STUDIES IN THE VĀKYAPADĪYA VOL I

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA

Critical Text of Cantos I and II
[ with English Translation, Summary of Ideas and Notes ]

By
K. RAGHAVAN PILLAI
B A (Hons) Ph D (Lond ),
Director, Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library,
University of Kerala, Trivandrum

Formerly of the Staff of the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics, School
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London & Professor of
Sanskrit, Indian Literature and Culture, The American Academy
of Asian Studies, San-Francisco

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
DELHI · PATNA · VARANASI
PRINTED EDITIONS AND MANUSCRIPTS USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE TEXT

1  Pandit Charudeva Sastri's edition of Canto I  
   (Lahore—1934)

2  Benares edition of the Vākyapadiya,  
   (Benares 1887)

3  Manuscript No 10924 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum  
   containing Canto—I, and portions of Bhartrhari's own commentary on Canto I of the Vākyapadiya

4  Manuscript No 8918 of the University Manuscripts Library,  
   Trivandrum containing Cantos I and II

5  Manuscript No 2392—C O  
   belonging to the University Manuscripts Library and containing Canto II
Dedicated
to
the memory
of
my father the late
SHRI N SANKARA PILLAI
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Preface</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Introduction</td>
<td>xi-xxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Summary of Cantos I and II</td>
<td>xxiii-xxxvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Text with translation</td>
<td>1-146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Notes on translation</td>
<td>147-189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 General Index</td>
<td>191-195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sanskrit Index</td>
<td>196-222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Index of Kārikās</td>
<td>223-232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Bibliography with abbreviations</td>
<td>233-236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Errata</td>
<td>237-239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

This volume contains a critically edited text of Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadiya with an English translation, introduction, notes, etc.

The translation was at first prepared as part of my Ph D thesis which the University of London accepted in 1951.

My work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was supervised by the late Prof J R Firth, Professor of General Linguistics and Head of the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Prof J Brough, then Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, S O A S, University of London and now Professor of Sanskrit in the Cambridge University. Professor Firth’s famous Wednesday lectures on Linguistics, my individual discussions with him, and my Thursday sessions with Professor Brough have been of immense value to me in my study of the Vākyapadiya. I am grateful to them. I must especially express my gratitude to the late Prof Firth and to Mrs Whitley, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics of the S O A S for their kindness in letting me, a member of the Research staff of the department, undertake research work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Mahopādyāya K Harihara Sastrī, B A, Assistant Research Officer in the Oriental Research Institute & Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum, helped me with the collation of the Vākyapadiya manuscripts in the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum, and I thank him.

Shri E Easwaran Namboodiri, M A, Lecturer in Sanskrit University of Kerala, willingly undertook, to prepare the indices and errata included in this publication. I am very thankful to him.

I am indebted to the Kerala University for having been able to make use of the Vākyapadiya manuscripts in the collections of the ORI and MSS Library.

I also thank Messrs Motilal Banarsidass for kindly undertaking to publish this work.

Trivandrum
29 5 1971

K RAGHAVAN PILLAI
INTRODUCTION

General

The Vākyapadiya ranks among the principal authoritative works in Sanskrit Grammar. If the Aṣṭādhyāyī gives a study of the structure of the Sanskrit language with the rules governing its functioning, the Vārttika of Kātyāyana largely explains the sūtras of Pāṇini, sometimes taking positions different from those taken by the Sūtrakāra and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali besides extensively studying the topics in the Aṣṭādhyāyī and defending Pāṇini against the Vārttīkākāra, also incidentally introduces subjects in linguistic philosophy, one can say with certainty that it is in the Vākyapadiya that a first full-fledged statement and discussion of a philosophy of Grammar is given.

There are rudiments of the doctrine of Sabdabrahman in Sanskrit texts right from the Vedas downwards. We find the supreme Word principle (Sadbabrahman) described under various names in the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. It is identified with mind, matter and Prajāpati and is described in terms like Vāk and Prajāpati. As the other self of Prajāpati speech functioned as the source of all Universe. In the Ṛgveda it is conceived as the ‘active power of Brahman’, it is identified with him and is personified as a ‘productive principle’. The four regions of the world are described as taking their being from the seas of water descending from Speech in streams and the universe as getting life from the imperishable flood which flows from it. In the Yajurveda we find Vāk considered as ‘the Supreme worshel Śakti of Prajāpati named as Vācaspati. Coming to the Brāhmaṇas, the primeval waters are considered to have been created out of Vāk by Prajāpati.⁵ Again Vāk is

1 RV X—125
2 RV 1-84, Śatapathabrahmana VI 1 9 Pañcabumsa VI 1 3, X 2 1 XX 14 2
3 Kāṭhaka XII 5 and 27 1
4 Vṛtisasambhātā IX-1
5 Satapatha VI 1 9
described as Prajāpati's 'other self' in the matter of creating the Universe. Vāk was the 'nīvīd' of the twelve syllables which emanated from Prajāpati while he was performing sacrifice and it was through Vāk that Prajāpati created all beings.

Sarasvatī is mentioned in some of the later Mandalas of the Rgveda in a few Brāhmaṇas and in some of the Purāṇas, and as a speech principle is identified with Vāk and conceived as the creative principle associated with Prajāpati. She is described as carrying out the function of creating the shape of the body (possibly of Indra) by bringing together the marrow, flesh, etc., in their proper places. She also creates the internal organs, and even generates the vyāna vāyu (life-breath) which pervades the body from head to foot. She stimulates and sustains the growth of the foetus in the womb.

In the Upanisads we find the identification of Vāk and Prajñā (intelligence) and also the world phenomena. Thus all speech is held together by Om just as all leaves are held together by one leaf stalk and Om is the world-all.

Although thus we find the beginnings of the concept of a supreme Word-principle in the early scriptural texts, the first complete postulation and discussion of Śabdabrahman according to the Sanskrit Grammarian is, as stated above, given in Vākyapadiya of Bhartrhari. In the first Canto of the work called Brahmakānda are given the basic ideas concerning the concept of Śabdabrahman. In the second called Vākyakānda the discussions are largely on the nature of words and sentences. We find in this canto the fundamental idea of the integral nature of the sentence and its meaning discussed. The third canto is the largest, in it, grammatical topics mostly concerning words are discussed. Thus canto is called Prakīrṇa and also Padakānda. I discuss later, whether this is a part of the Vākyapadiya.

**Bhartrhari-biographical**

Bhartrhari, the grammarian was famous when I-tsing, the Chinese pilgrim visited India. I-tsing recorded that a

---

6 Pañcabhāṣa VI : 3, x 211, xx 14.2
7 Astareya X-1
8 Tattvarthabrahmanapatha II 64
grammarians by that name who was a contemporary of Jayāditya, one of the authors of the Kāśikāvṛtti on the Astādhyāyī died in AD 650. I-tsing also recorded that Bhartrhari was of Buddhist persuasion. We have also I-tsing’s evidence to hold the view that Bhartrhari wavered between the ascetic life and secular life several times. I-tsing also approximately gave a somewhat accurate size of cantos I and II of the Vākyapadiya.

There is the question whether Bhartrhari, the author of the Srngāra—the Vairāgya—and the Nīti-Satakas is the same person as the author of the Vākyapadiya. The difference in the style would appear to disprove any identification although there is nothing making it utterly impossible that a poet writes a treatise on grammar in one style and adopts a different style, when he composes a work like the Srngārasataka.

Tradition has identified Bhartrhari with Bhaṭṭi, it has also sometimes treated Bhaṭṭi as the half-brother of Bhartrhari. No doubt the strong phonetic nearness between Bhartr and Bhaṭṭi, and the fact that there is a well known grammatical work under each name led to the identification which, however, needs further proof for confirmation.

Works

The following are mainly considered to be the works of Bhartrhari, the grammarian—

1. Vākyapadiya (3 Cantos)
2. Vṛtti on the 1st and 2nd Cantos of the Vākyapadiya. Commentators like Vṛshabhadeva call the Vṛtti, Vivarana
3. A gloss (ṭīkā) on the 1st three pādas of the Mahābhāṣya. This is called Tr̥ṇpādī

Other works like a commentary on the Astādhyāyī and a commentary on the Brahmasūtra seem to be mere conjectures at the moment (See Charudeva Sastrī’s Sanskrit Introduction to Vākyapadiya 1935).

Editions of the Vākyapadiya

The first modern edition of the text was brought out in Benares in 1887, when Cantos I and II with what was des-
cribed as Punyarāja’s commentary were edited by Pt Gangadhara Sastri Manavalli and published as Nos 11, 19 and 24 of Benares Sanskrit Series under the general supervision of R T H Griffiths and G Thibau. The third Canto of the text with Helārāja’s commentary named Prakīrṇakaparakāsa was also published as No 95 in the Benares Sanskrit Series in 1905. This was edited by Pt Ramachandria Sastri Koti Bhaskara, Pandit of the Banaras Hindu College. It is now clear that the commentary on Canto I described as Punyarāja’s by Pt Gangadhara Sastri Manavalli was not a work of Punyarāja, it was an abridgement of Bhartrhari’s own Vṛtti on Canto I of the Vākyapadiya. This Vṛtti was later published first by Pt Charudeva Sastri and later by Prof K A Subramonia Iyer.

In 1935 Pandit Charudeva Sastri published the 1st canto of the Vākyapadiya with the commentary (Vṛtti) by Bhartrhari himself. This publication of Bhartrhari’s commentary by Pandit Sastri was legitimately a significant event. He also used several manuscripts in his edition of the 1st canto and it was therefore a distinct improvement on the Benares editions in which admittedly only a small number of manuscripts were used.

In 1935 a part of the third Canto of the Vākyapadiya was published as No C XVI in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series Sri K Sambasiva Sastri, the then Curator of the Oriental Manuscripts Library at Trivandrum edited the work. The publication also included the Prakīrṇakaparakāsa—a commentary by Helārāja. With a part II edited and published in 1942, by L A Ravi Varma the publication of the 3rd Canto with Prakīrṇakaparakāsa was completed in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series.

Canto I was again published by Pandit Suryanarayana Sukla with his own gloss in the Kasi Sanskrit Series (Chawkhamba) in 1937. In more recent times, more than one edition with or without translation of a part or other of the Vākyapadiya have appeared.

Prof K A Subramonia Iyer’s edition of Canto I with Vṛtti with a translation in English appeared in 1965 as No 26 in the Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series, Poona.

In 1966, Prof Subramonia Iyer again published the 1st Canto of the Vākyapadiya with the Vṛtti of Bhartrhari and the
commentary named Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva. This was published as No. 32 under the Deccan College Monograph Series, Poona.

Also a text of the Vākyapadīya Canto I and Vṛtti in Roman script with a French translation was published in 1964 by M. Bardeau (Bhartrhari—Vākyapadiya, Brahmakānda, avec la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabhā, Traduction, Introduction et notes Publications de l’Institut de Civilisation indienne, Fascicule 24, Paris, De Boccard, 1964). It may be noted that the author does not consider the Vṛtti as Bhartrhari’s Harivṛṣabhā, according to her, is different from Bhartrhari.

Vākyapadiya, Canto III, Part I with Helārāja’s commentary was published as No. 21 in the Deccan College Monograph Series, Poona in 1963. The editor was K. A. Subramonia Iyer.

**The Name Vākyapadiya**

The first Canto of the Vākyapadiya is called the Brahmakānda, the second is called the Vākyakānda and the third is called the Padakānda. In the first Canto is given the concept of Sabdabrahman and the general philosophy of sphaṭa and srutti. If we may say so, the first Canto largely gives the outlines of the metaphysics of Linguistic Philosophy, whereas in the second the linguistic topics are discussed in a linguistic background. Not that metaphysics are completely eschewed, but that they are given their proper place. In the third Canto problems connected with words are discussed.

**The Problem of Canto III**

But there is a problem concerning Canto III Helārāja, the commentator on the 3rd Canto of the Vākyapadiya thinks that the name Vākyapadiya refers only to Cantos I and II (commentary on VP, III 154). He names his commentary on the 3rd Canto Prakīrṇakaprakāśa. Indeed in some Lexicons the 3rd Canto of the Vākyapadiya is called Prakīrṇaka Vādhamāna, the author of the Ganaratnamahodadhī also thinks that Vākyapadiya and Prakīrṇaka are separate.
works by Bhartrhari. He says that Bhartrhari was the author of Vākyapadiya and Prakīrṇaka and author of a commentary called Tripādi on Mahābhāṣya.

The question deserves careful consideration. A few stanzas which occur at the end of Canto II of the Vākyapadiya are of special importance in this discussion. In these verses a history of what happened to Sanskrit Grammar when Patañjali’s work was corrupted is given. We are also told that the author's guru wrote the work, namely Vākyapadiya, meaning only, in accordance with the well known humility of Hindu authors that the author wrote the work with the blessings of his teacher. The significant thing about this last section of Canto II of the Vākyapadiya is that it gives a strong indication that the particular work ended there. If the Vākyapadiya originally had a third canto as it now has it is difficult to see why the last few verses of Canto II should occur there instead of at the end of Canto III. It seems thus that Helārāja’s position that Prakīrṇakānda was a separate work by the same author was not without foundation. It may also be remembered that Bhartrhari’s own vṛtti exists only on the 1st and 2nd Cantos, that Punyārāja is known to have commented only on Cantos I and II, and that I-tsung mentions the approximate size of Cantos I and II together. Further Helārāja’s commentary on the 3rd Canto alone is available as far as our present knowledge goes. All this may lead to the conclusion that Canto I and II alone formed the Vākyapadiya. If it, however, not forgotten here that most of the available manuscripts (but not all) describe the Prakīrṇaka as the third canto of the Vākyapadiya. But how old is this tradition? and did it possibly supplant a more authentic earlier one which was represented by the colophon in some manuscripts which read इत्य भाष्कर भूतं हनिकन्ते वाक्यपदीये द्वितीय काण्डम्। समाप्ता वाक्यपदीयकारिका इति।

Suppose the position is that the Vākyapadiya contained originally only two cantos. Then how does the name Vākyapadiya fit in? The answer is not difficult. The two cantos discuss together a system of linguistics in which the two meaning-conveying units in speech namely, the sentence and the word (vākya and pada) are discussed. Of these the vākya alone is complete and the pada is derived from it. There is also nothing inappropriate if we call the 1st Canto, the Vākya-
kānda, since in it are discussed the vākya—vākyā sphaṭa being the most complete utterance. In the second canto, topics concerning the word, the noun, the verb, the ṇupāta, the karma-pravacanīya, etc., are discussed. The discussion of topics concerning padas or words takes the best part of the space in that kānda justifying its designation as Padakānda.

**Commentators on the Vākyapadīya**

1. Bhartrhari himself—He commented on Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya. The work is called Vṛttī.
2. Punyarāja—He wrote a commentary on the first and second Cantos of the Vākyapadīya. But only his commentary on the 2nd Canto is available. What was included in the Benares edition of Vākyapadīya (1887) and described as Punyarāja’s commentary by the editor Pt Manavalli was, as found by several scholars later and by me in my examination of the Vṛttī manuscript in the Trivandrum Manuscripts Library, really an abridgement of Bhartrhari’s own Vṛttī on Canto I. Punyarāja according to scanty information given at the end of commentary on Canto II was a Kashmirī and was also known as Rājānaka Suravarma and learned the 2nd Canto of Vākyapadīya from a Śasāṅkāsisya. What does Śasāṅkaśisya mean?—a disciple of Chandragomin the Grammarian?—or does it mean a disciple of Śasāṅkadhara, namely Sahadeva who wrote a commentary on Vāmana’s Alankāra? This latter view is held by Pt Charudeva Sastrī. We have to accept our uncertainty about Punyarāja and his date, except to suggest a date between 11th and 12th Century.

3. HELĀRĀJA—He wrote a commentary on the 3rd Canto of the Vākyapadīya. This commentary is called Prakīrṇa-kaprakāsa. He belonged to the family of Laksmana who was Minister of King Muktāpida of Kashmir. He was the son of Bhūturāja. Helārāja may have lived in the second half of the 10th Century A D according to Pt Charudeva Sastrī and others.

4. VRSABHADEVA—the author of a commentary by name Paddhati on Bhartrhari’s Kārikās and Vṛttī together. The
Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva is now available only in the Vrtti on Kanda I of the Vākyapadiya

Nothing much is known about Vrsabhadeva except what he says in the introductory verses of his commentary that he was the son of Devayās as, an employee of King Visnugupta. We do not have enough material to identify this Visnugupta among the known Visnuguptas of Indian History. Vrsabhadeva's date, consequently has to be left undecided for the time being at least.

About the Present Work

In the years 1948-1951, I worked in the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. I also then undertook a study of the Vākyapadiya as my work for the Ph D degree of the London University. My thesis contained a study of Cantos I and II, a translation into English of the same and notes I had used for the purpose of the translation the text published in the Benares Edition of 1887. This contained also what was described by the editor as the commentary of Punyarāja on Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadiya. However, it has been subsequently proved that what the editor of the Benares Edition considered as the commentary of Punyarāja on Canto I was only a condensation of Bhartrhari's own Vrtti on Canto I.

