 

12, 2, 1292 b 20, possibly (see n. ad loc.) 

1, 8, 13, 1256 b 29. A good example is 

Pl. Lec. 400 d εὐθεῖα ἄκολουθε, φῶς ἡν 

άνοιαν ὀνὰν ὑποκριζομένοι καλόμες ὡς 

εὐθεῖας, ἀλλά την ἡν ἀληθῶς...Διάνοια 

where the construction of the relative 

sentence invades the resumed principal 

sentence. See 1323 b 34, 1324 b 13. The 

periphrasis of ἔχει c. accus. for a verb is 

sometimes varied. Here εἰληχεναι διά-

στασιν = διασταίναι as Pl. Tim. 38 b, Plol. 

288 Ε ἄνεμον εἰληχεται = ὑποκριζ, Phil. 

49 c γελοιον εἰληχε ταῦτας = γελοῖ σατ. 

In its simplest form the proposition states 

that the ὑπεροχή of the best condition of 

two things compared corresponds to the 

διάστασιν between the things. The 

best state of A : the best state of B :: A : B. 

Allow the soul's superiority, and you 

must allow the superiority of ἄρητη and 

φρόνησις its best states. (Vahlen.) 

15 διάστασιν] The order of the words in 

Γ (distantia quam quidem sortitae est 

quantum dicimus esse ipsum has Will.) 

may suggest that διάστασιν was originally a 

variant of ὑπεροχήν, and to be bracketed 

(Bojesen, followed by Spengel and Madvig 

who also proposed < καθι = διάστασιν). 

But Vahlen pp. 28—34 (30—39) has 

shown that διάστασιν is all but indi-pens-

able for the sense, and himself admits 

that it is not necessary to alter to ἡπερ... 

diástasis. Schneider, who first felt a 

difficulty, proposed violent changes ἐκ 

πράγματος κατὰ τὴν διάστασιν ἡνπερ 

εἰληχε πρὸς ἄλληλα τῇ ὑπεροχή ὃς 

φαινεν κτλ. SUSEM. 

αὐτὰς ταῦτας] Vahlen shows that this 

is an instance of the idiomatic attraction 

of a pronominal subject (here a demonstrative, often a relative) into the number 

and gender of the predicate. In Plato 

Phil. 57 ε ταῦτα ὃν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμα 

ἀκριβεῖς μαλαστ ἐναι = this is what we 

especially mean by the exact sciences. 

So here: 'the things whereof we say that 

just this and that are the attributes' 

becomes, not ὃν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, but ὃν 

αὐτὰς ταῦτα φαινεὶ διαθέσεις. 

17 καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν] Both 

absolutely and relatively to us. See N. Eth. 

1, 4, 5, 1059 b 2 : Bonitz Ind. Ar. 77 a 

21 ff. where τινι, ἐκάστῳ, πρὸς τινα, πρὸς τι 

are cited as similarly contrasted with 

ἀπλῶς. So III. 9, 3, 1280 a 21, μέχρι τινος.
18 Take τούτων after ἕκαστον. For the use of ἀνάλογον ἄχεων absolutely cp. *Π. 10* § 4, 1271 b 41, 11 § 3, 1272 b 37.

§ 9 Take ϑεσιν τῶν ἀρίστην ἕκαστον ἀνάλογον τούτων ἄχειν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ (I) τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεκεν αἱρέτα πέφυκε ταῦτα καὶ δεὶ πάντας αἱρέτας οὐκ οὐκ ἐκείνων ἐνεκεν τῆς ψυχῆν.

§ 10 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβίβαζει τοσοῦτον ἀριθμὸν περ ἀρέτης καὶ φρονίμησιν καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συναρμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμε-
and consequently that man, too, cannot find his principal happiness in external goods. On the other hand the notion that man also may be able to dispense entirely with external goods and yet attain happiness is completely excluded by the whole previous course of the argument, which began with admitting each and all of the three kinds of goods to be necessary for human happiness (see n. 689) and endeavoured to determine the relative importance of external and internal goods (Vahlen).

SUSEM. (705)

For this N. E. x. 8. 9, 1179 a 2, may be quoted, e1 μὴ ενδεχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι: cp. 1. 10. 10, 1101 a 19.


SUSEM. (706)

Add Phys. 11. 6 § 1, 197 b 3 σημειών δ’ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἦντο ταύτιν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἡ ἐντυχία ἡ ἕγγυς, ἢ δ’ εὐδαιμονία πραξίς τις ἑπταρχία γὰρ.

29 ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὔδε διὰ τὴν τύχην] Cp. Phys. 11. 6 § 4, 197 b 18 ff. ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸς ἐνέκα τοῦ γυμνούς, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἐνέκα γίνεται οὐ ἔξω τοῦ αἰτίου, τότε ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου λέγειν ἀπὸ τύχης δὲ τούτων διὰ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεται τῶν προαιρέτων τοῖς ἔχονι προαιρέσεις: "Hence it is clear that of events, which in themselves answer a purpose, we call anything not done by design a spontaneous occurrence; whilst all such spontaneous occurrences which happen in the region of purpose and to beings possessed of purpose are said to be by chance" (Eaton).

SUSEM. (707)


§ 11 ἔχομενον δ’ ἔστι κτά] Next there follows, without need for fresh arguments, the inference to the happiness and welfare of the best state. For welfare is impossible apart from well-doing. A literal version would be: closely connected and dependent upon the same arguments is the proof that the best state, too, is happy and fares well [like the best man]. It need hardly be insisted that 30 εὐδαιμόνα 31 πράττουσας καλῶς are predicates of which τὴν ἁρέστην πολὺν is the subject.

30 τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] Although this makes the essential identity of happiness in the individual and the state rest on no other grounds than those already adduced, we nevertheless get a new proof that human happiness consists mainly in virtue, and we are told (§ 12) that this applies to the state precisely in the same way as to the individual. This supplementary proof is certainly very incomplete. All human thought is largely conditioned and fettered by the language of a nation. Thus among the Greeks the verb πράττειν has (1) the transitive meaning ‘to do = to perform certain acts,’ line 32 ῥα καλά πράττουσα, (2) the intransitive meaning ‘to do = to be (in a certain state),’ as e.g. in this present connexion καλῶς πράττειν = to be doing (or faring) well, to be in a prosperous state. Hence it became easy to make the mistake of directly inferring the second meaning from the first, where we of course see only a dialectical play upon words. We do not however draw Bernays’ conclusion that Aristotle would
not have allowed himself this licence except in a dialogue. Had he looked upon it as a mere play upon words, he certainly would not have admitted it into a dialogue either; most certainly he would not have transcribed it from a dialogue into the present work. As a matter of fact not only has Plato committed the same mistake in all scientific seriousness, "Gorg. 507 c [Rep. 353 F], but it is also to be found in c. 3, §§ 1, 8 (cp. nn. 732, 744) and III. 9 § 14 (cp. n. 560 b), and similarly in "Nic. Eth. 1. 8 § 4, 1098 b 20 ff., though Bernays vainly attempts to disprove the last case (Vahlen). But Spengel is right in thinking it strange that the question disposed of in § 11 is in c. 2 §§ 1, 2 spoken of as still requiring to be settled and is accordingly there settled. This difficulty disappears so soon as we set the two paragraphs side by side as distinct versions of the same subject, and with it another difficulty raised by Hildbrand p. 368 ff., on which Spengel "Arist. Stud. 11. p. 73 (565) ff. has laid far more stress than it deserves. Hildbrand's view is that in III. 18 the question, whether the virtue or the happiness of the individual and of the state is identical or not, is brought forward as having already been settled by III. cc. 5, 6 (cp. nn. 471, 684), whereas in IV(VII). 1 § 11, 2 § 1, the question is first submitted to investigation, and that therefore III. c. 18 is a draft from Aristotle's pen which he afterwards discarded. The error in this conclusion lurks (as Böcker observes) in the words 'virtue or happiness'; for the latter term as used by Aristotle is not coincident with the former, but requires in addition a certain measure of external goods. The proof that the virtue of the state is identical with that of the individual does not therefore by itself in any way demonstrate the identity of their happiness [or wellbeing]. In any case, if we take the one version, that contained in c. 1. § 11, there is no escape from the difficulty that the previous inquiry as to the identity of the virtue of both is also ignored. But if we replace it by the second version, c. 2 §§ 1, 2, there would be nothing to prevent Aristotle expressing himself as he does, even with the distinct presupposition of the earlier inquiry (cc. III. 5, 6) and the reference to it in III. c. 18 § 2. As to the identity of the 'virtue or excellence' manifested by the state and by the individual cp. also c. 13 §§ 9, 10 and VIII(V). 9 § 12 with n. (1642). SUSEM (708) § 12.33 Observe that this is the postulate of Plato in the Republic, made implicitly II. 368 E and reasserted expressly IV. 435 B, 442 D ff. On δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, terms cognate to ἔλεος, λόγος, φάσις, cp. Bonitz "Ind. Ar. 206 b 12, and n. on 1. 4. 6, 1254 a 14. Apparently the antecedent of ἕ, if expressed, would be τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ φρονήσει: see on 1323 b 15.

§ 13.39 ἐτέρας...σχολῆς] For this forms the task of another study, a lecture of another kind. Here only in this sense,
40 λῆς ταῦτα νῦν δὲ ύποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἀριστος, καὶ (I) χωρὶς ἐκάστου καὶ κοινῆ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετ' ἄρετῆς κεχο—

1324 a ἑργημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἄρετὴν πρά—

§ 14 ξέων, πρὸς δὲ τῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐὰν αντανακ ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, διασκεπτέων ὑπέρτον, εἰ τις τοὺς εἰρήμνοις τυγχά—

2 νει μὴ πειθόμενοι: || πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν II 5 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἡ μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς, λοιπὸν ἔστιν εἰσεῖν. φα—

νερὸν δὲ καὶ τούτο. πάντες γὰρ ἀν ὠμολογήσειαν εἰ—

§ 2 να τῆς αὐτῆς. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλοῦτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὐ τίθεν—

ταί ἐφ' ἐνός, οὕτω καὶ τῇ πόλιν ὄλην, ἐὰν ἡ πλουσία,

10 μακαρίζουσιν ὁσοι τε τῶν τυραννικῶν βίων μάλιστα τυ—

μόσιιν, οὕτω καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἀρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστά—

τὴν εἶναι φαίεν ἂν· εἰ τε τίς τῶν ἔνα δὲ ἄρετὴν ἀποδέχεται,

§ 3 καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φίσει τὴν σπουδαιότέραν. || [ἄλλα 2]

40 καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστου omitted by P⁴ V⁴ Ald. and the first hand of P⁸ S⁷ (added in the margin of S⁷ by the same hand, in the margin of P⁸ by a later hand and again expunged) || 41 ἐκάστῳ P⁸ Ar. (?) Bk. and apparently a later hand in the margin of P³ || κεχορηγημένος P³⁴⁶ L⁶ Ald.

1324 a 4 πότερον...13 σπουδαίοτέραν a duplicate of 1323 b 29—36. See p. 86

10 μακαρίζουσιν ουκ μακαρίωσιν Ar. Spengel || 12 ἄν before εἰαν II² Bk. and P⁸ (in the margin, omitted by the 1st hand) || 13 [ἄλλα...1325 b 34 πότερον] Susem.²²

Lat. disciplina, course of study or instruction: in all other passages of Aristotle σχολή = leisure. What is meant is of course ethical science or instruction, which is itself, according to Aristotle, only a portion of politics in the wider sense, ἡ μὲν ὧν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφέσται, πολιτική τις οὖσα, Nic. Eth. 1. 2 § 9, 1094 b 11; see Introd. pp. 67, 70 f. As there was a work of Theophrastos called ἡδικαὶ σχολαὶ (Diog. Laert. v. 47) Krohn op. c. p. 37 ff. finds in this an indication that we have here a passage from his lectures, and not from Aristotle’s. But his view requires some stronger proofs. Susem. (709) “That σχολή was the recognized term for lecture in the time of Plato is shown by the sarcasm of Diogenes the Cynic τίν οὖν Ἑυκλείδου σχολὴν ἐλευχ ὄλνη, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβήν, κατα—

τριβήν, Diog. Laert. v. i. 42: cf. also Cic. Tusc. Disput. 1. §§ 7, 8, ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus..., itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in toto libros contuli” (Ridgeway). But the witticisms attributed to Diogenes need very careful sifting be—

fore they can pass as historical (Susemhl).

41 ὁ μετ' ἄρετῆς...1324 a 1 πρᾶ—

ευν] Here also, as well as in § 10, what is said in μ. (704) is applicable. Cp. also μ. (736). Susem. (710)

1324 a 3 διασκεπτέων ὑπέρτον] Spengel rightly observes, Über die Pol. p. 46, that this is not the way in which Aristotle usually speaks. But the mode of expression is very like that of a lecturer who invites his hearers to mention, and discuss with him afterwards, any difficulties they may still have. Cp. Excursus i. Susem. (711)

c. 2 § 2 9 ἐφ' ἐνός] Cp. Plato Theaet. 157 α ἐπὶ ἐνός νοῦς. c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1 (τεθεώρηται πρῶτε—

rov) A subsidiary question: is the virtuous life, which is most desirable, a life of active participation in civic duties, or a life of study and philosophic retirement? A life of war and external conquest, or of peaceable rule over freemen and of internal activity?

§ 3 13 ἄλλα ταῦτα ἡδίν δόο] The close
taur' ἰηδὺ δύο ἐστὶν ἢ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἐν μὲν πότερος αἴρε- (II) 15 τότερος βίος, ὁ δὲ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πό-
λεως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξεικός καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπο-
λευμένος, ἐπὶ δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν θετέων καὶ ποιῶν διάθεσιν
πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἰτε πάσιν οὕτως αἴρετον κοινωνεῖν πόλεως
§ 4 εἰτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς
20 διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' ὁ τὸ περὶ ἐκαστὸν
αἴρετον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην νῦν προφημεθα την σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο
μὲν ἰν ([γαρ]) πάρεργον ἀν εὕη τούτο δ' ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.
§ 5 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄναγκαιον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην 3

See Comm. nn. 712—717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—9 || 14 πότερον
Γ Μ σ (2) Π Σ Λ' Αρ. (Μ' has πῦ) || 18 αἴρετον <τοῦ> Κορας || 23 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπεὶ διὰ
Μ', το δὲ περαστὸν is a gloss of π² in the margin; γαρ Spengel, quite wrongly || 21 νῦν after προφήμεθα II Πβ. || 22 γαρ omitted by ΓΠ46 Ι' Βκ., rightly

sequence of cc. 2, 3 upon c. 1 leaves us only two alternatives: either cc. 2, 3 have exactly the same origin as c. 1, although in no way distinguished by the same excellences of style, or else the editor who inserted c. 1 has further added to it from his own materials cc. 2, 3, except of course c. 2 §§ 1, 2 (see n. 708). Even setting aside the difference of style, the second alternative is forced upon us by the numerous difficulties, some slight, others very considerable, which present themselves in this section, see nn. (713—
717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—749), with which the few points in c. 1 and c. 2 §§ 1, 2 that might raise doubts as to the genuineness of that portion (see nn. 699, 709, 711) should be more closely compared. Read Ed. Müller’s exhaustive examination in his History of the theory of art among the ancients 11. pp. 366—373, Breslau, 1837, a work universally neglected, which ought to have led subsequent inquirers to a renewed consideration of these chapters. What a deal of pains he takes to remove the difficulties in them, and all in vain. Although my view differs considerably from his, in many respects it is most intimately connected with his exposition. This is not the place to enter into a more detailed examination of his argument, but see n. (743). Only one difficulty is common to the two portions c. 1 (with c. 2 §§ 1, 2) and c. 2 §§ 3—c. 4 §§ 1: viz. that later on in c. 3 §§ 3, 4 the inquiry of c. 1, and so too a little further on in c. 13 § 8 ff. the inquiry pursued in cc. 2,
3, though in a slightly altered form, is commenced over again, in each case without the slightest sign that they have been already adequately discussed, whereas the interpolator does not fail to refer to anticipation this later section, c. 3 §§ 1 (cp. n. 731). 

SUSEM. (712) 14 ἐν μὲν—22 μεθὸδου ταύτης] The transition to the best constitution took place as far back as III. c. 18, and in IV (VII). 1 it was stated that we must first examine the best life; now after having concluded this examination and after having stated that the result holds good for the state as well as for the individual, it seems very awkward to say that there are two questions requiring to be investigated, (1) whether the best life for the individual is one of scientific leisure or of political activity, and (2) which is the best constitution. The first question is violently thrust in, and, as it stands, cannot properly be allowed to take even a secondary rank as a question of politics, which the author at once declares is all that he himself claims for it; it has nothing whatever to do with the science of politics, as Schlosser long since observed. It would be a different thing if it were preceded by, and then taken up and treated as co-ordinate to, the inquiry whether the end of the state is peaceful activity or war, which in § 5 is treated as a co-ordinate question. 

SUSEM. (713) § 5 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . φανερόν ἐστιν] It is plain then that the [absolutely] best polity is that system under which any one of the citizens whatever would fare
24 ἃς Ἀρ. apparently, [τάξιν] Spengel. The former probably right: yet see Vahlen p. 35 (37) ἣς Ἔρ. ἢς Π1 (1st hand, emended by corr.) 28 τις <ὁ> ἢ Koræs, [τις] would be a more obvious change, yet doubtless none is needed 29 φιλόσοφοι [sc. αἰτετόν] Jackson 30 τούτους after τούς δύο Π1 φιλοτιμότατοι Π1-3 Αld. 31 πρότερον Koræs (needlessly) and Π3 (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) 33 γε Spengel, τε Π1 Π2 Bk. Susem.1 in the text, omitted by Π⁵, perhaps rightly, [τε] Congreve 35 ἔκαστον ΠΠΠΒκ. Spengel, γφ. ἔκαστον Π1 (corr. in the margin), perhaps rightly τῇ πολιτείᾳ (πολιτείαν 1st hand of Π⁵) Π² Aρ. Bk. (γφ. τὴν πολιτείαν corr. in the margin of the Π¹), perhaps rightly; τὴν πόλιν Spengel, needlessly 37 τω̣ς omitted by Π¹

best and live in the enjoyment of happiness 3 C̣p. c. i § 1 and n. (685). Susem. (714)
29 τινές] 'Some' only? We should expect 'all.' But this may be explained as due to Aristotle's minimizing style of expression. Cp. n. (401). Susem. (715)
§ 6 σχεδόν γὰρ ... 32 φιλόσοφον] The two sections §§ 5, 6 are unusually diffuse. Susem. (716)

No account is here taken of the view that honour is the aim of the political life, N.Ε. i. v. 4, 100S b 23. Whereas in N.Ε. x. 7, 7, 1177 b 19 ff. αἰ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ἀρεταὶ are sharply distinguished from ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια (δεσποτικῆ), here the object seems to be to represent the political and contemplative life as akin, though the latter is in both discussions regarded as αὐτοτελῆς (Newman).

34 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῷ τῇ πολιτείᾳ] But granting that the speculative (i.e. studious) life is the better end for the individual, the state is in no way concerned in this, beyond rendering such a life possible to the few fitted for it, provided that the rest consent to take active part in the administration: for otherwise the state would itself come to an end. The author is in error (cp. n. 736*) in supposing that the question, whether scientific or political activity ranks highest for the individual, corresponds exactly to the question which arises with regard to the state, whether it should pursue a policy of peace or of war. Cp. nn. (743, 745). Susem. (717)

§ 7 35 οἷον μὲν] The advocates of a peace policy think that while despotic rule over others is never without a certain injustice of the deepest dye, even rule as exercised under a free government, though devoid of injustice, yet tends to disturb our own easy prosperity. The conjunction of τὸ ἀρχεῖν and γινόμενον = ἡ ἀρχή γινομένη is harsh, but can be paralleled. On δεσποτικῶς (properly as slaves) see 1277 a 33 n.
οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν εὐημερία τούτων (II)
δ᾽ ὡσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔτεροι τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες. μόνον ἄλλον
τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικὸν ἐφ' ἐκάστης γὰρ ἄρετὴς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιοταῖς
§ 8 ὡσιὸς τὰ κοινὰ πράπτονται καὶ πολιτευόμενοι. * * οἱ μὲν οἳ
οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν
τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαιμονία φαίνω. παρ᾽
§ 9 σπόζοντο τῶν πέλας. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην
ὡς εἰπέων κείμενον παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὦπειος εἰ ποῦ τι πρός
ἐν οἱ νόμοι βλέπωσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχαζόνται πάντως, ὦστερ
ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέτακται
σχέδου η ἡ παίδεια καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος. ἐτὶ δ᾽ ἐν
§ 10 τοῖς ἐθνεσὶ πάσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη τε-
τίμηται δύναμις, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι,
καὶ Κέλτοις. ἐν ἑνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τυνὲς εἰσὶ παραξύνον-
τες πρὸς τῷ ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φαν᾽
§ 11 τῶν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμων λαμβάνειν ὡσα ἐν στρατεύσω-
ται στρατείας. ἦν δὲ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονιάν νόμος τῶν

38 αὐτὸν Π, perhaps rightly, αὐτῶν Vettori, αὐτῶν Schneider.

1324 b 1 * * of Susen. and Böcker, <ὁμολογεὶ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἀμφιβαθτεῖται.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ * * > οἰ or something similar? Susen. || 4 δ᾽...όρος] δ᾽ όρος καὶ τῆς
πολιτείας όρος τῶν νόμων P1, δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὕτως τῶν νόμων 146, δὲ καὶ τῆς πολι-
τείας οὕτως όρος (καὶ added byCongreve) τῶν νόμων all other codices and editors except
Susen. || 8 πολέμους Π1 || 14 τῶν] τοσοῦτον P. Koraes, but see Vahlen
p. 34 (36) on 1323 b 15

§ 10 9 ἐν τοῖς ἐθνεσι] cp. 1. 2 § 6, and n. (19 b). SUSEN. (720)


12 καὶ Κέλτοις] cp. II. 9 § 7, and n. (287) p. 334 f. and below c. 17 § 3 and
n. (953). SUSEN. (722)

14 τῶν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμων] Does this throw any light on the real signifi-
cance of Hannibal's sending by Mago the rings of the Roman equites, as told by
Livy xxii. 12? (Ridgeway).

§ 11 15 καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν] Here we see the Macedonians expressly reckon-
ed among barbarian peoples. And even if this is pronounced the interpolation of a pupil, yet the more closely the earlier
Peripatetics were attached to the Mac-
donian cause, the more probable it be-
comes that the pupil is here reproducing

II.
μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεξόθησαι τῇν φόρ—(II) 
βελών’ ἐν δὲ Ἑκβαίνος οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἐορτῇ τῶν σκύφων
περιεφερόμενῳ τῷ μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότι πολέμιον’ ἐν δὲ τοῖς
'Ἰβηρον, ἔθνει πολεμικῷ, τοσότους τὸν ἄριθμον ὀβελίσκους
20 καταπηγγένουσι περὶ τῶν τάφων ὁσῶς ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν
§ 12 πολέμιων καὶ ἔτερα δὴ παρ’ ἑτέροις ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα πολλά,
τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἐθεσιν.

κατά τί δόξειν ἂν ἄγαν ἄτοπον ἵσως ἔωιν τοῖς βουλομένων 7
ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τούτ’ ἐστίν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι
25 θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἀρχή καὶ δεσπότη τῶν πλησίον καὶ βουλομένων καὶ
§ 13 μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰ ὑπὸ τούτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικόν,
ὁ γε μηδὲ νόμοις ἐστίν; οὐ νόμοιν δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως ἀρχεῖν, κρατεῖν δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ μὴ δικαίως.

unaltered his master’s view. Susem.
(723). Cf. Introd. p. 46 n. (3)
66. Susem. (724)
17 ἐν δὲ Σκύθας] Comp. Herod. IV.
18 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ’Ἰβηρον] The only mention of the Iberians, or Spaniards, in
the genuine works of Aristotle. They are mentioned in the spurious De Mira-
bilibibus 46, 85, 87, 88, 833 b 15, 837 a 8,
24 ff. Susem. (725)
19 ὀβελίσκους] What this word means, is not so easy to decide. The usual
translation ‘obelisks’ or ‘stone pillars’ is
quite reconcileable with the practice of
savage tribes. Thus “in New Caledonia
rows of stones are found commemorating
the number of enemies killed and eaten
in former wars.” Mr Ridgeway writing
to the Academy of Aug. 29, 1885, sug-
gests that this Iberian practice accounts
for the stone pillars actually placed around
tombs in Western Europe. On the other
hand Dr Jackson communicates the follow-
ing note.
‘obeliskous means, not ‘obelisks’ as
the commentators suppose, but literally
‘splinters.’ Originally the splinters carried
the heads of the slain: when the custom of
affixing the heads fell into disuse, the
spits, which should have borne the actual
trophies, continued to be planted ὀσῶς
ἀν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολέμων; i.e. the trophy
was converted into a badge. On trophy-
taking, and its connexion with ‘mili-
tancy’, of which Aristotle is quite aware,
see Spencer’s Ceremonial Institutions
ch. ii. p. 48 with p. 186.”
§ 12 22 κατειλημμένα established,
confirmed, secured: Cope Rhet. II. 2
20 compares Thuc. v. 21 σπονδάς εἴρον
κατειλημμένα; Plato Leges vii. 823 a 7 τὰ
ταῖς ἵμαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα;
Aes. Eith. x. 9 § 5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιὸν τοῖς
ἡσίες κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστήσαε: also
the active use in Thuc. viii. 63 § 3 τὰ ἐν
αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἐτὶ βεβαιώσερον κα-
τελαβον.
25 τῶν πλησίον] but § 8, a 5 τῶν
πλας.
§ 13 Hampke compares with this the
discussion upon slavery 1. 6 §§ 1—5: one
phrase of which, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου
μόνον ἐναὶ τῷ ἀμφιβοήτησιν, is certainly
echoed by the protest 27 f. οὗ νόμοιν
δὲ καὶ ‘to rule at all hazards, whether
justly or unjustly, is not lawful, and a
victory may be won even by unjust
means.’
The appeal to the other 'arts and sciences' is strictly on Socratic and Platonic lines, and Dr Jackson points out that the mention of persuasion is by no means superfluous. See Xen. Mem. III. 9 § 11, Pl. Rep. 488 b of 'an ξυλαχμάνειν δεμός ἢ, ὅποιος ἀρξόμεν ἤ σειδοντες ἡ βίαζομενον τοις ναυ-κληρον. Polit. 296 β ὡς τις ἄρα μὴ πιθον τοις λατρευμονοιν, ἡκὼν δὲ ὁρισμὸν τῆς τέχνης, παρὰ τὰ γεγραμένα βέλτων ἀνάγαγῃ δρών τινα, τι λοθομα τῆς βίας ἔσται ταῖτηρ; Yet the repeated collision of vowels, 39 λατροῦ οὔτε, κυβερνήτων ἀργο, πεινα ἢ, 32 οὖσθα εῖναι, 33 ἔκσα-τοι ὡς, is in striking contrast to the book as a whole, and in two cases is not removable by transposition.

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§ 17 δήλων ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς 10
μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὃς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἄλλα ἐκείνῳ χάριν ταῦτα. τοὺ δὲ νομοθέτου τὸν σπουδαίον ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι 9 πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγα-
§ 18 θῆς πώς μεθέξομαι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῦ εὐδαιμονίας. δι-
οίσει μέντοι τῶν ταπτομένων ἐνια νομίμων καὶ τούτῳ τῆς νομο-
θετικής ἐστιν ἰδεῖν, εάν τινας ὑπάρχος θεμελιώτης, ποία πρὸς (p. 99)
ποιός ἀσκητέον ἢ πώς τοὺς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρηστέον.
ἄλλα τούτο μὲν κὰν ὑστερον τύχοι τῆς προσηκούσης 15
νέες, πρὸς το τέλος δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντεῖνει.
3 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τῶν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον III
αἱρετώτατοι, διαφορομείνους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρῆσεως αὐτοῦ, λε-
κτέον ἢμιν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς (οἴ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκίμα-
ζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἁρχὰς, νομίζομεν τῶν τε ἔλευθερον

§ 16 1325 a 6 ἄρα after ὅτι M* P¹ Sb Vb 8 τοῦ before σπουδαίον omitted by M* P¹
§ 17 18 ὀ...] 23 ταύτων] This whole parenthesis is transposed in P²-3 to follow 24 ὀρθῶς,
by means of the letters αβγ written above the line 19 [τέ] Spengel
§ 18 12 ἰἀν τινὲς...γενειώντες] So already ii. 6 §§ 7, 8. The state must have a foreign policy, if it be only a
policy of non-intervention and self-defence.

καν ὑστερον] c. 14 §§ 7—11. See nn. (712)—this reference may of course be interpolated—and (906). Su-
sem. (731)
§ 17 περὶ τῆς χρῆσεως] How it is to be enjoyed.
λεκτέον ἢμιν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους] Comp. n. (696) on c. 1 § 6. Susem. (733)

19 'τε interdum ei vocabulo additur, quod utrique membro commune est: φύ-
σει τε <γάρ> ἀρχικῶν παθητικ ἐνια καὶ πρόγνωσι ἐκγονῶν (i.e. φύσει γὰρ ἀρχικῶν
παθητικ τε ὑιῶν καὶ...). N. E. viii. 13 [c. xi. § 2], 1161 a 18' Bonitz Ind. Ar. 749 b
44 ff. τοῦ ἔλευθερον] τοῦ ἀποκλεισθέντων, untrammelled by office and by civic obli-
gations. Aristotle and Xenocrates were metoeces, as Anaxagoras had been before

Μοις χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ὡς τῆς πολιτείας ὡς νύνταις οὐ (II) πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἐσται τῶν πολεμιῶν ζ μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον.
20 βίον ἐτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἴρετώτατον, (III) οὗ δὲ τούτων ἄριστον ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηδὲν πρᾶττοντα πράττειν εἰ, τὴν δ’ εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταύτων, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὄρθῶς τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἄρθρως, οὗ μὲν ὁτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ διεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων.

§ 2 τούτῳ γὰρ ἀληθές· οὐδέν γὰρ τὸ γε δοῦλον, ἢ δοῦλος, χρήσασθαι σεμνῶν ἢ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἢ περὶ τῶν ἁναγκαίων οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πάσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δὲ ἀποτειάν οὐκ ἄρθρων· οὗ γὰρ ἐλαττον διεστηκεν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχῆς τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει ἐλευθέρον τοῦ φύσει δοῦλον. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἁκονός ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις.

§ 3 τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτείν τῶν πράττειν οὐκ ἀληθές· ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξεις ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ κα-

21 ἀδύνατον γὰρ...23 ταύτων] Comp. n. (708). SUSEM. (732)

§ 2 25 οὐδέν γὰρ...σεμνῶν] Comp. λ. 7 § 5 n. (64) and below c. 14 § 19 n. (913). SUSEM. (734)

§ 26 ἐπίταξις] See note (124) on ἐπί-

ταξίς κρίθηκα 1. 13 § 14.

27 νομίζειν πάσαν ἀρχὴν διεσποτειάν] See n. (58). Yet Plato was free from this error when he classified the forms of rule, Laws III. 660 α ff. On the other hand he makes πολιτικὴ=βασιλικὴ, Ethyl. 292 c. a passage which should be added to Polit. 258 E, as quoted on 1. 1 § 2.

§ 29 ἢ αὐτὸ...δοῦλου] How great that difference may be, we learn from 1. 5 § 8 n. (47).

§ 30 ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις λόγοις] B. 1. cc. 4—7. SUSEM. (735)

§ 31 οὐκ ἀληθές] is not right, hand verum est.

32 ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξεις] This is certainly a genuine Aristotelian doctrine. See c. i §§ 10—13, n. (704, 710); Nic. Eth. I. 1. cc. 7—9. VI. 2 § 5, 1139 a 3, VI. 5 § 4, 1140 b 7, X. 6 § 2, 1176 a 33; Phys. II. 6 § 1, 197 b 5; Polit. 6 § 12, 1450 a 17; Rhet. 1. 5 § 3, 1300 b 14; comp. Zeller II. ii p. 612. But still it is so provided only that under πράξες is included not merely practical, but also theoretical or mental activity, and that consequently the term is understood in the wider sense: for otherwise this doctrine would not be true of the highest felicity of pure thought, as it pertains to God alone (n. 705), to which however the author himself appeals § 10, n. (746). And of human well-being, too, scientific perfection in active operation is the higher element, moral perfection only the lower element, according to the genuine Aristotelian doctrine. "It must be granted, that then it would be hard to say how the happiness of the individual and of the whole state can be one and the same" (Schlosser). Here Schlosser endeavours to explain the mistake pointed out in n. (717, 745) by assuming that 'Aristotle subordinated the idea of internal activity to that of contemplation.' This thought is quite just; but does this unhappy attempt to mend matters by such a confusion look more like the master or a pupil? Granted that this subordination is intended here (and from § 8 this cannot be doubtful—see n. 743), still of those who prefer the scientific life to the practical life it cannot possibly be maintained with truth that they prefer in activity to activity, nor can Aristotle himself have written anything so inconsistent. SUSEM. (736)

31 ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν κτλ] "The actions done by the just and temperate contain a realization of many noble ends." This is certainly in the spirit of Aristotle himself. Further comp. for σοφόφων n. (206 b), 11. 6 § 9. SUSEM. (737)
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ σωφρόνον πράξεις. (III) καὶ τὰς τάξιν ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων ὄντω διωρισμένων; 35 ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἀριστον· ὡστε ὦ δεῖ τὸν δυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν παρείναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παίδας πατρὸς μήθ' ὠλος φίλον φίλου μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μηδὲ πρὸς τὸ προτέρον νομίζειν. τὸ γὰρ ἀριστον ἀἱρέτωτατον, τὸ δ' εὐ πράττειν ἀριστον. 36 δεῖν Susem., δεῖ II Bk. Susem. in the text 39 ὑπολογίζειν Bas., ὑπολογέων Sf Bk., ὑπολογέων M: P 1-2-3-4 Vs Ald. Susem. in the text, ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν. Τὸ ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν μετεπεισθαι καὶ ἔτειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν ὑπολογίζειν. Τὸ δὲ μή ὑπολογίζει τὸ πρῶτον εὐπρᾶξεις. 37 παρείναι = to surrender, sc. τὸ ἀρχεῖν. τὸ παρείναι = to deprive another (state or ruler) of empire, Dem. VIII. De Chers. § 42, p. 100, 7, ἔχων ἄφελεσθαι. 38 πατέρα παιδών κτα] Plutarch, Demetrios c. 3. p. 890 B, complains that the Diadochi sacrificed every natural tie to their lust for empire. 39 ὑπολογίζειν] This verb, if indeed it be right, is ὑπολογίζειν in Aristotle, though found in Plato and Demostenes. 41 ὑπολογίζειν] "perhaps," conforming to Aristotle's own dictum Rhet. 11. 13 § 2, 1389 b 18 ἀμφιθαλότιτις προστιθέουσιν δεῖ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τάχα. But in b 2 it conceals a very positive opinion under a cautious formula. 42 tás πράξεις] The actions of one who has obtained power by violence (ἄριστος καὶ χαρακτήρας). 43 ὑπολογίζειν] These three species of domestic relations, and of household rule based upon them, are taken as the prototypes of all rule, except where it is government of equals by equals and so alternates with obedience. See i. 12 § 1 f. and Nic. Eth. VIII. c. 11 (Eaton). SUSEM. (739) 45 ὁ παραβαλλόν] An Archelaos or a Napoleon. 46 καταρθώσει] would perform a right action: rectum factum. This use of the verb, as opposed to παρεξηγεῖσαι, may be easily understood from Nic. Eth. II. 5 § 12, 1106 b 26, ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολικὴ ἀκαταρθωτικαί τὰ δὲ μέσον ἐπαίσχνεται καὶ καταρθητικαί, and in its turn led up to the Stoic use of καταθέσια as a technical term. 47 ὑπολογίζειν] Cn. III. 16 §§ 2—4 n. (672), II. 2 § 6 n. (134 b). SUSEM. (740)
IV(VII). 3. 8] 1325 a 33—1325 b 20. 487

καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν (III) 10 παρὰ φύσιν καλῶν. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ἣ κρείττων κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀριστῶν, τούτω 7 καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ’ οὐ μόνον ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ’ ἣν ἔσται πρακτικὸς. ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν 15 ευπραγιάν θετοὺς, καὶ κοινὴ πάσης πόλεως ἄν εἶπ καθ’ ἦν ἐκαστὸν ἀριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικὸς. ἀλλὰ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐννέα πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἰοντικεῖ τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοιάς ἐναι μόνον ταῦτα πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποθανεῖν ἐχόντων χάριν γινομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλι- 20 λον τῶν αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ δια-

18 εἶναι after μόνας P, after ταῦτα Γ’ | 20 αὐτῶν Vettori, αὐτῶν Γ’ Π | διανοη- σεῖς...21 μάλστα] Should this be διανοήσεις? ἢ...πράξεις τις. μάλστα?

10 διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις] To the genuine Aristotle this proposition holds provided only that the one great citizen is superior in virtue to all combined, not (as is here expressed) to each individual: see III. 13 §§ 13—25, c. 17. SUSM. (741) § 7 12 δεὶ δ’ οὐ μόνον κτλ.] “He must have not only the virtue but the force to develop his activity fully” (without transgressing virtue). This is only possible in the best state: see III. 13 §§ 24, 25; also n. (677) and Intro. p. 44. SUSM. (742)

14 ταύτα] That while the life of freedom is preferable to that of rule over unwilling subjects, βίος δεσποτικός, § 1, yet the life of action is preferable to that of inaction § 3 (which however does not imply that conquest or grasping at sovereignty is unconditionally desirable §§ 4—6).

16 ὁ πρακτικὸς] So far as the individual is concerned, comp. Nic. Eth. x. §§ 8, 1178 b 32, εἶναί ἣν ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ θεωρίᾳ τις, 7 § 9, 1178 a 7, οὗτος ἄρα (sc. ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος) καὶ εὐδαιμονιστάτους δευτέρους δ’ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀλλήν ἀρετὴν. But the qualifications introduced in § 8 seriously impair the comparison.

§ 8 “But the practical life need not mean a life in relation to others, as some suppose, nor those intellectual acts alone be practical which are done for the sake of certain external results of the action: on the contrary the self-contained speculations and processes of the intellect are far more truly practical.” By τινες we should naturally understand Plato: but the cap better fits Aristotle himself, Nic. Eth. x. 7 § 4, 1177 a 30, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὐς δικαιοπράξεις καὶ μεθ’ ὄν, § 7, αὐτα, sc. αἱ πολιτικὲς πράξεις, ἀναχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι αὐτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν, Eaton compares Rep. IV 443 a where justice is expounded to be harmonious activity of all the parts of man, and therefore internal, περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὑπὸ ἄλλης περὶ ἐαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐαυτὸν [πράξειν].

20 τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς...διανοησεῖς] This can only mean theoretical or purely scientific thinking; Ed. Müller’s uncertainty on this point is the chief defect in his whole exposition, which hinders him from arriving at any really tenable result and is the cause of many errors. Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 7 § 5, 1177 b 1 οὐδὲν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς θεωρητικῆς, γινεῖται παρὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλείων ἢ ἐλαττων περιποίομεθα παρὰ τὴν πράξεων. Upon Aristotle’s view two things must be distinguished in every activity, the end and the means; theoretical activity differs from practical and creative activity (see n. 34) in this respect, that in the former internal activity is a self-contained end, while in practical activity the end lies in the act produced by it, which affects some external person, and in the creative activity of art the end is the work or result produced. ‘See De Caelo II. 12 § 292 b 6, ἡ πράξεις ἐστιν ἁμῶν ἀπ’ ἐν δυνάμει, ὅταν καὶ ὁ ἐνεκα ἢ, καὶ τὸ τούτον ἐνεκα, Nic. Eth. vi. cc. 2—5, De Anima III. c. 9’ (Eaton): Zeller ὥρ. c. 11. ii. p. 177 f. If ἀυτοτελεῖς θεωρίας καὶ διανοῆσεις are the most truly practical, the supporters of the view that the intellectual life is to be
preferred to that of the statesman are unconditionally right, nor can we see how far the writer thinks he is mediating between them and their opponents. He would have done so in orthodox Aristotelian fashion only by adding that man must exercise not only his intellectual, but also his moral, powers: that he is an integral part of the whole formed by the state, and not a god, i.e. §§ 11, 12. That consequently, although it is life in the state which alone renders possible an assured scientific activity itself, yet it may well be permitted to individual men to be active for science primarily, and for the state only secondarily and in the fulfilment of the most general duties of a citizen. That at the same time there must be others who find their real satisfaction in the activity of the statesman and consequently adopt the opposite procedure: while a symmetrical combination of excellence in both will be the highest, and for that reason certainly the least common. See c. 14 §§ 7—11, n. (196), also nn. (717, 1024) and Introd. p. 48, p. 50 ff. SUSEM. (743)

21 ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος] Comp. c. i. § 11 n. (708). SUSEM. (744)

§ 9 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν...28 ὀτονοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων] "However even for states placed by themselves and determined upon an isolated life there is no necessity for inaction: activity is still possible to them in sections, for the various sections of the city have many ways of associating. And in the same way this is true of each individual man." What was recalled to mind in n. (717) is true here also. The comparison is not suitable; for neither is the internal administration of the state a theoretical activity, but rather it is practical or partly practical, partly creative (see nn. 34, 743); while in the case of the individual man every activity (except the theoretical) is always finally directed to others. Even on the doctrine of Plato (Zeller Plato p. 451 ff. Eng. tr.), no less than of Aristotle, the individual’s moral virtue is primarily a mutual relation of the parts of his soul, the rational soul and that which has to be subjected to the guidance of reason (see nn. 41, 112). Yet its active exercise is for the most part possible only in intercourse with others. SUSEM. (745)

28 ὁ θεὸς] See n. (702) on c. i § 10, n. (736). SUSEM. (746)

29 τὰς ὁ κόσμοι] An activity and happiness of the universe cannot, strictly speaking, be in question on the orthodox doctrine of Aristotle, as he combats the Platonic assumption of a World-soul. The world as a whole is only passively affected, i.e. God causes it to revolve round the earth, which is at rest, in 24 hours: or precisely stated, this passive affection belongs to the rest of the universe, the earth alone being exempt. All other motions and activities, affections and changes, belong to the several beings inside the universe. See Zeller ii. ii. pp. 374 ff. 450, 462 ff. And though comprehending all this in its harmonious arrangement we may call it, in a metaphorical sense, the activity of the universe, or even say that the world has its wellbeing in this harmoniously ordered activity, yet considered as an analogy to the internal administration of the state this is more halting than the last (n. 745). For it is intended to prove that the highest happiness of the individual man lies in purely internal or theoretical
activity: hence the whole analogy has no meaning unless the wellbeing of the universe (έχειν καλῶς) is exactly identical with its happiness (εὐδαιμονεῖται). Yet happiness can only be predicated of a single thinking self-conscious subject, so that if the collective personality of the state may be said to be happy, a world without a world-soul scarcely can. At least, this can hardly be without extraordinary misuse of the term, which I cannot bring myself to attribute to Aristotle. Susem. (747)

32 καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις]. This somewhat objectionable phrase I once believed, as others have done, to be a later addition. Now however I simply set it down to the interpolator of the entire section, cc. 2, 3, as one more proof of interpolation. Susem. (748)

c. 4 § 1 34 καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας. By "other forms of government" were formerly understood all others except the perfect one, and the context which here gives the exact transition to the discussion of the latter, would scarcely permit of any other interpretation. Indeed if we assume that Aristotle himself wrote this as well as all the rest of the chapter, from ἀρχῇ τῶν λοιπῶν onwards, the "other forms of government" can scarcely be understood except as in direct antithesis to the "state to be constituted according to an ideal," τῆς μελλοντικῆς κατ’ εὖχην συνεστάσας πόλεως (cp. Diebitsch's excellent remarks, p. 8 f., in opposition to Teichmüller). But then these words would prove that the traditional order of the books is the correct one. Yet the whole of §§ 1, 2 is merely a recapitulation of the contents of the first three chapters, and it is only as such that it has any meaning and connexion, as Spengel, Über die Politik p. 26 f., has incontrovertibly proved. The only sensible explanation is this: "After disposing of the necessary introductory questions regarding the best state, we must discuss this best state itself, and must treat first of its external and then of its internal requirements." Thus the intermediate reference to other forms of government (whether the discussion of them has preceded or not) is out of place here and breaks the connexion. Therefore Spengel pronounced the words in question καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας...πρὸτερων to be an interpolation, and he was followed among others by Susemith.* But when Hildenbrand p. 363 f. and Teichmüller (Philologus XVI. p. 164 ff.) pronounced "the other forms of government" to refer rather to the other model polities or at least those which are claimed as such, which have been already criticised in the Second Book, as distinguished from the true Aristotelian model state, Spengel gave his adhesion to this view. Yet even if the reference back to these is less injurious to the proposed connexion, still it is an inadmissible interruption, and would have to be set aside as an interpolation by another hand, besides that for the reasons previously stated it is only the former explanation of them, as referring to all other states except the perfect state, which appears possible. But the case is entirely different, if cc. 2, 3 are the work of an interpolator, who must then also be the author of c. 4 § 1 as far as πρὸτερων. We need then only add this new piece of awkwardness to the rest of his sins, and we shall have after all to decide in favour of the latter interpretation, that the words do refer to B. II., since the interpolator has tucked his composition on to the first chapter, the first sentence of which is immediately connected with the end of Book III., so that, as we have already stated, Introd. p. 48, he either found or made a redaction, which contained the books in the right order. At any rate this is the simplest explanation; we should otherwise have to assume that these words had been afterwards interpolated into his interpolation by a third person, who must already have been acquainted with the order of the

35 τοις λοιπών εύσεβεί πρότον ποιας τινάς δει τώς ὑπο- (IV) θέσεις εἶναι περὶ τῆς μελλόντος κατ' εὐχήν συνεστάται πόλεως.
§ 2 οὐ γὰρ οἶδο τε πολιτείαι γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἄνευ συμ-
μέτρου χορηγίας. διό δει πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι καθίστα
39 εὐχομένως, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ
§ 3 οἶδον περὶ τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὅσπερ γὰρ καὶ 2
1326 a τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς, οἴον υφάντη καὶ ναυπηγοῦ, δει τὴν
υήλιν υπάρχειν ἐπίτηδειαν οὖσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν
ἀυτῇ τυχγάνῃ παρασκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἄνάγκη καὶ τὸ γενόμε-
νυν ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ
5 τῷ νομοθέτῃ δει τὴν οἰκείαν ὑΗλίν υπάρχειν ἐπίτηδειως ἔχουσαν.
§ 4 ἐστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τὸ το πλήθος τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποιοὺς τινάς υπάρχειν δει φύσει, καὶ κατὰ
τὴν χώραν ὡσάμενον, πόσην τε εἶναι καὶ ποιαν τώρα ταύτην.

οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλείστοι προσήκων μεγάλην εἶναι τῆν 3
10 εὐδαιμόνα πόλιν' εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθεῖς, ἀγνοοῦσι ποια μεγίλη καὶ

35 [τῶν λοιπῶν] Spengel. See Comm. n. (749). If these words take up the sen-
tence 1323 b 37 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταύτα μεν...1324 a 4 πειθόμενος, we should expect ἄρχη
<δὲ> τῶν λοιπῶν || 36 περὶ omitted by Mr., [περὶ] Susem.1-2, perhaps rightly ||
37 γενέσθαι Susem.1-2, forc William, γίνεσθαι ? Susem. || 38 προϊστακτεῖσθαι Syl-
burg Susem.1-2, praesupponi William, probably right, unless we should write 39 εὐχο-
μένους, as Syburg suggested
1326 a 3 αὐτῆς II P 153 Bk. || 4 κάλλιον] βέλτιον M* || 7 [κατὰ] Spengel, <τὰ>-
κατὰ ? Schmidt correctly, if any change is needed || 8 πόσην Syburg, δόσων II Bk.1
Susem, in the text

books, in which they have come down to us. If we omit c. 2—c. 4 § 1, ἄρχη τῶν
λοιπῶν κτλ naturally follows upon c. 1. But if it be objected that even c. 1 in its
present form could hardly have made part of this work in Aristotle's own intention
(see Imm. 687, 712), we must observe that it is easy to give to what follows, ἄρχη
tῶν λοιπῶν κτλ, a place immediately after the end of Book III, without the
slightest disturbance or deficiency of meaning, if only we give the last un-
finished sentence of B. III. to B. IV (VII), —as has been done—and then get rid of
it with the rest of c. 1 of B. IV (VII), and at the same time treat the words τῶν
λοιπῶν in § 1 as the interpolator's addition. We should then translate here:
“Οur beginning is a statement of the necessary external conditions &c.” SUSEM.
(749) Cr. 11. § 2, 1260 b 36, ἄρχην
de πρῶτον ποιήτευν, ἣ περ πέφυκεν ἄρχη
ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως.

With this compare generally Plato Latus IV.
§ 2 38 χορηγίας] See n. on 1. 6
§ 3, 1255 a 14.
διὸ δει πολλὰ κτλ] Cr. 11. 6 § 7 n.
(102) : also 11. § 1, n. (128) and the references there collected. SUSEM. (750)
§ 3 40 ὅσπερ γὰρ κτλ] The analogy
was used 1. 10 §§ 1, 2.

§ 4 Under the external means required for a city comes first the mass of the
population: how many ought they to be? and of what natural character? So like-
wise in regard to the territory: how large and of what nature ought this to be?
The proper number of the inhabitants is discussed in §§ 4—14; their race and
mental characteristics in c. 7.
The size of the ideal city: c. 4 §§ 4—14.
1326 a 10 ποία μεγάλη] With §§ 4—
6 compare Pl. Rep. IV. 423 B: ἐος ἄν ἡ
πόλις σοι οἰκῆ σωφρόνως ὡς ἀρτί ἐτάχθη,
§ 5 ποία μικρὰ πόλεις. κατ’ ἀρίθμου γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρι- (IV)
νουσι τίνυ μεγάλην, δει δὲ μᾶλλον μη εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύνα-
μων ἀποβλέπειν. ἐστὶ γὰρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργων, ὅστε τήν δύνα-
μένην τὸτε μάλιστα ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην.
15 οἶον Απποκράτην οὐκ ἀνθρωπον ἄλλα ιατρόν εἶναι μελζω φήσει-
§ 6 εν ᾧ τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὖ
μὴν ἄλλα κἂν εἰ δει κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντας,
οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος τοῦτο οἰητέον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἵσως
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀρίθμων πολλῶν
20 καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ἐξενον), ἄλλα ὅσοι μέρος εἰσὶ πόλεως καὶ
ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλεις οἰκεῖοι μερῶν ἡ γὰρ τοῦτων ὑπε-
ροχῆς τοῦ πλῆθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, εἰς ἢς δὲ βάναυ-
σοι μὲν ἐξερχόνται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀρίθμον ὄπληται δὲ ὀλγυοι, (π. 102)
ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην· οὐ γὰρ ταύτων μεγίλη
tē§ 7 πόλεις καὶ πολυϊνθρωπος. οὐ μὴν άλλα καὶ τοῦτο γε ἐκ τῶν 5
26 ἔργων φανέρον ὃτι χαλεπόν, ἵσως δὲ ἀδύνατον εὐνομεῖσθαι

11 ποία added by Γ′ M′ Ar., omitted by all other authorities and Bk. 12 εἰς δὲ]
ἄλλα εἰς preferred by Thurot, but such variations should be noted without correction.
The passage supports R. Schöll’s conjecture at 1253a 22, <οὐκ> ἔσται || 14 οἰητέον
omitted by Π′ [σωτέον] Susem., perhaps rightly || 18 ποιητέον Camerarius Iκ.2, 3
ὁρατέον? Schmid || ἵσως after 19 πόλεσιν Π′ 10 Bk. || 20 εἰς μέρος πόλεως ap-
parently Π′, πόλεως εἰς μέρος Π′ 10 Bk. || 21 μορίων Π′ 10 Bk. || 25 οὐ μὴν άλλα
Π′, ἄλλα μὴν Π′ 10 Bk. || άλλα τοῦτο γε καὶ ? Koraes

§ 5 12 μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν
We should regard not so much their numbers as their efficiency: explained,
in the next line, as power to execute the proper task, or function, of a city. (In
§ 10, a 38 it is rather “essence,” cp. ετ
1 § 12, 1323 b 33.) For the use of δὲ
instead of the more usual ἀλλά, as in a 15
οὐκ ἀνθρωπον ἄλλα ιατρόν, cp. Thuc. ίv.
86. 1 οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ επ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ.

15 Τιποκράτην] We have no certain information concerning the life of this most renowned of Greek physicians, who
flourished in the latter half of the fifth century. Of the numerous works bearing
his name that have been handed down to us, the only genuine ones are the
excellent descriptions of diseases, which
constitute the first and third books of the
‘Epidemics,’ the no less excellent little
work ‘On the influence of air, water and
locality,’ and perhaps ‘On the origin and
care of diseases,’ and the fragment ‘On
wounds in the head.’ Still these are
enough to prove the ability of the man,
who is rightly called the Father of Medi-
cine. Susem. (751)

§ 6 18 κατὰ τὸ τυχόν πλῆθος ‘We
must not estimate it by the mass of any
and every sort of people.’ Comp. c. 8
§ 8 n. (8ο4) and viii(v), 3 § 11 ὡστε γὰρ
οὐδ’ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλῆθους πόλεις ἴσον
τίτι τι σκοπάται χρόνοι. (1531 b).
Susem. (753)

20 οὐσί μέρος…21 μερῶν] ‘but only
count those who form an integral part of
a city or the parts of which it properly consists’; see cc. 8, 9. Susem. (754)

21 τοῦτων depends on πλῆθους.
23 ὄπληται] Of course the soldiers
are here mentioned only to exemplify the
organic members of the city generally.
Susem. (755)

§ 7 26 χαλεπόν, ἵσως δὲ ἀδύνατον]
τὴν Λιαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοὺν ὄντος διαφορασθαὶ (IV) καλὸς ουδεμιὰς ὀρῶμεν ὃσταν ἀνεμεἵνην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος.
§ 8 τῶτο δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὥ τε γὰρ
30 νόμος τάξεις τῖς ἐστὶ, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαίον εὐταξίαν εἶναι, ὥ δὲ Λιαν ὑπερβάλλουν ἀρχῆς ὃν δυναται μετέχειν τάξεως. θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἢτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πάν. ἔτει τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλῆθει καὶ μεγάλῃ.
§ 9 εἰσβῆ γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἢς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθείς
35 ὁρὸς ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαίον, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε
<καλὸν καὶ μεγάλῃ καὶ μεγάλῃ εἰσβῆ γίνεσθαι.> ἀλλ' ἐστὶ 6
36 τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρον, ὤσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν πάν.
§ 10 τοὺς, ἡμῶν φυτῶν ὑργίνων: καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐκαστὸν οὔτε Λιαν
μικρῶν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλουν έξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύνα-
μιν, ἀλλ' ὡτε μὲν ὅλος ἑστηρημένοι εἶσται τῆς φύσεως ὅτε
29 τε omitted by M. P.1, very likely by G, perhaps rightly, [τε] Susem.1 33 επεὶ
...34 γίνεσθαι transposed by Böckler to follow 35 ἀναγκαίον. See p. 87. Schneider,
who first saw the difficulty, proposed to transpose the whole clause or to bracket ἐν
πλῆθει καὶ τὸ γε] δὲ τὸ and 34 [δὲ] Koraes || 34 πόλιν] πόλις P.112 and P.1 (1st
hand) || ἵκ Koraes, most likely right || 36 πόλεως P.5 Bk., civiliti Ar. || 38
αὐτοῦ G P.113, αὐτοῦ M. P.12

Sparta and the small Cretan cities were
the typical instances of εὐνομία: Syracuse,
and to a less degree Athens, of the
opposite. Yet Carthage is praised for
its comparatively good government 11.
11 §§ 1, 2. The most populous cities of
the Hellenic world in the fourth century
were the two already named. Syracuse
may have had in its territory 800,000,
the numbers given for Aegaracs Diog.
Laert. viii. 63, Holm Gesch. des Siciliens
II. 402 (Diod. XIII. 84 makes the free
population, exclusive of slaves, 100,000
at Aegaracs). Corinth, Rhodes, Byzanz-
tium, and Tarontum came next. The
glory of Miletus, Samos, Sybaris, Croton,
and Aegaracs had departed.

§ 8 30 νόμος τάξεις τίς] And πολι-
tεῖα = τάξεις τίς ἡ περὶ τὰς ἁρχὰς, so that
this vague notion of system or arrange-
ment does not tell us much. Editors
compare Pl. Gorg. 503 E ff. esp. 504 D
tάξει δὲ δὴ τῆς φυσῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεις
(φύσις) νόμων τῷ καὶ νόμως.
32 θείας γὰρ...33 τὸ πάν] “for this is a
task for divine power, such as holds this
whole world together.” And this although
Aristotle makes the whole activity of the
deity consist in pure thought, νοῦσεως
νόμωσ, thought thinking upon itself. For
God is not only the highest and ultimate
formal and final cause, but also the
highest and ultimate moving cause: see
esp. M. p. xii. (A) 7 § 6, 1072 b 13 ἐκ
τακτικὴ ἀρά φύσεως ἔρημην ὁ ὁμάρας
ὥ ἀρά φύσις; § 8 § 19, 1074 b 3 παρα-
δόθησαν παρά τῶν ἀρχαίων ὥστε παρα-
δέχεται τὸ ψεύδων ὑπνόην. SUSEM. (576)

§ 9 34 τῆς μετὰ μεγέθους κτλ] ‘which
has the definition here given,’ i.e. εὐταξία,
‘combined with a certain size,’ ἐπεὶ τὸ γε
καλὸν κτλ ‘since beauty is usually found to
depend on number and magnitude.’

Comp. Paus. 7 §§ 8, 9, 1450 b 34 ἐπεὶ δὲ
ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἡμῶν καὶ ἀπαν πράγμα ὑπερβαίνειν
τὸν ποταμὸν τίτλον νοῡν τῷ καὶ νόμῳ.
32 θείας γὰρ...33 τὸ πάν] “for this is a
task for divine power, such as holds this
whole world together.” And this although
Aristotle makes the whole activity of the
deity consist in pure thought, νοῦσεως
νόμωσ, thought thinking upon itself. For
God is not only the highest and ultimate

40 δὲ φαύλοις ἐχον, οἴον πλοῖον σπιθαμιαίον μὲν οὐκ ἐσται (IV) πλοῖον ὡλος, οὔδὲ δυνών σταδίουν, εἰς δὲ τὶ μέγεθος ἐλθον ὅτε μὲν διὰ σμεκρότητα φαύλην ποιήσει τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὅτε δὲ δἰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις η μὲν εὐς ὁλίγουν λίαν οὐκ ἀυτάρκης (η δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκης), η δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις ἀυτάρκης, ὅπερ ἔθνος. ἀλλ' 5 οὐ πόλις: πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ράδιον ὑπάρχειν τὶς γὰρ στρατηγός ἐσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλῆθους, ἢ τῖς κήρυξ μὴ Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρῶτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαίον τὴν ἐκ τοσοῦτον πλῆθους ὁ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ ξῦν εὖ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν 10 ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλῆθος εἶναι [μείζων] πόλιν.

§ 12 ἀλλὰ τοιτ', οὐκ ἐστίν, ὡσπερ ἐπομεν. ἀόριστον. τίς δ' ἐστίν ὁ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὁρος, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν ράδιον. εἰς γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων,

§ 13 ἀρχόντως ὁ ἐπίταξε καὶ κρίσις ἐργον πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν 15 περί τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχάς διανέμει κατ'

diephrámêna of 1. 5 § 5 (cp. 1. 2 § 13 ii. 28), 'or stunted,' in poor condition.

1326 b 3 η δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκης omitted by P15 III Ar. || 4 μὲν after τοις P234 SB Vb Bk. || αὐτάρκης, <αὐτάρκης δὲ> ὡσπερ ἔθνος οἱ αὐτάρκης, ὡσπερ <δὲ> ἔθνος Jackson, perhaps rightly || 5 πολιτείαν] πολι P23, πολιτερν SB Vb || 8 ξὺν after 9 εἴ II² P60 Bk. || 10 [μείζω] Schneider Bk. 2 Schmidt would transpose thus: μείζω ταύτης <καλ>. Presumably μείζω is a variant or gloss upon ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλῆθος

1326 b 8 τὸν Παλαιαργὸν ἐν τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ. 1326 b 9 τὸν Πελοπόννησον.
πολιτικών Η. 4. [IV(VII). 4. 13

άξιαν ἀναγκαίον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποιοὶ τινές εἰσιν, τοὺς (IV) πολιτικοὺς, ὡς ὅπως τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, φαίνομαι ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις.

§ 14 τῇ πολυαναθρωστῇ τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φαινότας. ἔτι δὲ ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις ῥαδίων μεταλαμβάνεις τῆς πολιτείας, οὐ γάρ 

χαλεπῶς τὸ λαυθάειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους. δή 

λον τοίνυν ὡς οὕτως ἐστὶ πόλεως ὄρος ἀριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ 

πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ξωῆς ἐυσύννοπτος.

§ 15 περὶ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διορίσθην τὸν τρόπον τοῦ 

26 τοῦ παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. περὶ 

μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποιαν τινά, δήλου ὅτι τὴν αὐτάρκεστάτην πᾶς 

τις ἂν ἐπιανέσει (τοιαῦτην δὲ ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὴν παν-

τοφόρον τὸ γάρ πάντα ὑπάρχει καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς 

30 αὐτάρκεις) πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαῦτην ὡστε δινάσθαι 

τοὺς οἰκονομᾶς ξὴν σχολάζωντας ἑλευθερίως ἀμα καὶ σω-

20 πολυαναθρωστῇ τῇ] πολυαναθρώπῳ Susem. 1, quae valde multorum hominum William || 23 [πόλεως] Spengel, ὄρος <τῆς μεγίστης> Schneider, both unnecessarily || 24 ἴτοι εὐφθορότοι P² (corr. 1) and P² (a later hand), a gloss from 1327 a 3 || 26 τὰ omitted by P⁴ P⁴ Vb || 27 τινά <δε> Spengel, τινά <δε> εἶναι τὴν χώραν> Scaliger, but 

πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπιανέσεις should be understood from what follows || πᾶς] τὰν Bk. 2 by a misprint

§ 13 17 ὡς ὅπως...18 κρίσεις] τοῦτο ἀπὸ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους. Ἀγένειον Athenian sentiment; not only does Plato's judgment agree with this (Lasso v. 738 Ε, ὅπως ἵνα φιλόφρονωται ἀλλήλους μετὰ θυσίων καὶ γνωρίζονται, οὐ μείζων οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγάθων, η γνωρίζοντο αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς εἰναι, ὅπως ἵνα μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλους ἐστὶν ἀλλήλους ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλὰ σκότους, οὐτ' ἵνα τίκτης ἂξιος, οὐτ' ἀρχῶν οὐτε δίκης ποτὲ τις ἵνα τῆς προσηκούσης ὀρὸς τυχανόν, but Thucydides also remarks, viii. 66 § 3, that during the reign of terror under the Four Hundred people were afraid to communicate their suspicions to one another διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς ἀλλήλους ἀγνωσίαν (Eaton). 

Susem. (762)

19 οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν] "it is not fair to pronounce off-hand." Knowing the ground of his objection to over-populous cities, we can argue (as in a similar case previously, see on 111. 5 § 3) that his own principles require him to withdraw it where increased facilities of communication have enabled men to surmount this difficulty.

§ 14 23 ἡ μεγίστη...24 εὐσύννοπτος] ‘the largest excess of population which will promote independence of life and yet can be taken in at one view.’ This closely corresponds with the decision pronounced by Aristotle as to the proper length of a poem, and the size of a work of art generally, Poet. c. 7 § 10, 1451 a 3 ff. 23 § 5 1459 a 30 ff. 24 § 5, 1459 b 18. Comp. Rhet. III. 9 § 6, 1409 b 17 ff. (Eaton). Also c. 5 § 3 below with n. (768). Susem. (763)

19 c. 5 deals with the territory. It should be sufficient for the support of the inhabitants without external supplies, §§ 1, 2; compact and easily defensible, § 3; and with direct access to the sea, § 4.

§ 1 30 αὐτάρκεις] ‘Independence’ implies that the soil produces all the necessities of life. See 1. 2 § 12 n. (21), and the references in n. (759). Susem. (764)

πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγεθεὶς in extent and magnitude’; muchness and greatness are here nearly synonymous.

31 ξὴν σχολάζωντας Σρ. χώρας δεσσεῖ 

τοὺς τοσούτους εἶ σὺς ἢ ρητοὶ θρησκευταί, Π. 6 § 6 n. (201) : δοκεῖ τε ἡ ἐνδυομενία ἐν τῇ
§ 2 φρόνως. τοῦτον δὲ τῶν ὄρων εἰ καλὸς ἢ μη καλὸς λέγω—(V) μεν, ὑστερον ἑπισκεπτεῖν ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλος περὶ κτή-
σεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐτορίας ἐμβαίνῃ ποιεῖσθαι 35 μνείαν, πῶς δεὶ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν 
αὐτῆς πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταυτὴν εἰσὶν ἁμφι-
σβητήσεις διὰ τῶν ἐλκοντας ἐφ’ ἐκατέρων τοῦ βίου τὴν ὑπερ-
βολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλυσχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν. 
§ 3 τὸ δ’ εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεποῦ ἐπιτέου (δεῖ δ’ εἰναι 40 πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἐμπείριοι, ὅτι χρῆ 
μὲν τοῖς πολεμίωσι εἶναι δυσέμβολον αὐτοῖς δ’ ἐνέξοδον. 
1327 εὑρίσκει. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρῆ ποιεῖν κατ’ εὐχήν, πρὸς τε 5 τῶν θάλασσαν προσήκει κείσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν. (p. 104) 
§ 4 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεῖς ὁρὸς (δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοήθειας κοι-
νῆς εἶναι τῶν τόπων ἀπάντων) ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν 
32 τοῦτο 1. Ar. Akl. || τῶν ὄρων omitted by II 2 Ar. (supplied by corr. in P 2) || 38 τὴν before γλυσχρότητα omitted by P 1. P 3 || 41 μὲν τοῖς τοῖς μὲν Susem. (cp. v. l. 1326 b 4) 
1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν after εὐσύνοπτον II P 5 Bk. || 6 μὲν < οὖν > Schneider 

σχολὴ εἶναι ἀσχολοῦμεθα γὰρ οὐκ εὐχλα-
κίωμεν, Ἡθ. Ἐθ. 1. 7. 6. 

ἐλευθερίων ἁμα καὶ σωφρόνων] “At 
once with liberality and temperance”: 
esp. 11. 6 § 8 n. (206), § 9 n. (206 b, 207); 
also 11. 7 § 7 n. (217 b, and IV). 11 
§§ 3, 4 n. (1200 b). Susem. (765) 
§ 2 § 33 ὑστερον] An unfulfilled pro-
mise; there is no such treatment o 
political economy. See Inrod. p. 49 
n. (4), 53 n. (6). Susem. (766) 
39 ἁμφισβητήσεις] ‘For there are 
many controversies on this subject; be-
cause of those who urge us to one or the 
other extreme in life, to parsimony on 
the one hand and to luxury on the other.’ 
Presumably written works are intended. 
37 ὑπερβολὴν] excess, extreme, as in 
c. 1 § 5, 1323 a 38, VII. 4. 11 § 10 τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολὰς. 
.esp. c. 1 § 7, 1323 b 11. 11. 9 § 24 (ἡ διάστα ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ 
σκληρὸν) and N. E. 1. 1 § 39, 1121 b 27 (ὡμοιαῖα δ’ ἀπὸ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ 
μεθὲν ἄν δοιναί). 
§ 3 § 41 τοῖς πολεμίοις... ἐνέξοδον] ‘A 
difficult country for the enemy to invade, 
but easy for the citizens to quit.’ Comp. 
c. 11 § 3 n. (848). Susem. (767) 
1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν εὐσύνοπτον εἰναι] 
See c. 4 § 14 n. (763). Susem. (768) 
“We say of the territory, as we said of 
the population, that it should be such as 
can be taken in at one view; meaning 
thereby that reinforcements can easily be 
marched for the defence of every part of 
it.” 
§ 4 κατ’ εὐχήν] ‘If we are to fix upon 
an ideal site’: comp. n. (128); ‘a position 
favourable for access to the sea and for 
communications by land is imperative,’ 
Susem. (769) 
§ 4 § 6 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεῖς ὁρὸς] “One 
defining principle,” see n. on III. 9 § 1 
‘is that just mentioned’: τὸ εὐποροθέτον 
einaι: “the city must be equally in 
communication with all parts of the country 
for defensive purposes.” This is ex-
panded c. 6 § 3, a 21—23. κοινῆ εἶναι= 
facilem aditum habere ad omnes locos 
Bonitz Ind. 1v. s. u. 
§ 7 ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς] “And the other is that 
it should be easy of access (τὸ εὐπαρ-
cόμαστον εἰναι τὴν χώραν) for the convey-
ance of the produce of the soil as well as 
of material like timber, or any other 
similar material in which the country may
γνωμένων καρπῶν παραπομπάς, έτι δὲ τής περὶ ξύλα (V)
ύλης, καί εἰ τινα ἄλλην εργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυργχάω
6 κεκτημένη τοιαύτην εὐπαρακόμιστον.
περὶ δὲ τής
11 πρὸς τήν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον ἡφέλιμος ταῖς
εὐνομομέναις πόλεσιν ἡ βλαβερά, πόλλοι τυργχάωσιν
ἀμφισβητοῦντες: τὸ τε γὰρ ἐπιζευγόσθαι τίνας ἐν ἄλ-
λοις τεθραμμένους νόμοις ἀσύμφορον φασιν εἶναι πρὸς
15 τήν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τήν πολυανθρωπίαν γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ
ἐκ τοῦ χρήσαται τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους
ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δὲ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύσεθαι
§ 2 καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, μέλτιον καὶ
πρὸς ἀσφίλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἁναγκαίων μετέχειν
20 τήν πόλιν καὶ τής χώρας <καὶ> τῆς θαλάσσης, οὐκ ἄδηλον.
§ 3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ῥᾶσον φέρειν τοῖς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους
εἶναι δει κατ’ ἀμφότερα τοὺς σωθησμένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν

8 The punctuation (a comma after παραπομπάς instead of a period, and no comma after τοιαύτην) Jackson followed by Welldon 9 τυργχάων P1, τυργχάουει P5 Sb 10 τοιαύτην before κεκτημένη M P1, before ἡ χώρα Γ 11 [περὶ...137 b 18 τοῖς] Broughton: see Comm. 12 πόλλοι Camerarius and possibly M P1 (1st hand): for
Μ8 has πολλα, i.e. πολλὰ or πόλλω, and P1 has πολλ (with a written very small and apparently an erasure after it), πολλὰ Γ P1 P5 Bk.1 P1 (corr.) and perhaps M8 14 εἶναι φασὶ Π2 P5 Bk. 15 ἐπὶ ἑναντίαν Μ8, ὑπεναντίον Π2 C5 20 τήν πόλιν omitted by Γ M8 16 τῆς χώρας <καὶ> Bojesen (see c. 5 § 3, c. 11 § 1), τῆν χώραν Γ P Λρ. Bk. Susem.1 in the text 21 πολέμους Sylburg, πολέμους Γ P Λρ. Susem.1 in the text

trade " (Welldon). κεκτημέναι εργασίαν τυ-
νώς—towards have acquired a trade in any
staple commodity.
§ 6 The advantage and disadvantage of
proximity to the sea.
Comp. A. Lang Introductory Essays
p. 71. Broughton maintains that c. 6 is
not by Aristotle, but is wholly the work
of some Peripatetic, which Apellikon or
Andronikos first inserted in this place.
Comp. n. (790), and on the other side
§ 1 12 πόλλοι τυργχάουσιν ἀμφισ-
βητοῦντες] See Plato Laws IV. 705 A.
706 ff.; cp. xii. 950. 11 But in Aristotle's
account of the opinions held by representa-
tives of this view there are some things
not to be found in Plato: accordingly it
would seem that he has other writers also
in view. At a later time Cicero 'is
wholly in agreement' with such opinions,
De Repub. ii. c. 3 f. 'Aristotle looks at
the question more impartially' (Oncken)
and really goes as far as it was possible
for him to go with his narrow theories
upon Political Economy. But of course
even he was greatly hampered by them.
See mun. (772, 774). Susem. (770)
13—18. Objections: (1) the con-
tinued residence of aliens brought up
under alien laws, and (2) the populousness
of seaport-towns, are prejudicial to good
government. See Laws IV. 704 D.
15 καὶ τήν πολυανθρωπίαν sc. ἁναγ-
καίων εἶναι. γίνεσθαι] sc. τήν πολυαν-
θρωπίαν. A large population is the result
of their traffic by sea. The participles
are accus. as subjects of χρήσαται.
§ 2 18 εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει] apart
from these results.
20 "that the city should communicate
both with the land and the sea." This
sense seems certain from 25 ἀμφο-
tέρων μετέχουσιν.
§ 3 21 φέρειν] To resist, bear the
brunt of an attack.
IV(VII) 6. 5] 1327 a 8—1327 a 37. 497

καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τους ἐπιτιθεμένη-(V)

§ 24 νους, εἰ μή κατ᾽ ἄμφω δυνατὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον οὐπάρ-

§ 4 ξεί μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρως μετέχουσιν. ὡσα τ᾽ ἄν μή τυγχάνη

παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὤντα, δέξασθαι ταύτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα

τῶν γινομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἑστίν. αὐτῇ

γὰρ ἐμπορίκην, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεὶ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.

οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφάς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγοράν προσέδουν 5

§ 30 χάριν ταύτα πράττουσιν ἤν δὲ μὴ δεὶ πόλιν τοιαύτης

μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ᾽ ἐμπόριον δεὶ κεκτήσασθαι τοιοῦτον.

§ 5 ἔπει δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχουν<τα> καὶ χώραις καὶ

πόλεσιν ἐπίρεισα καὶ λιμένας εὐφυνὸς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν

πόλιν, ὡστε μήτε το αὐτὸ νέμειν ἀστν μήτε πόρρω λίαν,

35 ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαί τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι,

φανερόν ὅσ τι μὲν ἀγαθόν τι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς

κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τούτῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ (p. 107)

24 ἀλλ᾽ εἰ Π., ἀλλὰ γε Schneider p. 30 ὑπ᾽ 1.2.3.4 Vb Ald. and apparently Ar.

32 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπεί Π. Α., ἐπεί δὴ Götting p. ὑπάρχουτα καὶ Welldon, ὑπάρχουτα

Congreve Susem. 3, 3', ἑπάρχον καὶ ΠΠ Ρκ, 1, ἑπάρχου καὶ Schneider Ρκ 9

34 νέμειν αὐτὸ τὸ Γ Αρ. Σουσμ. 1, 2, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπ. a lacuna Ρ 5 (1st hand), τὸ αὐτὸ (αὐτῶν Ρ 4)

νέμειν other authorities and Ρ 5 (later hand). Either may be correct. Cp. Busse p. 38.

23 καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι | Cp. c. 11

ΠΠ Ι. n. (855). Susem. (771) Also II. 6

§ 8

24 κατὰ θάτερον | ' in one of the two ways, if both are at their command,' (μετέχουσιν dative plur. of the participle.)

§ 4 27 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἑστὶν | Partitive genitive: 'is one amongst necessary conditions': so Π. Π. 11 § 10. 1273 a 33.

This periphrasis enables Aristotle to avoid the hiatus of ἐκπέμψασθαι ἀναγκαίων.

αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορίκην κτλ | 'For it ought to carry on trade in its own interests exclusively and not for the advantage of others.' This dictum strikes at the root of free-trade legislation (Eaton). Susem. (772)

Thirty years ago our other English commentator Congreve uncompromisingly denounced this dictum: "Any theory like this of Aristotle's—such as the mercantile and protective system of later times,—which aims at exclusiveness, is to be condemned as a direct attack on the real interests of mankind." Even now how large a part of civilized mankind is in Aristotle's position and fails to discern its real interests in this matter.

29 πᾶσιν ἀγοραν | 'a universal mart.' This exactly describes the situation of Athens as the sole mart e.g. of corn from the Black Sea. Cp. Xen. De Vit. 3.

31 ὁδὸ̂ν ἐμπόρων | The ideal city is not itself to be such a place of trade, nor is it to have a commercial seaport of this kind.

§ 5 32 ἔπει δὲ ... 33 ἐπίνεια | 'This was the situation of Peiraeus, Cenchreae, Lechaion, Notion [cp. viii(v). 3 § 15 n. 1541], Nisaea, Pegae, Patrae, Argos' (Eaton). Susem. (773)

35 τείχους | As the long walls connecting Peiraeus with Athens, Lechaion with Corinth, and Nisaea with Megara.

37 εἰ δὲ το βλασφημον | 'while any harm they may cause it is easy to guard against by prescribing and defining in the laws who are, and who are not, to enjoy mutual intercourse.' Here then even Aristotle adopts the principles of Plato's policy in regard to the treatment of foreigners, Laws XII 950 ff., esp. 952 D—953 E (Eaton). Susem. (774) Plato would exercise a strict surveillance on all who enter or leave the country: comp. n. (373) on the Spartan ἔνθηλαι.
§ 6. A naval force is essential within due limits. Epaminondas shared this opinion apparently; see Grote c. 79.

§ 7. 1327 b 4 εἰ μὲν γὰρ... βοήθων. "For if the city is to have a career of supremacy." One would have thought that in his ideal of a state Aristotle would have attended to the domestic activity of the citizens and not to external power and rule: 14 § 21. Nor is this really inconsistent with the present remark, which is very general in its tenor. Proximity to the sea, he says, and a naval force is an advantage to every state: a warlike, conquering state (which on Aristotle's principles therefore is not the best) needs of course a stronger naval force: the best state can do with a smaller fleet. See however u. (917) and Introd. p. 55. Susem. (775)

5 πολιτικῶν] Schneider well remarks: quasi relique civitates πολιτικῶν βοῶν non colant. Conservative critics defend the word as meaning "a true political life" by reference to ii. 6 § 7, iv(vii). 2 § 3.

§ 8. 10 καὶ τῶν πεζευτῶν] At Athens too the soldiers for the fleet were sometimes taken from the actual citizen army, the heavy-armed infantry (cf. u. 1519), Thuc. iii. 98 § 4, viii. 23 § 2; but generally (u. 1453) from the Thetes or fourth class in the census, Thuc. vi. 43 (Eaton). Cp. Bockeh Strutsch. 18. 583 f., 18. 649 f. p., 500 Eng. tr. Susem. (776)

14 τῶν Ἡρακλειστῶν] Xenophon also speaks of the large naval force of the
The natural characteristics of the citizens: they should be of Greek race, uniting intelligence with a spirited temper, and active intelligence with a strong body.

§ 1 22 dieiληται τοις ζηνεοις divided amongst different races. So διαλαξεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας VI(IV). 11 § 13, 1296 a 11; εἰς διαφοράς De Polit. Animal. I. 3 § 3, 642 b 30; διακωβεῖσαναι καὶ διαλαξεῖν εἰς εἰδὴ Rhet. 1. 4 § 4, 1359 b 3.

§ 2 3 Compare the remark made by Plato Rep. IV. 435 e, that among the Thracians, Scythians and other northern nations courage predominates; among the Phoenicians and Egyptians love of gain; among the Greeks reason. Hippocrates in his work de aere, aquis, locis alluded to above in n. (752), p. 547 ff. Kühn, compares in detail the natural differences between Europeans and Asiatics, and describes the happy mean of the Greeks. Herod. ix. 122 makes Cyrus say that fertile countries make effeminate people, since the same soil is not capable of producing rare fruits and warlike men; and in iii. 106, he says that Hellas enjoys by far the best climate. Plato Tim. 24 c commends in particular the happy blending of the seasons in Attica, and the combination of warlike excellence and love of knowledge resulting from this influence. In the Aristotelian Problems xiv. 8, 16, there is a discussion of the question why the inhabitants of warm countries are as a rule cowardly, and those of cold countries brave (Eaton). Cp. also n. (641). Susem. (781)
§ 2 πται τοῖς ἑθνεῖσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη (VI) καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη, διανοιας
25 δὲ ἐνυδέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεὶ μᾶλλον, ἀπολύτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίων ἄρχειν οὐ δυνά-
μενα: τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ
tὴν ψυχῆν, ἄθυμα δὲ, διόπερ ἄρχομενα καὶ δουλεύοντα
§ 3 διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος άσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ
30 τοὺς τόπους, οὐτὸς ἀμφότερος μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνυμον καὶ
dιανοητικῶν ἐστὶν· διόπερ ἐλεύθερον τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλ-
tιστα πολιτεύμουν καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς
§ 4 τυγχάνων πολιτείας, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἐξει διαφορᾶν καὶ τὰ 2


§ 2 23 τὰ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] "The nations which live in cold countries, and those which live in Europe." J. G. Schneider tried to explain the text as though Europe were here used in its oldest sense of the country between Peloponnesus and Thrace (Hom. Hymn to Apollo 251). Not only is this interpretation in itself improbable, but the contrast shows that it is not Greek but only non-Greek natives that are here alluded to; and as immediately afterwards Asia is opposed to Europe, the latter must refer to the whole continent just as much as the former. Similarly c. 10 § 3 n. (823). It is necessary therefore to bracket either καὶ or τὰ. In the latter case καὶ will be epegegetic: "those who live in the cold countries, i.e. in Europe," SUSEM. (779)

26 ἀπολύτευτα] Without organized government; and, in consequence, incapable of common action for aggression. Probably on the analogy of the individual φώσει ἄρχον Aristotel considers that the race, like the city, ought to be capable of ruling over the φώσει ἄρχομενοι.

28 διόπερ ἄρχομενα ... 29 διατελεῖ] Comp. III. 14 § 6 n. (621) and n. (54). SUSEM. (780)

§ 3 30 ἐνυμον] spirited, courageous.
31 διόπερ ἐλεύθερον ... 33 πολιτείας] "For which reason the Greek race is and always has been" [lit. continues to be] "free and best governed and capable of ruling all mankind, if it happened to be under a single government." Herod. IX. 2 makes the Thebans say to Mardonios that so long as the Greeks keep united (as formerly had been the case) the whole world could scarcely subdue them: κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν Ἑλληνας διοφο-
rενοτα, οὔτε καὶ πάρος ταῦτα ἐγνωσκον, ἁλέπα εἶναι περιγίνονται καὶ ἀπαίς ἀνθρώ-
pοιοί (Eaton). See further Introdt. p. 46. SUSEM. (782)

This is the passage on which Oncken 1. 18 ff. II. 2. 273 relies for his interpretation of Aristotle's attitude to Alexander and to Greek politics. He compares Isocrates' repeated appeals to the Greek nation to cherish οὗν (Paniegeryc. De Pac. Philipp. cp. Ep. 3). According to Oncken the μια πολιτεία was already realized de facto in the protectorate over Greece exercised by Philip, and after him by Alexander: the terms of which he infers from the contemporary speech (falsely attributed to Demostenes) περί τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν. But that the arrangement of 336 B.C. was an alliance of ostensibly free and independent powers, in short a confederation (συμ-
μαχία θυριῆσις χάρων) and not a πολιτεία (II. 2 § 3) is proved most conclusively by the wording of the first article; by the orator's argument that Macedon having broken the treaty, Athens has the right to appeal to arms; and by the terms συνθήκαι and κοινῆ εἰρήνη themselves (cp. Rhet. II. 23 § 18, 1399 b 12 ὃτι τὸ διδόναι γάρ καὶ ἔδωκα διώκειν [εἰστί], καὶ τὸ μετέχει τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεὶν τὸ προσπαθήμενον). Some however are not content to find in the words of the text, as in those of Herodotos, a sudden thought or passing hint. It remains then to inquire: what precisely was the constitution which Aristotle had in mind,
under which he thought united Hellas could expect to rule the world? The answer expected is either (i) an absolute monarchy, or (2) a federal state (Bundesstaat). Yet neither satisfies the conditions of a possible answer as given rather in the whole character and tendency of the work than in any single passage. That by "constitution" Aristotle means the constitution of a city-state and not a race or nation or tribe, is a fundamental postulate, although nowhere expressly laid down. Nations other than the Greek are occasionally mentioned as monarchically and "despotically" governed, and so far as oriental despotism is one variety of βασιλεία they may be said to have a constitution. But the very words in which this variety is described (see n. on III. 12 § 8) exclude its application to the Greeks: it is because Asiatics are of more servile temper than Europeans, and barbarians generally than Greeks, that they quietly endure the yoke, III. 14 §§ 6, 7. The difficulty lies in the absence of any detailed treatment of the interpolitical relations of the Greek cities. From the silence of our author it would be rash to affirm that theoretically the absolute king who may arise in a single city (III. 13 §§ 13, 14, 24, 25; 14 § 1, § 15; 17 §§ 5—8) has a counterpart in an absolute king over the whole Greek race. The slight evidence there is points to Aristotle's discerning in the hegemony of Macedon (which was nominally all that Philip or Alexander asked and the Congress of Corinth granted) a fact analogous to the old hegemonies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes: see vii (IV). 11 § 18 E, and Frag. 81, 1489 b 26, Plutarch De Alexandri virtute 1 c. 6 ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνειδήσεις αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλάσις ἡγεμονικοῖς τοῖς δὲ βασιλάρισις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενοι. To us Chaeronea, or Crenna, may mark the end of Greek history. Such was not the feeling of contemporary Greeks—whether they sided with Demosthenes or with Phocion.