When I planned later to publish a text of Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadiya with a translation and notes, the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the Benares text of 1887 was felt. Of course, Pandit Charudeva Sastri's edition of Canto I, published with Bhartrhari's Vrtti and extracts from Vrsabhadeva's Paddhati was available, and it was a very good edition for Canto I. But there was no good reliable text for Canto II. And even in the preparation of his text for Canto I, Pt Charudeva Sastri had not according to his own statement in his introduction, made use of the manuscripts of the work which belonged to the Oriental Manuscripts Library at Trivandrum because they were not made available to him. And these manuscripts contained good readings of the text with the Vrtti of Bhartrhari himself for Canto I, as well as the text of Canto II. I therefore felt that I could present a better text for the two Cantos making use of the hitherto-unused Trivandrum manuscripts.
In preparing the text of Cantos I and II included in this publication I have used the following printed and manuscript materials

Printed Editions and Manuscripts Used
In the preparation of the edition

1. Pandit Charudeva Sastri’s edition of Canto I (Lahore—1935)
2. Benares edition of Vākyapadiya (Benares 1887)
3. Manuscript No 10924 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Canto I, and portions of Bhartrhari’s own commentary on Canto I of the Vākyapadiya
4. Manuscript No 8918 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadiya
5. Manuscript No 2392—C O belonging to the University Manuscripts Library and containing Canto II

Since the text of Cantos I and II contained in this publication went to press (although the actual publication has been delayed for several reasons) before Prof K A Subramonia Iyer’s edition of Canto I with Bhartrhari’s Vṛtti and Vṛṣabhadeva’s Paddhati was published in 1966, I have not been able to use this latter publication in fixing the text. However, it may be noted that both the Vṛtti, and the Paddhati which he included in his 1966 publication had earlier appeared, the former fully and the latter in extracts in Pt Charudeva Sastri’s publication (1935), and the Vṛtti alone in the form of an English translation in Prof Subramonia Iyer’s own publication [of Canto I + Vṛtti (translation)—Poona], and in the form of a French translation by M Biardeau.

Prof Subramonia Iyer has omitted eight verses, (verses 108 to 115 both inclusive) in Canto I from his 1966 Poona edition, as he considered that they did not belong to the
Vākyapadīya I do not express any opinion on this, they, however, form part of the text adopted by me as they are found in all printed editions (except Prof. Subramonia Iyer's Poona editions) and inferentially in all manuscripts examined by earlier editors and in the Trivandrum Manuscripts which I examined.

I have noted in the footnotes in the text such changes in the numbering of the kārikās as have been necessitated.

I have also given notes where I felt that such were necessary to justify sound readings adopted in preference to others.

**About the Translation**

The translation prepared for my thesis based on the text of the Benares edition of 1887 had necessarily to be altered in places where a different text had to be adopted. Also, minor verbal changes had been occasionally made from the text of the translation as given in my thesis for the sake of clarity. The bracketted portions in the body of the translation of kārikās have been supplied in order to supply syntactical completeness of the sentences, or for greater clarity. The portion outside the brackets in the translation of each kārikā is by and large a literal rendering of the Sanskrit text. Very often introductory observations have also been given at the start of the translation for the sake of showing continuity of argument and logic.

**A running summary of the ideas in the two Cantos**

The Vākyapadīya is a difficult text. I have therefore thought it necessary to give a continuous statement of the ideas discussed in the two cantos of the text. This is given separately after the introduction. It is not claimed that every idea stated in the two cantos is given in this continuous statement. Where, for example, there are several examples given to illustrate a point, I may have dropped all but one or some examples. Sometimes where the author gives several variant views in one theme, I may have omitted a minor view. But it is claimed that the salient doctrines are discussed methodically from the beginning of Canto I to the end of Canto II giving in brackets the numbers of the kārikās of the text in which the particular ideas are expounded. Where the 1st Canto ends and
( xx1 )

the 2nd starts is clearly marked in the summary. Hence the
canto number is not always marked in the bracketed indica-
tion.

The notes on the Sanskrit text are given as foot-notes on
each page of the text itself.

Notes on the Translation are given at the end (PP
147-189).

It is my hope that this publication will be useful to
scholars, for the reason, among others, that it contains a more
correct text than hitherto published of Canto II and the first
ever translation of the same Canto to be published. It is also
hoped that the detailed notes at the end, the summary of ideas
in the introduction, and the introductory sentences in the body
of the translation will lead to an increased understanding of
this important text in Sanskrit grammatical philosophy.

Trivandrum,
29 5 1971

K RAGHAVAN PILLAI
CANTOS I and II—A SURVEY OF THE MAIN IDEAS

The Supreme Word principle or the Śabdabrahman is the source, the sustenance and the end of all manifestation (I—1-4). The Vedas reflect this Brahman. They are also the means of knowing It. We learn from the Vedas a multiplicity of spiritual disciplines, but all these disciplines subserve action. Various kinds of codes have also been formulated based on the Vedas. The Vedas, however, have not been interpreted in identical terms by all teachers. Some have given a monistic interpretation, while others have seen a dualistic import in the teachings of the Vedas. The true significance of the Veda is contained in the syllable ‘Om’—The Omkāra.

Grammar is the most important of the disciplines which have arisen from the Vedas (I—11). Grammar leads one to the realisation of Brahman in the form of the Supreme Word. We know the truth about things through words, and we know the truth about words through grammar. Grammar helps us purify our speech and mind. He who has a firm footing in this science and is capable of studying the Veda realises Brahman. The Supreme Word forms the essence of this Brahman. This Supreme Word is devoid of all distinctions, and such distinct entities like the R.K., the Sāman and so on have their distinct forms as apparent parts of that Word-principle (I, 11-22).

In Grammar the nature of words, meanings and the relationship between them and their different kinds are studied. The validity of a form is determined depending on whether or not it is recognised by the scripture, namely grammar (23-27).

Words fall into two categories, namely those which are created and those which are not. But both these can be described as eternal. The created word is only a manifestation of the Supreme Word-principle, about the eternal nature of which there is no question. The scripture prescribes this rule about the eternity of words (28-29).

Why should one rely on scripture to decide validity? Scripture is superior to logic or inference in choosing between right and wrong. There are many areas where inference fails
and scripture has to take over Scripture is the record of the
direct perception of those qualified for it, and direct perception
is superior to inference Therefore a study of words is started
based on scripture of impersonal origin and the codes of rules
based on it (30-42)

Words are of two kinds—one, the cause of all words, and
another, the kind of words used to convey a meaning Some
consider that there is an intrinsic difference between them,
according to others, the second type is only a manifested form
of the first The Supreme Word principle and the spoken word
are in a relationship similar to that between the fire which is
inherent in the firewood, and that which is made manifest
through rubbing fire-sticks together The nāda or the uttered
sound is only the sphota or the Word-principle in manifest
form But the manifested word has characteristics of its own,
which are not of the sphota (44-49)

A word consists of its phonetic-part and its meaning-part
The speaker’s mind first chooses the phonetic element and then
employs it to convey a meaning The listener also first takes
in the phonetic element and then passes on to the meaning
part (50-53) A word has to be first heard, before it can con-
vey a meaning (55-57)

Besides an object which a word conveys, as its meaning
a word can also convey its own form as its import For ex-
ample, the form of a word alone is meant most of the time when
it is employed in grammatical sūtras (58-69)

Are different occurrences of a word different instances of
the same word, or have we to consider them as different words
altogether ? (70) There are both views held on the subject

There are two schools of thought—those of the Monists
and of the Pluralists—among the philosophers of speech Ac-
cording to the first, the sentence alone is the reality—the single
unit The words and the syllables only appear to be complete
entities According to the latter, the syllable has a reality of
its own, the word is a sumtotal of the syllables and the sen-
tence is only the words added together In the view of the
Monists, the differences of diction and the like which belong
to the category of the produced sounds are superimposed on the
indivisible Word-principle named sphota, and are wrongly
conceived to belong to the latter (71-77)
In the school of thought which holds that a word-principle is manifested as individual words through speech sounds there are three views as to how it is manifested. There are also different conceptions as to the method in which words are manifested by the uttered sounds, the way such uttered words are received, the sequence in which the uttered sounds operate in conveying a meaning and so on. But in the theory that speech sounds reveal an ultimate and indivisible Word-principle, the qualities which are peculiar to the speech sounds, and the process necessary for the speech sounds to reveal the speech principle should not be considered as belonging to the latter. Different views are held on the raw material such as the breath which is converted into the speech sounds which, in their turn reveal the word principle (78-117).

Speech occupies a key place in the scheme of things. It is crucial in the process of comprehension and action. Consciousness is comprehended only as associated with speech. Speech is man’s self and Moksa or liberation is realising identity with Speech or Šabdabrahman. He who knows the secret of the functioning of words and attains the achievement of faultless speech enjoys Brahman (118-131).

The Vedas are of impersonal origin and they do not perish even when all records of human wisdom perish. The wisdom enshrined in the Vedas is eternal and is not vitiated by the faults which are natural to human wisdom. Logic is not free from these faults. Reasoning becomes a sure guide if and when it is based on scripture. Employment of correct words is a must for spiritual elevation. Grammar leads one to the ability for it. A man devoid of culture employs corrupt speech. It is granted that incorrect forms can sometimes convey meaning. But they do not do it directly. An incorrect form which is uttered brings to mind the correct form of which it is a corruption and thus conveys the meaning of that correct form (132-156). (Enumeration of the ideas of Canto I concluded)

The second Canto of the Vākyapadīya starts with a definition of what a sentence is according to the different schools of thought (II, 1-2). According to the Monists among the Linguisticians or the Śabdabrahmachārans, a sentence is an integral unit incapable of any fundamental division. Any
division of the sentence into words, and syllables is only a pragmatic one for grammatical purposes and the like (7-12). What is said of the sentences is also true of the words at their level, that is, they are not basically divisible into the syllables, although one feels they are for pragmatic purposes.

What exactly does this idea of the indivisibility of the sentence, the word etc. mean? For one thing, it is a fundamental metaphysical necessity of the Śabdabrahmavādins to hold that Śabda or speech of which the Universe is a manifestation is in reality an immutable entity of which we can speak of manifestations, production, mutation and the like only in a very empirical sense.

On the level of studying speech as an instrument in conveying meanings the monistic doctrine means that a speech unit, whether it is a sentence or a word functions as a single unit as a meaning-conveying instrument. A total unit conveys a total meaning.

The Monists naturally do not accept the idea that larger speech units are built up from smaller units, and that meaning itself is conveyed through parts, and not as one unit in a flash. The Abhirūtānava view of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Anvītābhīdhāna view of the Naiyāyikas are both denied by the Monistic Grammarians. According to the Monists the division of speech units being merely a pragmatic necessity, grammatical rules based on such analysis are also merely pragmatic and once they serve their purposes, they can be discarded (7-117).

The Monistic school, and the Pluralistic schools hold different views on the status of a word and its meaning in the scheme of the sentence and its meaning. To the Monists the word is only a convenient and conventional fiction created for the sake of pragmatic analysis. To the Pluralists, however, words are real, and the sentence is only built up from words. From either point of view, however, a discussion of word-meaning is necessary, although in one, it is only of pragmatic relevance, while in the other, it is basic. Twelve views on what constitutes the meaning of a word are stated (119-143).

The meaning of the sentence in the Akhanda School (Monists) is again discussed. The meaning of the sentence comes as a flash of insight (pratībhā). In it individual word-
meanings appear as parts, but the whole is simply not a sum-total of the parts. This prātiḥā or flash of insight is not a mere piece of knowledge, it is wisdom which guides man to right conduct (śrikaṭavaṭa). This flash of insight is derived from six sources, namely nature, action, practice, meditation, invisible causes, gift of the wise (144-152).

What does a word signify as its meaning? And what does it not signify? A word signifies an object like a cow and this object has qualities, but a word like gauḥ does not denote the qualities of the cow which it denotes. A knowledge of the qualities incidentally follows when the word denotes the object which has such qualities. There are however, some exceptions to this. For example, may be mentioned, a word which means some kind of oil. Here the meaning of the word is not merely the generic entity, but also the qualities of the oil. But generally a word functions whether the non-permanent attributes of the individual like colour are present or not. What then does the word exactly denote? What is never seen in separation from the object is the answer. This, of course, is the jāti, or the universal or genus (153-163).

What role do the root and suffix play in conveying the meaning of a word? Does the suffix express gender, number etc. or does it only illuminate these notions inherent elsewhere? There are both views on the subject. There is also the view that the aggregate of root and suffix convey the meaning of an object with its qualities like number, gender etc. In fact, there is quite a body of notions on the topics of root, suffix, root-suffix relationship and the relationship between the meaning of word, roots and suffix. In the same way too the prefix, how it modifies the meaning of the root, at what stage the modification takes place etc. are also discussed in the text.

What are conjunctions? and what are their functions? What is the type of organic relationship between a conjunction like ca and the things the aggregation of which it indicates? (163-176) The part of speech (karmapravacaniya) is also discussed.

With the discussion of the role of the part of speech named karmapravacaniya (197-204) the discussion of the five grammatical classes, namely nouns, verbs, prefixes, particles and karmapravacaniyas is closed. It may however be stated that
such a discussion of the different grammatical classes of words, though understandable and permissible under the point of view of the Pluralists, is only a purely pragmatic possibility and necessity for the Monistic Grammarian. To him, parts or avayavas in a sentence, namely, words are no more real than parts or avayavas in a word, namely, syllables. One may of course argue that if the aggregate is meaningful then parts also should be meaningful. As far as roots, suffixes etc which are parts of words are concerned, they are meaningful only in a technical sense, that is, they are not meaningful as complete units in the comprehension of a meaning. Copulative compounds, vrittis etc which one may argue, should necessarily convey the meanings of the parts, really do not present any difficulty in the monistic scheme of the Grammarians. Grammatical technique which is necessarily analytical has to deal with parts of sentences and words, but this is only a pragmatic consideration necessary for grammar, and the grammatical processes. It is not really relevant to the indivisible unity which it seeks to reveal (205-250).

As stated earlier, the monistic grammarian, can discuss such questions as the primary, secondary and incidental meanings of words just as the Pluralists can do. The difference is that, for him, the whole thing is tentative, and on the assumption that there are parts and meaning of parts in a sentence and its meaning without taking these positions as ultimately real. The question is asked: When we say that the same word conveys a principal meaning, and a secondary meaning, what is the real philosophical position? Is it that the same word conveys different meanings or that, with each meaning, there is a change in the identity of the word? Both views are held by thinkers. It may be stated here that the same philosophical discussion occurs when synonyms and their meanings are discussed. This discussion has its bearing in a study of hymns repeated in ritual. When a hymn is repeatedly chanted in a sacrifice does it mean that with each repetition, a different hymn comes into being, or can the same hymn be considered to be repeated? There are both views held.

Just as there is a classification of meaning as primary and secondary, as in the well known example, ‘gangāyām ghosah, where ‘Gangā’ means the shore of the Ganges, in the same way
there can be the concept of an incidental meaning connected with a primary meaning. A word may be employed with the speaker's intention to convey a certain meaning. But it may incidentally convey some other meaning also. This latter is an incidental meaning.

The relationship between verbal expression and signification of meaning need special study. Sometimes the meaning conveyed in a context may be the one for which there is no verbal expression. This is so, in such an example as the expression 'ardhahrasvam' (half of a short vowel) where the expression actually means half of a mātrā and the word mātrā is not used.

When a word can convey different meanings, what factors help decide the exact import of the word in a particular context? Several factors can do this function. Such are the syntactical connection of words in the sentence, situation-context, the meaning of another word, propriety, place and time. There is also a slightly different list given in some texts. Constant association of two things, their dissociation, company, hostility, the meaning of another word, situation-context, evidence from another sentence, and the proximity of another word are the factors enlisted in this. It is idle to think that the form of a word alone is adequate to convey the required meaning in a particular context (251-323).

The ultimate source of all word-meaning, primary, secondary or incidental is the sentence, it is derived and abstracted from the sentence.

Even a single-word-utterance may be treated as a sentence, if it has a verb implied in it. For example, when the word vrksah is mentioned it implies the verb tisthati and forms a sentence vrksastisthati (there stands a tree). To this idea the Mīmāṃsaka objects, and brings forth his srutārthāpattī view. According to this view, the heard word leads to the inference of the suitable unheard word, and the meanings of the two words thus juxtaposed in the intellect add up to convey the meaning of the sentence. This view is not accepted by the Grammarian (324-344).

It was stated that the meaning of the word is abstracted and derived from the sentence. For this the interpretation of the sentence is necessary. There are rules governing such
interpretation, from such rules is evolved a certain concept of
the relationship between sentences also. For example, what is
the relationship between a sentence, which lays down a general
rule and another which states an exception to it. The exception
is really part of the import of the sentence dealing with
the general rule, although there is no verbal statement of it
there. What the sentence dealing with the exception actually
does is to make explicit statement of the exception. The rule
and the exception thus constitute one single statement (345-351).

In this context too may be discussed the integral status
of proper names like Devadatta, which, like any other word,
function as total units in conveying their meanings. In other
words, the meaning which the name Devadatta conveys cannot
be considered to be conveyed either by 'deva' or 'datta',
the parts thereof. Datta and Deva only appear to be parts of
Devadatta, and are considered as parts of Devadatta, since
they are produced simultaneously with the latter. For pur-
poses of grammatical study the word Devadatta may be and
is considered a combination of deva and datta. But the same
thing cannot be said, let us add, about, say, jye and sthā which,
one may wrongly say, form part of the word Jyestha.

Proper names which are clan-names do not require acces-
sory factors to convey their meanings. The permanance
of word-meaning relationship is true of proper names and their
meanings also, although it may appear to be less true there.
This rule of the permanent nature of the indicator-indicated
relationship between word and meaning holds good for technical
terms like vṛddhi in grammar.

Proper names in every day usage function through their
forms aided by other factors. The long technical terms in
grammar also function along the same lines, and the presence
of causal factors is brought out by inference.

In grammar, both proper names in every day usage and
coined technical terms which are called samjñas are employed.
Sometimes the same technical term is used as a coined one and
as an every day one. For example, the word samkhya.
Sometimes a term with a non-technical sense when uttered will
extend its application to become a coined one (a technical
one). For example, the word sambuddhi in the statement
dūratsuṃbuddha (352-370).
The integral nature of utterances and the integral way in which they convey meaning have been discussed as the key doctrine of the Grammarian Philosopher. Now the question is asked: When the subject of a sentence is a group, who can be considered as doing the action?—the group or the individual? Where a group is described as eating, the eating is naturally performed by individuals. The result of satisfying hunger is also achieved individually. But some verbs like 'drś' (to see) appearing in a sentence with a plural subject function collectively. Sometimes there is both individual and collective reference. For example, take a statement like Śūdras should not enter the house. Here Śūdras, individually and collectively are prohibited from entering the house. In the same way the change of 'n' into 'n' takes place in spite of the intervention of at, ku, pu and ā collectively or individually, since all that is meant in the context is intervention—See Pāṇini atkupvānumvyavāye'pi (371-388).

The status of the component sentence in a compound sentence is like that of words in a sentence. There are different views on this. Some consider that the component sentences accomplish their meanings individually. In this view, the compound sentence is a collection of clauses each having a different form. But this view is not acceptable to the Grammarian. He conceives the relationship between the compound sentence and component sentences on the pattern of the relationship between a sentence and the words in it. The component clauses are recognised only after the compound sentence is totally uttered and comprehended, the meaning of the component sentence is a subsequent abstraction following the comprehension of the meaning of the compound sentence (389-390).

It is a crucial idea of the Monistic Grammarian that a meaningful utterance whether it is a word, a sentence, or a compound sentence is an integral unit of speech and also functions integrally in conveying its meaning. The notion that the meaning of the aggregate of an utterance culminates in the meanings of the so-called parts is only another version of this idea (391-398).

What is the essential condition for a speech-unit to convey its meaning? This question needs discussion. This condition is that the speech unit should be actually employed to convey the
meaning. Purposeful utterance should precede the conveying of meaning. A word may have several meanings, and several words may convey one meaning. In this situation order is brought about by the fact of purposeful utterance. That is, a word conveys that meaning which is the intention of the speaker (399-402).

Some hold the view that when Vedic hymns are uttered in sacrifices, they do not have a factual meaning because utterance is not directed towards conveying any meaning, utterance is for the sake of utterance. But when hymns are taught, then the very phonetic form of the hymn becomes its meaning since the teacher intends that form to be understood by the student. But these hymns are considered to be meaningful by others since they are purposefully employed. Among those who hold this view there are those who consider that each repetition is a separate occurrence of the hymn and others who hold that it is the same hymn which is repeated. According to these latter the speaker does not have to aim a word at a particular meaning. He has only to utter the word, because a word has the capacity to convey its meaning. What situation-context and other factors do is not to reveal the meanings of totally different words in different contexts, but of apparently different words (403-407).

The relationship between the meanings of the words in a sentence and the meaning of the sentence itself according to the Monistic school of the Grammarians and the opposing Pada-scholars (particularly the Mūmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas) may again be stated. According to the Grammarians philosopher, words present a specific meaning of the sentence. These words themselves are not meaningful in the sense that the sumtotal of the meanings of the words will constitute the meaning of the sentence. An analogy is given. Nobody can say that the meaning of a word is the sumtotal of the meanings of the letters in it. Letters obviously have no meanings of their own. But words have individual meanings, one will argue. True, they have meanings, but the meaning of the sentence is a unitary concept which is not a sumtotal of individual word-meanings.

Word-meanings, however, play a more important role in the scheme of the meaning of the sentence as worked out by the Mūmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas. According to the Anvītā-
bhudhâna view held by the Prâbhâkara Mimâmsakas, the
meaning of the sentence is built up gradually by the association
of the words, and the meaning of the sentence remains accom-
plished in the meanings of the words.
In defence of the Monistic position that word-meanings
are not recognised in the meaning of the sentence one may
bring forward the analogy of the sense-organs. Each organ
of sense has a separate object on which it acts, and it acts in-
dependent of other sense-organs. But all these sense-organs
need the body through which alone they can function. In the
same way words may independently denote objects, but their
meaningfulness as expression of reality is derived from the sen-
tence which alone completely expresses reality. Reality is
expressible only in the form ‘it exists’ which means that a word,
in order to express a reality has to be compounded with a verb
form, namely ‘exists’. This means that a word has to be part
of a sentence in order to convey a meaningful meaning, if one
may say so. If the verb is mentioned as expressing an action
to be conveyed nouns are required to effect the action. The
verb is more important than nouns and so it is mentioned first.
However, this discussion of the meaning of a sentence as a
system of relations is only valid from the point of view of the
speaker. The ultimate truth is that it is an integral entity in
which relationship is only a subsidiary reality (408-430, 437-
441).

Reality is understood only through speech (language) and
it is understood only in the form in which it is presented by
speech (word or language). But language cannot describe the
intrinsic nature of things, although we know things only in the
form in which words describe them (431-437).

The position of the Sanskrit Grammarian philosopher,
then, is that a sentence is not a sumtotal of the words which
appear to make it up. It is an integral unit in which words
only appear as parts. The meaning of the sentence, in the
same way is not the sumtotal of the meanings of the words. It
is an integral entity presented by the meanings of the words.
The Grammarian here makes a distinction between word-
meaning which only mentions an object, and the meaning of
the sentence which is primarily an action, effected by men
through objects.
In the context of these ideas a discussion becomes necessary on the status of those types of sentences which appear to convey more than one meaning, or those which have more verbs than one and therefore militate against the notion of an integral unity. How is unity sustained in the face of the obvious multi-point nature of such sentences? For example consider a sentence which has several finite verbs in it. Does this mean that the meaning of such a sentence is a multiple quantity since there can be a separate proposition around each finite verb in it, particularly so, in the context of Kātyāyana’s definition of the sentence as having one finite verb? The answer to the question posed here is in the negative. In such cases too, the sentence with more than one finite verb is an integral entity with an integral meaning. Again there may be a sentence like mrgah pasyata yāti (Look, there goes a deer). Here, a finite verb is linked to another finite verb. Here too the integral nature of the sentence or its meaning is not affected by this fact. If a sentence is to be complete, there must be expectancy on the level of meaning and no expectancy on the word level. Even when a sentence implies something and there is nothing in it verbally stated about the things implied, even then the sentence is complete (438-446).

The verb constitutes the essential and minimal content of a sentence. So a study of the verb in a sentence will constitute a study of the sentence in its essential aspect. There can be one or more verbs in a sentence as stated earlier. When there are more verbs than one, in a proposition, the proposition can be re-stated with the comparative status of verbs changed, without affecting any change in the meaning of the proposition. For example, the sentence “Recite while moving about” can be re-stated as ‘Move about while reciting’. What is a principal verb in one sentence becomes a subsidiary verb in another, but both sentences have the same import. This position really substantiates the doctrine of the Grammarians that the status or meanings of words in a sentence do not ultimately determine the meaning of the sentence itself. In the same way, a certain verb may be used in a sentence, and the action conveyed by it may be specifically different from what it says. The verb lends itself to these different meanings. Verbs con-
vey their meanings only in general and unspecified forms. For example, the sentence ‘Kings will perform Asvamedha sacrifice, does not convey the idea of any particular form of a sacrifice, nor the difference between the sacrifices performed by one king and another. Then again take the sacrificial injunction ‘He should offer to Prajāpati seventeen he-goats all of the same colour’ The verb used in the sentence is ālabheta. This verb which is singular lends itself for use with each one of the 17 he-goats, as if there were seventeen sentences with one he-goat as the object in each. Other examples of this kind may also be noted. All this means that a sentence will take one form when it is uttered, but in the stage of comprehension it may assume a different form. The verbal content of the sentence and the so-called individual word-components do not play the ultimate part in the scheme of the meaning of the sentence and the form of the meaning itself.

A verb may sometimes function in relation to a group-object taking the whole as one unit, or function in terms of the individuals of the group. Similarly a nominal form may be mentioned only once, but more than one verb may be employed. Then the verb gets itself connected with each meaning of the synonym as if it were used as a separate word. For example, take the sentence aksāh bhaksyantām bhōjayantām dvīyantām, (Let the duc be eaten, broken or thrown.) Here the word aksāh is available as subject for each of the verb. The concept is that the form aksāh is employed as if it were a combination of three forms aksah, aksāh, aksah. One utterance combines three possibilities. In fact, words are found to follow two rules when they convey their meanings. These are described as the rules of sequence and simultaneity. In the example aksāh etc given above, the component forms aksah, aksāh, aksah are connected to their verbal forms one after another.

On sentences, for which, due to the power of synonyms different meanings can be given, the Monist and the Pluralist differ in their approach. According to the Monist the same sentence functions in conveying different meanings through the exercise of different aspects or powers of it, the Pluralist, however, contend that the statements contained in a common form of the sentence are really different ones. One may remember here the same approach adopted by the two schools
when words with more than one meanings were discussed (447-475)

The last few stanzas of the second canto of the Vākyapadiya are devoted to a brief discussion of the fortunes of Sanskrit Grammar. The Samgraha text of Vyādi, the grammarian, was condensed so much by writers that it became obscure in course of time. Then Patañjali wrote his Mahābāhāsyā and brought back clarity and depth to the study of Sanskrit Grammar. However, Grammar could not avoid attack from votaries of dry logic like Baṣu, Saubhava and Haryaka. This led to the decline of grammar until it survived only in South Indian versions. The South Indian text was procured and the science cultivated by Chandra and other grammarians who were followers of the School of Patañjali. Bhartrhari says that his teacher wrote this work Vākyapadiya in Sanskrit grammar. According to the commentator Pūnyarāja, the statement that his teacher composed the work only means that Bhartrhari wrote the work with the blessings of the teacher. (See Introduction on this discussion)
THE VĀKYAPADĪYA

CANTO I

1. अनाविनिधन ब्रह्म शब्दतत्व यथशरस।
   विवर्ततेऽवभावेन प्रक्ष्या जगते यत॥

   That beginningless and endless One, the imperishable Brahman of which the essential nature is the Word, which manifests itself into objects and from which is the creation of the Universe.¹

2. एकंसेव यदासनात सिन्ने शक्तिच्यपाधयात।
   अपृथक्कलेपि शक्तिभ्य पूर्ववेषगै वत्ते॥

   which though described in the Vedas as one is divided on the basis of its powers, and although it is not different from its powers appears to be different,

3. अध्यात्मिकला यथै कालशक्तिपुपप्पिता।
   जन्माद्यो विकारा षड्भाष्यभेद्यो योनय॥

   the indestructible powers of which functioning through the powers of Time become the six transformations, namely, birth and the rest—the sources of all (these) manifold objects,²

4. एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यथै चेष्यमनेकथा।
   भोक्ता भोक्तव्यमेवेन भोगावृण च स्थिति॥

   to which, Single One, the cause of all, belongs this manifold existence, under the forms of the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the enjoyment,

5. प्रायूपायायोज्यकारस्व तस्य वेदो महार्जिस।
   एकोद्वेबंबंबेव समानात पूर्ववृष्क॥

   of that (Brahman) the Veda is both the means of realisation and the reflection and it has been handed down by the great Seers as if it consisted of many paths, although it (really) is One.³

¹ सिन्ने—क
² भोगावृण—क
³ वेदो—क
6 In the branches of the Veda are set out various paths, all at the service of one action (namely, ritual) and there (again) words are found to have a fixed capacity.

7 Codes of various kinds with objectives tangible and intangible have been formulated on the basis of it (i.e. the Veda) from its evidence by sages who are erudite in its meaning.

8 There are various controversies between the Monists and the Dualists arising from their own options regarding its explanatory sentences.

9 That true and pure knowledge alone proclaimed by that one word (namely Om) is stated there (in the Veda) under the form of the word Om—a knowledge which is not contradictory to any school of thought.

10 Different disciplines which are sources of knowledge and culture are developed as based on the divisions and the subdivisions of the Veda which (under the form of the Om) is the creator of the Universe.

11 The wise say that grammar, nearest to that Brahman and
the foremost spiritual training is the most important (of such) subsidiary texts of the Veda ⁴

12 प्रात्तत्त्वविनिमागाय यो वाच परसो रस ।
तत्तत्त्वाधमस्य ज्योतिष्टत्त्व मार्गे मयाक्षण: ॥

12 It is a direct path towards that holiest of lights, that supreme essence of the kind of speech which has assumed distinctions of form ⁵.

13 अर्थंप्रूःत्तत्त्ववान शब्द एव निन्दनम् ।
तत्तबः बोध शब्दवान नासित्त व्यासकरणावृत्ते ॥

13 Words are the sole guide to the truths about the behaviour of objects, ⁶ and there is no understanding of the truth about words without grammar.

14 तत्तत्त्वसंपवर्गस्य बाङ्ग मलाना चिन्यतिलम् ।
पवित्र सर्वविद्यानामस्विविद्य प्रकाशते ॥

14 A gateway to liberation, a cure to the blemishes of speech, purifier of all (other) disciplines, it shines as being applied to them ⁷.

15 अर्थार्थज्ञातय सर्व शब्दाङ्गानिनिवन्धना ।
तत्तवं लोके विद्यान एवं विद्या परायणम् ॥

15 Just as all thing-classes depend upon word-classes similarly, in this world, this (grammar) is the basis of all disciplines ⁸.

16 इद्माभ पवस्थान सिद्धोस्पापनपर्वंगाम ।
इय सा नोक्ष्माणान्तामजिह्वा राजपदिति ॥

16 It is the first rung on the ladder towards liberation, it is the straight Royal Road for those desirous of (reaching) that goal.

17 अन्त्रातीतिविषयसि केवलामनुष्यति ।
छल्लस्यचछल्लसा योनिमालमा छल्लोमयीलनुम् ॥

17 The soul which has passed beyond errors in it (i.e., in grammar) and is capable of studying the Veda observes that (Brahman) which is the source of the Vedas and the
very soul of which is constituted by the Veda (i.e. in the form of the Om)

18 प्रत्यक्तमित्वेण व यदावो रूप्तमस्म ।
प्रत्यक्तमित्वेव तमसि ज्योिि शुद्ध विचार्यते ॥

That pure light which is the supreme essence of speech free of (any kind of) form, which appears to take several forms in this darkness (of manifestation),

19 —बौँक्त समक्षान्त्वा भूतिव्यापारव्यानस्म ।
व्यतीत्यालोकत्वमसि प्रकाशं यथापतते ॥

—which is worshipped by those who have transcended the (manifested) speech showing form and action, and who have passed beyond (the duality of) light and darkness,

20 यत्र वाचो निमित्तानि निच्छति नीचाकप्पोमस्ते ।
शश्वरवण्यं योगेन नासन्ते प्रतिबन्धवत ॥

—in which the symbols of speech, pointers as it were to the ‘one-letter scripture’ (Om) shine forth like reflections in association with that (i.e. Om) which is antecedent to all (manifested) speech,

21 अभव्यया मङ्गलसः साम्भवमृग्युष्यतः ।
स्वतिस्मुच्चव्या चर्मं पृथविस्तत्तिपरिपृह ॥

—and in which the various sorts of the letter-sounds of the Atharvan, the Sāman, the Rk and the Yajus exist with distinct identities

22 यदेक प्रक्ष्यामेवेवंहु भविष्यते ।
नत्यायाकरणमागम्य परं ब्रह्माधिगम्ये ॥

—which, though one, is divided on the basis of the various explanations (of it),—that Supreme Brahman is attained by having recourse to grammar

4 श्रवत्वाया—श
5 वैत्तीनेव—ख.
23 Words, meanings, and then relations are described in it as timeless by the sages, who are the authors of the Sūtras, the Vārttikas and the Bhāsyas.

24 In this science are described for the sake of the code rules, word-meanings which are analytically (ie, etymologically) derived or fixed as such (by conventions, etc), words which are indicative or descriptive, and (word-meaning) relations which are either of the nature of cause and effect or of (inseparable) identity. These which form accessories to conduct and understanding are described through their own names, or through characteristic features and as covering the valid and the invalid ones, some of these are also used (in non-scriptural contexts) according to rules.

27 Even if it is found that there is no difference (between two forms) in the matter of expressing the meaning, only those which are derived from the scripture (ie, grammar) are valid as instruments for right conduct for the wise, the opposite ones are invalid.
28 Like living beings, words also have no (traceable) beginning whether they are eternal or created. This rule (about words) is called their eternity.

29 No one dare make this rule meaningless. Therefore, the the eternal code of rules about validity has been composed.

30 (Scripture is essential, not reasoning alone) — Right conduct is not established by reasoning dissociated from scripture. Even the knowledge which the sages possess has the scripture for its reference.

31 No one can refute by reasoning or by argument of empirical obviousness those unbroken and traditional paths of right conduct.

32 Rarely are the natures of substances known from inference, since their properties vary with variations in (their) state, place or time.