§ 4 34 The Dorian, Ionian, Thessalian, Arcadian, Aetolian ἡθος occur as examples of Greek tribal populations.

35 μονόκωλος] one-sided. The Aetolians approximated to the hardy peoples of the north: the Asiatic Ionians to the softer Asiatics.

§ 5 38 ὅπερ γὰρ φασί τινες] Plato in Ῥεπ. II. 375 c ff. Comp. n. (1006) on viii (VIII), § 2. SUSEM. (783)

39 τοῖς φύλαξι] See n. (140) on ii. 3 § 5. SUSEM. (784)

34 καὶ inserted by M II b. Bk. 35 τε omitted by III b. 2 Spengel approves the omission unless καὶ be inserted after τε. 38 τῶν νομοθέτων I. 14, τῶν νομοθέτων I apparently
Schneider). Just because this is only hypothetically expressed, there is no contradiction between it and the present passage. "Theognis, too, 109 ff., ascribes love and hatred to 'spirit' or θυμός" (Camerarius). Further comp. nn. (790, 182, 839, 935). SUSEM. (786).

41 αὐτην] Not τοιτο, see e. c. 1 § 8 n.

1328 a 5 σφ Bergk, following Schneider, ou ΙΠ Αρ. Bk. Susem.1 in the text διή Μ1, untranslated by William = παρὰ Γ15 Αr. Bergk, παρὰ with all other authorities Bk. ἀπάγχεια P1, ἀπέγχεια M1 and apparently Α (a lanciae perforationes William), ἀπάγχεια P2, P3, P4, ἀπέγχεια P5, ἀπέγχεια Sh Vh and perhaps Ar. (lanciae transfixiæ es)

1328 a 1 πρὸς γάρ τοὺς συνήθεις Eaton compares Rhet. ΙΗ. 2 § 15, 1379 b 2, καὶ τοὺς φίλους [ἀργίζονται] μᾶλλον ἡ τοῖς μή φίλοις: οίνωται γὰρ προσηκέων μᾶλ- λου πάσχεν εὑρ' ἀντόν ἡ μη. SUSEM. (787).

2 αἰρεται] rises viz. in indignation.

§ 6 3 Ἀρχιλόχος Frag. 67. Archilochus of Paros, who flourished about 680 or somewhat earlier, was the true father of Greek lyrical poetry. Before his time the νόμος belonging to religious poetry had received its artistic development only from Terpander and Klonas (see n. 17 to my edition of the Iudicia). The invention of elegiac poetry was disputed between him and Kallinos. But his claim to be the inventor of iambic verse is undisputed, and also to be the first who made a regular arrangement of secular poetry. He seems also to have composed in regular fashion sacred songs for choruses; there is however a doubt as to the genuineness of the ὁ Βάλχα attributed to him (Frag. 120), but none as to the hymn to Herakles (Frag. 119). Whether he also wrote dithyrambs and paean cannot be certainly inferred from Frag. 76, 77. He was the first to introduce the iambic and trochaic metre into poetry and into vocal music con-
10 τῆν φύσιν ἁγριοί, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας. τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλ—(VI)
λον ἐτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πιάσχουσι, ὥσπερ εὐρηταῖ πρότερον,
§ 8 ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν, καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον παρ’ ἐστὶν.
οἱ γὰρ ὄφειλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν ἐνεργείαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν ὅθεν εὐρηται
χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν καὶ

16 oι τοι πέραν στέρζαντες, oι δὲ καὶ πέραν μισοῦσιν.

§ 9 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευμένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν
18 δεὶ καὶ ποιούσι τιάς τῆς φύσιν, ἐτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην
tε τινα καὶ πολιάν τινα, διώρισται σχέδον (οὐ γὰρ τὴν (p. 107)
20 αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεὶ ζητεῖν διά τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γνω-
8 μένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔπει δὲ ὀσπέρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν VII


him by greater services in return, so that he may not be under obligation to others, but rather others to him (Broughton).

Cp. also n. (878). SUSEM. (790)

§ 8 'And this is a result to be expected; for they imagine themselves to be robbed as well as slighted by those from whom they believe a kindness ought to be due to them.' ἀποστερεῖσθαι (ἐν ἑκένων) παρ’ ὅσι—by those in whose case there ought to be an obligation to a service to themselves.

"Cp. Khet. ii. 2 § 15, 1379 b 2 ff. (Eaton, Congreve)." SUSEM. (791)

14 ὀσπὲρ εὑρηται] This is a line of Euripides, from what play is not known, Frag. 965 (Nauck). SUSEM. (792)

16 oι τοι πέραν κτα] We know neither the author nor the play from which this is quoted (Frag. adesp. 53 Nauck)

SUSEM. (793)

§ 9 19 oι γὰρ...21 αἰσθήσεως] Comp. c. 12 § 8 u. (868). SUSEM. (794)

Also Vit. Eth. 1. 7 §§ 18, 19, 1908 a 26 ff. and De Anima 1. 1 ad init. 422 a 2, with Wallace's note on ἀκρίβεια. Also 1. 5 § 1, 1254 a 20, IV (VII). 1 § 6, 1323 a 39 with

cc. 8—12 contain the social conditions of the best city, which differ but slightly from those laid down by Plato (more especially in the Laws B. V., vi.) and would command the assent of most reflecting Greeks as at least theoretically desirable.

C. 8. Distinction of the citizen (proper) who are an essential part of the city, from the rest of the population, which is but an indispensable adjunct.

This idea is already familiar to the reader of B. III. c. 5, c. 13 § 13; see n. on 1284 a 9.

§ 1 21 ὀσπέρ τῶν ἄλλων] Thus for instance the things without which happiness cannot exist are not all parts of happiness, Eudem. Eth. 1. 2 §§ 2—5, 1214 b 11—27 (Eaton). Some of these (ὡς ἄρεν οἰκ.) are only secondary causes, as Plato already called them (Ae. Lev. Phil. s. v. ephaistos), or necessary conditions (Camperarius). Cp. Metaph. v. (A) 5§ 1, 1015 a 20: "necessary (or indispensable) is that which without which as secondary cause life is impossible." (Eaton). See Zeller II. ii. p. 33. 3 (1). Cp. n. (907) and n. (504) on III. 5 § 2. SUSEM. (795)

τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτων] Natural wholes made up of organic parts, as in I. 5, 3, 1254 a 29, with which ἄλλος was ranked III. 1. 2, 1274 b 39 u. (434). They are frequently mentioned in the zoological treatises.
κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶσιν οὐ ταύτα ἐστὶ μόρια τῆς ὀλῆς συν- (VII) στάσεως ὁν ἀνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀν εἰν, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πό-
λεως μέρη θετέων ὁσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν —< οἴον εἴτε τροφῆ τούτῳ ἐστὶν εἴτε χώρας πλήθος
< εἶτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν> —— οὖδ'
§ 2 ἀλλής κοινωνίας οὐδεμίας εἶ ἦς ἐν τῷ τῷ γένος. ἐν γάρ

22. ταῦτα Μ. 1, ταὐτὰ Βκ. 1, ταὐτ’ Π. 1, πάντα ? Wyse | 25 εὖς Π. 2 Ψ. 1 and perhaps Π. 1 (1st hand), since in that ms. ἦς is over an erasure, [εὖς] ἦς and τόλος for γένος ? Postgate | [τᾶ] γένος ? Koraes

22. μόρια | Also μέρη (μάλιστα ὡντα 1329 a 4 ff., cp. 1291 b 8): the technical terms for 'full members,' constituent parts and not mere adjuncts of the organic whole. See the good instances c. 4 § 6, 1326 a 20 ff.; vi(iV). 4, 14, 1291 a 24. In contrast to them the adjuncts are (1) necessary appendages, ὁσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, (2) sine quibus non, ὥς ἀνευ πόλεως οὐ συνίσταται, (3) requirements, ὡς δὲι, or even (4) τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα e.g., τροφῆ, χώρα. Note that both μέρος and μόριον are also used as non-technical terms, for the adjuncts. So μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως sometimes (as here) of full membership, 1329 a 35: sometimes again of the entire population, 1279 a 32. The relation between constituent parts and necessary conditions is explained ιθιι. 12, 8 ff., 1283 a 15—22 and ιV(iV). 6, 1, 1237 b 9: the ναιτικὸς ὄχλος is no part of Aristotle's city. There can be no city of brutes or of slaves.

συντάσσεως  | A term with various meanings: (1) the putting together—construction, (2) the thing so constructed ὁ συνίσταται, thus duplicating τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστ., cp. 1329 a 35. It is largely used in the biological works for 'structure' or 'organism': so also ιV(iV). 11, 8, 1295 b 28. On the latent analogy between organism and state, implied in this term and in ἐγραφεῖσαι functions, but drawn out at length ιV(iV). c. 4 §§ 8, 9, see A. C. Bradley op. c. p. 203 ff.

The view of De Partibus Animal. 1, 5 §§ 12—16, 645 b 14—20, is that every part (μόρον) of the body, like an instrument (ὄργανον), is for an end: this end is a function (πράξει τις). The parts are nose, eyes, face, etc.; the functions, more or less specific, ψένεις, αἴσθησις, ὕπνοι, πορεία, κτλ.

The transposition of the clause 27 οἰον εἴτε τροφῆ... 28 ἐστίν appears inevitable, because 'food' and a 'quantum of territory' would otherwise be adjoined as instances of ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τοῖς κοινωνίαις, for which purpose they are clearly inappropriate. The common object of the society, which gives the city its unity, is its ethical end, the conviction of the members that they must endeavour to realize a noble life, § 4, a 56—38 (cp. ιθιι. c. 9). On the other hand a supply of food and so much territory are indispensable requisites, and would seem to be included under κτῆσις a 33.

24. οὖδ' ἀλλής κοινωνίας... ἦς ἦς ἐν τῷ τῷ γένος] "Nor is this true of any other association which is to form a unity of kind?" (and not merely of mass, γένος is adverbial accusus.): i.e. which is to have a true organic unity, not merely the collective unity of an aggregate or heap. After 25 ἐν τῷ there is no need to insert ἐστα, for γενησθαι (οι ἐστα) can easily be understood. Συμε. (796)

§ 2 For the real members of the society must have some one identical common interest, though they need not all share in it equally. Haece mihi videtur esse sententia: unum aliquid idemque sociis commune necessce est (Susemihi).

25. A generic unity, or natural composite whole, 1, 5, 3, 1254 a 29 ff., but not a κράσις, μέξι, or σύμφωνα in which the mingled elements vanish and give birth to a new product: for the citizens continue to exist as parts of the whole 1, 2, 14, 1253 a 26. The difference between the mere heap and the organic whole is explained Μετα. II. 17, 8, 1041 b 18 ff. (examples: a syllable, flesh; each something apart from its constituents). See also Μετα. II. 6, 1, 1045 a 8, ὅσα πλεῖου μέρη ἔχει καὶ μὴ ἐστιν οἰνῷ σώματος πάν, ἀλλ' ἐστι τῷ ὅλον παρά τὰ μόρια. For a parallel to the language see Ψυχ. v. 3, 72, 227 a 14, ἐν τούτοις ἐστι τὸ σύνεχες, ἐξ ὧν ἐν τῷ περὶκε γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναφαν.

The notion of Unity is analysed Μετα. D. 6, I. 1: τὰ πρῶτα λέγομεν ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ὡσεὶ μία ἡ συνέχεια (sometimes τὸ ὅλον is
This page contains a Greek text with some notes and references. The text appears to be discussing a historical or philosophical topic, possibly related to architecture or craftsmanship. The notes and references are in Latin, with page numbers and note types indicating where the text is located in the source materials. The page contains a mix of Greek and Latin, typical of academic or scholarly work.
§ 5 χωμείης ἀρίστης. ἔπει δ' ἐστίν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἰδρητὴς ἐνεργεία καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὡστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδεχόμεθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ μικρόν ἡ μιδάν, 40 δὴ λογίᾳ τοῦ ἀπειτοῦ ἐγείρεθαι πόλεως εἰδή καὶ διαφοράς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους: ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δεὶ ἄλλων ἐκαστοὶ τοῦτο. 1328 b 2

§ 6 ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτὶ ἐστὶν ἂν ἄνευ πολίς οὐκ ἂν εἰς καὶ γάρ ἐλέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως, ἐν τούτοις ἄν εἰς, διὸ * * ἀναγκαίον υπάρχειν. λεπτέον τοῖς τῶν τῶν 4

§ 7 ἐργον τὸν ἀριθμὸν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἐσται δήλον. πρῶτον 39 αὐτὴς <πάντως> ᾧ Σπενγελ, needlessly 40 τῷ τοῦ II 3 P 3 Bk. 1328 b 2 ταύτ' Σπενκέρ Bk. 3, τάυτὰ Bas. 4 διὸ omitted by II 3 P 3 Ar. Bk. and Vettore, who detected the lacuna. But Bk. ignored it, and Welldon is content to punctuate 3 εἰς (καὶ γὰρ... ἄν εἰς), διὸ ἀναγκαίον υπάρχειν

the head of 'animate property' are included slaves as well as domestic animals: sec 1 c. 4, c. 5 § 8 ff., c. 8 § 6 ff., c. 11 §§ 1, 2, c. 13 §§ 1, 2. Comp. also ἐκ. (37). SUSEM. (801)

η δὲ πόλις κτλ] "Now the city is a society of like members": comp. 1. 7 § 1, ἐλευθερον καὶ ἱσον. VI (IV). 11 § 8 ἱσον καὶ ὁμοίως, with πόλες (58 b, 1293). See also ἐκ. (133) and the passages there cited. On the other hand ἀδύνατον ὁμοίως εἶναι πάντα τοῖς πολίταις, III. 1 § 5, sec ἐκ. (471). SUSEM. (797)

36 ἕκεν δὲ [ὡς κτλ] It is therefore this 'best life realizable' which is the one identical common interest in question, ἐν τὶ κοινῶν (Congreve). Compare further ἐκ. (21) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (798)

§ 5 37 αὐτή δὲ κτλ] No reference is made to a previous discussion or to the Ethic. Comp. the Excursus I. SUSEM. (799)

38 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος] A fair paraphrase of the definition of Ἄντε. Eth., as may be seen from E. E. Π. 1, 1219 a 16, τῶν δὲ ἡ χρήσις ἔγγον, 1219 b 2, ἄν ἐκαστὸν χρήσις ἐστὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ὡστε καὶ ἡ πρᾶξες. 39 ὡστε] Apparently redundant, as in II. 2 § 5 ἐκ.

40 τῷ γύρισθαι πόλεως εἰδή καὶ δια-

An imperfect constitution exists because it is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Either the subordinate ends, which fall short of man's true develop-

ment, are raised into ultimate ends: or the true end is sought, but not for all.' (A. C. Bradley). ὑπ. c. 9 § 2, 1328 b 31. 41 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον κτλ] ὑπ. (466) on III. 3. g. SUSEM. (800) 1328 b 1 ὑπ. 1. 8. 4 ff.

§ 6 2 The recognition of the 'parts' or Members proper will be facilitated by an enumeration of social functions (ἐργα), i.e. 'occupations' (b ἐργασίας) requisite to the independent existence of the community, which serves roughly to classify the inhabitants working at these occupations: food implies farmers, handicrafts workmen, etc. New terms are introduced in the parallel lists VII(VI). 7. 1, 1321 a 4 ff. (βασιλικόν, ἀγοραίον) and VI (IV). 4. 9, 1290 b 40 ff. (βάσανον, ἀγο-

ραίον, δικαστικόν, ὁμοιρύγκων, βουλευτο-

µενον): but here τεχνητά must include βάσανον, while τὸ εὐσφορον or 'capital' probably furnishes the wealthier merchants (ἀγοραίον), so far as these are citizens, and the comprehensive κρατῆ τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων corresponds in the main to three classes (judicial, official, deliberative) of VI (IV). c. 4. "Both lists reflect the imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek society" (Newman).

3 All the real members, or parts (μέρη), of a city will be indispensable, though not all things indispensable will be members.

4 διὸ * *] There are so many conceivable possibilities for filling up this lacuna that any definite attempt of this kind becomes idle. SUSEM. (802)
mēν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δει τροφῆν, ἐπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ (VII) ὀργάνων δεῖται τῷ ξῆν), τρίτων δὲ ὀπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινω-
νοῦντας ἀναγκαίον [καὶ] ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐχειν ὀπλα πρὸς τε τὴν
ἀρχὴν, τῶν ἀπειθοῦντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξοθεν ἀδι-
τ. (p. 103)

8 [καὶ] Koraes, for which [τε] Welldon, wrongly | αὐτοῖς 15 (?), αὐτοῖς 1’ and the rest of our authorities | 11 <τὰς> Schneider Bk.2 | 12 [καὶ πρῶτον] Spengel
16 ὡν] ἀ M* P1 | 18 τούτων after τυγχάνῃ (τυγχάνει 14) IP1 IP2 Bk., thus avoiding hiatus | 20 συνεστάναι M* P1 | 21 παρασκευάσουσιν IP2 IP3 Bk. | 23 δικαίων
Lambin, ἀναγκαίων Γ’Η Ar. Bk.1 Susen,3 in the text

§ 7 An enumeration of functions necessary in a city, to some extent parallel, is attempted in Plato Rep. 11. 381, cp. Phaedr. 248 D, E.

§ 7 8 προς τε τὴν ἀρχὴν κτλ] To these two legitimate ends of warfare is added a third c. 321, 1334 ± 2 n. (918).
12 πρῶτων First in importance.
15 κρίσει] Under κρίσει τῶν συμφι-

§ 8 18 ὡς φαμέν] III. 1 § 12, cp. n. (447); IV (VII), 4 § 11 n. (759); also n. (21) with the passages there quoted. The present φαμέν is equivalent to a reference to what has preceded, not only here but c. 10 § 9, n. (831), c. 13 § 4 n. (572), 14 § 8 n. (903). Any multitude of men taken at random does not constitute a state; a remark which was made c. 4 § 6 n. (753) and repeated VII (V). 3. 11 n. (1531 b).SUSEM. (804)

§ 9 20 κατ’ τὰς ἐργασίας] must be organized in accordance with these occupations.
21 Cp. 11. 8. 10, 1268 a 32 f.
23 κρίτας] So above, § 7, b 14, κρίσιν.
c. 9 Exclusion from the franchise of the producing classes: artisans, traders, husbandmen. Those who remain will have different functions, according to age, military, governmental, and judicial duties. This class body of citizens will own the land; when superannuated, to become priests.

This exclusion of the necessary appendages from full civic rights was foreshadowed in the criticism of Plato’s Republic, 11. c. 5 §§ 18–28, and of Hippodamus, c. 8 §§ 8–12: it was laid down distinctly III. c. 5: see n. (504).
29 ταύτα Σουσμ., τούτο ΙΠΑρ. Βκ. Σουσμ.1 in the text 32 μέν ομιλούσαν μετόχως ή τόπους αὐτοὺς ἀπανταί· τις όμως ἐν τῷ τούτῳ πολιτείᾳ, καθάπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, 

$\frac{\text{§ 29}}{\text{καθάπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν}}$] Just before, § 1, b 25 εἶναι γὰρ κτλ. Σουσμ. (805) 33 πάντων sc. εἴρησων. 

§ 3 34 αὐτὴ... 35 εὐδαίμων] Comp. c. 1 § 3 n. (686), c. 13 § 4 n. (872): also ΙΠΑρ. 9. 5 n. (284) and n. (21). For the wide range of πολιτεία, see n. (466). Σουσμ. (806). 

§ 36 εἰρήσατο πρότερον] It was observed in Excursus 1, n. (687), that this can be referred to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37, and does not therefore compel us to infer that cc. 1—3 originally formed an integral part of this treatise. Nay more: had the reference been to c. 1, the more appropriate term would have been ἀποδέδεικτος, "proven," rather than εἰρήσατο "stated." Comp. further n. (873). Σουσμ. (807). 

§ 38 ἀπλῶς] In contrast to the partial justice of oligarchy and democracy: ΙΠΑρ. 9. 39 πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν] Relatively to the constitution of the time being: under its conditions, taking its principle or special idea (ὅρος) for the standard. See ΙΠΑρ. 4. 3, 1276 b 30, vi (IV). 7. 2, 1293 b 3 ff. 

τῶν ἀριστῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ μῆ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν των ἁγάθων ἄνδρων, with n. (1233). Comp. also ΙΠΑρ. 9. 1 n. Σουσμ. (808) Add vi (IV). c. 11 s. fin. 1296 b 9 ἄν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνῃ τις, but c. 16 § 1, 1300 b 14, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν, and Μετα. XIII. (M) c. 7 § 30 1082 b 32 πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ῥῦθος λεγοντι, ἀπλῶς δ' οὖν ῥῦθος. Bonitz Ind. Ar. 796 b 48 remarks that ὑπόθεσιν does not differ much from τέλος or ὅρος. Apparently the meaning is the same here as a 22 ὑπόθεσις does not differ much from τέλος or ὅρος. 

§ 44 αἰγενής] See ΙΠΑρ. 5. 5. ἑπούς (506, 509, 511). Cp. also n. (103) Σουσμ. (809) 

On the construction ὑπεραντιών πρὸς ΙΠΑρ. 11. 9. 1, 1269 a 32, § 18, 1270 a 40. For the thought Spengel has the parallel Demosth. ὁμήροι. ΙΠΑρ. 33 § 32, p. 37, 18: ἐστι δ' οὐδέποτε, οἷος, μὲν, γε καὶ κανόνικα φράσεις λαξεύνει καὶ φαίλει πραγματοποιεῖται τοῦτον αἰγενήν ἄν γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἐπιτεθήκατα τῶν ἄνδρων ἂν τοῦτον ἄγαμο καὶ τὸ ῥηματὴ ἄρχειν. Cp. Burke: Great empires and little minds go ill together. 

§ 4 1329 a 1 δει γὰρ σχολῆς "له"
sure is needed if virtue is to be forthcoming, as well as for the conduct of state affairs. Contempt for labour goes side by side with exaltation of leisure: n. (93). The artizan, the farmer even, is too busy to cultivate virtue. Cf. Aelian Ἱ. Ἰ. x. 16, ἡ ἄγρια ἀδελφή τῆς ἔλευθερίας ἐστί. From the Greeks this estimate passed to the Jews: see Ecclesiasticus c. 38, 24—34 (Newman).

3. Βουλευόμενον καὶ κρίνον From ἀμφω, a 6, it is clear that a single class is meant: a body which deliberates on questions of policy and decides questions of justice. Cf. § 9, a 31, το τε ὀπλιτικόν καὶ το βουλευτικόν.

4. ἐνυπάρχει] 'are contained in the city as members in the fullest sense' not merely indispensable adjuncts.

6. ἀμφω = the functions (1) of the military class, (2) of the deliberative and judicial class.

§ 5 7 διότι=that (after φανερῶ): as 1253 a 7 and often.

8. ἐτέρας ἀκμᾶς] sc. ἐστί: belongs to a different time of life.


10. ἐν δὲ κτλ] This is said to be στάσεως αἰτίων, II. 5, 25, 1264 b 8. With the partial genitive τῶν ἀνθρώπων cp. 6 § 4, 1327 a 27: in full ἐν τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων c. 14

§ 4, 1332 b 32.

11. ταυτή δὲ] Resumptive of the δὲ in a 9: 'in as far as it is impossible...in so far they must be the same.' When δὲ has preceded with the relative, it may for emphasis be repeated with the demonstrative. The idiom is found in Herod. (e.g. ii. 50), Thuc. (ii. 40), Xenophon, Isocrates (Panegyric: § 98, § 176), Plato (Lact. 194) ταυτά ἄγαθος ἢστιν ἐκατος ἡμῶν, ἀπερ σοφος, δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακος) and Demosthenes (c. Mid. § 100, see Buttman's Exc. XII.). Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 166 b 58—167 a 12, and Studien ii. iii., pp. 124—129, has disposed of the view formerly held (by Zell, Götting, etc.) that Aristotle in some cases used δὲ where other Greek prose writers introduce the apodosis without any particle. The only valid instances are (1) after a conditional particle (1287 b 12 n.), (2) as ἀλλ' occasionally far on in the sentence.

οἱ γάρ τῶν ὑπλαν κΤΛ] Hence one of the favourite measures of tyrants was to forbid the use of arms VIII(v). 10 § 11, and 11 § 22 nn. (1667, 1743 b). See moreover Xen. Cyx. vii. 5, 39, Thuc. iii. 27, the Demos in Mytilene obtained arms: ἐπειδὴ ἐλπὶν ὑπλαν οὔτε ἢκροβύτιν ἢ τῶν ἀχρύσων (Eaton). SUSEM. (811)

§ 6 13. τὴν πολιτείαν ταυτή] 'hanc partem rei publicae administrandae' Bo- nitz Ind. Ar. s. v. 'It only remains to
en trust this whole side of political life to both who are the same persons” (a lame conclusion): as if agriculture, trade, etc. were the other side, contrary to the teaching of cc. 8, 9. If however we adopt ἀμφότερα and ταύτα (see Crit. notes), then τῷ πολίταιν becomes the subject, not the object, of the verb ἀποδόθων. SUSEM.

17. ἐχεῖ...ἀξίαν] “This division recognizes desert.” See c. 14 § 4, 132 b 35, which is a reference back to the present passage; n. (806). SUSEM. (812) § 7 § 7 18 <ἐνιαί> περὶ τοῦτος] SUSEM. § 8, a 25, ἐνιαί τοῦτον, § 9, a 33, τῷ ἀνάπαυσαν ἐχεῖν αὐτώς. “περὶ c. acc. rem significant ad quam aliqua actio referatur” Bonn. Ind. Ar., who cites Topies 11. 7-5, 113 a 31, cp. 579 b 43 διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ ἀληθείας = the sensation of sight. “The landed property must be in their hands.”

19. Civic rights are not for the artizans, nor for any other class which is not employed upon the ‘manufacture’ of virtue.

21. ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως] We need not refer this to c. 1, it can be regarded as a reference to c. 8 § 5, 132 b 37 ff., as was explained in n. (807). SUSEM. (813) § 23 ἐνδιάμονα δὲ πόλιν] ‘When we call a city happy, we have in view all the citizens and not merely a particular class.’ SUSEM. (814) § 8 § 8 φανερὸν δὲ κτλ] It is certainly not a direct inference, that the soil should be cultivated by slaves or barbarians. But it follows indirectly if we mentally supply two propositions: (1) Aristotle’s decision that the Greeks in general are not slaves by nature, so that they cannot be treated as serfs or half-free, n. (54); (2) his remarks, II. 9. 2 ff., 1269 a 36 ff., on the evil consequences attending the employment of serfs of Greek descent, Penestae, Helots, etc. nn. (280, 284). Further comp. c. 10 § 13 n. (839) and Exc. ‘On the Cretan περιοικοῖ’ p. 336. SUSEM. (815) § 9 § 9 33 περὶ αὐτῶν must be περὶ τῶν
30 τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς: ἐπεὶ δὲ διϊρηταὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο (VIII) μέρη, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικὸν, πρέπει (p. 110) δὲ τίν περὶ τοπωθέτων θεοὺς καὶ τιν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοῦς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τοῦτοι ἀν εἰρὴ τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτείν.

§ 10 δὲν μὲν τοῖνοι ἄνευ πόλεως οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη 36 πόλεως, εἰρηταὶ (γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνιταὶ καὶ πάν τὸ θητείκον ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν, καὶ κεκω- 39 ὅριστα διὰ τοῦτων ἔκαστον, τὸ μὲν οἷον τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος).

[ἐνικε δὲ οὐ φύν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ’ εἰναι γνώριμον τοὺς περὶ IX]

33 αὐτῶν ὑπὸ Σουσέμ. τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας.

Those who were superannuated: upon the principle stated II. 9. 25, see n. (330). This is the solution of an apparent inconsistency; that in this, the only genuine aristocracy, n. (330), all citizens have equal rights, see n. (930), and yet aristocracy is the rule of a minority: III. 7 §§ 1—3, 15 §§ 8—10 n. (648), cf. III. 18. 1. For if the citizens of the ideal state must complete military service before admission, at the age of 35, into the popular assembly (c. 16 § 9 1335 a. 30 ff., Exc. II.), and are not eligible to the Council or the offices of state (military commands excepted) till they are about fifty, while later on they are again released from all civic duties and lose all civic rights by becoming priests, it follows that it is only from his fiftieth to about his seventieth year that each citizen can have a share in the entire government and administration, as indeed was remarked Intro. p. 51, p. 54. For these twenty years only is he actually a full citizen, in the active exercise of his rights. This being so, the ruling body of full citizens will always remain, beyond all doubt, a minority of the civic body in the wider sense, including the soldiers and superannuated old men, even if the boys and youths are excluded. Comp. c. 13 § 9, 1332 a. 34 n. (885), c. 14 §§ 4, 5. On the position which the priests hold in relation to the magistrates proper see VII (IV). 15. 2 n. (1344), VII (VI). 8. 24 n. (1478). Sousem. (816, 817)

35 ff. 'Thus we have given (1) the indispensable adjutants and (2) the integral parts of a city: i.e. cultivators, artisans, and the whole class of labourers are adjutants indispensable to cities, while the integral parts are the defensive force and the deliberative body. These elements are severally distinct, the distinction between integral parts and adjutants being permanent, that between the army and the deliberative body only temporary.' A valuable summary of results.

c. 10 [Historical digression: §§ 1—9.] Particulars respecting the division and cultivation of the land: §§ 9—14.

The historical digression is apparently an interpolation by a well-informed Peripatetic. At all events the suspicion under which it labours (see Crit. notes) has not been dispelled by Spengel's fond admiration of this "beautiful passage" (Arist. Stud. III. p. 3 n.), or by Newman's dispassionate survey, Vol. I. p. 573 ff.

§ 1 40 οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ νεωστὶ Possibly this is directed against Plato, and intended to prove that he was by no means the inventor of the particular classification wherein Aristotle here follows him. E. Curtius History of Greece 1. 6 p. 162 (I. p. 181 Eng. tr.) even goes so far as to suppose that all the three 'orders' of the
Platonic state had actually existed in Crete—an opinion which few people will accept. See II. 5. 16-17. (167). Susem. (818) Hippodamos (see II. 8. 2) also adopted this division between the military and agricultural population, which was always one of the main features of the Spartan state, II. 5. 17. 1264 a 10 note. A later historian finds a parallel to Plato's republic in the Indian state: Holm Griech. Gesch. III. p. 185.

41 γένε] Classes, castes. Seven in Egypt are enumerated by Herod. II. 164: i.epeis (ib. cc. 37. 143), μάχακιος (c. 165), βουκλιός (c. 65), γςβάτας (c. 47), κάπτας, κυβερνήτας, ἐρωμένες c. 134). See however E. Meyer Gesch. des Altherumns 1. § 53, p. 61, § 471, p. 565.

1329 b 3 τά μὲν οὖν] An instance of the idiomatic use of the particle οὖν not illative, at the beginning of a sentence, but explanatory and distributive, introducing a subordinate clause: "μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur" Bonitz Ind. Arv. s.v. The stock instance is Ἰνετ. c. 22 § 4. 145 a 23: ἀλλὰ ἂν τις ἀπαντη σώτατα ποιήσῃ, ἢ αἴνιγμα ἐστι η βαρβαρισμός, ὥς μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἴνιγμα, ἂν δ' ἐκ γλαυτῶν, βαρβαρισμός. Vahlen Petriac. III. 317 f. points out that this sentence should not be divided by a colon or period after the first βαρβαρισμός. So closely is the whole connected that the clause ἂν μὲν οὖν serves simply to distribute the preceding clause into its parts, explaining τοιαύτησι β' μεταφορῶν and ἐκ γλαυτῶν. Consequently οὖν is not illative; a simple μὲν and δὲ would have sufficed (as in the present passage they do suffice below § 2, b 6 f. τά μὲν...τά δὲ...). Vahlen classifies the present passage and Soph. El. 6. 15. 169 a 19, as precisely similar. He admits Categ. 2 § 1, 1 a 17, Top. 105 b 21, 108 b 9, b 38 to be not very different: while Tod. 1. 2. 8, 1252 b 29 (see Crit. not.), IV(vii). 17. 8, 1336 b 4, b 6 (δόλος μὲν οὖν...μάλαστα μὲν οὖν), and VIII(v). 12. 8, 1316 a 8 are somewhat dissimilar. Perhaps De Ref. Athen. c. 43 § 3, p. 111, 6 K.3, but Harpocratus omits οὖν.

4 Σεσώτριος] The Greeks were accustomed to refer all manner of Egyptian institutions to this celebrated king, in whom they seem to have combined (see Duncker History of Antiquity, I. 34—128, Eng. tr. 1877, pp. 142—159) two real kings, Sethos I. (1439—1388 B.C.) and Ramses II. (1388—circa 1250), just as all Spartan institutions were attributed to Lycurgus, and all Cretan institutions to Minos. In reality the caste-system, or rather the organization of the Egyptian population (Duncker 1. 191 f., Eng. tr. pp. 197—200) existed long before these two kings, and in germ at any rate goes back to the earliest records of Egyptian history. Susem. (819)

"The monuments prove that there was no such thing as caste, in the strict sense of the term, in Egypt. The son might, and usually did, follow the father's calling: professions and offices of state were often inherited. But there is no evidence of compulsion, or of obligation to marry only in a given caste": A. Wiedemann on Herod. II. 164, Herodotis zweites Buch p. 573, who quotes Plato Tim. 23, 24. Isocr. Busiris 6—8. Diod. I. 73 f., 1. 28. Strabo XVII. p. 787. Cp. Les castes en Egypte in Le Muséon, 1886. Also E. Meyer Gesch. des alten Ägyptens (Berlin 1887) II. p. 169. Meyer (ib. p. 292) doubts whether Ramses II. really corresponds to Sesostris, any more than Usetes to Sethos II. (as supposed by Manetho), or indeed any one military conqueror more than another among the kings. Wiedemann however (Ägyptische Geschichte p. 429 f.) follows Lepsius in regarding Ramses II. as the nucleus, around whom, as around Alexander the Great, legends collected. Cp. Ranke Weltgesch. I. p. 26. Maspero Geure ép. p. 83: 'Setsœ, var. Setsœ-œ, le nom populaire de Rhamèsâ.'

Of Aristotle Wiedemann says (Gesch. p. 117): "the three notices dealing with
the country leave a good impression; yet the statement that the division into castes originated with Sesostris does not diverge from the current erroneous tradition. It would seem that Aristotle can hardly have made independent researches on Egypt in detail."

"(IX)

§ 2 per[1 Cr[1 tēνν. ἀρχαῖα δ' έοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσστιτῶν ἡ τάξις, τὰ μὲν per[1 Cr[1 tēνν, γενόμενα per[1 Cr[1 tην Μίνω βα-σιλείαν, τὰ δὲ per[1 Cr[1 την 'Ιταλιαν πολλὸ παλαιότερα τού- 

§ 3 των. φαίνει o[1 οἱ λόγοι τῶν έκεί κατακοινώτων 'Ιταλόν τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οινωτρίας, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ τε ὄνομα 10 μεταβαλλόντας 'Ιταλοὺς ἀπ' Οινωτρών κληθήμαι καὶ τῆν ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης 'Ιταλίαν τούνομα λαβεῖν, ὦση τετυγχανεν εὐτός οὕσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ: ἀπέχει δὲ ταύτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὄδων ἡμι- 

§ 4 σειάς ἡμέρας. τοῦτον δὴ λέγουσι τῶν 'Ιταλῶν νυμίδας τοὺς 15 Οινωτρῶν ὄντας ποιήσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους τε αὐτοῖς ἀλ- λοὺς θέσατε καὶ τὰ συσστία καταστήσατε πρῶτον: διὸ καὶ υἱόν ἐτο τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου των χρώτατα τοῖς συσστιτίοις 

§ 5 καὶ τῶν νομῶν ἐνίοις. ὕκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρη-
interpolator has taken the opportunity to air his historic knowledge, for this whole passage has nothing whatever to do with the point he wants to prove. The nearest neighbours of the Oenotrians or Italii on the north-west and north-east only, are mentioned here. At any rate this must be supposed to have been the writer's intention, if indeed the mention of these places has any meaning at all. The name of the one, Opici, is the same as the Opsci or Oscans, explained in n. (823). Why the Greeks called them Ausonianus we cannot tell. Iapygia denotes what was afterwards called Apulia and Calabria. The Siris is a river in the south-east of Lucania. His inclusion of the Chonians among the Oenotrians is another proof of the author's agreement with Antiochus (Frag. 6, n. 823). But the Oscans were not near neighbours of that oldest Italy; even according to the account given by the interpolator they lived south of Tyrrenia (Etruria) in Latium, and more especially in Campania, north of the Gulf of Paestum. Cp. Arist. Frag. 567 [558 Arist. pseudep. = 609 ed. Teubn.] in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1. 72 where Latium is described as a region in Opici, των τόπων τούτων τῆς Οπικῆς, δι' καλείται Λατίων (Eaton). But Antiochus goes on to say that the name Italy, and probably also the earlier name Oenotria, had first been extended further north as far to the north-west as the river Laos which flows through the south-west of Lucania and to the north-east as far as the plain of the Siris and Metapontum, situated to the north of this plain in the north-east part of Lucania; so that Tarentum, which is not far east of Metapontum, was still included in Iapygia; for he tells us, the country round the plain of the Siris had been inhabited by a great Oenotrian tribe, the Chonians, who gave it the name Chonē. Thus the whole of the west coast of this region newly added to the old designation Italy is washed by the Terinaic Gulf, of which the Hipponian in the extreme south is only a particular bay. Thucydides' use of the word Italy quite accords with this, for he includes Metapontum in Italy, but makes it the boundary towards Iapygia (vii. 33 § 3), while he appears to include Tarentum in Iapygia (vi. 44 § 2) and places Campanian Cuma in Opicia (vi. 4 § 5). Herodotus (1. 167) even extends the designation Oenotria beyond the Laos and the Terinaic Gulf, so that Elea also is included in it. The country of the Opici would then touch this enlarged Italy on the north-west, but unfortunately in our present passage there is no mention of this extension of the name; and, besides, the Chonian territory is not said to border on this enlarged Italy or Oenotria, but is itself included in it. The whole passage is therefore doubtless a wretched interpolation, and as such would have to be removed from the rest, if that really belonged to Aristotle. But it will be shown in notes (820, 830) that the whole passage §§ 1—9 has been added by another hand, and that its author, one of the oldest Peripatetics, though he has drawn from good historical sources, may yet have written this sentence, in which he has certainly made very bad use of them. Susem. (825)

§ 6 24. τοῖς χρόνοις] The plural as in vii(iv). 6 § 5, 1293 a 1, and in the suspected chapter ii. 12 § 7, 1274 a 30: more usually as in vii(iv). 3 § 3, viii(v). 4 § 1. Another instance is Nic. Eth. viii. 12 § 2, 1161 b 25, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις.
MAGNA GRAECIA

Showing the limits of Italy as given (1) by Antiochus and (a) in Ar. Pol. IV (VII), 10.

Names occurring in this Chapter are underlined.
§ 7 Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσώστριος. σχέδων μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ (IX)
26 ἀλλα δεί νομίζειν εὑρήσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ,
μᾶλλον δ’ ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία τὴν χρεῖαν
εἰκὸς διδάσκειν αὐτὴν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὑρήσκεσθαι καὶ περιου-
σίαιν ὑπαρχόντων ήδη τούτων εὑλογον λαμβανέων τὴν αὐξη-
ίζον ὡστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἴεσθαι δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν
§ 8 ἔχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἄρχαία, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ 5
Λήγουσκαν ἑστὶν; οὔτοι γὰρ ἀρχαίοτατοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
νόμων δὲ τετυχάκασιν <ἀεὶ> καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τὸς
μὲν εἰρημένοις ἰκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλειμένα
35 πειράσθαι ζητεῖν.

§ 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεὶ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὁπλα κεκτη-
μένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχοῦντων, εἰρηται πρότε-
ρον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργούντας αὐτῶν ἑτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ
πόσην τινὰ χρὴ καὶ ποιῶν εἶναι τὴν χώραν’] περὶ δὲ τῆς 6
40 διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργοῦντων, τίνας καὶ ποιῶν εἶναι χρῆ,
λεκτέων πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔσε κοινῆς φαμέν δεῖ εἶναι τὴν

28 eikòs after διδάσκειν II² P⁵ Bk. || 30 τὰ omitted by Γ and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by corr.) || 31 δε] γὰρ ? Susem. || 33 <ἀεὶ> Bernays and Susem. independently, <πρῶτον> ? Schneider || 34 εἰρημένοις Lambin Bk,² apparently right || 36 τῶν <τὰ> Spengel || 41 δεῖ after εἶναι II² P⁵ Bk.

27 μᾶλλον δ’ ἀπειράκις] Cp. the well known passage Meteoro. 1. 3 § 8, 339 a 29, οὐ γὰρ ὅτι φήσομεν ἀπαξ εὐθές διὸ oúdeν ἀλλὰ τὰς αὐτὰς δόξας ἀναικιλεῖν γυνόμενα εἰς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ’ ἀπειράκις. § 7 27 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία ] Comp. n. (793) on c. 8 § 1. SUSEM. (827)

28 τὰ δὲ εἰς εὑρήσκεσθαι ζητεῖν] All these ideas are certainly genuinely Aristotelian : see 11. 5 § 16, 1264 a 3 with n. (167) and Meta. 1. 1. § 15, 908 b 17 ff. : esp. b 20 ὅθεν ἢ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατακεκεσιμάδων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τάναγα/α τῶν ἑπιστησιμῶν εἰρήθησαν. But see n. (829). SUSEM. (828)

§ 8 34 τὰ δὲ παραλειμένα πει-
ράσθαι ζητεῖν] How can that be done, if everything has been already discovered? It is hardly possible to attribute this paradox to Aristotle. The intermediate link is wanting, which explains that what has been already discovered may be lost in oblivion and therefore require to be rediscovered. SUSEM. (829) Cp. Plato Laws 630 e of legislators: ὅτι γὰρ ἂν ἐκαστὸς ἐν χρείᾳ γίγνεται, τοῦτο ἢ ἰνθεῖ ὑπὸ παραθεμένου. But Waitz compares the end of the Topics, 184 b 6—8.

§ 9 36 ὅτι μὲν οὖν...30 χώραν] If we compare this new recapitulation with the one given above in c. 9 § 10, it is clear that it passes over everything intermediate, as not containing anything peculiar or important for the course of the inquiry, but as seeking historic confirmation partly for what is affirmed in c. 9 and partly, with an eye to what is coming, for the sisyphus, which do not come up for discussion until 10 § 10; like the former recapitulation, it summarizes everything discussed before c. 10. But while the former is rightly confined to the contents of the two preceding chapters, with which alone what follows (6—9) is connected, the latter wrongly passes over the passage c. 5 §§ 4—c. 6 § 7, as though none of it were there at all, and goes back to the subject-matter of c. 5 §§ 1—3, although this has no immediate connexion with what follows. We can clearly detect the interpolator, who has framed this second recapitulation, so entirely out of place here, with the sole object of fastening his own composition (i.e. c. 10 §§ 1—8) on Aristotle's treatise. SUSEM. (830)

41 φαμέν] II. 5 §§ 4—9 nn. (156, 156 b,
1330 a κτήσιν, ὃσπερ τιμές εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικὸς (IX)
γινομένη κοινήν, οὔτε ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς.
§ 10 περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεί πάσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὐκατεσκευασμέναις πόλεις ἡπάρχειν· δὲ ἢν ἧδεν συν
5 δοκεῖ καὶ ἕμιν, ὕστερον ἔρομεν. Δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὗ ῥάδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπάρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἀλ-
λην οἰκίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοιναὶ
5 τρίσεις τῆς πόλεως ἐστίν.

§ 11 ἀναγκαίου τοινῦν εἰς δύο μέρη
tοις ἀντίκεισθαι τινὶς χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰναι κοινήν τὴν δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τοῦτον ἑκατέραν διηρήσθαι δίχα πάλιν, τῆς
μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἑτέρων μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας τὸ δὲ ἑτέρων εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, (p. 112)
τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἑτέρων μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχα-
15 τίς, ἑτέρων τὸ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλήρους ἐκάστῳ
νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν, τὸ 8
τε γὰρ ἰσον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δικαίου καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς

1330 a 2 γινομένη Congreve, γινομένη <γίνομεν> Susem.2, γινομένη Π Η Ar. Bk.
2042  1 to after μέρος omitted by Stob.  1 ταῖς ἐσχατίαις Stob., proprias necessi-
tates William Ar. Suid. and Phot. notice this passage s. v. ἐσχατίαι  15 ἑτέρων
δὲ τό] τὸ δὲ ἑτέρων Stob.  1 τῆς πόλεις Stob.  1 ἐκάστων 14, ἐκάστων L' Ald. Wb

158), 9 §§ 2—4 n. (279), 11 § 10 n. (393).
Compare also 11. 6 §§ 10—14 n. (211);
IV(VII), 9 §§ 3, 7, 8. The same use of
the present, φαμέν, as in c. 8 § 8 n. (804),
and below c. 13 § 5 n. (872), c. 14 § 8 n. (902).
Susem. (831)
1330 a 1 τις] Plato alone is meant by
this. Susem. (832) See n. on 1261 a 6.

2 οὔτε ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα] A condition
upon which special stress is laid in
the criticism of Carthage cited u. (831): ἐξ
ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦτο ὄνομα ἐς τὸν ἀναγκαιο-
tάτον ὄνομα εἶναι δυνάμει σχολαζέναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχολοῦντες καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχολοῦντες, ἐνταξεῖται, 1273 a 32 ff.
§ 10 3 συνδοκεῖ πάσιν] As e.g. Plato
Laws 780 b, ἐδοξεῖ μέγα διαφέρειν εἰς συ-
τηρήσει τὸ νόμον, Xen. De REP. Læc. c. 5.
5 ὕστερον ἔρομεν] An unfilled pro-
mise: Introd. p. 49 n. (4) and p. 53.
Susem. (833)
δὲ δὲ τούτων...8 οἰκίαν] "Now all
the citizens must take part in these
(sysstata), but it is not easy to arrange
that poor men should contribute their
quota from their own means and at the
same time pay all that is needed for
their housekeeping as well." See 11.
9 § 31 n. (341), 10 § 8 n. (362).
Compare also 11. (123) on II. 5. 2. Susem. (834)
For τὸ τεταγμένον cp. II. 10 § 7, 1272
a 15.

8 κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεως] "The
Politics takes for granted the mainte-
nance, even in the best state, of
the popular faith and the traditional
worship" (Newman). Comp. u. (859).

§ 11 13 εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δα-
pάνην] This is precisely the solution
which the criticism in Book 11. indicated:
see in. on 8 § 3 (254), 9 § 31 (341), 10
§ 8 (365).
14 τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν...16 μετέχω-
(835) The lands nearer to the city would
possess many advantages over those more
remote.
16 τὸ τε γὰρ ἰσον...20 καλὸν] Comp.
Thuc. I. 120 § 2 (the various members of
the Peloponnesian confederacy), II. 21
§ 3 (the Acharnians): the Book of Nu-
bers c. 32 (the tribes beyond Jordan), as
§ 12 ἀστυναύετονας πολέμουσι ὁμονοητικῶτερον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον (IX)
ἐχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐ μὲν ὀλυγωροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὀμόρους
ἐξήθρασι, οὐ δὲ λιαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν. διό
παρ’ ἐνίος νόμως ἐστι τοὺς γεννιώντας τοῖς ὀμόροις μὴ συμ-
μετέχειν θεωρήσατε τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἴδιον
οὐκ ἀν δυναμένους θεωρήσατε καλῶς.

§ 13 τὴν μὲν ὅπως ἅπαγη διηρήσατε τὸν τρόπον τούτον
διά τὰς προερημένας αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργῆσοντας μᾶλλον μὲν,
ei δὲ κατ’ εὐχήν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε ὀμοφυλόν πάνων μήτε
θυμοιδών (οὗτος γὰρ ἄν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶνεν χρήσιμοι
καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νευτερίζειν ἀσφαλείς), δεύτερον δὲ

§ 14 συν, τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν [ἴδιον] εἰς τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις
τῶν κεκτημένων τῶν οὐσίας, τοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινοῦς.
τίνα δὲ δεῖ τρόπον χρήσαται δούλους, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πάσι τοῖς
δούλως ἄθλον προκειμένη τὴν ἔλευσιν, ὑστεροῦν ἐρώμενον.

11 τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὧτι μὲν δεῖ κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς ἡπείρου τε X
καὶ τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὀμοίως ἐκ τῶν
ἐνδεχομένων, ἐξηραίται πρότερον· αὐτὴς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι
cited by editors. Moreover for §§ 11, 12
generally see 11. 6 § 14 n. (211). SUSEM.
(836)
§ 13 26 ei δεὶ κατ’ εὐχήν] Compare the passages collected in n. (128) on 11. 1
§ 1. SUSEM. (837)
μήτε ὀμοφυλόν] So Plato Latus vii. 777 D
ἐτοι τῶν μᾶλλον μᾶλλον μεταφράσατο ὂντος καὶ μᾶλλον ὀμοφυλὸν ἐν πρὸς τὸν
cūτας μᾶλλον δούλους ὃντας αἰτίας εἰς τὸν ἡμερῶν ὀμοφυλὸν.
Comp. Ps.-Ar. Oecon. 1. 5 §§ 5, 6, 1344 b 11 ff.; 208 b 18 καὶ
μὴ κατάσταται ὀμοφυλὸν πολλοί (Schneider). SUSEM.
(838)
μήτε θυμοιδών] The same expression
11. 5 § 25, 1364 b 9, see n. (182); there
μὲν, μὴ γὰρ σπιτί, here "passionate." Compare what is said of τῦθος in notes
on 111. 16 § 1 (64), 11 (vii). 7 § 5 (780),
§ 7 (790). SUSEM. (839)
28 δεύτερον δὲ] Comp. c. 9 § 8 n.
(815), also notes on 11. 9 + (282) and
Exc. iii. on the Cretan περιοίκοι p. 338.
SUSEM. (840)
32 διὸτι βέλτιον πᾶσι...ἐλευθερίαν] A
new contradiction in Aristotle's theory of
slavery. For slaves by nature, as in the
best state actual slaves or serfs can only be,
must logically remain slaves for ever.
However comp. Ps.-Ar. Oecon. 1. 5 § 5 f.,
1344 b 14 ff. ἡρῆ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὠρόθεια
πᾶσιν...δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευ-
θερίαν κεῖσθαι ἀθλον. SUSEM. (841)
33 υποτερόν] an unfulfilled promise:
Introdt. pp. 49, 53. SUSEM. (842)
c. 11, 12. The city: regulations in
detail for the site, the water-supply, the
plan of the streets, the fortifications, and
the two Agorai.
§ 1 36 ἐξηραίται πρότερον] In c. 5 §§ 3,
4. SUSEM. (843)
Kühn. In Greece, east winds bring rain, thus moderating the heat and purifying the air: cp. Meteor. 11. 6. 20, 364 b 19 f., Problem. xxvi. 56. Ocean. 1. 6. 9, 1345 a 31 ff., Thuc. iii. 23. 5. Aristophanes Wasps 265 speaks of the north wind as rainy, and so also Theophrastus De ventis § 4: like the trade winds, he adds, which are described sometimes as north-east and sometimes as north-west winds. Socrates in Xen. Memor. iii. 11. 9 and Xenophon himself Ocean. c. 9 § 4 (a passage almost literally copied Pseudo-Arist. Ocean. 1. c. as Schlosser remarked) prefer a house with a south aspect (Eaton). SUSEM. (846)

Add Plutarch De curiositate c. 1, 515 c: ὡσπερ τὴν ἐμὴν πατρίδα πρὸς ξέφυρον ἀνέμοι κεκλεμένη καὶ τὸν ἡλίου ἐφεύσατο δείλης ἀπὸ τοῦ Παρασοῦ διέχυτον, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς πατρίδας Λεβανήν ὕπερ τοῦ Χάρισον. The east wind is spoken of as warm Probl. xxvi. 31, 943 b 24 (Newman).

41 κατὰ βορέαν] Under the north wind, and so protected from it: i.e. with south aspect. Cp. Ocean. 1. 6. 8, 1345 b 33, κατὰ βορέας οὖσα, Plato Critias 118 a, b: πρὸς αὐτῷ ἐκτέλεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκρῶν κατὰ βορέας (J. G. Schneider). Hippocrates however preferred a north aspect as next best to an east aspect. SUSEM. (846)

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν] What are the four points to be observed, a 36? Health first, a 38; two more are accounted for by the words πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχειν; the one which still remains is, in all probability, beauty

ορθά addisi positionem, quattuor utique respicientes William, who doubtless translates a gloss εἶναι omitted by P5, [εἶναι] Bk.2 (perhaps rightly), εἰ δὲ Welldon, who transposes εὐχέσθαι δεῖ to follow κατατυγχάνειν (wrongly). Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. suspects that κατατυγχάνειν is corrupt ἐρχέσθαι M5 πρὸς omitted by P1 (supplied by P1) δῆ omitted by II; δὲ ? Schneider, * * δὲ Susem.1 2 38 αἱ τε γὰρ...40 ὑμεινότερα] Similarly Hippocrates De aere 1. p. 525 ff.
of situation. See ἡδῶν 1330 b 22, κόσμον b 31, εἴχαμι 1331 a 36, καὶ τοῦτον τῶν κόσμων α 38. If the mention of this has been lost after λαοῦν we may perhaps supply it, as suggested in the Critical notes, and render the whole: "of the remaining points, <regard for the beauty of the town is indeed important, but far more important> that it should be well situated for the needs of civil administration and for military purposes." See Quaest. crit. coll. p. 408. Susem. (847)

§ 3 1330 b 2 πρὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς (N)
§ 3 1330 b 2 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὔξοδυν εἶναι χρή, τοὺς δὲ ἐναντίους δυσπρόσδοκον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον, ὑδάτων δὲ καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλῆθος (p. 11, 5 οἰκεῖον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τούτου γε εὐρηταί διὰ τοῦ κατασκευασμένον ὑποδοχάς ὀμβρίους ὑδασιν ἀφθόνους καὶ μεγάλας, ὡστε μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ τὸ λέομον.

§ 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ περὶ ύγείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἑνοικοῦντων, τούτο 3 δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κείσαθαν τοῦ τόπου ἐν τῳ τιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοῖς τοιούτοις καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὑδασιν ύγιείνοις χρήσθαι, καὶ τούτου τῆς ἐμπμελείας ἐχειν μὴ παρέργος. οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλείστον συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ύγείαν, ἣ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ το 5 πνεύματος δύναμις ταύτην ἐχει τήν φύσιν. διόπερ ἐν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσαι δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεισιν, εἰνάς μὴ πάνθ'
óμοια μὴ ἀφθονία τοιοῦτων ἡ ναμάτων, χωρίς τὰ τε εἰς (X) τροφὴν ὑδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ τῶν [τῶν] ἐρμηνῶν οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαισιν, ὅπως ἀκρόπολις ὀλγαρχικὸς καὶ μοναρχικός κόσμοι, δημοκρατίκων δ᾽ ὀμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικῶν δὲ οὐδέτεροι, τόπων  ὀς χρύσοι τόποι πλείους. ἤ δὲ τῶν ἱδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσις ἱδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμιωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πρίξεις, ἀν εὐτομὸς ἤ κατὰ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ τῶν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπων, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας τοῦναντίον ὡς εἰχον κατὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων δυσεξόδους γὰρ ἐκεινὴ τοῖς ἐξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων μετέχειν (ἐνδεχεται ταῖς, ἄν τις οὕτως κατασκευαζὴ καθίστη ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις ἃς καλούσι τινες τῶν ἀμπελῶν συντάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖτο εὐτομὸν, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τῶπους.

16 μὴ] μηδὲ Koraes, rightly | τοιοῦτων Π1 Π4-6. L4 and P5 (corr.), τούτων the other authorities Ar. Bk. | 18 τῶν omitted by M* P1, <τῶν> τῶν τῶν Π5 V8, τῶν τῶν τῶν Bk. with the other authorities | 21 ιδίων] οἰκείων Μ* and P1 (1st hand, corrected in the margin) | 22 μὲν omitted by P1, untranslated by Ar., hence [μέν] Susm. | 23 καὶ inserted before κατὰ by Π2 P1 Bk. | 24 [καὶ] Schneider Susm. 2, possibly right | ἵπποδάμειον Π2 (in P1 as written faintly) | 25 χρόνων] τρόπων Π1 M* | 26 δυσεξόδους—δυσεξερεύνητος] δυσεξερεύνητος—δυσεξόδουs Jackson | 27 ἀμφοτέρων after τοιοῦτων Π1 P9 Bk., thus avoiding hiatus | 28 γεωργίων Scaliger, γεωργοῦς Π1 Ar. Bk. Susm. | 30 ἄλλην Ar. and P3 (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) | πόλιν after μὴ ποιεῖν Π1 P9 Bk., omitted by P1

§ 5 20 ἀριστοκρατικῶν] This holds good of the best constitution also, since this is at once the true and the best form of aristocracy: VI(VI). 7. 2 n. (12.32), cp. c. 2 § 1 (11.33), § 4 (11.41): II. 6. 17 n. (218); III. 7. 3 n. (336) and Exc. I. on B. III. For it is only in an aristocracy that fortified places are used solely as a protection against external foes: and the latter will plainly find the conquest of the city more difficult if they have to capture many such. Under a monarchy or an oligarchy the Acropolis, or single citadel, was also used for defence against popular insurrections; for this reason it is against the interests of democracy, because liable to become the rallying place of movements in favour of the tyrant or the oligarchs; in short usurpers may establish themselves there. These remarks are not disproved by the fact that democratic states like Athens itself retained their old Acropolis. Susm. (849)
ούτω γάρ καὶ πρὸς ἄσφαλειαν καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔξει καλῶς. (X)

§ 8 περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δειν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἁρχαῖος ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, 34 καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὀρῶντες ἑλεγχομένας ἐργῷ τᾶς ἐκείνως καλλω-

§ 9 πισομένας. ἕστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὀμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ 6 πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειράσθαι σοφεσθαι διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρμυνότητος: επεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαινει καὶ ἐνδέχεται πλείον τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπίστων [καὶ] τῆς ἀνθρωποτησίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρέτης, εἰ δὲι σφή-40 ἐζεσθαι καὶ μὴ πᾶσχειν κακῶς μὴδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρμυνότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰκτέον εἶναι πολε-

1331 a 3 τῆς ἵπποις πλαισίων τὰς πόλεσιν ἄξιοιν 7

31 πρὸς before κόσμον omitted by Π² P⁵ Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 37 καὶ before συμβαινει omitted by M', [kai] Koraes; καὶ συμβαινει transposed to follow 38 ἐνδέχε-


andria (p. 793) ἀσα δὲν ὅν ὁδοὶ κατα-

τέτηται.

§ 8 32 οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δειν κτλ] Plato Lact. vi. 778 D ff.: περὶ δὲ τειχῶν ἐγώοι ἀν τῇ Περίτα ἐξισορροπἶν πὸ καθα-

dεῖν ἐν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακειμένα τὰ τείχη καὶ καὶ μὴ ἐπαναστάται. Susen. (853)

34 ἑλεγχομένας ἐργῷ] Here no doubt he is thinking more especially of Sparta: see n. (554) on III. 9. 10. Susen. (854)

Grote asked how, if Sparta had had walls like those of Babylon, they could have procured for her any greater protec-

tion than her strong position afforded in the first Theban invasion, 370—369. But in his last invasion, 362, Epaminondas,

tho he did not succeed in surprising it unawares, actually penetrated into the city, Xen. Helen. vii. 5. 11, Polyb. ix.

8. 5. Very obstinate resistance had been offered to Philip by Byzantium and Perin-
thus (340), although Thebes, in spite of its walls, was carried by assault (335).

§ 9 36 οὐ καλὸν] To skulk behind fortifications has been in all ages con-

trasted with courage in the open field. So of the remark of Archidamus, which

Camerasius quotes from Plutarch, that at the sight of a catapult he exclaimed: ἀπώλετο ἀνδρὸς ἀρέτα.

37 καὶ συμβαινει καὶ ἐνδέχεται] An inversion which Mr Newman compares

with II. 5. 27, 1264 b 18, μη τῶν πλείσ-

tων ἢ μὴ πάντων. Translate: “but as it

don not only may but does happen that the

superiority of the enemy is too much for

the brave...not...superhuman strength

of the smaller number, in such cases, if

the defenders are to preserve themselves

and be free from indignity and injury, we

must hold that walls of impregnable

strength are a soldierly precaution, es-

pecially when we consider the precision

that has been attained in the manufacture

of missiles and siege-engines.”

1331 a 1 τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς

μηχανὰς] Possibly this indicates the two

main divisions of Greek artillery ὀξυμελεις

capital for discharging arrows

chiefly, with a range of 400 yards, and the

heavier engines πετροβόλοι; see A. Bauer

Griech. Kriegsgethümer in Iwan Müller’s Handy-


Kriegsgethümer p. 190—204.

§ 10 3 ὀμοίων γὰρ τὸ...ἀξιόν καὶ] "To insist on not building walls round

cities is the same thing as to seek for a

country easily invaded:" for καὶ ἀς, after

ὁμοίων see II. 8. 21, 1269 a 6. With

ἀξιόν cp. II. 8. 13, 1268 b 5, τὸ κράτειν

ἀξιόν.
The construction must be ὁμολόγος δὲ <ὁμολογεῖσθαι> ...μὴ περιβάλλειν, this infinative being parallel to γινεῖν.

§ 11 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν κατὰ] We had a similar mode of argument in c. 6 § 3 n. (771) with respect to a maritime site for the city. SUSEM. (855)

11 οὐχ ὅτι τεῖχη μόνον] μόνον is pleonastic.

14 τὰς ὑπὸ ἐπεξεργαμένας] Dionysius the Elder invented machines of this kind; Diod. xiv. 42. 1, 50. 4 (Camerarius). Cp. Rüstow and Köchly Gesch. des griech. Kriegswesens p. 207 ff. Afterwards the campaigns of Philip and Alexander of Macedon led to many fresh improvements in the siege-engines and heavy artillery; see Rüstow and Köchly p. 264, 307 ff. "It is possible" (see u. 1589 on vii(v). 6, 13) "that Aristotle was acquainted with the work of Aeneas Tacticus. (See c. 32.)" (Eaton.) SUSEM. (856)

See also H. Droysen Kriegsgeslechterführer c. 9 p. 187 ff. The first casual mention of καταπάλται at Athens circa Ol. 105 or 106, 356—348: they were of course used by Philip in the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, 340, 339; and by Alexander against Halicarnassus 334.

§ 12 17 ἀρχὴν γὰρ ὑπὸ ἐπιχειροῦσιν] This is equivalent to the Latin maxim: si bellum vitare vis, bellum para (Congreve). SUSEM. (857)

c. 12 § 1 19 τὰ δὲ τεῖχη ...21 ἐπικαίρους] So Xenoph. Cyrop. vii. 5 § 12, towers for guard-rooms ἄνωτα δὲ πολλοὶ πύργοι, ὅπως ἵνα πελάτα ψυχάρη υἱὸν ἡμῶν καὶ Polyb. viii. 17, 5 of Cretan mercenaries at Sardis συνέβαινε δὲ τοῖς Κρίταις πεπιστευόμενοι τι τῶν φυλακτηρίων τῶν κατὰ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ ἕρμον τοὺς τῆς ἀκρας (J. G. Schneider). SUSEM. (858)

20 διεἰληφθαί] c. 7 § 1, 1327 b 22, διεἰληφθη οἰκεῖοι θέθεισι.

21 αὐτὰ] Vahlen on Poet. c. 15 § 12, 1454 b 17 out of several instances has
§ 24 θεός Π' Αρ., θείοις the other authorities and Bk.1. 25 τα τῶν κυριώτατων ὁμολογήσατο Susem., τα κυριώτατα <τα> τῶν Ridgeway (but see § 7, 1331 b 6 ff.) ἀρχεῖων Π', ἀρχαίων the other authorities συσσετιτήων Π', ἀρχαίων Π'-8 L. Αρ. Αδ., ἀρχαίων the other authorities τούς Spengel. 28 ἐπιφάνειαν—θέσιν Thomas Aquinas, approved by Chandler and Spengel, perhaps rightly. If so, τε must be bracketed or transposed to follow ἔχει πρόσ 29 ἀρέτης] lecteis ?Jackson ἀρέτης θέσιν] theses ἀρέτης Lambin ἀρέτης] ἑων Götting, ἑως Eaton, θέω Schneider. If this latter be accepted, either with Susem, read [ἐπιφάνειαν τε] as a gloss, or with Bücheler transpose ἐπιφάνειαν τε to follow θέαν 32 νομίζουσιν Lambin, νομαζόσων Γ Η Αρ. Bk.1 Susem, in the text τοιούτων Π' Π' Bk., also Π' (corr.) and apparently Αρ. (perhaps rightly)

one similar: De anima II. 4 § 12, 416 a 10 αὐτό φαίνεται μόνον τρεφόμενον. Add Pol. III. 5, 4, 1278 a 14.

Prof. Ridgeway says quite rightly: "Aristotle's idea is that the messes of the several divisions of the citizens shall be held at the immediate sphere of their employment: those of the φίλακες in the φιλακτήρια and πόργου where they are on duty. Similarly the common meal of the ἀρχωντες is in the town hall." Hence he proposes to read τα κυριωτα τα των ἀρχειων, which is open to the objection: non omnium magistratuum sed superiorum tantum praetoria circa forum superius inact. Susem.

§ 27 μαντέευν ἀλλο πυθαχρηστον] Thus Aristotle places all the regulations for religion and 'cultus' in his ideal state under the Delphic oracle precisely as Plato does Rep. IV. 427 b (Congreve). Susem. (899).

§ 28 ἐπιφάνειαν τε κτλ] Cp. Vitruv. 1. 7: aedibus vero sacris, quorum decurum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, in excelsissimo loco, unde moeno maxima pars conspicuatur, areae distribuantur (J. G. Schneider). Quite similarly Plato Laws vi. 778 c, the temples to be built all round the Agora and the city around them πρὸς τοὺς ἴσηλοις τῶν τῶν εὐεργείας τα καθαρέως χάρων: VIII. 848 δ (similarly in the twelve κώμαι). Susem. (860).

Add Pausan. IX. 22 εὐ δὲ μοι Ταναγραίοι νομίζω τα ἐά τοις θεοῖς μάλατα δοκούσων Ἑλλήνων, χωρίς μὲν γὰρ αἱ οἰκίαι σφάζει, χωρίς δὲ τα ἱερὰ υπέρ αὐτὰς ἐν καθαρῳ τα ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπων. Χενοφων gives as Socrates' opinion: οἷον γε μὴν καὶ βιωμὸι χώμαν ἔφη εἰμι πρεπό- δεστάτην ἦτας ἐμφανεστάτη οὖσα ἀστι- βεστάτη εἰς, Μεθ. III. 3. 10.

31 περὶ Θεσσαλίαν] Also, according to Xenophon's romance, amongst the Persians also: Cyng. 1. 2. 3, ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐλευθέρα ἄγορα καλουμένη, ἐνά τα τά βασιλεία καὶ τάλλα ἄρχεια πεποιηται. Susem. (861).

See Blümmer Privatalt., § 18 p. 134 n. (2). ἄγορα was also used as a term for 'harbour' in Thessaly (Hesychius).
§ 39 τῶν—προσβεβήσας Γ, τὰ—προσβεβήσατο apparently M


§ 5 39 ἀρχοντάς τινος] Either special magistrates: cp. vii(vi). § 8 § 22 γυναικαρχία, πρὸς δὲ τούτους περὶ ἀγώνων ἐπιμέλεια γυναικῶς καὶ διανοιγόμενως with n. (1484)—ορ the παραβάλλον, for whom see c. 16 § 12 n. (943), c. 17 § 5 (982), § 7 (960), § 10 (963), § 12 (969): vii(iv). 15 § 3 (1345), § 9 (1355), § 13: vii(vi). § 8 § 22 n. (1483) and Introd. p. 52. SUS. (862)

§ 105 δὲ προσβεβήσατο] In order that they may be kept in check by the presence of the magistrates: Introd. p. 52. Comp. c. 17 § 9, 1336 b 11 f. n. (962). SUS. (863)

§ 6 1331 b 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ] See c. 9 above. SUS. (864)

§ 5 The repetition of εἰς before ἀρχοντας is not without parallel. But as the soldiers form an important element of τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως, it is probable either that they were mentioned here (possibly the double εἰς conceals some corruption), or that πόλεως is itself a corruption of πολίτευματος, the governing body. See Quaest. crit. coll. pp. 409—411. It is apparent from a comparison of II. 6. 2, 1264 b 32, εἰς δὲ μέρη, τὸ μὲν εἰς ψευδογόνος, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος, and κατὰ c. 14 § 12, 1333 a 30 ff. ἀπορητά...τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαία καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά, how much harsher the text is than would be the following e.g. τὸ μὲν εἰς τερέσι τὸ δὲ εἰς ἀρχοντας.

With τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων understand, from b 1, ἀγώνας as in b 11. See Quaest. crit. coll. p. 410. This removes one of Prof. Ridgeway's objections (Transactions ii. p. 143), but it is still strange that ἱερῶ should be an adjective here when it is a substantive § 2, § 8. 6 ἐξειν τὴν τάξιν = τετάχθαι, as § 4, 1331 a 37. So ἐξειν τιμήν = τιμάσθαι,
§ 8 νενεμηθηαι δε χρη την ειρημενην ταξιν και τα περι την
15 χωραν' και γαρ έκει τοις άρχουσιν, ους καλοδην οι μεν υλωρους
μεν δε αγγουνομαι, και φυλακτηρια και συστιτα προς φυλακην
αναγκαιον υπαρχειν, έτι δε ιερα κατα την χωραν ειναι νενεμη-
μεναι, τα μεν θεοις τα δε ήρωσιν.

§ 9 άλλα το διατριβειν νυν ακριβολογουμενους και ονομα-

20 τα περι των τοιοτων αργων εστιν. ου γαρ χαλεπων εστι
τα τοιαυτα νοσαι, άλλα ποιησαι μαλλον το μεν γαρ
λεγειν ευχης εργον εστι, το δε συμβηναι τυχης.

διο περι

8 την after άλλω omitted by Μ* Π1, perhaps rightly, [την] Susem. 1 || 10 και
και ? Susem. || kataskevαsθαι Π1, kataskevαsθαι Σb Βb, kataskevαsθαι Μ* ||
14 meμιμηθηαι Π3-5,6 Σb Βb Αρ. Άλδ. Βk.3 and Π2-4 (1st hand, νενε in Π3
is written over an erasure), νενεμηθηαι Π4 (corr.) || 16 αγροανομαι Π3 Σb
and Π3 (1st hand, corrected by a later hand)

§ 7 9 Αγροανομαιν...10 αστυνομαι] Comp. Π1. 5. 21 n. (176 b), VI(VII). 15. 9
n. (1554), § 22 n. (1573); VII(VI). 8 §§ 3—5
nn. (1461, 1463, 1468). Susem. (865)
10 συνοδο] As in Π1. 9. 31, 1271 a 28
n. meeting, Comp. 1219 a 32.
11 περι has almost the meaning of a
possessive gen., cp. c. 9 § 7, 1320 a 18.
§ 8 14 ταξιν is the so-called cognate
accus. after νενεμηθηαι.
15 ους καλουσιν, κτλ] Comp. VII(VI).
8. 6 n. (1465) for these wood-angers or
foresters. Plato has the term αγροανομαι
Laus. VI. 760 ff. Susem. (866)
16 φυλακτηρια κτλ] Comp. Plato
Laus. VIII. 848 1; for the twelve κωμαι,
exactly as VI. 778 c for the Agora (Eaton).
See the citation n. (860). Susem. (867)
II. 5, 1258 b 34 f. το δε κατα μερος
ακριβολογοιναι χρησιμον, φορτικον δε το
ενδιατριβειν.
20 ου γαρ χαλεπον] Comp. c. 7 § 9,
22 ευχης εργον] Another of the pas-
sages cited in n. (128) on Π1. 1. 1. Susem.
(869)

This next chapter, c. 13, is preliminary
to that detailed account of Education in
the best state which forms the subject of the
treatise from c. 14 to the (incomplete)
termination of B. V(VIII). We have here
a string of remarks on the end of the
state, and the best means to secure it by
a given character in the citizens: remarks
not very dissimilar to parts of cc. 1—3,
or again to c. 14. For this reason the
chapter has been bracketed by Congreve
and Broughton, either wholly or in part.
See Anal. p. 115 f., Introd. p. 88 f.
Prof. J. Cook Wilson's view, as there
stated, is that c. 13 seems like a shorter
duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "The chief
difference is that c. 13, 1332 a 7—9,
takes the definition of the Good in the
general form given in Nic. Eth. 1. c. 7
(or Eth. Eth. Π1. 1), while cc. 14—15,
like *Nic. Eth. x.* distinguish between the life of moral virtue and the higher life of philosophic contemplation. In c. 13 there is no consciousness of what seems implied in c. 15, that moral virtue does not belong so completely to the *kallon* as *theoria.* In the version of c. 13 the language which follows the words *φάμεν δὲ καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἡλίκιας, 1332 a 7,* has more affinity for the Eudemian than for the Nicomachean Ethics*” (*Journal of Phil. x. 84 ff.*).

§ 1 26—38 Eudemus reproduces this *E. E.* ii. 11. 3, 1227 b 19—22. The whole period b 26—1332 a 3 is excellently discussed by Bonitz *Ar. Stud.* ii. 111. p. 94 sq. *Susem.*

§ 2 29 *εὐφρασκέω* = assequi. See 1330 b 5 n. So *λαβεῖν* = ascertain. Yet below b 38 *κρατεῖσθαι* = to be won, secured.

§ 3 30 *ταύτα* are (1) *τὸ τέλος* and (2) *αἱ πρός τὸ τέλος* ἑφοεῖσθαι πράξεις. See b 38. *οἶνον περὶ λατρικῆν* References to Medicine have occurred i. 8. 18 n. (270), iii. c. 6 § 7 n. (531), ii. 11 §§ 10, 11, c. 15 § 4 n. (638), c. 16 § 6 ff. Also i. 11 (vii). c. 2 § 13 n. (726). *Susem.* (670)

§ 35 *τὸ ὑγαίνον εἶναι σῶμα.* Note that *εἶναι* is transposed. The order is ποίησιν τι τὸ ὑγαίνον σῶμα δεί εἶναι, in what condition the patient should be left, in order to be well.

§ 3 41 *χορηγίας τινῶς* Certain resources, means, prerequisites, auxiliaries. For this meaning cp. *N. Eth.* i. 8. 15, 1099 a 31—33, καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεεμένην ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἡ οἱ μόδιοι τα καλά πράττειν ἀρχηγόνητον οὐνα, i. 10. 15, 1101 a 14 f. τὸν τῶς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένον, x. 8. 4, 1178 a 23 ff., § 9,
1178 b 33 (Eaton). These are the auxiliatory causes or indispensable conditions (see n. 795) of Wellbeing. **Susem.** (871)

§ 4 1332 a 2 αὶ δὲ εὖθεσ] The δὲ answers μεν of 1331 b 40: 'whereas others, with the means at their command, from the outset miss the right way to attain happiness.' For this sense of εὖθεσ comp. 1. 5, 2, 1254 a 23 εὖθες ἐκ γενετήσ. Bonitz Ind. s. v. distinguishes (1) a temporal use, as in III. 16. 9, 1287 b 10, 1. 8, 9, 1256 b 9, κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὖθες; so vii(V). 11. 6, 1295 b 16, εὖθες ὁκοθεν, and viii(V). c. 4 § 9, 1304 a 30, § 12, 1304 b 9, c. § 3, 1304 b 32, c. 11 § 23, 1314 b 29: (2) a quasi-causal sense, supœte natures,—φάσαλος εὖθες (ὑπάρχει), as in viii(VIII). § 23, 1340 a 40: (3) introducing, in a series of reasons, one which is at once perfectly obvious, as 1. 13. 6, 1260 a 4, III. 4. 6, 1277 a b, iv(VII). 14. 2, 1332 b 18, v(VIII). 2, 2, 1337 b 2.

3. ἐνὶ... 7 λανθάνειν] It is pointed out in Exx. 1. (p. 359) that the same expression has already been employed twice before, (i) in c. 1 § 1 ff. and (ii) in cc. 8 and 9 (c. 8 § 4 f. 1328 a 35—39, with which must go c. 9 § 3, 1328 b 34—39, § 7, 1329 a 22). The first time this resulted in an independent investigation of the nature of Happiness, εὐθαυσία, while on the second occasion Happiness was merely defined (as ἀρετῆς ἑνέργεια καὶ χρόνης τελειος 1328 a 38), without further explanation and without reference either to the previous discussion of c. 1, or to the Ethics. Hence—assuming the genuineness of c. 13 and especially observing that in this present passage, too, the discussion of c. 1 is ignored—we inferred that the first chapter of our present book was not intended, in Aristotle's final plan, to find a place in this work. Another difficulty, certainly, though a less serious one, arises from the fact that here the passage in cc. 8 and 9 is equally ignored. Had Aristotle put the finishing touches to his work, he would doubtless have inserted a reference to the Ethics there (i.e. in c. 8 § 4), and a short allusion to the previous passage (c. 8 § 4 f., c. 9 § 3, § 7) here. The difficulty is however much diminished by the reading adopted in c. 13 § 4, φαμέν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα, where the present φαμέν should perhaps be again taken—as at 1328 b 18 n. (804). 1329 b 11 n. (831), 1331 a 19 n. (902)—in the sense of ἐφανε, and thus as referring back to cc. 8 and 9. Cp. also n. (807) and 1. 2. 8 n. (21). **Susem.** (872)

§ 5 8 εν τοῖς ἢθικοῖς] Nic. Eth. 1. 7. 9 ff., esp. § 12, 1098 a 15 ff., 1101 a 14 ff. Comp. cc. 6—8. **Susem.** (873)

εἰ τί τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὀφελος] It is impossible to decide whether this parenthetical remark is due solely to Aristotle's love of qualifying and limiting expressions (see n. 401), or is to be explained, as Bernays supposes [Dialoge, p. 71], from his relations with practical statesmen as a half-sarcastic reference to the scornful way in which men like Phocion and Antipater would look down upon his philosophical treatment of such questions. **Susem.** (874)

With far less probability Grote in an essay on the Ethics (in Fragments p. 133 f.) connects this passage with Nic. Eth. 1. 3—2 f., 1004 b 14 ff. and 11. 2. 3—5. 1104 a 1—11 (περὶ τῶν διαιτητῶν) as an indication of Aristotle's despair of reaching certainty, or securing any common agreement upon matters of ethics and politics (cp. 1337 b 2): 'that Aristotle regarded
the successful prosecution of ethical inquiries as well as desperate."

9 The grammatical subject of εἶναι is εὐθύμειον. The definition in full is ἐνεργεία καὶ χρῆσις ἄρετῆς τελεία, ouk e ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks l. p. 575 f., II. 385—401.

τελείαν] We may paraphrase: "matured and relatively permanent." See Rassow Forschungen p. 116 ff. Happiness of too short duration is no true happiness, as Aristotle shows in the passage to which he refers. At the same time in expressing himself thus he is doubtless thinking of a certain immaturity in age: for a child has not yet attained to Well-being, because its virtue is not yet developed: Nic. Eth. 1. 9. 10, 1100 a 1 ff., cp. Pol. 1. 13. 11, n. (120). The corresponding negative term, too, εὐθυμια, is used for the undeveloped and immature virtue and reasoning power, as well as for that of a commonplace man who has never attained full intellectual or social development: 1. 13. 7 ff. (cp. § 11), III. 11. 9 n. (572), v. (VIII). 5. 10 n. (1033). SUSEM. (875)

10—21 Respexit haec Eudemus VII. 2. 43 (565), 1328 b 8 sqq. SUSEM.

10 ταύτῃν οὐκ [ἐ]ὑποθέσεως] This is not to be found in Nic. Ethics, but Aristotle adds it here to avoid any possible misunderstanding, if indeed, as I believe, n. (881), he is the author of this chapter. SUSEM. (876)

There are no good English equivalents for these technical terms: 'conditional' (or contingent) and 'absolute' are attributes not very suitable to moral or virtuous activity, or goods in general.

§ 6 11 τάναγκαια.] On this passage see Dr Jackson's article, Journal of Phil. x. 311, to which should be added that he justifies "the rather abrupt use of the word τάναγκαια for morality enforced by law and custom by a reference to Plato Rep. vi. 493 c: άλλα τάναγκαια δίκαια καλοὶ καὶ καλά, τήν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ αγαθοῦ φύσιν, δόσων διάφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἐσωράκως τῆς κτλ." Cp. c. 14 § 12, 1333 a 32: πρακτά = (1) ἀναγκαία καὶ χρήσιμα, (2) καλά; and Nic. Eth. III. 6. 5, 1116 b 2 f. δεὶ δ' οὖ ν δέ ανάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλὸν.

to καλὸν] sc. πρακτέαν. But below, a 13, to καλὸν, sc. εὐεξία = nobleness or beauty as a quality of action.

13 καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχουσιν] 'They are of the character of a necessary evil.' (Congreve). SUSEM. (877)

14 τῶν τιμίων, sc. τιμωρίων καὶ κολάσεων.

15 ἐπὶ = to secure; the final sense of ἐπὶ c. acc. Bonitz Ind. Ar. 268 b 59 ff., Eucken ii. p. 58.

§ 7 17 ἀναίρεσις] Postgate defends the vulgar αἴρεσις = choice, in the sense that of two evils we choose the less. For me this is too subtle. SUSEM. (877 b) sc. αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς.
χρήσαιτο δ' ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἄνηρ καὶ πενία καὶ νόσον καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φανάλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑστών. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς ἥθικοὺς λόγους, οὕτω συνεισέγαγεν καὶ καλῶς εἶναι ταῦτα καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαίως σπουδαίαι καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταῦτα.

25 ἀπλῶς. διό καὶ νομίζουσιν ἀνθρώποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὑτὰ τὰ ἔκτος εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὡσπερ εἰ τούτων κινδυνοῖς λαμπρῶν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιώτατον τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

22 δὲ ἀρετήν, omitting τὴν, M. P.1: hence [τὴν] Susem.1, perhaps rightly || 23 [τὰ] before ἀγαθὰ Reiz Bk.2 || δὴ Sepulveda, δ' Π.Π. Ar. Bk.1, Susem.1 in the text || δὲ καὶ οὕτω apparently Π (palam autem et quod William) || 27 αἰτιώτατον—<τὶς> P5 Bk.2 || ἡ Λύρα Γ, perhaps rightly

19 χρήσαιτο δ' ἂν] Comp. Nic. Eth. 1. 10. 11 ff., 1100 b 18 ff., where this is presented as a special feature of Magnanimity (cp. c. 7 § 7, n. 790). Again in Post. Analytics II. 13. 18. 97 b 15 ff., this, τὸ διάδρομον εἶναι εὐπροσώποις καὶ ἀνθρώποις, is mentioned as a second mark of the high-souled character (μεγάλοφρες) along with that addeduced in n. (790), τὸ μὴ ἀνέχεσαι ἀρμαδόνει (Eaton). Susem. (878) Cp. χρῆσις in N. E. I. 10. 12, 1100 b 27, χρῆσαι § 13, 1101 a 4.

20 τὸ μακάριον] The decision in N. E. I. 10. 14, 1101 a 6, is ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδὲποτε γένος ἂν ὁ εὐδαιμόνος, οὐ μὴν μακάριον γε, ἀν Πραμακινὸς τύχαις περισσότητος. Cp. id. 1. 10. 3, 1100 a 16 ff., and the absurd derivation from χαίρειν, VII. II. 2, 1152 b 7.

21 κατὰ τοὺς ἥθικους λόγους] Nic. Eth. III. c. 4 (c. 6, Bk.), esp. § 4, 1113 a 25, τῶν μὲν σπουδαίων τὸ κατ' ἀληθείαν (sc. βούλητων) εἶναι sc. φατέον βουλητῶν, a 32 διαφέρει πλείστον ὁ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἀλήθεια ἐν ἐκάστοσοφραν. It is quite true the statement is not made there in so many words: this is much more nearly the case in the two spurious treatises, Eud. Eth. VII. 15. 5, 1243 b 26 ff., Magna Moralia II. 9. 14, 1207 b 31 ff. Susem. (879) Comp. also Rhet. I. 6. 2, 1362 a 24 ff.

§§ 24 τὰς χρήσεις] The plural as ἐνέργεια. In fact χρῆσις and ἐνέργεια are both opposed to ἔξεις. The use which from time to time he makes of these goods (not of their opposites) attests his absolute virtuousness and goodness. Hence to consider external goods the cause of Wellbeing is the same thing as to attribute to the instrument what is really the result of the player's skill.

25 διὸ... 26 ἀγαθῶν] Because external goods are just those which while absolutely good (ἀπόλογος ἀγαθὰ) are not good for every one, but only that good at all times to the good man: Nic. Eth. v. 1. 9, 1129 b 1 ff., ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονεκτῆσθαι ὁ ἄθλιος, περὶ τάγαθα ἑσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἐντύχει καὶ ἀτύχει. ἕστι μὲν ἀπόλογος ἀγαθὰ, τοι δὲ οὐκ ἰκανον, Lct. I. VII (vii). 4. 2, 1029 b 5, καὶ τούτῳ ἐργὸν ἔσται, ὡσπερ εἰ τοῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιήσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστω ἀγαθῶν τὸ ὅπως ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστω ἀγαθὰ. Susem. (880) The distinction is drawn N. E. VII. 12. 1, 1152 b 26 ff. τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχώς τὸ μὲν ἀπόλογο τὸ δὲ τιμω. See N. E. I. 3, 1304 b 17 ff.: wealth and strength are instances, since they have proved in some cases fatal (τοι δὲ οὐκ ἰκανον ἀγαθα). c. 13 §§ 1—8. Congreve (see Crit. note on 1331 b 26) enclosed in brackets the whole passage, §§ 2—8, from 1331 b 26 ἐπεὶ δὲ...1332 a 27 τῆς τέχνης, as an unnecessary interruption of the reasoning. "What was said" (a 28, τῶν εἰρήμενων) would then mean what was said cc. 4—12; and that would undoubtedly serve to explain what according to §§ 9, 10 requires explanation ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενων. But then the following passage a 31 τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον κτλ. lacks all proper connexion unless it has been directly preceded by the statement that Wellbeing consists in the practice of virtue assisted by the requisite external conditions. This alone makes all follow in regular order: these conditions, we are now told, § 9, depend on Fortune, but if the external conditions are present it is the governing intelligence that produces virtue. Hence the fundamental idea of §§ 1—8 is indispensable for the context, and the atheesis of that passage is not the right way to re-
move the objection noticed in nn. (687, 872), although we do not deny, and in n. (872) have clearly stated, that the present detailed discussion would doubtless have received a different character had the final touches been given to the work. With Congreve, square brackets do not necessarily imply an un-Aristotelian origin. Still it is all but inconceivable, if the connexion intended was that assumed by Congreve, that Aristotle himself should have spoilt it by the inserted passage. Apart from the connexion, the whole passage does not look un-Aristotelian. For, though we cannot stop to prove this here, of all Broughton's objections to the genuineness of c. 13 the only valid one is that mentioned in nn. (876, 879), which taken by itself is far from decisive; while the genuineness of the passage is supported by the reference back to it embedded in the context of c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f.; cp. n. (931). SUSEM. (881)

28 [έκ] It follows from what has been said: cp. n. on 1254 a 31.

το μέν = έκ τίνων καὶ πολών δει συνεστᾶν τὴν ἀλλουσαν ἐσποναί εἶλεται μακράν = χρόνος ἀρετῆς ἀπόκει καὶ τάγαθα ἀπόκει. To this is opposed the work of the legislator as in 1. 10, 1. 1258 a 21 ff., I. 5, 8, 1263 a 39, 11 § 15, 1273 b 21. The drift of §§ 9, 10, seems to be this. Of the two requisites, the one, χρόνος, is due to Fortune: the other, ἀρετή, is the legislator's task (σπερτησίων). Cp. 1333 a 14 πραγματευτέων. viz. by education. 'Wisdom cannot create materials; they are the gifts of nature or of chance.'

§ 9 29 [εὐφράσεω] Another of the passages cited n. (128). SUSEM. (883)

30 τῆς τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν  The structure of the state = the state we are constructing, or are to construct. We pray it may be fortunate enough to secure the goods at Fortune's disposal. The relative clause is the object of καταστησίων.

καὶ τραγῳδεῖας For here we acknowledge that Fortune is supreme. Comp. c. 1 § 10, 1323 b 27 f., nn. (707, 795, 871); Zeller op. cit. II. ii, p. 333. SUSEM. (882)

32 [ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως] The presence of virtue in the state is not then a matter of fortune, but of knowledge and purpose (will), the two conditions of all right action, the eidos and προαιρετικός of N. Eth. ii. 4, 3, 1105 a 30 f. (Congreve). On them depend virtue or vice, goodness or badness of character. See further N. Eth. III. cc. 1—5, dealing with the intellect and moral action; also n. (121) on I. 13. 12. SUSEM. (884)

34 [ήμιν δὲ πάντες] Here still more clearly than at c. 9 § 7, 1329 a 10, it is laid down that all the citizens of the best state have perfectly equal rights. Cp. nn. (816, 817); III. c. 1 §§ 9, 10, c. 13 § 12, nn. (440, 599). SUSEM. (885)

§ 10 35 [πώς ἀνὴρ γίνεται σπουδαῖος] By this term Aristotle denotes only the man of developed and matured virtue and excellence. See III. 3, 3, n. (470), and n. (112) on I. 13, 6; further N. Eth. VI. 1. 7, 1139 a 15, 2 § 6, 1139 b 12 f. Comp. Walter op. cit. p. 283 ff. In what sense the words εἶπαν ἐνδεχεται στ. εἶναι μὴ καθ' ἐκατόν δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν ἂν to be taken is clear from III. c. 11 §§ 2—4, 1281 a 42 ff., esp. b 4 f. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐνδεχόμεν ἐκατόν μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὠπερ ἐνα ἄνθρωπον, n. (65 b): c. 13 §§ 3, 4, 1283 a 37 ff. See further IV(VII). c. 1
36 metai spoudaios. kai yap ei pantas enedechetai spoudaious (XII)
einai, mi kal' ekaston de tov politon, ou'tos airopoteron:
akolouthei yap to kal' ekaston kai to pantas.

§ 11 allla mi'n agatho ge kai spoudaios hymoitemai dia tis,
ta 6 trida de tou eis, esti physeis ethos logos, kai yap finai dei pro-
ton on on anerwston allla mi' tov alloan ti zowon, esti kai (p. 1)
toina to to soma kai tin phuxhni. einai de oudeon ophiilos
1332 b finai: ta yap etheta metaalliein poiei: einai yap esti dia
ths physeos epameroterizonta dia tov ethon esti to pleiron
§ 12 kai to belion. ta m'en ovn alla tov zowon malista m' 7
thi physei, ymi, mikra de' einai kai tois ethosin, anerwotos de
5 kai logon' monon yap exei logon' hoste dei taunata symfow-

41 etta P5 (later hand) and Lambin, ovtos II 1 Ar. Susem.1 in the text and I5
(1st hand) || 42 de T, 7e II Ar. Bk.

1332 b 1 metaalliein II 2 Bk. || einai... 3 belion observed to be defective by Con-
ing || yap de? Schneider || esti dida] estin idia Koraes || [ida] Gottling, bia
Lindau, against the sense || 2 physeos <kai> in the margin || <a diegetai> dia
? Susem., <a> dia and <mpei> esti Schmidt, ethw <de metaallieino> ? Conring,
ethw * * or else [ida ton ethw] Thurot || de is added after dia by Alb. and Thomas
|| 3 belion <agona> Schneider (who also brackets b 1 esti), belion <agona>
Weldon who also reads 2 dia <de> ton ethw || 5 iste... 6 allhlos transposed by
Boker to precede 3 ta m'en ovn: see Introd. p. 89. Susem. had observed that in its
traditional place this clause is plainly inconsistent with 6 polla yap... 7 belion || 5
mounos Spengel (solus Ar.), perhaps right

§§ 11, 12 n. (708), VIII (v), 9, 12, 1310
a 18 f. n. (1642). SUSEM. (886) As here
the virtue of the whole state is unequally
diffused through the citizens (as was doubt-
less the case in the existing democracies), so
(II, 5, 27) we find unequal distribution of
happiness discussed. For the antithesis
pantes || ois ekastos, see II, 3, 2, 1261
b 26 n. Add to the instances VIII (v).
8, 3, 1307, b 35 ff.

39 allla mi'n... 10 logos] This is repeated
SUSEM. (887)
c, 15 § 7; 1334 b 6 f. n. (931). Comp.
N. Eth. x. 9, 6, 1179 b 29 f., genoistai di' agathos oton tai mi' phonoi eis o' ethi eis
de didacchi. As in that passage logos,
reason, is explained by didacchi, instruction,
so in B, n., 5, 16, 1263 b 39, it is replaced by
philosophia, culture. Comp. also II, 8,
24, 1269 a 20: the coercive force of law is
of these good or bad natural dispositions,
or qualities (ai phonai ekeis), as the neces-
sary conditions for the future growth of
the real moral and intellectual qualities
or aptitudes (ekeis), which correspond to
them. Comp. n. (1043), i.e. Exc. III. on
B. v (viii). SUSEM. (888)

42 einai is subject to phinai, but in the
next line it must be the object governed
by metaalliein.

§ 11 1332 b 1 einai yap... 3 belion)
That there is some flaw in this sentence
will hardly be disputed. Arctinus trans-
lates well enough to show the meaning,
'nam aliqua per naturam ad utrumque
apta per mores ad peius vel melius con-
vertuntur'; but in this he can scarcely
have followed any manuscript. SUSEM.

§ 12 3 ta m'en ovn allla kat] In form
this sentence recalls Meta. 1, 1, 3, 980
b 25—28, N. E. viii. 12, 7, 1162a 10—22.
4 mikra is accus., einai nominative. The
gender of mounos is a parallel to teleos
and xwriosi, 1, 2, 15, 1253 a 32 f.

5 dei taunata symfounen] Habit should
cooperate with natural endowment. This
neiν ἀλλήλωις. <τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀλλα τῶν ζῶν μᾶλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσιν> (XII) +<ζήμ, μικρὰ δ' ἐνια καὶ τοὺς ἐθέσειν, ἀνθρωπὸς δὲ καὶ λόγῳ. μόνον> <γὰρ ἔχει λόγον'> πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθεσμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν ι πράττουσι διὰ τῶν λόγων, εἰς πειθόσων ἀλλα λέχειν βέλτιον.

§ 13 τὴν μὲν τῶν φύσιν οἴνους εἶναι δει τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχερώτους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον. το δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἣδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰθεξόμενοι μανθάνουσιν, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες.

14 ἐπει δὲ πάσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνεστηκεν εξ ἁρχῶν-XIII των καὶ ἀρχομένων, τούτο ό τὸ σκεπτέον, εἰ ἐτέρους εἶναι δει τοὺς ἁρχοντάς καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους οἱ τῶν αὐτῶς διὰ 15 βίου. δήλου γὰρ ώς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν

8 τῶν omitted and δὴ inserted after φύσιν by M² and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹ in the margin); presumably τῶν and δὴ (before φύσιν) were variants. In Bk.² φύσιν is omitted by mistake | 10 εὐθεξόμενα II² | 13 γον] εἶναι P¹ (1st hand), δὴ II². Bk. and P¹ (corr.), possibly right | ἐτέρους—14 τοὺς αὐτῶς Γ' II Ar. Bk. Susem,¹ in the text, τοὺς αὐτῶς—14 ἐτέρους Susem.² Madvig first suspected corruption, but proposed ἀρχομένως, [ἡ] | 15 τὴν omitted by P⁴ Sb Vb

is a satisfactory sense; see however p. 89 for Prof. Wilson’s view (παύτα reason, habit, natural endowment: all three).

§ 13 9 πρότερον] In c. 7. Susem. (889)

10 τα μὲν γὰρ] By habituation (ἐθεξόμενοι) arises moral virtue, by instruction (ἀκούοντες) intellectual virtue, Nic. Eth. II. 1. 1, 11033 14 ff. These are the two sides of Education: N. E. II. 1. 8, 11033 23 ff., x. 9. 8, 1179 b 29 ff. (Eaton). Susem. (890)

11 ἀκούοντες] Cp. N. E. x. 9. 7, 1179 b 27 οὔ γὰρ δὲν ἀκούσει λόγου. Apparently ἐθεξόμενοι...ἀκούοντες corresponds to τῷ λόγῳ...τοὺς έθέσει ι 15 § 7, 1334 b 18.

c. 14 The distinction between rulers and ruled: whether absolute and life-long, or relative and temporary: §§ 1—5.

§ 1 12—16] Comp. III. 4. 8 n. (477) for the distinction in education. Susem. (891)

13 f. Against the proposed transposition (see Crit. n.) Dr Jackson argues in the following note: 'Aristotle here contrasts (a) the permanent assignment of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that the man who rules never is ruled, the man who is ruled never rules, with (b) the alternation of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that at one time X rules, Y is ruled, at another Y rules, X is ruled. Now a priori the phrase τοὺς αὐτούς εἶδαι might be used to describe either of the contrasted systems: i.e. it might be said that, when the functions are permanently assigned, "the same person always rules, the same person always is ruled"; or again it might be said, that, when the functions alternate, "the same persons rule and are ruled." But although the phrase might be used in either sense, plainly it should not be used simultaneously in both senses. Susemihl however, though he has altered the text in 1332 b 13, 14, so that the phrase τοὺς αὐτούς εἶδαι bears the latter of the two meanings above distinguished, nevertheless employs it in the former of those meanings in 1332 b 22. Thus the alteration creates an inconsistency. On the other hand, if the phrase is taken in both places in the former of the two meanings, the unaltered text is consistent and intelligible.'

What Jackson calls an inconsistency Susemihl assumes to have been the cause of the alteration: "vitium inde orte esse videtur, quod deinde pro τοὺς ἁρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἁρχομένους ετέρους εἶναι διὰ βίου potius dicitur οἱ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῖς μὲν ἁρχεῖν τοῖς δ' ἁρχεῖσθαι καθάπαξ (v. 22 sq.) et pro τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι accuratius ἄρτεν τοῖς ομοίως κοινωνίν κατὰ μέρος ἁρχεῖν καὶ ἁρχεῖσθαι (v. 26 sq.)" Qu. crit. coll. p. 412. Where the reasons on each side are so equally balanced, the traditional order in the text indicates no more than non liquet.
§ 2 κατά την διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοῖς εὐθραυτοῖς τοσούτων (XI) διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τούς θεούς καὶ τοὺς ἱερασίας ἡγούμενα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεις, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλῆς ἐχοντας ὑπερβολὴν, εἰτα κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῶν ἀρχηγομένων τῆς τῶν ἀρχοντῶν, δήλον ὅτι βελτίων ἂν τοὺς τούτους τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δὲ ἀρχεσθαι.

§ 3 καθάπαξ ἐπει δὲ τοὺτῷ ὅτι ὁ πάντως λαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ὡστερ ἐν Τﺒ γενέσθαι, ἢν διὰ τοῦτον ἡ ἀληθής σκίνωμα τῶν καθηκόντων καὶ τῶν ἀρχηγομένων καὶ ἐκείνου πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι. τὸ τε γὰρ ἵσων * * ταύτων τοὺς ὁμοίως, καὶ ἀργάτικα μείνειν τῆς πολιτείας τὴν μείωσθηκίνην, καὶ παρά τὸ δίκαιον, μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχηγομένων ὑπάρχοντι νεωτερίζειν τοῖς χώραν τοσούτοις τε εἶναι

23 ὡσπερ] ὅπερ Reiz. || 26 κατὰ μέρος transposed to follow 27 ἀρχεσθαι. || Schneider, [κατὰ μέρος] or 27 [καὶ ἀρχεσθαί], or else ἀρχεσθαί καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἀρχεῖν Spengel (the last the best suggestion) || 27 ἵσων <τῷ δίκαιῳ> Thurot. ἵσων <καὶ τὸ δίκαιον> Susem. from Dubiner’s translation || 29 νεωτερίζειν βοηθήματι transposed to follow 30 χώραν by Lambin and Thurot || 30 βοηθήματι Vettori (in his translation), Reiz, rightly || τε] δὲ Spengel.

16 κατὰ = in virtue of. Cp. κατὰ ταύτα λέγεσθαι Meta. 1.6, 3, 987 b 9, Bonitz ad loc. Eucken p. 43. This construction with ἀκολούθωσι is less frequent than the dative. But cp. Ν. Ε. Ι. 2. 1, 1103 b 23, κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφοράς ἀκολούθουσι αἱ εἰς, VII. 9. 6, 1151 b 34, καὶ ὡς τοῦτο ἀκολουθήσειν, Hist. Animal. VIII. 2. 13, 590 a 16, ἀκολούθουσιν οἱ βίοι κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς, a 18, III. 9. 2, 517 a 13 (Ibid. Ar. 26 a 36 has, what is rare, a double misprint, Γ. 2. 517 a 3).

§ 2 εἰ μὲν τοῖς κτῷ] Comp. 1. 5. 10, 1284 b 34—36 with n. (47). Susem. (889) Strikingly similar to Pl. Politicus 301 D: ὅτι γὰρ δὲ γε ὅπως εἰς ὁμοίωμα ὡς δὴ φανερὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεις βασιλείοις ὅπως ἐν συμφ. νομικάς ἑρμῆτικα, τὸ τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρουν εἰς, δεί δὴ συνελθόντας ἡγούμενα κατὰ γραφές.

22 βελτίων δὲ κτῷ] This has been affirmed 11. 2. 6, 1261 a 38. It is the basis of the argument for Absolute Monarchy III. 13. 13. See n. (601, 678).

§ 3 Scylax of Caryanda in Caria was sent by Darius Hystaspis to explore the mouth of the Indus, Herod. iv. 44. We may conclude with certainty from this passage that he published an account of his expedition in a book of travels. But the geographical work, which has come down to us bearing the name of Scylax, ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἐντὸς τῶν Ἡρακλείων στηλῆς, is of much later date.


24 τοὺς βασιλεάς κτῷ] Cp. vii. (iv). 4. 4. n. (1163). In Ethiopia the kings were chosen for their stature. Susem. (894) 27 τὸ τε γὰρ ἵσων <καὶ τὸ δίκαιον > ταύτων] Where all the citizens are peers, equality is the same thing as justice. See III. 9 §§ 1, 2. Susem. (895) Equality = τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι, cp. 1261 a 30. From viii. 1. 11—13, 1301 b 26 ff., it 10 to καὶ ἑπάνω ἵσων which is ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, while it is ἀρμύριλος ἵσων which is ταύτω.

28 ἀργάτικα μείνειν τὴν πολιτείαν . . . . 32 ἐστὶν] This passage condenses the results of the inquiry into the stability and instability of governments in B. viii (v) and vi (iv), especially recognising the criterion of viii (v). 9. 6, 1309 b 16 ff., and vii (iv). 12. 1, 1296 b 14 ff. ὡς κριτήριον ἔσται τὸ βοηθήματι τὴν πολιτείαν. See n. (1307).
(XIII)

31 τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολεμεύματι τὸ πλήθος ὡστ' εἶναι κρείττους τοῦ· (p. 119) τῶν πάντων, ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι 3 γε δε τοὺς ἀρχοντας διαφέρει τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβη-
34 τητον. τῶς οὖν ταύτ' ἑσται καὶ τῶς μεθέξουσι, δεὶ σκέψα-
§ 5 σβαί τον νομοθέτην. εἰρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἢ γὰρ
φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα [αὐτῷ] τὸ γένει
37 ταύτῳ τὸ μὲν νεότερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὅπερ τόις μὲν ἀρ-
χεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δ' ἀρχεῖν· ἀγανακτεὶ δὲ οὐδὲς καθ'
ἥλικιαν ἀρχομένους, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττους, ἄλλως τε
40 καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τῶν τοιοῦτον ἔρανον, ὅταν τὰχ'
§ 6 τῆς ἰκνουμένης ἥλικίας. ἐστὶ μὲν ἀρὰ ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχεῖν
καὶ ἀρχεσθαι φατέον, ἑστὶ δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. ἀστε καὶ τὴν
παιδείαν ἑστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίον, ἑστι δ' ὡς ἐτέραν
ἐνια. τὸν τὸ γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἀρχεῖν ἀρχηγήναι φασι
dεῖν πρῶτον. ἑστὶ δὲ ἀρχῆ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἰρη-
4 τα λόγοι, ἢ μὲν τοῦ ἀρχοντος χάριν ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχομένου.
§ 7 τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναι φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν

31 τούτων after 32 πάντων P1.5 IP Bk. || 36 διαίρεσιν Ar., αἱρεσιν ΓΠ Bk., ep. 1333 a 33 || αὐτῷ inserted by Abk. Wb Bk., αὐτῷ M5 and E after τῶ, αὐτῷ P5.4.5
Sb Vb Il, τῶν αὐτῶν Bas, τὸ Spengel, omitted by P1 Ar. || τῶν Abk. Wb || 37 ταύτων Bk., ταύτω M5 and P1 (1st hand, emended by corr.1), visdem Ar., untranslated by William, omitted by Bas.3 || τὸ—τὸ tot—tot M5 P1 || 39 εἰ ovd' ei nomizei Sepulveda, ovd' ei nomizei Koraes, not badly || 40 τῶν τοιοῦτον τοῦτων τὸν IP 5 Bk., perhaps right, cundem Ar.
1333 a 1 ἐστιν] ἑστι μὲν Bk.2

§ 5 35 εἰρθαι δὲ πρῶτον] c. 9 §§ 4—6: see n. (814). SUSEM. (896)
41 ἰκνουμένης = προσηκούση Bon. Ind. Ar. s. v. Found with ἤρα Prob. XX. 14, 924 b 14; with ἓξις, ἐπιστήμη Pol. VI (IV). 1. 2, 1288 b 16.
Education to be in one sense the same for all; in another sense a different education for rulers and ruled; §§ 6—8.
§ 6 1333 a 1 ἐστιν ωs κτλ] The education is the same and yet different in so far as it has two different sides; it trains the governed to obey well, but only in so far as this would seem to teach them how to govern well in the future: thus so far it really teaches the future governors. Comp. Bonitz in Zeitsch. J. d. östr. Gymn. XVIII. 1867, p. 680 f. SUSEM. (897)
2 τὸν τὴν γὰρ] With this whole passage comp. III. 4. 10—14, 1277 a 25 n.

(490). This is one of the few instances in which τε γὰρ—ετέριν, as is allowed by Bonitz, who discusses the Aristotelian usage of τε γὰρ generally in the paper just cited p. 672 ff., esp. p. 680. SUSEM. (898)

English readers may consult Shilleto's critical note to Dem. De Falsa Leg. § 176. He cites Herod. IV. 167, Aristoph. Par 402, Ar. Khet. III. 7, 11, 1408 b 17, and III. 11, 7, 1412 b 9, and further illustrates the similar usage of ὁτε γὰρ.
3 εὶ τοῖς πρῶτοις εἰρηται λόγοις I.e. III. 6 §§ 6—10, 1278 b 30 ff. It is noteworthy that reference is only made to this passage, and not to the much more similar one quoted in n. (898). However, some such reference may have been lost, where the following context is defective. See n. (900); also n. (902). SUSEM. (899)
§ 7 6 ἐλευθέρων * *] The passage which is wanting here, must have stated that in the government of the best state only the latter kind of rule can be in question, and that the power of ruling over slaves is not such as can only be learnt by previous corresponding service; on the contrary, the service of a slave is unworthy of a free man, and ought not to be learnt at all by the young sons of our citizens. Compare the discussion III. 4 §§ 11—14, which is analogous in other respects too, and where § 13, like § 7 here, contains a limiting clause:—"except sometimes of necessity and for their own use," 1277 b 5 ff. 

SUSEM. (900)

6 διαφέρει δ' ... 11 τίνος ἐνεκέν] See V(viii). 2. 6, 1337 b 17 ff. with n. (983). 

SUSEM. (901) The end redeems and ennobles apparently menial offices, as for a soldier to groom his own horse.

§ 8 If the good officer, who has learnt to command by obeying, is also the good man, how are we to train up good men? By this section we are brought back to 1332 a 36. But the last clause τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀράτης ζωῆς carries us back further, to 1332 a 7 or the beginning of c. 13, 1331 b 24 ff. How tortuous the course of the discussion is, may be seen from the fact that after the Unity of Education we take its two main branches, moral and intellectual Educa-

tion; next criticise Sparta; then after much repetition arrive at a similar halting place to the present, 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐστάτων, τούτῳ δὴ θεωρητέον.

12 φαμέν] The present may well stand here also (see nn. 804, 831, 872) in the sense of a past tense: if so there is certainly a reference to III. 4 § 5. 

Comp. n. (471). 

SUSEM. (902)

14 τούτ' ἄν εἰπῃ ... 16 ἡμᾶς] The virtues which must be learnt by obedience are however only the moral virtues, not the intellectual ones, as in the case of φιλοσοφίας has been clearly proved in III. 4. 17. The question now to be considered is which of the two rank the higher; in other words—is development of character or of intellect the highest aim in education? Aristotle decides in favour of the latter. Cf. also V(viii). 2. 1 n. (977), also n. (1024) and Exc. 1. to B. V(viii).

Also Intr. p. 48, p. 50 ff. 

SUSEM. (903)
meven. δὲν φαμευ τάς ἀρετάς εἶναι καθ' ἴα τής ἀγαθός λέγε- (XIII)
2ο ταί πώς. τούτων δ' ἐν ποτέροι μᾶλλον το τέλος, τοῖς μὲν ὠτοὺς
§ 10 διαιροῦσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμευ ὡκ ἀδηλον πώς λεκτέον. ἀεί γὰρ τὸ
χείρον τοῦ βελτίωνος ἑστιν ἐνεκεν, καὶ τούτῳ φαινειν ὁμοιώς εἶν
(p. 120) τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν βελτίων δὲ τὸ λόγον
ἐχον. [διήρηται τε διχῆ, καθ' ὄντερ εἰσθαμεν τρόπον διαι- 25 ῥεῖν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ πράκτορό ἐστι λόγος ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός.
§ 11 ὀσαντός ὡςν ἀναγκή καὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος διηρήσθαι δηλον-
οτι.] καὶ τῶν πράξεως δ' ἀνάλογον ἔρομεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς
τοῦ φύσει βελτίωνος οἰκετεύτερα εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυμ-
29 χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυνών αἰεί γὰρ ἐκαστὸ τούθ' αἴρε-
§ 12 τῶντατον οὖπ τυχεῖν ἐστιν ἀκροτάτου. διηρήται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ 31
βίος εἰς ἀγολοίαν καὶ εἰς σχολὴν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρή-
nυν, καὶ τῶν πράκτων τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαία καὶ χρή-
§ 13 σεμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά. περὶ ὧν ἀναγκή τὴν αὐτὴν
αἴρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξει-
20 πότερα Μ᾽, qvia William || 24 [διηρήται...27 δηλοφοτί] Susem. || τε] δὲ Γ' ||
διχῇ ὁ λόγος> Reiz, following Lambin's translation || 26 οὖν] δ' Π' || καὶ τοῦτο
τὸ μέρος after διηρήσθαι Π'—Π' Bk. || δηλον δ' Βk., omitted by Ald. Wb, while Ar.
translates it after πράξεως: δήλον < δ'> Βτι Sylburg, <καλ> δήλον Αρι Spenge. Both
Sylburg and Spengel omit 27 δ', which neither William nor Ar. translates || 29 ἢ
πασῶν ἢ < τῶν > τοῖν δυνών Ed. Müller (Gesch. der Kunsttheorie II. p. 370), ἢ πασῶν ἢ
τῶν δυνών Lindau, [ἡ] πασῶν ἢ τοῦ δυνών Ridgeway, [ἡ] πασῶν [ἡ τοῦ δυνών] or else
[ἡ] πασῶν ἢ < τῶν > τοῖν δυνών Susem. Schmidt however conjectures that what ὧν
βούλωνται has been dropped after δυνῶν || 31 [καὶ] πόλεμον Reiz || 32 [εἰς τὰ] and
33 [εἰς τὰ] Bonitz Ind. Ar. 42 b 26 ff., 632 a 29 f.: see however Vahlen Zschr. f. d.
estr. Gym. 1872 p. 540 || 33 [περὶ] and 34 διὰρεσον Schneider, wrongly

§ 10 24 διηρήται Sc. τὸ λόγον ἔχον. The passage in brackets as far as 26 δηλο-
οτί is in itself thoroughly Aristotelian, see n. (40); and it would be quite appropriate
to raise here the further questions: In regard to Reason itself, is it the theoretical or
the practical side that occupies the higher place? Is it the intellectual develop-
ment of the former, or rather the cultivation of practical and political insight,
which is the chief and final aim of Education? Yet these questions are not raised
anywhere in the context and so the pas-
sage serves no useful purpose. What is
worse, it interrupts the connexion in the most confusing manner: it must therefore
be pronounced an interpolation by an alien hand. Susem. (905)

§ 11 27 καὶ τὰς πράξεις Cp. nn. (712, 717, 731, 736, 743) on c. 2 § 1, § 6, c. 3 §1, § 3, § 8. Susem. (906)

29 τοῖν δυνών] The relation is expressed 1331 b 29, τὰς πρᾶσα τὸ τέλος φε-
ροῦσας πράξεις.

§ 12 30 διηρήται δ] As e.g. 1. 5. 10, 1254 b 31. There is an echo of this
division in Plut. De lib. ed. c. c. 13, 96 οὲν πά ως διὰ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἀνεσθαί καὶ σπουδάζ
διηρήται (Newman).

32 τῶν πρακτῶν] Cp. 1332 a 10. With χρήσιμα comp. the utilitarian con-
ception of a civic virtue as in Plato's
Phædo, Protag., Republic and Mr Archer
Hind's Phædo, Appendix I.

§ 13 34 αἴρεσιν] The correlation of αἰρέωτατον a 28; so a 41, τὰς τῶν πραγ-
μάτων αἴρεσιν = the choice of one action
in preference to another. The estimate
of value is the ground of preference. At
πρὸς πάντα μὲν τούτων τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετητέον, καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυγῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις
§ 14 αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν
40 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμά-
των αἱρέσεις; δὲ μὲν γὰρ ἄσχολειν δύνασθαι καὶ πο-
λεμεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰρήνην ἤγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τὰ

αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ χρῆσιμα [δὲ] πράσσειν, δὲ καλὰ δὲν
μᾶλλον. ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ πάθας ἐτί
4 ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἥλικιας, ὃσι χέονται παί-
§ 15 δειας. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύουσα τῶν ἨΛ-
6 λημών, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστησάντες τὰς
πολιτείας, οὕτω πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον τέλος ψάνοιται συντάξα-
ντες τα περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς
τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτίκως ἀπέκλιναν
10 πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκοῦσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας.
§ 16 παραπλησίοις δὲ τούτους καὶ τῶν ὑστέρον τίνες γραφάντων
40 πράκτων; Susem. cp. a 32. Yet πραγμάτων gives a suitable sense
|| 41 αἱ-
ρέσεις Koraes (cp. a 34), διαφέρει (δὲ αἱρέσεις 14) Γ. II. Ar. Bk. Susem. in the text ||
μὲν omitted by Γ Π, hence [μὲν] Susem.3
1333 b 2 δὲ before πράσσει added by Π2 Bk., before καὶ Π, δὲ ? Stahr || 7 βελ-
tον Π2 Π6 Bk., possibly right, βέλτιον <καὶ τὸ> ? Schneider || 8 πάσας omitted by Π1

a later time αἱρεῖσθαι, φεύγειν are tech-
nical Stoic terms, e.g. D. L. vii. 10:
35 πόλεμον] sc. αἱρετῶν εἶναι οἱ αἱ-
ρεῖσθαι δὲν.
ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολής] Comp. N. E. x. 7. 6, 1177 a 4 ff., Plato Lact. i. 628 b
(Eaton), and with the former passage n. (921) below. Susem. (907)
37 βλέποντι] Goes with πρὸς πάντα:
aν incidence of hyperbaton.
39 τελη] Plural as in § 14 b 3 σκοποῦς.
§ 14 1333 b 6 μᾶλλον δὲ εἰρήνην
άγειν] Cp. again Plato Lact. i. 628 b,
ουσαύτου τις οὐτὲ ἃν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένου,
οὕτως πρὸς τὰ ἐξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων
μένον ἢ πρῶτων, οὐτὲ ἃν νομόθετος ἀκριβῆς,
εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνην τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ
μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔνεκα τὰ τής εἰ-
ρήνης (Eaton). Susem. (908)
4 τὰς ἄλλας ἥλικιας] What these are,
is plain from 1200 b 15 ff., 1277 a 16
—20. See further n. (1024) on v(viii).
5 4. 1339 a 29 f.
§ 15 5 οἱ εἰ νῦν] Cp. II. 1. 1, n.
(128 b). Susem. (909) The plural
notwithstanding, it would seem as if
Sparta and Lycurgus alone were meant.
7 οὕτος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον] A familiar
criticism. Cp. II. 9. 34 n. (344 ff.), IV
(vii). 2. 9 n. (719), v(viii). 4 §§ 1—7, n.
(1005). Susem. (910) Add Isocr.
iv. (Pangrammata) 187, 188, 228 (Newman).
With συντάξαντες comp. 1324 b 8, and
1271 b 2 (συντάξεις).
9 φορτίκως] In a purely utilitarian,
almost mercenary spirit.
§ 16 11 καὶ τῶν ὑστέρον τίνες γρ.]
Comp. vi(v). 1 § 3 with n. (1123) and
Intr. p. 20 n. 1. Here we again clearly
perceive how slight is our knowledge of
such political literature before Aristotle.
It is highly probable that among the
writers here alluded to were those too
who were the first to set up the theory of
a mixed constitution, see II. 6. 17, n.
(219—221) and B. III. Exc. 1. p. 449,
since it was in the Spartan and Cretan
constitutions that they found the realiza-
tion of their ideal, 1265 b 33 with n. (219). Thibron, or Thibron, according to another reading, is quite unknown to us. There can scarcely be a doubt that Aristotle was also thinking of the work on the Lacedaemonian constitution which bears the name of Xenophon. At any rate his author, i. e. f., makes the happiness which the Lacedaemonian citizens attained by obeying the Laws of Lycurgus consist chiefly in the fact that, in spite of their small number, they had proved themselves the most powerful and celebrated state in Greece; and Aristotle's next remarks sound exactly like a polemic against the opening words of this little work: ἄλλως ἐγὼ ἐννοήσας ποτὲ ὡς ἡ Σπάρτη τῶν ὀλγανθρωπότατον πόλεων οὖσα δινατώτατε τα καλὰ ἀναμονήτατον ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἐφάνη, ἐθαύμασα ὡς ποτὲ πρόσω τούτων ἐγένετο. εἰπέ μέντοι κατενήσατά τα ἐπιθυμήσαι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐκέτι ἐθαύμαζον. The suggestion would therefore be natural enough that Thibron, and not Xenophon, was the real author; but the true authorship of Xenophon has been lately demonstrated with such certainty by Naumann De Xenophonis libro quatuor Lacedaemoniorum Politeia inscribitor (Berlin 1876) that it is scarcely possible to adduce any tenable argument against it. Oncken's suggestion, too, op. cit. II. p. 179, that Xenophon wrote it under the assumed name of Thibron, is just as unsatisfactory as that of v. Leutsch (Philologus XXXIII. p. 97) that he wrote the first part of the Hellenica under the name of Cratippus. Both these hypotheses themselves depend on an hypothesis, the falsity of which has been demonstrated by Nitsche (after Morus) in a dissertation Uber die Abfassung von X. Hellenica (Berlin 1871) p. 42 ff. This is the hypothesis, unquestionably dating from ancient times, that, according to his own statement, Hellen. Ill. 1, 2, Xenophon published his Anabasis under the name of Themistogenes of Syracuse. But the right interpretation of the passage in question is that Themistogenes also wrote an Anabasis, to which Xenophon refers because his own was not written at the time. Moreover there is no ground for the supposition that Xenophon ever published any of his works under an assumed name. Thibron or Thibron is a well-known Laconian name, and the one alluded to here by Aristotle was doubtless a Lacconian by birth, and this may have been the reason why Aristotle cites him by name, without mentioning Xenophon.

SEUSEM. (911)

v. Wilamowitz identifies the author Thibron with the Spartan who commanded in Asia Minor 399 B.C. (Xen. Anab. VII. 6, 1, 24, Hell. III. 1, 4, IV. 8, 17). His words are: "Next there appeared on the scene a champion of Oligarchy, Thibron, an ambiguous character and incompetent official, but one of the ruling caste: he wrote in glorification of Lycurgus. Well might Agesilaos request his literary agent, Xenophon, to draw up a new version of the story" of Sparta, "just as he had entrusted him with the task of justifying before public opinion the period from 404 to 388... The foundation for the common traditional view of Sparta was laid in the half century 403—350: its author was probably Dieuchidas of Megara" (Homeriche Untersuchungen p. 273 f.). He conjectures in a note that possibly Plato's strange authority for Sparta in the Laws [B. III. esp. 683—693] was Thibron.

14 τὸ κρατεῖν] Conquest, 'to win victory,' as § 19, b 30, 1271 b 3. We find ourselves in the midst of a discussion similar to that of c. 2 § 8 ff.

15 καὶ τοὺς ἔργους ἐξάλημενταί οὖν] Comp. II. 9 § 16 n. (308), § 34 n. (345); and n. (919). SEUSEM. (912)

§ 17 17 πολλὴ ἀφορμὴ] As in II. 9 § 35, γίνεσθαι τάγαθα τά περιμέχητα δε ἄρεθι.
tōn eὐτυχημάτων, οὔτω καὶ Ὑμβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται (XIII) τῶν τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκατοστός τῶν 20 γραφῶντος περὶ <τῆς> πολιτείας αὐτών, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγομέναςβαι § 18 πρὸς τοὺς κυνόνυμοὺς πολλῶν ἄρχου· καὶ τῷ δήλον ὡς ἑπειδὴ 12 νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαι-
moves, οὐδ' ὁ νομοθέτης ἄγαθός. ἦτι δὲ τούτῳ γελοιον, εἰ 26 μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μὴδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος 25 πρὸς τὸ χρήσατοι τοὺς νόμους, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζην κα-
§ 19 λῶς. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἄρχης ἢν 30 δει τιμώντα φαινέσθαι τούτω νομοθέτην· τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικὸς ἄρχειν ἢ τῶν ἔλευθερων ἄρχη καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς· ἦτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τούτω δεὶ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαιμονα νομί· 13 35 περ ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμῆν. οὕτε δὴ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιοῦ-
tων νόμων καὶ λόγων οὐδεὶς οὕτε ὀφέλιμος οὕτε ἀληθῆς ἕστιν.

18 Ὑμβρων Π² P⁵5 Ar. Bk. || 20 <τῆς> Schneider Bk.² || γεγομέναςβαι Μ⁴ P¹ || 21 ἑπειδὴ γε οὖν Μ⁷ P¹ || 23 ἐστὶ δὲ Congreve, ἐστὶ γὰρ Susen. || 26 δὲ Μ⁴, omitted by Π⁴ Sb vb L¹. || 30 [κρατεῖν] Reix, καρτεύειν ? Congreve, perhaps rightly || ἐσχύσειν Π⁴, ἐσχύσεις Μ⁴ || 31 τὸ Scaler Bk.² || 36 λόγων (omitted by Π⁴) καὶ νόμων Π² P⁵5 Ar. (? ) and Bk.

18 Υμβρων] See n. (911).
19 τῶν ἄλλων] To Thimbrōn and Xenophōn we saw cause to add Epherōs n. (219); and perhaps Critias.
20 γεγομέναςβαι] By the Agoge, the public training which constituted a Spartan citizen: see Schömann op. c. E. tr. p. 255 ff.

§ 18 21 δήλον] That is, on their own premises such eulogies are refuted. Aristotle fastens on the logical inconsistency of post hoc propter hoc.

23—25] As Mr Newman observes, there were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline in the Lacedaemonian state. (1) Many ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus, e.g., Xen. De Rep. Lac. c. 14, [Plut.] Inst. Lac. c. 42. (2) But Aristotle ascribes it to faults in them: cp. 1270 a 19. Possibly Plutarch's authority for the 'Life of Agis' adopted the first view, and was anxious to save the credit of Lycurgus from Aristotle's criticism in B. ii, and in the Politics. Thus Plutarch replies in effect that (a) Lycurgus was not in fault, but Epitadens and degenerate Spartans: (β) Lycurgus had nothing to do with the Crypteia, or the treatment of the Helots: and (γ) it was not true that he had failed to subject the women to his training.

§ 19 27 τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικὸς κτλ.] Comp. 1. 5 § 2, n. (38 b); iv(vii). c. 3 § 2 n. (734). SUSEM. (913)

§ 20 32 δήλον γὰρ] 'For on these same principles every single citizen, if he can, must aim at making himself supreme in his own state.' Certainly a very appropriate remark. SUSEM. (914)

34 On Pausanias see viii(v). § 10, 7 § 2 n. (1498, 1596). SUSEM. (915)

35 πολιτικός] Statesmanlike. The adjective of a 'noun' πολιτικός, exactly as in 1324 b 26 νομοθέτως stands to νομο-
θῆτης.
§ 21 ταύτα γὰρ ἀρίστα καὶ ίδια καὶ κοινῆ, τῶν <τε> νομοθετην (XIII) ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταύτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἄνθρωπον· τὴν τε τῶν 14 πολεμικῶν ἂσκησιν οὐ τοῦτον χάριν δεῖ μελετᾶν, ἵνα κατα-40 δουλώσωνται τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλὰ ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς μὴ δουλεύσωσιν εὐτέροις, ἐπεῖτα ὅπως ἐντὸς τῆς ἡγεμονίας τῆς 1334 α ὀφθαλμός ἑνέκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων διεσπο-τειας, τρίτων δὲ το διεσποτείαν τῶν ἀέριων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ 15 § 22 δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολαίεν (p. 122) 5 ἑνεκεν τάξη καὶ τής ἐφήμης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς λόγοις. αὐτὸς πλείστη τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσι μὲν ἐφόσον, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπολλυντα. τὴν γὰρ βαθὺν ἀναίσθω, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, ἐφήμην ἐγγυνε-τες, αὐτίως δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παίδευσας δύνασθαι σχο-10 λάξειν.

15 ἐπεὶ δὲ το αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῆ καὶ 16 ἱδία τοῖς ἄνθρωποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῶν ἄριστων ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῆς ἀριστης πολιτείας, φανερῶν ὅτι δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολήν ἀρέτας ὑπέρεχειν· τέλος γάρ, 37 ταύτα P2 4.5 L8 Vb Ar., ταύτα the other authorities, τά Spengel. || ἱδία P2 Ald. || τῶν <τε> Thurot Susem.23, ≪καὶ≫ τὸν Congreve || 38 ταύτα omitted by P4 6 L8, [ταύτα] Bk.2 || ἄνθρωπον τῶν τε τῶν twice over in P1 || 39 πολεμιών Γ M8 || 41 δουλεύσων P1 5 Sb Vb || ἕλοις Γ 1334 a 1 πάνως ? Oncken || 2 τρίτων τοῦτο Joh. Brandis (Rhein. Mus. XI. p. 596), not rightly || τῷ Vettori, τοῦ Koraes || 3 ὡς...4 σχολάζεσι omitted by Γ M8 || 5 τάξει P1 (1st hand) and probably Γ (ordinis William), τέξη M8 || 8 ἀφανεῖν Π2 P9 Bk., perhaps rightly || 11 δὴ Susem., yet δὲ is also tenable || 14 ὑπέρεχειν Susem., ὑπάρχειν Π Π II Ar. Bk. Susem.1

§ 21 37 τῶν <τε> νομοθετῆν] Cp. n. (296) on II. 9. 12. Susem. (916) 40 ίδια followed by ὅπως. See P. Weber Absichtssätte p. 20, who quotes 1267 a 2, 1301 b 6, 1330 b 11. 41 ἐπεῖτα ὅπως ζητοῦσι τὴν ἔν] This is a curious admission, which proves that Aristotle did not necessarily imagine his ideal state without external dominion, but rather as at the head of a group of allies, whom it has conquered in war, and protects, but also to some extent rules; like Athens, Sparta or Thebes. Only this dominion ought to be generously exercised, so that it may be of even greater service to the governed than to the governing states. Cp. also Introd. p. 55. Susem. (917) 1334 a 2 τρίτων δὲ κτλ] Comp. 1. 8. 12, 1256 b 23, with notes; also un. (54, 75, 758) and 1. 7. 5, 1255 b 37, n. (65). Susem. (918) § 22 5 τὰ γινόμενα] So I. 5. 1, 1254 a 21 ἐκ τῶν γινόμενων καταμαθεῖν. A fuller phrase 1328 a 20, see n. 6 Ephorus apud Strabonem 9. p. 614: καθαρά ἦν ἐπιμελείς διὰ τοῦτο παλαιόν, γενουμένων κατ' ἑκατέραν μόνον ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ τῆς ἀριστερῆς νόμου ἀρετῆς ἤτοι μόνον ἀποτέλεσμα τῆς ἀριστερῆς νόμου. Μήδεις δ' ἐπιμελη-θῦναι τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἑκατέρας, F. H. C. 1. 254 (Newman). 9 αὐτίως δ' ὁ νομοθέτης] Cp. again II. 9. 34, with n. (342). Susem. (919) c. 15 Preeminence of the virtues of peace, though all virtues are alike indis- pensable: §§ 1—6.
§1 15 είρηται πολλάκις, είρημή μὲν πολέμου σχολή δ' (ΧΙΙΙ). §2 ἀσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἄρετῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν ἤ καὶ διαγωγήν, ὅπερ τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἂν ἐν τῇ ἀσχολίᾳ. δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως ἔξηθ' σχολάζειν: διὸ [σώφρονα] τὴν πόλιν εἴναι προσήκει 20 καὶ ἀνδρεῖαν καὶ καρτερικῆν' κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παρομίαν, οὐ σχολή δούλοις, οἳ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως.

§3 δούλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρίας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτέριας δεὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφότεροι τοῖς χρόνοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήμην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν ὁ μὲν εἰρήμην Γ Μ, perhaps Γ had σχολάζης || [σώφρονα] Susem.

§1 15 εἰρήται πολλάκις] c. 14 §§ 12, 13, 22. Susem. (920)

§2 16 πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγήν] Besides its general meaning 'mode, or condition, of life' (Meta. i. 1. 15, 981 b 18, 1. 2. 11, 982 b 23), the word διαγωγή in Aristotle, with or without the attribute ἐλευθέρος (cp. v[vIII], 5, 8 with n. 1027) or some similar expression, or ἐν τῇ σχολῇ 'in a condition of leisure' (v[vIII] 3 § 3, § 8, cp. n. 993), means the occupation of leisure worthy of a really free man, such as he attains when his political duties have been performed, or such as he always possesses, provided he is pecuniarily independent, and leads a life of true study or contemplation. The occupation of such leisure, i.e. in other words (see Nic. Eth. x. 7. 6, 1177 a 4, cp. nn. 907, 548, and 922) the highest degree of human happiness and satisfaction, is however activity: according to Aristotle, the highest activity there is. It consists in the study of all branches of knowledge and the contemplation of all works of art: it confers the highest intellectual enjoyment and most nearly approaches to the divine blessedness, Metaph. xii (A). 7 § 7, 1072 b 14 f. and above nn. (702, 728). From this meaning of 'the highest intellectual enjoyment,' the word sometimes descends to the more commonplace one of mere occupation and especially 'social occupation or intercourse': N. E. ix. 11, 5, 1171 b 13, Fragn. 90. 1492 a 28; cp. also e.g. Pol. v[vIII]). 2 § 9 with n. (995). Then it is used in the plural for societies whose object is such intercourse, especially refined intellectual culture (III. 9, 1280 b 37, where it might be translated 'social clubs,' cp. n. 548 and v[vIII], 5. 11 with n. 1035) and even for regular feasts, gambling and drinking parties: Nic. Eth. x. 6 § 3, § 8, 1176 b 12 ff., 1177 a. In such cases the word becomes identified with the amusement, sport, or past-time, undertaken for recreation (cp. Nic. Eth. iv. 8 § 1, 1127 b 33 f.); though in the former and stricter interpretation, the two are sharply distinguished: v[vIII]. c. 3 §§ 3—8, c. 5 § 1 ff. § 9 ff., c. 7 § 3 ff., comp. nn. (993, 995, 1023, 1024, 1027, 1032, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1041) and especially Exc. v. on B. v[vIII]. See also Schwegler ad Arist. Meta. Vol. iii. p. 19 f., Bonitz, Arist. Meta. ii. p. 45, Ind. Ar. 178 a 26 ff., and especially Zeller ii. ii. p. 734 f. n. (5). Susem. (921) In short, a term which may stand for any employment of leisure, even on vulgar amusement, receives a special application to (1) elevated intellectual enjoyments (1339 a 22); in particular (2) those of philosophy and art, including music.

§2 16 φιλοσοφίας] Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. refers this to the meaning 'investigation,' as in III. 12. 2, 1283 b 23, or Phys. 1. 2. 5, 185 a 20; and hence explains it as 'virtus intellectualis.'

§3 23] Comp. Thuc. iici. 82. 2: οδή πόλεμοι ὑφελών τὴν εὐπρο- πίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βιασὸς διδάσκαλος καὶ
IV(VII). 1334 a 15—1334 a 39.

30 πάντων μακαρισμένων ἀπολαυόντας, οὐν ὅτι δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης τῶν ἀριστῶν δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ
§ 4 ὑβριστάς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλής οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἀριστῶν δοκοῦντας, οὖν εἰ τινὲς εἰσὶν, ὦστερ οἱ ποιηταὶ φασίν, ἐν μακάριω νῆςοις. μάλιστα γὰρ οὕτω δείσουσιν ἑπιστολοποιοῦσαν καὶ δι-
καιοσύνης, ὅσοι μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιοῦ-
§ 5 τῶν ἁγάθων. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν ἐνδαιμονήσεων
cal καὶ σπουδαίαν ἐσθέναι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἁρετῶν μετέ-
χειν, φαυλοῦν, αἰσχρῷ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι (p. 123)
tοῖς ἁγάθοις, ἐτί μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολαῖς χρῆ-
§ 35 καὶ σπουδαίαν ἐσθέναι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἁρετῶν μετέ-
χειν, φαυλοῦν, αἰσχρῷ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι (p. 123)
tοῖς ἁγάθοις, ἐτί μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολαῖς χρῆ-
§ 36 εἰρήνης δὲ ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀναπαραστάσεις. διὸ δεῖ

28 δει] δεόνται (δἐ over an erasure), 29 δοκοῦντες, and 30 ἀπολαυόντες Π8, indignut
secundum—you William 29 σωφροσύνης <μετέχειν> Koraes, more satisfactory, if any change is needed 37 τοῖς ἁγάθοις omitted by Π4 (first hand, supplied by a later hand), τοῖς...χρῆσθαι omitted by Μ4, ἐτί...χρῆσθαι omitted by Π2 Ar. 19 τὸ] τῷ Π1 (first hand), omitted by Π8 Bk., <αἰσχρόν> τὸ Koraes, perhaps rightly

πρὸς τὰ παρώντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοίων (Eaton). SUSEM. (923)
26 ὑπετὶ ἑταὶ ἐπικριτικῶν Comp. Thuc. III. 29. 4, VIII. 24. 4; Plato Latois VII 814 κ (Eaton). SUSEM. (924)
§ 4 29 δοκοῦντας Porson discusses this idiom, accus. not dat., in a note on Orestes 625. It is not confined to Euripides amongst Attic writers (Valckenenaer on Hippol. 23): see Aesch. P. V. 86, and the fragment quoted from Aescharianus by Porson, p. 450, εἰρεχωρίας σε δεῖ, as cited by Porson.
31 οἱ ποιηται] First in the Odyssey IV. 561 ff., next the author of the episode on the ages of the world in Hesiod’s Works and Days 167 ff., then Pindar Olymp. II. 60 ff., and others. The Isles of the Blest, or Elysium, are placed at the remotest ends of the earth: it is the land of privileged heroes who do not die but are taken alive from the earth: here, where falls not hail or rain or any snow; where gentle breezes are ever blowing, they spend a most blessed life in undisturbed enjoyment of all good under the sway of Kronos or Rhadamanthus. See Preller Griech. Mythol. I. p. 635 ff.; cp. pp. 53, 69. SUSEM. (925)
μᾶλιστα γὰρ οὕτω κτλ] This is the moral of Plato’s fine myth respecting the

children of Kronos, Politicus 272 A—D. Though it is not there stated that the advantages of the golden age failed to confer greater happiness, there can be little doubt that this is Plato’s meaning. Several expressions of the Politicus, παροιμίας αὐτοῖς οὕτω πολλῆς σχολῆς...κατε-
χωρίτων τοῖς δόμησιν ἐμπάτησαι ἐπὶ...φιλοσοφοῖας... ἐμπάτησαιν τῶν δόνων καὶ ποιῶν 272 B, C, seem to find an echo here.
32 φιλοσοφίας] Culture, cp. II. 5. 15, 1264 a 40. Intellectual aptitude, a habit of intellectual inquiry, to give occupation in leisure and save the citizens from rusting. Liberal and refined pursuits such as music, literature, philosophy in the restricted sense, must in leisure hours replace the active business of life, τὰ ἀναγ-
καία καὶ χρῆσιμα.
33 σχολάζοντων] This conception of a life of cultivated leisure, distinct from work and recreation, as the ideal life (cp. 1337 b 30), which only ‘philosophy’ can train us rightly to enjoy (cp. 1267 a 11), is of primary importance for the discussions in Book VI(VII). See esp. VI(VII). c. 3 §§ 4—8 with notes.
§ 5 39 ἀνθρωποδοξείς] This term ‘slavish’ means to Aristotle ‘sunk like beasts in low sensual enjoyments.’ Plato traces out exactly the same line of thought,
though in a different manner, in the first two books of the Laurus. See n. (43) on 1. 5. 8. SUSEM. (926)

§ 6 1334 b 1 ταυτά τοῖς ἀλλοις μεγιστά] Namely the external goods. Compare for the Spartan convictions ii. 9. § 24, 1270 b 34, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρπετεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρα...ἀποδαίειν τῶν σωματικῶν ὕδωρ, n. (328), and § 35; 1271 b 7 ff., οὕτως; μὲν γὰρ γένεσθαι τά γαρ διὰ τῆς περιμάχητα δι᾽ ἀρετῆς κτλ with nn. (346), 346 b, 347). SUSEM. (927)

2 διὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν] That is, by means of valour or courage, which is a particular virtue: see ii. 9 §§ 34, 35 nn. (344, 347), esp. 1271 b 2 f. πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πάσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, τὴν πολεμικὴν: αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησιμεύσα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. Comp. also iv.(VII). 1 § 6, κτῶς καὶ φιλάττομεν οὐ τὰς ἁρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἄλλο ἐκείνα ταύταις, n. (607). SUSEM. (928)

Mr Newman well observes that this correction of the one-sidedness of Lacedaemonian training tells just as much against all systems which, like Stoicism and Puritanism, tend to develope something less than the whole man. ἐπεὶ δὲ μεῖζον...ἀρετῶν] The passage is defective: we may supplement it from ii. 9 §§ 34, 1271 b 4, thus: 'But as they esteemed these goods higher than the virtues, and the enjoyment of them higher than that of the virtues, <they maintained their state only while at war, and fell after they had acquired empire.> (Thurot.)' SUSEM. (929)

4 < ὁτι μὲν οὖν κτλ] Thurot further suggests as the sense of this opening paragraph: <That virtue must be practised in leisure also,> and for its own sake, is clear from this. SUSEM. (930)

§ 7 6 διηρήμενοι προτέρου] The result of our previous analysis: 13 § 10, 1332 a 39 f., see n. (887) and n. (881) on c. 13 § 8. SUSEM. (931)

7 τούτων] The citizens of the best state (Susemihi): cp. b 8 παιδευτέρω, § 5, a 34, § 4, a 29, § 1, a 13.

φύσιν, διώκοιται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρήσατι πότερον παρακατεύθυνε τὸ λόγῳ πρότερον ἤ τοῖς ἑδέσιν. ταύτα γὰρ δεῖ ποὺς ἄλλοις συμμορφωνών συμμορφών εἰς τὴν ἀρίστην' εὐνόησιν γὰρ διημαρτησθέναι καὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς βελτίστης ὑποτεθεὶς διὰ τῶν ἔθων ὁμοίως ἡχθαί. παρέδωκεν δὴ τούτῳ γε πρώτου μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἄλλοι τέλους, οὐδὲν γόνος ἤμιν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὡστε πρὸς τούτους τινὰ γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἔθων δεὶ παρασκευαζεῖν
§ 9 μελετήσω. ἐπειτὰ ὁσπερ ψυχῇ καὶ σῶμα δὲ ἐστὶν, οὕτως καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρόμενον δύο μέρη, τὸ τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ λόγου ἐχὼν, καὶ τὰς ἐξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τῶν ἀριθμῶν, 20 οὖν τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἄριστος τὸ δὲ νοῦς, ὁσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα

8 παιδευταίοι: Μ* παιδευτένων Ρ2 || 9 πρότερον omitted by Ρ3 Ρ5 || 10 ἀρίστην. <ἡ τοῖς ἑδέσιν> Jackson || 11 καὶ omitted by Ρ2, [καὶ] Koraes Bk.2; Koraes also suggested its transposition to follow τῶν λόγων || 12 ἔθων omitted by Ρ5 (supplied in the margin of Ρ1 with ἐρ. prefixed) || ὁμοίως Ρ5 Ρ6 Βν and in the margin of Ρ1 with γρ. prefixed, ὁμοίως Λ. τ. Ρ3-2 || διὰ...ἡχθαί] τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔθων ὁμοίως ἄγωγῳ? Schneider || 14 ἀρχῆς <ἀρχῆς> François Thurot, perhaps rightly, but (as Postgate observes) even this slight change is hardly needed || [τέλος] and ἀλλ' οὖ C. Thurot, ἄλλο τέλους <νυς> Spengel

8 διώκοιται πρότερον In c. 7. SUSEM. (932)

9 τῷ λόγῳ κτλ. Parallel to c. 13 §§ 12, 13, and to the more general discussion of Nic. Eth. Χ. 9 §§ 1—12 (c. 10 Bk., 1179 a 33 ff.).

11 διημαρτησθέναι τῆς βελτίστης ὑποτεθείσως] To miss the truest (highest) conception or ideal; as is explained in c. 13 § 2. See c. 4 § 1, 1325 b 35. Men may be led astray by habit as well as by reason. With ἡχθαί = drawn cp. Δ. Ν. Ε. 1. 4. 6, 1095 b 4. The sense of ὁμοίως is virtually, 'amiss.' Göttling is quite wrong in rendering "eodem perdidit moribus quo perduxissent ἡ βελτίστη ὑποτέθεισσα." § 8 12—15] Mr. Newman thinks much light is thrown on this difficult passage by De Part. Animal. Π. 1. 6, 646 a 30 ff. παύ τοῦ γενόμενον ἐκ τινος καὶ εἰς τι ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπ' ἀρχῆς, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κινουσίας καὶ ἐξουσίας ἐκ τινὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ τινὰ μορφὴν τοιούτων ἀλλ᾽ τέλος.

13 ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς] The sense of ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is clear from c. 16 § 1, see n. (937): ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὄραν δεὶ ὁσας κτλ. "Obviously birth is the first or earliest thing which demands our care," i.e. we begin with birth. The next words mean 'the nearest or proximate end from any starting-point'—understanding ἐστὶ with the gen. ἄλλον τέλους, 'belongs to [is referred to] another, or new, end.' The proximate end is but a means, subordinated to a higher end: Nic. Eth. Ι. 1. 4, 1094 a 14 ff. In our human nature this higher end is intellect and reason. SUSEM. (933)

16 τὴν τῶν ἔθων μελετήσω] Somewhat stronger than ἐπιμελεία, for which cp. Ν. E. Χ. 9 §§ 9, 13—15, 17 (e.g. 1180 b 23 ἐπιμελείας βελτίστους ποιεῖν). § 9 18 δύο μέρη κτλ.] See c. 14 § 9, 1332 a 17, η. (904), and esp. η. (40) on 1. 5. 6. SUSEM. (934)

20 τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξιν τὸ δὲ νοῦς] In English, as in German, it is not easy to find two terms, mutually related as ὄρεξις and ἐπιθυμία. Striving, or effort in general, is the meaning of ὄρεξις [Hamilton's conation]; ἐπιθυμία denotes sense-desire, or appetite, in particular. This explains why ὄρεξις alone denotes 'the motive force of the irrational soul' (as I should translate ἐξίς; characteristic possession, or attribute, is not strong enough), while within the soul ἄνωτος, passion—see η.
πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀλογὸν τοῦ (XI)

§ 10 λόγου ἔχοντος. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ τούτοι θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένου εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὥ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊόνθει πέφυκεν ἐγ' ἡμέραν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκαίοις εἶναι προτέραν ἡ τῆς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἑπειτα τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἕνεκα μὲντοι τοῦ νου τῆς τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ (π. τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

16 εἰπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῦ νομοθετήν ὀράν δει ὁπως XIX
30 τὰ σώματα βέλτιστα γίνηται τῶν προφετεύων, πρῶτον μὲν

23 καὶ ἀπὸ δὲ οἰκεῖον παρὰ Ἰλίσθα τοῦ Π. Βk. || 24 πέφυκεν εἰς ἐγγενεσθαι (ἐγγενεσθαι Π.Ⅲ.9.4) Π.Ⅲ.9.5 Βk. || 26 τὴν ἄπαντον οὐκ ὀλίθρωσιν β. II. || 27 τὴν δὲ τοῦ I. 110 28 τοῦ σώματος τοῦ τρίτον Μ (huius autem eorum quae animae William) || 30 τὰ σώματα ἁπλά στατας γίνηται τῶν προφετεύων, πρῶτον μὲν

(641, 786)—ἐπιθυμία, desire, and βούλησις, will, are distinguished : and further, why in 1. 5. 6 the term ὀρέξις is first used, 1254 b 5, and afterwards 1254 b 8, to παθητικοῦ μνόμεν τὸ 'the emotional part,' see note (40). The same trichotomy of the irrational soul is also found in De Anima II. 3. 1. 414 b 1. III. 10. 3. 433 a 23 ff. (That these passages are not in conflict with De Anima III. 9. 3. 432 b 4 ff. and Topica IV. 5. 6. 126 a 12 ff., if the statement in τὰν λογιστικὸν ἡ βούλησις be rightly interpreted, is shown by Susmenihi Jiahr. f. Philol. CXIX. 1879, p. 743 n. 17.) The spurious treatise De Morte Animal. c. 6 § 4, 700 b 22, ἀλλὰ μὲν ἡ ὀρέξις εἰς τρία διαίρεται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, and Eud. Eth. II. 7. 2. 1223 a 26 f. βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὀρέξις... ὡστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ δρεπτικόν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν, need not be taken into account. The Will appears, as the passage from Eud. Eth. more particularly proves, as ὀρέξις = impulse, whether rightly or wrongly guided by reason, directed to real or apparent good, see N. Eth. II. 4 (II. c. 6 Bk.), while Desire (ἐπιθυμία) aims at what is pleasant, and θυμὸς (θυμός) at revenge. See Walter Die praktische Vernunft pp. 194—212. Yet all this does not suffice to explain the present passage, which rightly denies to the child (at all events to the infant just after birth) the possession of any rational impulses. The difference between our passage and the two cited from De Anima is that here θυμός and βούλησις are again drawn closer together and opposed to ἐπιθυμία. Should

θυμός καὶ βούλησις be taken to mean 'aversion and liking'? In any case at b 22 βούλησις is used in what Zeller calls (op. c. II. ii. p. 587, n. 3) a wider sense, or more precisely a weakened sense, denoting something more analogous to θυμός than to ἐπιθυμία. SUSEM. (935)

§ 10 We must then train the body first; then the impulses, the motive forces of the irrational soul; and lastly the reason.

25 πρῶτον μὲν...27 ὀρέξεως] Here again Aristotle follows closely in the track of Plato, Laws 11. 652 E—653 C. SUSEM. (936)

Add Republic 410 b, 563 a, 591 c ff. c. 16 Precautions necessary on the part of the parents to secure healthy progeny.


δεί ὁπως] The remedy for a rather violent hiatus may be easily discovered by comparing 1320 a 33, ἀλλὰ δὲ τὸν ἀληθινὸς δημοτικὸν ὀράν ὁπως κτλ.
41. "Nuptial," not 'conjugal'; cp. 3. 1., 1253 b 9 n. Or, as Prof. Gildersleeve puts it, γάμος = wedding, not wedlock.

§ 2 33 κοινωνία] Comp. Eur. Bacchae 1277 εγκυκτο | Πένθεσθε ἐμοί τε καὶ πατρὸς κοινωνία. 34 συγκαταβαίνωσι] For the vb. καταβαίνειν, § 5, 1335 a 11, see Schw. Lex. Herod. It is used, like ἐκπείθειν (cp. 1332 b 41), for 'to suit'; properly 'to meet in.' The compound with συν = come simultaneously to an end, so producing a convergence or correspondence.

§ 3 Johnson Rasselas c. 29 affords a parallel. "From these early marriages proceeds likewise the rivalry of parents and children: the son is eager to enjoy the world before the father is willing to forsake it, and there is hardly room at once for two generations.... Those who marry at an advanced age will probably escape the encroachments of their children; but, in diminution of this advantage, they will be likely to leave them, ignorant and helpless, to a guardian's mercy. From their children if they have less to fear they have less also to hope."


4. ἔγκληματικόν τὸ πάρεγγυς] Nearness, i.e. equality in age, produces bick-erings, misunderstandings (II. 5. 4).
§ 6 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἐστὶ δ’ ὁ τῶν νέων συν-4
12 δυσαρέσχας φαύλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πάσιν ξόφοις
ατεληθα τὰ τῶν νέων ἐγκονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ
μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμηρίων δὲ· ἐν ὤσις γὰρ τῶν
πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζει τὸ νέος συνευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτέ-
§ 7 λεὶ καὶ μικρὸ τὰ σώματα εἰσῆν. ἐτί δὲ ἐν τοῖς τάκοις
αἱ νέαι πονοῦσι τε μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους· διὸ
καὶ τὸν χρήσιμον γενέσθαι τινὲς φασὶ διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν
20 τοῖς Τροιζηνίοις, ὥσ πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμι-
σκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κο-
§ 8 μιδῆν. ἐτί δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδο-
σεις ποιεῖσθαι πρὸσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ δοκοῦσι
νέα χρησίμαινα ταῖς συννοσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων
25 δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν, εἰάν ἐτὶ τοῦ

11 ἐστ’ ἐτὶ Susem.3 in the notes, wrongly || 12 τὴν omitted by Π² P5 Bk. ||
13 ἐγγονα Π² P5 Bk. || θηλυτόκα Camerarius (wrongly), θηλυτέρα Koraes || 14 ταῦτα τοῦτο Π² P5 Ar. Bk., hoc irdum William || 16 ἐπιχωριάζει M* and (after a lacuna)
P1, ἐπιχωριάζεται Π² P5 Bk. pl (in the margin) and apparently Π || τὸ τοῦ M* P5 ||
18 αἱ νέαι ἐνωι Π1, ἄλλως αἱ νέαι pl in the margin || πονοῦσι after τε M* P1 || 23
einai inserted after γὰρ by Π² P5 Bk. Susem.2 || 25 δὲ omitted by Π1, untranslated
by Ar., [δὲ] Susem., wrongly

§ 6 13 θηλυτόκα This point is not mentioned Hist. Animal. v. 12. 1 (v. 14
Bk.), 544 b 16, where the offspring are merely said to be weak and puny. Susem. (938)

We find it however, with the presumed physical cause, De Gen. Animal. iv. 2,
1, 766 b 29 ff., τὰ τε γὰρ νέα θηλυτικά μᾶλλον τῶν ἀκμαϊστών, καὶ γαρδάκνυται
μᾶλλον τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὕτω τέλειοι τὸ θερ-
μόν, τοῖς δ’ ἀπολείπει. Falstaff, Henry IV.
Part II, Act 4 sc. 3, humourously calls this one of the ill effects of water-drinking.

15 τεκμηρίων δὲ...γὰρ] If the Index
Ar. s. v. may be trusted, this is the only instance of this usage in its normal form,
the pronoun being omitted. We had στ-
μεἰον δὲ...γὰρ c. 7 § 6, 1328 a 1, and
Bonitz ib. 677 b 9 ff. cites ten other instances,
including 1312 b 21, 1318 b 17.

16 ἐπιχωριάζει] Comp. v(viii). 6. 12,
1341 a 34. The verb appears in another sense in Pl. Phaed. 57 a. The supposed
passive of the Lex. (see Crit. n.)
receives its coup de grâce from Kaibel, the
last editor of Athenaeus, who at xiv.
619 f. reads κατὰ τίνα ἐπιχωριαζομένην παρ'
αὐτός...δόστε, with the critical note

“παρ’ αὐτός < ἐορτὴν > Wilamowitz,
recte defendens ἐπιχωριάζεσθαι verbum
medium.”

συζευγνύναι] To pair, join in marriage:
§ 9, a 29.

§ 7 18 πονοῦσι τε μᾶλλον] This
statement reappears in the spurious B.
vii. of Hist. Anim. c. 1 § 16, 582 a 20.

19 τῶν χρήσιμων] A gloss cites the
oracle in the form μὴ τέμνει νέαν ἄλοκα,
‘till not the fresh furrow.’ Götting
proposed to alter νέαν to νέας, thinking there
was a play upon νέας which he took to be

gen. of a supposed νεά- noval, fallow
land [for which νείος, Attic νείς, is
the received form]. Susem. (939) Comp.
Enr. Phœn. 18 στείρεν τέκνων ἄλοκα,
Soph. Oed. T. 1210 (Ridgeway); also
Antig. 569 ἄρωσιμον γὰρ χάτερων εἰσὶν
γάς.

20 διαφθειρομένων] Comp. Frag. Λόγου
γαμμακοῦ of Clemens Alexandrinus p. 1022
P., 111. 501 Dind. παρθένων φηδρο λέγεται
οὐ μόνον πορνεία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρὸ καιροῦ
ἐκδοσία, ὅταν, ὥς εἶπεν, ἀωρὸς ἐκδοθή τῷ
ἀνδρί.

§ 8 24 Comp. Aristoxenus Tarent.
Fr. 20, F. H. G. 11. 278.
IV(VII). 16. 10] 1335 a 11—1335 a 33. 549

σώματος αὐξανομένου ποιοῦται τὴν συνομολαίαν  καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον (XIV) 27 τις χρόνος ὄρισμένος, ὧν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθύνον ἐτὶ <ἡ μικρόν.> § 4 a 6 <σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα 7 συμβαινει κατὰ μιᾶν <ἐπιμέλειαν.> § 5 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὀρισται τέλος 8 τῆς γεννησεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ <πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν αὐθάπον μὲν ὃ 9 τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμοῖς <ἐσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ 10 γυναικῶν, δεὶ τὴν ἁρχήν τῆς συζυγίας <ξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν 11 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους.>

§ 9 διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τῶν ὁκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζυγίαν, τοὺς δὲ ἐπτάς καὶ τριάκοντα[,] ἡ μικρόν.

30 εὖ τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀκμάζουσι τε τοῖς σῶμασι σὺζυγίας ἐσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῖδαν τῆς ἐκκοπής συγκαταβήσεται 10 τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαιρίων: ἐτὶ δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς 33 μὲν ἀρχομένους ἐσται τῆς ἁρμῆς, εἰάν γίνηται κατὰ λόγον.

26 σώματος Γ’ Ar. and P2 (corr.3), ἄλλως σώματος P1 (in the margin), σπέρματος of the other authorities  27 χρόνος after ὄρισμένος P1-5 P2 Bk.  πληθύνον Bk.2, πληθύν M1, τιθαμ William Ar.

6 δὲ Susem., δὴ Γ’ II Bk. Susem.1 || ταῦτα before πάντα M1, untranslated by William

29 συζυγίας P1, συζυγίας M9 || ἡ Αρ., ἐπτά all other authorities: πέντε? Susem. from an earlier suggestion of Spengel’s, see Comm. u. (940) || [ἡ μικρόν] Sepulveda, transposed by Göttling Susem.2-3 to follow 27 ἐτι || 30 τοσοῦτον τοῖς χρόνοις II2 P15 Ar. and P1 (corr.1 in the margin) || ἀκμάζουσι M1, ἀκμάζουσα P4-5 Sb Vb || 31 <συγ> καταβήσονται Susem.1-2 wrongly following William (convenient) || 32 τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένωις Ridgeway wrongly: see Exc. ii. p. 567 || 33 ἀρχομένως Γ’ apparently (inchoante alèmes William) Bk. Susem.1-2 and P5 (corr.), perhaps rightly || γίνηται II2 P10 Bk.1, γίνηται P1

26 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον κτλ] Sc. τοῦ σώματος: bodily growth has fixed limits of time which it does not exceed (or only to a small extent). Comp. note on v(VIII). 11. 1, 1337 a 13.

§ 9 28 διὸ τὰς μὲν κτλ] In Rep. v. 460 e Plato fixes the period for procreation amongst his guardians from twenty to forty in the woman, and from twenty-five (apparently) to fifty-five in any case in the man. His regulations in the Latus are not consistent. The marriage of the sons is at one time enjoined when they are between thirty and fifty-five (IV. 721 A, VI. 785 B), at another time when they are between twenty-five and thirty-five at latest (VI. 772 B). Similarly the daughters are to marry before the age of twenty, but while the earlier limit is once fixed at sixteen (VI. 785 B), it is elsewhere raised to eighteen (VIII. 833 B).

In the spurious B. vii. of Aristotle’s Historia Animal. cc. 5, 6 there are statements about the limits of age for getting offspring in tolerable agreement with the present passage. The limit is said to be, as a rule, sixty in the man, forty in the woman, with occasional prolongation to seventy and fifty respectively. Xenophon (Occan. 7 § 5, cp. 3 § 13) fixes the earlier limit in the woman’s case at fifteen. Susem. (940)

§§ 9, 10 are treated by Prof. Ridgeway, Transactions p. 145 f, Dr Jackson ib. pp. 116—118.

§ 10 34 καταλελυμένοις On the analogy of καταλύειν, πόλεμος, εἰρήνη, βίος, κατάλυσις ανυποτελοῦσιν, στρατίας, τρίβοις (a crew), δήμου, πολιτείας, where ‘breaking up,’ ‘dissolution’ are the main ideas, we must render ‘in the decline of their powers, or vigour.’ So fracta aetate Vict., actae iam decrepita Lambin.

38 χειμώνος more exactly, in the month Gamelion (January and February), which derived its name of wedding-month from the custom: Theophr. Hist. Plant. VII. 1 § 2. Pseudo-Hippocr. περὶ ἀφόρους (III. p. 12 Kühn), quoted by Eaton, maintains "that the spring is the most suitable time." SUSEM. (941)

§ 11 41 καιροὺς Favourable conditions.

1335 b 1 τὰ βόρεια That the north wind is particularly favourable to male offsprings is more precisely stated by Aristotle in different passages of his Historia Animalium and De generatione Animalium: e. g. II. A. vi. 19 § 4, 574 α 1 καὶ βορείαι μὲν ἐχεινώμενα ἄρσενοτοκεῖαι μάλλον, νοτίοι δὲ θηλυτοκεῖαι. SUSEM. (942) 3 ἐπιστητήσασι Intransitive, as if τὴν γυνῶν had to be supplied: attentively. Cp. 1336 b 25, also Soph. Ant. 227.

§ 12 4 ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παύσονομας Another reference to a discussion to follow, which is not to be found in the extant work: see c. 17 § 5 n. (958), § 7 n. (960), § 10 n. (963), § 12 n. (969), § 5 n. (862); vii(vi). c. 15 § 19 n. (1355), § 13, vii(vii). 8 § 22 n. (1483). Also Intrad. p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. SUSEM. (943) 5 Bonitz Ind. Ar. 168 a 54 ff. is in doubt whether δεὶ might be mentally supplied from λεκτέων, or must be added. The sense is: id iam nunc dicendum est, quod est τῶν ἐθνῶν ἱκανός. SUSEM.

5 οὔτε γὰρ ἢ τῶν ἑθνῶν κτλ. Comp. Plato Rep. III. 404 A (Eaton) and below v(viii). 4 § 1 n. (1004), §§ 7—9 n. (1015). SUSEM. (944)
IV(VII). 16. 15  1335 a 34—1335 b 22.  551

kaiteknoptiaian, outheiaterapeutikakakakosotontikah"" (XIV)
§ 13 aλλήμεσητουτων.πεποιημενηνμενοινεχεινδετην(p. 126)
εξου,πεποιημενηνδεπνοιςμημιαιοιςμηδεπροςενα
10μουνων,ωσπερητωναθλητωνεξις,αλλαπροςταςτων
ελευθερωνπαρειερισμωνδεδεταυτωνπαρειρωνκαιαν
§ 14 δρασικαιγυναιξειν.χρηδεκαιταςεγκυωςεπιμελεισθαι9
τωνσωμάτων,μηραθυμούσασμηδειραιαπροφηχρωμή-
νασ.τούτοδεράδινονομοθετηποιήσειπροσκείξεταικαθ'
15ημέραντιναπεοινθαιπορειανπροςθεωναποθεραπεια
τωνειληχότωντηνπερητηςγενεσεωςτιμη.
τημένουδια-
νοιαντουναντιόντωνσωμάτωνραθυμότερωναρμόττειδια-
γευνραπολαύονταγάρφαινειαταγεννώμενατηςἐχοὺςη
§ 15 ὁσπερτάφυσμενατήςγῆς.περὶδεἀποθέσεωςκαὶ
20τροφῆςτῶνγεννώμενωνἐστονόμοιςμηδένπεπεριομένων
τρέφειν,διὰδεπλήθοςτέκνωνἡτάξιςτῶνἐθνῶν
κωλύειαιποτίσειταιτῶνγεννώμενωνὁρίσθαι γὰρ
by p1) || ὑγιεῖν M1 P1.5 || 7 θεραποντικὴ M1 and apparently P1 (1st hand, corrected by p1), curis indisgn William || κακοσοντικη M1 and P1 (1st hand, corrected by p1), male habens William || 8 ἓχεν omitted and a lacuna left by P1 (1st hand, supplied by p1) || 9 ἐν * * Susem.1.2, 6 as a gloss by corr. 3 in the margin of P2 and Schneider Bk.2; but πόνον should be understood || 11 ἑλευ-
θερῶν Γ1, ἑλευθερῶν the other authorities Bk. Susem.1.2 || τοῦτα Π2 P5 Ar. Bk. || καὶ omitted by Π2 P6 Bk. || 12 ἐγγύνων P1 Ald. || 16 ταῖς εἰληχύαις Γ1 Αr. Susem.1.2, perhaps rightly || 18 ἀπολαβοῦντα M2, ἀπολαβοῦντα Γ and perhaps Ar. || γεννώμενα Π2 Bk.1 || 19 καὶ added before τὰ by Π2 Bk. || 20 γεννώμενοι P2, γεννω-
μένων P3, γεννωμένων M5 Π2 Bk.2, γεγονόμενων Π2 Bk.1 || 21 ἑαν added after τέκνων by Π2 P5 Ar. Bk. and P1 (margin), ἐὰν μὴ ? Scaliger. Schömann Gr. Alt. II. p. 517
n. (1) restores the passage thus: τέκνων (ἐὰν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθνῶν κωλύει μηδὲν ἀποτίσει ταῖς γεννώμενων) ὀρίσθαι γε δε' || ἐπίθνων Γ1 Π2 P3 Vb Lc Αz. || 22 κωλύην Π2 P3 Vb Ar. Ald. Bk. and P3 (corr.1), κωλύει apparently 13 (1st hand), perhaps rightly, κωλύει Susem., καλὴ (with preceding ἐαν) Schlosser || γεννωμένων Koraes (who does not reject γεγονόμενων), γεγονόμενων Scaliger, γεγονόμενοι M1 P1 Bk.2 Susem.1 in the text, γεγονόμενοι Π2 P5 Π2 Bk.1 || ὀρίσθαι Γ1 Αr. P1 (margin) and P2 (corr.1), ὀρίσθαι M1, ὀρισθῆαι P1 (1st hand), ὀρισταὶ P5 P3 P2 Bk.1 P5 (corr. in the margin) and P2 (1st hand, emended by corr.1), ὀρίσθων Spengel || γὰρ τούν Koraes, γε Schömann

§ 13 10 “If any word is needed, read πόνον, but ἐνα refers to πόνωι with quite sufficient clearness. Similarly ν(VIII). 4. 2, 1338 b 15” (Ridgeway). Comp. however Quast. crit. coll. p. 415.
§ 14 14 προστιξάντακαθ' ἡμέραν τινὰ...16 τιμῆν] Plato, too, Latos vii 789 e, prescribes in spite of ridicule, ὡμα φέρων, that when enceinte the wife should take walks assiduously (Eaton). SUSEM. (945)

15 ἀποθεραπειαν] The force of the prefix is similar in ἀφοσιοβοῦσα, to discharge one’s conscience. Here, ‘to discharge her service.’
18 ἀπολαύοντα] Prof. Ridgeway takes this to mean that the foetus is a drain on the woman’s strength, just as plants draw the good out of the ground: τῆς sc. ἐν γαστρὶ ἐξοφη.
23 δεὶ Π1. Arg. and P3 (1st hand), δῆς Π2.5 Π3 Bk. and P1 (corr. in the margin) P3 (a later hand): so Spengel \ 24 συνδιασθέντων Spengel Susem.1-2 from a misuse of William's translation alicuius...combinatis, <τῶν > συνδιασθέντων? Koraes || 25 μὴ omitted by Π2 P5 || 28 δεὶ χρῆ Π2 Π3 Bk. || ξείως M5 and P1 (1st hand, emended by corr.1) || 30 καλ inserted after καθάπερ by Γ, if sicut et finiorum (William) is an accurate translation || τὰ omitted by M5; possibly by Γ || τῶν omitted by P1 || 31 γηρασκόντων M5 and P1 (1st hand, corrected in the margin with γρ. prefixed)

6 § 12: see nn. (209, 211), also 11. 7 § 5 n. (236). Plato, too, Κρ. v 460 B, 461 C, orders exposure in the case of weakly or deformed infants of the guardian class (as was remarked n. 140), and in the case of conception occurring where the law or the magistrates' orders have been infringed, abortion, or (presumably if this has been delayed) exposure. Indeed he goes further than this by condemning the offspring of inferior guardians: τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ εἰάν τι τῶν ἑτέρων ἀνά- πηροι γλίστασαν, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδόλῳ κατακράφσοναν, 460 C. But even in the Timaeus 19 Λ his words convey the impression that he had not given any instructions for exposing the children of less qualified parents, but meant simply a secret transferral of them to the third class of the population. Under the guise, that is, of a mere repetition, he modifies his former regulation in this sense (see Zeller Griež. Phil. ed. 4 Π. i. 909 n. 2, ed. 3 pp. 771 n. 3, Eng. tr. p. 478 n. 55, Susemihl Plat. Phil. ii. p. 171). In the Laws (see nn. 192, 208) he drops the preventive means of abortion altogether, nor does he say anything about exposing illegitimate and deformed infants. Thus in the course of his own lifetime Plato gradually attained to a more humane view. In this respect Aristotle's ideal state goes far beyond that of the Laws in the stringency and callousness, or rather, to give it its true name, the abominable cruelty of its regulations. As to exposure, the example of Sparta has again had a determining influence on both thinkers. In all other Greek states it was left to the father's decision whether he would expose his child or not: but at Sparta a committee of the eldest members of the Phyle decided, and in accordance with their decision the deformed or weakly infant had to be despatched to the place of exposure (Ἀποβάτα) on Taygetos. See Schömann p. 270 f. (Eng. tr. 256). Comp. also Introd. p. 52 f. SUSEM. (948)

Note that ὑπερθα...πλῆθος is a virtual repetition of Π. 6. 12, 1265 b 6 ff., just as c. 4 § 2, 1325 b 38 f. reproduces 1265 a 17, in both cases without the conventional ὡς ἐφτασαν πρότερον (Newman).

23-25 Here the indignation of some honest reader found vent in the remarkable gloss on the margin of P3, τὶ λέγει ὁ δαμακόνω τούτοις; Doubtless the same hand which scribbled φλαρεῖ, φλαρεῖ, against 1269 b 26, 1272 a 23. Whether from this " thin end of the wedge " came the gradual depopulation of Greece, which Polybios (xxxvii. 9) deplores, is another matter. Cp. Thirlwall Hist. viii. 463 ff.

§ 16 28 Meisterhans ed.2 p. 28 ff. shows that λιποφυγεῖν is the true Attic form. The usurping λειποφυγέω does not appear before the third century B.C. When this ει was pronounced as τ, Λι-
§ 17 didi kata tēn tēs diatōrias ākmēn. aúth δὲ ἐστὶ ἐν τοῖς (XIV) πλείοτοι ἢντερ τῶν ποιητῶν των εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἐβδομάσι τῆν ἥλικιαν, περὶ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τῶν πεν-35 τήκοντα ἐτῶν. ὡστε τέταρτον ἢ πέντε ἐτεῖν ὑπερβάλλοντα 12 τήν ἥλικιαν ταύτην ἀφέθανε δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως ὁ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑπεικαὶ χάριν ἢ τινὸς ἄλλης τοιαῦ-36 των ἀιτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιομένους τῆς ὁμιλίαν. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην καὶ πρὸς ἄλλουν, ἢστω μὲν ἀπλῶς μὴ καλῶν 40 ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἢ καὶ προσ- (p. 127) ἀγορευθῆ πόσις: περὶ δὲ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τῆς τεκυποίας εἰς τῶι φαίνεται τοιοῦτον τι δρῶν, ἀτμία ἡμιουθω πρε-36συνομ ὑπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

17 γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἶεσθαι <δεῖ> μεγάλην εἰναὶ δια- XV φοράν πρὸς τῆς τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τῆς τροφῆς, ὅποια 5 τις αὖ ἢ. φαίνεται δεῖ διὰ τε τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἐπισκο-35ποίῳ, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν οίς ἐπιμελεῖς ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τήν τουρφια was written in inscriptions of the Roman period.

§ 17 33 τῶν ποιητῶν των] Solon Frag. 27. Aristotle virtually adopts this theory of successive stages in human life at c. 17 § 15 (op. n. 971), and similarly in Hist. Animal. v. 12 § 2 (v. 14 § 3, 544 b 25 ff.), 17 § 16 (v. 20 § 3, 553 a 2 ff.), vi. 16 § 1 (17 § 2, 570 a 30 ff.) ; comp. VII. 1 § 1, 581 a 12 ff., VII. 13 (vii. 12 § 2, 588 a 8 ff. quoted in the Scholia to Aristoph. Birds 494). Compare Hippocr. quoted in Philo περὶ καμπυτωσιάς p. 71 Pfeil, and Censorin. De die natali 1.4 (J. G. Schneider). Congreve remarks that in Rhet. II. 14 § 4, 1390 b 11 f. the forty-35ninth year is more precisely given, not the fiftieth as here. SUSEM. (947).