33 The power which a substance is well-known as possessing.
towards a particular activity is obstructed when it comes into association with another specific object

34 यत्तेनानुसरतोष्टयथं कुशलारुपात्तम्भतः
अभियुक्तमर्त्तमर्त्त्यथे वोषिकायाते

34 Even a conclusion inferred after great consideration by clever logicians is decided to be otherwise by others more qualified

35 परेक्षासमस्माल्येवम्यासादैव जाते
मणिर्याद्विविज्ञान तत्त्वरा नानुमानिकम्

35 Such a knowledge as discriminates between different diamonds, different coins, etc.,—a knowledge which cannot be described to others—arises in those who possess it, only from practice, it is not inferential

36 प्रत्यक्षमधुमान च व्यतिक्रम व्यवस्थिता
"सिद्धत्रय शिखाताना कर्मेन्" एव सिद्धम्

36 The supernatural powers which demons, departed souls and ogres possess, which transcend the perceptual and the inferential, are indeed the results of their actions (in previous births)

37 आविश्वूर्तप्रकाशानामतु"पश्चिमवेलसाम्
अत्तीतसम्प्रकाशतर्गत्व विपस्थिते

37 The knowledge of the past and the future, which is possessed by sages, enlightened, and undisturbed in mind, does not differ (in certainty) from direct perception
38 The words of those who perceive the super-sensual and non-cognisable objects with the eye of a sage are not refuted by inferential reasoning.

39 When a man does not doubt the perceptual knowledge (of a reliable person) as if it were his own, how can another one (given to reasoning) make him who (thus) stands on the side of perception, turn back?

40 The scriptural truth is of equal use to all humanity down to the Cändālas in their judgements ‘this is virtue’ and ‘this is sin’.

41 He who has got the Vedic knowledge which shines unbroken like consciousness is not influenced by the inferential arguments (of the logicians).

42 Like a (blind) man running along on an uneven path obtaining his knowledge (of the path) only from feeling from his hand, he, who relies on inference (for his knowledge) will speedily fall.
Therefore, basing themselves on the scripture of impersonal origin and the tradition of the precept-books with their binding precepts, the investigation of words is undertaken by the wise.

Grammarians consider that there are two ‘word-entities’ (i.e., two elements) in functional words, one (i.e., the sphota) is the cause of the (production) of words and the other (the speech-sound) is used in connection with meanings.

Some, among the teachers of old considered that there was a difference in essence between these two. Others (on the other hand) speak of the same undivided entity being thought various, through a difference in concerning it.

22 वा—ख
23 साधुविषय स्मृति—च
24 Charudeva Sastrī’s Benares edition (क) gives the following verse in the commentary under stanza 44.

Sastrī adds the following note on it: “This stanza is seen interpolated in all manuscripts except क-5. The commentary would indicate that the karika was by another author and has been given in the text by the author of the Vākyapadiya to show a particular view held by another author.”

( 9 )

43 तत्समाद्वकां शास्त्र स्मृति च सनिवधनाम्।
   आश्चर्यार्थस्य सिद्धां शब्दानामनुष्ठासनम्॥

44 द्राकुपापवाणशब्दः शब्दो शब्दवदो विदु।
   एको निमित्त शब्दानामपरोधः प्रयुज्यते॥

45 आत्ममेवेतः कक्कविस्तौत्य हुराणाए।
   बुद्धभवाभिनयस्य भवें देवकाण्डे प्रचक्षते॥

22 वा—ख
23 साधुविषय स्मृति—च
24 Charudeva Sastrī’s Benares edition (क) gives the following verse in the commentary under stanza 44.

तत्समाद्वकां शास्त्र स्मृति च सनिवधनाम्।
   आश्चर्यार्थस्य सिद्धां शब्दानामनुष्ठासनम्॥

44 द्राकुपापवाणशब्दः शब्दो शब्दवदो विदु।
   एको निमित्त शब्दानामपरोधः प्रयुज्यते॥

45 आत्ममेवेतः कक्कविस्तौत्य हुराणाए।
   बुद्धभवाभिनयस्य भवें देवकाण्डे प्रचक्षते॥

Sastrī adds the following note on it: “This stanza is seen interpolated in all manuscripts except क-5. The commentary would indicate that the karika was by another author and has been given in the text by the author of the Vākyapadiya to show a particular view held by another author.”
46 Just as the light which is in the fire-stuck acts as the cause for further lights, similarly the Word which is in the mind is the cause of speech-sounds.

47 The Word is examined in the mind, is then fixed to a specific meaning and then through the instrumentality of the speech-sounds produced through (their) causes.

48 The Word is neither a ‘previous’ nor ‘a subsequent’, because it is the speech-sounds which are produced in sequence. But the non-sequential is revealed as sequential as if it were divided.

49 Just as a reflection formed elsewhere (i.e., in water) appears, due to the activities of the water, to partake of the movements of the water, similar is the relationship between the Word and the speech-sound.

---

25 This karika is numbered 47 in 'ka'—an obvious mistake. Being numbered correctly as 46 in the text as given in the present edition, the numbering of karikas from this point onwards differs from 'ka'. This agrees with the Benares edition.

26 ज्ञात—ख, घ
27 नापरस्थ—ख
28 तोये कि—ग

Bhartrhari’s commentary contained in the Trivandrum manuscript (“ga”) does not go beyond karika 50. The text alone is given after it.
50 Just as in (perceptual) knowledge, there can be seen both itself (ie, the act of perceiving) and the object of knowledge (the thing perceived), so in the word there appears the meaning-element and the formal element.

51 The inner principle called 'speech' which exists egg-like, evolving into speech-activity, assumes sequence through its parts.

52 Just as a shape which is (a copy) of another shape, after it has become the object of a unified perception (having been first received by the senses as a complex-pattern of parts), is then painted (in stages) on the canvas, so likewise three stages (three aspects) are seen in the comprehension of speech.

53 Just as the mind of the speaker first dwells on the words (and not their parts when he wants to convey their meaning) similarly, the activity of the hearers first arises out of the words (and not their parts) in their attempt to understand their sense.

54 When certain meanings are conveyed the forms (which convey them), having (thus) become accessories to
(such) meanings, and having their purpose (thus) fulfilled, they are not perceived (as accessories to action), because they are (uttered) for the sake of another (namely, meaning)

55 ग्रहणत्व प्रागृहत्व च द्वे शब्दी तेजसो यथा ।
तथाबं सर्वभवानामेते पूणंगविन्यते ॥

55 Just as light has two powers, namely the power of being perceived and the power of causing the perception of objects, similarly all words have these two distinct powers

56 विषयःवभमानापः शब्दनिर्णयं प्रकाशते ।
न सतत्यौङ्ख तेध्यतना अगुहःता प्रकाशाका ॥

56 Meaning is not understood from words which (themselves) have not become objects (of the sense of hearing). Without being (thus) received, they do not express meaning by their mere existence

57 अतोज्जितत्रन्नणात्तप्पवाक्षिमाहृत्यभियोगः ।
नेक्षियणा प्रकाश्येष्यं स्वरूप गृह्यते तथा ॥

57 Therefore when the form of the (uttered) word is not clear, the question ‘what did you say’ is asked (of the speaker). But the nature of the sense-faculties is not similarly grasped when an object has to be revealed by them

58 भदेनाद स्मृतिः हृदी शब्दप्रविपोद्ततो ।
भेदकयं भुरो नवरोवेऽवचन गच्छत ॥

58 These two aspects of the word, analysed and comprehended separately, act without mutual opposition as causes of different effects

59 बुद्धवाचयो यथा शब्दा तवधोपपरिवर्तिनन्तना ।
अद्वैतप्रपायते शब्दं सम्बन्ध यात्ति सत्यम् ॥

59 Just as the words ‘vṛddhi’ and the like besides expressing their own form are also related to the sounds named by them, namely, those symbolised by ‘ādauc’ (i.e., ‘ā’, ‘ai’ and ‘au’) etc.,

31 प्रहस्तत् च—च
32 नातुगृहीती—च
60 Agnibhadrasthayavadayamaninabhipravayam

60 So this word ‘agni’ (‘fire’) besides being related to the word ‘agni’ (meaning fire) is also related to that referred to by the word ‘agni’ namely the form ‘agni’

61 Yo y ubharyaṃte śabdare niyatam nams kāryamakam

61 A word which is uttered (in everyday use) is never linked with grammatical operations (But) its capacity to convey that other form (that is, its own form as the meaning) is not obstructed

62 Ucchārāntasatāntatvādakhyān kārayāṃn mahāadhutaṃ

62 The word which is pronounced (in ordinary speech) being secondary, since it is for the sake of the other (namely, the thing-meant) is not linked with grammatical operations, and hence we adopt the convention that the grammatical operations are attached to words which symbolise themselves

63 Sāmadehiḥ yaduṃsatrātpamṛtyoyah

63 Whatever common attributes there exist in the object with which anything is compared and the thing which is compared to it, some attributes other than them also exist in the object to which the comparison is made

64 Guṇa prakṛtibhūtya satāntavātvyopadhitah

64 Whatever quality which is the cause of the excellence (of an object) is (itself) mentioned in the form of an object, its (own) excellence is caused by the qualities residing in it

33 Yo vā nā kāryaḥ
65 When a word (like ‘agni’ in the Sūtra ‘agnerdhak’), which has its own form as its meaning is pronounced (for conveying its form), then (from that word) is discriminated another word (namely, the word ‘agni’ which has ‘fire’ as its meaning)

66 Before being connected to the thing it means a name is capable of genitive and nominative constructions, because it has its own form as its meaning

67 The nominative is prescribed to a name because it is meaningful with its form (as its meaning), and it is from the same meaning that the genitive construction in the form ‘of it’ arises

68 Some consider that in the Sūtra ‘svam rūpam’ a name as a particular is meant, the universal attached to the particular undergoes grammatical operation

69 Others think that what is meant by the Sūtra is a particular instance of the named (and that it is the class which is the name) and that in any given instance one finds only a particular, the understanding of which is brought about by the universal.17

17 सूत्राम् अस्यर्थं संबोध्यते।
70 Both among those who uphold the eternity theory of words, and those who hold that words are created, there are some who uphold its sameness (in all instances of its occurrence). Again among the upholders of the doctrine of eternity and of the doctrine that words are created there are those who uphold the plurality of words (i.e., that every occurrence of apparently the same word, is really the occurrence of a different word).

71 (The doctrine of an opponent school is stated regarding the comparative reality of letters, words and sentences). Even when the word is a different one, the identity of the letters is not impaired, and (in the same way) in different sentences the same word is observed.

72 Therefore the word does not exist as more than its letters, nor is there a sentence existing as more than the letters and the words.

73 (The grammarian’s doctrine is given —)
Just as there are no parts in letters (similarly) there are no letters in the word. Nor is there any reality in abstracting the word from the sentence.

36 खते—च

37 वा न च—क, ग, घ
People follow customary usage (and talk of 'words' and 'letters') though basing their theories on different views and on this (question) what is considered as primary by one school is taken in an opposite way by others.

People talk of difference of diction (as belonging to the utterance) of the Word, which itself is of undivided time, but (appears to) follow the time-pattern of the speech-sounds (uttered), in accordance with the differences in the causes of its being perceived.

With regard to the short, long and prolated vowels, since a speech-unit (here, a vowel) is (essentially) timeless, and (therefore) fundamentally different (from the speech-sound which reveals it), it is the time of the primary-sound which is metaphorically considered as belonging to the speech-unit.

In interpreting the verse "svabhāva etc etc" Bhartrhari in his commentary as given by Charudeva Sastri (ka) quotes a verse from Samgrahakāra with the introduction evam hi Samgrahkārah pathatū The verse reads as follows

The commentary given in the Benares edition does not give this verse. But the Benares version of the text gives this as part of the text with the difference that sthitāyatē in the third line is changed into bhitāyatē. In the light of the
77 It is however after the word has been revealed (by the primary sound) that the modified sounds are presented to the mind as distinctions of diction (and hence a fortiori) the self of the Word is not divided into parts by them 18

78 इन्द्रियस्येव संस्कार शब्दस्योधनस्यव ।
क्रियाते ध्वनिभवायद्वस्मयोद्भवस्यवित्तवादिनाम् ॥

78 There are three views among those who hold the theory that words are manifested 19 (1) the sounds act upon the sense-faculty, or (2) they act upon the word or (3) they act upon both

79 इन्द्रियस्येव संस्कार समाधानाः स्त्रावित्तयेऽवि ।
विषयस्य तु संस्कारस्तु गत्वत्र प्रतिपत्तयेऽवि ॥

79 (The first theory) would be analogous to the theory of sight—perception which held that) only the sense—faculty (of sight) is acted upon, namely, by attention and application of ointment; 20 (The second theory would be analogous to a theory of smell-perception which held that) only the thing (for instance, the earth) is acted upon in order that its smell might be received

80 चक्षुषाः प्राप्त्यारीत्वे तेजसा तु ह्ययोरिष् ।
विषयेन्नियोगिन्न तत्कार स कमो ध्वने ॥

---
evidence of Bhartrhari's own commentary, I have not included the verse in the text. Since, however, the idea given in the stanza is integral to the philosophy, I give below a translation

"The cause through which the letter is perceived is defined as the primary speech sound while the modified speech sound is the cause of the difference in diction."

89 वादित—ग
80 (According to the third theory) where however, the eye effects the reception of a cognition, it is clear that both the object and the sense-faculty are acted upon by the light, and speech-sounds operate in the same form.

81 स्फोटव्याविभागेन व्यवस्थापनमिष्ठते ।
केदिक्रियाध्वनिनिरस्वेय स्वतन्त्रोपन्याय प्रकाशित ॥

81 Certain theorists maintain that reception of the sound takes place without any separation of it from the form of the Word (sphota), others hold that the sound is not perceptible. According to yet others it is an independent manifesting agent.

82 यथानुवाकः क्लोको वा सोहतसपवातिति ।
आवृत्तया न तु स ग्रन्थ प्रत्यावृत्ति निर्हल्यते ॥

82 Just as a chapter or a single verse is apprehended as a unit by means of saying over its component parts in order, but of course the book is not defined at each component parts,

83 प्रत्येकतुपास्येवेप्रवहणानुगुणेप्रत्येकाः
व्यवस्थापिते शाब्दे स्वरूपस्वभायेते ॥

83 —so likewise the form of a word is apprehended (as a unity) when the word is revealed by the sound through the agency of causal factors which are appropriate to the cognition (of the word), but which are not themselves (as such) apprehended (i.e., the hearer is not aware of the separate sense-data).

84 नासारिहितवैज्ञानिकमन्त्येन व्यविनिता सह ।
आवृत्तपरिपक्षायं बुद्धे शाब्दवेशवधायते ॥

84 Simultaneously with the last sound, the word is apprehended by the mind in which the seed has been sown by the (physical) sounds, and in which ripening (of the speech) has been brought about by the telling over (of the sounds).

80 बृत्य—ख
बृत्तिः—च
85 As far as the non-existent forms, which (a hearer) considers as existing in the interval (before the complete word has been pronounced), are concerned, this is merely incapacity on the part of the hearer, they are in fact, only means to the apprehension (of the complete word).

86 There is the semblance of distinctions in cognition, (similarly) the attributing of distinctions on words is always seen. The word appears to be produced in stages and cognition seems to be dependent on the cognised.

87 Just as earlier numbers (in a series) should be apprehended for the apprehension of subsequent ones, although the latter are different from the former, so is the apprehension of parts in a unit of speech (an aid to the apprehension of the whole).

88 When in reality revealing units in the syllable, word and sentence function independently of each other, they appear to function in combination, although they are entirely different.

41 In interpreting this karika (86) Bhartrhari in his commentary quotes the following stanza:

"In this world there can be no knowledge without the known. A word which is not, revealed in sequence never conveys a meaning."

42 वर्ण वा—ख
89. यथेष्ठ वर्षोऽः पूर्वं दूरं रासास्तत्संकी वा ।
अन्धाधृत्य विषयमय्यथेष्ठाध्यावस्यति ॥

89 Just as on looking from a distance or in the dark, one at first misunderstands an object, and (later on) understands it otherwise (i.e., in its true nature),

90 व्यञ्जनानं तथा वाक्यं वाक्यास्तिविकित्तुषुभि ।
भागावप्रहृष्टं पूर्वं वृद्धि प्रवर्तते ॥

90 —similarly during the manifestation of the sentence by its causes (namely, the smaller units like letters and words), the mind first functions as comprehending the component units (as real units)

91 यथानुपूर्वीनियमो बिकारे शोरबोरो ।
तथेष्ठ प्रतिपद्धा नियतो वृद्धिपु क्रम ॥

91 Just as there is a (fixed) sequence (in the stages) of the transformation of milk (into curds) and the seed (into the tree), similarly there is a fixed sequence in the series of the hearer’s perceptions (of the intervening words, phrases, etc)

92 भागावप्रहृष्टिः प्रेक्ष्ये भवने ध्वनि कमात् ।
निम्नगृहितांशयो वा भागामप्रकृष्टपनस् ॥

92 And when they (i.e., sentences, words, etc.) are made up of real parts (granting the Mīmāṃsaka’s position), the difference in form (between two speech units for instance, two words, ‘nadi’ and ‘dina’) is really due to the (difference in the) sequence of their sounds. And where words, etc., are considered as not made up of (real) parts (by the Akhandavādins), the fancying of parts is a means (to the realisation of the total unit)

42 This reading does not make sense since the reference in the the karika is to sounds (dhvanis) that reveal the sphota in the syllable, the word and the sentence, and not to the varna or the syllable. Nevertheless the reading is given here

43 व्यञ्ज—an
It is considered by some that the Word is a universal suggested by a number of individuals (namely, speech-sounds), these individual speech-sounds (according to them) constitute the sound-pattern of the Word.

Just as light (reveals objects), the speech-sounds produced by (their) causes become the cause of the immutable Word.

(If the Word is revealed like this, does it not mean that it is not eternal? The answer is in the negative) — Being revealed is not established as invariably pertaining to non-eternal things. Universals which are eternal are also considered to be revealed by those (ie, the particulars) in which they inhere.

In life (only) concrete objects are found to have relation to place and the like (for instance, time). And even accepting the alternative (that difference in place, etc applies also to those that are not concrete objects), there is no (such) difference between the speech-sound and the Word (it reveals).

Just as there exists an invariable competence of the revealed and the revealer between a perceiving sense-organ and the thing it perceives, so does it exist between the Word and the speech-sounds.

Both Punyaraja’s & Bhartrhari’s commentaries support the reading accepted.
98 And it is seen (in our experience) that, in the case of (various) smells and the like which are perceived by the same sense-organ, there is a separate causal factor for each substance.

99 (The point that the attributes of the speech-sounds revealing the Word are transferred to the Word is again stated) —
The object revealed partakes of the attributes of the reflecting medium. This is obvious in the different kinds of reflections (of an object) produced in oil, water and the like.

100 And surely, concrete objects of the type of mountains cannot have existence (except as their reflections) in stones, a mirror-surface and the like of incompatible size.

101 Therefore the period of the speech-sounds and of (their secondary variations in the form of) diction is assigned to the syllable, word and sentence which are (themselves) without time-distinctions.

102 (The definitions of the sphaota and dhvani by another school are given) —
The sphaota is that which is produced by the union and
( 23 )

disunion of the speech-organs (like the vocal choirs)
And dhvans are sounds born of this sphota

103 अल्पे महति वा शब्दे स्फोटकालो न भिन्नते।
परस्तु शब्दसत्तान प्रचयापचयात्मक॥

103 (The nature of the primary and modified speech-sounds
is again stated from the author’s point of view) —
Whether the speech-sound is short or long, the measure
of the Word does not change. The subsequent sound
(ie, the modified speech-sound) which arises out of
the primary speech-sounds is expanded or contracted in its
form

104 द्रवात्रभेद दीपस्य ध्वनिसारं तु "लक्षयते।
घण्टाधिनां च शब्देषु ध्वंतो मेद स दृढ़यते॥

104 (The view-point of another school is stated) —
Like light from a lamp, merely the speech sound
(undifferentiated as primary and modified) is heard from
a distance. But in the sound of a bell and the like the
distinction is clearly noticed

105 द्रव्याभिषातात्मचितो सिन्नें दीर्घमुल्लाविप।
कम्पे तूपरते जाता नावा वृस्वेष्वोषका॥

105 (The discussion of the doctrine held by the Grammarians
is taken up again) —
The long and prolated sounds which are different (from
the short sound) are produced by the striking of the or-
gans of speech. And the sounds which modify diction
arise after the cessation of the movements (of the organs). 25

106 "अत्यस्त्वायस्थकम्पेदपिकरणे "ध्वन्यायोपरे।
स्फोटाद्वोपजायल्ले ज्वालाज्वालान्तरारंभ॥

106 (The view of another school) —
Even before the vibrations of the speech-organs (which
produce the word) have subsided, other sounds, are formed
from the word (sphoṭa) itself, as one flame from another

48 कर्म-क

49 Karika 106 is not seen in manuscript gha Bhartrhari
has his commentary on this, however the Benares edition also

gives the karika

90 नय परे—च
(24)

१०७ वायोरूपना शास्त्रय शब्दत्वा-पतिरिष्टते।
कथितींभूषणभूषणति। प्रवादेपवनवस्थत्।

107 (Now regarding what constitutes the substance of speech)
It is held by some (i.e., by three schools respectively),
that air, the atoms or consciousness become speech.
There is an endless number of variant views in this matter.

१०८ सज्जविक्ष्य प्रयतनेन वाक्युलिक्षसनुवल्लुना।
स्थानेष्वबसिहतो वायु शास्त्रव प्रतिपद्यते।

108 (These views are expounded)—
The air which is stirred by the speaker’s effort following
his desire to speak strikes the speech centres and produces speech.

१०९ तस्य कारणसामध्यब्रह्मचर्यवर्मणूः।
सक्रियात्त्वाभिष्यते सार्वव्योऽपि मूर्त्तय।

109 Even powerful objects are broken by air which possesses
the attributes of speed and accumulation, blowing with
the capacity to cause (such breaking).

51 व्यािपतिर—प

52 After this the Trivandrum manuscript (ga) gives
the karika "अज्जस्वृति इत्य त्ति" given as 116 in the text given
here. The text in the said Trivandrum manuscript omits 9
karikas namely the following:

वायोरूपना विभज्जनाल्लमोः

The manuscript gives the karika "अज्जस्वृति इत्य त्ति"
as follows:

अज्जस्वृतियंशकं सुश्मत्वेवोपर्यंते।
व्यािन्तजात्यन्तिव स निमित्तायतिर्नम्ते।

Note the reading प्रचीयते in the last line. In the verse
as given in Charudeva Sastri and the Benares editon the
reading is प्रतीयते.

५३ घमण—ख
११०। अग्नि सबेषाकितस्वाद्वेशसंगमोक्तय।
छायात्यतम शब्दभावेन परिणामित॥

110 (Regarding the atom-theory) —
The atoms, which unite and separate, transform themselves into shadows, light, and darkness and also into speech on account of their possessing all (possible) capacities (i.e., the capacity to be transformed into all things)

१११। स्वशक्तो व्यज्ञानाया प्रत्यक्षेण समीक्षित।
अभ्यासीव प्रचीरस्त्वे शब्दाय्या परमाणव॥

111 When their capacity is being revealed these atoms which are called speech, prompted by the effort (of the speaker) collect together like clouds (in the sky)

११२। "अस्यमात्तरो ज्ञाता सूक्ष्मे वाणात्मिनि स्थित।
व्यक्तिष्ये स्वस्य रूपस्य शब्दत्वेन विवर्तिते॥

112 Finally, regarding the consciousness-theory) —
Again, the inner knower who exists in the subtle quintessential speech transforms himself into (audible) speech for the purpose of revealing his nature

११३। स मनोभावमाघ्य तेजसा पाक्षमगत।
वायुमाविष्कर्ति प्राणमयासी समुदीयंते॥

113 It (i.e., consciousness) taking the form of the mind and ripening in the fire (of the stomach) enters the life-breath, and it is then uttered

११४। अन्तं करणत्वस्य वायुरामछला गत।
तदर्जन समाविष्टस्तेजस्वेव विवर्तिते॥

114 The breath which has become the substratum of the mental principle is suffused with the mind’s attributes and manifested (after it passes) through the fire (of the stomach)

५४ अभ्यस्तमात्तर ज्ञान सूक्ष्मवाणात्मिनि स्थितम्—ख
Breaking up its inherent knots (i.e., its continuous current) the breath reveals the syllables through different and distinct speech-sounds and merges into those syllables themselves.

(Yet another view about sound both of speech and of other kinds is given)—

Sound though it is ever-existing is not experienced because it is too subtle. It is realised through the appropriate causal factors just as air is through fanning.

(The view of yet another school)—

The powers of speech resident in the breath and in the mind undergo transformation (into speech) at the centres of speech-production and assume the distinctions (of revealed speech).

The power which is based on words controls this universe. This universe which has a single Intelligence as its soul is perceived as manifold through the word as the eye.

Since, it is seen that distinctions between two things, for

This kanika etc is omitted in manuscript. The kanika is given in all other printed books and manuscripts.
instance, between a sadja and another musical note become clear when explained in words, therefore all manner of things are determined as being only (understood through) words

120 शब्दस्य परिणामोपयमित्याम्यान्यविदो बिदुः।
छन्दोभ्य एव प्रथमात्वत्वम् व्यवर्तनः॥

120 Those who are versed in the Vedas know that this Universe is the transformation of speech. It was out of the Vedas that this universe was first evolved.

121 इतिकर्त्तव्यता लोके सर्व शब्दव्यपाध्याय।
या पूर्वाहितस्तकारो 'बालोपिप्रतिपद्यते॥

121 In this world the knowledge of the proper action (in a

60 विवेकतः—ग
प्रवत्तेतः—च

60 Manuscript ग does not complete the karika and breaks off with the obviously wrong reading याले (for बालोपिप). After karika 120 the manuscript च gives as text four karikas which occur in Vrsabhadeva’s tīka under karika शब्दस्य परिणामोपयम् etc in Charudeva Sastri’s edition (क).

These karikas are the following —

1 विवेक बहुधान्तमान स शब्दस्य प्रजापति।
छन्दोप्यायमानवाच्च बहुवेव विवेश ततः॥

2 साध्वी चामृतस्यो येषु पुरुषेषु स्वस्विन्ता।
धिक वर्तते तेषु पुरुष रूप प्रजापते॥

3 श्राजापत्य महलयस्ततात्तस्वें तव तत्तमृ।
सरीरमेवं विधुषा स्तो योगिनुपावति॥

4 वदेतस्तन्नि भाषावे धाम विब्र्यस्त स्वथ।
तद्भवविस्मस्मूह विधाया प्रविलङ्कते॥

The karikas as given in the tīka have slightly different readings from the manuscript version. The differences are noted below —

carika 1 line 2 तत् instead of तत्त carika 2
साध्वीचार्यस्य वेष पुरुषेषु
context) entirely depends on speech. Even a boy has this knowledge of the proper action, having in him the accumulated experience of the past.

122 आच्छ करणविच्यास प्राणस्योधवं समीरणम्।
स्थानामभिघातिः क विना शब्दभावनात्॥

122 That first movement of the organs (of speech), the upward sending of the breath and its contact with the centres—these would not be possible but for verbal imagination (in the child).

123 न सोंस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके य शब्दाणुगमावत्॥
अनुविद्धिमिव ज्ञात सर्वे शव्देन भाषयेः॥

123 In this world no comprehension is possible except as accompanied by speech. All knowledge shines as permeated by speech.

124 चापूपता चेडूलकामद्वबोधस्य शावकती।
न प्रकाशं प्रकाशेऽत सा हि प्रत्यथवबिधिनी॥

124 If it is denied that the permanent stuff of knowledge is speech, then that light (namely knowledge) will not shine (in the form of a recollection). It is speech (ie, words) which makes recollection possible.

125 सा सवृपिधिः गित्याना कल्याणा चोपविधिनी।
तदाशिल्भिः लिक्ष्यती सवं बस्तु विभजयते॥

125 It is speech which binds all branches of knowledge of arts and crafts. Everything when it is produced is classified through it.

126 तं यथा सतारिणा सतां बहिर्नत्तच् वर्तते।
तन्मात्राश्रयतिकायं चैतन्य सर्वं जातिष्ठ॥

126 This speech exists within and outside all living beings.
Consciousness can exist in all creatures only after it is preceded by speech.

It is speech which prompts all mankind to activity. When it is gone, man, dumb, looks like a log of wood or a piece of stone.

It is when the distinctions (such as subject versus object) obtain, (ie, in the state of wakefulness,) that the agent functions in connection with an object. But when such distinctions do not obtain (ie, in the state of sleep) speech itself remains in the form of an object.

Whether things are (identified with) the self, or with the Supreme, they become established in the form in which they are introduced by words. It is words which establish things.

Even when the cause for verbal expression (ie, an object),

Karika 127 which follows is not given in the text. It is given in the commentary by Bhartrhari and some other texts give the karika in the commentary. It does not give the karika

Obviously a wrong reading.

Charudeva Sastrī (क) rightly notes that the Vivaranagrahānta shows that the reading अथैः विचीयते is the author’s reading. The Vivaranagrahānta, in fact, says ‘तथा हृदयं विचीयते’
is entirely non-existent, description of the form of such a thing through words is found, as in the case of a circle made by a fire-brand.

Further, speech which exists within the speaker as his self is said to be the great Bull, identity with which is desired.

Therefore, attainment of faultless speech is the attainment of Brahman. He who knows the secret of its functioning enjoys the immortal Brahman.

No one knows a collection of precepts which is of impersonal origin. When all such collections of precepts perish, the three Vedas alone exist as the root (of such collections).

Even when different schools (of Agamas) perish and there are no new authors, mankind does not transgress the duties prescribed by the scriptures and the books of precepts.

If knowledge were instinctive, then scripture is of no use.
but if virtue is the root of knowledge then the source of knowledge is the Vedas

136 (Regarding reasoning as a source of knowledge) — Reasoning which is not contradictory to the Vedas and the scriptures is an eye to those who do not possess the vision (into the significance of the Vedas) The sense of a Vedic sentence is not obtained from its form alone,

137 —for which reason, various kinds of the means of interpreting sentences have been classified by logic, such as, for instance the intended meaning of a sentence (is such and such), a statement is for a purpose different (from what is obvious) or, a meaning becomes clear from the evidence of another sentence

138 Human reasoning is the power of words That reasoning is in accordance with the Word (ie, the scriptures) which is not based on anything other than the scriptures

139 Just as different colours, etc, are found to possess (different and) fixed capacities, so are words (such as the words of a hymn) found (to possess capacity) in destroying poison etc

75 स्त्रीपीडः
76 न्यायितिः
77 सतीश्
78 कौशय पुस्तक
79 स शब्दानुगतो न्यायो नागमेघनिवलन—ग
80 अथिपति कलय—ग
140 Just as these words have power to do that, so are they understood (as possessing capacity) in regard to virtuous conduct. Therefore correct words should be used by those desirous of elevation.

141 Men learn about matters which have transcendental effects from the Vedas. Contrary results also can always be stated from the scriptures.

142 This tradition of grammar has the knowledge of correctness as its subject. And it is directly based on the unbroken (series of) recollections of learned men.

143 It is the highest source of Speech, threefold as Vaikhari, Madhyamā and Pas'yantī and having various stages (through which it is realised).

144 It is seen as being constituted by two different features namely, the treatment (of words, etc.) in analytical terms or as integral units. The capacities of words are noticed by those wise in the attributes of objects.

81 धिथिमि—क्र, ग
82 कृत्स्तु—ग, घ
145. "अनादिमयवैचिन्त्या शृङ्खलान्महरकं काम।
शिखरनिधियमाना तु न व्यवचिन्त्यं स्मरित।"

146. अविद्याभागिन्तातामसिद्धा "स्वप्नवचूम् तौ।
भावतस्वं तु विजाय विज्ञमेत्यो चिन्तिता स्मरित।"

147. (Another view about the scripture and the codes is
given.) —
In the scripture are the utterances, which are like dream-
words, of those (i.e., the sages) who have evolved from
the Integral (Brahman). And the codes have been
composed (by their authors) after knowing the truth
about existent things through the (appropriate) evidence

148. कायवादुःधिविषयम् ये मला समविन्यात।
चित्रणाम् अथवानामकाथा स्वस्तवेष्टेष।

149. Whatever impurity there exists, of the body, of the word
and of the mind, their purification is effected through the
sciences of physical treatment, grammar and spiritual
welfare respectively

150. शब्दं "सस्कारहलो यो गौरित्रम् प्रयुक्तश्च।
तमस्प्रयुक्तविक्रियायनिवेशितसि।"

151. That ungrammatical form (for instance, 'goni') which
is employed to denote a particular object when (a correct
form for instance) 'gauh' is required to be used, is con-
sidered as a corrupt form

83 This karika is not given in manuscript ध. However
Bhartrhari notes this

84 The reading 'अवयवचिन्त्या' given in the Benares
edition is obviously a mistake. It should be अवयवचिन्त्या as is
given in the Charudeva Sastr's edition and in all manuscripts

85 अविचारात्वि—क
86 शब्दवचन—क
87 शब्दसकार—ग, ध।
88 प्रयुक्तसि—ध
149. Words like ‘asva’ and ‘goni’ are correct forms when used to denote other objects (i.e., objects other than a horse and a cow respectively). Correctness is everywhere determined on the basis of what meaning a word is to convey.

150. These (incorrect forms) which through inference cause the comprehension of the meaning of the correct forms, apparently identify themselves (with the correct forms) and convey their meaning.

151. Because these incorrect forms are understood neither by the learned nor by grammar as valid synonyms (of the correct forms), they are not capable of expressing the meaning directly.

152. When a boy who is being instructed indistinctly utters ‘ambā’ ‘ambā’, those who know the correct form understand it through the indistinct one.

89 तथ तु—ख, घ
90 This karika is not given in manuscript घ
91 नुमन्यन्ते—घ
92 ण प्रभाष्यते—क, ग
93 This karika is not found in manuscript ग
94 योजनब्ध —ख.
153 Similarly, the meaning covered by a correct form is conveyed by an incorrect form which is used where the correct one ought to be.

154 येषु तेषा साधुरवाचक।
प्रतिद्विन्दुगता विगुणेष्वभिमातृपु।
पारम्परियवभृष्टः शा

155 And where there are in current use, forms which have become current among corrupt speakers from generation to generation, in such cases, the correct form is not the one which conveys the meaning.

156 द्‌विद्विद्विपञ्चायतं त्व विस्मिताऽव उद्विजिवपञ्चयं।
अविद्विद्विपञ्चायतं त्व "डत्तके नाथायामय।
तः विन्यासविचिन्ते। विन्यासश्रोतेवविविचारः।
समाप्तम् प्रथमकाण्डम्।

156 This divine Speech (Sanskrit) has been intermixed with incorrect forms by incompetent speakers. Those who hold the view that the word is non-eternal, (for instance the Naiyāyikas), hold a contrary view on this.