§ 18 40 προσαγορευθῆ πόσις] "In the sense of call προσαγορέων sometimes employed προσαγωγήσαντα and προσαγορε-36υθη, though in the sense of ἀσπάζομαι it had προσερω, προσειπον, and προσερρη-37θη" (Rutherford). See New Phrynichi- chus p. 333 ff. with citation of [Dem.] Ἀθ. Βοστόν. de die. XI. § 1, ὅταν τις ἀδέλφος προσαγορευθῇ. Comp. 1. 12. 3, 1259 b 13 (προσαγγείαν), and for the use of πόσις, Soph. Trach. 550 f. μὴ πόσις μὲν Ἰρακλῆς ἐμὸς καληθῇ τῆς νεωτέρας δ' ἀνήρ (paramour).

c. 17 Treatment and food of children during infancy. § 1 1336 a 3 οἶεσθαι... 5 ἢ τοῖς "Our next care must be for the proper quality of the nourishment, since much depends upon this, as we are bound to believe, for the thriving of the body." Comp. Plato Rep. III. 404 a ff., Xenophon De Rep. Lac. 2 § 5 (Eaton). SUSEM. (949).
πολεμικὴν ἔξιν, ἢ τοῦ γάλακτος πληθοῦσα τροφὴ μάλιστ' (XV)
§ 2 οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀνωτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἐτὶ 2
dὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσας ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τηλικοῦτων συμ-
θέντος. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μῆλον διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δὲ ἀπαλο-
τητα χρώνται καὶ νῦν ἐνιὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὄργανοι τισὶ μη-
χανικοὶ, ἢ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀστράφεις. συμ-
θέντος δὲ εὔθυς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψυχὴ συνεβίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν
14 παῖδων τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγείαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς
§ 3 πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρ-
βόρων ἐθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γενό-
μενα [ψυχῶν], τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα ψυχῶν ἀμπίσχειν, οἷον
Κελτοίς. πάντα γὰρ ὡσα δυνατῶν ἐβίζειν, εὔθυς ἀρχο-
μένων βελτιῶν μὲν ἐβίζειν, εὐθὺς ἀρχο-
20 εὐφυῆς δὲ ἢ τῶν παῖδων ἔξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὸν τῶν

7 πληθοῦσα Vettori Bk., probably right || 8 νοσήματα] σώματα P4-6 L3 ||
9 τηλικοῦτος Susem.1-2, tantillos William, τηλικοῦτον ? Susem., τηλικοῦτον P4-6 L3 ||
10 διαστρέφεσθαι M8 and P1 (corr.), διαφέρει P1 (1st hand), defiere William, δια-
αστρέφεσθαι other authorities and P1 (in the margin, with γρ. prefixed) || ἀπαλο-
τητα M8, ἀπλήτητα Π8 || 14 πρὸς before πολεμικὰς omitted by M8 P1 || 16 τοῖς
τῶν M8 P14 || γενόμενα Susem., γενόμενα Scaliger, γενόμενα M8 P1 Bk.2 Susem.,
in the text, γενόμενα Π8 Bk.1 || 17 [ψυχῶν] Susem. || ψυχῶν after σκέπασμα
P1 and P14 (corr.), μικρῶν the other authorities and Ar. Bk. || ἀμπίσχειν Bk. Susem.1
and Π2-3 (?), ἀμπίσχειν Π8 (1st hand), ἀμπίσχειν P6 || 18 εὔθυς…19 ἐβίζειν omitted by
P4-6 Sb Vb L8 || ἀρχομένων Π2-3 Ald. Bk., ἀρχομένου ? Sylburg, ἀρχομένου ? Spengel
|| 19 εἰκονίζειν omitted by Ar. || 20 δα <τὴν> Jackson

8 ἀνωτέρα] Plato Laws ii. 666 A forbids indulgence in wine before the
eighteenth year (Götting). Comp. Hist. Anim. vii. 12 § 2, 588 a 5 ff. (Eaton);
De Somnio c. 3 § 9, 457 a 4 ff., § 14, 14 ff.
Susem. (950) Comp. L. H. Morgan
Ancient Society p. 25 (Ridgeway).
§ 2 9 κινήσεις...τηλικοῦτων] “All
the exercise possible at that early age.”
So also Plato Laws vii. 789 e ff. Susem. (951)
10 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μῆλον διαστρέφεσθαι] This passage, says T. Hilaire, is the
first germ of orthopedy. Camerarius under-
stood it of cradles and swaddling
clothes (ep. Plato l. c.): Vettori of iron
to straighten the crooked knees of chil-
dren, sererastera as Varro calls them L. L.
ix. 5. 11. Susem. (952)
§ 3 15 διὰ...18 Κελτοίς] The same
thing is said in an epigram first published
by Brunck Anal. vet. poet. III. p. 150
XXII, ἀργαλεῖον Κελτοῖ ποταμῷ ζηλήμου
Ῥήμω | τέκνα ταλαντεύοσι, καὶ οὐ πάρος εἰσι
τοκίσι | πρὶν πάν λαθροσκιε ἱερομνίμου ὕδατι
σεμφ.…. | ὁπως γὰρ γεγένατο φεράνιον, πρὶν
γ’ ἑσαρπήσῃ | κεκριμένον λυτροσκόν ἐλευθέ-
ραμα τοπαμοῖο, and by Nonnos Dionys.
XXIII. 95, XXXVI. 5 (Götting). Further
compare Strabo III. 165, Galen περὶ ὑγι-
εινῶν I. T. vi. p. 31 Kühn, and Kapp
Galen however calls the people, of whom
this is told, not Celts but Germans. See
on this point ii. 9 § 7 with Note, p. 334
and iv(vii). 2 § 10 n. Comp. further
Verg. Aen. ix. 603 ff. There is a similar
habit amongst the Beloochees (Ridge-
way). Susem. (953)
§ 5 20 δα <τὴν> θερμότητα] Aristotle thus
assumes that the vital heat, which by its
gradual but serious decline causes old age,
and by its extinction death, gradually
becomes weaker and weaker from the
moment of birth, so that it is most largely
found in the embryo and the new-born
infant, and in animals generally so long
as they are growing, because growth is
conditioned by vital heat. Comp. Probl. III. 71, XI. 14, De Inventiœ etc. cc. 3, 4 (Eaton). SUSEM. (954)

§ 6 36 oi κωλύοντες εν τοίς νόμοις] Plato Laws vii. 791 ε fl. (Camerarius). SUSEM. (955)

38 Dr Jackson defends τοῖς πονοῦσι by an appeal to Darwin On the Expression of the Emotions pp. 148, 236, 284.

§ 4 23 μέχρι πέντε ἔτων] Plato however in the Laws vii. 793 ε fl. makes this second stage of education extend from the third to the sixth year (Eaton). Still this deviation is not material, since Aristotle makes education proper begin with the seventh year, §§ 7—15. SUSEM. (956)

28 καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδίας] Plato l. c. proposes for this age a kind of Kinder-

garten under the inspection of the nurses (αἱ τροφοί) who for the most part leave the children to invent their own games (παιδικά αὐτοφυεῖς), but prevent them from growing too angry over them, the nurses themselves being under the control of a female Board of Inspection. SUSEM. (957)

§ 5 30 καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων] Comp. n. (970), and §§ 7—12 in regard to the παιδικῶν: above c. 16 § 12 n. (943), c. 12 § 5 n. (862) with notes (960, 963, 969), and Introd. p. 53 f., also vii(vi). 15 § 9 n. (1353), § 13, vii(vi). 8 § 22 n. (1483). SUSEM. (958)

33 διὸ τὰς παιδίας... 34 σπουδασμένων] Comp. Plato Laws 1. 643 B fl. SUSEM. (959)
35 οἱ καλέστωντες ἐν τοῖς νάμοις συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς ἀδικημένων γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἴσχυν τοῖς πονούσιν, δὲ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινόμενος. ἐπισκεπτεῖν δὴ
40 τοῖς παιδονύμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὦτα ἦκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἴλι--

§ 7 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινόμενοι. ἐπισκεπτεῖν δὴ

§ 8 καὶ τῶν ὀραμάτων ἀνελευθεριάν καὶ τηλικούτων ὡμας. ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν εἰς τῆς πόλεως, ὡσπερ τι ἄλλο, δεῖ

§ 9 δὲ τοιούτων. ἐὰν δὲ τῆς φαίνεται τι λέγων ἢ πράττων ἀπηγορευμένων, τῶν μὲν ἔλευθερον μὴπο δὲ κατακλίσεως

σπονδασημένων or σπονδασημένων Γ apparently (studentorum William) and perhaps Ar. (quae postea serio sunt facienda), σπονδασημένων Γ, σπονδασημένων Μ P1 II Bk., σπονδασημένων Ridgeway

39 δὲ Susem., δὲ Γ Βk. Susem.1 in the text

1336 b <τὴν> μέχρι ?Susem., but see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 109 b 44 ff. || 2 ἀπολαβέων Γ (absumere William) Susem.1, ἀπελαύνειν Π2 P5 Bk. || 3 ἀνελευθεριάν] τῶν ἀνελευθεριῶν Π1 Βk.2 and Π (1st hand), τῶν ἀνελευθεριῶν Π (corr.) || 4 ὡς περὶ εἰπερ Lambin Βk.2, wrongly || τι after ἄλλο (so avoiding hiatus) II P5 Bk. || 7 μὲν οὖν] δὲ Susem., approved by Schmidt || 8 δὲ δὴ Susem., μὲν οὖν Schmidt (with colon after 12 χάρων) 9 ἀπηγορευμένων] τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων Π5 Βk. Bk. || ἔλευθερον <μὲν> Koraes

§ 7 41 ὅτι ἱκύστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται] Comp. § 9 n. (g62). Here then Aristotle refuses to adopt the idea of common games for children, in which the children of aliens and slaves of this age also take part, as was proposed by Plato, here again the more humane of the two, and briefly mentioned in n. (g57). His refusal is on the ground that by means of these infant schools Plato begins the public education as soon as the third year has been reached, while he follows the Spartans in postponing it to the seventh year: see Schömmp. p. 271 (Eng. tr. p. 206). Further see § 5, n. (g68). Susem. (960) 1336 b 2 εἰλιγογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν κτλ. This and the two following sentences with the double use of μὲν οὖν gave occasion to many critical doubts, for which see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 540 b 55 ff., Vahlen Poetics2 p.

190 l., Busse ὤρ. c. p. 28, Susemihl Quaest. crit. coll. p. 416. Unquestionably ἀπολαβεῖν, which William of Moerbeke misconstrued, not only here but in 1335 b 18 and 1393 b 31, for ἀπολαβεῖν (in pronunciation u = i, β = ν), is correct and means to derive influence of any kind, good or bad: Busse cites δέοδα μὴ ἀπολαύσω τι φλάγιον Isocr. 8. 81.

§ 8 4 ὡς περὶ τι ἄλλο] With the utmost vigilance. A variation upon the more usual εἰπερ τι ἄλλο which recurs viii(v). 8. 2, 1307 b 31 in the same order, ὡς περὶ ἄλλο τι, which II 2 gives here.

7 ἀκούωσιν Plut. De recta ratione au-dendi c. 2, 38 b, δὲ καὶ Σπινθράτης τοὺς παις μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἀδηλταῖς ἐκλέειν περι-απτεῖν ἀμφιτίδας ὧν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὰ υἱάται πληγάζαι, τοῦτον δὲ τοὺς λόγους τὰ ἱθε διαστρεφόμενων.
10 ἥξιωμένων ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίωσιν ἱτιμίαις καὶ πλη- (XV) γαίς, τῶν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἱλικίας ταύτης ἱτιμίαις ἀνδρευθέρως ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἥ

§ 10 γραφᾶς ἡ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελεῖς μὲν οὖν ἐστώ τοῖς ἄρχονσι μιθὲν μήτε ἀγαλμα μήτε γραφήν εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μὴσίν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τισὶ θεοῦ τοιοῦτοις οἷς καὶ τῶν τοπασμῶν ἀποδίδοσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τοιούτως ἀφιή-

10 [ἹΤιμίαις] Bücheler Susem.2,3, rightly if ἱτιμίαις is not corrupt: ἱτιμίαις or ἐπιτιμήσεις? Susem. formerly, aikias? Schmidt who further approves [καὶ πληγαις] Schneider || 14 ἐστων P1-5 Ar., ἐστι ΓΜ*Η2 || 17 πρὸς...νόμος omitted in P1-5 Sb Vb || τούτους Reiz Bk.2 || παρήγαν Γ5 over an erasure, ἐφίησιν Koraes

§ 9 11 ἱτιμίαις ἀνδρευθέρως] Meier, De bonis damm. p. 103, understands by this their exclusion from sacrificial festivals in which slaves could not take part, that is, from the state sacrifices (ἰερὰ δομοτελή) proper: for which cp. Böckh Staatsch. 1. p. 269 (ed. 2, p. 298). SUSEM. (961)

12 ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν "To punish him for his degrading conduct." Comp. c. 15 § 5 n. (926) and especially n. (43) on i. 5 § 8: and in regard to this whole section c. 12 § 5 n. (863), and more particularly Introd. p. 52 n. (3). SUSEM. (962)

§ 10 14 ἐπιμελεῖς μὲν οὖν...16 μὴσίν] See vi(viii). 15 § 21 n. (1053), vi(viii). 7 § 3 n. (1084). The magistrates here mentioned are of course the Παδούμοι, as before; see n. (958). SUSEM. (963)

16 ἔραξεν = scene, n. (1084).

εἰ μὴ παρὰ τισὶ θεοῖς...17 ὁ νόμος] As, for instance, Dionysos, Aphrodite, Priapos, Eileithyia (Kapp). Aristotle himself, it is well known, traces the origin of Comedy to the worship of Dionysos, namely, to the improvised songs added to the choral ode by the chief singer or leader of the chorus in the phallic songs; such phallic songs, he says, were still customary in many places (γενομένη ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικὰ ἔχοντον), Poct. 4 § 14, 1449 a 11 ff. These improvised speeches certainly contained improprieties of the sort here mentioned. But that even in the phallic songs properly so called there was often much that was positively indecent might hardly be doubted, even apart from the specimen we have in Aristotle. Ach. 263 ff., where Dikaïopolis sings a burlesque of one, as he himself says (261). Other facts relative to this matter are mentioned by Athenaeus xiv. 631 d—632 d, on the authority of Sothis and Semos. Both writers mentioned certain reciters, called ἄποκτάβδαλοι, who delivered monologues or even dialogues (ῥήσεις) from the stage crowned with ivy according to Semos, and were at a later date called ἰαμβοῖ, like their poems. It is beyond all doubt that Archilochos, n. (788), found similar iambic lampoons in current use at the merry festivals of harvest and vintage, and therefore in the worship of Dionysos and Demeter, which was especially cultivated in his home of Paros and his colony Thasos, where Archilochos settled, Comp. Homer Ἰον 286, Paus. x. 28. 11, Steph. Byzant. s. v. Πάρος, Hesych. s. v. Κάβαρος; Welecker Kl. Schrift. i. p. 87 ff. It was out of this natural popular poetry that he fashioned his own artistic iambic poetry. Aristotle himself mentions directly afterwards (§ 11) the recital of such artistic compositions (ἰαμβοῖς), which certainly took place at such religious festivals at Athens and elsewhere at the proper season, probably in contests between rhapsodes. For it would appear from the pseudo-Platonic Ιον 531 Α that a contemporary rhapsode might include Archilochos in his repertoire; in any case his iambic poetry, on the analogy of the present passage: whether also his elegies, is doubtful. About that time also the burlesque epos and its recitation by rhapsodes were brought into vogue by Hegemon of Thasos, in contests at festivals of this kind. SUSEM. (964)
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η. 17, [IV(VII). 17. 10

σὺν ὁ νόμος τοὺς τῇν ἠλικίαν ἔχοντας ἐτῇ τῇν ἰκνουμένην καὶ (XV)

υπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεούς.

§ 11 τοὺς δὲ νεαστέρους οὐτὶ ιάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας θετάς θετέον, 9

πρὶν ἡ τῇν ἠλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ἡ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρ-

ξει κοινωνεῖν ἡδή καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων

γυνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἡ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας.

§ 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τοῦτων πετοῦμέθα τὸν λόγον. 25

υςτέρον δὲ ἐπιστήσατας δεὶ διορίσασί μᾶλλον, εἰτε μή δει

πρῶτον εἰτε δεὶ διαπορήσατας, καὶ τῶς δὲ κατὰ δὲ τὸν

§ 13 παροῦντα καὶρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαίον. ἰσώς γὰρ οὐ 10

κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑπο-

18 τοὺς...ἰκνουμένην Μα.1, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἠλικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν Γ Π5 Βκ. (πλέον

Π8 over an erasure), iam homines factos Ar., τοὺς πρεσβύτερους Bas.3 in the margin,

omitted by Π2 Bas.1,2 and the text of Bas.3 ἐτὶ ἦδη? Susem., iam Ar., [ἐτὶ] 1139. Welldon

19 αὐτῶν Π1, αὐτῶν Γ Π8 Π2 || καὶ γυναικῶν omitted by Π1 (supplied by corr.) 1139.

in the margin of Π1), hence [καὶ γυναικῶν] Susem.1 1139 || τιμαλφῶν

Μα.1 || [τοὺς θεούς] ? Susem. || 20 θετέων] θετέων Μα, νομοθετέων Π8 Βκ.,

<ἐναι> ἐστέων Jackson, probably right || 23 ἀπαθής Μα and apparently Π1 (1st hand)

|| πάντας suspected by Jackson, πάντως ? Susem. || 24 νῦν μὲν οὖν...27

ἀναγκαῖον transposed by Susem. to follow 35 δυσμένειαν || 27 [Ἰσώς

...37 αὐτῶν] Böcker || 28 κακῶς] καλῶς Γ Π3 || ἔλεγε suspected by Camerarius,

ἐφέσκη γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον? Schmidt

18 ἐτὶ] The word cannot have arisen

from ἦδη, nor is it likely to have crept

into the text. However dissimilar, this

must apparently be added to the pas-

sages in which ἐτί means ian. Susem.

§ 11 20 οὔτε ιάμβων] See n. (964)

and n. (788) IV(vii). 7 § 6. Susem. (965)

21 κατακλίσεως υπάρξει κτλ.] The term

μένη which recurs v(viii). 5 § 2, n. (1019)

denotes the advanced stage of the banquet,

at which men’s spirits were more elevated

and they began to drink wine undiluted

(ἀκρατον); cp. Plato Lasso Π. 271 E, Ath.

II. 40 a (J. G. Schneider). Comp. also

v(viii). 5 § 8, n. (1028), 7 § 13 f. n. (1067),

also n. (113). But, as was remarked in

Intro. p. 55, κατάκλισις, or admission into

αἰσθήσια, in all probability commenced

with initiation into military service from

the seventeenth year onwards: see v(viii).

4 § 9 Exc. i. to B. v(viii): but when

recruits have a compulsory diet prescribed

for them (Exc. to B. v(viii)) they cer-

tainly have syssitia of their own, and only

when their education has been completed,

from their twenty-first year onwards, are

they admitted to the syssitia proper, at

first those of the soldiers, and allowed the

other liberties here mentioned. Susem.

(966)

22 καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων κτλ] Plato on the contrary even in the 

Lasso Π. 816 D, E, XI. 935 E wholly banishes

comedy and Iambos, and only permits

comic dances by foreigners or slaves. 

Susem. (967)

§ 12 25 ὕστερον ὃ' ἐπιστήσατας Another point the discussion of which is missing: see Introd. p. 49 n. (4), p. 53 n. (1). Susem. (969)

§ 13 28 Θεόδωρος] It is beyond all doubt that Theodorus is here treated as

one deceased: but I fail to see that he

is spoken of Rhet. III. 2 § 4, 140 b 22 ff.

as if he were still living and on the stage,

as Zeller Π. ii. p. 131 n. (1) maintains.

From the latter passage it is very clear

that he was the greatest tragic actor of

recent times. Aelian, V. H. xiv. 40, 

relates a story of the powerful impression

which his acting made on the tyrant

Alexander of Phære. Plutarch mentions

him along with Polos as a famous pro-

tagonist actor in leading parts in De regim.

21, 816 E, and with Nikostratos, Kallip-

pides, Mynnimos, Polos in De Gloria
kríthēs: oudei γὰρ πῶς, παρήκειν ἐαυτοῦ προεισήγειν, οὔτε (XV) 30 τῶν εὐτελῶν ύποκριτῶν, ὡς οἰκειομέμενοι τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς πρώταις ἁκοιαίς: συμβαίνει δὲ ταύτῳ τούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων.

§ 14 πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μάλλον. διὸ δὲ τοῖς νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν 35 ἔχει ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν.

§ 12 b. 24 <νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον> 25 ύπότερον δὲ ἐπιστήματα δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἶτε μὴ δεῖ 26 πρῶτον δεῖ διαπορίσασθαι, καὶ πῶς δεῖ· κατὰ δὲ τῶν 27 παρόντων καιρόν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον.> 35 διελθόντων δὲ τῶν 36 πέντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἐπτά δεῖ θεωροῦν ἡδη γίνεσθαι 37 τῶν μαθήσεως ἢς δῆσει μανθάνειν αὐτούς.

§ 15 δύο δὲ εἰσίν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον διηρθῆσαι τὴν παί- 39 δείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπτά μέχρις ἡδης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν

29 προσάγειν P4-6 Λbs Ald. Wb and probably P5 (1st hand) || <οἷς>, οὖν Bothe (on Terent. p. 619) || 30 θεατῶν ΙΦ P5 Ar. Bk. (and with γρ. prefixed) corr. of P3 in the margin || 34 ὅσα after αὐτῶν P4-5 ΙP3 Bk. Susem.1-3 in the text, inlациииен William, improbliatem Ar., δυσμένειαν Schmidt, Susem.2, δυσχείρειαν Koraes.

1336 b. 24—27 24 τούτων P1 and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ) P4 Ald., τούτων Μ′ Ar. and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ) all other authorities Bk. || 25 διαφέραι P4-6 Λβs Ald. Wb || 26 πρῶτον] πρῶτερον? Koraes, needlessly.

36 ἡδη omitted by ΙP3 wrongly, [ἡδη] Susem.1 Cp. 1268 b 21, 1280 a 6 || 38 τὴν omitted by Μ′ and P1 (1st hand, supplied by corr. in P1), [τὴν] Susem.1 || 39 μέχρι ΙP2 Μ′ Bk. Susem.1

Ath. vi. 535 F (cp. also De Audiendi Poetis 18 c). Demosthenes De Falsa Leg. § 246 f, p. 418, 4, mentions him along with another great protagonist of the time, Aristodemus, with the remark that both shone in the rôle of Sophocles' Antigone, but did not appear in the Phoenix of Euripides; that Aeschines acted under them as protagonist and had represented Creon in the Antigone. In his private life Theodorus appears to have been very wild, to judge by the nickname given him no doubt by the comic poets (see Hesych. s.v. πελεθόβας or πελεθόδας). An habit of his habits may also be gathered from Hesych. s.v. Θεόδωρος έλεγον οἱ καμικοὶ τοῦ πρώκτος, ἀπὸ Θεόδωρον τινὸς οὖν εὐ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ὡς χρησαμένον. See also Hesych. s.v. Ἀριστόδημοι οἱ καμικαὶ τῶν πρωκτῶν, καὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Τιμοσάντακτα έλεγον. Diog. Laert. ii. 104 calls him a tragic poet: but this must rest either on a false reading or an error—more probably the latter, as Aelian also calls him ὁ τῆς πραγματίας ποιητής. Comp. also Athen. xi. 482 D and Meineke Fragm. Com. Gr. 18. p. 523 f. Susem. (968) § 15 39 μετὰ τὴν ἄφρ. ἡδης... 40 ἐτῶν]

The first period is to be wholly taken up with gymnastic, three years of the second with the remaining subjects of youthful training, the following years again with severer bodily exercises; see V (VIII), 3 § 13, n. (1003), 4 § 9 n. (1015) Exc. Here Aristotle only partially follows Plato [see nn. (1015, 1016)]. In the Republic the latter divides the educational course into three parts. The first begins with gymnastic, preceded by the narration of mythes, legends and tales, much as Aristotle also prescribes (see § 20, n. 958): gymnastic is followed by music and poetry together with reading, writing and arithmetic, and certain elements of
mathematics generally: this lasts until
the seventeenth or eighteenth year. The
next two or three years, until the twen-
tieth, are to be spent in military exercises.
The second course of ten years for the
more highly qualified students is in the
higher mathematics, pure and applied;
the third or philosophical course, which is
only for the most richly endowed
natures, lasts five years longer, as we had
occasion to mention in n. (182) on ii. 5
534 c—535 a, 536—537 b, 539 d ff. In
the Laws (see vii. 794 c—795 d, 809 e
—813 c, 817 c—822 d, cp. 813 c ff.).
Plato prescribes the elements of gymnastic
from the sixth to the tenth year (cp. n.
950); reading and writing from ten to
thirteen; music, singing, and at the same
time the really severer instruction in
dancing and gymnastic from 13 to 17;
lastly, the elements of arithmetic, geo-
metry, and astronomy—no doubt from
seventeen to eighteen. It has been ex-
plained in n. (193) on ii. 6. 5 that even
in the Laws the better endowed natures
were afforded opportunity, after the age
of thirty, for the same higher education
as that furnished in the Republic by the
second and third courses, or at least for
something similar to it. Susem. (970)

40 oί γάρ... 41 οί κακῶς] Cr. c. 16
§ 8 n. (947). Susem. (971)

1337 a 1 πάσα γάρ τέχνη... 2 ἀνα-
πληροῦν] Eaton compares Phys. ii. 8 § 8,
199 a 15 f. διὸς τε τῇ τέχνῃ τὰ μὲν ἐπι-
tελεῖ τῇ ἠ φύσει ἀδικισθεὶσανθα, τὰ δὲ μεμεῖται: “and in general it is art
which either brings to completion what
nature is unable to effect or else imitates
nature”: on which passage see Döring
1. 6. 15 (i.e. i. c. 4 Bk., 1097 a 2) where
we are told of all arts and sciences that
each seeks to meet a definite want, τὸ
ἐνδεές ἑπιζητοῦσαν. Susem. (972)

“The context here, in its reference
to education, limits the scope of τέχνη
to useful art. Useful art supplements
nature and at the same time follows her
guidance. He who would be a master
in any art must first discern the true end
by a study of nature’s principles, and
then employ the method which she sug-
gests for the attainment of that end”
He adds: “in the passage from the
Physics also it is probable that the dis-
tinction is not, as would at first sight
seem, between useful and fine art, but
between two aspects of useful art. The
sentence is not quite logical in form, but
the meaning is that useful art on the one
hand satisfies those needs of man for
which nature has not fully provided, on
the other hand its processes are those of
nature.”
EXCURSUS I.  

ΟΙ 'ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ.  

NOTE ON IV(vii). 1. 2, 1323 a 22 (687).

It would take us too far out of our way to give a detailed or perfectly complete account, supposing it were even possible, of the meaning of this expression which recurs in III. 6. 5, 1278 b 32, and in six other passages. Inquiry has not by any means as yet disposed of the subject. The one point which has been conclusively established is that in general 'outside discussions' (or discourses) are opposed to strictly scientific discussions (οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι, III. 12. 1, 1282 b 19, see n. 584). But whether they are (1) discussions by others, or by Aristotle himself: whether, in the latter case, the reference is to (2) Aristotle's dialogues and popular works, or to (3) dialectical discussions, in Aristotle's sense of the term dialectic as the tentative solution of problems, in his scientific writings, and whether they should be sought in another work or, as in Physics IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31, in the same work: whether in fact writings of any sort, or merely (4) oral controversies and expressions of opinion are intended, must on each occasion be decided from the context, if at all.

Now here, as at III. 6. 5, n. (527 b), it appears to me that the only meaning which really suits the context is 'discussions in daily life' or 'in ordinary intercourse.' Aristotle appeals (see n. 689) to what has already become the common property of the ordinary cultivated consciousness and

1 Nic. Eth. i. 13. 9, 1102 a 26, vi. 4. 2, 1140 a 3; Metaphysics xiii(M). i. 4, 1076 a 28: Physics IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31: End. Eth. i. 8. 4, 1217 b 22, ii. 1. 1, 1218 b 34.
3 See Bonitz Ind. Ar. 105 b 16 ff.
4 This is a point quite rightly emphasized by Vahlen. But how is it consistent to say e.g. that 'the division of goods which follows has furthermore been laid down and explained in the outside discussions and does not require to be repeated in detail here' (cp. Vahlen p. 9), when Vahlen at the same time in this passage accepts as possible the interpretation of the phrase 'outside discussions' accepted by me? And how can the supposition of a previous explanation be got out of the words? They contain nothing but an appeal to what is universally admitted. Cp. n. (688).
EXCURSUS I.

has developed into a permanent conviction of universal validity; what is
treated as a settled and generally accepted fact in the conversations and
discussions on such subjects in educated circles¹. In other words he calls
in good sound common sense. Bernays on the other hand, Dialoge des
Arist. p. 69 ff., 158 ff., finds here a quotation from an Aristotelian dialogue
and thinks that the very lively fluent style of this chapter, which presents
a marked contrast to the remainder of the book, should be explained by
assuming that Aristotle in the main borrowed and transferred it from that
dialogue, reproducing even the very words. Vahlen², Aristotelische Auf-
sätze 11. (Phil.-hist. Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad. LXXII. p. 5 ff.) has
conclusively shown how weak is the foundation for this hypothesis (cp.
also the review by Susemihl Philol. Anzeiger v. 1873, p. 673 ff.). He has
not made another attempt on his own part to clear up this fact, but only
remarked that this chapter forms a complete whole by itself, which must
be retained or condemned as a whole—a statement which no one would be
likely to controvert. Still for a right decision of the matter considerable
importance attaches to his pertinent observation, that Bernays appears not
to have fully met the difficulty of the surprise we naturally feel³ that for a
question discussed in the Ethics Aristotle should quote his popular writings
in preference to that treatise.

This difficulty remains the same, even though we substitute an appeal to
the popular judgment for the appeal to popular writings. In the Ethics the
whole investigation turns on the inquiry, “What is the best life, or human
happiness?” and that this factor also should be utilized was perfectly in
point. In the Politics Aristotle might have done in starting this inquiry what
he has done on several other occasions (II. 1, 5, III. 5 § 9, 7 § 1, VI(iv). 9 § 2,
cp. IV(vi). 12 §§ 3, 4: see nn. 133, 545, 584, 873, 879, 1289); he might
simply have referred to the results of the Ethics. But if he had intended to
begin in this place a fresh discussion of the question over again in detail, and
in such a manner that his investigation should not merely satisfy the require-
ments of science, but so far as possible compel the assent of ordinary opinion
with its own peculiar assumptions and prepossessions, then at any rate, when
the same subject comes up for discussion later on, it would have been impos-
sible so utterly to ignore this exposition, to treat it as so altogether non-
existent, as is actually the case.

¹ For Bernays’ proof of the impossibility of this interpretation, though ad-
vanced with full confidence in its success, can be easily refuted. And Zeller op. cit.
11 ii p. 119 n. (2) reads into this passage something very different from what is
there. It does not state that ordinary opinion agrees with the outside discussions
merely in holding that mental goods are required for the best kind of life, but it
says:—“as we believe many of the statements current in ordinary conversation
respecting the constituents of the best life to be perfectly correct, we should in the
present instance make use of them. For one thing at any rate is universally con-
ceded, that there are three kinds of goods, and that all three are necessary to the
best life, or in other words, to happiness. But of course our agreement with ordinary
opinion (εξωτερικός λόγος) goes no farther: for the ordinary view regards mental goods,
i.e. the virtues, as subsidiary, whilst we make them the principal thing.”
² And more recently Diels: see below.
³ See Krohn op. cit. p. 37.
Now already at c. 8 § 4, cp. n. (799), and at c. 9 § 3, § 7 Aristotle has returned to the position, that the state has for its aim the best possible life, and that the best constitution is the one by which the state attains the greatest happiness (cp. n. 806). In the first of these passages it is merely stated what constitutes the best life or happiness without any such addition as “according to our previous inquiry,” and equally without any reference to the investigation of this question in the Ethics. In the second passage there is a reference, but apparently it is to the former passage, c. 8, and not to c. 1 at all; see nn. (807, 813). There is this further and more serious difficulty, that c. 13 (cp. n. 872) begins, just like c. 1, with the statement that, as the best constitution is that which enables the state in the highest degree to attain happiness, the precise nature of happiness must not be left obscure. For the general character of this transition is not in the least altered by the fact that c. 13 treats, not of the best life, but of happiness, and the happiness of the state in particular. But in this the non-existence of c. 1 is expressly implied; the other course—of a reference to the results of the Ethics—is quite gratuitously adopted, and thus the matter is settled. However if the genuineness of c. 13 is not quite above suspicion (see nn. 876, 879, 881), there only remain the other and minor objections to c. 1 in its present place upon which dependence can be placed.

But taking everything into consideration, are we to decide offhand that c. 1 is spurious? There is nothing in the following chapters which is materially inconsistent with it, and there is nothing to disturb the suggestion made in the Introd. pp. 12, 15, 48, that in his oral lectures on Politics Aristotle was accustomed to effect the transition to the description of the ideal state in the very words before us, however different may have been his procedure when committing his thoughts to paper. If this be so, we have before us in this chapter a portion of some careful hearer’s notes which the editor has inserted, although it stands in no organic connexion with the rest of the work. Cp. also n. (711). SUSEM. (687)

The oldest view of this much disputed phrase, which implied a twofold form of the Aristotelian teaching, had long been felt to be unsatisfactory when Bernays, in 1863, in the work already cited, put forward the brilliant and attractive theory that the Aristotelian dialogues are meant. Subsequent writers were much influenced by this theory, but very unequally. Thus Grote, who discussed the expression Aristotle 1. pp. 63—75, not content to understand by it ‘discourses outside the subject,’ thinks a negative character, dialectic not didactic, is intended, appealing especially to Phys. iv. c. 10 where all the difficulties which beset the notion of time are noticed and traced out. For this view, which is substantially that of Thurot, Études p. 213, he can cite Alexander in Topica διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν, ὃς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πραγματείᾳ (the Topics) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ρητορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς, 260 a 24 ed. Brandis. So too Simplicius, τὰ ἐξωτερικὰ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δὴ ἐνδίδουν περαιώματα.

1 On the other hand this is the very utmost that can be conceded: see n. (881).
2 For the inconsistencies which Krohn thinks he has discovered are too deep for me to detect.
Grote then understands the term “extraneous to philosophy” (because dialectical) to include not merely oral debate but writings, whether Aristotle's own or the Platonic and other dialogues.

Zeller also in the third edition (1879) of his great work has advanced beyond his earlier standpoint, by recognising in ἐξωτερικὸς more than one primary meaning. First, simply 'extraneous,' as when applied to σκέψις Pol. I. 5. 4, 1254 a 33; equivalent to the phrase οἱ ἐξωθεν λόγοι. II. 6. 3, 1264 b 39, and so unquestionably used by Eudemus who paraphrases Aristotle's own ἀπορίαν...ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον Phys. i. 2. 9, 185 b 11, by ἀπορίαν ἐξωτερικὴν Simpl. in Physica 85, 26 Diels. But the word may also mean 'relating to what is outside,' and this again may bear more than one sense. Thus to suit Phys. c. iv. 10, Zeller adds the meaning (2) discussions 'that do not go deep into the subject,' and from Eud. Eth. II. 1. 1, 1218 b 33 compared with Nic. Eth. i. 8, 1098 b 10 καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς, (3) oral, not written, discussions. Lastly, he admits (4) that some lost Aristotelian writing of a more popular character is referred to in the six remaining passages, including those in the Politics, 1323 a 22, 1278 b 32.

In the view taken of these six passages we trace the influence exerted by the theory of Bernays, that the 'exoteric discourses' are Aristotle's own dialogues: a theory adopted, in the main, by Heitz and by Bonitz (Ind. Ar. 104 b 44 f.). More recently this theory has been vigorously attacked by Diels in a paper entitled Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles reported in Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad. 1883 pp. 477—494, in its turn followed by a note from Hirzel, defending Bernays, Rhein. Mus. xxxix. p. 178 f. n. 1, and an article by Susemihl in Jahrb. f. Philol. cxxix. 1884, pp. 265—277. Diels insists that the term is a technical term in the Peripatetic school, and holds it to be indispensable that its meaning should be constant wherever it occurs. The explanation he gives is 'discussions carried on outside the Peripatetic school,' τὰ ἐξωθεν λεγομένα, including such as were customary in the Academy or had been held of old by philosophers or laymen. He rejects the view of Grote (and Thuot) that the imperfect form or the dialectical character, is intended by 'exoteric,' arguing that if evidence from without confirms Aristotle, in what form it is stated or how obtained is not the essential point: though doubtless a Peripatetic will attach to it no more credit a priori than to ἐνδοξα generally. Moreover, if the difference of method is emphasized in the formula of citation, why is not the appeal to λόγοι διαλεκτικοί? (cp. λόγοι ἐπιχειρηματικοί, 451 a 19). Diels allows that when contrasted with οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι all outside discussions present a character of their own. Not that they are all to be rejected: on the contrary the Peripatetics are unwearied in their use of the wisdom of the ancients, philosophers and famous men, verses of the poets, sophistic declamations: but in such ἐνδοξα we have only the raw material of knowledge; only true scientific method, viz. that in use inside the Peripatetic school, can properly test the alloy and extract the ore from it.

This view is based in the first instance on a detailed examination of our present passage and comparison with Nic. Eth. i. c. 8, where a similar in-
tention is announced, 1098 b 9 σκεπτέων δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπερά-
σματος καὶ εἰ δὲν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ
ἀληθεὶς πάντα συνάδει τὰ υπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ φευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφώνει τάλιθικα.
The evidence got from the use of terms, from popular or philosophic views, is to
be set side by side with the syllogistic conclusion and philosophic definition.
Then follows the threefold division of goods, as in our Politics passage.
Diels pronounces it a current Academic division, familiar to Plato (Laws III, 697 A, 11),
adopted by Xenocrates and his successors, and points triumphantly
to the words 1098 b 16 ff. ὥστε καλὸς ἰν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δοξαν
παλαιῶν οὕτων καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων. "Thus he has found
support for his definition in this old opinion. Observe the γέ: 'at least this
dιαίρεσις is wholly recognized': the particle recurs in Pol. IV(VII). 1, 3, 1323 a
24, while the confidence in general recognition is repeated § 5, 1323 a 34,
tαῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὡσπερ πάντες ἰν συγχωρήσεις. That he had the Ethics in
mind is shown by the words of 1323 b 39 ἐτέρας σχολῆς, and by the citation
c. 13. Returning to 1323 a 22, we see that the emphasis is on ἰκώνως:—beliefing that a sufficient account of the best life can be drawn from much of
what is found in Outside Discourses, we must now also make use of it: καὶ
νῦν, here in the Politics as before in the Ethics!"

Working on these lines, the temptation becomes irresistible to find a
parallel in the older literature for all the passages where the phrase (or of
ἐξωθεν λόγου and the like) occurs. E.g. Alcmeon (? Epicharmus) is sug-
gested as the authority for the dichotomy of the soul in N. E. I, 13, 1102
a 26; Plato Charmides 163 A for N. E. VI. 4, 1140 a 3; Hesiod, Homer, or
the Sophists for 1278 b 32 ff. Thus Diels succeeds in satisfying his own
postulate of a technical term with constant meaning, and for consistency he
is bound to infer that the ἀπορία concerning Time in Phys. IV. c. 10 have
come down to Aristotle from his predecessors.

It may however be gravely questioned whether the interpretation in all
passages should be so strict. "With the same fundamental meaning the
phrase may have had different shades of meaning in different connexions:
not only is it external and referring to what is external, but in contra-
distinction to ὧν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι, it would naturally be used for
non-philosophical discussions." What all men say may be a part of the
ἐξωτερικὸς λόγος though it is not necessarily the whole. Certainly in Eud.
Eth. II. 1 it is just—'what all the world says.' And this meaning makes
both Politics passages, 1278 b 32 as well as 1323 a 22, more logical. But
on the other hand with regard to Met. 1076 a 22—28, Eud. Eth. 1217 b 22,
and Physics IV. 10 it can plausibly be maintained that the reference is
not so much to λεγόμενα as to something lying 'outside of philosophy' by
reason not of its origin, but of its method.

3 Torstrik's rendering of another dis-
puted phrase ὧν καὶ ἐν κοινῷ γίγαντομενοι λόγοι
De Anima I. 4, 1, 497 b 29, is ea dispu-
tationes quales homines elegantiores instituere solet. This at least does justice to
the present participle.]
Note on IV(vii). II. 6, 1330 b 26.

δυσεξίδος γὰρ ἐκεῖνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις.

Aristotle here recommends the older sort of street architecture on the ground that it makes it difficult for strangers who are within to get out, and for enemies who are without to attack, thus echoing the latter part of the precept πρὸς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμικῶν αὐτῶν μὲν εὐθείαν εἶναι χρῆ, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσωπον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον 1330 b 2, but at the same time amplifying it, in so far as account is taken of the case in which strangers are endea-vouring to make their escape, as for example Thucyd. II. 4. It seems strange however that, whereas the case in which the stranger or enemy wants to get out (1) cannot occur until he has first got in, and (2) is exceptional and comparatively unimportant, Aristotle should give it both prece-dence and prominence. Should we not expect δυσεξίδος? and if so, would it not seem that δυσεξερεύνητος should correlate with ξενικοῖς, δυσεξίδος with ἐπιτιθεμένοις, rather than δυσεξίδος with ξενικοῖς, δυσεξερεύνητος with ἐπιτι-thεμένοις? I conjecture therefore δυσεξερεύνητος γὰρ ἐκεῖνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξίδος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. H. JACKSON.

EXCURSUS II.

The Age of Superannuation.

ἐτὶ δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίνηται κατὰ λόγον, εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἣδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἄριστον. IV(vii). 16. 10, 1335 a 32—35.

The sense is: Furthermore supposing the birth of children to follow upon the marriage as early as may reasonably be expected, the eldest (or only) sons will succeed their fathers at a time when the former (i.e. the children) begin to enter on their prime, while the latter are already in their decline towards their seventieth year.

Aristotle has in view simply the normal case: the eldest son, born nine months after the marriage, grows up to manhood. If the number given in the text, 1335 a 29, for the man’s age at marriage (37) were correct, the eldest son would be only about 32 at the time when the father is about 70. But it is in the highest degree improbable that he should succeed to his father’s civic rights (so I take διαδοχὴ) before he is himself permitted and obliged to marry. Besides, Aristotle approves (§ 17, n. 947) the division of human life into periods of seven years. Now suppose that, with Spengel, we replace 37 by 35: in that case, by the time the eldest son reaches 35 the
father's age will be, on the foregoing assumptions, 70\(\frac{1}{2}\) years. The father may then be relieved from active citizenship and give up the two family properties: his son steps into his place, while he as priest is superannuated, c. 9 § 9, 1329 a 30—34. It might certainly be supposed to be in favour of the number 37, that Aristotle demands the simultaneous cessation of the reproductive faculty for husband and wife and fixes the limit in the one case at seventy, in the other at fifty years: if a man of 37 marries a wife at 18, this calculation is fairly exact, since when the husband is 69, the wife will be 50: whereas if the man marries at 35 he reaches the limit three years before his wife. To this we may reply, that beyond all doubt a mere approximation is quite sufficient, especially as the husband is forbidden to have children after his 55th year (§§ 16, 17, 1335 b 26—38). In the whole question, the younger sons, if any are born, are left out of account: there is no place for them on Aristotle's scheme, except to fill the vacancies caused by death or to be adopted into childless families, where the head of the house finds himself after his fifty-fifth year without male offspring (§ 15, 1335 b 21—26, ii. 6. 10—13, 1265 a 38—b 16, cp. ii. 7. 5, 1266 b 9 ff). Further, the remark in Intro, p. 54, that the citizens do not serve on the jury-courts or become members of the popular assembly until they are fifty, requires now to be modified: even as early as at thirty-five, it appears, they become qualified for these functions and must take them. But it may be doubted whether their obligation to military service ceases then, and unquestionably Aristotle intended to fix a higher age, presumably 50, as the qualification for serving on the Council and filling the magistrates (with the exception of military commands). What arrangements were to be made in case the heir did not attain the age of 35 until from one to twenty years after the superannuation of his father, or adopted father, is a matter which receives no elucidation either in our incomplete sketch of Aristotle's ideal of a state or elsewhere in his writings. The only conceivable solution is that the exercise of political rights in this family is dropped in the interval, and the family properties are managed by guardians, though not necessarily for the full term until the heir becomes thirty-five. If we remember that full civic rights are exercised only from the age of fifty to the age of seventy, it still remains true that their possessors are only a minority of the whole civic population, n. (817).

The above explanation premised, a word or two of criticism on the views of Ridgeway and Jackson. The former (Transactions of Cambridge Philological Society II. p. 146) would read ταῖς μὲν ἀρχομέναις, thus opposing the wife's physical prime to the husband's intellectual prime (about 49). That this is unsatisfactory is pointed out by Jackson (ib. p. 118), who in his turn retains ἀρχομένης (Γ and corr. P'), but, while rightly referring ἀρχομένης τῆς ἁκμῆς as well as καταλευμένης τῆς ἡλικίας to the father, takes τοῖς μὲν to be the older, τοῖς δὲ the younger children by the same marriage, and explains ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων as the children's attainment of the age of puberty. Had this been the sense we should have expected τῶν μὲν...τῶν δὲ instead of the datives, and perhaps the addition of τῶν πατέρων after τῆς ἁκμῆς and of ἐκείνων after ἡλικίας would then have conducted to clearness. This however is a small
matter. The chief difficulty is the strange sense given to ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τεκνῶν; as if it meant that the children succeed (not their father but) one another, i.e. they successively attain puberty between the thirty-eighth and fifty-sixth years of the father's age. This presupposes several children, comparatively speaking a large family: whereas the passage quoted above from B. II. as well as the whole of the present chapter make it abundantly clear that Aristotle is committed to the system of small families—in the normal case, one son and one daughter,—in order to keep the population stationary.

SUSEM.
B. \textit{v(viii)}. The same subject continued: the true system of state education.

This book joins on so closely with the preceding that it is not easy to make a parting at all. Undoubtedly Spengel's proposal to begin at \textit{πρῶτον μὲν} is in full accordance with the usage of Aristotle. The same thing frequently happens at the commencement of a chapter. Aristotle recapitulates before starting a fresh subject. The worthy people who divided his books into chapters ignore this: see e.g. cc. 3, 5, and 7 of this book, which more properly should begin at 1337 b 22, 1338 b 39, and at 1341 a 9 respectively. The alternative commencement has actually been marked in this edition at II. c. 12, p. 314; III. c. 2, p. 359.

\textit{c. 1. Three points to decide:} (1) Should there be a systematic education? (2) Should it be a public system? (3) What subjects should it include? While (1) and (2) are soon settled in the affirmative, B. \textit{v(viii)} leaves off before we are far advanced with (3). Cp. \textit{Anal.} p. 118.

\textit{§ 1 12 καὶ γὰρ} Si num et significat, pro altero καὶ α\grave{a} 18 post longam parenthesim adhibitum est \textit{ἐτὶ δὲ}, sed facilius fortasse καὶ γὰρ \textit{elenetin} esse suum nos: certe altera earum indutca est his, altera \textit{ἐτὶ δὲ particulis}, et \textit{μὲν οὐν} a 11 excipitur \textit{δ’ conjunctione quae legitur a 21}. \textit{SUSEM.}

\textit{13 οὐ γινόμενον τούτο} The neglect of this: in Latin, \textit{hoc non servatum}. Cp. 1324 a 36 n., \textit{vii(v)}. 8. 2, 1307 b 33 f.

\textit{§ 2 14 δει γαρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι} What this means is explained \textit{vii(v)}. 9 §§ 11, 12, 1310 a 12 ff. Cp. \textit{n.} (1641). \textit{Rhet.} 1. 8. 6, 1366 a 12 f. (Eaton): \textit{ὅδε αὐν τὰ ἡδη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης ἐχειν ἡμᾶς: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστης ἡδος πιθανωτατον πρὸς ἐκάστην εἶναι}. \textit{SUSEM. (973)}

\textit{τὸ ἠδος τῆς πολιτείας} As Plato in \textit{Rep.} \textit{viii.} 544 D explains, any constitution (e.g. a timocracy) is due to the prevalence of a certain (e.g. timocratic) temper amongst the citizens: \textit{ib.} 549 A, \textit{ἡ οἰκε ἐκ}
In which the noble temper. In other words, where the constitution is such as to permit the excellence of the individual considered to coincide with his excellence considered as a man: comp. 111. cc. 4—6 § 2, c. 14 §§ 7, 8 : iv(viii). 6 § 1, c. 8 §§ 2, 5, c. 13 §§ 9, 10: vi(iv). 7 § 2 with notes (468, 471, 684, 808, 1233). Also Plato Lato 1. 641 b, ei δ' δόλως ἐρωτάσας παιδείαν τῶν παιδευθέντων, τί μέγα τὴν πόλιν ὄντως, οὐ χαλεπόν εἰπεν, ὅτι παιδευθέντες μέν εἰς γίγνουσιν ἀν ἄνδρες ἀγάλλω. SUSSEM. (974)

As to the argument, it is much the same as in 1. 5. 2 f. 125 a 25. It is perplexing to determine whether it merely guarantees consistency in the use of the term βέλτιον, or is intended for a material inference.

έτι δὲ answers a 12 καὶ γὰρ, alleging another reason.

19 δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας] An Aristotelian periphrasis for the special sciences which has already occurred II. 8. 18, 1268 b 36. Comp. 111. 13 § 1, 1282 b 16, where ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις is one, the highest of εὐποτίμημα καὶ τέχνα, b 14, which phrase is replaced in § 3, 1282 b 31, by εὐποτίμημα καὶ δυνάμεις; also vi(i). 1 §§ 1, 2, with notes.

21 καὶ πρὸς τ. τ. ἀ. π.] Therefore there should be τὰξις τις περὶ τῶν παιδίας: the first of the three questions is settled.

§ 3 21 ἐπεὶ δὲ] This corresponds to ὅτι μὲν ὄν ὁνὶν a 11.

25 τε καὶ] join ἔδιδον to διδάσκανων.

26 δὲ γὰρ] This sentence gives one reason why the education is to be public. The second point is quickly dismissed, but the third takes up the whole of this book.

§ 4 27 ἀμα δὲ κτά] The sacrifice of the individual to the state was carried out most completely at Sparta, but Periclean Athens did not fall far short in this respect. Aristotle accepts the principle along with the other fundamental postulates of the Greek state, and expresses it as clearly in 1. 13. 15 as here. Comp. 1. 1 § 12 ff., 4 § 5, and Eucken Method p. 80 f. Also the conception of rearing a family as ἀγνοομαλά, iv(vii). 16. 16.
30. The order πρὸς τὴν τοῦ διὸ βλέπειν ἐπιμέλειαν would avoid the hiatus and conform to 1. 13, 15, 1260 b 14, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ διὸ βλέπειν ἀρετὴν. Cp. Plato Laws 903 b, c.

31. ἐπαινέσεις δ' ἀν τις Comp. N. Eth. x. 9.1, 1180 a 24 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (975)

32. καί κοινὴ ταύτην On the ἀγωγή or public training of Spartan citizens see Schömann Eng. tr. 1 p. 255 ff.

It was the same for all vii(IV). 9. 7, 1294 b 22 ff. (except the kings' eldest sons or next heirs, Ps.-Pl. Alc. 1. 122 B, Plut. V. Agesilai c. 1), and without it mere birth from Spartan parents did not constitute any one a citizen: cp. the well-known story of the hostages: Ἑτέρους ἐφοβουσαν εἰπε 'παῖδας μὲν ὄν ὄσαν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπαίτεισιν τὴν γένουσαν, τὴν πατρίου ἀγωγῆς ἀπεκτησανε' οὐδὲ πολέμα κατὰ αὐν ἐφοβαν,' Plutarch Arophila. Lec. 54, 235 B. Cp. Inst. Lec. 21.

c. 2. Conflict of views as to what should be taught: divergent theories of the end of education: § 1. 2.

The knowledge needed for affairs of life must be imparted, but only within certain limits. Even in scientific studies there is much which a gentleman would not pursue, or only as means to a given end: §§ 3—6.

37. οὐτέ πρὸς ἀρετὴν—ἀριστον] But Aristotle would not recognise any such dilemma as 'virtue or happiness,' unless we here limit virtue to mean moral virtue only. This limited meaning occurs in § 2, a 42, see n. (978). SUSEM. (976)


As here τῆς ἑθος, the character of the soul is a fuller form of expression for ἕθος, so also in c. 5 § 16 we have τοῦ περὶ τῆς ἑθος cp. n. (1043). SUSEM. (977)

§ 2. 39. τῆς ἐπιστοᾶς παιδείας From the standpoint of the ordinary, current education.

40. ταραχώδης = perplexing: ταραχὴ for ἀπόρια in H. 8. 12, 1268 b 4. The three theories of the end of education are that it should be (1) directly utilitarian i.e. subservient to a livelihood, or should cultivate (2) the moral, or (3) the intellectual faculties. They still find supporters in the modern controversies on the subject.

42. πρὸς ἀρετὴν] Here and in the following clause (b) ἀρετὴ is evidently restricted to 'moral virtue' combined with φρόνησις, practical wisdom. SUSEM. (978) ἢ τὰ περιττά] The fragment which has come down to us does not include a discussion of the question whether and to what extent these higher sciences should also be taken into account in the education of the young, cp. c. 3 §§ 10, 11, with n. (999) and n. (1015), Exc. 1; also Introd. 50 ff. SUSEM. (979)

ἐπιλέψει ταύτα κρίτας τινας] Have found
partizans, supporters; literally 'umpires to decide for them.' The metaphor is clearly taken from the dramatic contests: cp. Metaph. 1. 8, 5, 980 a 6 ff.

3 πρός not περί, after diaφέροσται, as after αμφίψυχοιν in III. 13. 1, 1283 a 23, 24: 'with regard to' (cp. 1283 b 15).

What is σκέψασθαι ἀρέτης? Learning by practice, practical training in virtue: cp. 1341 a 8, πολεμικά and πολιτικά ἀσκ., 1333 b 39, 38, τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκήσεων... μελητάν.

3 The first theory is only partially accepted. Some 'utilitarian' studies are indispensable, but we must exclude all which bear the taint of ἀναγκαία πάντες.

4 By the really indispensable parts of useful knowledge he may be supposed to mean much what we mean by the three Rs. Here in fact we return to the starting-point, IV(vii). 14, 14, 1333 b 1—4. There is no need to limit the expression to ἀναγκαία τῶν ἔργων as in 1. 7; 3, 11, 6, 5, III. 4, 11.

5 ὅτι δὲ There is nothing strange in the repetition of ὅτι after παντερόν. Comp. III. 13. 7, 1283 b 16 ff, where ὅτι is picked up by ὅτι, as also in Phys. 1. 7; 9, 190 b 17, 19; other instances from Phys. vi. 2, 9, 233 a 13 ff, VIII. 7, 1, 260 a 23, 25 (Bonitz). We may render: 'as to all not being required, in view of the distinc-
tion made between liberal and illiberal occupations, it is clear that such useful subjects only should be studied as will not degrade the student.' τῶν τοιούτων limiting as in 1260 a 40.

§ 4 8 The article omitted with ἔργων, because τῶν ἔργων is predicate.

§ 5 παντερόν] What is meant by παρασκευάζοντα καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαριναία ἐργασίαις] 'Trades plied for hire' including all kinds of paid labour, mental as well as manual. See notes (103, 103). But in 1. 11, 4, 1258 b 25, μισθαρία is used in a different sense, as 'working for wage,' to denote merely the manual labour of artisans and unskilled labourers as distinct from ἐμπορία and τοκισμός, i.e. all kinds of trade and commercial occupations (including usury). Comp. n. (101). SUSEM. (981)

καὶ ἐργασίας. ἀσχολοῦν γὰρ ποιοῦσα τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα· (II) 15 πεινήν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνελθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν τῶν ἐνίον μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελθερίου, τὸ δὲ προσέδειν Λίαν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐνοχὸν ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἥξει δὲ πολλὴν διαφοράν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἑκεν πράττει τις ἡ μανθάνει τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φιλῶν ἢ δὲ ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀνελθερίου, ὃ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δὲ ἀλλοις θητικοῖς καὶ δουλικοῖς ἂν δόξει πράττειν.

15 <μη> ἀνελθερίων οὐ ἀνελθερίων? Göttling ( wrongly), ἀνελθερίων Ridgeway: but see Comm. n. (982) = 16 ἀνελθερίων perhaps Γ' Ar. = 16 τὸ...20 ἀνελθερίων omitted by ΠΑ (supplied in the margin of ΠΒ) = τὸ δὲ προσέδειν omitted and a lacuna left by ΠΑ (1st hand), προσέδειν δὲ (supplied by a later hand in ΠΒ) Bk. = 17 ἀκρίβειαν τὸ τέλειον ΠΒ, perfectionem William, extremaeum Ar., τὸ ἐντελὲς Vettori Bk. = εἰρημέναις refheias ΠΒ = δὲ γὰρ ? Susem. (a very doubtful suggestion) = 18 ἑκεν] χάριν ΠΒ = 19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ] αὐτὸν μὲν γὰρ ΠΒ, with hiatus in pausa = αὐτοῦ] αὐτῷ ΠΒ in the margin, ἃν Μ = τῶν inserted before φιλῶν by ΠΒ = 20 ἀνελθερίων perhaps Γ' Ar. = πράττων ΠΒ cp. 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1327 a 16 = πολλάκις (πολλάκις ΠΒ) after δὲ ἀλλοις ΠΒ Bk. = 21 ἂν (in ΠΒ a correction by a later hand) after δόξειν ΠΒ Bk.

15 ἐστὶ δὲ... 17 βλάβαις] The sense, which Göttling and Ridgeway have mistaken, is: "And even as to studies not in themselves illiberal, while (μὲν) there are some which it is liberal to pursue [ὡν ἐντυμώτερα ἐργα ἅ 1253 b 28] within certain limits, too close application to them with the aim of scientific mastery is subject to the drawbacks above mentioned." Aristotile is thinking more particularly of Gymnastics and Music, but also of Drawing and Painting. See c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), c. 5 § 8, n. (1029), c. 6 §§ 3—8, §§ 15, 16, nn. (1065, 1080). But on the other hand consult Exc. 1. p. 619. Susem. (982) Of the two clauses introduced by μὲν and δὲ Bonitz' dictum holds: "prius sc. memoria, grammaticae coordinatum, re vera subiectum est alteri membro.

16 προσέδειν] to work closely at: II. 5, 6, 1263 a 29; infra c. 4 § 4, 1338 b 25. Comp. ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι l. 11. 5, 1258 b 34. = § 6 17 ἥξει δὲ πολλὴν διαφοράν = πολὺ διαφέρει, it makes a great difference; cp. II. 8, 25. Otherwise c. 6 § 1 below, 19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν κτλ.] Cf. III. 4, 13, n. (488), IV(VII) 74.7 nn. (900, 901). Susem. (983)

20 ὅ δὲ...πράττειν] Comp. n. (103) and Metaph. XII (A), 10. 3, 1075 a 19 II. (Eaton). Susem. (984)

πολλάκις] This word goes with ἂν δόξειε while δὲ ἀλλους (= in obedience to others) goes with πράττων as contrasted with αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φιλῶν, and accordingly ΠΒ have transposed it. But the hyperbaton is not stranger than in many other passages. Cp. 1255 b 3.

21 θητικοῖς] Cp. 1341 b 14. The strict conjunction between βάναισος and δοῦλος is laid down l. 13, 13, n. (122). The day labourer, θη, was mentioned III. 5, 4, 1278 a 13, 18, 22: see nn. (505, 486). The word is used in De Rep. Ath. of the lowest property classes, as reconstituted by Solon: τοῦ δὲ ἀλλοις θητικοῖς, οὐδὲμας μετέχοντας ἀρχής. διό καὶ καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὰν ἑρμηνεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα καθοριστάν ἀρχήν, πάσω τελός τελεῖ, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐκτὸς θητικῶν: c. 7, s. f.: a very close parallel to II. 12, 6, 1274 a 21.

21 ἰττικοῖς] Of the ordinary subjects of instruction Grammar (Letters), Gymnastic, Drawing have a practical value: § 1. A consideration of Music leads us to determine the higher end of all Education, which is the right employment of leisure: §§ 2—7, as Homer attests: §§ 8, 9. Recapitulation: §§ 10, 11.

3. 

ai mēn oūn kataβeβλημέναι vūn mabhēsēis, katάpete eirh-(II) 
tai prōteoros, ἐπαμβοτερίζουσιν ἐστι δὲ tētārpa schędōn ā pai-3 
droyein eivōthasī, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικήν καὶ μουσικήν καὶ 
25 tētartōn énnoi graφikēn, tīn mēn graφmatikēn kai graφikēn 
ōs χρησίμουs prōs tōn bión ou̇sas kai poluXrōstous, tīn δὲ 
gυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσαν prōs àνδριāν tīn δὲ μουσικήν. 
§ 2 ἡνί diaporphēseis av tis. vūn mēn γār ὡς ἡδονής χάριν οἱ 
πλειστοὶ metéxousai autής; οἱ δ' ēx āρχῆς ἑταῖν ὑν pai-
30 deía diei το τῆ ὕψους αὐτήν ἥπτειν, ὀπέρ πολλάκις ειρη-
tai, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάξεων δύ-
vasthai kalos. autή γὰρ ἄρχῃ πάντων, ἵναι καὶ πάλιν 
§ 3 εἰσπομεν περί αὕτης. εἰ δ' ἀμφω μὲν dei, μᾶλλον δ' 
αιρετον τὸ σχολάξει tīs ἀσχολίας kai tēlos, ζητητέου (p. 13)

22 εἰρηταὶ ἐλέξη Π2 P5 Bk. || 25 τὶν μὲν...γραφικὴν omitted by Π1 (supplied 
by p1 in the margin) || 27 τὴν δὲ μουσικήν] περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς P5 
and perhaps Π1 (i.e. musica autem dubitabit utique alius οἰκις William) || 28 ήὴ omitted by Π5, untranslated 
by William and Ar., Ηη Susen.1, ei dei Koraces, needlessly || 33 δ' Susen., 
γάρ Π2 Π2 Ar. Bk., Susen,1 in the text || 34 τῆς...35 σχολάξεως omitted by Π2 
(supplied in the margin of Π4), τῆς ἀσχολίας over an erasure P5, καὶ...σχολάξεως omitted by 
Ar. || [τῆς] Susen,1, perhaps rightly, τελευταῖον P5, ὀλος Vettori Bk.

§ 1 22 καταβεβλημέναι] Here and 
1338 α 36 used for ordinary, current i.q. 
tά ἐγκύλα, or ἐγκύλος παιδεία. Ap-
parently from καταβάλλεσθαι = 'lay down 
a foundation' mid. So Pl. Laws 803 Α. 
Late writers use the passive in the sense of 
'to be published,' committed to writing, 
so already N.E. 1. 5. 8, 1096 a 10 : cp. 
Antigonus Caryst. De Mirabilibus c. 60 
ἐξεβούλκονται περὶ αὐτῶν καταβέλλεται 
μβλα.

23 πρότερον] In c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 39— b 2, Susen. (985)

ἐστι δὲ...25 graφικὴν] Comp. Plin. 
N. H. xxv. 10. 77 (Vettori): huîus 
(Pamphili) auctoritate effectum est Sicelone 
primum, unde et in tota Graecia, ut 
pueri ingeniō antea amant graecophi, hoc 
est picturam in luxo, docentur, recipi-
returque ars ea in primum gradum liberali-
rium: Plato Protag. 325 D, Crit. 50 D, 
Ref. 11. 376 E, Laws VII. 795 D, Xen. De 
Lac. Refp. 2, 1, Pseudo-Plat. Theages 122 E 
(Eaton). Susen. (1986) Under graφi-
ματα came reading, writing, counting (λο-
γιστική), and the elements of arithmetic. 
Most of the authorities given above recog-
nize the threefold division e.g. Pl. 
Prot. 1. c. (1) γραμματόν τα καὶ (2) κιβαρίσως, 
both in the διδακσάλεων (i.b. εἰς διδακσά-
λων πέμποντες) and (3) physical training 
(eis παιδοτρίβου πέμποντος) at first in the 
paideia. So Theages Ic. oûn (1) γράμ-
ματα τα καὶ (2) κιβαρίσεως καὶ (3) παλαιῶν 
avtai καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἄγωνιαν.

§ 2 30 ζητεῖν] Nature, personified, 
is said to aim at a right use of leisure, as 
she is said to define, to make a division, 
to place at man's disposal: 1. 8. 5, 1256 a 
26 f., IV(vii). 14. 5, 1332 b 35 f., I. 10. 1, 
1258 a 23, 

πολλάκις] E.g. ii. 9. 34, IV(vii). c. 14 
§ 9, c. 15 § 6. Susen. (987)

32 αὕτη] "This is the principle which 
determines all." The pronoun is attracted 
into the gender of the predicate. See 
IV(vii). 1. 8, 1323 b 15, n., Vahlen Anys. 
Π. 4. 34. Another instance IV(vii). 7. 5, 
1327 b 41.

πάλιν] That is, after 1333 b 1.

§ 3 33 δὲ Qu. crit. coll. p. 418. Hoc 
lco γάρ (Π2 Ar. Bk.) plane absurdum 
est. Immo si Aristoteles omnino voluisti 
set haec cum antecedentibus nexu causae 
et consecutiones coniungere, certe multo 
magis illa causa sunt, haec consecutivo. 
Ut in hoc potissimum libro saepius pecu-
tum est γάρ et δὲ confectionibus propter 
compendiorum similitudinem inter se per-
mutatis, ita hoc loco δὲ restituentum est. 
Susen.
35 ό τι δεί ποιούντας σχολάζειν. ού γάρ δή παίζοντας: τέλος (II) § 4 γάρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βλοῦ τὴν παιδιὰν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις χρηστέον τὰς παιδιὰς (ό γάρ ποιῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ή δὲ παι- διὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστίν· το δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει 40 μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δεί παιδιῶς εἰσὶςχειν 5 αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν ἴδιον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ξῦν
§ 5 μακαρίως. τοῦτο γάρ οὐ τοὺς ἀσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοὺς σχολάζοντιν ό μὲν γάρ ἀσχολεῖν ἕνεκά τινος ἀσχολεῖ 5 τέλος ὡς οὐ υπάρχοντος, ή δ' εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστίν, ἤν οὕτω λύπης ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἴδιονς οὐκοῦτ πάντες εἶναι.

33—36] With the punctuation now adopted (comma after τέλος): "If both are necessary but leisure more desirable and more truly the end than occupation, we must next inquire what should employ our leisure. Certainly not amusement, or else amusement would be made the end of life." With ἀναγκαῖον there is the less need to express ἂν.


§ 4 41 φαρμακείας χάριν] Cr. N. E. VII. 14 § 4, 1154 a 26 ff., διὰ τὰς ὑπομβάλλας τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔθεν ἀπαίαλες, τὴν ἴδιον διώκουσιν: §§ 6, 7, b 9 ff. εἶθεναν δὲ ἴδιον λύπην...κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἤδε τὰ ἀπαθῶντα (Eaton). See below c. 5 § 10, n. (1031). SUSEM. (899)

42 ἄνευς γάρ...τῆς ψυχῆς] This is seen most plainly in the case of sleep, which is sweet because it affords pleasure of this kind: c. 5 § 3 (cp. n. 1021). Further comp. N. Eth. VII. 7; 7, 1150 b 17 f. ἢ γάρ παιδί ἄνευς ἐστιν εἰπὲν ἀνά- παυσις: 'amusement is recreation, and consequently of the nature of relaxation.' SUSEM. (990)

138 a 2 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν] Here καὶ is explicative; translate, 'and indeed,' 'and what is more.' For the pleasure here mentioned is not something apart from Happiness (i.e. Wellbeing), but is contained in it. It is incredible that Döring op. c. p. 155 (cp. p. 109 f.) should have been satisfied with the absurdity "happiness," or as he says, the life of happiness (which is much the same), "consists of happiness accompanied by pleasure." To complete the logical absurdity he should have added "together with the sense of existence." SUSEM. (991)

§ 5 3 The violent hiatus—ὑπάρξη ἀλλὰ—can be removed by emendation, or we may relegate the whole clause τῶν... σχολάζοντων to the margin.

6 μεθ' ἴδιον] Pleasurable. The use of μεθ' and a genitve as an equivalent for an adverb or adjective is noticed in the lexicons s.v. Ast. n. 112 a 310 f., Bonitz Ind. Ar. 458 a 2 ff. Döring's difficulty (see n. 991) partly arises from overlooking the fact that Happiness is a misleading term for εὐδαιμονία. The English reader need not be reminded that Welfare, Wellbeing (of which 'well-doing' is the primary


constituent), or even Real Interest, would often better express man’s ultimate good, because these terms do not necessarily imply "a whole of which the elements are
pleasurable feelings": Prof. H. Sidgwick
Methods of Ethics p. 76 n. 1, History of
Ethics p. 48 n. 1, p. 56 n. 2.

7 ταύτην μέντοι... 9 καλλιτεχνών
Comp. Nic. Eth. 1. 8. 10 ff., 1099 a 7 ff.
(Congreve). I cannot understand how
Döring p. 109 f. is able to prove from
these words, that the pleasure which be-
longs as a necessary condition to the life of
happiness is not the pleasure which arises
from virtuous action and theoretical know-
ledge, but something which taken by itself
is an integral factor of happiness. (To
this view Döring’s reviewer Walter, Jen.
Litt. 1877 p. 29, rightly took exception.)
From what other source can it arise?
Every pleasure, as Aristotle rightly main-
tains (see Zeller op. c. 11 ii p. 617 ff.),
can only be conceived as a consequence of
some bodily or mental activity—even the
pleasures of taste or the agreeable sensation
of falling asleep: for eating and drinking
are bodily activities, and the very act of
falling asleep (inasmuch as the cessation
of a movement is itself a movement) is
also an activity. Döring is no less mis-
taken when he goes on to state that the
pleasure which is introduced as an
integral factor into the end of life itself con-
tributes to the highest intellectual enjoy-
ment (διαγωγῆ), whereas the latter is
really due to the cognitive faculties and the
pleasure inseparably associated with
their strenuous exercise. The thought of
Aristotle is a very simple one: that those
activities alone can belong to happiness,
which naturally produce the purest possi-
ble joy with the smallest admixture of
pain. Comp. further c. 5 § 10, n. (1032).

SUSEM. (992)

§ 6 10 Dr Jackson writes: "in the
face of την ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆς § 8, a
21, I cannot reconcile myself to this
phrase. Is it possible that σχολή is the
interpolation of a scribe, who, finding πρὸς
τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ, did not see that with
these words ἠθυπη θείας should be understood
from the preceding sentence?" Dr Post-
gate Notes p. 15 defended both phrases,
explaining this as 'our training must in-
clude certain studies available for leisure
to be spent in rational amusement,' and
a 21 as 'rational amusement to be pur-
sued in leisure time.'

§ 7 14 εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν] Ranked
under, with: so 1339 b 14 and θετῶν εἰς,
1339 b 12. But § 8, 1338 a 23, ἐν ταύτῃ
τάττονοι.

17 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφική] "While
drawing too has its use in making us
better judges of works of art," so that we
are less liable to be taken in when pur-
chasing such works, c. 3 § 12, 1338 b 1.

SUSEM. (994)
χυτῶν ἔργα κάλλιον, οὖν αὐτό καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς [II] τετείγει καὶ ἀλκήν (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὁρώμεν διαγωγὴ).

§ 8 τῆς μουσικῆς: λειταριεῖ τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται παράγοντες αὐτήν. ἣν γὰρ οὕτως ἐνσωματώσει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν. διόπερ "Ομήρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν (p. 133)

25 ἀλλ' οἶνον μὲν ἑστὶ καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα βαλείν,
§ 9 καὶ οὕτω προειπὼν ἐτέρους πινάς, οἱ καλέσαντι

27 φησίν,

ὁ κεν τέρπησαν ἀπαντασ.

28 καὶ ἐν ἄλλως δέ φησιν Ὀδυσσεύς ταύτῃ ἀρίστῃν εἶναι διαγωγήν, ὅταν εὐθραυσμένοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων

30 διατυπώνες δ' ἀνα δόματα ἀκούσαντει ἀλλοιον ἰχθέως.

§ 10 ὅτι μὲν τοινυν ἑστι παιδεία τις ἢν οὖν ὁς χρησίμην παιδεύων

32 τέον τοὺς νείδειν οὖν ὁς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὁς ἐλευθέρων καὶ καλήν, 

φανερὸν ἑστὶν πότερον δὲ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἢ πλέον, καὶ τίνες αὖ-

25 οἶνον Schneider || μὲν is corrupt, μὲν ? Schneider, μὲν γ?' ? Götting, μὲν τ' ? Spengel, γε μὲν Welldon, μὲν ὁδόκε ? Schmidt || καλεῖν (καλείσαθαι ?) after εἰπ' δαίτα [II] || θαλίν 1st, θαλείν Μ', corrigendum William || 26 οὖς καλοῦσιν or σι καλοῦνται Spengel, rightly || 27 φησίν] φήσιν Π. || 5] ἰδιοί Π', δι 1st || 31 χρήσεως 1st || 32 ἀναγκαίαν 1st, ἀναγκαίον Π' Bk. || 33 μιᾶν Π' || τῶν ἀριθμῶν Π' 1st Bk., avoiding hiatus, may be more right

§ 8 21 λειταριεῖ τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν] See n. (921). Aristotle seems mistaken in asserting that the only remaining end, which music can subserve, is to educate men for rational enjoyment in leisure. There is still the end of moral training, and below c. 5 §§ 1—8 he goes so far as to demonstrate that this is the only object to be considered in the education of the young. He has then expressed himself hastily and inaccurately. Comp. nn. (1000, 1024). SUSEM. (993)

23 διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἑλευθέρων] Intellectual enjoyment worthy of free men. So a 28, ἀριστήν φασά, the noblest enjoyment. References to both passages will be found in n. (921) on IV(VII). 15. 2, 1334 a 17. SUSEM. (995)

25 Though not found in our texts, nor cited in Plato Rep. 389 b, in Aristotle’s Odyssey this line must have followed XVII. 383 (Spengel). SUSEM. (996)

§ 9 27 φησίν] This is Od. XVII. 385.

Our present texts give άείδουν instead of ἀπαντασ. SUSEM. (997)

We may conjecturally restore Aristotle’s text as follows:

τὰς γὰρ ἐρείδας καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτῶς ἐπελεύθημα |
383 ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημοσκηφὸς ἔσται; |
<ἀλλ' οἶνον μὲν τ' ἑστὶ καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα βαλείν> |
384 μάλιν ἣν ἢ Ἰππήρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δολάρων |

ἡ καὶ θεότον ἀλλότων, ὃ κεν τέρπησαν ἀπαντασ.

The discrepancies in the Homeric citations (indicated by Bonitz Ind. Arv. s.v.) are numerous enough to exclude the hypothesis that skips of memory would sufficiently account for all of them. See Wachsman De Arist. Studii Homerici p. 12 ff.

28 Ὀδυσσεύς] Odys., ix. 7 f. With all this comp. n. (1021). SUSEM. (998)

II. 37
§ 11 ταί καὶ πόσ. ὑστερον λεκτόν περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν (31)
35 εἶναι πρὸ ὀδὸν ἡγογεν. ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄρχαιων ἐξομέν ὑπαρχουσι τοῖς καταβεβλημένοις παιδευμάτων ἡ γὰρ μονικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δήλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι 2
δεὶ τῶν παιδεύεσθαι τούς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρησίμων, 39 ὅσον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολ.
§ 12 λάς δὲ αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεσθαι γίνεσθαι μαθήσεις ἐτέρας, ὁμώς 41 δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἱδιοῖς ὑνίους μὴ δια-
μαρτάνωσιν ἀλλὰ ὅσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν ὁμήν τε καὶ πράσιν, ἣ μᾶλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικοὶ τοῦ
περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ξητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρη-
σίμων ἥκιστα ἀρμόζει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἑλευθέροις.

36 * * ἐκ Conring, rightly, if, as Reiz and Schneider thought, the passage needs any alteration: but this is extremely doubtful. ὅτι τὸ καλὸν ὑπὸ ἑξεργαν. ἐκ Ὀσμ. 37 τῶν χρησίμων after ὅτι δεὶ Γ (if William has translated accurately μυοδ ὑποτατατίλλισιν) 15 40 δὲ αὐτῶν after γίνεσθαι (γίνεσθαι Βκ. 3) Π 2 Π 3 Βκ. (in Π 1 ἐνδεχεσθαν is omitted) 42 ἄλλα ἢ Reiz, ὅ[σιν...β 1 ή] Koraes -
1338 b 1 ἢ transposed by Postgate to follow μᾶλλον ἢ άλλα Λρ. 3 Reiz, Thurot ἢ πράσιν, ἣ μᾶλλον...2 κάλλους; Jackson formerly ἢ θεωρητικὸν (θεωρη
cικῶν S 4) Π 5, θεωρητικοὶ Π 3, 3 ἄρμοσσει Π 2 Π 3 Βκ. ἢ ἑλευθέροις? Οσμ. 1000

§ 10 34 ὑστερον] Another of the unfulfilled promises. See Intro. p. 49 n. (4). Οσμ. (999)
§ 11 νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον...37 δήλον] The sequence of thought here is liable to be misunderstood. In §§ 2—9 Aristotle has proved, or tried to prove, that the ancients had regarded poetry and music as being preeminently a means to intellectual training, which in his eyes is more important than moral training, and to the highest intellectual enjoyment associated with it. It is true the evidence he has produced suffices for no more than the inference that the ancients considered music and poetry in the light of higher rational amusements for men of riper age, but not that they adopted music in the education of the young with the view of training them for this rational enjoyment in the future: cp. οὐκ. (993, 1024). He does not, in §§ 2—9, touch upon the question, see οὐκ. (993), whether this art may not be utilized for the development of character: this he discusses later on, c. 5 § 1, where he expressly states that he will resume the inquiry of c. 2 § 3—c. 3 § 11, which had been left incomplete: see οὐκ. (1017, 1018). Hence he is here contrasting the intellectual and theoretical aim of education not with its moral aim, the development of character, but only with the third and lowest aim, a knowledge of what is absolutely necessary and practically useful. All three aspects are more intimately concerned with the mental side of education. The third is disposed of in §§ 11, 12; in § 13 Aristotle reverts to the difference between intellectual and moral training, without however pursuing the inquiry more precisely into particulars, his attention being at present especially directed to the proper development of the body. Οσμ. (1000)
35 εἶναι] Lobeck in his ed. of Phyr
idichus p. 275 treats this as a case of the absolute inf. See οὐκ. on 1330 a 37.
§ 12 42 πρὸς] This preposition as in 1261 a 13, 1262 b 3, 1284 a 1, 1336 b 31, 1338 b 2.
1338 b 2 περὶ τὰ σώματα] The prepositional phrase an equivalent for the adjective ‘corporeal,’ So Plat. Timaeus 35 A, Phaedr. 246 b. See Ast Λεκ. s. v. of whose exx. Soph. 251 c πενίς τίς περὶ φρονήσεως κτήσεως = ‘poverty in mental endowmement’ is perhaps the best.
τὸ δὲ ἐξεργαν κτλ] See ΗΗΙ. 8. 1, 1279 b 13 f., Eucken Methode p. 35.
3 τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις] Editors comp. Ν. Ε. ΙV. 3. 33, 1125 a 11 f. Οσμ. (1001)
§ 13 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερῶν πρότερον τοῖς ἐδείχνεν παιδευτέον ἦ τῷ (II) 5 λόγῳ εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἦ τὴν διάνοιαν, δήλον ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τούς παιδίας γυμναστικῆς καὶ παιδοτριβικῆ τούτων γὰρ ἢ μὲν ποιῶν τινα ποιεῖ τὴν ἐξίν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ δὲ τὰ ἐργά.

4 νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμε- 10 λείσθαι τῶν παιδίων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικῆς ἐξίν ἐμποιοῦσι, λοιπο- πρότερον Π1 (corr. 1), πρότερον Ar. with all the other authorities || παιδευτέον after 5 λόγῳ Π2 Bk., avoiding hiatus || 5 εἶναι omitted by Π1 || 6 <πρότερον> παραδοτέον ? Susem.


7 τούτων γὰρ κτλ. From what follows, as well as from c. 3 § 1, compared with IV(vii). c. 14 § 9 ff., c. 15 § 8 ff., it is plain that instruction in gymnastics does not conduce merely to physical development, but also to the moral education of the mind in courage. For the difference between παιδοτριβική and γυμναστική see also Galen De 1. 11, 9. T. vi. 143 Kühn, where the relation between teacher (παιδοτριβής) and student (διδάσκαλος) is compared to that between a cook and a physician. See VI(iv). 1. 2 n. (1115), and for this passage generally c. 4 § 7 ff. n. (1015), i.e. Exc. I. p. 619. Susem. (1003).

ποιῶν τινα ποιεῖ] The phrase recurs c. 5 § 3, 1339 a 13 ff., § 24, 1340 b 11, c. 6 § 16, 1341 a 16. Like παιδευτέον (see n. 1. 8, 7, 1250 a 37) the precise import of ποιῶν τινα "of a definite character" is determined by the context: in 1339 a 24 ἐνυπάρχουν χαρέων ὁδών (cp. 1339 b 24); in 1341 b 18 βάριον ἀναλύει simply; while in 1340 b 11 it is as vague as ὄργανικα καὶ παιδικᾶκα 1340 b 3. In our present passage it is substantially βελτίων ποιεῖ, πρὸς ἀρέτην (τὸ ἕδω) συντείχειν; in short, παιδευτέον, "develope," "influence." A correlative phrase, παῖδι τίνα γνώμηθα, occurs c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 7 ff., where see note. Comp. N. E. i. 9. 8, 1099 b 31, Rhet. 1. 1. 9, 1354 b 20.

c. 4 Athletic training. Two errors to avoid: we do not desire to make professional athletes, or to realize the Spartan type: §§ 1—7. Bodily exercises to be relaxed in favour of other studies for three years after puberty; §§ 7—9.

The censure of an athletic training was passed IV(vii). c. 16 §§ 12, 13, 1335 b 2—12. The criticism of the exercises of the Spartans widens into a condemnation of their political system in general on the lines of B. ii. c. 9, IV(vii). c. 14 §§ 15—22, c. 15 § 6.

10 ἀι μὲν ἐμποιοῦσι] Some endeavour to make their sons professional athletes. Aristotle evidently considers that such a career is βάριον: cp. § 6, b 33, n. (1012), § 9, n. (1015), i.e. Exc. I., and IV(vii). 16. 12, 1335 b 5 ff., n. (944). Susem. (1004).

In his condemnation of the mania for sports, Aristotle had predecessors in Xenophanes Frag. 2, Euripides Aul. Fr. 1, as well as Plato Rep. III. 404 A, 407 b, 410 b—D, VII. 535 D, IX. 591 C. The judgment of poets and philosophers was confirmed by practical soldiers like Epaminondas and Alexander, and later Philopoemen (Plut. Vita Phil. c. 3, p. 357 c), by medical authorities like Galen (Προτερ. Λόγος cc. 9—14, 1. p. 20 ff. K.; cp. Plut. De sanitate tvnda c. 16, p. 130 A ff.), and by the Romans. On the degradation of the athletic sports, see P. Gardner New Chapters pp. 300—303, Mommsen The Provinces i. p. 269, 287—289 Eng. tr. The chief causes for the prominence of the professional element were (1) the increasing popularity of the heavier sports, and the boxing and the pankration; (2) the change of diet, see n. (1015); (3) the progress made in the science and art of training. "But it was Herodicus of Selymbria who ruined athletics, by introducing elaborate rules for eating and drinking and exercise. He first discovered that the human body can by scientific tending be made, not healthy and beautiful, but muscular and adapted to this or that special service: he improved the speed of the races and the skill of the wrestlings, but spoiled athletics as a means of education for life and happiness" (Gardner). The evil increased until in Roman times no-pro-
viii. 12 δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν ὦν ἡμαρτον τήν ἁμαρτίαν, θηριόδεις δ' ἀπεργάζοντα τοις πόνοις, ὥς τούτο πρὸς ἀνδριάν
§ 2 μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἰρήτσι πολλάκις, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν
§ 15 πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέπουσα ποιητέων τήν ἐπιμέλειαν εἰ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τούτο ἐξευρί-
§ 3 μάλλον τοῖς ἢμεροτέροις καὶ λεωτώδεσιν ἠθεσίν. πολλά
§ 20 δ' ἐστι τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀ πρὸς τὸ κτείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρω-
ποφαγίαν εὔχερως ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τῶν Πόντων Ἀχαιοῦ τε καὶ Ἡπιόχοι καὶ τῶν ἢπειροτικοῖν ἐθνῶν ἐτερα, τὰ μὲν ὦμοιος τούτοις τὰ δὲ μάλλον, ἀ λητρικὰ μὲν ἠθεσίν, οὐ τοὺς ἄνδριάς δὲ
§ 4 ἀνθρωπος ἐκ μετειληφασίαν. ἔτι δ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς Λύκωνας

15 μίαν <ἀρέτην> Susem. (after Alb. and Ar.), μίαν <ἐξ> Ridgeway. It is better to understand ταύτην || 20 δ' τ' or γὰρ Susem., qui Ar. || 23 ληστρικὰ M. 1 L. Ald., ληστρικὰ Bk, with all the other authorities || 24 τοῖς omitted by 1 L. Ald.

vience of the empire possessed so many professional athletes, and none supplied so few soldiers.