156 योजन्य प्रयुज्यते शब्दो न सोइस्वत्स्यामहापायक।

End Canto I

95 तत्तमा-ग
96 तत्तमा-ग, ध
97 Manuscripts ग, and ध do not give this karika
98 ज्ञेदात्स्यशब्द--क
2. निघातालिव्यत्वायं शास्त्रेऽ यत्परिभाषितम् ।
साकां प्रक्षायवं लेन नः सर्वं तुल्यलक्षणम् ॥

3. The definition of the sentence given in grammar (by the author of the Vārttika) to establish the dropping of accent, etc., as an entity whose parts possess mutual expectancy, is not parallel (to that given by the Mīmāṃsakas) in all respects.
4 (The Mīmāṃsakas' definition of the sentence is incidentally given) —
A sentence is one which has its parts possessing mutual expectancy when they are considered separately, but not possessing expectancy for anything else (outside) when in combination, which has the verb as its principal element, and has qualifying words and one unified meaning

5 वचनमातृत्व वत्स तत्त्र क्रियाया विशेषकः ।
व्रजाति देववटः निधातो उच्च तथा सति ॥
5 (Certain possible objections to the Vārttakāra’s definition of the sentence are answered in 5 & 6) —
The word in the vocative (in a sentence) qualifies the verb, this being so, in the sentence ‘vrajāṁ Devadatta’ (Let me go, Devadatta), the vocative loses its accent ३७

6 यथातैःकां भवान्ति तत्काल्य सत्तृत्सय विशेषकः ।
तथा तिल्कल्यं ख्यात्वस्तःत्सय विशेषकः ॥
6 Just as several infinitives can qualify a finite verb, similarly a finite verb (which, in such a case, is taken as a principal verb) can qualify another finite verb

7 यथेकं एव सर्वांगेऽपि प्रत्यत्य वर्दिभयते ।
बृहज्ञेवानुरूक्तवे वाक्यापि नुगमित्यथा ॥
7 (The Akhandavādin’s position that the sentence is an indivisible whole (definition 4 above) is stated and illustrated (7—12) —

१०४ सर्वीं स्थाने प्रकाशे प्रविष्टं
सञ्ज्ञास्वस्तिक्ष्यते श

१०६ This reading प्रमविष्यते makes no sense. It may only be an error of the scribe for प्रविष्यते. The reading however, is noted here since the good variant प्रकाशे is given in this manuscript
8. Just as an unified perception of a composite (picture) can be analysed (into the perception of the component parts), depending upon which part is required to be perceived, so likewise is the understanding of the meaning of the sentence.

9. Similarly the sentence which is single and does not possess expectancy is described in terms of words which possess mutual expectancy.

10. Just as roots and suffixes are analysed from a word, similarly words are analysed from sentences.

11. Parts of some letters (like conjunct consonants) appear as separate letters (though, of course, it is well-known that it is artificial to look at them in that way); so do parts of the word appear as separate words (while in truth, they are not).

107. आकाशस्य...ङ
108. नामपूर्णम्...घ
109. सब्धते...ङ
110. गा इव स्थिता:...घ
12. The words 'vrsabha', 'udaka' and 'yāvaka' are composed of parts which do not possess any meaning. (It should also be noted that the rule on the association and (absence of) dissociation (between the word on the one hand and the root and suffix on the other) is only for pragmatic purposes.

13. (Just as sentences, words, etc., are indivisible so are their meanings)

The Word has no parts, how then can its meaning have any parts? The ignorant person gets a different idea of its formation by splitting it into parts.

14. (This is illustrated) —

Just as the idea of 'Brāhmaṇa' does not exist in the meaning of the word 'Brāhmanakambalam', similarly words like 'Devadatta' have no (independent) meaning in a sentence.

15. (The Mīmāṁsāka's definition of the sentence as a mere combination (samghāta) of words with mutual expectancy and syntactical relationship is criticised. This is the abhīhitānvaya position.) The word which possesses a general meaning disappears when uttered in a context, and therefore is not associated with a particular meaning (which the context demands). Why should the word which exists (namely, with a general meaning) be abandoned and how does a word thus abandoned continue to exist?
16. अशोके यदि वाक्यार्थ पदार्थार्थी तथा भवेत्।
एवं२४ च सति सम्बन्ध शब्दस्तार्थः न होयते॥

16 (If the fact of words being a collection, and being in syntactical relationship constitutes the sentence, then logically it is not words, but their combinedness, and syntactical relationship which convey meaning of the sentence. This leads to wrong positions.) If the meaning of a sentence is not derived from the (component) words then the meaning of the word (itself) cannot be (considered as) derived from them (i.e., the component sounds in it.) This being so, is not the word’s relation with its meaning broken?

17. विशेषशब्दं केवार्थभूततामान्यप्रतिपत्तिः।
शब्दान्तरान्तिरसम्बन्धव्यत्यत् प्रतिपत्तिः॥

17 (Definitions 7 and 8 of the sentence are stated. These are held by the anvitābhidhāna school of Māmāmsakas.) According to the view of certain thinkers, words which (at first sight) may appear to be universals are revealed to the listeners as being particulars because of their connection with the other words in the sentence.

18क. तेषा तु फूलहु वाक्यार्थ प्रतिभेदः समाप्यते॥
18ख. व्यक्तोपक्यव्रजना सिद्धिरयस्य प्रतिपत्तिः॥

18a According to their view, the total meaning of the sentence exists in each of the individual words.
18b (But) listeners get the meaning of the sentence through the clear utterance of (all) the words in it.

19 “अव्यक्त: कम्यानु शब्द उपायवयमानीयते।
“अव्यक्तस्तु वित्तथेष बुधियाःवातयति॥

19 (The sentence and its meaning are again discussed from the point of view of the Akhanda-school of Grammar.) —

11१ एव सति च सः—च
11२ सन्यक्त च
11३ अव्यक्तस्तु च
This Speech is described as indistinct, sequential or as uttered in a low voice. The non-sequential appears as being stretched out (ie having sequence) when the mind dwells on it.

20 यथा""अभिविशेष्यम् कर्मेभेदे न गूढ्याते। 
अात्माता ब्ययते जाति कर्मभिन्नमणाविन्य।।

21 (Definition 3 of the sentence is stated, that it is a universal, (jātusphota) This position is also the doctrinal position of the Akhandavādi—grammarians) Just as (in an action of whirling round and round) the character of the action is not understood at each of the repeated revolutions, but the class of the action is revealed through the repetition of revolutions,

22 वर्णवाचपदेश्वेव तुल्योपव्यठ्ठना श्रुति। 
अत्यन्तभेदे तत्तत्त्वम् "सःहायत प्रतीयते।।

23 —in the same way, in letters, words, and sentences the speech-sounds, being produced at the same centres as the Word-principle, appear to resemble it, although they are fundamentally different from it.

24 नित्येशु तु कुल पूर्वं पर वा परमार्थं। 
एकतंश तु सा श्चित्तव्यद्वेयवभासते।।

25 (This Speech, in reality, is timeless) Now, in reality, can there be a preceding and subsequent part in timeless entities? This appearance (of sequence) is a result of the powers inherent in the integral entity itself.

26 चिर शिप्रप्रिति जाने जाल्मेवादृते यथा। 
भिन्नकाले प्रकाशते तस्य कृष्णवैपीयो।।

27 Just as the cognitions ‘a long time’ and ‘a short time’ do not differ in time (because they are cognitions and not time-measures) and yet appear as if they have different durations of time, similar is the nature of the long and short (sounds)

114 ययोहन्त—च
115 सःहायत—च
24क. सत्य परमात्माः कालेभस्मिवावहति ॥  
24ख व्यावहर्त्तनाना मात्राणामभावे कोवृश्र कम ॥  

24a (But, can one say that an indivisible entity becomes multiple on the basis of the media of its revelation? That would mean a change in its integrity. Yes)—Does not time which is indivisible appear to be divided into periods by durations taken by other things (like an atom)?

24b (But such measuring of time on the basis of the behaviour of other things is not sound) what sequence can there be in the absence of recurring periods?

25क तत्स्थो या जायते वुद्ध—
रेका सत्यभागवतिनी ॥

25ख सा हि स्वशक्त्या सिन्भवें
क्षमप्रत्यवर्तनिनी

25a The cognition arising from these (i.e., periods measured on the basis of the behaviour of other things) is one without parts.

25b It is due to the power inherent in it that sequence appears in it as if it has parts.

26क कमेलेक्षातुष्कप्पेण
26ख तस्य यद्विज्ञानाहिततम्।
तर्कबनात्त्वयोत्स्तत्
निर्विविन्तविविष्ठतः।

26a This is because it can be described in terms of sequence.

26b (This is wrong)—Whatever be the seeds (of the behaviour of atoms, etc.) laid in the mind, a description of it either as identified with
the mind or as different from it is impossible

27. भावानामसे त्वेत्ति "कर्मसामयमकरम् ।
   व्यावृत्तमेव बोनायधि मेघवानूपलभ्यते ॥

27 The sentence which is (really) indivisible becomes capable of division when it is (analytically) conceived and due to this the meaning which is, in fact, indivisible, is presented to the mind as if it consisted of parts

28 पदानि वाक्ये तात्येव वर्णस्ते च पदे यदि ।
   वर्णोऽपि वर्णे "भागानास सेव स्यात्मसामुः ॥

28 If these words (which are abstracted by analysis) exist as real entities in a sentence and letters similarly exist in words then letters themselves should be capable of division, just as atoms are (according to some schools of thought divisible)

29. भागानाम समस्ततः बृहविडश्यद्विशयताम्
   तेषामवृपत्तेष्यत्वाक्षिष्मविबिध्यताम् ॥

29 Since the identification of (self-sufficient) parts is not, any way, possible (in a letter) there would be neither letter nor (as a consequence) the word, (if we follow the position of the Pada-school). And when neither letter nor word can be established how can anything else (i.e. meaning) be conveyed?

30. यद्वस्ते शब्दत्तत्वे तु "नादेरेक प्रकाशितम् ।
    तदाहुपरे शब्द तस्य वाक्ये तत्यतं ॥

30 (The definition of the sentence as a transformation of consciousness (def no 6) is stated) —

Others say that speech is that indivisible inner Word-principle revealed through speech-sounds, and thus too it possesses unity in the sentence 40
31a According to them meaning is an inner principle which is revealed by means of pieces of (verbal) meaning

31b Speech and meaning being the two halves of one fact, are not distinct and separable

32 The power of being the revealer and the revealed, the cause and the effect, eternally belongs to the Word-principle which is essentially internal

33 It (i.e. the time-less Word-principle) has in fact the two powers of having or not having (attributes like sequence), the appearance of sequence in the non-sequential being merely dependent on pragmatic considerations

34 (The following arguments are given against the Pada-school) —Since (their) evidence for the existence of word-meaning (as a real unit in the meaning of the sentence) is its cognition, this will result in the meaninglessness of the preceding words in a collection of word-meanings (which is the meaning of the sentence, in this view), since the mind leaves (cognising them as it passes on to the meaning of subsequent words) 41

35a The form rāja conveys the meaning ‘king’ in different forms 42
35b And the same word 'rāja' occurring in a complex grammatical formation though similar to a verbal form is (nevertheless) employed in a different sense (from the verb).  

36. यथादकर्ण इत्युत्ते विनेवावशेष गम्यते।
कविवग्यव विभिन्नश्च। सब्रशु प्रत्ययस्तथा॥

Just as, when the word 'asvakarna' is uttered a certain definite meaning which has no reference to 'as'va' (a horse) is conveyed (to the listener), the same is the case in all verbal cognitions.

37 वाक्ये त्वचान्तरगते सादृश्यपरिकल्पने।
केशात्मचर्हृदिशब्दत्व शास्त्र एवानुगम्यते॥

(An objection against the akhandaschool. If the meanings of all compounds are realised as single units, does this not make the distinction between rūdhī and yaugika (etymologically explained) words superfluous? No) — In reckoning (the degree) of similarity (between a complex word-formation and the sentence analysing it) certain words, because of their transfer to another meaning in the sentence, are understood to be rūdhī—but only in grammar.

38क उपागः यथा वेद हृदात्तानुपायान्त्र प्रचार्यते।
38ख. उपायात्ता च नियमो नावेश्यभवतिष्ठते॥

38a (Grammarians) propound means (for the understanding of language) which, once grasped, can be thrown overboard.

38b) And there is nothing necessarily absolute in the methods (of grammatical analysis).

39क. अर्थं कथान्नतुपुष्यं कविवग्यस्त्रैर्प्रतिपक्षयते।
39ख. सूक्ष्मत वा विभक्ति त्वा मेहरा चाक्यनिवन्धनान।॥

39a) The meaning is realised by a person in some manner.
39b (Summing up) —Therefore (all meaning of) parts (of a sentence, like a word) are derived from the sentence, whether (such parts remain) as isolates or in combination.
40 When the unity between a sentence and its meaning is grasped by the mind—a unity expressible in the form ‘this is that’ then, in some places, a single letter of the sentence is sufficient to convey the meaning of the sentence.

41 The concept of the meaning of the sentence according to the (samghāta) theory of the Abhihitānvayavādī Mimāmsakas is stated.) Words, say some, when used in a sentence convey the same meanings as they convey as isolates. And the additional meaning which arises when they are in mutual relation, is described by them as the meaning of the sentence—a meaning which is dependent on several words.

43 (According to some in this school) the meaning of the sentence although it resides in several words reveals itself through the individual words (in turn), just as a class (reveals itself through the particulars) Others hold that it is realised in the totality of words just as numbers are

44 (The Anvītābhidhāna position is stated.) Others consider that it (ie, the meaning of the sentence) is a unified whole in which all the parts are mutually compatible and that it partakes of the character of the meanings of the parts.
As regards the uncertainty (as to the meaning of the sentence) while it is still requiring (other) parts for its completion, that is removed when the meaning is understood as localised in the individual parts thus revealing its nature of being a connected whole.

(The meaning of the sentence is thus nothing more than the inter-connection of word-meanings. And being a connection it is not perceptible, it has to be inferred.) The interconnection (of the parts) is inferrable from its effect (namely, the collection of words-meanings conveying a new sense). It has no form. Therefore it is known as being non-existent in the ultimate analysis.

(The same point is further explained.) The means being present, the effect is fixed, and a verbal action has a fixed means of accomplishment. Thus, the meaning of the sentence being something fixed reveals itself by the mere juxtaposition (of verb and object).

(But the expectancy resident in verbs and nouns is different from each other.)

The noun functions in this respect as possessing expectancy.
for the verb in the form of a subsidiary and the verb pos-
sesses expectancy for its subsidiary (i.e., the noun) as a
thing to be performed.

49  सन्ते एव विशेषा ये पदार्थेऽऽथ व्यवस्थिता ।
ते कमादुनमयते न वाक्यमभिवद्यक्षम् ॥

49 (The sentence is a sequence of words, definition no 5)
Those functional features which already exist in the mean-
ings of the words (i.e., the features of being the subject,
object, etc.) are conveyed (to the listener) by the sequence
of words and there is nothing distinct as a sentence
conveying them.

50a  शब्दानां क्रमार्ते च नान्यः¹ शब्दोदस्तिः वाचक ।

50b  क्रमोपिच् धर्म कालस्य तेन वाक्य न विद्यते ॥

50a As long as there is some sequence of words there is no need
for any other speech-entity to convey the meaning.
50b And sequence is an attribute of time and, therefore, there
is no sentence.

51  ये च सम्भविनो भेदः । पदार्थेऽविभाजिता ।
ते सन्निधाने व्यवस्थिते न तु वर्णव्यक्ति क्रम ॥

51 The functional features which are inherent in the mean-
ings of words, but which are not manifest are revealed
when the words are in each other’s proximity. But the
same is not the case with the sequence of letters (i.e.,
wordmeaning is not a revelation of meanings of letters).

52a  वर्णानां च पदानां च क्रमानां निर्वेदिनी ।
पदार्थाः वाक्यत्तता च ॥

52a ‘Word’ and ‘sentence’ are respectively the names given
to the sequence which resides in letters and words.
52b (But) the status of a speech-entity (conveying a complete-meaning) is not given to them (i.e., to the letter and the word)

53. अन्यथा हृदं शब्दशब्दे वृद्ध सप्रत्यय पवात्। 
   प्रतिवर्ण त्वस्ति नास्ति पवस्यार्थमतो विदु।

53 Even if they have thus equal status as non-speech-elements, understanding is seen to proceed from the word, and there is no such understanding at each separate letter. Hence they say that meaning belongs to the word

54 यथा साध्ववा वर्णा विना वाच्येन केलचित्।
   अर्थान्त समुद्धिता वाच्यमेवविनिवध्यते।

54 (The three different definitions of the sentence just discussed are re-stated in the following three stanzas. First the samghāta-view is re-stated) — Just as letters, and their parts, are devoid of meaning (by themselves), but are meaningful when combined, the same is the case with the sentence (in respect of its being a mere combination of words)

55 अन्यथा साध्ववायव्यायाः पर्यायध्वनिवर्तत्तिवा।
   क्लेशोत्पत्तित्वायव्यायां भिन्नलक्षणमू।

55 (The sequence-view is re-stated) — Words which, by themselves, do not possess any meaning or alternatively (according to a different doctrine) are meaningful as means (to understand the meaning of the sentence) convey that meaning of the sentence when they are uttered in a sequence, and the meaning of the sentence thus conveyed is different in features from the meanings of the words

56 नित्यते समुदायाना जातेर्यो परिकल्पने।
   एकस्यावार्थायात्महाविक्ष्यायव्यभिचारिणीसू।

56 (The vākyā-sphota view is summarised) —
Whether we consider that the individual speech-unit (here a sentence) is imperishable or that there is a generic entity (which is common) to a group of particulars, it is the unitary sentence which is meaningful in an invariable manner.

57a Those who consider the sentence as an indivisible unit consider (the recognition of) words (in it) as pragmatic and as subsequent to indivisibility (in the order of reality).