12 The statement that the Spartans were prohibited from boxing and the panatarion is found in Plutarch V. Ly-
curg. 19. Apollod. Lyceus. 4. 189 e, Seneca De Benef. V. 3. 1, Philostr. De Gymnast. 9. 58. It is not certain that it applies to classical times. Xenophon says καὶ γὰρ πυκνοίς διὰ τὴν ἐραν ὡς ἐν συμβάσειν, Rep. Iac. 4 § 6. Epmami-
nondas saw the difference between the correlative athletic habit and that of a spare, wiry soldier: Plut. Apollod. Ep. 3. 192 c.


15 With μίαν understand ταύτην: 'neither to this alone, nor to this principally' (Ridgeway). An omission of ἄρετάς to be found I. 13. 9. 1260 b 24.

19 λεωτώδεσιν] The character of the lion is given Hist. Animal. IX. 44. 2—6: 629 b 8 ff. ἐν τῇ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπώτατος ἐστὶ, μὴ πεινῶν δὲ καὶ βεβρικῶν προάτα-

τως, ἐσπὶ δὲ τὸ ἄδος ὦν ἐπίττης οὖνδεκα νοῦν ὀνδεὶς ὄδης ἵππωμενος οὖνδε, πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ σύντροφοι καὶ συνήθειας σφαίρας φιλοτιμούσι καὶ στερ-

κεσίς. ἐν δὲ ταῖς θηρισὶ ὀργίμοις μὲν οὔδεποτε φεύγει οὐδὲ πτησθεὶ, ἀλλ' ἐν

καὶ διὰ πλῆθος ἀναγκασθῇ τῶν θρησκῶν ἐπαγαγεῖν βάθος ὑποχρείᾳ καὶ κατὰ σκέ-

λα, κατὰ βραχὺ ἐπιστρεφομένοις. Plato, whom Aristotle here follows in the treat-

ment and criticism of γυμναστική (see Rep. III. 404—412), gives the dog as an example of the 'spirited' temperament in Rep. II. 375 c ff.; comp. also III. 410 ε, to which Aristotle alludes in IV (VII). 7.

§ 3 21 εὐχερώς ἔχει, "are indifferent to (think little of) bloodshed and cannibal-

 miscarisms." These wild races lead the 'nat-

ural' ληστρικὸς βιος of I. 8. 7 f., 1256 b 1 (Newman).

καθάπερ τῶν... 24 μετειληφασίν] Comp. Nic. Eth. vili. 5. 2, 1148 b 21 ff (legate δὲ τὰς θηριωδίς) ... διὸι χαιρεῖσι φαίνει εἰνώς ἑω-

χιαν: Herod. IV. 18. 106, Ἀρδροφάγοι δὲ ἀγροτάτα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι ἤθε, οὔτε ἄκρον νομίζοντες οὔτε νόμοι ὀφεῖλει χρε-

όμενα, κούδας δὲ εἰσι: Seylac Prinzip. 75 f. p. 60 (Müller). Nevertheless the Greeks took these tribes to be of kindred origin with themselves: Strabo IX. 416 a (colo-

nists of the Orchenians, who had wandered thither with Ilmamenus after the capture of Troy), xi. 495 f. φασὶ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἱλάνος στρατιάς τοὺς μὲν Πελατῖας Ἀχαίοις τὴν ἐνδεδμη Ἀχαίαν αἰκίσαν (Eaton).

With courage, as with every other virtue
25 ἵσμεν, ἐνος μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπερ-(III) ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνοίς ἀγώσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειτουμένους ἑτέρων. οὐ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς νέους 28 γυμναίεις τῶν τρόπων τούτων διεσφερον, ἀλὰ τὸ μόνον πρὸς μὴ ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν. 36 <δὲ> δὴ ὡκύ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων 37 ἐργόν <κρίνειν ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν ὑπ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς 38 παιδείας νῦν § 5 <ἕξουι, προτέρου δ' οὐκ εἴχον.> 29 ὡστε τὸ καλὸν ἄλλο ὑπὸ τὸ θηρίου, 30 οὐδέ δὲ προταγωνιστεῖν: οὔτε γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων ἀγωνίσατο ἄν οὐδένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μάλλον § 6 ἀνήρ ἀγάθος, οὐ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνένετε τοὺς παῖδας.

(see Nic. Eth. IV. 2, 7, 1122 b 6, and often), the motive must be purely the noble, the beautiful, the good: the virtue must be exercised τῶν καλῶν ἔνεκα, cf. § 5, n. (1009). See N. E. III. c. 11 § 6, 1115 b 19 ff., § 13, 1116 a 10 ff., c. 8 §§ 1—17 (Congreve). SUSEM. (1007)


25 αὐτοὶ] By themselves, alone: αὐτός = μόνος. Very near to this is the sense αὐτή (but is it right?) would bear, n. 9, 19, 1270 b 8 “iam per se” and l. 1. 2, 1252 a 14, 1. 6. 4, 1255 a 18. SUSEM. Add 1335 a 39.


§ 5 29 ὁ καλὸν] With this and b 30 καλὸν κίνδυνον, cp. n. (1007). SUSEM. (1009)

30 οὖδὲ γὰρ λύκος κτλ.] Comp. Nic. Eth. III. 8. 11, 1116 b 30 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (1010)

τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων] With this genitive should be compared 1. 13 § 2, 1250 a 25, § 13, 1260 b 2, III. 5 § 7, 1278 a 27, 13 § 21, 1284 b 11 (if III gives the true reading); 'genetivus partitivus non addito e quo pendet vel ēkastos vel pronomine indefinito.' SUSEM.

§ 6 32 οἱ δὲ λίαν κτλ.] In Sparta, reading and writing were not included among the subjects taught by the state. But this did not prevent individuals from learning them on their own account, if it seemed expedient to do so (Plut. Lyce. 16), and it is therefore a rhetorical exaggeration for Isocrates to make the sweeping assertion (Panath. § 209) that in the most ordinary education they were so backward as not even to know their letters (Schönemann Eng. tr. p. 259). Yet the author of the Hippias Major (258 c) says very few Spartans understood figures (Eaton). Plato Resp. VIII. 548 b 5 concisely proves that they attached far greater importance to gymnastics than to music. Chamaeleon in Athen. IV. 184 b 1 asserts that all the Lacedaemonians learnt flute-playing, but this cannot be accepted in the face of Aristotle's statement, c. 5 § 7 n. (1026), that they were not taught music. This disposes of Schónemann's assertion to the contrary. And yet strictly speaking this would include singing as well; but the expression should probably
not be pressed. Singing, no doubt, formed part of the prescribed course of study. Many too must of their own accord have learned to play the lyre and flute, or else it would be difficult to explain how the choreus of whom Aristotle tells a story, c. 6 § 12, n. (1026), could have attained such mastery of the flute. From Aristotle's language c. 5 § 7, it may be inferred that the Spartans who simply listened to others, as well as those who could themselves play, held music to be a means of moral training, and not simply a source of pleasure and amusement.

SUSEM. (1011)
33. The form ἀπαίδαγγητος appears AV. E. IV. 1. 36, 1121 b 11.

βανάισους] Comp. plur. (103, 1004). SUSEM. (1012)
35 χείρον ἐτέρων] Comp. again the passages quoted in n. (1005). SUSEM. (1013)
§ 7 40 μέχρι μὲν ἡμέραν] Comp. Plato Latus VIII. 833 c : τριτά ἤ μᾶλλον ἐν τοις παίδευσιν ἐν τοῖς πάθοις, ἐν ἐν

1339 a 1 δύνανται II. A. 4b. Δ. W. 1b, δύναται P2-3-4-5 Sb T9 Bk. 1b. 2 ὀλυμπιονικά P2 and P3 (later hand) || ἄν] ωφή III (corrected by p1) || 3 ἀσκοῦνται] ἀποκτάς Γ || 5 γίνονται II. 6 ἀναγκοφαγίαις] ξηροφαγίαις Γ, from a gloss which is retained as such in the margin of P2 from corr. 3.

The order is artistic; four short syllables.

§ 9 1339 a 2 δύο τις ἢ τρεῖς εὐρών] The order of the “lighter” or “violent” (βίας) contests: ἄτι τοιοῦ ἄγνωστος ἐξυπάρξεσα τὰ μὲν κοῦπα ταῦτα στάδιον, δόλεος, ὑπαίμα, δαίμων, ἀλλὰ τὰ βαρύτερα δε, παγκράτιον, πάλη, τύχη, πέναλος δὲ ἄφρον ἄνδρος ὑπερσωμόσων Ἰθιούρ. De Gymnastic. 3. These terms are also applied to the athletes, ‘heavy-weights,’ ‘light-weights,’ Galen vi. 487 K.
N. H. xxxii. 7 (63). 121 and Diog. Laerct. viii. 13 a trainer named Pythagoras, ἀλέττων τῶν, not the philosopher). Cp. Favorinus in Diog. Laerct. viii. 12, ἰχαζὲ ἔξοικα καὶ τυφών ύγροι καὶ πυρὸς σωμασκοῦστων. Plato Rep. III. 404 A says that their mode of life made them sleepy, and that any departure, however slight, from the prescribed regimen made them liable to long and serious illness. Aristotle himself states De Gen. Animal. iv. 3. 42, 768 b 29 ff., that a disproportionate and abnormal growth of certain parts of their bodies resulted from the large quantities of food which they consumed (Eaton). In Problems xxxvii. 5, 967 a 11 ff., viii. 4, 887 b 22 ff., they are described as pale and chilly (ἀχρωμός, δόξαργος): and Probl. 1. 28, 862 b 21 ff. it is said that athletes and all other very healthy people seldom get ill, but when once they fall ill are very likely to succumb (Bonitz). With this passage generally comp. c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), iv(vii). c. 16 §§ 12, 13 n. (944) and Exc. 1. p. 619. SUSEM. (1015)

7 ἄμα γὰρ...10 σῶμα] Plato practically lays down the same principle: Rep. vii. 537 β. εὖ πάσα δι τούτων τοῖς τε πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις δι' αὐτόν ἐνερχασθέντως ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑάντως εἰς ἄριθμον τῶν ἐγκρίσεων...ἀναγκαίαν γενναίοις μεθ' εἰς τῶν ἐναγκαίων γενναίοις μεθενταί. εὐωνυ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος, εἰς τὸ δέ ἐνει τὰ πρὸς ἠγγείας, ἀδόκιμος τί ἄλλο πράξατο. κόσμο γὰρ καὶ ὑπὸν μαθήμασι λόγομοι. He differs slightly in his mode of carrying it out; see iv(vii). 17. 15, n. (990) and Exc. 1. SUSEM. (1016)

c. 5—7 discuss the place of Music in education. See Anal. p. 119.


§ 1 11 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 3 §§ 1—11. SUSEM. (1017)

12 καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας κτλ] The discussion breaks off, c. 3 § 11, 1338 a 34 ff., with the sentence beginning νῦν ἐλεύθερον στοιχεῖον ἐνυπάρχοντας ἀπὸ κτλ. See n. (1000). SUSEM. (1018)

13 νῦν] The variant in M4 is valuable for the treatment of elision and crisis in the manuscripts.

14 ἀναφοράμενος] For the absolute use Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. quotes 1. 13, 16, 1260 b 23, vi(iv). 1.5, 1288 b 35. With ὄντως 1289 b 5; with the direct object (τῷ αὐτῷ δόξαν), iv(vii). 14, 16, 1333 b 12. In 11. 12, 1, 1273 b 27, there is a variant.

§ 2 15 διελέειν] As in in III. 13, 6, 1283 b 11, "decide," "Ex distancingi significazione abit in notionem disputandi, explorandi, explicandi: Bonitz s. v. who quotes 1299 a 12, 1300 b 18. Also v(vii). 7. 2, 1341 b 31: but see note.

16 The first reference: for amusement and recreation merely.

17 μέθος] See iv(vii). 17. 11, n. (966). SUSEM. (1019)
natural text
§ 41 τον θρόνος, ἦ πρὸς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλει καὶ πρὸς (IV) φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τούτο τρίτων θετέων τῶν εἰρημένων).

ὅτι μὲν οὖν δει τούς νέους μὴ παιδιάς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλου (οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖδὲ διαγωγὴν τε παισίν ἀρμόττει 30 καὶ ταῖς ἥλικίας ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιούταις (οὖδὲ γὰρ § 5 ἀπελεί προστήκης τέλος). ἀλλ' ἱσος ἀν ὄδεξεν ἦ τῶν παι-5


§ 24, b 30, c. 2 § 8, 1122 b 7 f., and many other passages. In the same way the moral judgment is confused and moral perception hindered by the wrong and harmful and feeling of pleasure and pain, see Ne. Euth. iii. 4, 4 f., 1113 a 29 ff., vi. 5, 6, 1140 b 12 ff., and even ordinary pleasures of sense, which are permissible and within due limits necessary, easily delude men into over-estimating their importance: see below § 13 f., 1339 b 31 ff., n. (1039). Cp. Döring op. c. p. 106 f., 110 f. Susen. (1022)

§ 4 The third use: to promote rational enjoyment and the culture of the intelligence.

26 φρόνησιν] Bonitz Ind. Ar. 831 b 4: φρόνησις λατιοτάτη σεισμός, συν. γρώσις, ἐπιστήμην. The passages cited, amongst them 1288 b 22, 1289 a 12, are sufficient proof that the term is found in Aristotle with the meaning 'intellectual culture,' which is here appropriate, as well as in the kindred sense of 'knowledge' or 'science.' By this additional term Aristotle emphasizes the fact that rational activity as well as rational enjoyment is one element of our highest satisfaction: while e. c. § 8 he can equally well emphasize the other element by inserting ἔμπνευσαν καὶ before διαγωγήν εὐευθείρων: see n. (1027). There is nothing therefore to justify alteration, bracketing, or transposition. Spengel's suggestion εὐφροσύνην, on the analogy of the second passage, is least open to objection: yet amusement, as well as music, is εὐφροσύνη and Aristotle would hardly have designated amusement as εὐμερεία. Susen. (1023)


28 μετὰ λύπης] But Happiness is οὖ μετὰ λύπης ἄλλα μεθ' ἠδονῆς, c. 3 § 5, 1138 a 6. The inference is obvious. If learning is painful, teaching is difficult: a tacit contradiction of the Sophists' belief that education is no more than cramming: see Pl. Rep. 345 b, 518 c: and Aristotle's own comparison of the sale of ready-made commodities De Soph. El. 33 § 17, 184 a 2—8 (Butcher). On the pleasures of learning see Rhet. 1. 11, 21, 1371 a 31 ff., b 4 ff., also the application to art, Post. c. 4 § 4, 1448 b 12 ff.

29 τε] See iv(vii). 3, 4, 1325 a 19, n. 30 οὖδε γὰρ ἀπελεί προστήκης τέλος] Döring p. 137 is right then in saying that the young are incapable of enjoying art either as an amusement (παιδιά) or by deriving from it the highest intellectual gratification: although it is really only in the latter sense that the 'enjoyment' of art can be spoken of. For the rest of the passage cp. c. 6 § 2 n. (1062). In iv(vii). 14 § 9 ff., 15 § 5 f., cp. n. (903). Aristotle says intellectual training is the highest aim of education, and moral training only a means thereto; while v(viii). 3, 6 he says that even for the highest intellectual gratification we need to be educated and to learn certain things, adducing (c. 3 § 2 f.) the fact that the ancients considered Music in this sense a part of education: cp. n. (903), n. (1000). This inconsistency can only be reconciled by assuming (a) that in the passages from iv(vii),—παιδευτέον 1333 b 4, τὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν μελέτην 1334 b 16, τὴν ἑπιμέλειαν b 25—he does
not use education in the exclusive sense in which it is applied to the young up to their twenty-first year, and (b) that, as appears from c. 5 §§ 5, 6, n. (1025), § 8, n. (1027), § 11, n. (1036), cp. nn. (1101, 1113), in his judgment Music, although as applied to the education of the young it directly influences character (ήδος) only, at the same time indirectly serves to prepare them for the future enjoyment of music as a recreation and for the formation of correct musical taste. It thus would pave the way for the true artistic enjoyment of music of a high order, and consequently for that highest gratification which is willing to flow from there. See also § 7 n. (1026), Excursus 1, and n. (875) on IV (viii). 13, 5. Susen. (1024).

§ 5 32 παιδιὰς χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένους] In itself this is really not inconsistent with Aristotle’s own opinion: see c. 5 § 11, n. (1036). Susen. (1025).


§ 6 37 ἀπεργαζέσθαι] The absolute use: give a performance. Note that πε-ποιημένοις is perfect of the middle ποιεῖσθαι (ἐργον).

39 τὰ τοιαῦτα] All such subjects as afford an amateur enjoyment.

40 ἀγωνίζομενων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεατὶς γεγονόμενος.

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ποιημένοις is perfect of the middle ποιεῖσθαι (ἐργον).

§ 7 41 δύναται] The subject is η

μονοθεία, but to find it expressed we must return to § 3, a 22—24, though it is ob-

sceunly indicated a 37 by αὐτὸ τοῦτο, i.e. the execution.


§ 8 4 τὸ αὐτὸς λόγος κτλ] Here the concession already made with regard to amusement and recreation (§ 5, n. 1025) is extended to intellectual enjoyment, see n. (1024); namely that musical instruction during youth may possibly
serve as preparation for the elevated enjoyment of music in riper years. Cp. also *nn. (912, 1029). SUSEM. (1028)

7 ὑπόληψιν] See Bonitz ad *Melao. 1.

8 ὃς Ζεὺς] Schlosser thinks that here Aristotle has forgotten Apollo. On the contrary the mention of Zeus, the highest divinity, alone, is quite intentional. As to representations of Apollo and other gods with the cithara, or lyre (cp. *n. (1071), see particularly Jan De mdhibus Gracorunum (Berlin 1859), pp. 17, 20 f., 24 ff. *Zeus is not among the number. SUSEM. (1028)

ἀλλὰ καὶ κτλ.] See *n. (982), Exc. 1. to this book, and *c. 6 § 4, c. 7 §§ 13, 14 with *n. (1067). SUSEM. (1029)

10 Plato *Laws ii. 665 b 1 f. πᾶσιν που γιγαντίαις πρεσβίτεροι ὄκνοι πρὸς τάς φῶς μεστοῖς, καὶ ἱππεὶ τῷ ἤτοι πράττων τούτῳ καὶ ἀνάγκης γιγαντίαις αἰσχύνοντ' ἀν ἀμάλλον.

§ 9 11 ὑπότερον] I.e. c. 6 § 1, 1340 b 20 ff. where this point is again taken up. See *n. (1069). SUSEM. (1030)

13 παιδειαν] The end to which Plato confined all poetry and all art: see Butcher *Some Aspects* p. 317 ff.

"Aristotle allows that for childhood the use of poetry and music is to convey moral instruction"...but "for the grown man the poet's function is not that of a teacher, he is only so by accident" p. 322 f.

§ 10 17 ἰατρεία τις] This has been set forth c. 3 § 4, φαρμακείας χάρων: cp. *n. (989). SUSEM. (1031)

18 μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν κτλ] The highest intellectual (or aesthetic) enjoyment implies the highest nobleness (τὸ καλὸν), because it is the highest activity of soul: it implies the highest pleasure, because from this highest human activity flows the pleasure appropriate to it: see *n. (992) on c. 3 § 5. SUSEM. (1032)


§ 11 20 ψυλή] Instrumental music, unaccompanied by the voice: § 17, 1340 a 12 ff. ἀκρωφίας...χορὶς τῶν ὑμιθῶν καὶ τῶν μέλων αὐτῶν.

Comp. *Nic. Eth. 1. 9. 1, 1008 b 25, ix. 8, 9, 1159 a 20—25: also vi. 11. 2, 1152 b 6, c. 13. 2, 1153 b 14 (Newman).
dió kai eis tás synouníasas kai diágeníasas eułógyos paràlambávoun-
24 sw autín ós δυναμέννων euφrànevn), óste kai ενεύθεν υπολάβοι
§ 12 án tis pайдévousbas dévnh autín toús nēstérous. ósa gáρ αβλαβή
tón hídeon, ou μónon ármoṭei prós tw télos álλa kai prós
tín anápautin epéi de én mèn to téleiv sýmβaínê tois
ánbrhoiow ólignákis γýnëseis, πολλákis de anapetíntai
kai χρóntai tais pайдiásis oux ósou épì pléon álλa kai
30 diá tihn hídonhn, χρήσιμον án eí̂n dianapánevn év tais áptó

21 γáρ Π1, γοῦν Π2 Bk., δέ Π5 || 24 υπολάβων after 25 án tis Π2 Π5 Bk., avoid-
ing hiatus || 28 γενέσθαι? Susem. || 29 καὶ διά] δέ αὐτὴν Spengel, but the text
can give the same sense

21 Μουσαιός] Not an historical char-
acter, but a mythical personage. Under
this name went a variety of ancient
poems, the real authors of which were
unknown, including (a) hymns—Paus-
aniás, IV. 1, 4; maintains that a hymn
to Demeter is by Musaeus, and is the
only genuine fragment of his which has
been preserved—(b) oracular responses
(χρησιῶν); collected by Onomacritus
of Athens under the direction of
Hipparchus and esteemed of such im-
portance that Onomacritus was banished
from Athens for the interpolation of
a single line, which was discovered by
Lasus of Hermione: Herod. viii. 6, viii.
96, ix. 43; also (γ) a gnomic poem ad-
dressed to his son Eumolpus, referred to
by Plato Κρίτ. ii. 363 C, called "Eu-
molpíα" by Pausaniás, ix. 1, 3, but "Τσο-
θηκαί," 'Precepts,' or 'Advice,' by Suidas.
Susem. (1034)

23 diáγενας] The plural has a con-
crete meaning 'social gatherings,' the
more playful forms of social intercourse,
approximating to παιδίασ, from which δια-
γενής is in general carefully discriminated.
Comp. n. (921), and Π1. 9, 13, Νει.
Εἰθ. x. 6 § 3, § 8 there cited. Susem.
(1035)

24 καὶ ενεύθεν] In order that in
mature life they may find in music a
recreation: cp. e. 5 § 5 with ἦν. (1024,
1025). The difficulty there raised, as to
why in that case boys should learn to
sing and play themselves, has been post-
pponed for future discussion: § 9. n. (1030).
Susem. (1036)

The order of the words in Π1 must be
modified. There is authority for ύπο-
λάβοι tis ān, 1265 b 6; or we might
comp. 1277 a 32. καντιέθεν ān κατίδως
tis. Yet as at § 14, b 39, all MSS. give
ἀν tis υπολάβοι, we should probably adopt
the same order from Π2 here.

§ 12 25. αβλαβή τῶν ήδεων] A Pla-
tonic conception: ἤθελ. 511 A—52 b, 66 c,
Κρ. Π. 357 B ai ἡδοναi ὀσαι ἀβλαβεῖς,
L nú. 667 b, v. The harmless plea-
sures, especially those of imitative art,
"conduce both to our great end, Happi-
ness, and to rest by the way. Few men
have the fortune to find themselves at
the goal. All, however, take frequent rest
and pastime" (Jebb).

27 ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει γύνεσθαι] An un-
usual phrase, which must mean τοῦ τέλους
toxeión, to achieve that highest end of life.

Possibly the following is a burlesque of
some encomium on music: εὖς ἀπο-
λαβέω τῆς τέχνης ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μανθάνειν, καὶ
αἷμα τε ἄρχεται καὶ εἰς τῶν τέλει εὖτειν, Λυκ.
De Paradois 14.

29 οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον] "Not merely
for the sake of a good beyond it, but also
for the sake of the pleasure." Even the
man who spends his leisure in contempla-
otive activity requires a change: the
most cultivated would then seek repose
not in difficult but in easy music, though
not perhaps such music as is described
in Νει. Εἰθ. x. 6, 3, 1176 b 6 ff., virtuous activities and
pleasant pastimes (αι ἡδεῖαι τῶν παιδίων)
are declared to be the only two things
which men pursue purely for their own
sakes and with no other end in view.
Susem. (1037)
31 taúthēs ἴδοναις. συμβέβηκε δε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιείσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος: ἐχει γὰρ ἵσως ἴδονήν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλὰ οὐ τὴν τυχόσαν, ξητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβανοντάς ὡς ταύτην ἐκείην, διὰ τὸ τὸ τέλει τῶν πράξεων.

32 ἐχει γὰρ ... ἁπτάσιν] "The true end, no doubt, is fraught with pleasure too—though not of the commonplace sort. Pursuing the commonplace pleasure, men mistake it for the true pleasure, because it is a faint image of that to which all their actions tend. The true end is desirable independently of things to come after it. So it is with pleasures of this sort; they are desirable independently of what may come after them, and solely on account of what has gone before them, such as toil or pain" (Jebb).

With οὗ τὴν τυχόσαν cp. Ιν(viii). 9, 8, 1328 b 17 (where ἀπὸς οὗ τὸ τυχὸν does not mean an extraordinary number, but a number definitely defined) and Ποι. c. 26 § 15. 1462 b 13, δεὶ γὰρ οὗ τὴν τυχόσαν ἴδονήν παῖςν αὐτάς (τὴν πραγματία καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολικά) ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην. Τακτὸν παίασων τῶν τέλων: τακτὸν τῶν παίασων τῶν παιδιῶν τέλος. Πλατ. are ἑκατέρας, because § 10, b 16 f., they heal the pain which comes of toils: in Pindar's words ἄριστος ἑφυρότων παίων κεκρεμόνοις ἰάτρος Ἰν. v. 1; ἐκρούει τὴν ἱππών: καὶ διὰ τὰς ἐπερθόλας τῆς ἱππής, ὡς ὅσοις ἰατρεῖας, τὴν ἴδονήν διὰκονοῦ Ἰν. Ἐπ. vii. 14. f. 1154 a 27 f.

33 διὰ τὸ τὸ τέλει ... ἑκεῖν ὀμοιώματι τι] One consequence of the similarity here explained is that men forget the essential difference, viz. that the higher intellectual pleasure contains its end in itself, whilst ordinary sensual pleasure, so far as it is harmless and necessary, has its end in recreation, becoming (when used at the right time and in moderation) something positively useful and not merely harmless. Cp. c. 3 §§ 1—4 with n. (988). Döring op. c. p. 107 f. points out the apparent inconsistency with the parallel passage Βικ. Εἰθ. Χ. 6, 6, 1176 b 27 ff., quoted in that note, but without attempting to clear it up. In the Ethics Aristotle says: Happiness does not consist in amusement. For amusement is closely connected with recreation, and man needs recreation because he is not capable of supporting unbroken exertion. Consequently recreation is not an end but a means to activity, οὐκ ἐν παιδί ἁμική ἐνεδαμονία, καί γὰρ ἀντίον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιαίον, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βαθὺν ἀπαντά τοῦ παιδίων χάριν. ἀπαντά γὰρ ἔξεσθαι ἐτερών ἐνεκα ἀνικήτως παίδων τῆς ἐνεπάβασιν. τέλος γὰρ αὐτής, ὀποιοδέξατε δε καὶ ποιεῖτε παιδιὰς χάριν ἄλλων φαίηται καὶ λαϊ παιδίκων. παίασιν ἄν. ὑπὸ ὅπως ὀποιοδέξατε, κατ᾽ Ἀνάδραμην, ὅρθως ἐχει δοκεῖ, ἀναπαύεται γὰρ ἐνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύεται τοιθαν. ἐνεκα ἄνπασης δὲ ὑπὸ ὅπως ὀποιοδέξατε παίασιν ἃ ἄν. ἀναπαύεται, ὅπως εἶναι ἐνεκα ἄνυπασης ὁμοιότως γίνεται γὰρ ἐνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. Here the end of recreation is said to consist in the work to be done, not the work already done, and rightly enough: recreation is naturally to lead from the labour of the past to new labours. But although a man may know this very well, nevertheless, in the midst of recreation (if it is to be a real and enjoyable rest) he will forget the fact, and without any thought of future labour give himself up entirely to a feeling of satisfaction at having happily ended the past toils, for which the present holiday is a recompense and restorative. This appears to me to be the idea which Aristotle wishes to express in the Politics in contradistinction to the idea in the Ethics. Cp. also n. (1143). Susem. (1038)
§ 14 πής. δε ἢ μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ζητούσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γίνεσθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην εἰκότως ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι τὴν αἰτίαν περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖ τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ γε ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς εἶοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητεύς μὴ ποτε τούτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστίν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρήμενην χρείαν, καὶ δεὶ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἢς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθήσεων (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσική τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἥλικίαις 5 καὶ πάλιν ἥθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλής), ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν εἰ πη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἱθὸς συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν. § 16 τούτο δ' ἢν εἴη δήλον, εἰ ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἱθὴ γυνόμεθα δ'

is used to include two alternatives, e.g. τότερον πράοι ὡ ὀργίλος, ἀνδρεία ὧ δειλοὶ (Newman).

§ 17 The clause ἐτὶ δὲ...ἀυτῶν is not a further reason for inferring ποιῶς τινα διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γίνεσθαι: it gives the ground for the reason already alleged in § 16. If the melodies of Olympus inspire ecstacy, that is because they express ecstacy: quod rhythmis et modulationibus eundem animi affectum exprimebant. And why does such an effect follow upon such a cause? ‘Quia eosdem omnino semper in auditoribus omnibus excitant affectus, qui eis exprimitur, rhythmis atque modulationibus’: Quaest. crit. coll. p. 420. Hence ἐτὶ requires emendation, and the whole clause finds a better place below. There is no difficulty in taking χωρίς as an adverb: apart from the words, when the performance is instrumental solely (ψυλλ.). SUSEM. There is possibly a tacit correction of Plato who in Laws 11. 669 E condemns instrumental music without words: ἐν οἷς ὅ τι παράξειτον ἄνευ λόγου γεγομένον ῥυθμὸν τε καὶ ἀρμονίαν γεγονούσιν, ὦ τί τι βροιλία καὶ ὠτό ἔοικε τῶν ἀξειλόγων μιμητῶν.

§ 18 τρις δὲ ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισεῖν, <καὶ> δῆλον ὅτι δεὶ μαυθανεὶ καὶ συνεβίβασθαι μηδὲν οὕτως ὥς

8 ποιῶ...9 δὲ καὶ omitted by P15 Sb Tb Ar. Ald. and P34 (1st hand, supplied in the margin of P4 and by a later hand in the margin of P3, afterwards erased) || φανερῶν] δῆλον δὲ 9 ἐτέρων] ἀλλοι] 12 ἐτὶ] ἐπειδή Susem. who transposes 12 ἐτειδή...14 αὐτῶν to follow 23 τοιότων, a transposition approved by Spen- gel: see Introd. p. 90 || 14 ἐπεὶ ἔτη] ἐτὶ δὲ with a change in the punctuation (a series of separate clauses replacing the one long protasis); or if the punctuation be retained, ἐτὶ ἐπεὶ <ἐπεί> ? Susem. || τῷ μουσικῷ after εἰναι II1 2589 Bk. || 16 καὶ added by Susem. || δῆλον ὅτι δεὶ 115, δεὶ δῆλον ὅτι Bk., δεὶ δῆλοντι M12 Ar. and P1 (corr.), δῆλοντι P1 (1st hand)

and clearly
no study, no self-discipline is so important as that of rightly judging and rejoicing aright in worthy characters and noble actions." Evidently the term μαθηματα is used in a narrower sense here for the development of the intellect. Although we are only concerned with the education of ὁδός, character, still no ἴδικη ἀρετή, no moral virtue = excellence of character, exists apart from φύσις, practical wisdom or insight: and the converse is true, Nic. Eth. vi. c. 12 § 8—c. 13 § 6, 114 c 20—b 32. Also there is no true pleasure apart from a right moral and aesthetic judgment. But judging is a function of the intellect and not of the will. Comp. also c. 5 § 7, ὑ. (1026), c. 6 §§ 1—4, ὑ. (1061, 1066), and Excursus 1. Susem. (1045)

17 τὸ κρίνειν ὅρθως] Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9, 20, 1181 a 17 ἵ.; ὥσπερ οὖθε...τὸ κρίνειν ὅρθως μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μονοτικὰν, οἱ γὰρ ἐμπερθὲς πέρι ἑκάστα κρίνουσιν ὅρθως τά ἐργα (results: in music, the performances).

18 However true it is that melody has an emotional import, a comparison of popular airs soon reveals a wide diversity in the means employed for its expression. Even in the rendering of joy and melancholy different races may be altogether opposed. Some prefer minor keys for joyous airs.

19 τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις] The real things, objects. As in 1256 b 14, γάλακτος φύσιν (see ὑ.), the content of φύσις is greatly reduced.

21 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἥθικων] Music can
V(VIII). 5, 20]

1340 a 17—1340 a 33.

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χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἐστὶ τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχειν (V)
25 τρόπον (οἷον εἰ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεόμενος μὴ
d' ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτῆς, ἀναγκαῖον
tοῦτῳ καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρεῖν, οὐ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ,
§ 20 ἡθειαν εἰναὶ), συμβεβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἰθεσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς 30 ἀποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γενεστοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὀρατοῖς ἡρέμα
(σχῆματα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτα, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθή-
σεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρὸν, ἐτί δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίωματα [τῶν ἰθῶν], ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γινόμενα
27 καὶ[1] κατ' Μ* P4, καθ' Γ* || αὐτήν Γ, αὐτοῦ Ar. Lambin Scaliger Bk.2, perhaps rightly || ἐκεῖνον Lambin Scaliger Bk.2, perhaps rightly || οὐ after τὴν εἰκόνα Μ* P3 (thus causing hiatus). William translates 27 καὶ αὐτήν...28 εἰναί in this order: illam visionem, eis visid imaginem secundum se esse detectabilem || 32 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρὸν after 31 τοιαύτα Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem, transposed to follow 32 κοινωνοῦσιν by Spengel, Susem.2 3. Ed. Müller (pp. 348—353) discovered the error, but conjectured <οὐ> πάντες without any transposition. Welldon transposes 31 καὶ πάντες... 32 κοινωνοῦσιν to precede 28 συμβεβηκε, wrongly || ἐτί δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem, ἐπὶ Heidenhain op. cit., ἐπείδη Susem, see Comm. n. (1050) || 33 [τῶν ἰθῶν] Flach Susem,3

flach to the modern world. In fact, we suspect it to be based on an exaggerated estimate of the influence music has in its own sphere. 27 τὴν θεωρεῖν (ἐκεῖνον) οὐ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ: the contemplation of the original must also give him delight.

§ 20 This is maintained even more strongly in the Problems: XIX. 29, 920 a 3, διὰ τί οἱ ρημαί καὶ τὰ μέλη φωνῆ σοῦν ἠθέσαν έκεῖνος; ἢ ὅτι κινήσεις εἰσίν ὁποῖες καὶ αἱ πράξεις; ἢδον δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐνέργεια ἡθῶν κατα ήθός: so XIX. 27, 919 b 26 ff., esp. b 35 ἢ ἐκ κινήσεις αὐτίς πρακτικαί εἰσίν, αἱ ἐν πράξεις ἠθῶν σημαίνεστιν. This points to an exaggeration of the rhetorical element: see Butcher op. c. p. 271 ff. Ordered movements reproduce the moral life which is itself an activity, i.e. a movement.

29 τοῖς ἰθεσιν] For the meaning see Exc. III. p. 622 ff. Comp. also generally n. (1054). Susem. (1048)

30 ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὀρατοῖς] We may translate “The objects of sight do indeed, in a slight degree, [present an image of moral affections]—since forms have this moral suggestiveness, and the perception of it is universal, though it does not go far. Besides, these forms are not images [of moral character]: forms and colours are rather symbols of the characters on which they usually attend.” It is not a little surprising to be told that the strongest impressions are not conveyed through the eye, but through the ear.

31—32] The words ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρὸν are a poor qualification of τοιαύτα, which they follow in the MSS. Moreover the next sentence needs some limitation, which fact led E. Müller to alter to οὐ πάντες. The slight transposition makes all right.

31 σχῆματα[4] There is no word which denotes all that is signified by σχῆματα, viz. forms, gestures, bodily motions generally, including figures and attitudes in dancing (cp. σχηματίζειν). Statuary, it should be remembered, imitates by forms only: painting by forms and colours, Pind. c. 1 § 4, 1447 a 18 ff. with n. (4) of my edition. Cp. also Athen. xiv. 629 b, ἐστί δὲ καὶ τα ἄρχαι τῶν δημοφιλῶν ἀγάλματα τῆς παλαιᾶς ἀρχηγοσ λειψανό. Susem. (1049)

32 ἐτί δὲ[4] To make this a second point of dissimilarity is awkward. The slight alteration to ἐπείδη makes it the explanation of the preceding unlikeness. Susem. (1050)

οὐκ ἐτί...ὁμοιώματα...ἀλλὰ σημεῖα] “Painting and sculpture working in an inert material cannot indeed reproduce the life of the soul in all its variety and successive manifestations. In their frozen
and arrested movement they fix externally the feeling they portray... Still shape and line and colour even here retain something of their significance; and their meaning is helped out by symmetry, which in the arts of repose answers to rhythm.” Butcher, *Some Aspects* p. 274 ff. The element lacking in painting and sculpture, but present in music, has been called “ideal motion.” Plato, *Phaedrus* 250 A ff. makes the most lustrous copies of the ideas to be apprehended by sight: Thompson *ad loc.*, “by δοσα πίμα φύσιν he seems to mean moral ideas, among which he proceeds to show that beauty alone has its clear antitype on earth.”


καὶ τοῦτ’...35 πάθεσιν] I.e. in a state of emotion a man reveals his inner self by his outward appearance. These words are incorrectly explained by Döring *op. c.* p. 150 f. and the text is slightly altered by him to suit the meaning. But he does well in calling attention to the fact that, whilst Aristotle rightly enough makes music and the creative arts excite in the spectator the same states and processes of feeling as are represented, on the other hand the emotions evoked by tragedy and epic poetry are fear and pity, the object for representation in both kinds of poetry being that which excites fear or pity (*Poet. c. 11 § 4, c. 14 § 1*), just as in comedy it is that which excites laughter (γελοίον, *Poet. c. 5 § 1*). Yet Aristotle nowhere expressly adds: “and not fear or pity itself,” or “and not that emotion itself which finds expression in laughter;” he nowhere expressly speaks of a difference in this respect between Tragedy, Epic Poetry, and Comedy on the one hand, and Sculpture, Painting, and Music on the other. It is therefore very doubtful whether he was ever conscious of this contrast, and Döring seems to have been the first to follow up this idea, suggested by Aristotle. However, both Aristotle, in assigning to tragic and epic poetry as their only result the excitement of pity and fear, and Döring in insisting upon the difference between poetry and the imitative arts, have overlooked their similarity. Do we not, apart from fear and pity, take pleasure in the noble and high-minded characters brought before us? Does not the overpowering pathos of the emotions they exhibit take us out of ourselves, inspiring us with a faint measure of similar feelings? Take the charming scenes between Odysseus and Nausicaa, which form an essential part of the plot: what have they to do with fear and pity? Their charm consists rather in the vividness with which they call up before us the noble disposition of the maiden in all its shrewdness and naiveté, its natural innocence and sprightliness, and the hero’s feelings under this severest test of his constancy, with the manly spirit, at once firm and tender, which he displays on this occasion. *Susem.* (1052)

36 δεί μὴ τὰ Παιδεύσων...αλλὰ τὰ Πολυγραφών] Polygnotus of Thasos, the creator of the ‘art’ of Greek painting, flourished after the Persian wars. Cimon brought him to Athens, and he became an Athenian citizen. Thus his work falls in that stirring period so full of the rapidly unfolding promise of Attic art. Pausan was rather younger, as he is often ridiculed by Aristophanes, *Ach. 854, Thesm. 949, Plut. 606*. See *Poet. c. 2* § 1, 1448 a 5 f. Πολυγνότου μὲν γάρ κρείττους, Παθοῦν δὲ χείρας, Δυσφύσιοι δὲ δραματείας εἶκαν: the one was a master of ideal representation, the other of caricature. In *Poet. c. 6* § 15, 1450 a 26 ff. οὖν καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεύξις πρὸς Πολυγνότου πέτοντες οὐ μὲν γάρ Π. ἀγαθόν ἔφευρε, ἤ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφή οὐδέν ἐξεῖς ἕσσος. Polygnotus is held up for praise in contrast to Zeuxis. It would seem his strength lay in the portraiture of character and that he drew noble characters. We see then that a 38 ἴδιός must be understood in the sense proposed *Exc. 111.*
As the originator of that 'ethical' style, pure and self-contained, of which the Parthenon frieze is the highest embodiment, Polygnotus, "the Raphae1 of antiquity," takes the same rank among painters as Pheidias among sculptors. Panson however was not precisely a caricaturist, but he delighted in comic scenes of deformity and crime, or satirical pictures of low and vulgar subjects. As regards both painters, see Brunn Gesch. der grisch. Künstler II p. 41—46, 49—51; Vahlen Aristoteles Lehre der Rangfolge der Thiele Tragödie in Symb. Philol. Bonn. p. 159 ff. Comp. also IV (VII). 17, 10 with n. (603) and Introd. p. 52. SUSEM. (1053)

38 ἐν δὲ τοῖς μεθέοιν αὐτοῖς κτλ] "Melodies on the other hand contain in themselves imitations of character." Prof. Butcher has written an able commentary on this op. cit. p. 267 ff. Premising that upon the Aristotelian conception of fine art as μιμητικός "a work of art is a copy or likeness of an original, and not a symbolic representation of it," he shows that "the various arts reflect the image from without by different means, and with more or less clearness and directness. Music in most of its forms was, by Aristotle, as by the Greeks generally, regarded as the most 'imitative' of the arts. It is a direct image, a copy, a reflection, of character....Not only states of feeling but also strictly ethical qualities and dispositions of mind are reproduced by musical imitation, and on the close correspondence between the copy and the original depends the importance of music in the formation of character." He forcibly contrasts the exactly opposite modern view. "We generally think of music quite otherwise. The emotion it suggests, the message it conveys, corresponds but little with a reality outside itself. It is capable of expressing general and elementary moods of feeling, which will be variously interpreted by different hearers. It cannot render the finer shades of extra-musical emotion with any degree of certainty and precision. Its expressive power, its capacity to reproduce independent realities, is weak in proportion as the impression it produces is vivid and definite."

§ 22 40 ἡ τῶν ἀρμονίων φύσις] Besides its general meaning of 'music,' 'musical sounds' (for which see § 25 below; the soul assumed to be a 'harmony') ἀρμονία has a special musical significance: scale, octave, definite succession of notes. Unfortunately 'harmony' in modern music has totally different associations: as a technical term in music it denotes the 'combination of simultaneous sounds' or parts—in fact, part-writing, something almost (not quite) unknown to Greek musicians, for which their word is συμφωνία. The best rendering for the technical term ἀρμονία is not 'key' or 'scale,' but Mode, a term which still survives in musical treatises where Major or Minor scales are more correctly designated scales 'in the Major or Minor mode.' Comp. the Miltonic description of the Dorian Mode, Paradise Lost 1, 550 ff. 'to the Dorian mood' | Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised | To highth of noblest temper heroes old | Arming to battle, and instead of rage | Deliberate valour breathed, firm and unmoved | With dread of death to flight or foul retreat; | Nor wanting power to mitigate and sway; | With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chase | Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain." See further Excursus IV on Greek Music generally, p. 624 ff. SUSEM. (1054) Trans. "So essentially distinct in nature are the several musical modes that they produce a corresponding variety of mood and do not affect the hearers alike. Some, like the mixo-Lydian, cast us into grief and gloom; others, the relaxed modes, soften the spirit; another will produce a sober and sedate frame of mind, an effect which seems peculiar to the Dorian mode; while the Phrygian excites to ecstasy." For the non-musical reader we may sum up thus: the Dorian was the old national minor scale of Greece; the Lydian and Phrygian two foreign major scales (from a modern standpoint abnormal), borrowed from their neighbours by the Greeks of Asia.
πρὸς ἡκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως (V) 1340 b καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλομένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνεμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς 4 ἐτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρμονιῶν, ένθο-§ 23 σιαστικοὺς δὲ ἡ φρυγιστὶ—ταύτα γὰρ καλὸς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ 9 τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην τεφιλοσοφήκτες λαμβανοῦσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων— τούτῳ δὲ τρόπῳ ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ρυθμοὺς, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐχο-9 σιν ἦθος στασιμώτερον οὗ δὲ και κυνηκίαν, καὶ τούτων οὗ μὲν

1340 b 1 συνεστηκότως Π 3 (1st hand), συντετηκότως Madvig, συνανεφότας Schmidt || μιξολυδιστὴ Μ* and perhaps Μ. Similarly b 4 δωριστή Μ* Π 4 Σb Tb and perhaps Π || 5 φρυγιστή Sb Tb Μ* (1st hand) and perhaps Π || 6 παιδείαν Ar., παιδείαν Π Π II || 7 ἔδε Π II Π Paris. 2042, γὰρ Π 2 Π 5 Bk., untranslated by Ar. || 8 τὰ omitted by Π 3 P 5 and Π 1 (first hand, supplied by corr. 1), untranslated by Ar., [7τά] Bk. 2 || ἐχοῦσι since 9 ἦθος Π 2 Π 5 Bk.

1340 b 1 συνεστηκότως] Affect the spirit with restraint, 'oppressively'. For this effect of the mixo-Lydiad mode Plato vouches and accordingly banishes it, Κεπ. 398 d 1 f. τίνες οὖν ὑπηρέτες ἀρ-μονιαί; Μιξολυδιστὴ, ἐφ' ἐκ συντυχο- λυστὶ καὶ τοιαύται τίνες. Ὀδοῖοι αὐτὶ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀφαρετέας ἀφροτοι γὰρ καὶ γυμναίς, ἃ δὲ ἐπίεσεις εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἄν-δρασιν.

2 τὴν διάνοιαν] Not the subject of the infinitive (ἔχειν or διατίθεσθαι) but the adverbial acc. after it.

3 τὸς ἀνειμένας] The modes called here "relaxed" are obviously those which Plato calls χαλαρᾶ, Κεπ. 398 e: τίνες οὖν μαλακά τε καὶ συμποτικά τῶν ἀρμο-νιῶν; Ἰαστί, ἢν δ' ὦ, καὶ λυδιστὶ, αὐτὲς χαλαρὰ καλοῦται. The terms refer to pitch: ἀνειμένα (χαλαρᾶ) = low, low-pitched, σύντων = high, high-strung. See Pratinas Prag. 5: μῆτε σύντων διῶκε, μῆτε τῶν ἀνειμένων Ιαστὶ μοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέσαν, πέμω σον ἀρμοφόροι αὐτὶ τῷ μέλει...πρέπει τοῖς πᾶσιν οἴο ἀλαβράκας Αἰολίς ἀρμονία (Athen. xiv. 624 f). Plainly the Aeolian mode or 'key' is described as intermediate to 'high-pitched Ionian,' and 'low Ionian.'

§ 23 5 οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην ρ. Amongst others, no doubt, Aristotel refers to Damon mentioned in Ἱ. (105.4), i.e. Exc. IV p. 630, whose inquiry into the different effects (ήθους καὶ πάθος) of the various modes and rhythms, probably a special work on the subject, is quoted as an authority by Plato Κεπ. 111. 400 B (ep. IV. 424 c). Also to the author of that arrangement of the Modes which he has adopted c. 7 § 3 (?) Aristoxenus, see h. (1053); probably also to his fellow-pupil Heraclides of Heraclea in the Pontus Athen. xiv. 624 c, who preferred to call the three chief Modes by Greek names, Dorian, Aeolian, Ionian. Damon was also a politician, an associate of Pericles: most probably it was he who started the idea of providing pay for the Dicasts and Bouleutae (μωθὸς δικαστικός, μ. βουλευτικός), as Wilamowitz Hermes xiii. 1880. p. 318 ff. has shown. Κρ. 11. 12. 4. h. (408). See 'Ath. Πολ. c. 27 § 4, p. 76, 5 ed. Kenyon: πρὸς δὴ ταύτην τὴν χρησίαν (sc. τὴν Κιμωνοῦ) ἀπολειπόμενου τὴν οὐσία, συμβολουχόντος αὐτῷ Δαμοφίλον τοῦ Οἰδῆν (ὅσ εἴδοκε τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰση-γήσεως εἶναι τῷ Περικλεὶ, διὸ καὶ ὡστράκισαν αὐτὸν ἰστέρον), ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἡττάτο διδόνει τοὺς πολλοὺς τὰ αὐτών, κατεσκεύασε μαθηφόρον τὸς δικαστής: also Prag. 364, 365 Rose in Plut. Per. c. 4, c. 9 and Plut. Πε. c. 4, Steph. Byz. s.v. 'Οα. Σusem. (1055)

Plutarch however may have confused Damon the musician with a Damonides, the politician (Gomperz).

7 τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων Κτλ.] "As with the different Modes, so is it with the different times or measures. Some mea- sures have rather a grave character, some a brisk one: of the latter, again, the movements are sometimes less, sometimes more refined." On Rhythms in Greek Music, see Exc. IV. p. 632. Susem. (1056)
17 καὶ τὸς θόκον... 19 ἀρμονίαν] The transposition is recommended by Böcker for the simple reason that the words in the traditional order do not suitably follow on the remarks immediately preceding, that music is adapted for the education of the young. If we could be certain that Aristotle always fitted in his notes at the right point, and never turned back to a subject he had just dismissed, this would be ample justification: see Böcker's own remarks p. 32 (cited above Introd. p. 95 n. 2).

17 συγγένεια] Butcher compares Pl. Tim. 47. D, ὃ δὲ ἠρμονία ἐνενεγείς ἔχουσα φοράς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιοδῶς. ‘Musical tones and measures have a certain affinity’—the context plainly shows the meaning to be ‘with the soul’: but the extraordinary brevity and allusiveness of Aristotle’s style seem to have permitted the ellipse. The Aristotelian text-books, οἶοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι, were composed, it should be remembered, for the members of the school; in their peculiar terminology, Diels observes, they resemble a system of shorthand to which only the pupils possess the key: and he compares Galen De sophism. xiv. 385 K. σύνθες ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιότου τάχος τῷ φιλοσοφῷ καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σημείων ἐκφεύγων τὰ πολλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀκτρικούς ἤσυχον γράφεσθαι.

18 πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν] This was a Pythagorean doctrine. After them two pupils of Aristotle, Aristothenes, who had previously been trained among the Pythagoreans, and Dicæarchus held this same view without any essential difference: see Zeller Phil. d. Griechen 1. ed. p. 444 (ed. 4 p. 413), 11. i. 3 p. 888 ff. Eng. tr. Pre-Socrates 1 p. 476. Susem. (1057) The earliest evidence is Plato Phædo 85 E, on which see the note of Mr Archer Hind who thinks Simmias must be the exponent of a widely received opinion. The examination of this doctrine in De Anima 1 c. 4 assumes that ἀρμονία = κράσις, a blending of diverse or opposite elements (λόγος τις τῶν μεθέντων ἡ σύνθεσις): and so Simmias in one place of the Phædo 86 B, though again he compares the soul to the music or tune i.e. something immortal played upon the material lyre, which answers to the body. The present passage certainly favours the latter interpretation of the ambiguous term ἀρμονία.

19 οὐ δὲ ἐχεῖν ἄρμονίαν] Pl. Phædo 93; the soul has in it virtue, which is a harmony. Cp. Sussehili Plat. Phil. 1 p. 440 f., 443. Susem. (1058) § 24 11 φανερὸν ὑπὶ κτλ] The problem of § 15, 1340 a b, is thus solved. And in b 16 we have an echo of 1340 a 14.


16 ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει κτλ] “Music
has this sweet seasoning in its nature." Nevertheless we were told, § 4, that the actual process of learning even music is troublesome and painful. SUSEM. (1059)
c. 6 Practical instruction in music is indispensable: §§ 1, 2. Nor is some measure of skill in execution unsuitable or dignifying: §§ 3—8, provided wind-instruments and technical subtleties be excluded from the educational course: §§ 9—16. Cp. Anal. p. 119.

§ 1 20 χειραγωγούντας] Apparently only here and c. 7 § 3, 1342 a 3, in the sense of 'playing on a musical instrument,' 'becoming performers,' and so 23 κοινωνίας τών ἐργών, where ἐργά = musical performances, as below b 36 f. and in Nici. Eth. x. 9. 20. 1181 a 20.

21 πρότερον] C. 5 §§ 4—8. Comp. 5 §§ 9, 10 with n. (1030). SUSEM. (1060)

22 πολλήν ἔχει διαφοράν] See c. 2 § 6. Here 'it makes a great difference' = it is a great advantage: multum praec.

23 ἐν γάρ τι κτα] This is directly opposed to the Spartans' boast, c. 5 § 7. 1339 b 2 ff. cp. nn. (1026, 1045). SUSEM. (1061)


§ 2 26 διατριβήν] Occupation; somewhat analogous to a pastime for recreation, and still more like the highest intellectual pursuits of the adults: though in the case of boys neither the one nor the other is yet possible, c. 5 § 4, n. (1024): cp. Döring p. 137. SUSEM. (1062)

'Ἀρχύτα] A famous Pythagorean philosopher of Tarentum.—For the foundation of Tarentum, see viii (v). 7. 2 u. (1592), for its fortunes ib. 3 § 7 u. (1517), for its constitution vii(vi). 5. 10 u. (1441): also n. (141).—Archytas was a friend and contemporary of Plato, and also renowned as a mathematician, general, and statesman. He was seven times στρατηγός, the highest political and military office in his native city, an honour not usually conferred more than once upon the same citizen; he led the army to victory in several wars (Diog. Laer. vii. 79, 82) and was for a long time the leading statesman of Tarentum (Strab. vi. 280). Plato made his acquaintance on his first voyage to Sicily, and it was through his diplomatic mediation that Dionysius the younger at last allowed Plato to depart in safety on his third journey (Diog. Laer. viii. 79, 111. 22). Archytas was a man of excellent character, and his interest in education as well as his kindness towards his slaves is shown by the story that he delighted to get their children about him and teach them himself (Athenodor. in Athen. xii. 519 b). The rattle which he invented became proverbial (Athenodor. l. c.), cp. Aelian Var. Hist. xii. 15, Suidas s. v. 'Ἀρχύτας, Poll. ix. 127). No very definite opinion can be pronounced upon his merits as a man of science, since the writings bearing his name were for the most part forgeries. Fragments of several of them are extant: of these the fragments from the beginning of a work upon Mathematics can hardly be assailed, whilst the work upon Acoustics was cer-
tainly not genuine, see Westphal Metr. 2. ed. 1. p. 71. But at any rate the science of Geometry was substantially advanced by him (Procl. on Eucl. p. 19). In particular we know his interesting attempt at solving the problem of squaring the cube (Eudem. Fr. 110. Speng. Eratosth. quoted by Eutok. in Archim. De Sph. p. 135, 143. Ox. and Diog. Laert. viii. 83). He was also the first to treat Mechanics methodically according to geometrical principles (Diog. Laert. l. c., ep. Favor. in Gell. x. 12. 9 f. Vitruv. vii. 26. Praf.) See Hartenstein De Archytate Tartiniti fragmentis philosophicis (Leipzig 1833), Gruppe ‘On the Fragments of Archytas’ (Berlin 1840), Zeller op. c. 1. p. 267. iii. ii. p. 88 f., 91 f., 112 f. Susem. (1063)

The Doric form Ἀρχίτον, which was altered to Ἀρχύτον by corr.1 in 11 as well as by IPP2, makes another instance for Prof. Ridgeway: see n. on l. 2. 5 (p. 144).

34 διόρισα καὶ λίτσα] Define and refute the objections of those who maintain that to take up music practically is disregarding. The absolute use of λόγιοι instead of λόγιον ἀποριας recurs b 41; cp. Meta. X. 2. 5. 1089 a 3. Λυσεί καὶ ὀμώσε ψαλτεῖται τῷ λόγῳ, Khd. 11. 25. 1. 1402 a 31. 26. 3. 1403 a 26. Aristotle’s own explanation of this metaphor is explicit enough: ἡ γὰρ ὀστείρα εὐπορία λόγιος τῶν πρότερον ἀπορομένων ἐστὶ. Λυσεί δ’ οὖκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦσα τοῦ δεσμον Μετα. B. 1. 2. 995 a 28.

35 βάναυσου] Repeated § 5. b 41, § 6. 1341 a 7. Comp. notes (103. 982. 1080). Susem. (1065) § 4 Some degree of skill in execution is needed to make a connoisseur.

36 τοῦ κρίνειν χάρμων] Comp. mm. (1026. 1045. 1061). Susem. (1066) 37 πρεσβύτερους δὲ γενομένους] Except at a drinking party, or in jest c. 5 § 8 n. (1027). See also c. 7 §§ 13, 14 with n. (1113); iv (vii). 17. 11 n. (1066). Comp. Introd. p. 56. Susem. (1067)
5 The censure passed on music implies that the pursuit of excellence as a professional degrades the youthful citizen into a performed trained person. It is remarked in Exc. 1. p. 620, that the feeling of the Greeks in the fourth century towards artistic specialists seems to have varied with the eminence of the artist much more than it does amongst us. While the artists of genius were recognised as great men, the ordinary artist was a mechanic, who had left the true political life for a bread-and-butter study.

6, 7 There must be no practising upon instruments which unfit the citizen for taking his part in war and in athletic exercises. Musical training must not be such as to fit the learner for contests of artists.

10 Brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty. Even in the present day it would be sound advice to leave these out of the musical education designed for the young. SUSEM. (1068)

12 ἄ νῦν ἐ ἱλιῦθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγώνας κτλ] Comp. Athen. xiv. 629 b, καὶ τὰ σχῆματα μετέφερον ἐντεῦθεν (sc. ἐκ τῆς χειρονομίας) εἰς τῶν χοροὺς, ἐκ δὲ τῶν χορών εἰς τὰς παλαιότρας. § 8] tα τοιαύτα I.e. the practice of pieces not thus excluded, on instruments (such as the lyre) which are not prohibited μέχρι περ = only until.

14 Comp. with this stock phrase c. 5 § 17—19. This tends to form character.

15 τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς] Cp. c. 5 § 15, 1340 a 4 with n. (1040) on την
δὴλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποιοὶς ὀργάνοις χρηστέον.§ 9 οὔτε γὰρ αὐλοῦς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτὲ ἄλλο τι τεχνικὸν ὀργάνον, οἷον κιθάραν κἂν εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο ἔστων, ἀλλ' ὁσα ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἄκροατας ἁγαθοὺς ἢ τῆς μουσικῆς παι-

18 τι omitted by Π⁴ P⁵ Ar. Bk. || 19 ἄλλο ἔστων Π¹, ἄλλο ἑτερῶν ἔστων Π⁴ (corr.), ἑτερὸν ἔστω with all other authorities Bk. || 20 παιδίας Γ Μ¹

ηδονὴν φυσικὴν. Aristotle means that sensuous charm, that tickling of the ears, produced by every kind of music, good or bad, simply as music by its native means of expression, harmony, melody, rhythm. A feeling for rhythm is, to a greater or less extent, innate in all men: Prol. c. 4 § 7, 1448 b 20 f. Comp. Döring p. 114 f. See Probl. xix. 38, 920 b 29—30. It will be seen, c. 7 § 6, that some scope is allowed to this inferior pleasure. Plato indeed, Laxos ii 655 d, shrinks from adopting the standard of pleasure: καίτοι λέγουσι γε οἱ πλεῖστοι μουσικῆς ὀρθότητα εἰστι τὴν ἡδονὴν τάς φυσιάς περὶζουσιν δύναμιν. ἄλλα τούτο μὲν οὔτε ἄνεκτοι οὔτε διόν τὸ παράπαν φυλέγγειν, τοῦτον οὖν φύσιμον ὑποκειμένον συμβάλλει τερατῶδες.

τῶν ἄλλων ἐνία [φων] The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined Eind. Eth. iii. 2. 8, 1231 a 2 ff.: οὐδὲν γὰρ, δι' αὑτὶ καὶ αὑτὸν λόγον, φαίνεται πάντων [sc. τὰ] θηρία] αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροασίᾳ τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μὴ τί ποιον ὑπερβάλλει τερατωδή. § 9 § 18 αὐλοῦς] Usually translated by 'flute.' But in reality the instrument had a mouth-piece (στήναυς), with a vibrating reed (στεφόσα) fitted in it, so that it more closely resembled our 'clarinet.' The στεφύγες μουνόκαλαμος may have represented the modern flute. Hom. Il. X. 13 mentions both, αὐλῶν συριγγῶν τ' ἐνοπην. The αὐλὸς was always played in pairs (Latin tibiae, cp. § 13, 1341 b 4, αὐλοῦς), the two instruments being connected by a leathern strap, φορμεία, worn round the mouth. See Westphal Gesch. der alten Musik p. 86 ff.; cp. L. van Jan De fidibus Graecorum p. 5 ff. Plato Rep. iv. 399 D permits both Lyre and κιθάρα to be used in teaching; on the other hand, he restricts the instruction to be given to a yet greater extent than Aristotle. Comp. Laxos vii. 812 c ff., and infra c. 7 § 9, n. (1105). See Westphal Gesch. der alten Musik p. 86 ff.; cp. L. van Jan De fidibus Graecorum p. 5 ff. Plato Rep. iv. 399 D permits both Lyre and κιθάρα to be used in teaching; on the other hand, he restricts the instruction to be given to a yet greater extent than Aristotle. Comp. Laxos vii. 812 c ff., and infra c. 7 § 9, n. (1105).

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Kepion a pupil of Terpander, Plut. De musica c. 6, 1233 c, invented the κιθάρα about 700 b.C. This was the ordinary instrument used by professional players and solo-singers. It possessed greater resonance, being of the shape here shown.
δείας ἡ τῆς ἄλλης· ἐτι δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ αὐτὸς ἡθικὸν ἀλλὰ (VI) μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικὸν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καίροις χρηστεύον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἡ μά-
§ 10 θεσιν. προσθώμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον πρὸς 25 παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρησταὶ τὴν ἀφήσιν. (p. 143)
διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκιμασαν αὐτῷ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρήσην ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶ-
§ 11 τον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικότεροι γὰρ γενόμενοι διὰ τῶν ἑυπτυχίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐτι τε πρότερον

21 ἦ καὶ Π1 || ἐτι δὲ ΓΠ Αρ. Σουσέμ.1 in the text, ἐτι δ’ Βκ., ἐπειδὴ Σουσέμ.2 || ὁ αὐτὸς Μ1, id ἔρισμα William || 23 δύναται before κάθαρσιν Γ1, after μᾶλλον Π1Π5 Bk., thus allowing hiatus || 24 αὐτῷ after ἐναντίον Π1Π5 Bk., avoiding hiatus || 28 γενόμενοι Schneider, γενόμενοι Μ1 Π1, γεγόμενοι Π2Π5 Βκ.1 || 29 τὴν omitted by Π8Τ5 Τ6 Αλδ. Bk.

δείας must depend on ἄγαθοις: 'such only as will improve the hearers of them in respect of their musical or general education.'

21 The change of ἐτι δε to ἐπειδὴ is thus defended Quaes. crit. coll. p. 421: Aristotle diss. quidem v. 17 sqq. ἥθελν δ’ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποιεῖ ὀργιασμὸς κτλ., sed nondum docuit cur hoc sit ἐπιλογὸς ἐκ τού-
tων. Secundum demum haec cause. Ergo hoc quoque loco non ἐτι δὲ scripsit, sed ἐπειδή. SUSEM.

22 ὀργιαστικὸν] I.e. it produces an ecstatic frame of mind, it intoxicates with excitement and elevation of the feelings. This appears plainly from c. 7 §§ 3 4 8 9. Cp. also c. 5 §§ 22 23, Excursus iv. p. 628 nn. (1054, 1092), and especially n. (1107). SUSEM. (1072)

Since ἡθικὸν = expressing character, ὀργιαστικὸν should mean expressing orgies or fanatical excitement. It is because this wild, excited music interprets the excesses of religious frenzy, that it also accompanies and stimulates them. See n. on c. 5 § 17.

ὡςτε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους κτλ] "Hence the flute should be used at such times when the effect of the concert is to purge the emotions and not to instruct."

23 κάθαρσιν] Here occurs for the first time the idea of purging or curing emotion by means of emotion. How is this effect of music related to the three already discussed (1329 a 16 ff., b 13 πό-
tερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδίαν ἢ διαγωγὴν sc. ἰδεῶν). For the present we are only told that it differs from παιδεία, that pleasurable enjoyment which goes to form character. But we receive no informa-
tion as to its relation to the recreation which music affords (παιδία, ἀνάπαυσις) or the full aesthetic enjoyment which belongs to διαγωγή, the highest intellectual gratification. See p. 638, Excursus v. n. (1101). SUSEM. (1073)

Besides its literal meaning cleansing (καθαρεύω) which is necessarily vague, κάθαρσις has two definite metaphorical senses: (1) religious, or rather liturgical, purifying= lustratio, expiatio; (2) medical (or rather pathological) purging. The latter metaphor is prominent in Aristotle: but his usage of the term constitutes a distinct application (3) in a psychological sense, emotional relief followed by refine-
ment of the emotions. See the passages cited in the 'Note on κάθαρσις' p. 641 ff.

24 αὐτῷ is αὐλῶ. "Besides, it hap-
pens to tell against the educational use of the flute, that playing upon it hinders singing." Here λόγος approximates to the meaning of φωνὴ, cp. n. (26).

26 Probably ἐκ implies that they not only 'disallowed its use' but excluded it or withheld it from the hands of the young. So 1336 b 7, 1321 a 25.

§ 11 28 σχολαστικότεροι] More fitted for leisure, qualified to use it intelligen-
tely: cp. viii(v). 11. 5 συλλόγοις σχολαστικοῖς. Better fitted by their in-
creased resources for leisure, fired with loftier aspirations after excellence, even earlier as well as in the full flush of their achievements after the Persian wars they began to lay hold on every form of learn-
ing without distinction, pushing their re-
search onward." "To this stirring gene-
ration, active in striking out new paths, belonged Hippodamus" (Newman).
The χορηγὸς was a rich citizen, selected to defray the expenses incurred in the training and equipment of a chorus, whether for lyric poetry, or for comedy or tragedy. So a 36 χορηγὸς. SUSEM. (1974)

34 ἐπεχώριασεν] As in 1336 a 16 u. The flute was more at home in Boeotia, where it is recorded of Epaminondas, as something exceptional, that he had learnt to accompany his singing on the lyre.

35 δὴ λοιπὸν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πῖνακος] There can be no question this appeal to the 'tablet' resembles that in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 4 to the statue of Diphilus.

36 πῖνακος δὲν ἀνέθηκε κτλ.] The most ancient Attic comic poets of note were Chionides and Magnes, Poet. 3 § 5, 1448 a 34 (cp. 5. 2, 1449 b 3), the next in order Ekphantides and Cratinus, of whose poetry fragments were extant, the oldest of them being from the pen of Ekphantides, who on this account is erroneously described by the anonymous commentator upon Book iv of the Nic. Eth. (iv. 2, 20, 1123 a 23 f.) as the earliest poet of the Old Comedy. We only possess a few insignificant fragments of his, principally quoted by this scholiast; but we know the title of one of his works 'the Satyrs' (Athen. 1. 96 c). See Meineke Fragn. com. Gr. 1. p. 35 ff., 11. p. 12 ff. At the time when Thrasippus was his choregos, Ekphantides won the first prize. The word πῖνακες refers to the custom which compelled the victorious choregos to dedicate in honour of himself and his tribe a brazen tripod, with an inscription upon the pedestal, either at the temple of Apollo near the theatre or at one of the temples situated in the street leading to the theatre, which from this fact received the name of (τρίποδας) the street of tripods. The tripod was then as a rule erected upon the temple, but sometimes placed inside it. See Paus. 1. 20. 1 ff., cp. Plut. Them. 5, Demosth. xxi. 6. We possess a considerable number of inscriptions of this kind, which for the most part relate to dithyrambic (cyclic) choruses, and in these the names of the flute-player, the poet or chorus master, the archon, and sometimes the principal actor are mentioned, as well as the name of the tribe to which the choregos belonged and the species of drama represented. SUSEM. (1976)

See however Haigh Attic Theatre p. 53 f. "The memorials of victory erected by the choregoi to the dramatic choruses appear to have taken the form of tablets (πῖνακες). For instance, Themistocles after his victory with a tragic chorus erected a 'tablet' in honour of the event. It is a trait in the character of the mean man in Theophrastos, that when he has been successful with a tragic chorus, he erects merely a wooden scroll (Char. 22 πανια τον τινα) in commemoration of his victory."

37 υστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη Plutarch, Vita Alcibi. c. 2, tells the story that Alcibiades threw away the flute in disgust, with the words αὐλητίσωσαν ὅν τηθίαν πᾶσες οὐ γάρ ἦσαι διαλέγεσθαι. He adds that both by jest and earnest Alcibiades tried to stop the practice of learning the flute: δὲν εἶξεν εἴσεπτο κομίδῃ τῶν ἐλευθέρων διατριβῶν καὶ προπλακισθήναι παντάπασαν δο αὐλός. The connexion of cause and effect can hardly be accepted. Still, no doubt the famous αὐλητὰi who were applauded at Athens were as a rule strangers, and two of the greatest, Antigenidas and Timothens, were Boeotians.


§ 13 39 πολλὰ...ἀρχαίων, sc. ἀπεθανομένων.

§ 13 συντεινοῦν ὑμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὀργανῶν τῶν ἀρχαίων, 40 οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἣδυν ὑποκείμενα τοῖς ἀκούοντες τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγοναι καὶ τρίγοναι καὶ σαμβύκαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεόμενα χειρουργικῆς ἐπιστήμης. εὐλόγως δὲ ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων 8 μεμυθολογημένων. φασὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν εὑροῦσαν ἀπὸ-

§ 14 βαλεῖν τοὺς αὐλοὺς. οὐ κακὸς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ διὰ 5 τὴν ἀσχήμοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποίησαι δυσχεράσασαν τὴν θεόν ὡς μὲν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰκός ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν

38 καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἁρέτην omitted by M* and P2 (1st hand) || 40 πηκτίδες P2, πηκτίδες P4, ποητήδες P5, πηκτάδες Thomas Ar.

1341 b 1 σαμβύκαι Göttling, ἰαμβοῖ 11, σαμβύκαι Π2 Π5 Ar. and P3 in the margin, ἰαμβοῖ Susem. 1 || 2 αὐλῶν] ἀυλόν 1 Μ* || 3 δὴ omitted by Ε1, [δὴ] Susem. 1 || 4 μὲν οὖν] enim William, οὖν omitted, a lacuna being left, in Μ* (1st hand, supplied by a later hand) || 6 θεόν Π5 Sb Tb

§ 13 39 πολλὰ...ἀρχαίων, sc. ἀπεθανομένων.


eὑροῦσαν ἀποβαλεῖν] The Satyr Marsyas is said to have picked up the flute which Athene threw away, and to have played upon it: and for this the goddess punished him. The earliest extant allusion to this legend is in a dithyramb of Marsyas' by Melanippides Frag. 2. α μὲν 'Ἀθάνα | τῷ ὑραγόν έρρυψιν θ' ἔρις ἀπὸ χειρῶν εἰτὲ τ' ἔρρητ' αἰσχεῖα, σῶματι λέγει: to which the contemporary poet Telestes replied in his 'Argo' Frag. 1, διὶ σοφὸν σοφὰν λαβόνων οὐκ ἐπελποκεῖτο νῦν δρομοῖς ὀρέσιων ὑραγον | διὰ 'Ἀθάναν δυσοἴσθαμον ἀγάμος ἐκφεύξθησαν ἀδέας ἐκ χειρῶν βαλεῖν, | νυμφαγενεῖ χειροτύπῳ φηρὶ Μαρσύας κλέος. | τῷ γὰρ μὲν εὔφρατοι κάλλεος δόξος ἐρως ἐτέρων, | ἀ παρθενίαν ἀγάμον καὶ ἀμαῖδ' ἀπένειμε Κλωθώ; see Athen. XIV. 616 b, l. (J. G. Schneider). In other legends the Phrygian Marsyas is himself the inventor of the flute; an enthusiastic singer and flute-player in the service of Cybele, he is, like all Satyrs and Sileni in Asiatic myths, one of the deities of rivers and fountains in the train of the Phrygian Dionysus. In this character he encounters Apollo, the representative of the music of the kithara, by whom he is defeated and punished. In Lydian legend Pan replaces Marsyas as the rival of Apollo and the teacher of Olympus. See Preller Griech. Mythol. I. p. 176 f., 508, 510, 576 ff., 585. Hyagnis also, a Phrygian, or Mysian, the supposed father of Marsyas, was sometimes called the inventor of the flute: and Olympus himself, who was believed to be the pupil of Marsyas, is at one time called a Phrygian and at another a Mysian, pointing to the origin of this kind of music in Asia Minor, whether in Phrygia, Mysia, or Lydia (see Exc. II and IV). The authorities to consult for the above are Plut. De musica 14, 1135 E, Alex. Polyhist. Fr. 52 apud Plut. ib. 5, 1132 F, Heracleid. ib. 7, 1133 E, Strabo x. 324, Schol. in Aesch. Persas 933, Suidas s. v. Ὀλύμπος. Comp. Pl. Laws iii. 677 d, Synth. 215 c, Ps-Pl. Minos 318 b: and for the whole section nn. (288, 297). Susem. (1078) § 14 6 οὐ μὲν ἄλλα κτλ] "Not but what a more likely reason is the fact, that instruction in the flute contributes nothing to the culture of the intelligence. For to Athene we ascribe science and art." Susem. (1079) For διάσωσι cp. n. (1023) on φρόνησις: it has been opposed to ἔθος c. 2 § 1, and in III. 11. 2, 1281 b 7. With περιβείναι in this sense Bonitz joins Rhet. 1. 9. 40, 1368 a 29, μέγεθος περιβείνα (ταῖς πράξεσι) 'to invest exploits with importance.'
ουδέν ἐστιν ἡ παϊδεία τῆς αὐτόλησως. τῇ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶ τὴν ἑπτα-(V) στήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τῇν τέχνην.

§ 15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὄργανων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζοντες την τεχνικὴν παϊδείαν (τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἱδνον, καὶ ταύτης φορτικώς, διούτερον οὐ τῶν εὐερήμων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ θητικώτεραν, καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι.

§ 16 τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὅ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, τὸ γὰρ θεατῆς φορτικῶς ὁν μεταβάλλει εἰσάγει τὴν μουσικήν, ὡστε καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετώντας αὐτοὺς 7 τε ποιοῦσι τίνας ποιεῖ καὶ σῶματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις. σκέπτεσθαι [δ] ἐπὶ περὶ τὲ τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ρυθμοὺς, καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν πότερον ταῖς ἀρμονίαις πάσαις ἁρπαζούν.

7 γὰρ Susem., δὲ Γ Π Bk. Susem. 1 in the text, cum Gr. || 12 παιδιάν III (emended with τρις prefixed by p3 in the margin) || 14 τῆς τῶν II 6, 1, 6, 1, 99, 6, 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 1, 6. (565) B. Susem. (1080)

12 φορτικῶς] Because the spectator is φορτικός, b 16. Comp. ἐπο. c. 26 § 1, 1461 b 27 ff. ἐι γὰρ ἡ ἤπτον φορτική (se. μέσος) βεβλίων, ποιήσῃ δὴ ἡ πρὸς βέβλιας θεάς: also Lactan. II, 655 D (quoted in II, 655 D). || μενον ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ἁρπαζεῖν II 6, 1, 6, 1, 6. (565) B. Susem. (1080)

14. θητικώτεραν] Supra 1337 b 21 n. § 16 14 συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι] Cp. ὄδον γὰρ καλλίερ κθλ c. 6 § 6, 1, 341 a 41. 

17 αὐτούς τε] This is rightly opposed to τὰ σώματα. But whether ποιοῦσι τίνας ‘of a certain character’ should be emended to τοιοῦτον τινὰς φορτικῶς is altogether uncertain. See Quaest. crit. coll. p. 421. Susem.

c. 7 Which musical modes and measures are to be accepted, (1) in general §§ 2—7, (2) for education, §§ 8—15. Which is more important for educational purposes, melody or rhythm (time). The latter question is not considered. Cp. Anal. p. 120. The subject is discussed by Plato at Rep. III. 397—399. § 1 19 With σκέπτεσθαι commences the apodosis corresponding to a protasis ἐπιεῖ ἐδο...κινήσεις, b 9—18: so that unless δὴ is changed to δή, it had better (with Schneider and Bonitz) be omitted: Qu. Gr. coll. p. 421. The difficulties of this long period are discussed by Bonitz Arist. Stil. III. pp. 95—99 (61—65). Susem.

Bonitz suggests β 20 the excision of καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν, (1) because no satisfactory sense can be given to καὶ, (2) because των questions are distinguished, and it is the second one, beginning at ἐπιστά, which has to do with Education. Further he is inclined to extend the period as far as b 32 περὶ αὐτῶν, reading ἐπεὶ δὴ at 23, and making ἐμπάλαιτες μὲν ὀν ποίησιν the apodosis to this (secondary) protasis b 23 ἐπεὶ δὴ...26 εὑρίσκων, on the ground that it is impossible for ἐπεὶ δὴ to introduce a second protasis referring to the preceding apodosis σκέπτεσθαι...ἐπιεῖν.
21 καὶ πάσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς ἡ διαίρεσιν, ἑπειτα τοῖς πρὸς παι-
(II) δεῖαν διαποιου ὁ πότερον τῶν αὐτῶν διορισμοῦ ἢ
τινα ἔτερον, τρίτον δέ, ἑπειδὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ
μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὕτων, τοῦτων δ’ ἐκάτερον οὖ δει λε-25
ηθὲναι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον
προαιρετέων μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελὴ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὐρυθμὸν.
§ 2 νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τῆς
μουσικῶν ἐνίσχυε καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν
ἐμπείρων ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν
30 καθ’ ἐκαστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδόσομεν ζητεῖν τοῖς βουλο-
μένοις παρ’ ἐκεῖνοιν, νῦν δὲ νομικῷς διέλομεν, τοὺς τύπους

21 καὶ πάσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς omitted by P4-V-Sb Th L* || 23 τρίτον δει (δὴ P5 L*)
before τινα ἔτερον Π II Bk., τρίτον δὲ with the transposition Susem. δὲ untranslated
by Ar., [δεὶ] Koraes; Bonitz (Arist. Stud. iii. p. 95 ff.) showed the passage to be
31 νομικῶς in genere Ar., γενικῶς Bas.3 in the margin, λογικῶς Koraes, συντόμως
Flach || διέλομεν P4 Sb Th and M* (1st hand), διέλομεν or διέλομεν apparently Π

21 tois ... diapounous] The dativus
commodi, not the dative after τῶν αὐτῶν.
"Whether for those whose work is educa-
cional we shall make the same division."
After this ἢ τρίτον δει τινα ἔτερον ΠII seems
hopeless. What, asks Bonitz, is to be un-
derstood by τρίτον? Not to speak of the
harshness, if not impossibility, of sup-
plying an infinitive for δει from ἔρωμεν.
22 ἢ τινα ἔτερον, τρίτον δει] Veram
mili emendandi rationem inventam esse
spero, cum ea conicercim. Si haec spec
me non fecellit, v. 25 κατ significat "etiam,"
et sic quidem ferri forsan, sed vel sic
Susem.
25 καὶ πότερον κτλ] In the Introd.
p. 49 (cp. n. 2) it is pointed out that the
discussion of this question is no longer ex-
tant in our present treatise, Susem. (1081)
The whole passage may be rendered:
We have still to consider the question of
musical modes and rhythms: whether all
the modes and all the rhythms should be
employed or a distinction made be-
tween them: secondly, whether the same
distinction will serve for those whose work
is teaching, or whether we shall make a
new one: thirdly, as we find Music to
consist of melody and rhythm, and the
influence which each of them has upon
education ought not to be overlooked,
[also] whether the preference must be
given to goodness of melody or of rhythm.
§ 2 27 Vahlen rightly calls attention
to the close similarity of phrase between
this passage and IV(VII). 1. 2, 1323 a 22.
28 τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κτλ] See nn.
(1055, 1083, 1103). Perhaps intended to
intimate that Plato passed judgment on
these matters without sufficient musical
knowledge. See § 9. Susem. (1082)
31 νομικῶς] 'Formally.' Idem fere
signment atque νόμου χάρων Μetra. xiii(M).
Susem.
The passage from the Metaphysics runs
thus: ἑπειτα μετὰ τὰτα χωρὶς περὶ τῶν
ἰδέων αὐτῶν ἀπώλος καὶ δῶσον νόμον χάρων.
Here ἀπώλο α seems to mean 'in general
terms,' much as καθόλου (so Endemus
συντόμως in the parallel passage E. E. 1. 8,
1217 b 19), and not with Bonitz = simply
(a sense nearly akin to χωρὶς; quas-
tionem de numeris et de principiis cum
hae de ideis quaeestiones nondum vult con-
jungi). The precise reference in νόμοι too
is disputed. Bonitz refers it to Aristotle's
own practice of criticizing his predeces-
sors: Bernays rendered νόμον χάρων by
dicas causa: Diels disapproving of this
remarks that νόμομον is not ὅσον, nor does
the phrase ὅσις χάρω, and prefers to
render it "to comply with the prevailing
custom, the fashion." It seems best to
modify Bernays' interpretation a little.
The original meaning is "only so far as
to avoid a conflict with the law," i.e.
'under compulsion and reluctantly.' Other
authors use the phrase thus, of what is
done grudgingly, only because it is expected of one, and so may be hastily despatched: e.g. Diphilus Ζωγράφου, Fr. 2 l. 13 apud Athen. vii. 292 A οἵθεν θέλω τοιεί γάρ οίτως, ἀλλ' ὅσον νῦν χάρων, said of a stingy shipowner who has vowed a sacrifice in a storm, is reluctant to pay his vow, and certain to behave shabbily about it. See Bernays Die DiaIogue p. 150, Forchhammer Aristotelis und die exatte-rischen Kleiβ p. 51 f., Diels Monatsh. der Berl. Akad. 1883, p. 488, Susemih in Neue Jahrb. f. Philol. xxix. 1884, p. 272.

§ 3 The construction is ἐπεὶ δὲ... ἀποδεχόμεθα... ὡς διαιροῦσι... καὶ... τίθασι... φαίνει δ' ὅν μᾶς... χάρων (καὶ γὰρ... ἀνάπαυσι) all of which is the protasis, the apodosis beginning with φανέρου. Translate: "We accept the classification of melodies made by certain philosophers into ethical, scenic, ecstatic [literally, according as they represent (1) character, (2) action, and (3) ecstasy], as well as their statement that each class of melodies has a musical mode which is naturally appropriate to it. But we hold that there is more than one advantage in the use of music, its object being both educational and purgative—what we mean by purgation will here be stated in general terms, a clearer explanation to be given hereafter in our treatise on Poetry:—while, thirdly, it is a means to aesthetic enjoyment, to relaxation and recreation after exertion. This makes it evident that all the musical modes must be employed, though not all in the same manner. For educational purposes, only those with the most character; but those significant of action, and the ecstatic modes as well, when we listen to the performances of others."


34 τά μὲν ἠθικά κτλ] This division is based upon the threefold nature of the subject-matter of all imitative art, viz. ὄδος, πράξεις, πάθος: characters, actions, emotions (c. § 8—22, iv[vii]. 17, 10, cp. n. (963)), Poet. c. i § 5, 1447 a 27 f.). For ecstatic modes and melodies do not merely give expression to enthusiasm pure and simple, but also to other painful emotions, see §§ 4—6, § 8 with nn. (1089, 1096, 1101), cp. nn. (1047, 1054). It may be questionable, to say the least of it, whether music can represent actions such as, as well as the feelings which produce and accompany action (e.g. the martial spirit), still the Greeks have, as a matter of fact, made attempts to represent the process of an action by the sequence of feelings excited by purely instrumental music, as in the case of the famous Pythian νόμος (see Hiller 'Sakadas the flute-player' Rhein. Mus. xxxi. 1876, p. 79 ff., Gahrauer Der pythische νόμος Jahrb. für Philol. Suppl. N. S. viii. p. 309 ff.)

This, one of the earliest instances of 'programme music,' depicted the sequence of incidents in the conflict between Apollo and the Python. In any case no doubt we must hold that the πρακτικαί ἀρμονίαι express emotions, but they are of an energetic character, stimulating to vigorous action, and not of an enervating character such as those produced by the ecstatic Modes. Nor must we forget that πράξεις includes the idea of 'scene' as well as 'action,' and at times, e.g. iv[vii]. 17, 10, 1336 b 16 is most correctly rendered by the former expression. SUSEM. (1084)

The second of the three classes (πρακτικὰ μέλη, πρακτικαί ἀρμονίαι) has no direct English equivalent: we must be content to designate them 'modes and melodies of action.' Clearly the first is like ecclesiastical music now, calm and serious; the third the wild excited airs, at once significant of, and fitted to stimulate the orgies of Dionysus or Cybele. But the second depicted some stirring action, as in the Pythian νόμος, or arming for the fray, as in a lost tragedy: Probl. xix. 48, ύδος δὲ ἐχεῖ ἡ μὲν ὑπορευμάτωπρακτικών, διὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ Γηρμόνθη [cp. Nauck Frag.2 p. 762] ἡ ἐξόδος καὶ ἡ ἐξοπλαίας ἐν ταύτῃ πεποίηται.
39 πᾶλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς] Unfortunately this fuller exposition in the Poetics is no longer extant. Vahlen gives good reasons for believing that it came after the discussion of Comedy now lost: see Arist. Aufsätze III. p. 13 s. f. (Wiener Sitzungsber. LXXVII. p. 293 ff.) SUSEM. (1085).

40 τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν] At first sight there is a difficulty, if κάθαρσις and διαγωγή constitute separate ends. What else than διαγωγή, as described above, see n. (1000), could express the aim of the concerts and musical exhibitions which are productive of κάθαρσις more than μαθησις (c. 6 § 9)? Not to mention that it is strange to find, in the received text, διαγωγή apparently explained by ἀνάπαυσις with which it is so often contrasted. Nor is it possible to reconcile the three advantages attendant on the use of music here with the three ends of musical education enumerated c. 5 §§ 2—4 and easily recognisable c. 8 § 9. Comp. Bernays Rhein. Mus. xiv. 1889 p. 371 f. Ueber die tragische Katharsis (ed. 2) p. 125 f. See however Exc. v. p. 638. If the two passages in c. 5 refer exclusively to music as a means of education, all the three ends there given (διαγωγή, παιδεία = ἀρετή, ἀνεσί = ἀνάπαυσις) are summed up under the single phrase παιδείας ἕνεκα of our context. That is, though preparatory to διαγωγή (since those who have not learnt when young can never fully enjoy music), the educational use must be conceived as distinct. Then there is further the emotional or pathological use (κάθαρσις) now introduced for the first time. Plainly, that does not attend on the music employed in education. It should be noted that Zeller (op. c. p. 771 n. 1) insists on a fourfold use here: he would separate from (3) πρὸς διαγωγήν, the following clause (4) πρὸς ἀνεσί τε καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν. 1342 a 3 ταῖς ἡθικῶταταις] In this class the Dorian Mode stands first, as Aristotle says himself § 8. But from Excurs. iv n. (1054) it seems strange he should speak of more than ἡθικῶτατη ἀρμονία, since only the Aeolian and perhaps the antiquated Locrian and Boeotian can go with the Dorian; indeed even the Aeolian forms a transition to the ἀρμονία πρακτική: cp. n. (1103). From Excurs. iv it would appear that Lydian, Hypo-phrygian (Ionian), and possibly Hypo-lydian constitute the next group of πρακτική: while the ecstatic are the Phrygian, Mixolydian, high-pitched Lydian and high-pitched Ionian (unless this was identical with the Mixolydian): see pp. 630, 631. SUSEM. (1086) πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτ. χ.] “But for listening to while other people play,” ἀκρόασις is a conveniently general term
under which κάθαρσις and διαγώγη can be included.

4 καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς] Here καὶ = 'as well as.' For Aristotle would not separate from πρακτικαῖς and εὐνοοιαστικαῖς ἄρμ. such others as, though ἵθικα, do not possess that character in the highest degree and so form the transition to one of the other two species. From Exc. IV these would seem to be the low-pitched Ionian and low-pitched Lydian. Since every painful emotion, though not of course every trace of emotion, is foreign to them, the ἵθικασαι would be exceptions: yet this is not expressly stated: much less is there any express statement that only 'ecstatic modes,' as Döring thinks, exert a cathartic influence, see n. (1101) p. 638 ff. (That this is my view and was maintained by me in Jahrb. f. Phil. LXXV. 1862, p. 416 is admitted by Döring Philologus XXVII. p. 724, though I regret that in Kunstkreis des A. p. 283 he reprints unaltered an incorrect statement about it which appeared Philol. XXI. p. 501.) Not to mention others, the Dorian melodies, apparently the most numerous of all, do not exert any cathartic influence. Further, the plural form in the mention of πρακτικαὶ ἄρμοι should be noticed. Comp. Exc. IV. n. (1054), and § 5, τὰ μὲν ἄρμα with n. (1096). SueSem. (1087, 1088)

The important point to seize is that the ecstatic music had no direct ethical, but only a pathological, effect. In fact, the absence of a direct ethical effect prevents it from being used in education.

Zeller, p. 774, n. (2).

§§ 4, 5 The link of connexion with the preceding seems to be that the public performance of music in the ecstatic 'modes' calls for justification. Döring differently (p. 256): 'Every species of music has its special province, the 'ethical' music in παύεια, the 'ecstatic' in κάθαρ-
σις [see however n. 1007], the πρακτικαί perhaps as military music. Besides this, every species of music may be used for enjoyment. This last proposition needs no further proof, so far as the first two species ἵθικα and πρακτικά are concerned: in respect of ecstatic music it sounds a little startling. In order therefore to explain it, and the term κάθαρσις as well, Aristotle proceeds with §§ 4, 5. This enables him to give the explanation of κάθαρσις in general terms (ἀπλῶς) as the effect of certain melodies upon a form of religious frenzy, κοριβαστιασμὸς." The fact last stated is partially corroborated by a passage from Aristides Quintilianus II. p. 157 Meib.; Döring p. 332. Translate: "For the emotion which violently affects some souls is present in all though in a greater or less degree. This is true of pity and terror, true also of ecstasy. Some persons are liable to seize by this form of morbid excitement. Now as the effect of the sacred melodies we see that such persons, under the treatment of the melodies which excite frenzy in the soul, fall back into the normal state, as if they had undergone a medical cure or purga-
tion." It is also possible to take ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν μελών with ὁρόμενον: 'we see from the sacred melodies etc.' Cp. Hafgrors p. 13 f. 7 οἶον ἄλος καὶ φόβος] From the whole context it is more than probable that fear and pity are here adduced not with reference to their influence in Tragedy (see my Introd. to the Poetics pp. 36—67), but like ecstasy, with reference merely to the cathartic effect of music, so that the beneficial excitement of fear and pity by music expressing these emotions is here given by way of illustration. See c. 5 § 18 n. (1047), 7 § 3 (1084), § 5 (1096), § 8 (1101). SueSem. (1089)

With this view Mr Newman appears to concur: Introd. p. 366 "for though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse feelings of enthusiasm or fear or pity, and purge these emotions, are useful only to a few over-fraught spirits, this is not really so: all are more or less in need of music of this kind and relieved by it. The melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent plea-
sure."

Bernay in his usual manner completes the sentence thus: 'e.g. pity and terror.
8 ταυτης της κινησεως κατακωχιμοι τινες εισιν' εκ των θ (VII)
ιερων μελων ορωμεν τουτοις, οταν χρησωμαι τοις εξορμα-
ξουσι την ψυχην μελεσι, καθισταμενους οσπερ ιατρειας τυ-
χωντας και καθαρσεως. ταυτο δη τουτο ἀναγκαιον παςχειν ελ

8 δ ') δε before των P46 L'Ald. Bk., after ιερων P66 || 9 [ὅταν...τοις μέλεσι]
Susem.3, see p. 640 || 10 καθισταμενως II P3 (corrected by p1) || τυχωντα M11,
tυχωνας possibly Γ || 11 [κατ] Spengel, τῆς ? Ueberweg formerly, <τῆς> [κατ]
Susem., see Comm. n. (1094) || δη] δε Γ, perhaps rightly

(are violently present in those liable to pity and terror, but in a less degree in all men').

8 κατακωχιμοι] ‘Liable to be possessed, attacked.’ So also with ecstasy. Any one may be seized by slight frenzy, but in some it amounts to a disease, κωψωμαισιωμας. Plato uses κωτωχις for inspiration, Phaedr. 245 A, Ion 536 c. Cp. Zeller p. 777 n. i. (Note that all the mss agree here and 1269 b 30 in an irrational form. But in Nic. Eich. x. 9, 3, 1170 b 9 Kb gives κατωχιμον.)

εκ των δ ιερων μελων] Join with καθισταμενους, not with ορωμεν. See Burian's Jahresber. LVII. p. 174 [and Bonitz Indl. Ar. 356 a 41]. These are assumed to be the same as the melodies of Olympus, mentioned c. 5 § 16. See Exc. II. p. 621. Susem. (1090)

9 οταν χρησωμαι] “When they have used the melodies” in the same sense in which we speak of using remedies. Cp. n. (1095), and p. 641 f. Susem. (1091)

ιικε κινησαις, καθιστασθαι, κουφζθεθαι, this is a medical term. Cp. Hippocr. III. 712 K. της φαρμακιας χρεσθαι, III. 859 κουφζοις χρεσθαι, I. 82 την αυτην χρησιαν (remedy, treatment) αει προσδε-
χεθαι (Döring). And this, notwithstanding the more general sense of τη μοναζη χρησθαι above, 1341 b 37. It might seem doubtful, from the context alone, whether the patient only listened to, or sang; the maddening strains. Aristides Quintil. implies that both were practised; ἐκ κατασκαλτεν (sc. την ψυχην) φαιν ειναι τη μελωδια, ἤτοι και αυτοις μικαρει τωι της φυσεως ἀλογων ἀσωμελιστομενους… η και δι’ ακοης [φωεις] φωβων τοιωδει ἀσωμελιστομενους, “the soul must, they say, be soothed by melody, either the patients themselves must appease its irrational state by a certain (musical) imitation (of the frenzy), or they must divert such terror from themselves by listening.”

[εξορμαξουσι] See ὀργαστικον, 1341 a 22, n. (1072), and ὀργαστικα, 1342 b 3, n. (1107). Susem. (1092)

10 καθισταμενους] The expression pro-

perly means ‘are cured,’ ‘recover’ = return to themselves, as Döring has shown [see Step. s. v. L and S. quote only ἐστιν καθ. Hippocr. 97, add i. 206, 208]. These terms however are not used of temporary, or palliative, restoration (such as is referred to here), but only of a permanent cure. In other passages of Aristotle καθιστασθαι simply means ‘to calm oneself,’ to settle down after excitement, with no suggestion of a medical sense; e.g. De Menov. c. 2 § 29, 453 a 271, διο καὶ ὑρεγα καὶ φρονε, ὅταν τι κινησαις, ἀντικυσωντων τῶν τούτων ὑ
cαθιστασθαι, De Somn. c. 3 § 25, 461 a 25, ἥ δε τρόφιμοι καὶ μὴ νοσόδους (ανα-
θυμίασις) καταφέρεται συνισταμεν. Even here this sense would be very appropriate. Cp. καθιστασθαι Rhet. i. 11, 1, 1369 b 34. See also n. (1093), p. 640. Susem. (1093)

ὁσπερ ιατρειας τυχωνας και κα-
θαρσεως] The ὀσπερ marks the intro-
duction of a metaphor: both ιατρεια and καθαρσει are metaphorical, the latter the more specific term (Bernays).

This does not hold in the case of those who are sound in mind and possess exactly the right measure of emotional excitability, nor of those who are naturally too little disposed to emotion. As regards the former the medical analogy is only applicable in a precautionary sense, as when for instance a man of sound body must take boily exercise to prevent illness, and in any case is refreshed and invigorated by a walk and finds pleasure and recreation in it. The latter are less susceptible to the power of music, and in so far as they are susceptible, it will be the excitable and not the purgative side of this homeopathy of the feelings which will be most prominent, that is to say the really homeopathic element will be least represented. Susem. (1094)

Comp. II. 7. 11, 1267 a 7 f., δια την ταυτης (sc. ἐπιθυμιας) ἀδικησονων ιατρειαν.

§ 5 “So too of necessity with those who are liable to pity and fear, and persons of emotional temperament in
generally, and with the rest of men in such measure as they are susceptible of this or that emotion; they have a like experience; they all undergo a purgation of some sort and feel a pleasurable relief." Under the former case (Corybantism) come only morbid patients: here the world at large are included. However slight the degree in which they are subject to pity and fear, still, so far as these passions have a hold upon them, they participate, in every-day life, in the same beneficent effect which frees the 'o'er fraught heart' from its accumulation of emotion in critical moments. This is the normal effect of music and upon it attends the constant concomitant of normal activity, pleasure (μεθ' ἰδονής).

13 καθ' ὀσον ἐπιβάλλει] In proportion to their susceptibility to such emotions. See 1260 a 19, 1261 b 33 n. Bernays p. 88 (188) shows that the principle of the cure of Bacchic delirium (Corybantism) was observed by Plato (Latos VII. 790 f.), though he never applied it to anything but the nursing of infants. Aristotle, observes Butler, "with his generalising faculty and his love of discovering unity in different domains of life, extended the principle to tragedy and hints at even a wider application." However, on the whole the two are violently opposed as to the treatment of emotion, Bernays p. 46 (164) ff.

14 τινα κάθαρσιν] This implies that the catharsis is not in all cases precisely of the same kind. The catharsis of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, that of "enthusiasm" or morbid ecstasy. See the note on κάθαρσις p. 641. Susem. (1095)


§ 6 15 τά μέλη τά καθαρτικά] Thus the authorities. Sauppe's emendation tā πρακτικά was adopted in Susem24. See Excursus v. p. 638 f. especially p. 649 n. 1, and generally n. (1089). Susem. (1096)

In handling a locus classicus like this, excessive caution is no sin. Yet it must be allowed that the reading of the MSS. leaves the sentence enigmatic. (1) Does it merely emphasize τά μέλη as opposed to ἀρμονία, 4? This can hardly be, though apparently Mr Newman thus takes the passage (see the quotation given above after n. 1089). For μέλη are mentioned a 9 f., not to urge with Thurot Etudes p. 103 that Aristotle as little distinguishes between ἀρμονία and μέλη as a modern critic between the keys in which music is written and the compositions themselves, passing naturally from the one to the other, and contrasting them indifferently with μεθυσόλ; see e.g. 6 § 5, 1341 a 1, 7 § 10, 1342 b 5 f. (2) Does it introduce a new species of airs? But surely, those treated in a 4—15 must be καθαρτικά. The new species should be πρακτικά—of which nothing has been said. Unless indeed any one maintains, as against n. (1089), that the effect of tragedy is alluded to § 5, a 11—15, and this apparently meaningless clause returns to the consideration of music. (3) Or does it introduce a new effect (χαρά ἀβδαββής) of the music whose cathartic effect has been described in 4—15? If so, the 'harmless delight' would be contrasted with the cathartic effect in which pleasure is blended with, and follows, painful emotions. Zeller p. 774 n. (2) says that music purges the παθητικός, and affords enjoyment to all. Döring p. 260 finds a contrast between (1) the extraordinary, curative effect, κάθαρσις ἀπλώς, of morbid patients (whether suffering from the malady of Bacchic frenzy, or hypochondriac through excessive pity and terror), and (2) the normal cathartic effect of ecstatic music heard at concerts under ordinary circum-
\[\text{§ 6} \text{ χεί χαράν ἀβλαβή τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύ-} \]
\[\text{ταις ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι ** θετέον τοὺς τὴν} \]
\[\text{[θεατρικήν]} \text{ μονοσκήνας μεταχειριζόμενους ἀγνωστάς (ἔπει δὲ ὁ} \]
\[\text{θεατὴς διττός, ὃ μὲν ἔλευθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὃ δὲ} \]
\[\text{φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συν-} \]
\[\text{§ 7} \text{ κείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἄγωνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις} \]
\[\text{πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν εἰσὶ δὲ ὦσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρε-} \]
\[\text{στραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεσι, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων} \]

16 χώραν Π1 (emended in P1 by corr.1) and P2 (corr.1) \[\text{|| 17} \text{ θετέον P3-5 St Th L Ar.} \]
\[\text{Ald. and P1 (corr.1) P4 (1st hand, emended in the margin with γρ. prefixed),} \]
\[\text{<χριστα> εἰς τῶν Ed. Müller ii. p. 63, <χρίστα> θετέον Spengel, both plausible:} \]
\[\text{Koraes detected the error: παθευτέων Jebb || τοῦς} \]
\[\text{πρὸς St Th and P4 (in the margin, with} \]
\[\text{γρ. prefixed): omitted by M*} \[\text{|| 18} \text{ θεατρική written above the line as a gloss by} \]
\[\text{p5, omitted by P1 Ar. and P2 (1st hand), added by Bk. with all other authorities} \]
\[\text{|| 19} \text{ ἔλευθερος ? Susem. || 22 εἰσὶ] ἐστὶ Bk.2} \]

stances. Bernaytranslated (from Bekker's text): "now in the same manner as other means of catharsis the cathartic melodies procure for men innocent delight. Therefore it must be laid down by law that those who perform the music for the theatre" which is intended to provide innocent delight "should come forward with such modes and melodies." The objection to this is the forced meaning of ὄμοιος. The means of catharsis just mentioned are melodies: where is there a distinct suggestion of any other? Certainly not in ταυτὸ τοῦτο πάσχειν. Busse moreover ὁρ. c. p. 49 accepts the correction πρακτικά.

§ 6 "Hence it is such modes and such melodies that we must prescribe for the virtuosi, who take up music professionally, to employ in their performances. But as there are two types of audience, the one of birth and education, the other the vulgar audience of mechanics and day-labourers and the like, entertainments and competitions must be found to provide even these latter with recreation."


17 θετέον] The construction with the dative would follow more smoothly if χρίσται were supplied, οὐ ἄγωνισθαι in place of ἄγωνιστάς. Still the meaning is clear. In τοῦτο...μεταχειριζόμενοι it is not hard to discover τοῦτο ἀντί τοῦτο πεπαιδευμένους ἐργαν καὶ τέχνην of c. 5 § 6, 1339 a 37. The care shown for the amusements of the lower class of citizens is worthy of Plato and the Republic.

20 ἐκ βαναύσων...συγκείμενος] As an attribute of θεατὴς this is curious. Perhaps we may cite as parallel Cic. De Finibus ii. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus negoti est, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, or ad Att. iv. 15. 1, ut est me ex et te inunct Dionysius M. Pomponius.

21 ἄγωνας καὶ θεωρίας These musical contests and competitions seem to have excited the keenest interest, and to have led to brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty being practised even at school; c. 6 § 7, § 16.

§ 7 "Just as their souls are distorted from their natural state, so too amongst the musical modes there are some perverse forms and amongst melodies the high-strung and falsely coloured, but as its own natural affinity gives every class pleasure, we must allow the artists who perform before such an audience to use the corresponding style of music."

22 ὦσπερ αὐτῶν...23 ἔξεσι] Comp. n. (103), and above c. 6 §§ 15, 16, n. (1080). But on the other hand see the praise of the great public as a critic in art. iii. 11. 2, n. (656 b). Susem. (1097)

23 καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις] It is not easy to determine with certainty which modes are meant. Perhaps he was thinking of the 'wailing and mournful' music of the mixo-Lyian and high-pitched Lydian principally: it may have been of the 'lax and effeminate' low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian. See c. 5 § 22, also Exc. iv. n. (1054). Susem. (1098)
parakebásieis eisí kai tòv n melan tòv súntovn kai parake- (VII) 
25 chrōsména, poiēi dè tìn ãkoustoí to katá fúswn 
oikeión, diáster ápodoténon exousían tòis ágounizómenois prós 
tòv thetín tòv tòouýtov tòouýtw tìv chrísthai tò gênei tìs 
§ 8 mousoikíhs): prós dè paideían, ósster érhnetai, tòis ãthikóis tòv n 
meión chrístéon kai tais ãrmoníais tais toiaútous. toiaútia 
30 ò' ò dorístai, katháter éptoménon próteron déxhshai dè dê 
káv tina álhn ãmèn dokimásoi oí koinwov tòi tò en fí-
§ 9 lousofía diatribíhs kai tís peri tìn mousoikính paideían. ó 
ò' òn tì politeía. Sôkráthn ou kalos tìn fíwngísti mónvn

24 parakephorámeva Ip (emended by p1 in the margin with γρ. prefixed) and P2
|| 28 paideían Ip (emended by p1 in the margin) and P2 (1st hand, emended by corr.1)
|| 30 ðorísth P4.5

24 parakephorómevá] A technical term for varieties of the three genera—
diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic. See Excursus IV. p. 636. SUSEM. (1099)
25 poiéi dé kta] Apelt Beiträge zur Gesch. d. Phil. p. 325 (1) thinks this, in 
connexion with N. E. VII. 14. 2. 1154 a 12, points to a division of pleasures into 
physikà and anagkaià. He compares Epicurus' division of építhumíes and 
Nemesius De Natura Hominíc. c. 18 peri ã- 

dównov. 27 toioútw tìv] i.e. a corrupt, 

§ 8 28 ósster érhnetai] In § 3, 1342 
a 3, prós mén tòn paideían tais ãkoustátàs. 
See Exc. v. p. 638. SUSEM. (1100)
We have now reached the end of the 
long discussion, §§ 4—7, following on 
the mention of modes suitable for public 
performance prós ákrasán étéron chrísfor-
gonvntwn: we have in fact answered the first 
question of c. 3 § 1 práteron prásws chrí-
stéon. The connexion of the whole 
weakening the advantages of the text, is 
discussed Exc. v. p. 638 ff. SUSEM. (1101)
30 próteron] In c. 3 § 22, 1340 b 3 ff. 
Comp. n. (1054) p. 628. The previous 
statement (óste Òxew méxos kal kathetst-
kótos màlsata prós étéron, ón dòkei 
piaen ò ã. múny ãrmoníov) is not quite 
to the same effect. In one sense it includes more than is found here; cp. n. (1109). 
What has been pointed out n. (1086) 

31 ói koinwov...32 paideías] Here the 

§ 9 Socrates in the Republic is incon-
sistent: he rejects the flute, but tolerates the 
Phrygian Mode.

ò' òn tì politeía. S.] This is the 
normal, explicit manner of referring to 
Socrates, the character in the dialogue 
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The passage in Kerp. III. 399 a runs thus: álla kaiwthen kai sêwmati leiptetha kai 

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§ 9 Socrates in the Republic is incon-
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en εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίῳ ἀλλ’ ἐν ἐκούσιών προδείξεως, ἢ τινά τε πεθυμόντος τε καὶ δεσμοῦν, ἢ εὐχή θεόν καὶ διαδίκης καὶ νοοθετέως ἄνθρωπον, τούτων τῶν ἀλλοι δομέομεν ἢ διάσκεπτον καὶ μεταπείθοντες ἑαυτῶν ἐπέχομεν, καὶ έκ τῶν τοπίων πράξαντα κατά τούς, καὶ μὴ ὑπερήφανον ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σοφρόνως τε καὶ μετρῶς. Ἐν παίτι τούτων πράξαντες τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνων ἁγάπων. ταῦτα διὸ ἁμώνιοι βιαίων, έκοφεούς, δυστυχῶντων, εὐγνωμόνων, σοφρόνως, ἀνδρείων αἰτίων φύλογος μεμίονται μάλαστα, ταῦτα λείπε. As with the musical instruments, n. (1071), so in the case of the modes Aristotelian is stricter than Plato, since in truth—see in. (1080, 1102, 1104, 1109)—the Dorian Mode is the only one which he retains for the purpose of moral education. SUSEM. (1106).

44 ἀποδοκιμάσας...τοῦν αὐλόν Pl. Rer. III. 399 B: τί δὲ; αὐλοποιήσαι ἢ αὐλητάς πραδεξεῖ εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολυχορόντατο καὶ αὐτά τὰ παναρκεία αὐλοῦ τιναίναι ὡς μέμνημα; The onestensible ground for its rejection is the complexity of its music. SUSEM. (1106).

1342 b 3 ἄμφω γὰρ ὄργανικὰ κτλ] We were told this before the flute, c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 22 ff., οἷς ἐστών ὁ αὐλὸς ἤριδον ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὄργανικά; it has an intoxicating effect, tending not to form, but to purge, character. The Phrygian Mode again was described as relatively the most maddening and ecstatic, c. 5 § 22. The addition of the more general term παθητικά = ‘passionate’ here is a fresh and striking proof that the ecstatic modes, αἱ ἑνθουσιαστικὰ ἁμώνια, are not restricted to the expression or impression upon others of Ecstasy pure and simple. On the contrary, like the flute amongst musical instruments, they are adapted generally to pourray and call up all emotions, or at least all painful emotions:—in the words of the text, ‘all Bacchic frenzy and similar mental excitement.’ Comp. Exc. iv. p. 628 and notes (1080, 1047), also n. (1096) p. 643. SUSEM. (1106).

8 Poetry shows this. When the subject is wild and delirious, as in a dithyramb, the music is set for the flute and the airs are in the Phrygian Mode. The cogency of this illustration depends upon the fact, which must always be borne in mind, that the Greek poet set his own words to music (precisely as in the Wagnerian opera): he also chose his own dance measures.

5 τῶν δ’ ἁμώνιων ἐν τοῖς...μέλεσι] See Thurot p. 103 (cited above p. 611 upon § 6, 1342 a 15).

6 ταῦτα = βαχχεια καὶ τοιαύτη κινησι (subject).

8 οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην] An extraordinary phrase where we should expect οἱ περὶ ταύτα συνέτοι ὡς: i.e. musical critics or connoisseurs. In Bonitz’ words, σύνεσις is used ‘objective’ = η μονικῇ τέχνῃ.

9 Φιλοξένος] Of Cythera, born 459 B.C., one of the most famous of the dithyrambic poets. He lived for some time at the court of the elder Dionysius, who imprisoned him in the stone quarries of Syracuse, where (according to one account) he wrote his most noted dithyramb Κόκλως. When brought out to listen to Dionysius’ own compositions, he is said to have addressed the attendants in the words Εἰς λατρομας, “Take me back to the quarries.” See further respecting him Bernhardy Gesch. d. griech. Literatur ii. p. 669 ff. (ed. 2), SUSEM. (1108) Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his criticism of the later dithyrambic poets, including Philoxenus, specially mentions...
their intermixture of styles and license in rhythm: οἱ δὲ γε διδύμαμβοι καὶ τοῦ πρῶτος μετέβαλλον, Δάμιος τε καὶ Φρυ-
γίος καὶ Λυδίως εν τῷ άφατοι ποιοῦσιν· καὶ ταῖς μελείας έξηλαττώ· καὶ τοῖς ρυθμοῖς κατὰ πολλάς αδεῖαις έναντιώνας διετέλον· οἱ γε 
dια ήτα κατὰ Φιλόζενων καὶ Τιμόθεου καὶ Τελεστῆς· επεὶ παρά τοῖς αρχαίοις τεταγμένοι ἢν ὁ διδύμαμβος, De 

11 ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς[See § 13, 1342 b 27, ὃ φύσει υποβάλλει: also Mel. 1. 3, 984 b 9 f., ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀλη-
θείας ἀναγκάζομεν ἐξήγησας, and Phæs. 1. 5, 6, 188 b 29 f.]

§ 12 ὑμελογούσιν ὡς οὕσιν[See 1362 b 12 n. Comp. vii(iv), 9, 1204 b 20. The best explanation and parallels in Lobeck ad Soph. Αἰας. 281. Frequent in Lato, e.g. Phil. 16 c, Laws 624 A, b, στασιμωτάτης] That the Dorian 
is the only mode which produces a sedate and sedative frame of mind was said so c. § 22, 1340 b 3. Comp. notes (1102, 1105).

SUSEM. (1109)


SUSEM. (1110)

15 ἢ δὲ δωριστὶ κτλ.] I.e. the Dorian melodies are principally of a middle compass. In contrast to this, melodies composed in the 'high-strung' (σύντονοι) and low-pitched (ἀνεμένα, χαλαραδι) modes diverged from this middle compass to the higher and lower parts of the register respectively. This is explained in Excur- sus iii. n. (1054) p. 625. SUSEM. (1111) § 13. 18 skopo[ν] τρός οὐς ποιοῦται τὸ τέ-
λος, 1341 b 15. That the choice of melodies must be regulated by what is practicable and what is becoming (se. for the age and voice of the performers) is a truisim, whoever enumerates it, see c. 6 § 3, n. 20. ἐστι δὲ καὶ ταύτα κτλ] "But these conditions (viz. what is practicable and what is becoming) are defined by the age of the performers. For instance, it is not easy for those who are old and feeble to sing in the high-strung modes: nature suggests the low-pitched modes at their age."

21 διὰ χρόνον] Διὰ c. gen. means (1) "after the lapse of some time" as in II. 1, 6, 1275 a 25, and vi(iv). 15, 1, 1299 a 6, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔξαμενως, οἱ δὲ δι’ ἔλεύθεροι ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς· So in Phæs. 1. 11, 20, 1371 a 29 f., στάνοι τὸ διὰ χρόνον, a thing seen after an interval, an occasional en-
joyment. Hence the distributive sense of διὰ τρίτου ἐτούς 546 b 10, διὰ τρίτης (ημέρας) 594 b 21. (2) In διὰ βλου (4 times, cp. διὰ τούτων χρ. 1272 b 13) it implies duration. With the accusative (as Poes[Í] see Crit. n.) the sense is causal: those who fail by reason of age. This reading avoids the hiatus, which is in its favour. But the causal sense with gen. is admitted by Eucken p. 38, Hayfors p. 46; cp. 1337 a 36 (?), 1316 b 14 (aiτιῶν οἴ οὐ).
vías, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἢ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοὺς τηλι-(VII)
§ 14 κούτους. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτίμωσι καὶ τούτο <τῷ> Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ
11 τὴν μουσικήν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας ἀποδοκι-
25 ἔσειν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς,
οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βαχχευτικὸν γὰρ ἢ ἐν
26 μέθη ποιεὶ μᾶλλον) ἀλλὰ ἀπειρκνιάς. ὡστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν
έσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεὶ καὶ τῶν τοιο-
§ 15 τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἀπέτεθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιοῦτον. ἐτι
30 δ' εἰ τίς ἐστί τοιαύτη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἢ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παι-
δῶν ἡλικίᾳ διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἔχειν ἁμα καὶ
παιδείαν, ἵνα ἡ λυσίτι φαίνεται πεπονθέναι μάλιστα τῶν

23 τῷ added by Wilson || 27 ὡστε <ei> Spengel || καὶ untranslated by Wil-
liam, perhaps rightly: but 29 ἐτι δὲ may answer to this καὶ || 28 καὶ untranslated
by William and Δρ., [καὶ] Koraes || 30 ἢ ΓΑλδ. || 32 παῦδων C. E. Ch. Sch.
Schneider (on P1. Κεφ. ΙΙΙ. 399 Α) || παιδείαν οίαν P1 (1st hand, corrected by later
hands), διάνοιαν Π1 (οίον added in the text and γρ. παιδείαν by P1 in the margin of
P1) and P2 (corr.!)}

§ 14 23 <τῷ> Σωκράτει] I.e. in
Plato Κεφ. ΙΙΙ. 398 ε: τίνες οὖν μαλακι
καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν; 'Ιστι, ἢ δ' οὖν, καὶ λυσίτι, ἀτίμως χαλαραὶ καλοῖνται.
Ταῦται οὖν, ὥς φίλε, εἵπολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐστ' ὁτι χρῆσετε; [SUSEM. (1112)]
25 ὡς μεθυστικὰς κτα] “On the
assumption that this is drunken music,
not in the sense of intoxication—indeed
intoxication rather tends to excite mad
revelry—but as being enervated.” Boni-
itz is probably right in making 27 ἀπειρκνιας
acc. plur. Ind. Αρ. 71 b 47, comparing
24 τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας: and so ‘ener-
vated,’ languid, exhausted. Schneider
preferred to regard it as gen. sing., but
if that were so, surely we should expect
αὐτὴς τῆς μέθης or some equivalent as
the antithesis of τῆς μέθης ἀπειρκνιας.

§§ 13—15 17 εἰςὶ δὲ...34 πρέπειν] That this close of the chapter is a foreign
addition is indicated by the square
brackets, and must be admitted unless
we choose to believe that Aristotle would
again partially introduce by a side-wind
the musical modes which he has already
openly banished from education. Aris-
totle recommends Dorian melodies for
the instruction of the young on account
of their middle compass: all other modes,
‘the most ethical’ alone excepted, are
excluded: also, he expressly warns us
against any education for amusement, c. 5
§ 4. He distinctly forbids adults to sing
or play, c. 6 § 4, and consequently re-
stricts the introduction of ‘practical’
(πρακτικαί) or ‘ecstatic’ Modes, as well
as the less ‘ethical’ Modes, see n. (1087),
to performances at which the citizens are
auditors. The author of this addition,
on the other hand, is anxious that the
youth should also learn to sing in modes
which, from the low compass of the me-
dies, are least suited to them and best
adapted to be actually sung in riper age.
Now it is no doubt true that these low-
pitched modes do not belong either to
the ‘practical’ (πρακτικαί) or to the
‘ecstatic’ but to the ‘ethical’ class and
appear to constitute the less ethical; see
n. (1054, 1087). It is further true that
Aristotle allows the citizens of his ideal
state an occasional banquet for relaxation
and recreation, IV(VII). 17. 11, cp. n.
(966), and at such times probably also
permits them the exceptional privilege of
singing (see c. 5 § 8 with n. 1028, 1057).
It is true that the description of the low-
pitched keys here given (ἀπειρκνιας)
points, like Plato's Κεφ. 398 ε, see n.
(1112), to the appositeness of their
employment on such occasions. Finally it
cannot be denied that the idea of learning
something in youth, which may afford
amusement in later life, is not wrong in
itself (c. 4 §§ 5—7), though in the present
instance inadmissible, because for mere
amusement it is not necessary to learn to
§ 33. After ἀρμονίων, ἥ * * δήλον ὅτι τρεῖς τοῦτος ὀροὺς ποιητέων εἰς τὴν (VII) παιδείαν, τὸ τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον * *]

sing and play yourself, when you can get others to perform to you, e. c. 5 § 8: cp. inu. (1024, 1025, 1036). However, this is quite enough to condemn the proposed instruction of boys in melodies to be hereafter sung at drinking parties. Aristotles would have been much more concerned to practise the young in the practical (πρακτικά) and ecstatic melodies, in order to educate their taste for the end of the highest intellectual enjoyment. But he obviously thought: teach a boy to sing and play minor tunes, and amid the mirth and gaiety of a banquet he will surely, if so inclined, be able to sing melodies in the major modes, and appreciate them at musical performances intended for true aesthetic enjoyment.

And now let us consider for one moment the illogical sequence of the whole passage. The introduction: "but in musical instruction, as in all else, we should keep in view what is practicable and what is fitting" stands in no conceivable logical connexion with what precedes. Has the previous restriction of musical teaching to the Dorian and the related Modes any other object except to secure for the young what is practicable and fitting, because suited to their capacity? Even the casual remark at the close, 1342 b 14 ff., that just on account of its middle compass the Dorian Mode is specially adapted to induce moral virtue, which is a mean between two extremes (see n. 1111), is directed simply to what is fitting. This the interpolator has failed to recognize, for he brings in the Mean as a third aim, different from the possible and the fitting. He has not then perceived that the medium compass of the Dorian Mode is only a secondary reason and not the sole reason for preferring it. Starting from the strangely perverse notion that this was the only reason, he felt bound to assign some part to propriety and the possible, and so he goes on to remark that not only the possible but also the fitting is determined by gradations of age, a mere truism as regards the latter point, since the interpolator has expressly stated that by what is fitting for youth he understands (κόσμος ἀμα καὶ παιδεία) grace (decorum) and moral culture. But, first, a word as to possibility or capacity. It might have been thought that according to this standard boys should be taught to sing in the modes best adapted to their age from the compass of the melodies. Instead of this exactly the opposite inference is drawn, that they require further instruction in those modes which are better adapted, or only adapted, to older people. Secondly, from the point of view of what is becoming for boys the Lydian Mode is especially recommended:—just as though Aristotle had not himself prescribed the Dorian Mode from the same point of view as almost the only one permissible. Had he intended to assign to the Lydian Mode a special place beside or next to the Dorian, he would have found an opportunity in § 8, 1342 a 30, instead of merely referring to the decision of professional musicians, who are at the same time philosophers, the question what modes, other than the Dorian, may be employed in the education of the young. As we shall see in Exc. iv, Aristotle himself probably did not reckon the Lydian among the ethical modes at all, but among the πρακτικαί. The distinction made by the interpolator between outward decorum and inner moral culture, κόσμον ἐξευτ. καὶ παιδείαν, cannot appear genuinely Aristotelian to any reader of the Ethic, for in Aristotle's view the man of moral virtue and he alone behaves with outward propriety, and the habit of behaving thus even counts among the moral virtues: see Nic. Eth. iv. cc. 6—8 (12—14 Bekker). And is not decorum just as fitting for adults as for children? Or has κόσμοι a different meaning from decorum? A further error of the writer is apparent from a lacuna in the text where even the sense cannot be supplied. The ἥ pre-
served in two MSS. would seem to indicate (a) that he had discovered something else besides propriety and moral culture, which is more suitable to children than to adults, and had smuggled in a new mode to serve this purpose: or else (b) this \( \dot{\eta} \) marks the transition from the possible and fitting to the Mean, \( \tau \odot \mu \varepsilon \sigma \omicron \nu \), which, as well as \( \tau \odot \delta \nu \tau \alpha \tau \omicron \nu \) and \( \tau \odot \pi \rho \varepsilon \pi \omicron \nu \), is the subject of the last sentence with its mutilated commencement. In short, though in this book Aristotle has often been inconsistent and obscure, has fallen into apparent or perhaps actual contradictions, as may be seen from notes (993, 1000, 1003, 1015, 1024, 1027, 1038, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1045, 1059, 1062, 1067, 1079, 1094, 1096, 1098, 1101, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1109), yet all this goes beyond anything we can attribute to Aristotle himself. Indeed it would be paying the writer too high a compliment to look for him in the ranks of Aristotle's immediate pupils. He would seem to have been a Peripatetic of a later date. SuSEM. (1113)
EXCURSUS I.

ARISTOTLE'S SCHEME OF EDUCATION.

οτι μεν ούν χρηστέων τη γυμναστική, και πῶς χρηστέων, ὁμολογώμενον ἔστιν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβης κοινότερα γυμνάσια προσουστέον)...όταν δ' ἡβης ἐτη τρία πρὸς τοὺς ἀλλοις μαθήματι γίνονται, τότε ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκαστικοampie καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἔχομενην ἥλικιαν. V(VIII). c. 4 §§ 7—9, 1338 b 39—41, 1339 a 4—7.

This passage furnishes most of the scanty information we gain respecting the education of the citizens as a whole. Aristotle distinctly states that gymnastic training must come first, c. 3 § 13, 1338 b 5 f. n. (1003). He makes the first easy course of gymnastics to extend from the seventh year, IV(VII). 17, 15, to the age of puberty; gives the next three years, from 14 to 17, to the remaining subjects of education, and then appoints a stricter course of military drill lasting to the twenty-first year, to fit the youth for service in the army. This arrangement differs materially from that of Plato, n. (970), in the longer period assigned to gymnastics as compared with the other subjects to be learnt. On the other hand, it has been shown in the Introd. p. 51, from a comparison of c. 3 § 10, 1338 a 31—34, with c. 5 § 4, 1339 a 29 f., n. (1024) that a higher scientific training was intended to follow, as in Plato’s scheme, after the twenty-first year, especially in the principal subjects, most probably in pure and applied mathematics and finally in philosophy (παιδεία ἔλευθερος καὶ καλή). These are the higher sciences (τὰ περὶ τῆς) mentioned c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 42, n. (979), of which it is not true, as it is of other studies (or at any rate, most other studies, including even proficiency in gymnastics and music; see c. 2 § 5, n. 982) that, while not in themselves derogatory to a free man, they cannot be carried beyond a certain point without risk of βαρανοσία.

Aristotle’s ideal state is not therefore, like Plato’s Republic, in the last resort a preparation for another world, for he ignores individual immortality. It is quite as much a school of intellectual study as of morality: it is in the former aspect that its highest end is attained, cp. Introd. p. 48 f. But in the sequel wherever the word παιδεία is employed, c. 5 § 9, 1339 b 12, c. 6 § 7, 1341 a 13, § 9, 1341 a 18, 20, c. 7 § 1 ff., 1341 b 25, 29, 38, 1342 a 3, 28, 32 etc., it almost always denotes the early training, in the narrower sense of the term, before the twenty-first year (even μάθησις is so used c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23), and hence that development of character of which the young are susceptible as they grow up, viz. the acquisition of moral habits, rather than that development of reason and the understanding which is only attainable
EXCURSUS I.

at a ripe age by instruction, experience, or personal reflection and inquiry. Nevertheless a certain tendency in this direction is clearly inseparable from the formation of character in the young, since without it even moral habits could not be acquired: see n. (1045). But Aristotle distinctly regards the speculative enjoyment, the aesthetic contemplation of the beautiful creations of imitative art as one factor in that highest intellectual gratification which in his judgment constitutes the true end of life and the height of human happiness. The question arises then: Would he have prohibited the citizens of his ideal state from engaging in the creation of such works of art? That instrumental performers and solo-singers living by the practice of their art, indeed all professional musicians, would have been classed with τεχνίτας or paid professionals would be quite certain even if we had not his repeated assurances to this effect, c. 5 § 8, c. 6 §§ 4—8, 15, 16. Actors he would doubtless have treated in the same way, especially as in Greece they were all trained to dance and sing on the stage in solo parts. Nor would he have been likely to show more consideration to the rhapsodists. Even for the purposes of singing and dancing in the dramatic, as in most of the lyric choruses, some sort of professional training was required; while the leader of the chorus was certainly obliged to be a skilful solo singer. The prohibition to practise music in later life c. 6 § 4, 1340 b 37 ff., n. (1067) sounds so uncompromising that even the equally precise statement, “no well-bred gentleman ever sings or plays, unless it be over his wine or for a jest” (καὶ τὸ πρᾶπτειν οὐκ ἄνδρος μη μεθύνοις ἢ παίζοντος, c. 5 § 8, 1339 b 9, n. 1029), barely justifies the inference that on exceptional festive occasions this prohibition ceases to apply. Of any further concession, permitting the citizens to sing in the lighter lyric choruses, no trace can be found. For all these arts, then, only strangers, aliens, and freedmen are available in the ideal state. Even creative artists, who live by their art, and similarly, no doubt, writers of comedies, farces, and the like, cannot be conceived as occupying a different position. But we need not hence infer that Aristotle would have objected to see amongst his citizens such masters of sculpture and painting as Polygnotus (c. 5 § 7), Pheidias and Polycleetus (Nic. Eth. vi. 7. 1, 1141 a 10 ff.); or such tragic poets as Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Theocritus. Very possibly he may have hoped that his educational course would prove exactly fitted to produce just such men in his state, men who like the rest of his citizens are of course in easy circumstances, obliged, and at the same time competent, to renounce all thought of a return for their art in money or money’s worth. “It is inconceivable,” remarks Bradley, Hellenica p. 214 n., “that Aristotle, with his high view of art, should have considered his account of βασανοσία applicable to Phidias; but probably the following typically antique passage would not have sounded so strange to him as it does to modern ears: ‘If a man applies himself to servile or mechanical employments his industry in these things is a proof of his inattention to nobler studies’: καὶ οὐδεὶς εὐφυὴς νέος ἢ τῶν ἐν Πίστῃ θεωρέμενος Δία γενέσθαι Φεδίας ἐπεθύμησεν ἢ τὴν Ἡμῶν τὴν ἐν Ἀργεῖ Πολύκλειτος, οὐδ’ Ἀνακρέων ἢ Φιλητᾶς ἢ Ἀρχίλοχος ἠθείες αὐτῶν τοῖς ποιήμασιν: Plutarch, Vita Pericles c. 2, p. 153 A.” SUSEM. (1016)
EXCURSUS II.

THE COMPOSITIONS OF OLYMPUS.

τόν 'Ολύμπου μελών ταῦτα γὰρ όμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, v(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 9 f.  Cr. ἐκ τῶν 8' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρῶμεν σῶτον, ὅταν χρήσωμαι τοῖς ἔξοργιάσσομι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὀσπέρ ιατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως, c. 7 § 4, 1342 a 8—II.

Olympus, like Musaeus n. (1034), is not an historical character, but personifies in legend the earliest development amongst the Greeks, principally under Phrygian influence, of instrumental music for the flute: see Exc. IV. n. (1078). For apparently all the pieces ascribed to him which were preserved until Aristotle’s times and later were purely instrumental compositions for the flute (see Bergk Poet. Lyr.¹ p. 809 f.) or nothing but αὐλητικοὶ νόμοι, as they were called; cp. n. (17) to my edition of the Politics. Some of them were older than any other pieces of music, instrumental or vocal, then extant (Glaucus apud Plutarch. De Musica 5, 1132 E, F), and on this account Olympus was regarded among the Greeks as the originator of artistic music: Plut. ὁμ. c. 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. ὁμ. c. 11, 1135 B: cp. Glauc. l.c. But others were of later date than Terpander, and even than Thaletas², see nn. (419, 788). Musical connoisseurs in antiquity, such as the tragic poet Pratinas, who easily recognized the difference, made an attempt to distinguish an older from a younger Olympus, the latter a descendant of the former, and to ascribe to the younger those νόμοι of Olympus which exhibited a more advanced artistic development, for example, a νόμος πολυκέφαλος, so called from the number of its preludes. Others went further and invented a pupil of this younger Olympus, Crates by name, to whom they assigned the authorship of the πολυκέφαλος. Another of these airs (νόμοι), called ἀρμάτιος, of far older date, was admitted by all the critics to be the work of the earlier Olympus: see Plut. l.c. 7, 1133 D ff. Besides these we know of an air composed in the Phrygian Mode (see Exc. IV) in honour of Athene, called ὀρθιός, the prelude to which was in different time from the body of the air (Dio Chrys. I ad init., Aristox. apud Plutarch. ὁμ. c. 33, 1143 B; cp. Plat. Crat. 417 E), another in honour of Ares (Plut. ὁμ. c. 29, 1141 B), a dirge upon Python, the earliest composition in the Lydian Mode (Aristox. apud Plutarch. 15, 1136 C), also compositions in honour of Cybele called μητρόφω (Plut. l.c. 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. ὁμ. c. 19, 1137 D).

¹ The reference to the oldest flute-players can only apply to Olympus and his school. There can be no doubt that, as Bergk and Westphal agree, αὐλητικῶν and αὐλητικῶν should be read in this passage, instead of αὐληθικῶν and αὐληθικῶν.

² For the introduction of the paeonian or cretic rhythm into artistic music is rightly ascribed to Thaletas, and in the prelude to the air in honour of Athene ascribed to Olympus this rhythm occurs.
As to the strange effect of these musical compositions, Plato says much the same thing, that they possessed a specially overpowering and extravagantly exciting character, and discovered such as feel a longing desire for the gods and their worship. Undoubtedly such airs and, in particular, those of them composed in the ecstatic Phrygian Mode (see Exc. iv. p. 628 and n. 1107), are the 'sacred melodies' from which Aristotle c. 7 § 4, n. (1096), demonstrates the purifying effect of music in its most original form, since through the ecstasy which these airs awaken morbid ecstasy is expelled. This homoeopathic purgation from excitement is present to Aristotle's mind here, though all he alludes to is the arousing of the ecstasy by which it is effected. All the more noteworthy, then, is the inference here from this well known purgative (cathartic) effect of music to the possibility of a moral effect. However carefully they are distinguished (c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 21 f., c. 7 § 3 ff.), these two kinds of influence must have much in common. Susem. (1042)

EXCURSUS III.

Ethos or Character.

ό δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τῆν ψυχῆν ἡθους πάθος ἐστίν, V(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 11 f.

Döring Kunstlehr des Aristoteles p. 335 ff. (Philologus XXVII. p. 705 ff.) has proved that in this passage, as well as in c. 2 § 1, 1337 a 39, n. (977), and elsewhere, the expression 'character of the soul,' τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς (or τοῦ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς) ἡθος, or 'character' only, must be taken to mean not the more or less fixed special state of a man in regard to moral virtue and vice generally, or to this or that virtue and vice in particular, and hence in regard to his relation to the emotions, but the moral nature itself, the seat of desire and mental emotion, as the subject of the particular state in question: cp. mn. (40, 641, 786, 935, 790). But two things make it impossible to accept this explanation without modification. In the first place, if we look more closely, n. (1022), it appears that this 'oerotic' soul is also that within us by which we feel every kind of pain or pleasure, so that the influence of music upon the character in this sense might equally be said to consist in the recreative pleasure with which music tickles the ear. In the second place, the inference that 'because music undoubtedly calls forth the primary emotion of ecstasy, it must therefore affect that part of the soul which is the seat of the emotions as well as of the moral virtues and vices' is quite sound, but does not in the least prove what Aristotle is anxious here to prove, namely, that music can

1 Plato Sympos. 215 c: Socrates is like Marsyas; ὃ μὲν γε δι' ὄργανων ἐκήλη τοὺς ἀρθρώποις τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δύναμει, καὶ έτι μνή ὡς ἀν τὰ ἐκείνων αὐλή. ἀ γὰρ Ὀλυμπὸς ἤθελε, Μαρσύας λέγω, τοῦ διδάξων αὐτος. τὰ οὖν ἐκείνων ἐὰν τε ἄγαθος αὐλητής αὐλή ἐὰν τε φαύλη ἀναλητής, μόνα κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δῆλοι τοῖς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένοις διὰ τὸ θέαν εἶναι.

2 τὸ ορέκτικον, the 'oerotic' soul.
be employed in the acquisition of the aptitudes or formed states (ἐξεις) called moral virtues. ‘Influence upon the character’ means here nothing more than the process of acquiring—or more correctly, assistance in the process of acquiring—those formed states, as is plain from the whole context, while it is also expressly laid down in the explanation that this influence makes us ‘attain this or that distinctive state in respect of character’ through the intervention of music (cp. Poet. 6 § 12 f., 1450 a 19 f.)

Thus the phrase ‘character,’ or ‘character of the soul,’ cannot mean that part of the soul in itself but only (1) in so far as it already possesses those excellences or their opposites in the form of natural aptitudes, or favourable dispositions towards this or that virtue, or emotion, or their opposites,—φυσικὰ ἐξεις, φυσικὰ ἄρτεαι (καὶ κακίαι) as Aristotle calls them, N.E. vi. 13. 1 ff., 1144 a 1—14 (cp. above Pol. iv[viii]. 13. 11. n. 888), and (2) in so far as it already is gradually acquiring this or that moral virtue or its opposite, as they are concerned not simply with actions, πράξεις, but with emotional excitations or feelings (πάθη, N.E. ii. 6. 10, 1106 b 16 ff.). From this it is apparent that the growth of moral ‘habit’ may be fostered by excitement of the feelings, and hence that the real inference to draw is this: ‘because music can undoubtedly call forth feelings, at least in the case of ecstasy, it must probably, if not necessarily, be capable of being employed to foster moral habits.’ Thus, according to Aristotle, emotion as a passive excitement belongs to the irrational soul just so far as the soul is capable of receiving, and does receive, a character, and can itself be called ‘character’ precisely as a man of bad, or strong, or brave, or just, or temperate character is said to be himself such a character.

Even love and hatred are but emotions, and yet, as Aristotle immediately says, cp. n. (1022, 1044), all moral action is based upon love of good and hatred of evil. Take such a passage as Döring quotes from Rhet. ii. 9. 1, 1356 b 12 ff., § 5, b 33 ff., to the effect that certain emotions belong only to a good, and others only to a bad character: the simple consideration that courage is an emotion of the brave man and fear of the coward shows most plainly that Döring’s explanation requires to be modified. It is only in this way that we can understand why Aristotle c. 5 § 18, cp. n. (1047), ranks the emotions, e.g. anger, among peculiarities of character (ηθικά) side by side with the moral virtues, e.g. meekness, courage, temperance, and even proceeds to call these peculiarities of character §§ 20—22, cp. n. (1048) themselves characters (ηθης), whilst in other places, such as c. 7 §§ 3—11, Poet. i. 6, 1447 a 27 f., cp. n. (1084), he holds fast by the difference so commonly recognized among the Greeks between emotion (πάθη),

1 ποιον τινας τа ἡθη γράμθεα, 1340 a 7.
2 εἰσι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τα ἡθη ποιου τινες, κατὰ δὲ τας πράξεις εὐδαιμόνες ἡ συνόρων πολλῶν ὀφειστο τὸς ἡθη μιμήσεως πρᾶτ τονσιν, ἀλλὰ τα ἡθη συμπαραλληλάζουναι διὰ τάς πράξεις.
3 καὶ άμφος τά πάθη (sc. ἔλεες καὶ νε μεεαθ) ἦθους χρώστου. [Döring argues thus: πάθη are in this and other passages ascribed to ἦθους, but Nic. Eth. ii. 5. 1, 1105 b 20, πάθη are said to be ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, while from Rhet. ii. 12. 1, 1388 b 30, we gather that ἦθος (like ψυχή) includes more under it than πάθη only. Hence he considers himself justified in equating ἦθος with ψυχή φρειτική, and would explain Pol. v[viii]. 5. 16, 1340 a 6, as a case where the more special term ἦθος is combined with the more general term ψυχή.]
in the sense of a passing burst of feeling, and character (ἡθός) in the sense of a permanent moral state, which is the fixed and standing temperament of each man, composed of the various moral virtues and vices specially belonging to that particular individual. Döring p. 156 f. from his own line of thought finds this strange and cannot refrain from attempting to whistle away the meaning by forced ingenuity. Even at the end of § 21, cp. n. (1052), an artist 'full of character' (ἡθικός) does not mean a sculptor or painter who depicts emotions, but one who depicts characters in this narrower sense, who indeed, to speak still more accurately, represents noble characters, no matter whether in a state of emotion or free from emotion. Even the separate moral virtues are called 'characters' Nic. Eth. vi. 13. 1, 1144 b 4, or as we should say 'qualities of character.' The expression τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡθός πάθος 'an emotion of the character of the soul' (= ὁ πάθει τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡθός, suggests the radical meaning of πάθος 'suffering.' SUSEM. (1043)

EXCURSUS IV.

ANCIENT GREEK MUSIC: MODES, RHYTHMS, MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, SCALES:
NOTES 1054, 1056, 1078, 1099.

MODES.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεωσιν αὐτῶις ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν (καὶ τούτ' ἐστι φανερῶν' εὐθύς γὰρ τῶν ἁρμονίων διέστηκε φύσις, ὡστε ακούοντας ἄλλωσ διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας δυνατοτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἶον πρὸς τὴν μεξολογίστι καλομένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακώτερας τὴν διάνοιαν, οἶον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότος μᾶλλον πρὸς ἑτέραν, οἶον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μῶν τῶν ἁρμονίων, ἐνθουσιαστικοὺς δ' ἡ φρυγιστὶ . . . .) c. 5 §§ 21, 22, 1340 a 38—b 5.

"Melodies, on the other hand, give us substantive imitations of character. This is manifest. The temper of the several musical modes is so essentially distinct that the hearers are affected with a corresponding variety of mood. Some, such as the semi-Lydian, tend to wrap the spirit in grief and gloom; others, the luxurious relaxed modes, touch it to a softer ease; the Dorian seems alone in producing a sober and sedate frame of mind; the Phrygian kindles enthusiasm."¹

We feel a similar difference in the impression made upon us by the major and minor keys, the only two species of keys we possess, which differ from each other in having a major and minor third respectively. In the scale without signature we take as key-notes only A (la) and C (ut)², and

¹ This version is largely indebted to Prof. Jebb: see Translations p. 121.
² Do is often used instead of ut.
so obtain A minor and C major scales. But the Greeks must have taken every other note of the octave in turn for key-note; so that they obtained seven Modes, i.e. 'Harmonies' (άρμονια), or 'Species of Octaves' (εἴδη τῶν τοῦ διὰ πασῶν)¹, as they were called by the school of Aristoxenus and by Ptolemy:—

1. BC D EF G a b², Mixolydian;
2. C D EF G a bc³, Lydian;
3. D EF G a bc d, Phrygian;
4. EF G a bc d e, Dorian;
5. F G a bc d ef, Hypolydian;
6. G a bc d ef g, Ionian;

The Acolian Mode was by later writers on the theory of music called Hypodorian (Heracleid. apud Ath. xiv. 624 ε.), and what they called Hypophrygian was to all appearance the same as Ionian. In this way there only remain three distinct names of Modes, Dorian, Lydian, Phrygian, and the Modes similarly designated Hypodorian, Hypolydian, Hypophrygian stand in exactly the same relation to the former three; the Hypodorian and the Dorian, the Hypolydian and the Lydian, the Hypophrygian and the Phrygian Modes are respectively the same, only with this difference that in each case a melody in the first named mode ends on the key-note (tonic) whilst in the last named it ends on the fifth (dominant). The first way of ending is usual with us, the latter an unusual exception, but among the Greeks on the contrary the latter was the normal ending, the former being considered subsidiary as is shown by the "hypo," and it is therefore clear that the Lydian Mode, though it closely resembles our Major, yet by no means coincides with it. Lastly, the Mixolydian Mode according to Westphal⁴ and Gevaert⁵ was a Phrygian or Ionian ending on the third, and corresponding to it there was also a 'high-strung' Lydian, a second mode in A besides the Aeolian. We are not told whether the Dorian or Acolian Mode was also modified in this way, which would have given rise to a second mode in C; Westphal thinks it possible that a Boeotian Mode mentioned in the scholia on Aristoph. Eq. 985 may be the one in question. Compositions of this kind must at any rate have been produced very seldom. The terms high-strung (σύντονοι) and low-pitched (ἀνεμέναι) are only applied to the Lydian and Ionian, and if this is all correct, neither Hypolydian nor Mixolydian can have been the original designations for the modes of those names.

¹ Also called τῶν, but improperly so, because that is the word used for transposition-scales. [The word species itself is used in Dict. of Antiquities, Art. 'Music,' for άρμονια or εἴδος τῶν τοῦ διὰ πασῶν: for τῶνοι the writer uses 'key.' As to 'key-note' see n. p. 637 f.]
² Where the interval is a full tone, the letters have been placed further apart; for an interval of a semitone they are closer together.
³ ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si.
⁵ Histoire et théorie de la musique de l'antiquité (Gent 1875) i. p. 146.
EXCURSUS IV.

but the first must have been called low-pitched Lydian, the second high-pitched Ionian, and as contrasted with the latter that which is known as the Ionic Mode would be low-pitched Ionian, although according to the analogy of the Lydian the names high Phrygian and low Phrygian would be expected to be applied to these two modes. The number of modes will thus be raised from seven to eight at least, and a further one must be added, a third mode in A, the Locrian (Pseudo-Eucl. Harm. p. 18, Bacch. p. 19, Gaudent. p. 20 Meib.), which was invented by Xenocritus of Locri (Callim. in Schol. Pind. Ol. xi. 117) about the time of Thaletas (see n. 419), commonly employed in the time of Simonides and Pindar, but afterwards fell out of use (Heracleid. in Ath. xiv. 625 E). As Gaudentius expressly states that the seventh species of octave admitted of a twofold division, according as either the fifth (as is the case with the Aeolian or Hypodorian Mode) or the fourth is to be taken for the closing note, no doubt this second case represents the Locrian Mode. To the question, why the Mixolydian received that name, though it is a species of the Phrygian, Gevaert replies p. 188 ff., that, as the ancients observed (Plut. De Mus. 16, 1136 E), it was the counterpart of the low-pitched Lydian, since the sequence of intervals in the one is exactly contrary to that in the other, the Mixolydian scale having a sequence of a half tone, two whole tones, a half tone and three whole tones descending, the Hypolydian the same sequence in ascending:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BC</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>EF</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixolydian (ascending)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>CB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixolydian (descending)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>bc</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>ef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hypolydian (ascending),</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and moreover, because in these two modes alone only a single division into the fourth and fifth is possible in the ascending scale, viz., in the Mixolydian into the fourth and fifth, in the Hypolydian reverse into the fifth and fourth, because in the former the first fifth, ascending B to F, is diminished, and in the latter the first fourth, F to b, is augmented:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fourth</th>
<th>Fifth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BC D</td>
<td>EF G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixolydian;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|      | diminished Fifth |
|      | Fifth | Fourth |
| F    | G    | a bc  | d ef |
|      | Hypolydian; |

To this must be added the fact that the Mixolydian Mode ends the melody with the third, in common (not indeed with the low-pitched Lydian, but) with the 'highly strung' Lydian, and this, says Gevaert, appears to have been the really decisive analogy in the eyes of the ancients, for Plato (Rep. III. 398 E) says both these keys convey an impression of wailing and lamentation. Lastly in regard to the terms σύντονον 'highly strung' and ἀνεμέναν 'relaxed,' which in strictness can only mean raised and lowered in pitch (since the tightening of the string produces a higher note), Gevaert (p. 175) proposes to
explain them by saying that the high-pitched Lydian and the high-pitched Ionian or Mixolydian melodies seem to have principally employed the higher part of their compass and to have gone in this direction beyond their proper octave. In the case of the low-pitched modes, the Hypolydian and Ionian, the opposite would have to be proved, and Gevaert might have supported his theory by the statement made in c. 7 § 13 ff., though not by Aristotle (see n. 1113), that men advanced in life could not manage the high-strung keys, but found the low-pitched ones naturally more suitable to them. But putting aside the Locrian Mode and the points in this explanation most liable to be disputed, viz.—whether the Hypolydian and low-pitched Lydian Modes, the Hypophrygian or Ionian and the low-pitched Ionian, the Mixolydian and the high-pitched Ionian are in each case one and the same, and whether the last together with the high-pitched Lydian Mode really differed

1 That this cannot have been the case will be seen below. Still less can I agree in the views of another expert who has investigated this subject, C. v. Jan Die Tonarten bei Platon im dritten Buch der Republik, Jahrb. für Philol. XCV. 1867, p. 815 sqq. According to him the high-strung and low-pitched Lydian are considered to be the two subdivisions of the Lydian as distinguished from the Hypolydian, just as the high-strung and low-pitched Ionian are subdivisions of the Ionian. Jan thinks that to obtain an Aeolian octave from the fundamental Dorian octave, cd ef g a be d e, all that was necessary was to tune the second string (παραφάθη) half a tone higher (d); to obtain a Phrygian it would be necessary also to tune the sixth half a tone higher (c); for a Lydian you might either raise four strings (f#, g#, a#, b) or lowering three (e, d, c) or lowering four strings (c, b, a, g). A double method was similarly possible for obtaining a Mixolydian scale, either by raising six notes (c, d, e, f#, g#, a#) or lowering six (c, d, e, f, g, h) to h, but only the first was called Mixolydian, and it cannot be decided here how this came about. The Hypolydian, he thinks, could be derived in both ways, but had originally no special name, because it was not readily capable of practical employment owing to the augmented fourth f#. (In this assertion Jan has omitted to consider the fact that this mode occurs frequently in the ecclesiastical music of the middle ages, also in a Swedish national air still current at the present day, indeed Beethoven has composed a Canzonetta in this mode; see Gevaert, pp. 137 ff., 172, 175.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mixolydian</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G6</th>
<th>A6</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Hypolydian</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-pitched Lydian</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-pitched Ionian</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phrygian</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F#</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeolian</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F#</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorian</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[High Mixolydian]</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[High Hypolydian]</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>A#</td>
<td>B#</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-pitched Lydian</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>A#</td>
<td>B#</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-pitched Ionian</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>A#</td>
<td>B#</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reason why I have not been convinced by this explanation, which has been carefully thought out, may be gathered from my exposition generally and the more detailed account of Gevaert, the main outlines of which I have reproduced, with the necessary reservations where I could not concur. Still in view of the difficulty of the subject I did not wish to withhold Jan’s opinion from the reader. [See further Jan’s article ‘Musik’ in Baumeister’s Denkmäler III. 974—983.]
EXCURSUS IV.

from the rest by ending on the third, this much is certain that there are only three main distinctive names, applied in the nomenclature of the Greek Modes, Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian, and that we must consequently assume only three fundamental Modes corresponding to them, the difference between them and the Hypodorian, Hypophrygian, and Hypolydian respectively being no doubt that discovered by Westphal and stated above. With this explanation best agrees the fact that originally Hypodorian was called 'Aeolian' and Hypophrygian 'Ionian.' For we must credit Plato's statement (Lach. 188 D), that the Dorian Mode was the only original and national one, if we include under this name the Aeolian Mode, which Plato Repub. l.c. omits to enumerate among the modes, because no doubt he regards it as forming one and the same mode with the Dorian. It is very characteristic that, on this supposition, the original key of the Greeks was a sort of Minor differing from our Minor in not having the sixth and seventh sharpened in the ascending scale:

\[
\begin{align*}
A & BC D EF & G & a = \text{Aeolian;} \\
A & BC D E F & G & a = \text{our A minor;} \\
\end{align*}
\]

whilst in the descending scale the modern Minor agrees entirely with the Aeolian. This is in accordance with the description given by the ancients of the simple, calm, and manly character (ἡθός) of the Dorian Mode which, ending as it does on the fifth, would be least suitable for modern polyphonic music though it really furnishes the clearest and most distinctive harmonic relations, whilst the Aeolian as a Minor and the Lydian as a Major approach most closely to the spirit of modern music. This is also shown in the attempts of the ancients to describe the different impressions conveyed by the Aeolian and the Dorian. The Locrian too was of course a Minor. In addition to the original Dorian and Aeolian Modes of the Greeks two new ones were introduced from Asia Minor, the Phrygian or Ionian and the Lydian, in company with the wind instruments which had their origin there (see nn. 1042, 1078). It can be easily understood that the Phrygian was also called the Ionian after the Ionians of Asia Minor who first adopted it, and that then the two names were used to distinguish the principal Mode and the subordinate Mode. These two new ὀρμονίας, the Phrygian and Lydian, were of the nature of our Major Keys, the latter an augmented Major, so to speak, the former an undeveloped Major: the latter had a flat too few or a sharp too many, the former exactly the opposite; the Lydian had an augmented or tritone fourth, the Phrygian a diminished seventh:

\[
\begin{align*}
F & G a b c d e f = \text{Hypolydian;} \\
F & G a b c d e f = F \text{ Major;} \\
G & a b c d e f g = \text{Ionian (Hypophrygian);} \\
G & a b c d e f g = G \text{ Major.}
\end{align*}
\]

1 [See note on p. 637 f.]
2 We hear even of a Phrygian tetra-

chord ef g a. See Helmholtz Lehre der Tönempfindungen p. 405 [Eng. tr. by A. J. Ellis].
MUSICAL MODES.

DORIAN GROUP (minor with no leading-note).

Modern A minor.

PHRYGIAN GROUP (major with diminished seventh).

Modern G major.

LYDIAN GROUP (major with tritone fourth).

Modern F major.

There is a great contrast between the impressions which these groups convey. Moreover the Lydian melodies conform to the natural or authentic order, in which the final note is the lowest, the Phrygian to the so-called oblique or plagal order, in which the melody rises about as high above its final note as it descends below it, so that the final note is about in the middle of its compass. This explains the ecstatic and rapturous feeling (for which πάθος is a more correct expression than ἔθος) which the Phrygian melodies inspired in the ancients. Our 'major mode' is a development out of these two ancient modes as the proper mean between them. The Mixolydian Mode was first invented by Sappho, about 600 B.C. (Aristox. in Plut. De
Musica 16, 1136 C sq.) and was theoretically developed much later by Pythocleides of Ceos, a musician living at Athens (Aristox. ibid.), or according to another more detailed account (Lysis ibid.) by another musician of somewhat later date Lamproclus of Athens, who like Pindar was a pupil of Agathocles (Schol. Plat. Alcib. 1. 118 C). The invention of the low-pitched Lydian was ascribed to the Athenian Damon, a contemporary of Pericles and Socrates, see n. (1055) (Plut. ibid. 1136 E). Aristotle designates the low-pitched modes as relaxed and effeminate, similarly Plato Rep. I. c. speaks of them as effeminate and intoxicating, which no doubt is rightly explained c. 7 § 11 (see n. 1113) to refer, not to the exciting, but to the soothing and weakening effects of intoxication. In c. 7 § 4 Aristotle mentions with approval a division of all the musical Modes into ἡθικαί, ethical, πρακτικαί (Modes of action = scenic?) and εὐθυωσιαστικαί, ecstatic; and allows the young for educational purposes to be instructed in those only of the first class. Here Gevaert has made a great mistake in assigning all those which end on the dominant, i.e. Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, to the first class ‘ethical’; all those which end on the tonic, i.e. Hypodorian (Aeolian), Hypolydian (low-pitched Lydian) and Hypophrygian (Ionian or low-pitched Ionian), to the second class (πρακτικαί); and all those ending on the third, i.e. the two mournful and high-pitched modes, Mixolydian (highly strung Ionian) and highly strung Lydian, to the third class ‘ecstatic.’ He is only right as regards the third class. But if the Boeotian was a Dorian Mode ending on a third, they might belong to the same class, and the same would hold good of the Locrian. Gevaert has been misled by the fact that Plato assigns a prominent place to the Phrygian only along with the Dorian, and yet according to his description of the Phrygian (Rep. 399 A ff.) as impetuous and warlike, it ought to be reckoned among the second class. But Gevaert strangely forgets that Aristotle c. 7 § 9 f. (see n. 1107) strongly disputes Plato’s assertion, and designates the Phrygian Mode as ecstatic above all others, putting it at the head of the third class. There would then be joined to it the two other ‘high-strung’ modes of a mournful character, inasmuch as all painful emotions imply something ecstatic, something carrying men out of themselves (cp. n.n. 1047, 1072, 1084, 1089, 1095, 1096, 1101). In Problems XIX. 48 no doubt the Hypophrygian has the same adjective πρακτικός applied to it which is used of the second class of Modes here, but not so the Hypodorian; on the contrary it is called majestic and calm (μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ στάσιμον). It is simply an afterthought to class both together as πρακτικά, but even then only in opposition to the Phrygian Mode which is there also said to be ecstatic and full of Bacchic frenzy as the expression of passive emotions1. The Hypodorian or Aeolian Mode must undoubtedly be assigned to the first class, although it forms a sort of transition to the second, and the Hypophrygian ought certainly to be put

---

1 ἡ [ὑπὸ]φρυγιστὶ (ἐνθυωσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχική). κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομεν τι...κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδομιστικὴν καὶ ὑποφρυγιστὶ πράττομεν. The insertion of μάλιστα δὲ ἡ μεγαλομεταφραστῶν (from Gaza) before κατὰ μὲν οὖν, as recommended by Gevaert, appears to me quite a mistake. Cp. p. 607.
with the second, were it not for the statement both of Aristotle and Plato that the low-pitched keys are relaxed, effeminate and drowsy. There are only two possible solutions of this difficulty: either the author of this problem had a different idea of the character of the Hypophrygian from that of Plato and Aristotle, or else the Hypophrygian and low-pitched Ionian are not the same Mode. It is quite evident that drowsy and effeminate modes cannot be classed with those which inspire a bacchic frenzy. They can only come among those representative of character, ἕθικαί, not in the position of the highest of those modes such as the Dorian and Aeolian, but as constituting a transition to the ecstatic. In this way the Lydian only would remain in the second class, but c. 7 § 15 it is curiously distinguished from all other modes, and would appear from the description given to belong to the first class. Still this passage, which cannot have proceeded from Aristotle's pen, is so strange in other respects that it need not be taken into account, see n. (1113). Much more weight attaches to the circumstance that Aristotle evidently (see nn. 1088, 1096) assumes more than one mode of the second class, and this compels us to decide that the Hypophrygian or Ionian must really be a different mode from the low-pitched Ionian, and consequently that the low-pitched Lydian is unlikely to have been the same as the Hypolydian, so that this point remains quite obscure. Of course the Lydian Mode was also employed for mournful instrumental pieces upon the flute (see n. 1042), and in Tragedy was frequently adopted in the κομποι, dialogues of lamentation between the leader of the chorus and actors (Cratin. in Ath. xiv. 638 F); for the latter purpose however the Dorian Mode was used in older times (Plut. De Musica 17, 1136 F), and it is very characteristic that Pindar in his odes appears to have employed only the Lydian Mode besides the Dorian and Aeolian. It is very interesting to notice the fact shown by vii(iv). 3. 4 (cp. n. 1159) that even among the ancients some theoretical musicians rightly perceived that the three fundamental modes might be reduced to two, which we call Major and Minor. For those who, as is stated in that passage, only recognized the Dorian and Phrygian as fundamental ἀποροσίας, like the moderns, put all other differences into the background, so that the main distinction entirely upon the minor or major third. In this way they might just as well have put Lydian for Phrygian, or better might have combined the words into Lydo-Phrygian. It is well known that the Greek modes passed to the Romans, and to the ecclesiastical and secular music of all European nations until after the Reformation; they are still well represented in the older protestant hymn tunes and survive in Celtic, Swedish, Slavonic, and Flemish national airs. Even in the older periods of modern music we continue to find an excess of the Minor over the Major, followed later on by a balance between them. Susem. (1054)

1 The explanations given by Susemihl Jahrb. f. Phil. xcv. 1867, p. 231 require considerable modification in accordance with the foregoing.
EXCURSUS IV.

Musical Rhythms.

The Greeks had three kinds of time or metre: (1) even or dactylic time, in which the two parts of the metre are of even length, (2) double or iambic time, in which the prominent beat, arsis, is twice as long as the secondary, thesis, and (3) one-and-a-half or paeonian time, in which the arsis as compared with the thesis is in the proportion of 3:2. The dactylic time, corresponding to our common time, conveys a quiet settled feeling; the iambic corresponding to our triple time, and still more the paeonian, a time of five beats which seldom occurs in our modern music, give an impression of unrest. The Ionic measure was considered specially wanting in nobility, loose and effeminate (Arist. Quint. p. 37 Meib., Demetr. De cloc. § 189, Metr. Ambros. p. 9 Keil, p. 262 Nauck, Mar. Vict. ii. 8. 7, p. 122 Gaisf. p. 99, 19 sq. Keil, Schol. A Heph. p. 190 Westph., Dionys. Halic. De Demosth. vi admirabili p. 1093). The Ionic monopody, dipody, and triody correspond to our 3, 4, 4 time. Cp. Westphal Metrik 2 ed. i. p. 534 ff. SUSEM. (1056) See now the third edition of Westphal's work, Gricchische Rhythmik (1885), p. 99 ff. esp. p. 156, Aristoxenus i. p. 35 ff. An example of (3) is the Delphian hymn to Apollo in 4 time.

Musical Instruments: Harps, etc.

None of these stringed instruments were of Greek origin, and Aristoxenus (in Athen. iv. 182 f) speaks of the φοίνικες, πηκτίδες, μαγάδιδες, σαμβύκαι, τρίγωνα, κλεψάμβου, σκυνάψοι, and ἐννεάχορδαι as uncommon (ἐκφύλα). The πηκτίς was a Lydian harp (Hdt. i. 17, Pind. Fr. 102 in Athen. xiv. 635 D, Soph. Fr. 375, ibid. 635 c and iv. 183 f, Telestes Fr. 5, ibid. XIV. 625 f) of high register (Telest. l.c., cp. Pind. l.c.). The first notice of it occurs in Sappho Fr. 122; then it is mentioned by Anacreon Fr. 17, 22, by Plato Repub. iii. 399 c as being many-stringed, but apparently by Sopater, the composer of parodies, in Ath. iv. 183 b as a two-stringed instrument. Like
the magadis, it was played with the fingers without a plectrum (Aristox. in Athen. xiv. 635 b). Menaechmus asserts in Ath. 635 b, ε that Sappho was the first to use the instrument, stating that he follows Aristoxenetus in regarding it as the same as the magadis, whilst others rightly make a distinction between the μάγαδις and the πηκτίς (Ath. 636 A ff.). In all probability the explanation of this inconsistency must be sought with Jan in the fact that the μάγαδις seems to have been a modification of the πηκτίς. At any rate the μάγαδις also is termed Lydian by Didymus in Ath. 634 f and perhaps before him by Anacreon (ibid. fr. 18), and the latter calls the πηκτίς (Fr. 17) and the μάγαδις (Fr. 18 in Ath. 634 c, 635 c) his instrument, assigning to it twenty strings, a round number, as Posidonius thinks (ibid. 634 c, d), instead of twenty-one. But from the account of Aristoxenetus (ibid. 635 b), who quotes Pindar l. c. in his favour, it appears that one-half of the strings gave the same notes as the other half, but in a higher octave, and that the instrument was used in accompanying antiphonal singing of men and boys, requiring therefore that it should be played with both hands, the one striking the higher, the other the deeper notes. When Telestes (Fr. 4 in Ath. 637 a) apparently describes the μάγαδις as five-stringed, we must probably assume with Jan that he really means five tetrachords, that is to say twenty strings, and in the same way in the case of Sopater l. c. we must suppose that the πηκτίς had, not two strings, but two separate tetrachords, and therefore eight strings or a full octave. Phìllis however (ibid. 636 f) says the πηκτίς and μάγαδις (which he distinguishes from one another), the σαμβύκη, ἵμπαρτίς, ἱμαγώνων and κλεψίμα, had all of them nine strings. According to Euphorion (in Ath. iv. 182 f, xiv. 435 a) the μάγαδις—or rather the σαμβύκη, a modification of it (see below)—was most frequently used in Mitylene; and on the assumption of its development from the πηκτίς this fact entirely coincides with the mention of the latter and its employment by Sappho, the poetess of Lesbos. Yet the Spartan poet and composer Aleman, himself a Lydian by birth, had at a somewhat earlier date sung of putting aside the μάγαδις (Fr. 91 in Ath. 636 f) and must no doubt have used the instrument.

Similarly the βάρβητων (neuter), also βάρβητος (masc. or fem.), was of foreign or rather Lydian origin. For Strabo x. 471 says that all the names σαμβύκη, βάρβητος, πηκτίς, are foreign, and Pindar l. c. designates the βάρβητων as an adaptation of the Lydian πηκτίς. Like this, it was a leading instrument in Lesbos much used by the lyric poets there. Pindar l. c. ascribes its invention, or more correctly its introduction, to Terpander. Horace (Carm. i. 1. 34) calls it ‘Lesbian’ and assigns its use to Alcaeus (Carm. i. 34. 5 ff.). Sappho also mentions it and must have used it in her songs; so too afterwards the Ionian Anacreon, a follower of Alcaeus and Sappho (Euphorion in Athen. 182 f=Sapph. Fr. 154, Anacr. Fr. 143). Critias calls the βάρβητων Sappho’s favourite instrument (in Ath. xiii. 600 c); Neanthes (Fr. 5 in

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1 So also Suidas s.v. Σαμφίς, where the mention of the plectrum in the received text is due to corruption.
Athen. 175 c) erroneously ascribes its invention to Anacreon\(^1\). Jan (p. 15 f.) is then no doubt right in recognizing the instrument, with which Alcaeus and Sappho are represented, as the Barbiton:

![Barbiton illustration]

The only particular difference between this instrument and the \(\lambda \upsilon \rho \alpha\) consists in the greater length of the strings and of its entire structure. This is in agreement with the fact that it was an octave lower than the \(\pi \epsilon \kappa \tau \iota \varsigma\), as appears from Pindar \(Lc\). Thus it continued down to about the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (\(R. A. \text{ VII. 72}\)) to be comparatively the commonest stringed instrument in Greece after the \(\kappa \iota \theta \alpha \rho \alpha\) and \(\lambda \upsilon \rho \alpha\), as may be gathered from the mention of them together Athen. 182 E and Pollux IV. 8. 59, from the fact that Aristoxenus (see p. 632) does not place it among the uncommon instruments, and also from the numerous representations of it. It would seem to have been played by means of the plectrum, if we are to rely upon No. 59 of the so-called Anacreontea. Anaxilas apud Ath. 183 B mentions only three strings, Plutarch \(D e \text{ Monarch. 4. 827 A, and Theocritus xvi. 45, speak of many strings, and Teuffel correctly observes (Pauly's Realencycl. iv. p. 1289 n.) that the number of strings may have varied very much, since we find on vases figures of } \beta \alpha \rho \beta \iota \tau \omicron \omega \iota \varsigma \text{ with three, four, and six strings. The contrast which Aristotle here makes between } \beta \alpha \rho \beta \iota \tau \omicron \omega \iota \varsigma \text{ and } \pi \epsilon \kappa \tau \iota \varsigma \text{ on the one hand, and the other instruments mentioned by him on the other, shows that the latter were less in fashion than the } \beta \alpha \rho \beta \iota \tau \omicron \omega \iota \varsigma \text{ and } \mu \acute{\alpha} \gamma \alpha \delta \iota \varsigma. \text{ In vase paintings there often occurs the annexed triangular instrument, which represents no doubt either a triangle or a } \sigma \alpha \mu \beta \acute{\epsilon} \gamma \eta :–}

\(^1\) Cp. Pseudo-Simonides \(Fr. 184, \text{ Anacreontea 2, 14, 23, 40, 41, 59.}\)
The τρίγωνον or triangle is called by Juba (Irk. 73 in Ath. 175 b) an invention of the Syrians, that is probably of the Assyrians; by Ptolemy Harm. III. 7, p. 248 an invention of the Egyptians. Sophocles Lc. gives it the epithet Phrygian, and according to another tragic poet, Diogenes (in Ath. 636 A, see Nauck Trag. Gr. Fragm. p. 602 sq. ed. 2), it was common among the Lydians, and in Suidas (s.v. Σίβυλλα) its origin was traced to the Sibyl. It was triangular in form, as its name implies, and had a number of strings of unequal length, the shorter ones at the elbow, the longer at the base (Aelian apud Porphyr. on Ptolem. p. 216 sq.), and it was therefore of some considerable size (Diog. Lc., Arist. Probl. XIX. 23). The σαμβύκη was likewise triangular (Athen. 634 A, Suidas s.v. Σιβυκός) and, the strings being short, had a very high register (Aristid. Quintil. p. 101, Athen. 633 f). Euphorion represents the instrument as being an adaptation of the μάγαδις (in Ath. 635 A); the same writer (in Ath. 633 f on the authority of a work of Pythagoras upon the Red Sea) states that it had four strings among the Parthians and Troglodytes, whilst among the Greeks it was many-stringed, according to Plato Lc. The statement of Skamon in Athen. 637 b that it was invented by Sambyx and first used by the Sibyl does not help us. Neanthes Lc. says either of the τρίγωνον or more probably (agreeing with Suidas Lc. and Schol. in Aristoph. Thesm. 168) of the σαμβύκη—which instrument is meant, is not clear—that it was invented by Ibykus, who probably was in fact the first to introduce it into Greek music; but Juba (Lc) attributed the (?) λυροφοίνιτα σαμβύκη, as well as the triangle, to the Syrians. Practically all the ancients, agreeing with Aristotle, were of opinion that the τρίγωνον, and more especially the σαμβύκη, were only suitable for loose songs and melodies and persons of light character, and this would be in accord with the first adoption of the σαμβύκη by Ibykus. Compare the comic verses in Athen. 638 ε and the phrases “ballet girl and player on the triangle,” τὴν ποδοκύτταιρα καὶ τὴν τρίγωνον.

1 Heliodorus Aeth. iv. 17 speaks of Phoenicians, who after playing the πηκτή indulge in wild Assyrian dances.
2 In Kaibel’s edition of Athenaeus an hiatus is assumed at this place, 175 b, between λυροφοίνικα and σαμβύκη.
3 Both were introduced into Rome, Dionys. Hal. R. A. L. 33, Ath. 183 c, Liv. xxxix. 6.
4 ὁ δὲ Γνήσιππος ἦσσον ἀκοῦειν ὅσα νυκτερῖν ἐφε μοιχοῖς ἁείσματι ἐκ-καλείσθαι γυναῖκας ἔχουσας ἵαμβύκην τε καὶ τρί- γωνον.
EXCURSUS IV.

τριγωνίστριαν (Lucian Lexíph. 8), χαρακτιπας καὶ σαμβυκτιστίας (Plut. Anton. 9), ἀγοντα σαμβυκτιστίας καὶ κιναίδους (Plut. Cleomt. 35), κιναίδους ἀγεω καὶ σαμβύκιας (Pólyb. v. 37. 10) and others (Tib. Gracch, in Macrob. Sat. ii. 10, Arnob. ii. 42). This explains what Eupolis meant by mentioning triangle-playing (Fr. i in Ath. 183 c, r) in his comedy of the βάκτα, directed against Alcibiades and his companions, who are represented in the play as celebrating indecent orgies in honour of the Thracian goddess Cotyto. Presumably such instruments were introduced simultaneously with the wild rites of foreign deities. The right reading is therefore undoubtedly σαμβυκτικα, and not ἵμπβυκα, which I had adopted in my larger edition from the indications of the better family of manuscripts. The ἵμπβυκη was the instrument used by Archilochus and other older iambic poets in declaiming their verses when sung, the κλεψιαμβως being used when they were melodramatically recited (Philis l.c., cp. Hesych. and Suidas s.v. ἵμπβυκη). Aristoxenus, as has been mentioned, gives the κλεψιαμβως among the unusual instruments. Upon the whole question consult Böckh De metr. Pind. p. 260 ff., Lobeck, Aglaophamus p. 1014 ff., L. v. Jan, De fidibus Graecorum pp. 15 sq., 26 ff., Baumeister Denkmäler iii. p. 1444 ff. SUSEM. (1077)

Scales.

τῶν μελών τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 24 f.

The “colour” of notes (χρώμα) denotes the distinction between the three varieties of scale, or ‘genera’ of octaves, one of which is itself called the chromatic, the two others being the diatonic and enharmonic, and their subdivisions. The most simple form of the diatonic scale embraced all the notes of the octave in their usual order ef g a bc d e. Terpander omitted e, whilst the oldest instrumental composers for the flute included under the name of Olympus (see Exc. ii.) omitted d and probably g (Aristot. Probl. xix. 32, Aristox. apud Plut. De Mus. 11, 33). The latter arrangement would give the following succession of intervals:

\[
\begin{align*}
ef & \quad a & \quad bc & \quad e \\
\end{align*}
\]

semitone, major third, tone, semitone, major third; and this was the older form of the enharmonic scale. Later on the interval of a semitone was split up into two quarter tones (δίεσις):

\[
\begin{align*}
ef & \quad a & \quad bc & \quad d & \quad e \\
\end{align*}
\]

so that the intervals became: quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third, whole tone, quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third; and this was the second kind of enharmonic scale. The diatonic scale on the other hand even in its irregular forms had no intervals either so large or so small. Its two regular varieties correspond to our so-called natural scale and scale of even temperament.

1 The suggestion, which D. Volkmann De Suidae biogr. p. 14 makes à propos of this passage, that Aristotle was the first (perhaps in the Dialogue On Poets) to attribute the original employment of the πηκτίς, τριγωνον, and σαμβύκη to Sappho, Ibycus, and the Sibyl, is based upon very slight evidence, as he himself in part admits.