57b And those who take a word as a real entity consider the indivisible sentence as subsequent to words.

58a The definition of a connected discourse (given in the Rgveda pratisâkhya) is explained in different ways.

58b (They are) —
A connected discourse is the source of words or it is built up from words.

59 (The second view is criticised) If the Pada-text being other (than the Samhita) is the original of the Samhita and is itself not created, how is the Pada-text to be constructed according to rule? (how can that which is eternal be also constructed or created?)

60 Just as one does not get the cognition of the meaning of the word at each one of its letters similarly the form of the meaning of the sentence is not realised at each of the words (taken individually).

---

133 श्राः
61 (The Pada-school replies that letters are not after all meaningless) —
Just as the meaning of the sentence resides in words occurring side by side, similarly the meaning of the word exists in letters occurring side by side.

62 Just as a small object is perceived when it is in the company of another object, similarly a letter too when it is united with another letter, conveys a meaning.

63a. पदस्थङ्खारणाद्वायं यथा कवित्तनिहृद्यते।
63b. वर्णनामपि सालिन्यात्तथा सोयं प्रतीयते।

(Further it is against experience to say that a letter has no meaning) —

64. प्रात्सङ्ख्य यत् साम्प्रथाप्रियमार्थ यत्सं हितं।
तेनात्यं विषेषेण सामाज्य यदि बाध्यते।

Again, five difficulties arise if the pada-position that the meaning of a sentence is understood through the meanings of the component words is not accepted. The first of which is discussed in 64-71) —
Since the scriptural hearing of that which is (already) implicitly legitimate is for the purpose of restriction, if the general is completely ruled out by this very different particular,
65. यज्ञेति यदा द्रव्य प्राप्त जामय एकार्यंशस्म् ।
ब्रीहित्तुत्वया निवर्तेत न स्वाध्यौतिनिविविष्टवा ॥ ॥
—and if a substance (in general) legitimate as being indicated by the implicit power of the verb ‘yajeta’ were to be ruled out by the word ‘vrihi’, then no substitution would be possible ॥

66. तस्मात् ब्रीहित्तवमिष्काक ब्रीहित्तवद् प्रकालयन्।
द्रव्यविशिष्टवत्वात्मात्यरथं सत् न बालवते ॥ ॥
Therefore the word ‘vrihi’, while prescribing rice in addition (to the general ‘sacrificial substance’ implied by the verb), being (simply) for the purpose of providing (the general concept with a particular meaning), does not prohibit substance (in general), since the two things are not mutually exclusive ॥

67. तेन चापि व्यविचित्रेऽद्रव्यवद सहचारिणि।
असमभावश्वशेषाणात् तत्रात्मेवामदेशनम् ॥ ॥
And when (the concept of) substance (in general) which is part of (the verbal concept) is particularised by it (i.e., by the word ‘vrihi’), there is then no appearance of other particulars, because of the impossibility (of two objects occupying the same logical space) ॥

68. न च सामायंकायेऽक्ष्याकब्रेश्व लक्षिताः।
विलोकणं न धि सब्बेषय सत्ता शब्दोज्ञानार्यः ॥ ॥
The verb (like yajata = to sacrifice) does not indicate every particular substance (with which the sacrifice can be performed) as it does the idea of substance in general. A word, of course, does not denote (at one and the same time) every existent (which can be named by it) ॥

69. शुक्लायो गुणा सत्तो यथा तद्विवस्तिताः।
तथा शब्दाट्व भेदान्व इवते इवत्सहचारिणाम् ॥ ॥
Just as the qualities ‘white’ etc., though they are existents, ॥

१३६—चित्तयज—ष
१३७—व्यक्तसहचारीणो—ष
are not (immediately) intended to be conveyed (by the word ‘vr̥ṇih’) so also all the various substances which are associated with the concept of substance are not intended in the context (by the verb ‘yajati’)

70 A substitute is enjoined in the absence (of the normal material) so that the performance of a compulsory ceremony, or of an optional ceremony already undertaken may not be cut short

71 (But substitution will be impossible if the position that the meaning of the sentence is an integral whole is accepted.)

According to him who considers that the meaning of the sentence is an action (i.e., the meaning of the verb) qualified by (or accomplished through the nominal agents viz, instruments, etc.), it would be a different action if the material is absent and a substitute is employed

72 (Now the second of the five objections against the Akhanda-position is stated) —

When (in a sentence like ‘vaṇat pika āṇīyatām’ in which there are familiar and unfamiliar words), the meaning of the familiar word (or words) is conveyed, the question ‘what is it’ is asked about words like ‘pika’ which are not familiar

73 (The third objection is stated) —

—सामक्ष्यार्त्थसार्थः व्यक्त्यार्थमनुपर्ययांति

—युपपदति—च

—भले—च
If a thing which could be understood by implication (from a statement) is, nevertheless, stated for the sake of clarity then such direct statement supersedes the authority of syntactical connection and evidence stated elsewhere.

74. अप्राप्तो यस्य शुक्लादे सत्त्ववातन्म गम्यते ।
    स यत्त्वाविवशते वाक्ये भूतितमविलक्षणं ॥

(As for the difference between direct statement and syntactical connection) when ideas like ‘whiteness’ are conveyed not directly (from a direct statement), but from the proximity (of the relevant word to other words in a sentence), such conveying of the idea through a syntactical connection is of a different nature from its being conveyed through a direct statement.\(^{53}\)

75. अभिन्नमेव बाक्य तु यथास्बार्ताचिन्नस्य
    तत्तथं भूतिःमूलत्वान्न भूतिव विरोट्तत्स्य

If it is considered that a sentence is an indivisible whole conveying an indivisible meaning then since all (relations) are from a direct statement, there is no (question of any) conflict (of syntactical connection or anything else) with direct statement.\(^{54}\)

76. वाक्यायता समुंद्रायद्वे तथा एकार्ष्यः पिसिद्रये
    साकार्ध्यान्तवस्तत्र वाक्याध्यायमुनि न विद्यते

(The next objection against the Akhanda-position is stated —
Where we have a group of clauses (as in a mahāvākyā, i.e., a complex or compound sentence) all intended to build up one principal idea and having expectancy for one another, then there would not be any meaning for the component parts (if the Akhanda-position of the indivisible sentence conveying the indivisible meaning is accepted)

\(^{140}\) —दायचे—च
77 (A fifth objection is raised against the Akhanda-position. The acceptance of the position will lead to the meaninglessness of the rules employed in interpreting Vedic texts in order to decide such questions as the sequence of sacrifices, the relation of subsidiary and principal actions and so on (77-87) —
This (action) should be performed as an incidental one, while this (other) should be performed according to the principle of tantra (i.e., different forms being contained in a single form), (again) this action should be performed (by several persons) using the same means one after another, and this (other) action should be performed, each person using a separate means, there is (the operation of) sublation and combination in this place.

78 उहोैसमन् विषये न्यायः सम्बन्धोत्स्य न बाध्यते।
सामान्यस्यस्मिन्नितिविषयोऽतिविषयते॥

78 A substitution is valid here, and here the connection of the word (is carried on from one sentence to another), a transference of the general attributes of an object is in indicated here, and (in this other place) some special attributes are transferred (from one object to another).

79 , अथवा समान्यस्य समस्यास्त्रयोऽस्मिन्नितिविषयोऽस्मिन्नितिविषयते॥

79 Here (a person’s) need to do an action (is shown) and (in this other place) his competence (is indicated), in this third sentence, the object of the two (i.e., of the person’s need and his competence) is the same,
he (who performs the sacrifice mentioned here) has scriptural authority to do so, he has not the authority to perform (that) other action

80. इव शुल्या क्रमशः प्रतिशिर्यमुच्चारणादिभि ॥
क्रमोयमञ्जरी बल्वानांसस्सु न विवाक्षित्. ॥

80 The sequence here is fixed by direct statement, and in this, the sequence is fixed on the basis of pronunciation, the sequence, here, is powerful and no sequence is intended in this (other one)

81 इव परास्थ्यसम्बन्धमञ्जरानामप्रयोजकम् ॥
प्रयोजकमिव तेषामेत् नानात्मायकम् ॥

81 This non-operative one among the accessories is connected (to the principal) through the other (operative) accessories, among them (i.e., the accessories), this is the one which effects the action and this (other) is incidental

82 इवं प्रधान वैषयव्योजक विनयोगक्रमस्वयम् ॥
साक्षात्प्रयोपकारोद्विद्विद्विशेषकम् ॥

82 (Among the actions) this one is principal and this is subsidiary, and this is the order of performance of the two (actions). This means serves the action directly and this other indirectly

83. शृविध्वाद्वारके वेषोद्वम्पलमञ्जरी तु "विद्वान" ॥
सम्बन्धा यज्ञात्मेवोद्वार भेदस्त्राविवक्षित्व ॥

83 The things mentioned here have different potentialities and functions, and the results (of the action mentioned here) vary, this (particular) object has changed due to its association (with something else), no distinction is intended in that (other) place
84. प्रसन्नमात्रवोज्य पयः मृत्युः प्रत्यति नु।
इव गौणसिद्ध मुख्यं व्यापीद गुस्लिङ्गवद्म॥

84 (Further, besides these rules of interpretation, there are also others which will be nullified by the Grammarians’ position (84-86) They are —This is the negation of a possible case, and this (other) is a prohibition of a particular thing without enjoining an alternative, this word has a secondary meaning and this other, a primary meaning, the scope of the meaning of the word here is wide, the method employed here is a complex one, in this other place a simple method is employed.

85. भेदवानाज्ञानवो अत्यः बहुः "भेद "विभाषयते।
इव नियमयः स्थात्र योग्यत्वमुपजायते॥
85 “There is a divided relation of whole and parts in this sentence and an option of different things (in this other context), a restriction is enjoined here, and here the appropriateness of another thing is stated.

86. अस्य वाक्याल्परं वृष्टिलिङ्गात्मेवं मूलमियते।
अस्य शब्दायपोढृत्य पदार्थं प्रविभाषयते॥
86 The specification of this thing is inferred from the evidence of another sentence, the meaning of this word is obtained by analysis, after the word itself is detached from (the context of) its usage.

87. इति वाक्येशु ये धर्मं पदार्थोपलिन्वतं।
सबौः ते न प्रकल्पेरन् पदं चेत्यव्याचकः॥
87 The above-mentioned methods of exposition in sentences based on the meaning of words would not have been considered if a word were not a meaning-expressing agent.

88. अविभक्तेर्पि वाक्यां निक्षिप्ते उपाद्वायोढः।
वाक्याल्परविभागनं यथोक्तं न विश्वयते॥
88 (The criticisms of the Padavādin are now answered) —
The objections raised (by the Padavādin) do not con-
tradict (our position) because (we concede that) the
meaning of the sentence which is an undivided whole
lends itself to division along the (lines of) the included
clauses on the basis of its different aspects

89 यथेवेक्ष्य गन्धस्य भेदन परिकल्पना ।
Pुपाधिहु तथा वाक्येष्यवर्धेदोभिषेरिते ॥

89 Just as a single composite scent is analysed into (the com-
ponent elements such as) the smell of flowers, etc in
the same way are different meanings (as meanings of
clauses, phrases and words) pointed out in the sentence ॥

90 गववे नरोस्ते वाप्सेवकाजानाृति ॥ यथा ।
भए जात्यन्तरस्येव सदृशं प्रतिपदाते ॥

90 (The objection regarding words like ‘pika’ is answered) —
Just as in a Bos gavaeus or a man-lion which is the object
of an integral cognition, a part of it assumes resemblance
with another species ॥

91 अप्रतिबंधु तु यथमागमवृक्कमुपविद्यति ।
तावच्चवर्त्तिविवि सूढः सर्ववें प्रतिपदाते ॥

91 —and when an ignorant person perceives that certain
parts (of the Bos gavaeus etc.) have not been seen by
him before and are unknown to him, he is (really) having
an absence of understanding of the whole

92 तथा पिकावियोगेन वाक्येष्यन्तवियोगेन ।
सदृश्येव सत्यानमततो शर्ष्य सत्यं मन्यते ॥

92 Similarly, when, by the use of words like ‘pika’ the
sentence has become totally different, (the ignorant
person) imagines to see in it something which resembles
a meaning which (in fact) does not exist there

93 एकस्य भागः सबृह्व भागे भेदवच तथाते ।
निर्माणस्य प्रकाशस्य निर्माणे वेतसा ॥

93 Just as light and the mind which are both integral and
partless are found to be similar to each other in certain respects, and dissimilar in other respects,

94. तत्वेद्व भागे साध्व्य भागे भेदोऽवसीयते।
भागाभागेपि वाक्यानामत्वत्त भिन्नवस्यमां॥

95 —similarly sentences which (in reality) are integral wholes are imagined to be similar to each other in certain parts and dissimilar from each other in certain other parts

96. रूपनालो पवाना स्यात्कथ चाविकल्पना।
अगृहोत्ताटो शब्दे कथस्यो विविध्यते॥

(The Akhandavādin now criticises the Padavādin) —
When the forms of words are impaired (in junctions) how can the boundaries of the word be determined? And without determining the boundaries of the word how can its meaning be identified?

96. सर्व रूपणा शब्देऽन्यत्र व्यवस्थित।
नानापरेषु तद्वपतन्त्रेण परमार्थादिते॥

(The objection based on sentences like ‘śveto dhāvati’ is answered) —
Another school (i.e., another section of the Akhanda school) holds the view that in a form (like śveto), there is the conjunction, so to speak, of several forms and that the one form (rather than the other) is preferred among the various possible forms on the basis of tantra (i.e., different forms being contained in a combined form)

97. तत्सिद्धेवं भेदाना सर्वं इवः वर्तते।
रूपं रूपान्तरात्त्मावन्त्यतःविभाज्यते॥

There is, so to speak, in the one undifferentiated form the coalescence of different words, and hence the one required form though outwardly identical (with others) can be distinguished (by contextual factors)

95. —भेदे—च
96. —ग परमि—च
97. —गं उपवर्ते—च
( 60 )

98 शास्त्रे प्रत्यायक्ष्यापिक्ष्येविद्विद्मण्डितम् ।
प्रत्यायेऽन्तु कवचिंभेदो ग्राह्यप्रहयणयोऽस्मृतं " ॥

(The following few stanzas discuss incidentally, the problem whether a meaning and that which conveys the meaning are identical or different) —
In one grammatical statement the view is held that there is identity between that which expresses a meaning, and the meaning expressed, while in some other places it is stated that there is no such identity.

99क ऊ इत्येविद्मण्डितभवान्यांयास्य प्रकल्पितम् ।
99ख लुढळतोर्पणे सैवे ग्राह्याभया परिकल्पित ॥

99a Thus by the use of the identity-principle the sound ‘ू’ is used to indicate the three kinds of u-sounds, the short, the long and the prolated 58
99b In symbolising ूrn and ूrt (by the sound ूr) there is a difference (in numbers) assumed between the symbolised (and the symbol) 59

100 यस्येवऽवत्यो रूप सत्तानामसम्बघयकम् ।
न हि प्रतीयमानेन प्रहरणस्यार्थित्व सम्भव ॥

100 The form ‘yasya’ which is (genitive of yam-combined form of ‘a’ and ‘i’) expresses those symbolised by it (namely, the vowels ‘a’ and ‘i’ short or long) No understanding of a thing is possible as conveyed by something which is itself ‘a symbolised’

101 ऊ इत्येविद्मण्डितस च भिषज्यावाणत्वादित्यतम् ।
भेदेन प्रहरण चास्यः परस्परथिव द्वैयोऽ ॥

101 This sound ‘ू’ (prolated) which is non-different from the sounds of which it is the symbol, is also the basis of the different sentences (into which the original sūtra is analysed) It is understood in two ways just as a pararūpa is in regard to two meanings 60
102. प्रत्यायायज्ञवृद्धिः च समाहारस्थोलथा।
न्युस्थता पुनर्भेदशब्देष्वतन्त्रमाध्यतिः॥
102. (The view held by Kātyāyana the author of the Vārttika —
He (i.e., the author of the Vārttika), who rules that
(1) the component parts of a prolated diphthong are
themselves not prolated and (2) that a conjunction of
vowels (with udātta and anudātta tones) is not a svarita-
vowel, has (thus) adopted the position that there is an
ultimate distinction among speech-sounds (i.e., that for
instance, there is no numerical parity between the com-
ponent-elements in the word ‘sveto’ on the one hand
and the word itself in the sentence ‘sveto dhāvati’)

103. अर्द्धानिषु शब्देषु रूपवेद कथायथा॥
तन्त्रालूकसब्धृत्वे भिन्नता अनुतरणथां॥
103. Just as in words like ‘ardharca’, a form is (assumed by the
component elements) different (from their forms while in
the analysed sentence), due to the difference in their
sequence (of occurrence), so likewise, even when a word
remains the same, there is the (discriminative) hearing of
different words from it

104. शब्दान्तरव यान्तीव शब्दान्तरसिद्धासं॥
104. Letters which themselves are unchanging appear to be-
come different ones when in combination because they
assume different capacities

105. इन्द्रियाविविधकारेण तृष्ण प्राहोपु वस्तुपु।
आत्मत्यागाद्वे भिन्न प्रहण स चम शुन्तौ॥
105. It is observed about objects that, without their giving up
their real nature, they are perceived as different due to
changes in the perceiving sense organs (and other factors
like the angle of vision) The same is the case with heard
sounds (i.e., the same sound is heard in different forms in
combinations and the like)

159 —ष्या —च
106. अभिधानक्रिया"भेदार्ज्ज्ञवेद्विविकुतेश्वरिः
रूपसर्यस्यसैद्धव तद्वैव प्रकाशाते "

(When words are uttered in combination) even though
they remain intrinsically unchanged, a form will be heard
at the very same time, as absolutely different due to the
changed manner of pronunciation.