2 See n. 10 on the Poetics (ed. Susem.).
In the case of the former there is between f and g rather more than a whole tone (§), and between g and a rather less than a whole tone (p), whilst in the case of the latter, as on our tempered pianoforte, the intervals of a whole tone are all equal. Besides these the Greeks also had two irregular forms, (3) one with an excessive whole tone (§) and a diminished whole tone (§), a tone being inserted in the minor third B D in the place of the C omitted by Terpander, which was separated from D by the first, and from B by the latter interval, whilst at the same time in the other minor third E G the intermediate tone F was likewise exchanged for a corresponding inserted tone; the other (4) with an excessive and a diminished whole tone, the latter being inserted in the major third in the place of the notes G and D, omitted in the older Enharmonic, that is to say an excessive F and C. Finally the chromatic scale shares with the irregular forms of the diatonic the omission of C, and with the enharmonic the omission of G, and with both the compensation for these tones by an insertion, but differs from both in making the greatest interval always more than an excessive whole tone, and the two other intervals more than a quarter of a tone. The regular form of this class, which is also employed in our present chromatic and was older than the enharmonic (Plut. De Mus. 11, 1134 F, 20, 1137 E), has only the usual whole tones and semitones:

\[ efg^\flat \quad ab^\flat \quad b \quad d \quad e \]

semitone, semitone, minor third, semitone, semitone, minor third, whole tone. The irregular forms have quarter tones and excessive minor thirds or excessive quarter tones and half tones or diminished minor thirds etc. These subdivisions of the three scales were called their shades or \textit{nuances (χρώμα) of sound}. It appears therefore from what has been said that what we call chromatic and enharmonic in our music is something quite different from the chromatic and enharmonic scales of the Greeks. The quarter tones are something quite strange to us, but the augmented whole tones we can reproduce, and even the occasional attempts to work with them in composition have, since Beethoven, succeeded. The later enharmonic scale had gone out of use even as early as the time of Aristoxenus, but he defends it with great spirit (Plut. De Musica §§ 37—39). On the other hand the chromatic and the irregular diatonic were in Ptolemy's time still extensively used by soloists in vocal and instrumental music. But for chorus-singing even among the ancients only the regular diatonic scale was employed. The scales may be defined generally to be the different methods of arranging the intervals between the four tones of a tetrachord or the eight of an octave. See Westphal \textit{Metr.} 11. p. 412 ff., Gevaert p. 269 ff., also Helmholtz p. 403 ff. By unnatural ‘colouring’ Aristotle probably means all the kinds of irregular diatonic and chromatic scales and also, differing in this respect from Aristoxenus, the later enharmonic scale. \textit{Susem.} (1099)

\textbf{NOTE.}—The assumption of Modes in which the melody ended on the third, i.e. the third above the key-note, is beset with peculiar difficulties, p. 628 n. 1. For if only the melody ended on the third, while the accom-
paniment ended on the key-note, how can we account for the fact that the chord of the third was held by the ancients to be semi-dissonant, παράφωον, like the tritone? While if Gevaert is right in supposing accompaniment and melody alike to end on the third, then the assumed key-note is not the final note: what data then are left for determining the key-note of an ancient composition? On p. 625 this is taken to be the ὑπάρχος; compare now Th. Reinach in Bulletin de correspondance hellénique xvi. 1893, p. 597 ff. In the article Music in the Dict. of Antiquities (ed. 3) Mr. D. B. Monro pertinently remarks, "the chief difficulty is the want of any direct statement regarding the tonality of the ancient modes, or the note in which the melody ended." The hypothesis, that the μέση of each mode was its key-note (Grundton, Tonica), based upon Ar. Probl. xix. 20 (ep. Dio Chrys. 68, 7) and doubtfully accepted by Helmholtz, Lehre der Tonempfindungen p. 367 ff. (ep. p. 412), is only true, as explained above p. 625, of the Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian Modes.

A protest against Westphal's assumption of 'Modes ending on the third' appeared in Allg. Musik. Ztg for 1878 p. 737. Ultimately Westphal withdrew his assumption in the preface, dated 1890, of the posthumously issued second volume of his Aristoxenos' Melik und Rhythnik (Leipzig 1893). C. v. Jan, to whom the concession is due, treats it in his review (Berliner philolog. Wochenschrift xiii. 1893. 1285) as terminating a controversy which has lasted since 1863.

EXCURSUS V.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF V(viii). c. 7

§§ 3—8, 1341 b 32—1342 a 29.

With a view to answering the question, whether all the musical modes are to be used, Aristotle first (§ 3, b 32) gives the threefold division of them into the ethical (ἠθικά), those relating to action (πρακτικά), and the ecstatic (ἐνθουσιαστικά). Next, in so far as the answer must vary with the various ends of Music, he goes on to enumerate these various ends. At this point recurs the distinction between the end of catharsis and that of the moral training of the young, a distinction already mentioned c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23 ff. (ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μάλλον ἢ μάθησιν). But now the question there left unsettled (see n. 1073) has to be considered: the relation, namely, of catharsis to the two other ends previously recognised, recreation (ἀνάπαυσις) and the highest rational enjoyment (διαγωγή). According to the textus receptus both are distinct from the end of purgation, and are combined together to form a third end. But it is a conclusion reached independently by Liepert and Susemihl that this last cannot be the case, for several reasons. (1) In the preceding chapters διαγωγή and ἀνάπαυσις have always

1 See the translation of the textus receptus p. 607.
been opposed to each other; and (2) they really have nothing in common, except the element of enjoyment: but this they undoubtedly share with the other ends of 'moral training' (παιδεία) and 'purification' (κάθαρσις): consequently this does not justify their being combined together in contradistinction to these other ends, even if an attempt be made to keep them apart as two opposed members within the same combination by the insertion of the necessary disjunctive particle (b 40, πρὸς διαγωγὴν <ἡ> πρὸς ἀνέσιν τε κτλ). But (3) in addition to this, it is just as impossible, as Liepert has seen, to exclude from purification (κάθαρσις) the elements of διαγωγή and ἀνάπαυσις: and (4) grammatically the change from ἐνέκα with the two first ends to πρὸς with this alleged third (τρίτων δὲ πρὸς) throws suspicion upon τρίτων δὲ also. For in reality, whether it has a moral or a cathartic effect, music can only influence either the character or the emotions: and further how is it conceivable that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction? In any case then we require in the original text a statement that, regarded as an end of music, catharsis is only a means to one or other of these two ends; to διαγωγή, or to ἀνάπαυσις. Such a statement is furnished by my conjectural restoration ταύτης δὲ ἡ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ἡ πρὸς ἀνέσιν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν.

This is plainly confirmed by the subsequent course of the exposition. The next step is the division of the three classes of Modes (again according to the textus receptus) between the moral training of the young and the other ends of music, the most ethical being assigned to the former, those relating to action (πρακτικὰ) and the ecstatic (together with the less ethical) to the latter. But the explanation of κάθαρσις (§ 4 ff.), which had been previously promised (§ 3, b 38 τί δὲ λέγομεν κτλ) and is now added in the form of a reason (δὲ γὰρ περὶ ἔνιας κτλ a 4 ff.), proves by the very form in which it is cast that catharsis is to take the place of the other ends, or at least that by 'listening to the performances of others' (ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χειροποιητῶν) merely this is meant. It is the ecstatic modes and those of action which are said to be specially appropriate for catharsis, and it is to the ecstatic melodies that the explanation as given applies: the otherwise meaningless final remark ὀμοιὸς δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ τικαθαρτικὰ παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ, a 15, can

1 Zeller is so sensible of this that, as mentioned in n. on § 3 b 41, he would separate ἀνέσις and ἀνάπαυσις as a fourth end from διαγωγή, which he makes the third.

2 Even this suggested solution, which leaves the main question unaffected, appears untenable. For even if we understand ἀκρόασις ἐτέρων χειροποιητῶν to mean κάθαρσις, yet the very term ἀκρόασις implies the absurdity that the Greeks heard only melodies of action and ecstatic melodies (together with the less ethical) played and sung by others: that they never listened in this way to the most ethical, i.e. to the Dorian. Were this implied, it would seem necessary to admit the correction καθαρσίν for ἀκρόασιν. But then arises the question whether 1342 a 4 καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς should not simply be translated 'both those of action and the ecstatic,' especially as, when afterwards κάθαρσις comes to be discussed and explained, these two classes of musical modes and melodies are alone taken into account.
only be set straight by substituting, with Sauppe, the word πρακτικά ‘melodies of action’ for καθαρτικά ‘melodies of purgation’. In passing, there is the further suggestion to record that § 4, 1342 a 8 ff., the words ὁταν χρησωμεν τοις ἐξορμάζωσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεισι may be a gloss upon ἐκ τῶν ὅ’ ἱερῶν μελῶν which precedes.

From this investigation into the nature of catharsis it is inferred that the proposition was added to prove is really correct (διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις κτλ §§ 6—8, a 16—29). The previous directions for the moral training of the young are simply repeated § 8 (see n. 1100), in a less strict form, τοις ἡθικοῖς τῶν μελῶν καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις a 28 f., i.e. ethical modes replacing the most ethical, ταῖς ἡθικῶταῖς, of § 3, a 3. The further instructions relative to ἀκράσιας ἐτέρων ἱεροθυμάτων, i.e. to catharsis, are developed into a more precise statement that all the remaining Modes together are only appropriate and necessary for the recreation of the populace (the great mass of artizans, day-labourers, &c., who are not citizens in the best state), because this populace with its depraved taste takes most pleasure in artificial and complicated musical modes and “chromatic” scales. The more refined and cultivated public, consisting of the citizens in the ideal state, is distinguished from this populace, and obviously only the nobler musical modes are selected to afford this public the highest intellectual gratification. It is quite certain Aristotle cannot mean that this public is never to listen to ethical, and more especially to Dorian melodies. Such melodies, if they no longer serve for moral education, must surely contribute to that moral enjoyment which in this case is the basis for the intellectual element in the highest mental satisfaction (διαγωγή).

And on the other hand, are we to suppose that Aristotle meant wholly to exclude adults from the moral enjoyment of melodies of action and ecstatic melodies? Yet in c. 5 §§ 17, 18, 1340 a 12—23, he speaks (cp. n. 1046) not only of the pleasure awakened by the noble characters which music represents, but also of the worthy actions for which it finds expression.

Susem. (1101)

1 With this change the words will mean: “so also the melodies that impel to action afford an innocent delight.”

It is much to be regretted that Aristotle has not more fully explained how this is. For the ‘ecstatic’ (ἐνθουσιαστικά) modes and melodies include such as produce and express not only ecstasy, but painful emotions of all kinds, as was remarked n. (1084), with which notes (1054, 1080) should be compared: hence it is not immediately clear how a similar cathartic i.e. homoeopathic effect is to remain over for modes and compositions “of action.”

Manifestly, it is the more joyous and energetic emotions, love and courage, to which these latter correspond. Yet no doubt the expression of some painful emotions, e.g. anger, cannot be excluded.

Susem. (1096) Cp. Khet. II. 5. 21, 1383 b 7, θαρταλεῖον γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ. If Heraclides is rightly reported Athen. xiv. 625 E, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀρμονίαν εἴδος ἔχειν ἡθον ἡ πάθους, he confined music to the expression of character and emotion. He may have found the difficulties presented by πρακτικά μέλη insuperable. Cp. however n. (1084).


3 The proposition φανερῶν ὁτι χρηστέων μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπων πάσαις χρηστέων ἄλλα κτλ § 3, 1342 a 1—4.
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

καὶ γὰρ παθεῖας ἔνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως [sc. φαμέν τῇ μουσικῇ χρήσθαι δεῖν]—
tί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν καθάρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἔρουμεν

καὶ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῶς ἵσχυρός, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ
dὲ ἤττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μάλλῳ, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἐτὶ δὲ ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ
γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιμοι τινες εἰσίν· ἐκ τῶν δὲ ἑρών μελῶν ὀρέων
tούτων, ὃταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζοντι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεςτε, καθιστάμενοι ἀστήρ
λατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. § ταύτῳ δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς
ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς ὀλος παθητικούς, τοὺς δὲ ἂλλους καθ’ ὀσον
ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστῳ, καὶ πάσα γίνεσθαι τινα καθάρσιν καὶ κοφίζεσθαι
μεθ’ ἐξονής. c. 7 §§ 4, 5, 1342 a 4—15. Comp. ὅστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ
[sc. τῷ αὐλῷ] καρὸσι χρηστῶν ἔν σοι ἡ θεωρία καθάρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἢ μάθησιν.
c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 22 f.

Underlying this whole argument is the analogy of the homoeopathic
treatment for bodily ailments in vogue amongst Greek physicians of the
time and usually called by them καθάρσις : in regard to this it is sufficient to
refer to the Introduction of Susemihl's edition of the Poetics p. 44 f. and to
the fuller investigations of Döring¹. Two points have been properly empha-
sized by Döring : in the first place he has brought out the strong medical
colouring which a number of Aristotle's expressions bear²; and secondly,
that with the single exception of sufferers from the malady known as
κορηβαστισμός, Corybantian or Bacchic frenzy, who are really insane with
fanatical excitement (§ 4), Aristotle is not thinking of the cases where excess
of emotion has actually reached the pitch of madness, but only of emotional
subjects with a strong tendency to ecstasy, fear, pity, etc. while on the other
hand the subject of treatment by the musical catharsis is not compared to
a patient with a strong tendency to bodily disease but to one who is
actually suffering from it. Even the term κατακώχιμοι (§ 4, a 8), though it
reminds us of ‘possession’ and kindred ideas, does not mean anything more,
as Döring points out, than ‘liable to be attacked’ by a certain form of excite-
ment. So too the phrase δὲ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῶς ἱσχυρός, a 4,
“the emotion which occurs with especial violence in some minds,” in itself
ambiguous, denotes in this context the tendency to, but not the actual seizure
by, a morbid excess of emotion. And this is natural enough: for Aristotle's
chief concern is not with the insane and the means of their recovery, but
with convalescents who in time attain to perfect mental health (cp. n. 1094),
and with their aesthetic enjoyment; and what he has chiefly to deal with
here is not emotion already actually excited but the matter of emotion lying

714 ff. cp. p. 712 ff.).
² See 1342 a 8 κινήσεως and the notes on
κατακώχιμοι, a 9 χρήσαται, a 10 καθιστα-
mένους, a 14 κοφίζεσθαι.
dormant in their minds. The cure of morbid insanity is only of importance to him as a starting-point, as the foundation for his theory of the æsthetic catharsis, though it also gives him the right to make a new application of the medical technical term to this species of æsthetic effect.

This affords a further indication, as against Döring and others, within what narrow limits the medical, or pathological, analogy is confined. But at all events the term πάθος itself recalls τὸ πάρχειν, suffering or ailment, a suggestion quite lost in the usual rendering “emotion”; see Excursus III. n. (1043), p. 624. Aristotle no doubt distinguishes pleasurable and painful “emotions,” but if the form of his remarks would oblige us to assume that all “emotions” without exception are included, this is, as Döring rightly saw, only an inaccuracy of expression. In the case of the pleasurable πάθη (e.g. φίλα Rhet. II. 4. 1, 1380 b 33 ff., θάρσος, II. 5. 16, 1383 a 12 ff.) what analogy can there possibly be with bodily healing? And consequently how can there be cathartic, i.e. æsthetic, enjoyment, which is plainly described as a pleasure springing from pain? Pleasurable states (πάθη), on the contrary, are taken up with the moral feeling of pleasure at the successful musical imitations of noble characters and their emotions. To be quite accurate, Aristotle should have restricted his remarks here to painful emotions. Even the ‘violent occurrence’ (συμβαίνει ἴσχυρῶς) of the emotion reminds us, what has been said notwithstanding, of bodily disease: the ‘employment’ of melodies by those suffering from corybantism (§ 4) recalls the employment of remedies for bodily disorders, as was pointed out in n. (1093): it is to patients suffering from such disorders that the medical terms καθαρτασθαι = recover (but see n. 1093) and ιατρεία = regular course of treatment, are applied. Lastly, the mental relief (κούφιζεσθαι 1342 a 14) in the one case has its counterpart in the bodily ‘relief’ which is spoken of by the Greek physicians. With this exception however the medical terms are mainly used with exclusive reference to patients really delirious or insane. To render κάθαρσις by ‘homœopathic purgation of emotions’ (and thereby preserve the ambiguity of κάθαρσις παθημάτων Poetics 6. 2, 1449 b 27) does not imply that the emotions are purged, but that they are purged away: the emotion which music æsthetically awakens expels the every-day emotion of kindred name. The reader is referred to the Introduction to my edition of the Poetics p. 54 for further explanation why this view must be taken, and why of the two terms I prefer “cleansing” to “purgation.” There also, p. 44, I have argued that in all probability long before Aristotle’s time the treatment here described, whereby the priests employed the so-called melodies of Olympus to exert a soothing influence upon the minds of patients suffering from Corybantian frenzy, received the name of κάθαρσις “cleansing” in a religious (or lustral) as well as in a medical sense, because from a religious point of view such patients were considered to be defiled. SUSEM. (1095).

1 Bonitz Aris. Stud. v. p. 44: mental emotion has the term πάθος applied to it as being the counterpart of bodily ailment or disorder (πάθος = νόσημα).
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

Κάθαρσις as simple cleansing.

The etymology of the term, its literal meaning and the connexion of its manifold applications, cannot be better explained than is done by Plato in the Sophist 226 D—231 E. The Eleate stranger starts with the every-day operations of sifting, straining, winnowing as contrasted with such other processes as carding, spinning, weaving, and he infers that their object is to separate, not like from like, but better from worse. Cleansing (καθαρμός) is the general name for any such process1. Having thus determined the genus he goes on to divide it into its several species. When applied to animate bodies, such cleansing includes not only (a) the internal purge effected by gymnastic or medicine—here we approach the well established medical usage of the term, see below—but also (b) the merely external washing effected by the aid of sponge or bath; while inanimate objects undergo a similar treatment at the hands of the fuller or 'dress-reviver'2. With these literal corporeal cleansings the Eleate is less concerned than with the intellectual process, (c) the riddance of false opinions, whereby he is ultimately enabled to define the Sophist as καθαρτής, and the elenchus as a purge:—an application of the term to which we shall recur later on (p. 647).

The liturgical or religious sense: lustration.

It is generally admitted that as a technical term κάθαρσις was earlier and more widely used in this than in its medical application3. Amongst the Greeks the conception of impurity and ceremonial purification was elaborated from very simple and humble beginnings, as we see in Homer, where prayer and sacrifice are preceded by corporeal ablation and Achilles rinses carefully a goblet that is to be used for libations. At all times indeed the cultus of Greek religion laid special stress upon external, ceremonial purity: there must be running water near a temple and περιπαπαντήρια for worshippers. The opening scene of Euripides' Ion, 101 ff., reminds us of the importance attached to keeping the temple itself pure and clean. All the contingencies of individual life—birth, marriage, death—were attended by casual impurity which lustrations were needed to remove. The Ecclesia was cleansed before a debate: upon one occasion, when news arrived of a horrible massacre, it was cleansed afresh. A whole community might become defiled and require the intervention of some prophet, like Epimenides, to prescribe by what ceremonies the taint could be removed or absorbed.

1 τᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις (sc. ἡ καταλείπουσα μὲν τὸ βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χείρον ἀποβάλλουσα) λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις, Sophist 226 D. Hence the definition Ὄροι 415 D, κάθαρσις ἀπόκρισις χείρονος ἀπὸ βέλτιων. In the simple literal sense, there seems no distinction between κάθαρσις and καθαρμός.

2 τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἶδη καθάρσεων...τὰ τῆς τῶν ἔσοντα (α) ὅσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμναστικῆς ἱερικῆς τε ὀρθῶς διακρυνόμενα καθαιρεῖται, καὶ (β) περὶ τὰκτιτος, εἰς πᾶν ψυχὴν, ὅσα βαλανεντικὴ παρέχονται καὶ τῶν ἄφθονον σωμάτων, ὅν γραφεντικὴ καὶ ἐξυπνόσα κοιμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρέχομεν...πολλὰ ὀνόματα ἔχε, Sophist 226 E f.

3 Döring Kunstlehre p. 251.
The crude materialism at the basis of these usages is shown by the very nature of the rites; the detergents (περιψήματα) used to 'suck up' the pollution, the care taken to bury or cast into the sea, or a river, all these καθάρματα (καθάρσια), i.e. objects loaded with the taint. Gradually however higher conceptions were introduced. The need of moral purity was emphasized in the words graven in the court of at least one temple. In nothing is the elevation of idea more striking than in the treatment of homicide. It is well known that in the Homeric age the taint of blood-guiltiness was unknown: Theoclymenus, a homicide, is even present at a sacrifice, *Odysse*. XV. 222 ff., 236 ff. The notion of guilt being wholly absent, the only atonement for murder is the price paid to the kin of the murdered man. Traces of a new order of thought can be discerned in the later epics. In the *Aethiopis* of Arctinus, Achilles, having slain Thersites, goes to Lesbos, and there, after sacrifice, is cleansed by Odysseus. This earliest instance presents all the essential features of the remarkable beliefs so familiar to us in the story of Orestes and his trial on the Areopagus: the temporary exile, because the land is defiled by bloodshed, the ceremony of purification, the return when the angry gods and the manes of the dead are presumed to have been appeased. Precisely similar ideas and ceremonies are attributed to the Lydian king Croesus when he purifies the Phrygian Adrastus, Herod. 1. 35.

**Lustration as a cure for madness.**

But along with instances in abundance of lustration for the removal of casual impurity and the taint of blood, there is some not inconceivable evidence that κάθαρσις, in this ceremonial sense, was extended to the healing of disease, more especially of mental disorders, an application which serves as a transition to the well-defined medical use of the term. We need not dwell on the perfect congruity of this application with the beliefs of a time when the 'medicine man' is also a soothsayer, and cures are wrought by charms and spells. The complete parallelism between the mental and the bodily treatment, which is involved in the application of the terms κάθαρσις and καθαρμός indifferently to both, is asserted in the strongest terms in Plato's

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1 Compare also Δίς κάδιον οὗ τὸ ἰερέαν Δί τέθυται...χωρίντι δ᾿ αὐτοῖς...πρὸς τοῦ καθαρμοῦ ύποστρωμινὺτες αὐτὰ τοῖς ποσί τῶν ἐναγών (Suidas), ἐφ᾿ οἷς καθαρούσιν ἐστίν θεοῦ τῷ ἀριστέρῳ ποδί (Hesychius).

2 Porphyry. *De Abstinentia* II. 19: δὲ τοῖς καθαρμένοις τὸ θῆον ἵναι τὸ σῶμα ἐποιεῖ τὰ τῶν ἐναγών...ἐπὶ γὰρ Ἐπιδαύρῳ προεγέγρατο...ἀγρον χρῆ ναι τὸ θυώδες ἐντὸς ἰστί...ἐκεῖνα...ἀνεποδεὶς δ᾿ ἐστὶ φρονεῖν ὄσιν. The quotation from Bernays *Theophrastos über Frömigkeits* p. 67 f.

3 θεραπεύεθαι δὲ τὰ τιν ἄρμαθι (Ζάμολέξι) ἐφ᾿ ἐνφαίνας τις, PL Chart. 157 A. Not only ἐνθυσιασμὸς but lumbago and epilepsy were said to be cured by music: *Theophrastus perί ἐνθυσιασμοῦ*, Fr. 87: ὅτι δὲ καὶ νόσους ἴαται μοισχή Θεόφραστος ἀποθέσθησαν ἐν τῷ περί ἐνθυσιασμοῦ, ἵσχυς, τῶν φάσκων ἄνθρωποι διατείλει εἰ καταλήσοι τις τοῦ τόκου τῇ φυγιαί ἄρμον (Ἀθ. XIV. 624 b), Fr. 88 Θ. ἐν τῷ περί ἐνθυσιασμῶν...φοῖσι...τῇ μουσικῆς πολλὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα γιγνομένον παθῶν ἱατρεῖς καθάπερ λιποθυμίας φόδους καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ μακρὸν γιγνομένας τῆς διαλίθει ἐκστάσεις. ἴαται γάρ, φησὶν, ἡ καταλήσις καὶ ἵσχυς καὶ ἐπιτήλησι: (an instance is appended, Apollon. *Hist. Mirab.* c. 49).

Cratylus. There Socrates, speaking of the attributes of Apollo, whose name he connects with ἀπολλόων, ἀπολλών, says: “the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.” The strange nature of primitive remedies is what we might expect; ‘the hair of the dog that bit you’ is but one instance of crude homoeopathy, which might be indefinitely illustrated. The fact that to cure madness the Greeks resorted to noisy excitement is beyond all doubt. In Plato, madness itself is said to suggest this remedy to the clairvoyant patient, the ‘illustrations and religious rites’ which for his malady are alone of avail. In the legends we naturally find this method of treatment (ὑ διὰ φαρμάκων καὶ καθαρμῶν θερίσεως) referred to an individual inventor: Melampus, a well known seer, is represented as healing the madness of the daughters of Proetus by such lustral rites. Dionysus himself was the subject of another legendary cure. The case of Orestes, Paus. II. 31. 4, is less clear seeing that he was ‘cleansed’ of matricide as well as madness. On the other hand, in a picture of real life from the Wasps of Aristophanes, Bdelycleon in all seriousness endeavours to cure his father’s madness by initiating him in the Corybantian rites. Not less sober is the statement of the phenomenon as an acknowledged fact—the frenzy that music is supposed to excite and to cure—in the questions put by Porphyry and answered, in the person of Abammon, by Iamblichus.

1 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ καθαρσίς καὶ οἱ καθαρμοὶ καὶ τὰ τήν λατρείαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ αὐτὸς ἱεροῖς ἀποστραπάται καὶ τοὺς μαντικοὺς περιεργοῖς τε καὶ τὰ λοιπά τὰ ἐν τοῖς ποιοτοῖς καὶ αἱ περιφέρεσις, πάντα ἐν τὶ ταύτα δύνατ᾽ αὖ, καθαρμὸν παρέχει τῶν ἀνόητων καὶ κατὰ τὸ σώμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, 405 Λ, Ἡ. In view of this and the other Platonic passages it seems impossible to endorse the objection of Keiz, Ὀ. Ῥ. ε. p. 104, “expiari et lustrari dicuntur id dumtaxat, qui polluti sunt aliquo sceleri, tum qui mysteriis initiati, aut qui rem sacram facturi sunt: non etiam οἱ quorum animus ab aliqua perturbatione tanquam morbo purgatur et liberatur.”

2 ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσου γε καὶ πόνον τῶν μεγάλων, ἀ δή παλαιῶν ἐκ μεμιματῶν ποθέν ἐν τις τῶν γενών, οἱ μανίας ἐγενεσθοκε καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἐδει ἀπαλάληγν εὔβετο, καταφρονοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐφάρσ χε τι καὶ λατρειας, δήν δή καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελευτῶν τυχόντα ἐξάντλε ἐποίησε τὸν ἐαυτὸν ἔχοντα, Phaedr. 244 Β, Ἠ. In view of this the other Platonic passages it seems impossible to endorse the objection of Keiz, Ὀ. Ῥ. ε. p. 104, “expiari et lustrari dicuntur id dumtaxat, qui polluti sunt aliquo sceleri, tum qui mysteriis initiati, aut qui rem sacram facturi sunt: non etiam οἱ quorum animus ab aliqua perturbatione tanquam morbo purgatur et liberatur.”

3 ἐστοι ἀναφεύγει το στήλαιν τάς τυριάτερας τάς Προίτου μανιέας λέγοντας ἡ Μελάμπους θυσίαις τα ἀπορρήγοι καὶ καθαρμοὶ κατήχησεν ἐν χωρίων καλοίμενοι λουσάς ... καὶ ἠκέστα τῆς μανίας ἐν Ἀρτέ-μιδος ἱερῷ, Pausan. VIII. 18. 3. The account of Apollodorus (II. 2. 2 ff.) makes the cure depend on counter-excitement, Μελάμπους δε, μάντις ὁ καὶ τὴν διὰ φαρμάκων καὶ καθαρμῶν θερίσεως πρῶτος εὐρηκῶς, παραλαμβάνων τῶν δυνατῶτων τῶν οἰκείων μετ' ἀλαλαγμοῦ καὶ τινός ἐνθέου χορείας εἴ τῶν ὅρων αὐτὰς εἰς Σκίωναν ανρεδιώξε. κατὰ δὲ τῶν δυσμάτων ἡ προσβολή μετήλλαξεν: ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς τυχοθέας καθαρμῶν συνεργασάται ανέφη.

4 Ἡρα καθαρία αὐτῆς ἐξαλούσθη σαφῶς δ' εἰς Κήθελα τῆς Φυγίας ἀφερείαι, κάκει καθαρθεῖς ἐπὶ Ρέας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς ἐκκαθαρθεῖς, Apollodorus III. 5. 4. This is alluded to by Plato Lat. 672 Β.

5 The same remark applies to the cleansing of Alcmeon, Apollodorus III. 7. 5. 2—4. ἐστ'[α] ἀπόλλων καθαρσία: ὃ δ' οἶ μάλα. | μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκορυθήσατ' (120). Ιππ. schol. ἀντί τοῦ, τὰ τῶν Ὀμηρίκων ἐποίει αὐτῆς ἡμορία, ἐπὶ καθαρμός τῆς μανίας: and to the same effect Hesych. s.v. Κορυθήσισμος καθαρσίας μανίας.

6 ὅς τῶν ἐξισταμένων ἐνοί τινες αὐλῶν ἀκούσαντες ἢ κυματικῶν ἢ τυμπάνων ἢ τινος μέλων ἐνθονοῦσιν, ὡς οἰ το κορυθήσιμοι καὶ τοῦ Ἀράχων κατοχοί καὶ οἱ μητρίζοντες ... with the ordinary explanation (which Abammon of course rejects)
The main features of this celebrated form of worship, at once a revel and a mystery, are vividly presented by the authorities whom Lobeck has collected with all his learning and acumen in *Aглаохамуσ*, p. 1150 ff. To the Platonic dialogues we are indebted for some of the most graphic touches, pouring out various accompaniments of the weird scene of music and dance which was apparently far better adapted to produce madness than to take it away. First and foremost, the incessant piercing melody of the pipe, which haunted the patient until he had ears for no other sounds: then the wild frenzied dances, the music meanwhile drowning the cries of the patient, causing palpitation of the heart, while the tears started from his eyes. To other writers we are indebted for hints and allusions which fill in some details, but the philosophic reflections in which Plato himself sums up the total effect, *Λαός* 790 ε—791 ι, leave little more to be said: "this is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. The reason is obvious. The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent to μὲν οὖν κινητικὸν τὰ καὶ παθητικὸν εἶναι τῷ μοναστικῷ, καὶ τὸ τῶν αἰλῶν ἐμποιεῖν ἡ λατρευτείς τὰ πάθη τῆς παραρτησίας, καὶ τὸ μετατάσσεται τὰ τοῦ σώματος κράσεις ἡ διάθεσις τῷ μοναστικῷ, καὶ τὸ ἄλλως μὲν μέλεσιν ἀναβακχεύειται, ἄλλως δὲ ἀποτενεύεται τῆς βακχείας, καὶ πῶς αἱ τοῦτοι διαφορὰ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκάστας διαθέσεις προσαρμόττωσιν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἄστατον καὶ ἀκατάστατον μέλος πρὸς τὰς ἐκστάσεις οἰκεῖοι, οὐ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ Ὀλόμπον, καὶ σαν τοιαύτα λέγεται, πάντα ἀλλοτρίως μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἐνθουσιασμὸν ἐμπληρέως.  

1 Ιου 536 ο., οἱ Κορυβαντες ἕκεινον μόνον ἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους οἴζον δ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ ὅτι ἀν κατέχομαι, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχηματικὸς καὶ ῥηματικὸς εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσιν.

2 Στίχος 54 ἓν, ταῦτα εὖ ισθαὶ ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκόειν ὡσπερ οἱ Κορυβαντες τῶν αἰλῶν δοκοῦσαν ἀκόειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ἡ ἐχθροῦσι τῶν λόγων βουμβεί οὐκ ἤνεον ἡ ἀκοεῖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοεῖν.

3 Ιου 533 ο., οἱ Κορυβαντες οὐκ ἐμφανίων ὡστε ὀρχύνονται.

4 Λαός 790 ι., αἱ μητέρες... ἀδεχόν ἄταξυνοι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφράσεως βακχείων ἱδαίες ταῦτα τῇ τῆς κοινῆς ἀμα χορελά καὶ μοῦση χρώμεναι.  

From the expression βαχχείων λάσεως Döring op. c. 252 strangely infers that the religious or liturgical signification of the phenomena must be rejected. Quite the contrary: in the same context 790 ε we find αἱ τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἱλάσμα τελεύσει; τελεύσει are joined to καθαρμοῦ in *Φαικιτρία* 1144 E (cited above, p. 645 n. 2); and Dionysus in the legend is not only 'cleansed' but instructed in the Bacchic rites (καθαριεῖν ὡς Ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τὰς τελεύσεις ἐκμαθαί p. 645 n. 4). The common belief attributed Bacchic frenzy to the fact that the god had himself been driven mad by his step-mother: *Λαός* 672, λόγου τις ἀμα καὶ φήμη ὑποτείνωσ, ὡς ἢ δεῖτο ωτὸυ ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς Ἰππας διεστρήθη τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς γνώμην, διὸ τὰς τις βαχχείας καὶ πάναι τὴν μανίκην ἐμβάλλει χορέλαιν τι μωροβένον τι, i.e. in retribution.

5 Symp. 215 E: πολύ μανάλλον η τῶν Κορυβάντων ἢ τὰς καρδίας πνεύμα καὶ δάκρυα ἔκχειται.

internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy. Corroborative testimony is borne by Aristides Quintilianus, in the passage cited above p. 609, f. 2

Καθαρσίς as purification or purging of impurity.

In the applications of the term hitherto considered the object has been the person (or occasionally the thing) cleansed. In some of the metaphorical uses, however, and in the technical medical sense, the object of καθαρσίς is not the person but the impurity removed. With this construction the verb means not merely to purge [the system] but to purge away [what is noxious]; accordingly καθαρσίς denotes riddance and removal of impurity. The term has a wide range of metaphorical applications: e.g. 'separation' Plato Phædo 67 C, and moral 'purification,' which is a sense frequent in the Phædo. In the Sophist the elenchus is termed a purge. Socratic education, aped by the younger Sophists, was directed to ridding the pupil of that "false conceit of knowledge," which is the primary hindrance to the acquisition of true wisdom. Other usages, e.g. λύσεις τε και καθαρμοί ἀδικημάτων (Rep. 364 ε, cp. Phædo 82 d), support this meaning of riddance or removal.

From Plato it passed to the Neo-Platonists: in Stobaeus Ecl. Phys. I c. 49 § 65 there is an extract, probably from Iamblichus peri ψυχῆς,

1 Lactis 790 c—791 b, Jowett's translation. Ed. Müller Gesch. der Theorie der Kunst I. 121, 11. 70 (cp. Jährb. f. Kl. Phil. cit. 1870, p. 405 f.) called attention to this passage in connexion with καθαρσίς. Especially noteworthy is 790 e f. οὗτος εἰς ἑαυτὸν τοσοῦτον πάθεις σεμιμόν, ἢ τῶν ἐξωθεν κρατεί κίνησις προσφερομένη τῆς ἐντὸς φοβηρᾶν ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ μανικαί κίνησις, κρατήσας δὲ γαληνήν ἴσχυλαν τε, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεται ἀπεργασιμαχία τῆς περί τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γενομένης ἕκαστον πρόσθες, παντάπασιν ἀγαπητῶν τοὺς μέν ὑπὸν λαγχάνειν ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐγγραφόσας ἀρχομένους τε καὶ αὐλούμενοι μετὰ θεῶν, οἷς ἐπὶ καλλιεργοῦσεν ἑκατον θύσιν, κατεργάσάτο ἀντί μανικῶν ἴσως διαθέσεως ἐξαίρεσιν ἐχειν. An objection made by Döring p. 252 to the whole idea of a 'illustration' of Bacchic enthusiasts as involving a contradiction, since the votary of the god, full of his enthusiasm, cannot possibly be unclean, or stand in need of consecration, is fully answered by this and similar passages.


3 καθαραίαν...τὸ χωρίζειν ὑπὸ καθαρών ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν. Cp. Soph. 227 C, ψυχῆς καθαρός = κακίας ἀφαίρεσις, i.e. λυτεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, ἐκβάλλειν οὖν τὸ φλάβρων.

4 E.g. 66 b τὸ δ ἀληθὲς τὰ ὅπως ἢ καθαραίας [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν τοιούτων πάντων...καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φράσσεις μὴ καθαροῦσα τίς γ.: "whereas in truth it is really a purgation from all such things...and wisdom itself is probably a mode of purification." See also 69 c 6 κακαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος, 113 D, 114 C.

5 τὸν ἐλεγχον λεκτον ὡς ἢ αὐτή καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἔστι, 230 D. The sophist is δοξάζων εἰμι τοιούτων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχῆς καθαρεῖς, 231 ε. The analogy to the medical treatment is brought out fully 230 c—E.
which fully explains in what sense κάθαρσις was a technical term. It denoted in fact practical virtue, moral activity generally, regarded as one stage in the ascent of the soul, which must be purged from everything corporeal in order to attain to the divine likeness. Between this ethical and ascetic application, on the one hand, and Aristotle’s pathological application, on the other, there is nothing in common: they are totally opposed, a fact which gives peculiar value to the evidence of Iamblichus and Proclus to be hereafter considered.

The usage of the medical writers: purgation, discharge.

It remains to consider the most important extension of the meaning riddance or removal. In Hippocrates and Galen κάθαρσις as a technical term denotes ‘purging,’ i.e. expulsion of diseased humours from the system. Foesius has well defined it: κάθαρσις purgatio absolute dicitur Hippocrati, cum humores prava qualitate affecti et noxii vacuantur, sive id natura moliatur, sive sponte fiat, aut medicamento. To understand this definition fully, a slight acquaintance is required with the pathological theory of the father of medicine. The school of Hippocrates base their treatment upon the assumption of the four ‘humours,’ blood, phlegm, black bile, yellow bile. Health depends upon the due proportion of these vital fluids: disease is caused by their undue excess or defect, especially by their morbid accumulation in the frame. If they are disordered, the more they accumulate the worse the disease becomes. In such a case the task of the physician is to aid nature to discharge from the system the accumulation of peccant humour, lest it become corrupt: preparatory to a discharge it must however be

1 Πλωτίνος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀπόθεται τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν μορφωτικῶν διαγώνεια, δόξης τε πάσης ὑπεροφιλίαν [τῇ] καὶ τῶν εὐνοίας διανοήσεων ἄποστασιν, πλήρωσιν τε ἀπὸ νοοῦ καὶ τοῦ δυντος, ἀφομοίωσιν τε τοῦ κατανομημένου πρὸς το κατανοημένην τὴν τελειοτάτην κάθαρσιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν p. 454, 19 ed. W. He goes on to distinguish κρίσις, δίκη, κάθαρσις, and on the authority of οἱ ἀρχαῖοι assigns as the end of the last ἀφάρμαση τῶν ἀλληγρωμένων, ἀπόδοσις τής οἰκείας οὐσίας, τελειότητας, ἀπαλλότριας, αὐτάρκεια, ἀνοδός ἐπὶ τὸν γενησμένην αἰτίαν: whereas others confine it to the humber functions of ὑποειδικός ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ἀπαλλαγή τῶν καταδέσμων καὶ φθορᾶς ἐλευθέρωσις καὶ γενέσεως ἀφέσις. Plotinus discusses the relation of κάθαρσις to the virtues in Enn. 1. 2 περὶ ἄρετων, and decides (τ. 6. 6) that κάθαρσις is not a means to virtue, but identical with virtue. Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Hierocles, and Ammonius agree in placing the cathartic virtues above the civic (πολιτικά) and below the intellectual (θεωρητικά ἀρεταί): see Zeller Phil. d. Gr. ΙΙΙ. ι. 661, 711, 757; 819 n. 4. It is only in this neoplatonic sense that the word admits of the rendering “purification,” so common hitherto and so unhappily ambiguous.


3 I.e. ὑγιαίνει μὲν ὅσον μάλιστα, ὡστός μετρίως ἔχει ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κρησίσης ταῦτα καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιμημένα ἡ ἄλγεις δὲ, ὡστὸς τὰς τουτέστων λαξασόν ἤ πλέον ἡ ἑρωθηθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκραμένον ἢ τούτων ἡμιμηωσίας. Plato has a similar theory in his Timaeus cc. 39, 40, 82 a ff. except that he has transferred the ‘unnatural excess and defect’ and the ‘displacement’ in the last resort to his four elements (air, earth, fire, water) rather than to their secondary formations, the four humours. Still he follows the Hippocrateans in referring fevers to the bile and catarrhs to phlegm (Tim. 85 b).
reduced and softened. Three stages may therefore be distinguished: (1) presence of crude humours, τὰ μῆ καθαρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, (2) their reduction, πέψις, itself a species of transformation, or μεταβολή, (3) their expulsion, κρίσις. Of these stages, (2) and (3) are promoted by artificial means, as explained by Plutarch in the case of hellebore: an insufficient dose, he says, excites disturbance (ταράττει) without however effecting a purge.1 The induction of excitement (ταραχή) is somewhat of a parallel to homoeopathic remedies in modern medicine, while the stimulated ἐνθουσιασμὸς in the Corybantian worship corresponds to it in so far as in both cases the remedy adds fuel to the flame.2 The medical process (ταραχή) goes on until the reduction (πέψις) is complete. Thereupon it remains to rid the body of the disturbing alien matters.

Here it is important to insist upon the distinction which Galen emphasizes between the sense of κάθαρσις and of κένωσις in the Hippocratic corpus: the latter a depletion or total evacuation of humours,—it may be of healthy but surplus humours—the former the partial removal of morbid elements, whose presence causes active annoyance: κένωσις ἀπλῶς εἰσθα λέγειν ὁ Ἰπποκράτης ὡστὶ ἀπαντείς οἱ χυμοὶ ὁμοτίμως κενώσται, καθαροῖς δὲ ὡστὶ οἱ μοχθήραι κατὰ ποιότητα. This distinction is rendered prominent in such phases as κάθαρσις χολῆς, κ. αίματος, where the result is not merely the loss of blood, etc. but, as what is removed is bad, what remains is absolutely clarified and refined; it is purged but not altogether purged away.

From the medical writers this usage found its way into the language of every-day life. Thucydides treats it as a technical term in his description of the plague:3 Demosthenes allows a singularly naive and unsophisticated client to employ the word.4 Aristotle appears to have generally adopted the medical terminology as well as the theory of humours from the Hippocratesans:5 but in the biological works he has specialized this word in a slightly different sense.6 Nor can it be said that the distinction enforced by

1 ὁ γωνίον ἐλέξιως ἀρχὴν τοῦ καθαρεῖν ἔχει τὸ ταράττει τῶν ὕγιον, ἀλλὰ ἐκ ἐλάσσων τοῦ μετρίου δοθη, ταράττει μὲν αὐθεν τα ἰκαθαρεῖ. Plut. Quaest. conv. 3. 8, p. 565 B.
2 Comp. Plato’s reflections on the Corybantic rites, Laws 11. 790 C ff. as quoted above p. 565 n. 4.
4 ἀτοκαθάρσεις χολῆς πάσχει, ὡστὶ ὄπου ἀτράνων ὄφωμασμένα εἰσίν, 11. 49.
5 c. Conon. § 12, εἰ μὴ κάθαρσις αἵματος αὐτομάτη μοι ανέβηθ Or. 54, p. 1250, 24.
6 Litté. ed. of Hippocr. 1. 73: plus on examine comparativamente les écrits hispocratieques, ceux de Platon et d’Aristote, plus on trouve de conformités entre eux et de points de comparaison. Döring ap. c. p. 319 ff. collects a few instances of κείνης, κίνησις, ταράττει, ταραχή—e.g. 450 b 1, 70 b 9 ff., 1106 a 4, 1352 a 21, 1386 b 19, 23, 864 a 6, a 15 ff., 864 a 2, 873 b 31 f. Add Probl. 1. 42, 864 a 34 (quoted below p. 565 n. 8).
7 See Bonitz Ind. Ar. s.v. 354 b 28 ‘σύ τὰ καταμείωσα.’ The references adduced take up rather more than a column
Galend between κένωσις and κάθαρσις is much observed by unprofessional writers.

**Kάθαρσις as an aesthetic term.**

The foregoing survey will serve as an introduction to the usage of κάθαρσις in reference to Music in the Politics, and in the famous definition of Tragedy in the Poetics. All are agreed that Aristotle is employing the term in a metaphorical sense of his own, at once novel and calling for elucidation. Whether this aesthetic sense was derived from the liturgical or the medical usage of the term is not absolutely demonstrated: whichever it was, we may acquiesce in Zeller's opinion that the new application is a wide departure from the original intention. On the one hand there is no doubt that the theory which Aristotle puts forward rests upon the facts to which he himself appeals—facts which, however remote from our experience, were less uncommon in Greece and in the East—the cure of the Corybantic frenzy in the manner above described. On the other hand the occurrence of medical terms in the context, certain points in the process of relief, and the consideration urged by Bernays that a pathological effect on the mind would be more naturally elucidated by reference to the effect of medicine on the body, all make in favour of regarding the medical metaphor as prominent.

"Are we to imagine," it has been asked, "that when writing upon art, Aristotle was primarily thinking not of Plato’s ‘psychiaty’ in the Laws, but

(64 lines), and those for other mean-ings less than 20 lines (one of these latter is De gen. anim. II. 4. 11, 738 a 28 K. τῶν περιπτωμάτων). Bernays Ὸ�품. c. p. 91 (191) is able to adduce the parallels ἀπόκρισις τῶν καταμηριῶν, ἐκκρίσις.

1 E.g. Pl. Phaedo 69 c κάθαρσις = total removal.

2 μίκησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἑχόντος ἡδυσμένως λόγω χωρίς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδών ἐν τοῖς μορίοις δρόμων καὶ ὁ δὲ ἀπαγγελα, δὲ ἐλέου καὶ φόβον περαινον τῆς τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν Poet. 6 § 2, 1449 b 27.

3 Poļ. v(viii). 7, 3, 1341 b 38. We have lost the fuller exposition of the Poetics (ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἑρόημεν σα-φέστερον, cp. n. 1085).

4 Very few authorities now support the former view. Ed. Müller argues for it Jahrh. f. Phil. 1870, p. 494 ff. The view taken in the text follows Susemihl Intr. to Poetics p. 44.

5 Phil. d. Grich. 11a, ii. 775.

6 P. 642. Ed. Müller Ὸ�품. p. 406 n. (190) insists that the similarity in means employed, subjects treated, effects produced in the cases mentioned by Plato Laws 790 D ff., and Aristotle Pol. v(viii). is so great as to be unmistakeable (τῶν ἐκφρασιν βακχείων ἱάσεις in Plato, ὀσπερ ἡσπεραλες τιχειω καὶ καθαρσις in Aristotle; ἥξις ἡμφρανσ ἤξιν in the former, καθι-στασις in the latter). That the priestly cure was actually called κάθαρσις is, however, an inference resting on slender evidence (see above p. 644 f.) and only eked out by general considerations of the primitive identity between drugs and charms, cleansing from ceremonial impurity and healing of mental disorders, which, as Susemihl remarks Jahrh. f. Phil. xcv. 1867, p. 234, attached a taint to the patient.

7 See the notes ad loc. p. 610 f.

8 The operation of drugs is the subject of Probl. 1. 42, διὰ τὰ ἑρμακμα καθα-ρεῖς; The illustration conveyed in the words ὦ διὰ καταστασιν ἐκπίπτει φέροντα τα ἐμποδία αὐτοῖς καὶ καλεῖται τοῦτο κάθαρσις 864 a 32—34, is very apposite. Cp. Pl. Soph. 230 c νομίζεται ὅτι οἱ καθαρτοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὀπλε-περ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἑαυτοῦ νευμακατ μη πρότερον ἀν Ἰησοῦν προσφερμενῆς τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δίψασθαι σώμα, πρὶν ἄν ἄν ἐμπο-δίζοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ... The relief follows upon excitation which is temporarily an aggravation of the disorder.

9 Zwei Abhandlungen p. 13 (143).
of Hippocrates’ emetics and purges?” The incongruity is only apparent: it is just the assimilation of the mental effect to the bodily cure, the attempt to explain the ‘psychiatry’ on the analogy of the purge, that constitutes Aristotle’s original contribution to Aesthetics.

The treatment to which the priest subjected those suffering from Corybantic frenzy may be loosely said to have been of a homoeopathic nature: that is, under the stimulus of the music, with all its exciting accompaniments (p. 646), the frenzy was accelerated and heightened until it had worked itself off. It is this excess or outburst of quasi-religious fervour, and the subsequent exhaustion, of which Catullus presents so astonishing a picture in the Attis. A fragment of Theophrastus practically endorses this view of the power of music. Plutarch too describes the effect of the flute, the instrument on which the melodies of Olympus were played, in language which shows a striking agreement with the cathartic method of the Politics. Lastly, there is the passage from Aristides Quintilianus already cited (p. 610).

Not quite so clear is the operation of tragedy: “an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude, by means of language embellished with each of the different kinds of embellishment, which are separately employed in the several parts; in the form of action not of narrative; effecting through pity and fear the proper purgation of these emotions.” If we are to choose between Lessing and Bernays, between “the conversion of the passions into virtuous aptitudes” and “the relief of disburdening the emotional tendencies”—there can be no question that the former is an erroneous view and the latter, in principle, right. The whole hypothesis is pathological; tragedy has, directly at least, no moral effect. In the Poetics we are told in so many words that tragedy creates a specific aesthetic enjoyment, a pleasure peculiar to itself: about its moral or educa-

1 Comp. above p. 645. The assertion that homoeopathic treatment is intended by Aristotle was made, as Bernays points out p. 95 (193), by Milton in the preface to his Samson Agonistes: “(Tragedy) said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of these and such-like passions; that is, to temper or reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight stirred up by reading or seeing those passages well imitated. Nor is Nature herself wanting in her own efforts to make good his assertion, for so, in physic, things of melancholic hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours.”

2 μιά δὲ φύσις τῆς μονοσκής, κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκατάληκτος γεγομομένη τῶν διὰ τὰ πάθη ἑκάκων Frag. 89 ed. Wimmer. He made ecstasy one of the three primary constituents of music (ἀρχαὶ μονοσκῆς λύ-πην ἕδων ἐνθουσιασμοῦ): Fr. 90.

3 In Quaest. Conv. III. 8 Plutarch is discussing the effect of wine: 2 § 10, 656 v. ἐκὸς δὲ ποῦ καὶ ταύτῃ τῆς περὶ τῶν ἀκροθόρακα παραχθῇ, ὅταν ἄκειν λάβῃ, μαραίνεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις συνεχεῖς τῶν ὄϊνων πολὺς γὰρ εἰσελθὼν τὸ σῶμα συνεξε-καυσαί καὶ καταναλώσα τὸ μανιβόδες τῆς ψυχῆς. ἀστερ γὰρ θηριωδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήθειος ἀνός ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κυνή καὶ δάκρυνος ἐξβάλλει [cp. p. 646 n. 5], πρά-γων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οὐκον οὔσω κατὰ μικρὸν ἔξαερει καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυ-πητικόν ὄμωσις ἰδοι ἄν τῶν ὀίνων κτλ.


4 Prof. Butcher’s translation, op. c. p. 348. The Greek is given p. 650 m. 2.

5 Poet. 14 § 4, 1453 b 10: οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν
tional influence we learn nothing. Such good effect as the drama exerts must, on the Aristotelian theory, be indirect. But so soon as the attempt is made to define more precisely the nature of this purgation, of the emotions that are purged, and the pity and fear through which their purgation is effected, there arise difficulties which have not yet been wholly surmounted. For there may be a total or a partial removal, a ‘purging away’ i.e. expulsion, or ‘purging’ i.e. refinement (by release of painful elements)¹: further, it is possible to ask whether the emotions purged are those already existing in the spectator, or such as are excited in him by the action of the piece. Nor is it inconceivable that Aristotle has unduly pressed the medical analogy. How can the emotions correspond to the materia peccans? They are never expelled, and to speak of them as ‘secreted’ is an outrage on language. We more properly regard them as either suppressed or indulged, and in the latter case as running their course, culminating in the thrill of pity, the shudder of horror, the transports of enthusiasm, until satiated with over indulgence they at length subside.

While fully sensible then that every one of the following positions has been a matter of protracted controversy, we incline (1) to interpret the purgation of the emotions to mean their gratification, their relief by indulgence² (though perhaps the outlet thus afforded for emotional excess necessarily involves a qualitative change, viz. the loss of an impure element, what is painful and oppressive either in the emotion itself or in its manifestation in actual experience): (2) to discriminate³ between the emotions relieved, i.e. the pity and fear of real life, and the emotions which effect this relief, viz. those artificially excited by the action of the drama⁴: (3) to

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² Comp. Plut. De intum. util. 10. 91 F : τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενοι εἰς τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀποκαθάρσεις “indulging [lit. venting] these feelings upon his enemies.” Bernays thought he could distinguish πάθημα, the disposition or permanent tendency (παθητική πάθητη), from the πάθος its transient manifestation. It is impossible to follow him here, for Bonitz, Arist. Studien V, has shown that the two terms are absolutely convertible in Aristotelian usage. While if we say that the ‘painful emotion’ of fear and pity is removed, we are reminded that the definitions in the Rhetoric (i. c. 5. c. 8) make each of these—fear itself and pity itself—‘a sort of pain’ (δόνη τῆς), although the emotions generally are defined as ότι ἐπεταί λύσοι καὶ ἴδου Rhet. II. 1. 8, 1378 a 21, Nic. Eth. II. 5. 2, 1105 b 23.

³ The distinction between tragic fear and pity and these emotions in real life was first drawn by Ed. Müller Gesch. der Kunstth. II. p. 63 ff. Unless this distinction be drawn it is impossible to avoid the difficulties which those followers of Bernays encounter who interpret τὴν τῶν τούτων παθητικῶν κάθαρσαν in the definition of tragedy as the “expulsion,” i.e. purging away, of the emotions in question. Bernays himself escaped this difficulty only by distinguishing πάθος = emotion, from πάθημα = disposition, tendency to emotion: — a distinction which in view of Bonitz’ careful investigation (Arist. Studien V) cannot be maintained. See n. (2). But there is no reason why the phrase should not mean the purgation of the emotions, i.e. the freeing them from what is superfluous, the diminution of the whole by the expulsion of what is noxious, and consequent clarifying or refinement of what is left.

⁴ The best proof that they are distinct (which has often been denied) is that in real life fear of imminent ill is incompatible with pity, i.e. sympathy with others: Rhet. II. 8. 6, 1385 b 33, ὅτι γὰρ
associate the cure of the o'erburdened heart with that universalising element of the drama in virtue of which Aristotle regards it as an idealisation of experience.

These are the general outlines of the pathological interpretation of κάθαρσις. The erudition of Bernays discovered some slight confirmation for it in subsequent writers. Iamblichus (or whoever was the author of De Mysteriis), defending the least decorous of ancient rites, after adducing the now familiar argument that "suppression of the passions serves only to strengthen them, whereas judicious gratification quiets them" proceeds as follows: "hence it is that in comedy and tragedy by the spectacle of others' emotions we still and moderate and purge our own: and similarly by seeing and hearing things unseemly in the temples we are freed from the harm which actual contact with them would bring." If this is too vague, we learn a little more from Proclus, who in his dissertation on the tenth book of the Republic—presumably expounding the Peripatetic view as the opposite of Plato's—speaks of Tragedy and Comedy as enabling us to compound with the emotions (συνετελούσας πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν) which need to be excited just so much as will secure us from future annoyance. Again he says "it is possible to afford the passions a moderate satisfaction, and when they are thus treated to find in them effective aids towards education, when once the inconvenience they cause has been remedied." From the Platonic standpoint Proclus then proceeds to refute the defence of poetry he has sketched, and in a final sentence contrasts his own neoplatonic ascesis with the compromise proffered by Aristotle.

But while the dim outlines of the
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theory can be recognised, and here and there an obviously genuine phrase or two (ἀπέρασις, ἀφοσίωσις, ἐμπέτρωσις ἀποστιμλώνα τὰ πάθη), the rest is so coloured in passing through this unsympathetic medium that there is considerable uncertainty whether it does not reflect the neoplatonic, rather than the Peripatetic, meaning of καθόρισις.

It remains to pass under review another possible source of information: the utterances and indications of Plato's own aesthetic views in his dialogues. Plato, too, held pity and fear to be the effect of tragedy. His reason for banishing the drama is that, like poetry in general, it feeds that emotional nature which ought rather to be starved. In a celebrated passage the indulgence of sentimental pity in the theatre is thus condemned as mischievous: "If you consider that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's... Few persons ever reflect that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gained strength at the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own." Here unquestionably is the view from which that of Aristotle is a reaction. That the passions are sources of possible danger, both philosophers agree: but granting this, Aristotle provides, while Plato sternly refuses, the means for their relief. Even Proclus is sensible of the antagonism of principle which has deduced from common bases of ethical belief so divergent a practical treatment. It would be a rash, but not exactly inadmissible proposal, to equate 'the feeling kept under control in our own calamities' with the pity of real life, and that which is 'satisfied and delighted by the poets' with the pity which (in Aristotle's definition) is the means of its purgation.

To Poetry and Art generally Plato allowed two and only two functions:

tὰς ποιήσεις...πολλοῦ δὲν εἰς ἄφοσίωσιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· αἱ γὰρ ἄφοσίωσις οὐκ ἐν ὑπερβολά τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἐν συνεσταλμέναις ἐνέργειαις [the neoplatonic view], συμμερήν ὀφοσίωσιν πρὸς ἐκείνα ἔχουσαι ὁν ἡι ἄφοσίωσις (ibid.). In this and the previous citations from Proclus the corrections of Bernays (op. c. pp. 46—50) are given.

2 Phaedr. 268 c. ἤρεται ποιεῖν...οὐκ ἂν καὶ τοῦντον αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνων αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀπειλητικάς, Rep. x. 606 a.
3 τρεφεῖ γὰρ ταῦτα [τὰ ἐπιθυμητὰ τε καὶ λυπηρά καὶ ἡδέ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ] ἄρδονα, δέν αὐχμείν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἡμῶν καθότητι
dέν ἀρχεῖται αὐτά, 606 d. Cr. Laws 790 E.

4 606 A, B: ei ἐνθυμοί, ὅτι τὸ βία κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις ἄνευρα ῥημάτων καὶ πεπυρωμένο τοῦ δικρόνα τε καὶ ἀποδρασθαί ἰκανός καὶ ἀπολήσθηναι, φύετε τοιοῦτον καὶ τοῦτων ἐπιθυμεῖτε, τότε ἐστι πρὸ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιστεύοντας καὶ θαλοῦν τὸ δὲ φύετε βλέπεις τοῦτον ἡμᾶς, ἀτε οὐκ ἰκανός πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ ἀδέθ θεοί, ἀγατεί τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ τρηφεῖν τούτον, ἀτε ἀλλότρων πάθη θεωροῦν...λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἷοί, ἀδέθ αὐτῶν μέτεστιν, ἢ τὸ ἀπολαθεῖν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οὐκ θάρσει ὑποκατέχειν. The translation is Dr Jowett's. The last remark is endorsed by Aristotle Pol. V(vIII). 5. 19, 1340 a 23.
(1) to convey truth 'in a glass darkly,' as he himself does in his myths, and
(2) to conduct to moral edification by presenting fair models and inculcating
by force of sympathy proper sentiments. The latter is Aristotle's παθεία:
habitation to feel pleasure and pain at the proper objects. Now the
Aristotelian κάθαρσις is something wholly distinct from this. It might be
defended as producing a harmonizing and elevating effect on feeling and so
transporting the audience into a state where they are more susceptible to
sympathy with men as men, and to admiration for virtue. But this is only
an indirect result. Or again we may regard it as a preventive: it might be
urged that we are thus inoculated against the temptation which Plato has
specially in view and regards as so formidable, the abuse of emotion and
maudlin sentimentality. In any case this is one more hint which Aristotle
has borrowed from his master. He has developed in a special direction the
principle of 'that indispensable minimum' of gratification which even Plato
does not refuse to the lower nature of man. The temperate sage of the
Republic, who would fain stimulate and quicken the activity of the reason
before he betakes himself to rest, is well aware that if he is to pursue, without
let or hindrance, his aspirations after higher knowledge, his passions must be
allayed and his appetitive nature indulged neither too much nor too little
but just enough to send it to sleep.1

In an Eudcian book of the Ethics an even more advanced position is
taken up: the pursuit of pleasure to excess is exonerated from blame: where
the pleasures pursued are harmless (cp. 1342 α 16 χαρῶν ἀδιαλείπτη), even
artificial means of stimulating them to excess are not condemned, such
'intense' pleasures being natural remedies for pains.2 But that Aristotle
was not blind to the danger of excessive sentimentality is shewn e.g. by his
care for the education of the feelings in youth.3

Besides this insight into the main motive and genesis of the pathological
theory which Aristotle put forward in defence of the drama we gain from the
Platonic writings many indications which serve to clear up particular points
in the exposition. In the Philebus (47 ε ff.) there is an interesting and
valuable analysis of the mixed states, partly pleasurable and partly painful,
which attend the spectators of comedy. From this analysis Aristotle would
seem to have borrowed not a little where he traces the pleasurable con-
comitants of various phases of emotion.4 We have every reason then to

1 Rep. 1 x 571 ε f.: το ἐπιθυμητικόν δὲ μήτε εὐδείᾳ δοῦσ μήτε πλημμυρῆ, ὅπως ἂν
κοιμηθῇ καὶ μή παρέχῃ ἱσχύν τῷ βελτιστῷ
τῷ χαίρον ἡ λυπόμενον, ἀλλ' εὰν αὐτὸ
[sc. τὸ βελτιστόν] καθ' αὐτὸ μόνον καθαρῶν
σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρθέσθαι τοῦ καὶ αὐθάνεσθαι δ
μὴ οὕσεσθε...ὡσάντως δὲ καὶ τῷ θυμοειδὲς παρά-
νασ καὶ μή τινος εἰς ὁργάς εἶν τοὺς καμενθέντος
τῷ θυμῷ καθεύθη, ἀλλ' ἁγνυχάσας μὲν τῷ δύο
εὖθυ, τῷ τρίτον δὲ κυνής...οὕτως ἀναπαύ-
γηται. It seems then that while ἀποστι-
πάλαι is prohibited as immoral, ἁγνυχάσας
is a condition essential to the efficient
working of the rational soul. Of course
the two philosophers differ wholly as to
the application of this principle.

2 N.E. vii. 14, 5, 1154 b 3: αὐτοὶ γοῦν
αὐτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευαζοῦσιν. ὅταν
μὲν οὖν ἀδιάλειπτη, ἀνεπιτυμητον... b 13 f.
ἐξελαύνει δὴ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἡ τ' ἐναντία
καὶ ἡ τυχούσα, ἐὰν γ' ἒσχυρα.

3 See V(viii). 5, 17, 18, 1340 a 12 ff.
(cp. 1341 a 13 f).

4 See Bernays op. cit. p. 143 f. Esp. cp.
1378 b 1 (πάση ὡργῇ ἐσεθαλ τω ἡδονή)
with Phil. 48 a and the Homeric citation
conclude that the facts had already been collected and the psychological problem not only stated but approximately solved before Aristotle, who did not share his master's condemnation of the drama on grounds of morality, came to formulate his own theory of its effect.

common to the two: also Pol. v(vIII). 5. 12, 1339 b 25 ff. with Phil. 51 A ff. But the detailed analysis in respect of comedy appears inadequate, and of tragedy little is said beyond the remark τάς γε τραγικάς θεωρήσεις, δόταν ἀμα χαίροντες κλάσωσι, μέμνησαι, Phil. 48 A. Cp. 50 b.
INTRODUCTION.

Page 1, line 3. The statement that there are no manuscripts earlier than the fourteenth century has been falsified by the discovery of the Vatican fragments of the tenth century. See p. 454.

P. 2, note 1. After θυσίας add: and 1271 a 27 (1272 a 3, b 34) φιλίτια ΙΙ φιλίτια ΙΙ².

P. 7, l. 17. As Plutarch Περὶ Ἑβρωνίας is a fabrication of the renascence, of which a Latin translation was first published in 1556 (Lugduni apud Seb. Gryphium), the citations from the Politics would not in any case have carried us far back: although, if at the time the forger himself used a manuscript, or even emended the text on his own conjecture, his readings deserve mention. But they are not even entitled to such authority as they would have possessed in the case assumed, for though the Latin translation gives those citations in full, the manuscript from which in the year 1724 J. Christopher Wolf edited the tract in Greek exhibited blanks where the citations should have stood, and Wolf himself is responsible for the text of the passages which he copied out, probably from the first edition of Victorius. In his preface to Vol. IV of Anecdota Graeca (Hamburgi 1724) Wolf says of the manuscript of the Περὶ Ἑβρωνίας which he obtained from Joh. Gramm, Professor at Copenhagen, “membranae illae uno altero vie ante inventam typographiam saeculo, meo judicio, luculente quidem, sed non sine frequentibus oscitantis librarii indicii exaratae...Vetereum scriptorum loca, a Plutarcho allata, omissa in his penitus erant, asterisco vicem eorum supplente...Eleganter et erudite illa (Latina Arnoldi Ferroni interpretatio) confecta est, atque veterum testimonia integra Latine, sed sine additis, ubi exstant, locis exhibet. Atque hanc ipsam...cum Graecis in lucem profero, additis si pauc a exeperis, auctorum testimoniis, quae non sine cura aliqua ex monumentis eorum adhuc exstantibus conquisivi.” Compare his footnote p. 196 [it should be 296]: “Aristoteles lib. I. c. vi. Politicor. p. 37 edit. Victorii. In hoc loco vertendo liberius versatur Interpres” i.e. Ferron “nisi in opusculo Plutarchi eum alia quaedam legisse censeas, quam quidem hodie apud Aristotelem exstant. In ms. hic loco deest.”

P. 9, l. 29. Add: Gesammelte Abhandlungen i. 165 ff. (Berlin 1885).


42—2

Jowett. Translation with Introduction and notes; Oxford, 1885.

Gomperz. Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung griech. Schriftsteller; Wien, 1890.


Häberlin. Article on Arist. Pol. ii. 9 in Rhein. Mus. xliv. 1890. 311 ff.

Maehly. Article in Philologus li. 1892. 197.


Stoehr, Engel, Widemann, Schmidinger, Vogel. Curiae criticae in Ar. Pol. in Commen
tationes philologicae Monacenses, 97—114: Munich, 1891.


v. Wilamowitz. Aristoteles u. Athken i. 64—71, 187 f. n. (3).


P. 14, n. 3. Add a reference to Birt Das antike Buchwesen p. 459. The safest inference to draw from the absence of correspondence between the opening of one book and the close of the preceding is that the two were independently elaborated. Notice the δε inserted after περὶ by P2 and P6 (corr.) at 1323 a 14. Compare Newman op. c. ii. p. xxii ff. xxvi f.

P. 15, n. 2. At the end of this note add (on p. 16): The total would now (1894) be slightly increased by the athelesis of the last clause of B. i. c. 13 § 16, 1260 b 24 f. [καὶ προτέτων...πολεμείας], ii. c. 6 § 13, 1263 b 12—17 [φειδών...μόρεον], § 22, 1266 a 22—25 [ως...σκέψις], v (viii). 7. 4, 1342 a 9 f. [σταν...μέλεια], although these passages are not, as before, enclosed in square brackets, and Mr Hicks is not convinced: further, by vii (vi). 2 § 5, 1317 b 23 [ἡ διηγάκης], 8 § 24, 1323 a 6—9 [τρω...δημοσικῶν]. As regards ii. c. 6 § 15, 1265 b 21—23 [ἐπείρα...τυφόσ;], with which must go c. 7 § 4, 1266 b 5—8 [Πλάτων...πότερον], Prof. Sussehni is not altogether convinced: while he is inclined to spare ii. 6. 15, 1265 b 24—26 [καὶ...οίκειον]—the discrepancy between this passage and iv (vii). 10. 11, 1330 a 9—23 may be accounted for by a change in Aristotle’s opinions, if he wrote B. ii. after B. iv (vii) —as well as ii. 7. 16 f., 1267 a 28—37 [δε...πολορκίας] in spite of note (249). On most of these passages see Sussehni Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. Pars iii, p. iii. Possibly even viii (v). 12 §§ 1—6, 1315 b 11—39, is genuine as Diels contends Archiv. Gesch. d. Philos. iv. 1891, p. 483 f.

P. 16, n. 3. Had Aristotle completed the work, there is a balance of probability that he would have arranged the books in this order: A. I. B. II. O. Δ. Z. E. Of these H. O. (and probably A. Γ.) were written earlier than the Constitution of Athens, the other four almost certainly later.

P. 16, n. 4. Add that Newman declines to accept the second transposition, suggesting a merely mechanical cause for the first: ii. p. xxxix f. It is much to be regretted that he has increased the existing confusion by a new nomenclature, Book 7 (§)=viii (v) and B. 8 (6)=vii (vi) of St Hilaire and Bk. 2.

P. 18, n. 3. Cicero’s acquaintance with the Politics has come up for discussion in several recent works, especially Schmeckel’s Die mittlere SIta (Berlin 1892) pp. 47—85. The investigations of Schmeckel enable us to dispense with the assumption that Tyrannion provided Cicero with extracts from Aristotle: for a comparison of Cicero

Direct acquaintance with the Politics is thus established for Panaeitus whose life (circa 185—110) nearly covers the century between Hermippus and Apellicon of Teos: a result confirming the line of argument adopted on p. 18.

As for Polybius, see also v. Scala Die Studien des Polybios i. (Stuttgart 1890) p. 102 ff., 222 ff. who endeavours (pp. 128—131) to prove that Polybius had himself read Aristotle’s Politics. This hypothesis is combated by Susemihl Litteraturgesch. ii. p. 81 n. (4), p. 106 n. (97 b), p. 127 n. (147).

P. 18, n. 7. The definite quotations contained in this list require to be distinguished from the more numerous traces of acquaintance with Peripatetic political doctrine which may or may not imply actual use of the treatise. The former may be slightly extended as regards the commentators on the Ethics: see now the academic edition Michael Ephesius ed. Heylbut p. 504, 8 ff., 520, 31 ff., 521, 5 ff., 610, 7 ff., 16 ff., 611, 10 ff., 615, 20 ff., 616, 6 f., 619, 14 ff., 18 ff., 620, 10 ff., Anon. p. 190. 4 f., p. 214, 36 ff.

The latter must commence with the Eudemian Ethics and Magna Moralia, the parallels being fully given in the footnotes to Susemihl’s editions (Leipzig, 1883, 1884). Similarly with the Oeconomica: see again Susemihl’s ed. (ib. 1887) p. v n. (1) for Book i and p. x n. (25) on the expansion in Book ii of the idea suggested, and partly worked out, in the Politics i. 11 §§ 7—13, 1259 a 3—36. The beginning of this passage is clearly referred to at 1346 a 27—29: but this again has a bearing on the genuineness of Politics i. c. 11. See below.

Mr Newman has compiled in Vol. ii. p. x—xix, a list of similar parallels from Rhetorica ad Alex. 3, 1424 a 12 ff., b 3 ff., De animal. motu 7, 701 b 24 ff., [Plato] Erastae c 135 c, 138 c, Aristoxenus Fr. 19, 20, Philodemus De Musica (ed. Kemke) besides B. 3, Fr. 24, 52, 53, 54, 65, 66 noticed by Kemke and Gomperz, B. 1, Fr. 16, 17 : B. 3, Fr. 45, 55 : B. 4, col. 3, 23 ff.; 15, 5 ff.; 16, 17 ff. Plutarch Vita Crassii c. 2, p. 544 A (esp. the words γηύ γάρ οἰκονομικών ἐν ἀφίκχων χρηματι- στικῷ ὀφει ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτικῆς γεγομένης ὁμόμεν, though this is nowhere said by Aristotle), Moralia 9 c, 527 A, 787 c—d, 812 b, b 24 ff., 825 λ—c: Dio Chrysostom, 3. 115, 7, 207, 14. 439, 36, 83 R. All of these include the possibility of indirect use of the treatise. Prof. Susemihl holds that Plutarch was certainly acquainted with the Politics, but hardly with the Politics. Even his direct acquaintance with the ΑΘ. ΠΩΛ. is denied by some: e.g. v. Wilamowitz Aristoteles u. Athen (Berlin 1893) i. pp. 299—303.

P. 20, n. 1. Add references to Blass De Antiphonte sophista (Kiel 1889), Dümmler Prolegomena zu Platons Staat (Basel 1891), Wilamowitz op. c. 1. 161 ff., esp. 169—185.

P. 35, n. 3. Gilbert’s hypothesis, that Ephorus used the Politics of Aristotle, is rendered untenable by the discovery of the Ἀθροναν Πολιτεία, which contains very precise indications of having been compiled between 329 and 325 B.C. The same treatise slightly strengthens the probability that Aristotle may have made use of Ephorus (or his authorities) in part of his works. At any rate he is in the ΑΘ. ΠΩΛ. under considerable obligations to another of Isocrates’ pupils, Androclin. See A. Bauer Forschungen zu Arist. ΑΘ. ΠΩΛ. (Munich 1891) p. 155. v. Wilamowitz is again sceptical op. c. 1. p. 306.
P. 37, n. 1. The opinion here expressed, that the first part of B. II. c. 12 is genuine, the latter part a spurious addition, seems to have been strengthened rather than weakened by the discovery of the Αθηναίων Πολιτεία. See Diels in Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos. iv. 1891, p. 485. P. Meyer has indeed argued in Des Aris. Politik u. d. 'Αθ. Πολ. (Bonn 1891) p. 13 ff. that the atheesis should be confined to 1274 b 9—15, with perhaps the addition of 1274 a 32—b 5 ἔπει... κλήρων, and 1274 b 23—26 ἐγένετο... ἀν. Against this view see Susemihl Quaest. crit. et exeg. 1. p. xvi f.

P. 66, ix. The date of the Politics has recently been discussed with much vivacity. Since the publication of the Constitution of Athens, the appearance of general agreement combined with occasional discrepancy which the two works present, has not unnaturally stimulated inquiry into its cause. The first suggestion made, on the assumption that Aristotle wrote both works, was that the Constitution, which can confidently be dated circa 329—325, is separated by an interval of years from the Politics. Thus Mr Newman notes (in Class. Rev. v. 162) that in the first part of the Constitution of Athens "we are sometimes inclined to ask whether the Politics is not already in existence and known to the writer. Has not the writer" of Αθ. Πολ. c. 41 § 2 "PoL. 4. 4, 1292 a 4—37 before him?" Similarly Bruno Keil in Die Solonische Verfassung (Berlin 1892) confidently assigns the Politics to the period 350—335 B.C. long before the completion, at any rate, of the Constitution. Tempting as such conjectures are, in the absence of positive evidence it is still necessary soberly to restate the grounds before us for dating the larger treatise; and this is what Prof. Susemihl has done Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. ii. p. x—xii, iii. p. iii ff. His conclusion is that the Ethics and Politics were undoubtedly written later than the Physica, De Caelo, Meteorologica: that though they may conceivably have preceded the psychological, physiological and zoological works (and would then fall, say, about 332—330), it is far more likely that they were the latest sections of the Encyclopaedia with the exception of the Poetics, Rhetoric and Metaphysics. If this latter alternative be accepted, we may suppose the Ethics to have been finished before 327 B.C. About the Politics we cannot be so certain: for unquestionably the treatise consists of different component parts, written at different times with different aims, though ultimately incorporated in a single scheme. Of the portions anterior to the Constitution of Athens, i.e. say, to 337 B.C., we can point with confidence to Books iv (vii), v (viii): possibly also to Books i, iii. The rest of the treatise, B. ii, no less than Books iv—vi of the old order, may with a balance of probability be assigned to the years 325, 324, 323, when Aristotle was also at work upon the Poetics, Rhetoric, Metaphysics, while under his editorship the Peripatetic school was issuing the remaining Politics (other than that of Athens), the Νόμων μεταποίησις, the διδακτικαί, and other similar works.

v. Wilamowitz assumes that from the earliest times when he lectured at all, Aristotle repeatedly gave courses of lectures on Politics. While admitting that the present condition of the treatise does not permit a sharp separation of the different layers, or a general application of the indications which certain passages afford as to the date, he finds it hard to believe that Books II Θ were composed after "the comprehensive historical studies on which ΔΕΩΣ are based." I.e. he thinks that ΔΕΩΣ are later, or at least not earlier, than the Politics, which according to him they presume: Aristoteles u. Athen 1. 355 ff.

P. 68, n. 3. Add a reference to Newman ii. p. xxxii: Aristotle "had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics, and
yet he framed no fresh one to take its place:” a most important admission. Comp. also Birt op. c. p. 459 f. If the transition from B. i is an editor's addition, and δὲ an insertion of the family Η in 1260 b 27, the place of B. ii itself becomes doubtful, as Susemihl remarks Prolegomena ii to the revised impression of the Teubner text: “nisi tamen admodum fallor, Aristoteles totum opus si ita, ut voluit, perfectisset, etiam libros Η. ΗΙ. ΗΙΙ. ΗΗΙ. inserting, ut ΗΙΙΙ. locum magis idoneum inter ΗΗΗΙ. et novi ordinis ΗΗΠ. (veteris ΗΗΠ.) invenisset.” (This view is further developed in Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeget. iii. p. iii ff., as explained above.) v. Wilamowitz op. c. i. 360 u. defends the genuineness of 1181 b 12—15, παραλαπόντων...τελειωθῇ as quite indispensable, and is not disinclined to accept the rest.


P. 74, n. 4. line 5. After αὐτοκράτωρ insert 1287 a 39 παιδίων. See Corrig. and Addenda to Critical Notes ad loc.

P. 90, n. 4. Mr Newman admits that vi (iv) cc. 1—4 “are little better than a chaos.” See his appendix, Vol. i. p. 565 ff. and compare Vol. ii. p. xxvi, xxxviii, liv, lxvii.

P. 96, n. 2. Inexplicable as the subsequent delay may appear, the printing had proceeded thus far (indeed pp. 1—448 had been struck off) before the appearance of Mr Newman's volumes i. and ii.

CRITICAL NOTES.


P. 140. 1252 a 22 Θέαν and 23 διαπεθήντων Maehly, not rightly.

P. 141, line 2. 1252 a 33 [ταῦτα] and (for ποιεῖν?) διαπεθήντων Comperz.

P. 142. Add: No ms. gives the second article 1330 b 1 τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς: some omit it 1261 b 25.

P. 143, line 2. 1252 b 14 ὅ μὲν Χαρώνδας] Χαρώνδας μὲν ΗΙΙ Bk. Newman ||

Ib. line 5. Add: Shilleto followed Giphanius (p. 22 f.), who however preferred δικαίων.

P. 144, line 1. See Corrigenda. κατὰ φύσιν after ἔοικε Γ M' Susem.1 2

P. 146, line 3. After 28 insert: ήθη Γ 1.

P. 147, line 5. 1253 a 2 Stöhr Comm. phil. Monac. p. 97 f. comparing 1253 a 2,
a 7, 1278 b 20, Eth. Nic. 1097 b 11, 1162 a 17, 1169 b 18, Eth. End. 1242 a 22 would read ἀνθρώπος. See Dem. Olynth. i. 3, In Midiam § 198 ||

Ib. line 6. See Corrigenda. 1253 a 3 ἐστὶ after ἔφω added by Γ M' Susem.1 2

P. 149, line 1. After Bk. add: avoiding hiatus.

P. 153, line 2. 1253 b 15 πρῶτον...1254 b 39 σώματος noticed by Anon. in Eth.

Nic. Δ f. 55 a, p. 190, 4 f. Heylb. ||


P. 160, line 1. See Corrigenda. After Bk. add: Susem.3

P. 161, line 1. After Bk. add: (ἔστὶν Bk. 2).

P. 163, line 1. Add: See however Addenda to p. 7 above.
ADDENDA.


P. 183, line 1. 1257 b 12. *For* ὀψε* Newman cites 1293 a 8, 1297 b 7.

P. 190, line 2. c. 11, 1258 b 9—1259 a 36, is considered by a friend of Mr Newman a later addition.

P. 194, line 3. 1259 a 31 δράμα Campbell, but see Dem. *Prooem.* 55, p. 1460, 26: δράμα τότο ἐσπαίετο ὃ δήμος, *In Aristocr.* XXIII. § 19 (ὁπάτερ), etc.

P. 197, line 2. 1259 b 32. *See* Corrigenda. *After* Γ Μ* add*: bracketed by Susem.\(^1\)

Ib. line 3. 1260 a 4. *Cod. Oxoniensis* (Coll. Corp. Chr. 112) had in the margin ἀρχάντων καί, afterwards erased \[\]

P. 203, line 4. 1260 b 20—24 [ὡστ’...πολιτείας] bracketed by Birt, as an addition of the publisher. *Cp. Susem.*\(^3\) Prolegomena p. xli; Neque tamen ipsi Aristotelii haec ratione succurro, sed compositori, qui perperam ultima libri I\(^1\) verba 1260 b 23 sq. καὶ πρῶτον καλ adiecit.

P. 232. 1263 a 2. *The change in punctuation* (ἐχει πάσι, τάς, *see* Corrigenda) *is due* to Mr Newman \[\]

P. 252. 1265 a 40 *Add to line 12*: δὴ for ὄν Mr H. Richards *Class. Rev.* vi. P. 339.


P. 270. 1267 b 26 εὐτελεύς εὐσταλοῦς O. Apelt.

P. 274. 1268 b 1 γεωργήσεις (1891).


P. 290, line 2. 1270 b 8 Μ* omitt estin* \[\]

P. 294. 1271 a 7 [τὸ] δῶρον, or τὶ δῶρον C. Hāberlin \[\]

P. 295. 1271 a 20. *Comp. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γε 1276 b 18, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖται γε 1277 a 25 (Newman).*

P. 305. *See* Corrigenda to 1272 b 9. δυναστῶν III Susem.\(^1\)

P. 312. *See* Corrigenda to 1273 b 6. ἀπορίαν Γ Μ Bk. Susem.\(^1\)


Ib. last line. 1274 a 20. Wilamowitz defends τριτων τέλους, but hardly with success, *op. c.* 1. p. 69 n. 41.


P. 354. *Vm* is Prof. Susemihl's notation for the Vatican fragments in the Teubner text of the *Politics* (Susem.\(^3\) nova impressio correctior 1894), so that our fr. = Vm.

P. 356. 1275 a 23 κρήτεως καὶ defended by Wilamowitz *op. c.* 1. p. 205 n. 32.

P. 362. *See* Corrigenda. 1276 a 10—13 (τότε...συμφέρουν) εἶπερ the parenthesis and punctuation Niemeyer (in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxlili. 1891, p. 412 ff.).

P. 363. 1276 a 14 [καὶ] Niemeyer || τῶν κατὰ and comma after τριτων Niemeyer ||
CRITICAL NOTES.

P. 363. 1276 a 15 ταύτης (before τάς) defended by Niemeyer.

Ib. 1276 a 16 τυπανιδος; (with interrogation) Niemeyer, partly following Koraes.


P. 369. 1276 b 39—40 [έπειδή...πολίτας] Widemann.

P. 371. 1277 a 30 [καί] Spengel.


P. 379. 1278 a 34 ἀστῶν Cod. Berol. Hamiltonianus 41 (merely on conjecture; the MS., of the xv century, is one of the worse species of II². Possibly even in fr. the reading is conjectural).

P. 380. 1278 b 8. See Corrigenda. καί εἰ Γ' Susem. (omitted by M*).


P. 383. 1279 a 8—16 [διδ. ἀρχάς] Stöhr (hardly right).

P. 387. 1281 a 41 ἔξει (with colon after λέονθαί) Welldon (hardly adequate).

P. 401, last line. Add: But see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 539 b 18 ff.

P. 402. 1282 a 27. Mr Wyse prefers μέγιστον as avoiding hiatus. It is however in pause.

P. 411, line 1. 1283 b 15 Insert: δόξειαν Π*.

P. 412, line 3. Dele Plutarch.

P. 431, line 10. See Corrigenda. That 1287 a 39 πεπάθεντας is right (persuasos William) was seen by Schneider and has recently been demonstrated by Engel in Comm. phil. Monach. p. 103.

P. 442. 1287 b 30 f. [τοῖς...σινάρχοις] Widemann (not rightly).

P. 442, line 5. 1288 a 13. If Heylbuit’s conjecture be accepted, the punctuation will be changed: ἱπός πολέμικόν, διώκαμενον ||

P. 473, line 3. 1323 b 8. Vahlen’s conjecture requires εἴς τί. See Hagfors op. c.

P. 475. See Corrigenda. 1323 b 18 καί added by Γ' M* Susem. (not rightly).

P. 481. 1324 b 4 f. The order of Γ' M* is retained because neither the order of Π nor that of Π² will stand without Congreve’s emendation. Besides it is best suited by the context.

P. 489. 1325 b 34 [καί περ...πρότερον] would be bracketed even if the preceding chapter were allowed to be by Aristotle.


P. 493. 1326 a 40 οὖν...41 οὕτων noticed by Mich. Ephes. ubi supra p. 520, 35.

P. 495. 1326 b 39 f. The punctuation (δὲ...ἐμπείρους) is due to Mr Wyse.


P. 503, line 5. 1328 a 16. See Corrigenda. πέρα...πέρα Nauck, perhaps rightly || oúde Gomperz, οὐ δὲ with all other authorities Bk. Susem.

P. 521. 1330 b 30. See Corrigenda. μὴ ποιεῖν after πῶλω Γ' M* Susem.

P. 529. 1332 a 13. See Corrigenda. καί inserted before ἄναγκαια Γ' M* Susem.

P. 535. 1332 b 31. See Corrigenda. πάντων after 32 τοῖσιν Γ' M* Susem.

P. 537. 1333 a 26. See Corrigenda. διηρήσθαι after μέρος Γ' M* Susem.


**ADDENDA.**

P. 541. 1334 a 8. See Corrigenda. ἀνάσων Γ Μ Susem.¹ ²
P. 546. 1334 b 24. See Corrigenda. ἐγιγνεσθαί after 25 πέφυκεν Γ Μ Susem.¹ ²
P. 549. 1335 a 27. See Corrigenda. ὄρεσμένοις after χρόνος Γ Μ Susem.¹ ²
P. 559. 1336 b 34. See Corrigenda. αὐτῶν after ὅσα Γ Μ Susem.¹ ²

**COMMENTARY.**

P. 139. 1252 a 8. Add after *note (2):* The identity of βασιλικὴ with πολιτικὴ is asserted Pl. *Euthyd.* 291 c and *Politics* 259 d. The question, What is the object of this science, which in *Euthyd.* is left open, is answered in *Politics.* That στρατηγικὴ is subordinated to it, is asserted *Polit.* 305 a as in *Euthyd.* 290 c, d (Bonitz).

P. 140. 1252 a 17 τὴν υφηγημένην μέθοδον. Mr Newman is inclined to take this participle against Bonitz here and e. 8 § 1, 1256 a 2, in a middle sense: ‘the method which has led the way.’ Mr Wyse has independently proposed this same sense.

Ib. 1252 a 18. This method implies the examination of the ultimate species separately, cp. *De part. anim.* i. 4 § 4, 644 a 29, ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὕσα τὸ τῷ εἴδει ἄτομον, κράτιστον, εἰ τις δύνατο περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἄτιμον τῷ εἴδει θεωρεῖν χωρίς, ὡσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπων, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ὅρινθος (Newman).

P. 141 f. 1252 b 2. Mr Newman suggests that the Delphic knife may well have served ‘not only for killing the victim (σφαγίς Eur. *El.* 811) but also for flaying it and cutting it up (*kopis ibid.* 837).’


P. 143 f. 1252 b 15. Add after *note (17):* Mr Newman, like Dittenberger, defends ὅμοιοκατέξος, meeting the objection respecting the quantity with the suggestion that the term may have occurred in a prose treatise. But the letter of Epimenides to Solon on the Cretan constitution, *Diog. Laert.* i. 112, was undoubtedly a forgery later than Aristotle’s time: see Hiller in *Rhein. Mus.* xxxiii. p. 527 f.

P. 144. 1252 b 16. See again Quaest. crit. coll. p. 332. As in b 10, so here πρῶτη must be predicative, = as the first, primarily: συνεστηκών being understood from b 13. “From these two relationships the family is first formed.... From a number of families the society first formed with a view to something beyond the needs of every day is the village.” Both passages should be omitted from the examples given by Bonitz *Ind. Arv.* 652 b 53 ff.


Mr W. R. Paton, *Class. Rev.* v. p. 222, thinks that ὁμογάλακτες = those whom it was possible for two generations to suckle, i.e. two generations.

Many years ago Mr Wyse asked “What of the present tense (οῖς καλοῦσι τινες ὁμογάλακτας)? For from Philochorus *Fr.* 94 (Suid. s.v. ὅργεων)...τοῖς ὃμ. 005 γεννήτας καλοῦμεν we see the older term was extinct in his time. Was it current in Aristotle’s time? I have my doubts. It seems at any rate possible that, if the passage cited by Suidas occurred in the account of the διαψήφισις ἐπὶ Ἀρχέων ἄρχουστος 346/5 B.C.,
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Philochorus cited and explained in this context the ancient laws which as we know from Lysias needed interpretation even early in the fourth century. May Aristotle refer then either to the authors of ancient Athenian statutes or to lawyers? I do not think the word occurs in the Orators, having been expelled by γεννηθαί. It manifestly assists Aristotle's argument if the word is a relic from old times, not in use among the Athenians of his day (and Pollux vi. 156 remarks ἰδιον τῶν Ἀττικῶν).... As to the remark,” p. 145 Comm. left col., l. 25, “that no place in the development is found for 'associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals,' was not this just the aspect under which the γένος presented itself to an Athenian of the fourth century? The γένος implied κοινωνία ιερών.”

P. 145. right col. To the note on διό add: Aristotle follows Plato in arguing that the primitive form of government must have been monarchy, because the primitive family, supposed independent anterior to the rise of any government, is accustomed to the rule of its senior member. The Cyclopes are adduced as evidence of this earlier state of society (σποράδεις) without any king; patriarchal or other, not of course to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times, but rather to justify the particular statement made 1252 b 19 (ἐκ βασιλευμένων).

P. 146. 1252 b 28. The place of τέλειος illustrates Dr Jackson’s remark that by normal Aristotelian usage part of a complex epithet may be placed after article and substantive (hyperbaton).


P. 151. 1253 a 34. This note has suffered from undue compression. A fuller discussion appears in Quaest. crit. coll. p. 336 f. The main points are: (1) the weapons are not prudence and [virtue], or else they would have been expressed by the accusative, φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετήν. (2) Prudence and [virtue] are the qualities at whose disposal the weapons are placed. (3) The weapons are the various safeguards and aids necessary if any action, whether just or unjust, is to be performed with safety: prudence and perseverance (on Susemihl’s conjecture), prudence and skill (on Freudenthal’s) 1.”

Against those who, with Jowett, by φρονήσει understand δεινότης (N. E. 1144 a 23 ff.) and by ἀρετῆ φυσικῆ ἀρετῆ or ἔξος (N. E. 1144 b 1 ff.), it is urged 1. 1. that (1) such a use of ἀρετῆ is unexampled and (2) that the natural germ of virtue is not peculiar to man but is found in the lower animals: N. E. 1144 b 8, Hist. an. l. 1 § 32 ff. 488 b 12 ff., VIII. 1, IX. 1.

Spengel, who understands by ἀρετῆ intellectual virtue, is met not only by the invariable usage of the phrase φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή, but also by the fact that φρόνησις is probably the only intellectual virtue which has to do with conduct. There is also the improbability that the term ἀρετῆ would be used of a quality liable to abuse when

1 Quamvis recte monuerit Montecatini, si Aristoteles prudentiam homini et virtutem tamquam arma data esse dicere voluisse, scribendum ei potius fuisse φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετῆν, quid impedit, ne prudentia et id quod sub corruptovocabulo ἀρετῆ latet non ipsa arma sed res sint, quibus arma offerantur, armis autem prae- sidia illa variis atque adiumenta significentur unicuique necessaria, quotienscumque opus vel iustum vel iniustum tute perpetrare velit? Qu. cr. coll. p. 337.
Aristotle himself says Rhet. 1. 1. 12, 1355 b 4: τούτο γε (i.e. abuse) κουνήν ἐστὶ κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλῆθυν ἀρετῆς.

Bernays again Zwei Abhls. iiib. d. arisot. Théorie (Berlin 1880) p. 113 f. who adopts Montecatino’s explanation (arma homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem), quotes Seneca De erva 1. 17: Aristoteles ait adfectus quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro armis esse, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, sumi deponique possent indumentis arbitrio. haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnante, non expectant manum, et habent, non habentur. But the passions are not peculiar to man: and surely they are not more dangerous in man because, as Bernays interprets the words, they are ‘arms for insight and virtue.’ Not to mention the objection, stated on p. 151, that ἀδικία ἐχοσά δύπλα shows the arms must be used by φρόνησις and ἀρετῆ, not in order to procure them.

[Mr Newman suggests ‘language’ as one of these weapons, and admits that if ‘certain emotions, anger especially’ are included, Aristotle must then have regarded these emotions as peculiar to man.]


P. 152. 1253 b 3. The laxity here noted may be particularized as the omission not only of ἐστὶ but of ἐκείνων the antecedent to δόρα. But in Greek idiom the genitive case is appropriated to related terms, so that in the sentence ‘The parts of Economic are of the constituents of the Household’ the meaning of the words supplied are of is ‘correspond to,’ or ‘relate to,’ and not ‘treat of.’ Mr Newman compares 1258 b 27 (but this is doubtful), and refers to Bonitz Index Ar. 533 b 6—13, with Waitz on Anal. Pr. i. 46, 52 a 29 there quoted.

Ib. 1253 b 9. It would have been sufficient to say that the ordinary sense of γαμμὸς is ‘nuptial’ and not ‘conjugal’: cp. n. on 1334 b 32, p. 547.

P. 153. 1253 b 20. Lest the expression ‘speech delivered’ in note (31) should be misunderstood we add that the Μεσσηνιακός was a pamphlet cast in the form of a speech, like the ‘Archidamus’ of Isocrates, treating the same theme from the opposite side, and advising the Spartans to make peace with Messene (1397 a ii ff.): cp. Blass Attische Beredtsamkeit ii.2 pp. 350, 289.

Ib. 1253 b 21. Zeller Pre-Socratics Eng. tr. ii. p. 477 n. (3) observes that νόμω γάρ δέ μὲν δοῦλος ὃς δ’ ἐξεθέροσ forms a trimeter, so that under τοῖς δέ, b 20, a poet may be included.

P. 153 f. 1253 b 23 ἐπεὶ οὖν...33 ὑπηρέτης. The commentary may again be supplemented from Quaest. crit. coll. p. 339 f. Various critics have treated this whole passage as one loosely constructed sentence, but without agreeing how much of it is apodosis to the string of protases which they suppose to be introduced by ἐπεἰ. As οὖν introduces the apodosis to ἐπεὶ in I. 10. 3, 1258 a 31—34, so in the present passage, according to Eucken De Aristotelis dicendi ratione 1. p. 29 f. (Gotting. 1866), the apodosis begins at b 30 οὖν καὶ τὸ κτίσμα. Spengel Ar. Stud. iii. p. 5 (57) f. and Thurot Études p. 5 ff. proposed that it should begin two lines lower down with b 32 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος (to which Spengel by his punctuation ὀργάνων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος would add the preceding word ἐστὶ). Eucken’s punctuation is as follows: ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτίσις μέρος τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτιστικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκωνίας (ἀνευ γάρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων διόνυσον καὶ ἐφ καὶ ἐφ), ὡσπέρ δὲ ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαίων ἄν εἰ ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὀργανα, εἰ μὲλετ ἀποτελεσθέναι τὸ έργον, οὖν καὶ τὸ οἰκονομικόν, τῶν δ’ ὀργάνων τὰ

1 sc. ἀναγκαίων υπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὀργανα presumably.
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μὲν ἀφυκὰ τὰ δ’ ἐμφυκὰ (ὁμων τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οίκας ἀφυκὰν ὁ δὲ προφερεῖ ἐμφυκὰν· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἰδεὶ ταῖς τέχναις εὐστὸν) οὐτὼ καὶ τὸ κτήμα ὀργάνων πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἁπάσιν, καὶ ἡ κτήσεως πλῆθος ὀργάνων ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ δουλός κτήμα τι ἐμφυκὺν, καὶ ὡσπερ ὀργάνων πρὸ ὀργάνων τὰς ὑπηρέτες.

The criticism of these conflicting views suggests the result adopted in the text.

P. 155. 1253 b 35. τοῦ = the Homeric Hephaestus (Bywater). ‘‘Aristotle’s rule is to prefix the article to the names of personages in a poem or dialogue.’’ Cp. note on 1261 a 6.

P. 156. 1254 a 12. To the ref. from Eth. Eud. add Magna Moralia. c. 34, 1194 b 18 τοῦ γὰρ ἄνωτόν τι ἐστιν ὁ ὑπηρέτης.

P. 159 f. 1254 b 8. Add to note (40): What is called ὑπηρέτης in 1254 b 5, and τὸ ὑπηρετικὸν De Anim. iii. 7, 2, 431 a 13, is plainly that which is here termed τὸ παθητικὸν μόρον: comp. iii. 15. 5, 1286 a 18. Here as in iv(vii). 15, 9, 1334 b 18 ff., νοῦς and τὸ μόρον τὸ λόγον ἔχουν are opposed to ὑπηρέτης and the irrational part (τὸ ἄλογον 1334 b 18 and 1260 a 7; here τὸ παθητικὸν μόρον). But in N. E. i. 13, 15, 1102 b 13 f., the latter is called φύσις ἄλογος μετέχουσα τῇ λόγῳ.

P. 161. 1254 b 23. Cp. again Quaest. crit. coll. p. 343, where it is suggested that if λόγῳ be kept, the genitive λόγου may be understood from it as the object of ἀναβατόμενα, while both datives are governed by ὑπηρετεῖ. Comp. however for the ellipse of the copula iv(vii). 14. 9, 1333 a 17 f. τὸ δ’ οὖν ἔχει μὲν καθ’ αὐτό, λόγῳ δ’ ὑπακοδείων δυνάμενον.

P. 162. 1254 b 32. συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις κτλ. ‘‘But often the contrary also occurs so that [where this contrary occurs] the one have [only] the bodies, the others [only] the souls of free men’’ [and hereby the former are after all natural slaves, and the latter natural free men]. This is the translation of Prof. Susemihl’s second edition and the words inserted should have sufficiently indicated his position, which is that τοὺς μὲν = actual slaves who have the noble erect frames which Nature intended freemen to have, and τοὺς δὲ = actual freemen who have not such bodily excellence but only the souls of freemen.

P. 163. Add after Excursus ii: and the addenda to p. 290 below.

Db. 1255 a 8. With τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις = jurisconsults Dittenberger compares οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις = dialecticians Met. ix. 8. 20, 1050 b 35, οἱ περὶ φύσεως = physical philosophers 1066 a 2, 1050 b 24, 1053 b 14, 1062 b 26. Nor does καὶ before αἱ σοφῶν make any real difficulty in taking τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις = qui de legibus philosophantur; for not all who engage in philosophical discussions are really philosophers. (From Quaest. cr. coll. p. 344.)

P. 165. 1255 a 15. With ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθῷ τινὸς comp. iii. 12. 2, 1282 b 24, κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθῷ explained by κατά χρώμα, κατὰ μέγεθος.


P. 170. 1255 b 25. Note that ἐγκώλος is an epithet of ἄρχαι in c. 26 § 2, and of διοικησις in c. 43 § 1 of the 'Αθ. πολ. (routine offices, routine of administration).

P. 172 f. 1256 a 13—19. See additional remarks on this passage, Quaest. crit. coll. p. 349 ff.
P. 174. 1256 a 36. To note (71) add, that Aristotle is speaking of Etruscan piracy (Bywater). See Journal of Philol. ii. p. 60 ff., Frag. 60 in Rose's last edition (partly given 1480 b 31 ff.).

P. 175. 1256 b 13. Mr Newman aptly compares Plato Menex. 237 e, παύ γάρ τὸ τεκνὸν τροφῆν ἐχει ἐπιτηδειαν φ ἄν τέκνη ϕ καὶ γυνὴ δήλη τεκουσά τε ἀληθῶς καὶ μή, ἄλλη ποταμομεῖν, ἕναν μή ἐξή παγάς τροφῆς τῷ γενναμένῳ.

P. 176. 1256 b 19. τῆς τροφῆς Mr Newman thinks it possible that Theophrastus apud Porphyrium De Abstinentia ii. c. 12 had this statement in view and intended to controvert it.


P. 180. 1257 a 18 δογμα γάρ ἰκανῶν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν παιοῦσα τάς ἄλλαγάς. There is another way of taking this sentence: ἀναγκαῖον = ἀναγκαῖον ἀν, “For otherwise exchange would have been necessarily confined to the satisfaction of the exchangers' own wants”: and so Bernays and Jowett translate. Thus retail trade is proved not natural because, if it were, an absurdity would follow. The historical explanation of the imperfect given in the note appears the simpler and deserving of preference (1) because of the historical tendency throughout the context, and (2) because the direct proof is much more natural than the indirect and apagogic.

P. 182. 1257 b 7 ff. On various changes proposed in order to avoid the vicious circle in the reasoning of § 10 see Quaest. crit. coll. p. 353 ff. As it stands, 1257 b 5 διὸ = διὰ τὸ κατηλκυκιν χεβέομαι; “owing to the growth of Retail Trade Chromatistic is (erroneously) supposed to be concerned with money, because (really) productive of wealth: for wealth is often defined as a stock of money because Chromatistic and Retail Trade are concerned therewith.” At the best, the words in italics are a clumsy and inexact restatement of the fact contained in διὸ.

P. 185. 1257 b 37. Add to note: comp. iv(vii). 5 § 2, 1326 b 36, where see note. Mr Newman, to whom this reference is due, also adduces Plutarch De cupid. divit. 8, a fragment of a dialogue preserved in a slightly fuller form in Plutarch Vita Pelopid. 3. 279 b: τῶν γὰρ πολλῶν οἱ μὲν οὐ χρῶνται τῷ πλοῦτι διὰ μικρολογίαν, οἱ δὲ παραχρόνται δι' ἀσωτίαν κτλ. See Frag. 56 ed. Rose (Teubner 1886).

P. 186. 1258 a 10. Comp. Magna Moralia 1. c. 25, 1192 a 16 ff. (c. xxiv § 2 ed. Susem.).

Ib. 1258 a 11—13. Athenian generals in the fourth century were obliged to make their ‘art’ a means of gain, for the state was rarely in a position to find pay. Hence the author of Οἰκονομίκη B. ii. cc. 23, 25, 26 records the devices of Timoleon, Chabrias, and Iphicrates for obtaining money 1350 a 23 ff., 1350 b 33 ff. Chares is another instance given by Mr Newman: Theopompus apud Athen. 532 B, F. H. G. 1. 297.

P. 187. 1258 a 21 f. ἐσαρπὸς γὰρ καὶ...οὐτω καὶ] So c. 2 § 15, 1253 a 31 f., II. 8 § 22, 1269 a 9, c. 9 § 25, 1270 b 40 ff. Similarly καθάπερ καὶ...οὔτω καὶ VIII(v). 9 § 4, 1309 b 12 ff.

P. 188. 1258 a 24. Mr Newman takes εκ τούτων = starting with this food.

P. 190. As explained in the Addenda to Critical Notes, Mr Newman has examined with some care, Vol. ii. pp. 196—198, the doubts thrown on the genuineness of c. 11 by a friend of his. Comp. p. 468.

Ib. 1258 b 10. Add to n. (99) that others, as Jowett and Newman, take the
meaning to be that philosophers may speculate on these occupations, but to embark upon them is servile. In any case compare V(vIII). 2, 5, 1337 b 15—17.

P. 190. 1258 b 11. Prof. Tyrrell holds that in every case where ἐλεύθερος is of two terminations, the adjective = liberalis.


Ib. 1258 b 12—20. Mr Newman thinks that Plato Laws 842 c, d may have suggested this passage.


Ib. 1258 b 27—29. Mr Newman takes this differently, supposing the same ellipse as in 1253 b 3: τρίτων εἶδος χρωματιστικῆς <ἐστιν ἐκεῖνων> ὅσα κτλ.

P. 193. 1259 a 5 δει συλλέγειν. This has been done by the author of Oeconomica B. 11: see Susemihl's ed. (Leipzig 1887) Preface p. ix ff. n. (25), and for the age of the writer (circa 360—200 B.C.) p. xii.

P. 194. 16 f. The same construction ἐπιθέσαι δει is found 213 a 25, Ind. Ar. s.v.

P. 197. 1260 a 3. Prof. Susemihl, defending the reading ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσεων ἀρχώντων καὶ ἀρχομένων which Mr Newman rejects as nothing more than a conjectural emendation, writes as follows: As the principal family of manuscripts of Vet. Transl. has quenadamdomum et natura principiantum et subiectorum (and so rec. bl), this is what William of Moerbeke must have written. Whether he took the reading ἀρχῶντων καὶ from the text or the margin of his Greek manuscript, we cannot know for certain: but the question is superfluous, for the reading is even in the latter case older, in fact considerably older, than all extant manuscripts. Those who, like Dittenberger and Newman, set down all that is of value in Vet. Transl. to mere conjecture, will attach no importance to this: but then they should not appeal to the Vatican Fragments or in consistency should pass the same judgment on the two correct readings which they present. Further they should remember that the seventy odd right readings of K6 in the Nicomachean Ethics might with just as good reason be entitled 'conjectures.' If the oldest authorities are thus impugned how are we to come to a decision as to the goodness of any old manuscript? And do the good readings of the Vet. Transl. look at all like Byzantine corrections of the eleventh or twelfth centuries? Had this been the procedure of Byzantine grammarians in those times we should have found more of their interpolations (say rather emendations) in the text. There seems therefore no reason for rejecting this reading, which best suits the sense, in favour of exetical subtleties. Moreover, of what avail are these latter? If we do translate ὡσπερ by "corresponding," we obtain no real correspondence: for the differences between those who are naturally ruled do not correspond to the differences between the virtues of the rulers and the virtue of the ruled: it is at the most the differences between the virtues of the different persons ruled that correspond, in so far as the wife is nearer to the ruler, the slave in complete opposition to him and the child in an intermediate position. This would lead to the conjecture καὶ <τῆς> τῶν. Why not then follow the more suitable reading of the Vet. Transl.? Had he intended the other sense Aristotle would more naturally have written: τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρίτων ἐξει καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀρχομένων.

P. 201. 1260 a 33. With ὥς ἡγομένος leader, chief, qui principem locum obtinet, comp. Dem. c. Aristocr. xxiii. § 113 δύναν ἀγαθοὶ..., τοῦ μὲν ἡγομένου καὶ μεγάστου πάντων, Plato Laws ix, 875 b, τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἡγομένων τρέφων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ ἰδιὸν
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P. 202. 1260 b 4. Mr Newman opposes the insertion of τῶν: the concluding part of the sentence would, according to him, apparently run τελευτά χωντα τὴν ἡδικὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ' οὗ τὴν διδασκαλίκην ἐχοντα τῶν ἐργῶν δεσποτικήν, "it is from the master για master, and not from the master as possessing the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη, that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess." But (1) if so, ἀλλ' οὗ <ἡ> would be required. (2) It should be remembered that c. 7 § 2, 1252 b 22 ff., teaching slaves their duties (διδασκαλίκη) is called διδασκαλίκη ἐπιστήμη as opposed to issuing the requisite commands which is δεσποτική s.c. διδασκαλίκη (ἐπιστάθαι ἐπιτάττειν). It is no part of a master's business to teach slaves their duties, but merely to educate them to the moral virtue indispensable if their duties are to be rightly performed.

Ib. 1260 b 5. Against the view adopted by Mr Newman, following Bonitz, that λόγων here = reason, it would be superfluous to urge that (1) Plato does not propose to withhold reason from the slave, and that (2) while reason forms no proper antithesis to ἐπιστάξει 'rational conversation' does.

P. 205. To Excursus i on Epimenides add: Niese's conclusions can no longer be accepted. Compare now ΑΘ. ΠΟΛ. C. I s. f. 'Επιμενίδης 5' ὁ Κρής ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκάθησθε τὴν πόλιν, which is also decisive evidence for the earlier of the two dates assigned to him (circa 600 b.C., not circa 500 b.C.). See H. Diels Sitzungsber. der Berl. Akademie 1891 p. 387, Basolt Gr. Alt.2 p. 136 n. 1.

P. 209. Addenda to Exc. ii. Mr Newman's view of c. 6 is given Vol. ii. p. 150 f. (1) He distinguishes the objectors to slavery here mentioned (1255 a 8 τολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις) from the Abolitionists of 1253 b 20, who hold all slavery to be conventional and contrary to nature, thinking that the former probably did not object to the enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks. In fact he restricts the dispute to the validity of the law or convention actually in force at the time, by which captives of war become slaves of the victors. (2) At 1255 a 20 he (like Dr Jackson) explains ἄτεροι λόγοι as a true plural: "the other line of argument on which (A) and (B) must then fall back, supposing they gave up their common standing-ground"—the principle that 'Force is not without virtue.' "Those who connect the right to enslave with superior force and those who connect it with mutual good-will between master and slave, are regarded as having two lines of argument open to them: either they may derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground of slavery from the claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves under the latter, or they may impugn the claims of virtue: but if they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weight and cease to produce any serious debate." (3) At 1255 a 21, Mr Newman takes διῶς with δικαλαν. The connexion of 1255 a 21—b 3 with the foregoing he makes out as follows. "We shall arrive at exactly the same result"—that what is solid in the contending views is the principle, that superiority in virtue confers on the master the right to rule—"if we examine another view. We have hitherto had to do with those who discuss the law in question on its merits; but there are those who support slavery arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a law and that that which is so authorized is ipso facto just."


P. 212. The suggestion in the second paragraph of the note on 1255 a 20 ff., made
independently several years ago, does not greatly differ from Mr Newman's explanation, except that he makes τοιοατη—probably λεθηνη, not δμωνυμως λεχθεια. He translates: 'for a hand when destroyed' (by being severed from the soul, which is its ουσια) 'will be no better than a stone hand.'


P. 215. 1261 a 12 ου φανεται συμβαίνον. To be rendered with Mr Newman "evidently does not result" (not, as in the note on a 11, does not appear to result). Comp. 1266 a 5, 1270 a 33 n.

Ib. 1261 a 13. The adverbial προς is found in Aristophanes e.g. Προς 415 κάγωγε προς, διαιλοντα προς τάλλοτρα, 697 προς δε, τοιτους εικος υμας...παρειναι, Ach. 1229, Knights 578, Pax 19, Lysistr. 665 ἄλλη υφ' υμων διαλυθηναι προσετι κυνινεόμενον. Also in Demosthenes Adv. Leipr. XX. § 112 s. f. p. 491, 7 προς δε και ουδε δικαιον, Adv. Leonetem § 13, p. 1084, 12 προς δε καλ ει γυναικων.

P. 216. 1261 a 17. Mr Newman prefers to render μια μαλλων by 'more and more of a unity.'

P. 219. 1261 a 35. ωςτερ ἄν] According to Mr Newman the ellipse is thus to be supplied: "as (all would be shoemakers, i.e. in turn) if shoemakers and carpenters interchanged occupations."


Ib. 1261 b 7. On πέρικε Vahlen observes that the meaning is given by the Platonic equivalent, φωνη ξεια. Thus Rep. 473 η φωνη ξεια πραξεων λειεων ήττον αληθειας εφαπτεσθαι; 489 ου γαρ ξεια φωνη κυβερνητην παιων δεισαι ἀρχεσαι ίν το αυτο. Comp. Demosth. xiv. 30 τα κρήνας και τα φρεατα επιλείπον πέρικε, and for Ar. Polit. vi(IV). 12, 3, 1296 b 26 ἐνακθα πέρικεν ειναι δημοκρατιαν.

P. 222. 1261 b 18. Mr Newman translates κατα τον λόγον in connexion with (or 'in') the expression i.e. το λεγεων πάντας άμα το έμοι και το μη. Perhaps however it is more nearly parallel to § 4, b 32, το λεγομενον=the scheme in question. For plainly το λεγομενον, de quo servus est, i.e. το πάντα το αυτο λεγεων, is not 'the expression' itself but 'the general adoption of the same expression'; and so too with κατα τον λόγον.

Ib. 1261 b 24. Complete the reference to Plato Rep. 462 E by adding the words ένος δε, ουμα, πάγχωντος των πολεμων ουτων ή άγαθον ή κακον η τοιατη πώς μαλιστα τε φοιει εαυτης ειναι το πάγχων, και η ευγνωμονηται η ευλογισθηται.

Ib. 1261 b 26. Besides 1281 b 2 and 1192 a 11 f. (quoted in the note) the ambiguity of πάντες is prominent also in iv(vii). 13, 10, 1332 a 36 ff.

P. 224. 1262 a 1 ff. Add a reference to the fuller discussion in Quaest. crit. coll. p. 361 ff.

P. 225. 1262 a 7. After (Thurott) add: Or this may be another instance of μεν without δε following; see 1270 a 34 and Susemihl's Critical Edition (Susem.) Index grammaticus s. n.

P. 226. 1262 a 19. Γης περιοδοι had been written by Hecataeus and others before Herodotus: the allusion may be to one of them (Bywater).

Ib. 1262 a 21 f. και γυναικες και των ἄλλων χρων. Probably γυναικες='females' both here and in the passage from Hist. Anim. 586 a 12, quoted in n. (143): εις δε και γυναικες ένοικαι αυτοις γεννοται, αι δε το άνδρι, ωςερ η εν Φαραγλω ηπνος η Δκαλα καλομενη. Mr Newman prefers to take και...και=both...and. He also prefers to derive the name of this famous mare from her special quality, comparing Xen. Cyrop. viii. 3. 38.
P. 227. 1262 a 32. For obvious reasons, the last sentence but one of the note on λώσεις should run "are not mentioned by Homer."

P. 230. 1262 b 23. The connexion between the two meanings of ἀγαπητόν is given by Plato Euthyd. 304 b τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὧν Ἐὐθύδημε, τίμιον.

P. 232. 1263 a 1. For the clause τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν see Quaest. crit. coll. p. 365 f. Mr Newman is quite right in taking πάσιν with ἕξει in the next line.

P. 235. 1263 a 26—28. The subject of a 28 ἐπιδώσουσιν is not, as Bonitz and Mr Newman think, αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι, but as all other commentators and translators have seen αἱ ἐνδιάμεσαι δέν αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι εἰς διηγημάτα: for the increased trouble and attention which private ownership brings with it (1261 b 33 ff.) have this compensating advantage that they are merely means to the owner’s increased advantage. The reading ἐκάστος προσεδρεύετο suits this construction alone, the other reading ἐκάστου προσέδρευσας (adopted in the reprint of Susem. 3 1894, see Corrigenda) would agree with either: but it may have arisen from erroneously taking αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι as the subject to ἐπιδώσουσιν.

Ib. 1263 a 31. Add from Aristotle himself the exx. in the Index, 182 a 2, 431 a 10.

Ib. 1263 a 36 f. The difficulty in the text as it stands, which appears to have escaped some critics, is that κἂν δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδιάσας—καὶ τοὺς ἐφοδιάσας, ἄν τοῦτον δεηθῶσι, sc. χρόνας κοινοῖς. ‘In case they need provisions on a journey’ implying that they have none of their own ‘they share them in common.’ Whose? we may ask with Sydney Smith.

P. 239. 1264 a 2. Comp. Dem. 36 § 64, p. 960, 24 ἔτεσι καὶ χρόνοις ἄπερεν. For Iernans’ ingenious correction ἐθνέσι, which has Mr Bywater’s approval, see now Ges. Abhandlungen 1. p. 177.

P. 240. 1264 a 10. καὶ νῦν. ‘In his verbis νῦν male de tempore intellegent, quo factum est, ut Spengelius interrogaret, nomine semper Helotae id fecerint, Victorius novum non vetus institutum civitatis Laconicae hoc μὴ γεωργεῖν τοὺς πολῖτας fuisse Aristotelem affirmare crederetur; Schneider contra ea Giphanium secutus diceret a philosopho etiam sui temporis Lacedaemonii retinendi illius instituti studium tribuit, sed studium tantum (ἐπιχειροῦσι), iam enim eos coepisse a vetere more desciscere, sed si hoc Aristoteles voluisset, dicendum ei fuit non καὶ νῦν verum ἐτι καὶ νῦν. Quae cum ita sint, alia explicanda ratio probanda neque nimis longe ca quaerenda est. Νῦν enim saepissime il di significat quod revera extat”; even as it is, even as things are, actually. “Fictae itur Platonis civitati haec opponitur. Sed quid sibi vult illud ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, pro quo expectas ποιοῦσιν? Ni fallor, ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν non de eis dumtaxat, qui aliquid facturi sunt, sed de eis quoque dici potest, qui reapse aliquid faciunt, si ca ipsa actione dubiae rei experimentum instituunt et quam bene ipsis haec res procedat et sibi et vel nolentes simul aliorum in usum experimentur”: make the experiment.’ “Quae loquenti ratio hoc loco eo aptior est, quo magis Aristoteles rei, de qua loquitur, institutionem, quales apud Lacedaemonios inveniatur, minime optimam esse ipse postea demonstravit, c. 9. 1296 a 34—b 10. Quaest. crit. coll. p. 307. Comp. the limiting expression Isaeus viii. § 1: ὅπερ καὶ νῦν οὕτω ποιεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν ‘which is just what my opponents are doing in the present case.’


P. 242. 1264 a 27. After πολίτας is predicate add: as ἀρχοντας in § 25, 1264 b 7, ἀλ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας.

P. 243. 1264 a 33. ἀποφορὰν. Add the reff.: Plutarch Lyc. 8, Inst. Lac. 40.
Mr Newman aptly compares De Part. Anim. ii. 1 § 4, 646 a 20 δεύτερα δὲ σάτασις ἐκ τῶν πρῶτων ἢ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσεως, and Plato Philæbus 27 b πρῶτων μὲν τούν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἐπειτ' ἐκ τούτων πρῶτον μακρὴν καὶ γεγονεμένην οὐδαν.

Mr Newman has here an admirable observation. "In the criticisms on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle commonly notices first, or at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangements with regard to what he terms in the Fourth Book the ὑποθέσεις of the State—the number of citizens and the extent of the territory, cp. 1325 b 38." On the relation between criticism in B. ii. and construction in B. iv(vii). see Introd. p. 32 n. (2), p. 33 n. (8).

To n. (203) add the reference: Laws 625 c (Newman).

Comp. Quaest. crit. coll. p. 368 ff.

Aristotle's suggestion in b 7—to much resembles that of Plato Rep. 460 A, τὸ δὲ πιθήκος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τὸς ἄρχοντος πολίτου, ὥσπερ μάλιστα διασώζω τὸν αὐτὸν ἄριθμον τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποκοσμοῦται (Newman).

After "adapted" insert "of all constitutions." With this meaning of κοινωτάτην = most suited to, within the reach of, cp. 1252 a 3.

'Addenda to 1261 a 12.

Aristotle has apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see Plutarch De cupid. dicit. 3, 524 A." (Newman).

As to the form, although διωβέλλα occurs in the papyrus of Ἀθ. πολ. c. 28, yet Meisterhans² p. 18 shows that the proper form is διωβελλα. On Attic inscriptions ὄβελος itself occurs only once with ε (in an inscription of date before 444 B.C.) : but the derived forms preserve the older ε, unless the ending (as -bolon) includes an o. Hence ὄβελισκος, ὄβελεια, διωβελλα: on the other hand τριώβολον, πεντώβολον, δεκαώβολον.

As to the introduction of the ὑποθέσεως, cp. now the passage referred to above, Ἀθ. πολ. c. 28 § 3, where it is ascribed to Cleophon (ὁ λυστότις, δὲ καὶ τῶν διωβελλαν ἐπόρισε πρῶτος), not (as Plut. V. Periecl. 9 might lead us to conjecture) to Pericles. The increase in the grants must be due to the increased number of shows, for Dem. De Corona § 41, εἷς τῶν δύον ὄβελον, shows the price to have been only two obols in 330 B.C. First mentioned on an inscription of the year 410 (C. I. A. 1. 188 where the Treasurer of Athenes pays διωβελλα from the funds in hand, ἐπέτειοι), just about

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the time when Cleophon was a prominent politician. Cp. Xen. *Hell.* 1. 7. 10 of Archedemos, 406 B.C., ὅ τοῦ δῆμου τότε προειστήκως καὶ τῆς διωβελας ἐπιμελεῖμενος.


**Ib.** 1268 a 10. *Add to n.* (259) : The regulation in force at Athens, which Diog. Lær. 1. 54 ascribes to Solon, is thus alluded to in the *Constitution of Athens* c. 24 § 3 καὶ ἄρθραν...ἀπαξί γὰρ τούτως ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις ὑ. Mr Wyse refers to C. I. A. 1. 1, C. I. A. IV. p. 3, 4 an inscription not later than 460 B.C.

**Ib.** 1268 a 12. "δῆμου δ' ἐπολείτα τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως is added because the word is often used of the poor only as in 1265 b 39, 1270 b 25" (Newman).

**P. 274.** 1268 b 5. Here ἀπλώς ought to have been rendered "couchèd in absolute terms," and similarly in b 19 (275) ἀπλώς δικαίως = "duly framed in an unqualified form."

**P. 275.** 1268 b 19 f. Mr Newman observes: "It is possible that Hippodamos had in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one. The indictment of Socrates was of this nature... There is much force in Aristotle's plea that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to give an absolute answer."

**P. 276.** 1268 b 24 f. *Add the case of Theramenes as given in Lysias xii. 68, 70.


**P. 278.** 1269 a 2. παρασχέονται is technical of witnesses: see Antiphan 5 §§ 20, 22, 24, 28, 30.

**P. 279.** 1269 a 21. Comp. Plato *Laws* 758 Α, β οίς γὰρ ἃν ἐντραφέως νόμοι σέβεται καὶ φοβεῖται πάσα ή ψυχή τό τι κατείν τῶν τότε καθεστῶτων. Prof. Sidgwick has observed that this discussion shows what difference there is between Aristotle's political ideas and ours. In the modern European view the Constitution fills the place which the Laws (νόμοι, νόμοι) hold for him.

**P. 282.** 1269 b 20. This use of κατά is not uncommon: e.g. Dem. *XXIV.* § 109 κατά πάντω τοίδικε. 

**Ib.** 1269 b 21. *With τοιούτους comp. c. 5 § 8, 1263 a 39, ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιούτων.

**P. 284.** 1269 b 38. The view of Bernays [and Newman] is quite possible. In fact it may be said that Aristotle would otherwise have written <καί> ἐν ἑτέραις. See 1094 b 13, 14 οὐχ ὀμοίως...ωστερ οἶδαι. But Mr Newman's reference to b 34 πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων is by no means decisive. Here the question is of utility not πρὸς τὰ ἐγκύκλια, but πρὸς πόλεμον. It is true that the 110 baking-women were of service at Plataea, but Thucydides' judgment on the Spartans is implicitly contained in 111. 74, where he says the Corinthians: τολμηρῶς ἐνεπελάβοντο...παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένοντο τῶν θρόνων.

**P. 285.** 1270 a 8. Note that § 12 is strikingly like the language of Ἐθ. *pol.* c. 9 s.f. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν νῦν γεγομένων ἄλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας θεωρεῖν τὴν ἐκείνην βούλησιν.

**P. 287.** 1270 a 34. *Add to note (300) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in *Philologus* LII. p. 86.

**P. 291.** 1270 b 11. *Add to note (317)* : Mr Newman suggests, with great
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plausibility, that the events of 333 B.C. are referred to, "In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a rising in Greece against Macedon. We have no record of any negotiations while the fleet was at Andros; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single trireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army to his aid. The news of Issus, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud. If, as is probable, the ephors sent Agis on this errand, Aristotle may well have thought that they came near to ruining their country. See A. Schäfer Demostenes 3. 1. 163 who refers to Arrian 2. 13. 409: Curt. 4. 1. 37." If this is correct, not only would this show that the passage was added to, if not written, subsequently to 333 (as Mr Newman points out) but also that its date is earlier than 330 B.C., when more complete ruin overtook the Spartans at the 'battle of mice' in Arcadia.

P. 294. 1271 a 8. With οὐ τοῦτον comp. 1267 a 15 οὐ κλεπτὴν ἀλλὰ τῆς 

P. 295. 1271 a 9. Add to note (333) a reference to the election of the Gerusia of the Ninety at Elis viii(v). 6. 11, 1306 a 15 ff. τὴν δ' αἴρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν ἐλατὶ καὶ 


P. 298. 1271 b 8. Add to note (346) a reference to Rhet. 1. 6. 23, 1363 a 8 ff. 

P. 300. 1271 b 24. Add to note (352) a reference to F. H. G. i. 249.

P. 301. 1271 b 30—39. This is Ephorus again (Fr. 61) as quoted in the geographical poem of Scymnus Chius, F. H. G. i. 249; πρῶτος δὲ Κρήτας φασὶ τῆς 

P. 303. 1272 a 18. φόρον οὐκεφόρουν] "The word φόρος need not have political 

associations. It can mean rent for land and nothing more: here probably 'rent paid to the owners of private lots by the serfs who cultivate them.' See the inscriptions in Bull. Corr. Hell. v. (1881), p. 168 ff. and for the fact Dosiadas apud Athen. iv. 142 "(Wyse).

P. 307. 1272 b 30. Mr Newman keeps ἔχουσαν sc. τὴν πόλιν and for the ellipse appears to 1266 b 1, 2, where however it presents no such intolerable harshness.

P. 308. 1272 b 37. The meaning of ἀρωτινὸν here is clear from the antithesis to ἐκ τῶν τεχνὸν: 'to this office they elect for merit.' Writers on Greek Antiquities have favoured a different view, that ἀρωτινὸν αἴρεσθαι = election from privileged families. But while fully recognising the close connexion between good birth and
'merit' or 'capacity,' as shown by such passages as Isocr. *Areop.* § 37 οἱ καλῶς γεγονότες καὶ πολλάριν ἄρετιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑνδέκειμένοιν, Philochorus *P. H. G.* 1. 394 προσέδωντες ἐν τε γένει καὶ πλούσιν καὶ βίῷ χρηστῷ (where προσέδωντες echoes ἀριστίν·δὴν) we surely have no right to give the Aristotelian technical term any other meaning than that attested by Timaeus, καὶ ἀνδραγαθίαν αἴρετον.

P. 309. 1273 a 9. The text presents τοῖς καὶ ὅ δέμοις where all the authorities give καὶ τοῖς ὧ δ., and the change was defended by Prof. Tyrrell in *Hermathena* Vol. vi., No. 12 p. 31 f. (cp. No. 14 p. 334). Though the grounds for the change seemed imperative, it would perhaps have been more consistent to leave καὶ τοῖς in the text and print the conjecture in spaced type in the critical notes. For Mr Newman has shown that it is not impossible to give a sense to καὶ τοῖς: "over the measure which is the subject of that difference of opinion" (between Shofetes and Senate), "as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity." But would the writer have left all this for his readers to supply from conjecture? In any case, even this suggestion is not inevitable: Mr Newman has an alternative assumption that ὄμορφαμονοσίαν=are unanimous as to bringing or not bringing a given question before the popular assembly.


1273 b 13. κοινοτέρον τε κτλ] Mr Newman, retaining the manuscript order, would render "for it is not only fairer to all, as we said" sc. 1261 b 1.

P. 314. Add to the references for c. 12 and the Solonian Constitution: the *Constitution of Athens* cc. 5—12 (cp. c. 41) to which historical commentaries will be found in Mr Kenyon's and Dr Sandys' editions. Amongst the numerous publications which deal with the relations of this treatise to the *Politics* may be specially mentioned Mr Newman's review in *Class. Rev.* v. 155—164, Mr R. W. Macan's in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* xii. 17—40. P. Meyer *Des Aristoteles Politik* u. die 'Αθ. πολ. (Bonn 1891), B. Keil *Die Solonische Verfassung nach Aristoteles* (Berlin 1892), U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893). See also the second editions of the *Griechische Alterthümer* of Busolt and Gilbert, the *Gr. Gesch.* of Busolt, and the 6th edition of K. F. Hermann *Lehrbuch d. griech. Alterthümer* Bd. 1. Theil ii. *Der athlitische Staats u. seine Geschichte* edited by Thumser (Freiburg 1892).

It is worth noting that while the recent discovery largely supplements the commentary on B. ii. c. 12 there is nothing in it to cancel, except the incautious mention of Aristotle p. 317 for which Mr Hicks is alone responsible.

Tb. 1273 b 36. ἐνοι κέν οὖν οὖνται... b 41 ἔωκε δὲ... 1274 a 3 ὑπὸ καὶ μέμφονται τοις... a 11 φαίνεται δὲ...] In general structure this whole account may instructively be compared with two criticisms in 'Αθ. πολ. (1) c. 9 § 2, οὖνται κέν οὖν τοις...οὐ μὴν εἰκὸς (cp. ἔωκε above)...οὐ γὰρ... (2) c. 6 §§ 1—4, ἐν οἷς περιώνται τοις διαδάλλειν...οὐ μὴν ἄλλα πιθανότερον ὅ τῶν δημοκριτῶν λόγος· οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς...ταύτην μὲν οὖν χρή νομίζειν ψευδή τῷν αἰτίαιν εἶναι. Provisionally we may identify the ἐνοις of 1273 b 36 with οἱ δημοσιοκολ τῆς 'Αθ. πολ. c. 6. F. Dümmler in *Hermes* xxvii. p. 267 ff. would refer μεμφονταί τοις to Κritias who, he thinks, wrote on the constitution of Athens.

P. 315. To note (400) add a reference to the summary of Solon's constitution in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2: τρίτη δ' ἣ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν (cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 2 ad init.) sc. μεταβολή, ἢ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ' ἦς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο: and to c. 2 § 3, πρῶτος ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου προστάγη σκ. Solon.

Tb. 1273 b 37. Μαν ἄκρατου κτλ] Compare 'Αθ. πολ. c. 2 of the times preceding Draco and Solon: ἢν γάρ [τότε] ἢ πολιτεία τοῖς τε ἀλλοις ἀλήγαρχίκη πάσης, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἑδούλευν οἱ πενήντες τοῖς πλούσιοις...ἡ δὲ πάσα γὰρ δὴ ἑδίγην ἢν κτλ: c. 4 s.f.,
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4. Also fully confronted a limited state. Solon’s verses copied in the first century a synonym for Solonian.

40. Unquestionably pàtròs had become at the end of the fifth century a synonym for Solonian.

4. Fully explained by Aristotle’s commentary which for its importance we subjoin in full, though strictly only the third of the three democratic elements is here in point: oikê de tis Solônous politêias tria ta’ einai tis ðemokratikóta: prôton mév kai méγistov tò mei ðanvêxov òpì tòis sômâsas, èpeta tò òxouv òpì boulomênov [tîmoureas] upér tòw adikeumênov, trîtov de, <w> máli斯塔 fâsan iðychènai tò plêbhos, h èis tò dikàstôrion èpeseis: kúrios gár òw o dêmos tòs ðyphov, kúrios génetai tòs politêias.

4. This, like elída ‘Að. pol. c. 6, g. 9 cited above, indicates a mode of argument common with the writer of the Constitution and not unknown in the Politics. In default of direct testimony, in criticising current tradition or suspicious evidence, the method of reconstruction is employed, by which from the present we infer the past, and from a given state of institutions reason back to their origin or a previous state. See Mr R. W. Macan in J. H. S. xii. p. 37 f., who calls attention to the ‘signals of this method’ in style.

4. That this was a pre-existing institution in Solon’s time is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by the Constitution of Athens. It confronts us in the sketch of the áρχai politêias c. 3 § 6; h òw tòw ‘Arôspagíttôn boulh tòw mév tâxìn eîche tòv diasthpèron tòw nómos, dîkhe de tò plêstá kai tâ méγistà tòw en tò plêle, kai kólâxos sa kai êmôinêsa pântas tòw ákosomôntas kuriôs. It was then filled up from ex-Archons (ib.). Under Draco’s constitution it was made philax tòw nómos and received complaints of their violation (eisagwyelèa), c. 4 § 4. Before Solon (the statement is vague as to time) it appointed the magistrates, c. 8 § 2. Solon confirmed its censorship, its powers of general superintendence, of infringing fines, and holding trials for treason by the nómos eisagwyelyea, c. 8 § 4.

4. According to Aristotle’s constitution it was made philax tòw nómos and received complaints of their violation (eisagwyelèa), c. 4 § 4. Before Solon (the statement is vague as to time) it appointed the magistrates, c. 8 § 2. Solon confirmed its censorship, its powers of general superintendence, of infringing fines, and holding trials for treason by the nómos eisagwyelèa, c. 8 § 4.

4. The exact sense in which the last comment is to be taken is not quite clear. The little we know of the mode of appointment prior to Solon’s reform comes from ‘Að. pol. In c. 4 § 2 it is implied that under Draco the civic body (which at the time consisted of those able to provide themselves with heavy armour) used to elect the nine archons: ãpedëdêto (not âpedëdêth òpì Drákonvov) mév h politêia tois ðìla pàrêxhmuôn: ùρiûnto òde tòwv mév enevà ãrôxontas. But the authority of this chapter is doubtful and in c. 8 § 2 it is said vaguely that in olden time the Areopagus
used to summon and appoint fit persons to the various annual offices: τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον ἤ ἐν' Ἀριστοτέλη ἀνακαλεσάμενη καὶ κρίνασα καθ' αὐτὴν τὸν ἐπιτήδειον ἐφ' ἐκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ᾽ ἐναντίον διατάξασα ἀπέστελλεν.

Ib. τὸν δὲ δήμου καταστήσας κτλ] The importance of the appeal to the law court where the people interpreted the laws is emphasized 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 ἐτε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγράφθην τὸν νόμον ἀπόλλω μηδὲ σαφῆς...ἀνάγκη πολλὰς ἀρμοσβητήσεις γλύνασαν καὶ πάντα βραβεύον καὶ τὰ κοινά καὶ τὰ ἰδία τὸ δικαστήριον. So also Plutarch V. Sol. 18 (τὰ συνεκκλησάμεν και δικάζει ται' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ὑστερον δὲ παρατεθεῖες ἐφόνη' τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν διαφόρων ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς (namely through appeals from the sentences of the magistrates). Comp. Busolt Gr. Alt. p. 150 n. (5).

P. 316. 1274 a 3. μεμονυμένη τινες] These critics are probably the same as those mentioned in 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 6 §§ i, 2 (περὶ μονομεν τινες διαβάλλειν αὐτὸν...οἱ θυσίμενοι βιαστημένοι). Aristotle's acquaintance with them is probably due to an oligarchical pamphlet, perhaps of the time of the Four Hundred or the Thirty: see Wilamowitz φί. c. i. p. 74, p. 165 ff.

Ib. 1274 a 8. Ἐφαλῆς ἔκλογους καὶ Περικλῆς] The most remarkable novelty contained in 'Ἀθ. πολ. is the circumstantial account of the plot of Ephialtes and Themistocles to overthrow the usurped powers of the Areopagus: c. 25. The part ascribed to Themistocles seems unhistorical, for as the usurpation of the Areopagus lasted 17 years after Salamis (c. 25 § 1) this story would place Themistocles in Athens circa 462 B.C., whereas various lines of evidence converge in making him escape to Persia circa 466 B.C. See Mr E. M. Walker in Class. Rev. vi. 95 ff. Few at any rate will approve the suggestion to erase Pericles' name in order to insert that of Themistocles.

In dealing with the statement in the Politics we have to decide whether one or two attacks on the Areopagus are intended. Dr Sandys Constitution p. 100 prefers to identify Pericles' action with the later occasion ('Ἀθ. πολ. c. 27 § 1, τῶν 'Ἀρεοπαγίτων ἕνα παρελεῦσα) when some of its remaining privileges were taken from the Council. In this way the statements of Politics and Constitution would be reconciled. Prof. Susemihl however is inclined to adopt what is certainly the more natural interpretation, that in the Politics Pericles (not Themistocles) is associated with Ephialtes in the famous attack: Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. iii. p. iv. He goes on to infer (i) that it is more likely the correct account is later than the incorrect, and therefore B. ii. of Politics later than the Constitution of Athens (comp. above Addenda to p. 66), and (2) meets the possible objection from the silence observed in the genuine part of B. ii. as to Draco's constitution by reminding us that B. ii. only professes to deal with ἐποκόμοισα πολιτείαι, 1260 b 29, 1272 b 24, 1273 b 25. These inferences apart, the conjunction of Ephialtes and Pericles in the attack of 462 B.C. will remain, in spite of the romancing of the Constitution of Athens, a plausible hypothesis in view of the facts (1) that Ephialtes atoned for his share in it with his life, and (2) that Pericles succeeded Ephialtes in the leadership of the party of reform.

Ib. 1274 a 9. Add to note (408): See now 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 27 §§ 3, 4 with the story of Damonides' advice (the source apparently of Plutarch V. Cim. 10. V. Pericl. 9), Busolt Gr. Alt. p. 168 n. (4). The whole tone of § 4 and particular expressions can be paralleled from 'Ἀθ. πολ. cc. 27, 28 §§ 1—4, c. 41 § 2 (the 7th and the 11th μεταβολαί); while the exclusion from Solon's intention of merely accidental results (1274 a 11 φαίνεται δὲ κτλ) agrees with the defence of Solon in 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 s. f.

P. 317. 1274 a 14. Add to note (410): Compare 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 26 § 1; μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνεβαλεν ἀνίσονα μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαι διὰ τοὺς προθύμους δημαρχουόντας. The
mention of Aristides as a leader of the Moderates is particularly unfortunate: for in ’Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 2 he finds a place on the list of προστάται τού δήμου: (1) Solon, (2) Peisistratus, (3) Cleisthenes, (4) Xanthippus, (5) Themistocles and Aristides, (6) Ephialtes, (7) Pericles, (8) Cleon, (9) Cleophon; and in c. 23 § 3 ff., c. 24 a greater share of activity is assigned to Aristides than to his colleague Themistocles in the transformation of Athens into an imperial city. According to c. 26 § 1 the Moderates had no leader in the period just before Cimon.

Fragg. 369 mentioned in this note is of course Plutarch’s careless paraphrase of the eulogy of Theramenes in ’Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

Ib. 1274 a 15. To note (411) add: This is supported by ’Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 3, τοις δὲ τὸ θητικῶν τελεύτων ἐκκλησίαις καὶ δικαστηρίων μετείδωκε μόνον. Under the old oligarchy the Thetes had no civic rights at all: ’Αθ. πολ. 4 § 2, 5 § 1. The second of the two alternatives presented in n. (411) is nearer the truth; neither is exactly right.

Ib. 1274 a 17. No notice is taken of εὐδόνεων in ’Αθ. πολ. Nor is εὐδόνεων δίκαι ἀκολούθησιν technical where it occurs in Solon’s fragments. It is tempting to regard 1274 a 15—19 as neither more nor less than a plain prose paraphrase of the famous lines Δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα κτλ. Fragg. 5 and 6 Bergk.

Ib. 1274 a 19. To note (414) add: From ’Αθ. πολ. c. 4 § 3, c. 7 § 3 it would appear that these four classes are earlier than Solon: for even if c. 4 be rejected as an interpolation, there is the clause καθάπερ δήρητο τὸ πρῶτον when Solon’s τιμήματα are first discussed. Comp. Basolt in Philologus L. 393 ff.

P. 318. 1274 a 21. Note even the verbal similarity to ’Αθ. πολ. c. 7 s. f. τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις [sc. ἐδει τελεύτω] θητικῶν, οὐδεμιᾶς μετέχοντας ἀρχής. See p. 573 note on 1337 b 21.

Ib. 1274 a 22. Add to note (415): In Frag. 505, 1561 a 5, Zaleukos is called a shepherd and slave. This is hardly to be reconciled with πολεοτευθεῖτες αὐτοί, § 1, 1273 b 32.

Ib. 1274 a 23. Add: The laws of Chairondas (probably another form of the same name) were in force in Cos, see Herodas 2. 48: from Strabo XII. 539 we know that they were in force in Mazaka, in Cappadocia. In a decree found near Teos, Dittenberger Sylloge n. 126 lines 61, 65, 121, 123, Antigonus permits the people of Lebedos and Teos to introduce the laws of Cos for the projected union of the two cities. Hence v. Wilamowitz (1. 65 ν.) conjectures that the laws of Charondas, introduced deliberately when in 366 B.C. the state of Cos was refounded, had spread from that place as a centre.

Ib. 1274 a 25. των] Mr Newman adduces reasons why Ephorus cannot be intended. (1) Ephorus (Strabo vi. 260) states that Zaleucus borrowed his laws from Crete, Lacedaemon, and the Areopagus. He could not therefore have made Zaleucus and Lycurgus contemporaries. (2) We should expect him to trace laws to a Cretan origin, to Khadamanthus or Minos. (3) He would hardly have committed such an anachronism in regard to the Locrian Onomacritus, if indeed he be the same as the oracle-monger of Peisistratid times. Mr Newman inclines to assign the tradition to a Locrian origin, op. Clemens Chius v. 314 ff.

Ib. 1274 a 30. To note (419 b) add: Comp. the similar exposure of a chronological error in ’Αθ. πολ. c. 17 § 2: φανερῶς ληροῦσαν οἱ φάσκοντες...οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ταῖς ἡλικίαις, ἐὰν τις ἀναλογίζεται τὸν ἐκατέρτον βίον καὶ ἐφ’ οὐ ἀπέθανον ἄρχοντος. Comp. Mr Newman’s remarks in Dr Sandys’ edition of the Constitution p. lvi.

P. 319. 1274 b 7. Add a reference to Dr Sandys’ note in his Demosthenes Private Orations Vol. II. p. 115, and the Dict. of Antiquities (ed. 3) s.v.
P. 320. 1274 b 14. ταύν] In Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos. ii. 504 Prof. Bywater remarks that ταύν is the only form recognised by the Attic inscriptions. Undoubtedly the preponderance of masculine forms of the dual is very great, ταύν θεοῖν at least 30 times in inscr.: yet ταύν θεοῖν does occur, see C. J. A. ii. 3. n. 1559. In the dramaticists there is no instance of τοῦν, τοῦτον as feminine; but Menander Fr. 520 K. gives ταύν ἀδελφὰς ταύν δύον ταῦταν. On the other hand τώ, τώτω, τώς, αὐτώ, ὁ, ὤτως, are found as feminine, although τά, αὐτά, ταῦτα, τάδε, with substantives of the first declension, do occur. In the prose writers the results so far differ that τά, ταύτα, are nowhere attested, but ταύν is found more often than ταύν, e.g. in Plato τοῦ τῶν six times, ταύν four times. The Scholiast on Aristoph. Thesm. 566 has τῶ θεῶ] ὃς τῶ χεῖρε, οὐκέτι δὲ τῶν θεῶν ἄλλα ταύν θεῶν. In Isaeus ταύν occurs six times, in Aristophanes six times, in Sophocles, Xenophon, Lysias, Andocide, Hyperides once each.


P. 321. 1274 b 15 f. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσὶν, πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρχόντων τοῦ νόμου ἐθνεκ. Add to note (427): Possibly the writer felt it incumbent upon him to account for Aristotle’s omission of Draco (the real reason being, as explained above, that Draco’s was not one of the εὐδοκιμοῦσαι πολιτείαι), especially in view of 1273 b 34 νότον γὰρ (Λυκοδόρας καὶ Σόλων) καὶ νόμον καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν. Presuming that the sentence is a spurious addition it is not surprising that it is irreconcilable with Ἀθ. πολ. c. 4. Those recent authorities who do not reject it as spurious (and they include Newman and v. Wilamowitz) have to account for a glaring discrepancy with the detailed account of the Draconian constitution given in that chapter: which v. Wilamowitz considers to have been a hasty insertion in Ἀθ. πολ. at the last moment. See again Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. i. p. xvi, iii. p. iii ff.

☆. Add to note (428): See now Ἀθ. πολ. c. 4 with the increasing literature upon the Draconian constitution, beginning with the doubts of Mr J. W. Headlam and Mr E. S. Thompson in Class. Rev. v. 161 ff., 336, and M. Th. Reinach in Revue Critique 1891 p. 143 ff., to whose attacks replies have been made, amongst others by P. Meyer ὁμ. p. 31 ff. and Busolt in Philologus l. p. 393 ff. In the opinion of v. Wilamowitz the Constitution of Draco first appeared in Theramenes’ oligarchical pamphlet, 404 B.C.; it was reconstructed from the θεσμὸν of Draco, upon inferences to which Theramenes was led in the course of his inquiries into old and obsolete laws for the purpose of the revision of the laws and constitution instituted by the Thirty.

As to the absence of evidence for any such constitution, Busolt argues that since Draco’s laws, with the exception of those relating to homicide, were abolished (Ἀθ. πολ. c. 7) and only the laws on homicide remained in force, people easily came to the conclusion that the latter comprised the whole of Draco’s work. For a possible reminiscence he points to Pseudo-Plato Axiochus 365 ε: ὃς οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Δράκοντος ἡ Κλεισθένους πολιτείας οὐδὲν περὶ σε κακῶν ἐγεν.

P. 324, line 18. Add: Mr Barclay Head Hist. Num. p. 372 states plainly that a federal coinage implies other federal institutions, and that in spite of continual disensions something more than a mere tradition of political unity was kept up in Arcadia during the period of the coinage 550—400 B.C.

P. 330. To note (8) of p. 329 add after ὅνθης: This evidence is disputed by Mr F. B. Jevons Kin and Custom in Journal of Philol. xvi. 1887 p. 104 n. 1. According to him Polybius and Caesar were mistaken in attributing polyandry to
Spartans and Celts respectively, the ‘Joint Undivided Family’ having given rise to the misapprehension.

P. 334, line 5. To note (250) add: O. Apelt Beiträge zur gr. Philosophie (Leipzig 1891) p. 382 ff. suggests that Hippias of Elis was a pupil of Hippodamos [Hegesidamos apud Suidam].


P. 337, line 18. See Addenda to p. 303 above.

P. 339, note 1. ‘Oxen’ would appear to be meant by καρπαλπόδα, ‘cattle’)(‘sheep.’

P. 340. Excursus IV. The detailed account of the Carthaginian constitution implies a later date than the researches necessary for the Greek Πολιτεία and the Χώμια βαρβαρία. The bearing of this fact upon the date of B. II. (at least in its final form) is pointed out by Prof. Sussehn Quaest. Ar. cr. et exeg. III. p. iii f.

P. 352. To note (403) add: Since the publication of the Constitution of Athens the Solonian origin of the popular law courts is placed beyond question: see 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 4, c. 9.

P. 355. 1275 a 10. To note (435) add: See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 59 § 6, καὶ τὰ σύμβολα τὰ πρὸς τὰ πόλεις οὕτωι κυριότερα, καὶ τὰς δίκας τὰς ἀπὸ συμβολών εἰσάγοντι, where οὕτωι = οἱ συμβολώται.

P. 356. Comm. left col. line 17 add: Meier u. Schömann Attische Process ed. Lipsius pp. 994—1006, Dict. of Antiquities (ed. 3) II. 734 ff. Also Roberts Int. to Greek Epigraphy I. p. 355. In the absence of σύμβολα the only right was the right of reprisals, συλάν; cp. σύλην διδόναι κατὰ τινος, Dem. adv. Laecritium XXXV § 26 p. 931, 21.

P. 357. 1275 a 25. ὅποι έξέστων] The rule at Athens in the fourth century is thus laid down 'Αθ. πολ. c. 62 s. f. ἄρχει δὲ τὰς μὲν κατὰ πόλεις ἀρχὰς έξεστι πλευράκις, τῶν οὗ ἀλλὰν οὐδεμίαν πλὴν βουλεύεσα δίς. Comp. c. 31 § 3, and Politics 1299 a 10, 1317 b 24.

P. 359. 1275 b 8. At Acragas and Melite σύγκλητος was the name for the Council as opposed to the popular Assembly: Sloboda Die griechischen Volksversammlungen p. 307.

P. 360. 1275 b 22. πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν] See below, Addenda to p. 379. That this was the practice at Athens in the fourth century can be seen from 'Αθ. πολ. c. 42, μετέχουσι μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ εἰς ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες αὐτῶν.


P. 362. 1276 a 8—16. See the discussion of this passage in Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. I. p. XVII, following Niemeyer in Jahrb. f. Phil. CXLI. 1891, p. 412 ff. With the changes indicated in the Addenda to Critical Notes the passage runs thus: ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες πόλις ἢ χρῆσιν ἡ πόλις ἐπραξε καὶ πότε οὐκ ἢ πόλις, οὗτοι ὡς ἢ διαφοράς ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία (τὸτε γάρ οὐτε τὰ συμβολά διαφέρονται διαφόραν, ὡς ἢ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυραννοῦ λαβόντος, οὐτ' ἀλλὰ πόλλα τῶν τοιοῦτων, ὡς ἐναί τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ κράτειν όμοιος, ἀλλ' οὗ δὲ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον) εἴτε οὖν [καὶ] δημοκρατούμεν τινες τῶν τρόπων τούτων, ὡμοίως τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι [τάυτης] τὰς τῆς πολιτείας τάς ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἢ τῆς ἀλλοιρασίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος; “Some raise the question when the state is, and when it is not, responsible for public acts, for instance after the establishment of a democracy upon a previous oligarchy or tyranny: some under such circumstances would repudiate obligations, holding that they were not contracted by the state but by
the tyrant, and would decline many other such responsibilities on the ground that the basis of certain forms of government is superior strength and not the public interest: suppose now men to be somewhere living under a democracy of this origin, is the state just as responsible for the acts of this government as for those of its predecessor, the oligarchy or tyranny?” In a 14 τούτων τῶν τρόπων is explained by a 9 ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθερίας ἢ τυπανίδος γένηται διμοκρατία. The question should more properly have been put in the reverse way: is the state as responsible for the acts of the deposed oligarchy or tyranny as it is for the acts of the democracy which succeeds them? But Aristotle’s inexactness in such matters is notorious. Niemeyer retains the ταύτης bracketed above, as if the question concerned the identity of the state: more probably the alternative is, are the acts of the preceding tyranny to be attributed to the city or to the tyrant?

P. 364 f. 1276 a 36—38. On the divergent spellings adel αδελ see Meisterhans Grammatik d. a. Insch. 2. p. 25 n. 2; Christ preface to ed. of Metaphysica (Teubner series) p. xv, who cites the variants in the mss. at 986 b 17, 1016 a 15, 1026 a 21. The whole question of orthography is complicated by the discrepancy between (1) the best manuscripts and (2) the inscriptions. Prof. Susenohl, who has hitherto been content to reproduce faithfully the best manuscript evidence, now writes: “in rebus orthographicis sequi fontes optimos...non pergerem fortasse in nova editione, sed suadente Stapfer ad Meisterhansi grammaticam inscriptionum me accommodarem semperque scriberem non solum, id quod nunc feci, μικρός, μικρότης, verum etiam μεχρί, γέγρευται, γεγραψαν, πλέον et forsitan etiam δοῦν, αἰτείσθαι, breviari com- parativorum species in os et ω desinentes semper recipere.” See Stapfer Krit. Studien zu Aris. u. d. Soile (Landshut 1890) p. 7 ff. On the same rational principles Mr Hicks is inclined wholly to disregard the manuscript evidence on such points as the avoidance of hiatus by elision, and the retention of obsolete or incorrect spelling (θαλάσση 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1327 a 16, πράσσων 1337 b 20, Μιτιληναίοι 1285 a 35). v. Wilamowitz, op. c. 1. 319, sees in Aristotle’s Greek traces of Ionicism.

P. 366. To note (467)—comp. n. (455) p. 363—add: See now ‘Αθ. πολ. c. 39 s. f. (τά δέ χρήματα α ἐδανείσαντο εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐκάτερους ἀποδοθαίναι χιρῶς) and c. 40 § 3 (ἀλλὰ καὶ τά χρήματα Δακεδαμονίου, ἀ οἱ τράκαντα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἑλαβον, ἀπέδωσαν κουρη, κελευοῦσιν τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐκάτερους ἀποδοθαίναι χιρῶς) which now informs us that there was a special clause about the loan in the terms of reconciliation (διάλογος) agreed upon between the two factions in 403 B.C. It is with justice that in the ‘Αθ. πολ. the notice of the repayment is followed by the comment ἡ εν δέ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οὐχ ὅτι προστιθέασιν τῶν οἰκείων οἱ δῆμοι κρατήσαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆν χώραν ἀνάδασαν τοιοῦτοι.

P. 368. 1276 b 33. To note (470) add: Mr Newman (I. p. 363) understands ἁγάθων as the predicate with εἰςαι.


P. 370. 1277 a 11. From Dem. c. Μid. p. 533 it appears that there were several κορυφαίοι and a ἄγεμον κορυφαίος.

P. 373. 1277 b 12. To note (490) add: A trace of it is retained in M. Antoninus xi. 29 εν τῷ γράφειν και ἀναγραφόσκειν οὐ πρῶτερον ἀρχιεὶς πρὶν ἀρχῆς. The excellence of the Spartan military system is thus brought out by Thucydides v. 66 s. f. σχεδόν γάρ...ἀρχιοντες ἀρχισταν εἰς.

P. 375. 1277 b 34. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ σχ. ἀπορεῖται.

P. 379. 1278 a 30. We owe to Mr Wyse the proper antithesis to γνήσιος πολίτης, viz. νόθος πολίτης: see Scholia in Euripideum ed. Schwartz i. Orest. 903 and τῷ λέγειν δὲ Ἀργείος οὐκ Ἀργείος ἦν [see the line] εἰς τούτον βλέπει [sc. Κλεοφώτα.]

θέλε γὰρ εἰπεῖν Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ Ἀθηναίοι ὤντα αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ νόθων πολίτην παρόσον Θρᾷς ἢ δραμόειν. Again in Schol. on l. 904.

Ib. 1278 a 31. Mr Wyse suggests an alternative meaning for χρωσταί = thus apply the law.

Ib. 1278 a 32. παραροθῦται = (virtually) disfranchise: so 1285 a 16, 1311 b 6.

Ib. 1278 a 34. Add to note (516): By 'Δῆ Πολ. c. 26 § 4 this famous law of Pericles is assigned to the year 451/0 εἰς Ἀντιδότου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, Pericles' εἰσόντων, ἐγνωσαν μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως ὃς ἂν μὴ εἰς ἄμφοτέρων ἢ γεγονός. An error in the date is not so serious as to have maintained (with Duncker, Schenkli, Buermann and at one time Busolt) that no such law could have been proposed by Pericles. For the practice at Athens in the fourth century see c. 42 § 1 cited in Addenda to p. 360. Cp. 1275 b 21. Add a reference to the reverse process at Byzantium according to Occom. II. 2 § 3, 1346 b 26 ff. ὄντος δὲ νόμων αὐτοῦ μὴ εἶναι πολίτην ὃς ἂν μὴ εἰς ἄμφοτέρων ἢ, χρημάτων δειθέντες ἐνεργειανεμένον τὸν ἃς ἐνός ὄντα ἄστοι καταβαλόντα μηδὲ τράκακτα εἶναι πολίτην.


Ib. 1278 b 22. See p. 457 n. (4). Add to the note on 1278 b 23: Dubito. Not that the personal use is not sufficiently attested: cp. Demosth. De Corona § 254, p. 312, 2 τὸ ἐπίβαλλον ἐός ἡμᾶς μέρος: but it may well be that ὅνων agrees with μέρος, the order being changed to avoid hiatus. See however Bonitz Ind. Ar. 269 b 9 ff. who apparently favours the personal usage of the verb by arranging the present passage with Pol. IV (vii). 1. 10, 1323 b 21 and after adding 'inde explicandum videtur 1260 a 41' proceeds to the unmistakable usage ὅταν ἐπίβαλλα... AV EΠV/6 1266 a 25.

P. 382. 1278 b 27. ἂν μὴ κτλ = unless existence is overweighted with ['exceeds too much in'] the evils of life.


P. 386. Comm. left col. line 32. For "409 (or 408)" it would perhaps be better to read "410": payment for public services seems to have been restored soon after the battle of Cyzicus.

P. 389. c. 9. Many of the fine thoughts here are borrowed from the myth in Plato's Protagoras (Spengel).

P. 391. 1280 a 24. ἐλευθερία] Free birth; the abstract noun answering to ἔλευθερος = free born. See Newman i. p. 248 n. i. Compare 1281 a 6 ἐλευθερίαι καὶ γένος, 1283 a 33 οἱ δ' ἐλευθεροί καὶ ἐγένεσι ὡς ἐγγὺς ἄλληλοι, 1290 b 9 ff. ἂν οἱ ἐλευθεροὶ ὀλχοῦσιν ὄντες πλεῖον [καὶ μὴ ἐλευθεροί] ἄρχοσι; lastly, the locus classicus which establishes this meaning, 1291 b 26 τὸ μὴ εἰς ἄμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἔλευθερον = the freeborn who have only one parent of citizen birth. He further quotes Plato Comicus Hyperbolus 3, 4 for ἔλευθερος (εἷς, and refers to Diog. Laer. vi. 1 and vii. 4 for Antisthenes.

P. 396. 1281 a 17. Mr Newman (i. 145) understands this differently: "taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty" like ἐπὶ πᾶντων ἀνδρώπων.

P. 400. 1281 b 31. With βούλευσασθαι καὶ κρίνειν cf. 1274 a 15 ff. and reff. there.

ADDENDA.

Ib. 1282 a 22. Mr Wyse calls attention to the poetical colour of the words δαιμόνω (1338 a 30) and θόνη (1324 b 39) in this line; with which may go τιμαλφεῖν, 1336 b 19.

Ib. 1282 a 28. The plural δῆμος in 1294 a 13, 1310 b 21, 1320 a 4, 1321 a 19, 'Aθ. πολ. c. 40 § 3, Thuc. III. 82. 1, viii. 65. 1.

Ib. 1282 a 31. ταμεύοναι] Add to note (576): Cp. 'Aθ. πολ. c. 4 § 2 (Draconian constitution), c. 8 § 1 (Solon's): οισάει δ' οτι κληρωτάς ἐποίησεν ἐκ τῶν τιμιμάτων ὁ περὶ τῶν ταμίων νόμος, ὃ χρυσοῦν διατελέσθαι ἐκτι καὶ νῦν κελεύει γὰρ κληρον τῶν ταμίας ἐκ πεντηκοσιομεδίμνων, c. 47 § 1 ἐκ πεντηκοσιομεδίμνων κατὰ τὸν Σόλωνος νόμον (ἐπὶ γάρ i.e. εἰςα 329 B.C. δ νόμος κύριος).


Ib. 1283 b 14. Mr Wyse compares 1281 a 9, οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτείων ἀμφισβητοῦτες.

P. 415. Comm. left col. line 24. Add: The recent additions to our knowledge enable us to arrive at the following provisional results respecting Aristotle's judgment upon Ostracism. Having been wholly disused in the fourth century the institution had become the subject of antiquarian research. Two theories about its origin could appeal, with something like confidence, to facts in their favour: (1) the view of the text, 1284 a 17 ff. and of viii(v). 3. 3, 1302 b 15—18, which agrees with Diod. xl. 55, Plut. V. Themist. c. 22, Arist. 7, Nic. 11, Aelid. 13 (cp. Nepos Them. 8, Cimon 3), evidently the view of Ephorus and Theopompus, i.e. of the school of Isocrates: (2) the view expressed by Philochorus, Fr. 79 b (cited in u. 603), which is also found in Androton, Fr. 5 (quoted by Harpocratius s.v. Hipparchus). Both explanations appear in 'Aθ. πολ. c. 22, the writer showing himself here as elsewhere well acquainted with the latest researches of historians and Atthidigraphi.

Ib. line 39. The extract is preceded by an account of the procedure in cases of ostracism: προχειροτονεί μὲν ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ή πρωτανείας, εἰ δοκεῖ τὸ ὁστρακόν εἰσφέρειν ὅτε δὲ δοκεῖ, ἐφράσσετο σανίας ἡ ἀγορὰ καὶ κατελείποντο ἐξοδοὺς δέκα, δι᾽ αὐτῶν εἰσίν τοις καθὰ δικαίως ἐπίθεσιν τὰ ὀστρακά, στρέφοντες τὴν ἐπιγραφήν. ἐπιστάτων δὲ οἱ εἶναι ἄρχοντες καὶ ἡ βουλή· διαριθμηθέντων δὲ ὅτι πλείστα γένονται καὶ μὴ ἔλαττῳ ἐξαισχυλίων, τούτων ἔδει τὰ δικαία δόντα καὶ λαβόντα υπὲρ τῶν ἵδιων συναλλαγμάτων ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἔτη δέκα (ὕστερον δὲ ἐγένοντο πάντες) καρποφόρεσθαι τὰ εἰσόντοι, μὴ ἐπίβαλλοντα ἑνός Γερασίου Ἐλευθερίου· πάντως δὲ κτλ.

Ib. After note (603) add: Compare now 'Aθ. πολ. c. 22 § 1 én ois [sc. νόμοις] ἐτῇ καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὀστρακισμοῦ νόμος seemingly about 507 B.C., § 3 διαλύστοις ἐτῇ μετά τὴν ἴκην [Marathon], θαρροῦντοι ἴδιον τὸν δήμον, τότε πρῶτον ἐχρήσατο τὸ νόμῳ τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὀστρακισμοῦ, δι᾽ ἐτῇ διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς διμέρεσιν, δι᾽ ἡευστάτος δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγός ὃν τόπον κατέστη § 4 καὶ πρῶτος ὀστρακίσθη τῶν ἐκείνων συγγελών Ἰππαρχος Χάρμος Κολυμίτης, δι᾽ ἐν καὶ μάλιστα τῶν νόμον ἔθηκεν ὁ Κηλεσθένης, εξελάτας βουλόμενον αὐτόν. εὐθὺς δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει [i.e. 487/6 B.C.]...ἀστρακίσθη Μεγαλῆς Ἰπποκράτους Ἀλεπτεκῆθη [a nephew of Cleisthenes]. ἐτὶ μὲν οὖν ἐτῇ τρία τοῦ τῶν τυραννῶν φίλου ὀστρακίζων, ὥσ πάροντι λόγος ὀστρακίσθη, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει [probably 485/4 B.C.] καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔτει τῶν δοκιμών ἔλαβε μεθύστατο· καὶ πρῶτος ὀστρακίσθη τῶν ἀπευθεῖ τῆς τυραννίδος Εὐθύππος ὁ Ἀρίστορρος. Unquestionably the motives assigned, (1) jealousy of preeminence (Eph. Theopomp.) and (2) fear of a restoration of Hippias (Androt.), are inferences from the persons ostracized. The fragment of Androton in Harpocratius runs thus: ἄλλωσ δὲ ἐστὶν Ἰππαρχος ὁ Χάρμων, ὃς φησὶ Λυκούργος ἐν τῷ κατά
The coincidence of language is unmistakable, cp. viii(v). 5, 6, 1305 a 7.

P. 417. To note (609) add: A more correct account of the earlier position of these three islands is given in 'Ath. pol. c. 24 § 2: τοῖς συμμάχοις δεσποτικωτέρως ἔχρωντο πλὴν Χίων καὶ Δασείων καὶ Σαμίων τούτοις δὲ φίλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐώντες τάς τε πολιτείας παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄρχεν ὡς ἐτυχον ἄρχοντες. From this privileged position the Samians and Lesbians were not dislodged until they revolted. Comp. Mr Newman in Class. Rev. v. 162.

P. 423. 1285 a 16. Add: Busolt Die Lakedaimonier p. 141 ff. compares the Tageia in Thessaly, the βασιλεία of Arcadia (which is also α στρατηγία), and the 'Herzogthum' of the ancient Germans.

P. 424. 1285 a 35 et al. Note that according to Meisterhans Grammatik p. 23 n. (132) the true spelling is Μυστηρίαν.


P. 427. 1285 b 15. παράδειγμα) In 'Ath. pol. c. 3 § 3 the word is παραχώρειν.

P. 428. 1286 a 3. Add: This is the distinction between τάξεις and θεσμοὶ in Dion. Halicarn. Ant. Rom. v. 167 λ.

P. 431. 1287 a 38. In 'Ath. pol. c. 35 § 3 πρὸς χάριν happens to occur.

P. 434. 1286 a 30 f. The sentiment perfectly agrees with that of 'Ath. pol. c. 41 § 2; after mentioning the absolute personal sway of Demos (ἀπάντων γὰρ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν πεποίηκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψυφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίωσιν, ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἐστὶν οἱ κρατῶν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῆς βουλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δημοῦ ἀληθέσιν) the writer continues καὶ τούτῳ δοκοῦσι ποιεῖν ὀρθάν εὐδιαφθορώτερον γὰρ <οἷς> ὀλγαί τῶν πολλῶν εἰσίν καὶ κέρδει καὶ χάρισιν.

P. 438. Comm. left col. line 1. After turn out insert anyhow i.e.

P. 439. 1287 a 6. Comp. for this sense of διοικησις, 1331 b 9; also 1330 a 7 for διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν, and 'Ath. pol. c. 24 s.l. ἀπασία γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοικησία (maintenance) ἤν.

P. 442. 1287 b 19. περιληπθηκαί) In 'Ath. pol. c. 9 § 2 περικλαβεῖν.

P. 454. Add to Excursus ii. : See further remarks on the date of Pittacus, in reply to Beloch, by Toepffer in Rhein. Mus. xliv. 1894, pp. 230—246.

P. 467, line 5. See Corrigenda. Dole the sentence: Again, one might...πολιτεία.

P. 464 ff. The statistical results here given have been again and again revised by Prof. Susemihl in Quaest. crit. et exeget. 11. (1893) and Jahrb. f. Phil. 1893, p. 817 ff., the latter article a rejoinder to Mr Newman's presentation of the statistics in Classical Review vii. 1893, pp. 304—309. In such enumerations mistakes are apt to creep in, and an editor's judgment will from time to time be modified by the greater or less degree of probability which a combination of assumptions seems to present: hence neither the statistics of the text nor the modified results of the articles published in 1893 can be regarded as final. Both sides have made concessions, either from change of view (as when Prof. Susemihl admits that 1272 b 9 Mr Newman has rightly accounted for the variant δυναστῶν by δυναστεῖα in the next line, and accordingly
returns to ἰδος τῶν Π², and Mr Newman 1263 a 23 now accepts ἰδεῖς Π¹ in place of ἰδεῖς Π²? or from the laudable desire to do all possible justice to the opposing view (which may account for Prof. Susemihl’s surrender of 1256 b 1 κομιδονται, 1258 b 1 μεταβολικῆς, 1258 b 7 νήματα ἐκ νομάσματος in Quaest. II. p. iv. although he would still regard these three passages as extremely uncertain, and similarly for Mr Newman’s omission to count 15 passages on the side of Π², for which see Class. Rev. vii. p. 306 n. 1, p. 308). It only remains to state and compare the competing statistical tables in their latest form.

Let us start with Book i. where “Π¹ is certainly wrong 15 times” (text p. 464, line 40): deduce three of these 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1260 a 26 which fall back into the uncertain class, and add seven, viz. 1254 b 14, 1256 a 10, 1257 a 6, 1259 b 31 together with the more properly uncertain cases 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, b 7: this brings the total of errors in Π¹ to 19. But again, in B. i. “Π¹ is right 24 times” (text p. 464, line 3 from below): this should have been 23 for only 23 variants are enumerated. Of these five are very slight changes and Prof. Susemihl now refrains from counting them: viz. 1252 b 28 (ἡδη), 1256 b 8 (δεδομένη), 1258 b 40 (Χαρντιδή), 1250 b 28 (ἄδη), 1260 a 37 (ἄρα), but he adds five in their place, viz. 1253 a 32, 1253 b 33, 1254 a 10, 1260 a 26, a 31: the total remaining 23. Thus in B. i. the problem works out in favour of Π¹ by 23 : 19.

Mr Newman does not agree with this statement of the case, but instead of a detailed criticism he contents himself with objecting to five of the 23 variants claimed as right readings for Π¹ on the ground that words are omitted, and that this is the besetting sin of Π¹: these five omissions are 1252 a 9 (εἰδαί), b 20 (ἐννέαδον), 1253 b 33 (ἄδη), 1257 b 7 (εἰδαί), 1260 a 31 (ἄδη). If these five claims were struck out, the balance in favour of Π¹ would be destroyed.

In B. ii. the alleged superiority claimed for Π¹ is still disputed. Mr Newman accepts its authority in 35 variants and does not definitely pronounce against it in the 13 other readings, while at the same time rejecting it in favour of Π² in no less than 64 cases.

Prof. Susemihl again has altered his result (p. 465) in favour of Π¹ over Π² from 69 : 40 to 67 : 48. It is clear that while opinions continue thus widely to differ, as to which variants are decisive for the one or the other side, the facts require extremely cautious and delicate manipulation.

The changes in Susemihl’s figures for Book ii. are thus explained. “Π¹ has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times” (p. 465 line 32): deduce 9 of these, viz. 1261 a 35, 1265 b 39, 1266 b 39, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 21, a 27, 1272 a 1, 1273 a 9, 1274 a 4, in return add 17 others: 1261 a 22, 1264 a 16, 1265 a 22, 1268 a 6, a 17, a 34, 1269 a 38, b 21, b 28, 1270 a 23, b 12, 1272 a 3, b 9, b 28, b 34, 1274 b 8, b 9, b 14: the new total of the errors of Π¹ is 48. Again of the 69 passages claimed as right readings for Π¹ (p. 465 line 23) Susemihl is now disposed to omit nine, viz. 1263 a 12, 1266 b 31, 1267 a 40, 1270 a 22, b 19, b 32, 1274 a 5, a 21, in place of which he advances 9 others, viz. 1261 b 30, 1263 a 23 (καὶ), b 5, 1264 a 15, b 31, 1265 a 16, 1268 a 6 f., 1269 b 14, 1273 a 35: the total would thus remain at 69, but on reflexion he counts the variations of one passage, 1261 b 2 f., not (as on p. 465) as five, but only two (or three at most). This brings out the final result for B. ii.: Π²=67 (or 68 at most), Π¹=48.

Mr Newman’s divergent results are thus obtained. Of the 67 he accepts 35, but transfers nine others to the opposite side and reckons them to the credit of Π² (viz. 1260 b 27, 1261 b 4, 1263 b 7, 1268 a 3 all cases of omission by Π¹, together with
1265 b 11, 1267 a 35, b 26, 1269 b 6, 1271 a 29); the remaining 23 he leaves doubtful, though strongly of opinion that they also should be counted for II². Thus III¹ falls with him from 67 to 35; and II² rises by the addition to the 48 (which Susemihl finally admits) of seven other variants, which Susemihl regards as doubtful: viz. 1264 a 21, 1265 a 12, 1268 b 17, 1267 a 40, 1273 b 32, 1274 a 4, b 6. This makes the total for II²=55. Add the 9 variants above enumerated which Susemihl reckons for II¹ and Newman for II² and we get the result, II²=64, II¹=35.

On the question of the text generally we quote with pleasure Prof. Tyrrell's opinion as expressed in 1888, Hermathena Vol. vi. No. 14, p. 335. "The course taken by recent criticism illustrates one of Aristotle's rules for attaining the mean, ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίον. Bekker having completely neglected I¹ and Π, Susemihl's recoil carried him perhaps too far from Bekker's method, and now Busse and Dittenberger"—may we not add Newman?—"seem to be dragging him too near it again. Without free emendation and transposition we can have no readable text."


Θb. 1330 a 15. ἦνα...ἄμφωτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν] No one can fail to notice the striking similarity between this sentence and the following in the account of Cleisthenes' local tribes: ὅπως ἐκάστη μετέχη πάντων τῶν τόπων, Ἀθ. πολ. c. 21 § 4.

P. 520. 1330 b 11. For μὴ παρέργωσ see now Ἀθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5 τοῖς μὴ παρέργωσ ἀποσφαιμένοις.

P. 522. 1331 a 3. After 1269 a 6 add: and III. 3. 2, 1276 a 14 ff.


P. 539. 1333 b 12. With ἀπεφάναντο comp. the passage cited in Addenda to p. 520 above, from Ἀθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

P. 540. 1333 b 34. To note (915) add: Comp. Ἀθ. πολ. c. 23 § 4.

P. 541. 1334 a 5. Compare the parallel phrase of Metaph. 1. 2. 11, 981 b 22, μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός.

P. 570. 1337 a 27. Comp. Pl. Crito 50 d etc. and Dem. De Corona § 205 (οἷς τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ μητρὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πατρίδι).