107. ध्वन्यो वा गीतिमात्र वा साम द्रव्यान्तर न वु
"गीतिभेदार्ज्ञवेद्विविकुतेश्वरिः ता एव विवृता ऋषिः"

(How does this apply to the Vedas?) —
The Sāma-verses are either only the Rk-verses or only the
music. It is not a different entity altogether. And the
same Rk-verses are heard as altered, due to the difference
through the music.

108. उपयाच्छु तिस्तहारे भिब्धानामेकक्षोष्णाम्
तत्तत्रेणोध्वरणं तेषा शास्त्रे साधुतयस्मिन्यते"

When there are forms which are different among them-
selves, but have one of them capable of including the
others, the texts concede that they are valid in that
manner of combined utterance.

109. परिलोक्यम् शुद्धि चैवक्"रूपे" भेदवतामपि
तत्तत्रेणोध्वरणं कायमस्यथा तेन न साधव "

(Therefore in a situation of this kind) words, even though
they are different from each other should be uttered with
a common form of utterance. If used otherwise they
are not valid.

160. भोगाच्छय—ड
161. रीतिभेद तु गृहस्ते—ष
162. स्वश्यस्य—ष
163. रिगूह—ष
164. चैफ—ष
165. रूपसे—ष
110. Sentences which are similar to each other get a common valid form which is prescribed by the texts, when they are uttered with a common form of utterance.

111. Just as one (wind) takes various forms depending on how it is received (i.e.) by a flute or by other musical instrument, similarly in the present instance various forms can take a common form.

112. (The Pada-school’s objections regarding subsidiary clauses (stanza 76) is answered.) — Again, clauses do exist and they can be compared to words, at the same time they will have independent meanings, if there were not another sentence (of which they form parts).

113. (In this connection the Mimamsaka view that “purpose” is the significance of a sentence is criticised with special reference to the problem of the subsidiary clauses) — He who holds that meaning belongs to the word and that the significance of the sentence is its purpose cannot consistently admit any kind of relation between subsidiary clauses.

114. (This argument is refuted and possibility of recognising...
subsidiary clauses is discussed from the angle of the Anvita-bhiddhāna view of the Mīmāṃsakas) —
It is the verbs (in the subsidiary clauses) which expect each other. Therefore a mutual relation is seen (among them), as based on the verbs

115 आन्तिनरुवादो वा पदार्थश्चितस्यल्पने ।
प्रत्येक्ष तु समान्तोधि सहभूतेषु बर्तते॥

115 (An objection about the Anvītābhiddhāna view is answered in this connection) —
Repetition (of the meaning of the sentence conveyed by the first word, in subsequent words), is a repetition for the sake of defining the meanings of the (individual) words. The meaning of the sentence which is completed in the individual words (thus) resides in the collection

116क अविकल्पेिाःपि वाक्यात्विकल्पा भवनाभया ।
116ख अत्राधिकरणेऽवादा पूर्वपि बहुधा सता॥

116a Even though the meaning of the sentence did not vary, various different views, as discussed in this section, were held on it by the ancient teachers, depending on their (various) conceptions

117. अन्यासात्मप्रतिभांनु शब्द सर्वोपरःस्मृत ।
बालाना च तिरस्चा च यथार्थप्रतिपादनेऽ॥

117 (The Akhanda-position on the meaning of the sentence is stated) —
Others held that the total utterance caused instantaneous mental conception as a result of practice just as in the matter of conveying a meaning to children or animals
Some consider this practice to be a convention which has existed from times immemorial and it imparts the knowledge of the kind “after this, this should be done”

(Granting the Khandavādin’s position that the meaning of the sentence is built up by the meaning of words, different views are now given on what word-meaning is, and how it is conveyed) “Words all have a (general) meaning”—such a definition of the meaning of the word has been put forth by some, as being applicable as much to words like “gauh” as to words like “apūrvam” “devatā” and “svargah”

What understanding of the form of an object is obtained through the use of a word, through seeing the object and through repeating the act of connecting the two, that is due to these other efforts, it does not pertain exactly to the field of the function of the word

(Another view about the denotation of words is stated) — Some differentiating features (of the object like the universal residing in it) are conveyed by the word as its signification, while some others which are incidental are (also) taken to be the meaning of the word
122. जातिप्रत्ययक-शब्दे या व्यक्तिररुपाधिलेखी।
   न तानु व्यक्तिसतानु-भेदानु जातिशब्दोज्वलम्भते।

122 (This view is criticised) —
When the idea of an individual attaches itself to the word whose meaning is the universal, that class-word does not denote the particular features of the individual.

123 घटाविना न चाकारान् प्रत्यायति वाचक।
   वस्तुमात्रनिविदित्वात् प्रायौगतिः प्राप्तरीयकरः।

123 The word does not denote the shape (and such other attributes) of objects like pots, because words denote only the mere object (divested of its attributes). The attributes are conveyed incidentally.

124 क्रिया विना प्रयोगेण न दृष्टा शब्दोन्निविदिता।
   प्रयोगस्थनुरुपाठी शब्दां इति मन्यते॥

124 (An example of the incidental expression of an idea by a word is given) —
An action enjoined by a word (i.e., by a verb) is never seen except as accompanied by those which bring it into being (like agent, instrument, etc). The idea of this relation of the action with agent, etc., is an incidental meaning of the word (while the action itself is its meaning).

125 नियतात्तु प्रयोगः ये नियत यथा साधनम्।
   तेषाः शब्दाभिशेयत्वमपरेऽपर्नूगित्यते॥

125 (Still another view about the denotation of a word is stated) —
Whatever relations (of the verb with agent etc.) are constant, and whatever instruments (agent, etc.) are constant, they form part of the (directly conveyed) meaning of the word according to others.

126क. समुदायोपस्ते देयस्य भयाविदकल्पसमुच्छय।
126ख. असत्यो वाचि सर्गः शब्दां नैन्यिचित्तेच्छते॥

126a (A fourth view is stated) —
The word denotes the totality of the attributes of the object (and it denotes it) neither as members one after the other nor as an addition. 

126b (A fifth view is given) —
Some think that a word denotes an association (of the object with the universal, etc.) — an association which is unreal.

127a (The sixth view) —
Or Reality revealed through (the flux of) the Unreal is what the word denotes.

127b (The seventh view) —
Or the word (falsely) assumes the character of being produced and becomes (its own) meaning.

128. लोकस्थित्यमभिसङ्क्रामित्वादौपमेकोऽके हवा ।
शब्दस्थायिन्तं शब्दस्थित्यमप्रचक्षते ॥

When a word has its form identified with its meaning in the manner which can be described as 'this (i.e., the word) is that' (i.e., the meaning), then the word is considered as 'produced'.

129. तत्त्वोपत्यित्वादिवे स्वभावसमिचारिणि ।
वित्तिवचनज्ञानाम् ॥१२७॥

Although (in theory) the identity of a word and the thing denoted by it is invariable, in some places (both in ordinary and textual usage) one of them does stand out as prominent.

130a (In life the thing denoted is more prominent) —

175 —जन्य—ख, झ
176 —डिख—घ
177 —ङ्ग रूप—घ
130a In life the word functions by becoming identified with the thing denoted by it.

130b In grammar words are studied as divided into both kinds (namely those which convey an external object as their meaning, and those which convey their own form as meaning).

131 (The eighth and the ninth views regarding what a word denotes) —
Something (for instance, an action) which might be looked upon either as having powers of all kinds or as having no power of any kind, is so described (as an action etc.) invariably through words.

132 (The tenth view) —
A conception formed about an external object is (erroneously) understood to be the object and considered as the connotation of the word by some people.

133 (The eleventh view) —
Some words present meaning as comprising the (detailed) appearance (of the objects) and as producing their vivid recollection. Others, present it as a mere indefinite idea.
134. यथेन्द्रियां सत्तैवधृज्भेष्योपधार्याक्षम् ।
तथेच शब्दार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिरस्ते ॥

134 (The twelfth view) —
Just as a defective sense-organ reveals an object in an
unusual form, similarly meaning is understood from words
in various different forms.

135 वाक्यात्मयेव प्रकाशतो सिद्धेषु प्रतिपलृष्टुः ।
स्वप्रत्ययानुकारे न शब्दयस्य प्रविष्टते ॥

135 (Thus) a word-meaning intended in a certain way by a
speaker takes different shapes in different hearers depending
upon the comprehension of each

136 एकस्मि च दृष्टेः ज्ञेः दर्शनं भिन्नते पृथक्।
कालान्तरे एकस्मिनं दृष्टि वै कोष्ठपि त पश्चात्तद्यता गुणः ॥

136 Although the same object is perceived, its perception
varies (from person to person.) Again, even the same
person perceives the same object in a different form on
another occasion.

137 एकस्यापि च शब्दस्य निमित्तिर्विशिष्यहे ।
एकं बहुमिश्लायो बहुया परिकल्पनाते ॥

137 The same person (at different times), and different
persons, understand the meaning of the same word in
different forms due to the changing conditions of under-
standing.

138 तत्समवृष्टतत्ततद्वाना सापराधं बहुश्चलम् ।
दर्शनं वचनं एकपिनिन्द्यमेवानवस्थितम् ॥

138 Therefore, both the comprehension and report of people
who have not seen the truth (about things) are defective,
unreliable and perpetually inconsistent.

181 सम्—१
182 स्त्र—२
183 च, द—३
184 चैको—४
185 बापि—५
186 सेवायच—७
( 70 )

139. श्रीरागां दर्शनं यथा तत्वे किध्वितृस्विततम्।
न तेन व्यवहारो जस्ति न तत्त्वमिन्यन्तनस्त्॥

Nor can we stabilise meaning and usage on the basis of
the vision of sages)
That vision of the sages which is based on Reality cannot
be put to ordinary use, their vision is not linked with
words

140. तत्तबवृ दृश्यते व्योम लघोतो हृत्यवादिब।
"नेव चार्चित तत्तं व्योमन्त न लघोते" हृताशन॥

(Nor can any reliance be placed on the perceptions of
people)
The sky is seen as a surface, and the glow-worm seen
as a (spark of) fire, but there is no surface in the sky
nor any fire in the glow-worm

141. तत्सामात्रायक्ष्मपरं विद्वानीक्षत्य युक्तित।
न वर्णनं प्रामाण्यतं दृश्यमर्य अक्षेरयेत॥

Therefore a wise man should see through (the eye of)
logic even a thing which he perceives with his eye. Let
him not determine a thing on the evidence of his (physical)
perception

142. असामायेयतत्त्वानामार्थाना लोकीकर्ष्यन्त।
व्यवहारं समाह्यान तत्त्वाजो न विकल्पयेत्॥

When pragmatic people give pragmatic descriptions
of things whose essential nature is beyond words, the wise
man does not take them (as statements of reality)

143. विचचेष्ठ्योणेष्यन्तं प्रतिभायवं जायते।
बाक्यार्थं इति तामाहुः पवार्यैः रूपाविताम्॥

The meaning of the sentence as a flash of insight (pratibba) is described) —

187 न चेनास्तिक्ष ख
188 —बोलो हु—च
When the word-meanings in a sentence are detached (from out of the sentence) and (thus) understood, a different flash of insight is produced (out of it). That (flash of insight) presented by the word-meanings is described as the meaning of the sentence.

144 It is by no means describable to others in such terms as "it is like this". Having been formed from the function of one's inner self, its nature is not known even to the person.

145 It effects the fusion of the (individual) word-meanings, without itself being logically thought out, and it is comprehended as seemingly taking the form of the collection (of the word-meanings).

146 In the matter of the knowledge of what to do, no one transgresses it (i.e., this flash of insight) which is either produced directly from speech or is a result of recollection.

147 The whole world looks upon it as authority (for their conduct). Even in animals the knowledge of the beginning of behaviour dawns by virtue of it.
१४८. यथा इत्यविशेषणा परिपाकर्यतन्तजा ।
मल्लातिलश्रयो दृष्टा प्रतिभास्तहता तथा ॥

148 Just as qualities like softness are seen to belong to particular objects without further effort by virtue of their ripeness alone, so is the flash of insight in those who possess it.

१४९ स्वरूपति विकृतस्ते मधी पुक्कोकिलस्य क ।
जल्लवादय कूलायादिकरणं केन® शिखिता ॥

149 Who alters the note of the cuckoo in the spring? By whom are creatures taught to make nests and so on?

१५०. आहारप्रीत्यभियोगश्च वादितिविषयं ।
जल्लयप्रसिद्धस्तु प्रयोक्तं मूढपकितणामु ॥

150 Who directs animals and birds in functions like eating, loving, hating and leaping which are well known to each species or family.

१५१. भावनानुपातं वेतवागमादेव जायते ।
आत्मितिविश्रामश्चायाममस्तु विशिष्यते ॥

151 And this (flash of insight) arises from precepts accompanied by recollection. The precept is qualified by either proximity or distance (That is, it may be of the near past, or of ancient times).

१५२. स्वाभाविकरणाक्षायोगावृत्तोपपतिता ।
विशिष्टोपपहिता पेन्त प्रतिभा घटृविधा विदुः ॥

152 That flash of insight is considered to be of six kinds, as obtained (1) by nature (2) by action (3) by practice (4) by meditation (5) by invisible causes and (6) as handed down by the wise.

१५३. यथा सयोगिनि दृष्यं लक्षितेऽि न्युज्ञते ।
गोशब्दो न त्वस्तो लेखा विशेषणां प्रकाशकः ॥

153 (A discussion of the division of words as primary and
secondary depending on the meaning conveyed is given.)
Just as the word "gauh" is applied to an object which is
in conjunction with and recognisable by, (other) material
things, but the word (itself) does not denote those (mate-
rial things) which (so) qualify (the object).64

154 आकारवर्णविवेचः सत्त्वेः गावाविवेचः
शब्दं प्रवर्त्तमानोऽपि न तानुज्ज्वलरत्यसः।

154 (similarly) although a word functions as denoting an
object, which is associated with shape, colour and parts,
it does not denote these (as part of its meaning)

155 सत्त्वावर्णविवेचः वैविषिष्टः सृष्टः प्रमुखः
शब्दं न तत्वाववेचः प्रमुखः प्रतिपल्यात्।

155 (However), words (signifying colour, etc.) employed to
refer to an object qualified by shape, colour and parts,
do not denote those (qualifying) constituents alone

156 वृल्लभः कस्यचिलोके सर्वविवेचां दासम्पर्ष
केदरचिलचिलवृल्लभ्येते श्रृत्तनामस्मृत्यात्।

156 The perception of all parts of any object is rare in this
world, from some perceived parts, the whole is inferred

157 "यथा जलयुक्तलादिना गर्भेन सहवारिष्णाम्"

157 नित्यसाम्बन्धिता बृह्दं गुणानामवधारणम्।

157 —just as we see that through the instrumentality of the
scent of a jasmine, or of a lotus flower, the accompanying
qualities (of shape, colour, etc.), which are invariably
associated with the scent, are also apprehended

158 सस्मांसामानसंस्ताननिरपेक्ष प्रवर्त्तते।
बिन्दौ च समुदायेः च वाचक सहवारिष्णू॥

158 The word ("water") functions as denoting water—
whether it is a drop or a mass—without reference to attri-
butes, number, quantity and location

159 —शिष्टो य—ख
160 त—च
161 —रिणा च
159 But words which function as denoting oil, etc., which are delimitied by (attributes like) refinement, denote quantities of it and such words do in fact function in relation to parts.

160 A word withdraws from functioning when separated from that meaning linked to which it has been used.

161 Whatever non-permanent distinctions a word might be used to imply (in the object it denotes) the word does not necessarily require their presence for its operation.

162 Just as the word "gauḥ" is seen (functioning) even in the absence of horn, hoof, etc., (in the animal it is used for), it does not likewise, function dissociated from the universal.

163 Therefore while there may be comprehension of the non-permanent things from the word, the thing which is never seen in separation (from the object) is the one connected with it (i.e., the word).
164a (The place of root and suffix in the scheme of the meaning of the word is now discussed according to various views held on it)—
“The suffixes denoting duality and the like can be expressive or illuminating.”

164b “Or perhaps the aggregate of (root and suffix) denotes an object with its number, etc.”

165 “Or words like “gauh” convey through a change in their forms a meaning which contains the idea of number, etc, without (actually) mentioning them.”

166 The meanings of those words which have a permanent connection (with their meaning) and the powers of which become clear when analysed, are analysed (into root-meaning and suffix-meaning) through (the test) of association and absence of dissociation.

167 Where they (i.e. association and absence of dissociation) can be established without exception, (there alone) it is obligatory (that the root and suffix are significant elements), but there is no such rule about “nut” “sap”, etc.

168 Where such exists (i.e. the root and the suffix having distinct meanings), the implication of one meaning (by the other) is not conceived. The powers of word-elements
(i.e. root and suffix) raise expectancy (for each other) when in combination

169 न कुर्पूण्यायणांमयोर्यस्य दुःखते ।
अतो उपालि वाचिकं सतात्सत्येव "गम्यते॥

The words “kūpa”, “sūpa” and “yūpa” have no parallelism of meaning, therefore the capacity for expressing another idea belongs to the combination of letters

170 अवात्यानानि मिलने वर्षयुत पतिकरस्यु ।
बहुता समंवेय वर्षानां निमित्त फिन्निल्युयल्ये॥

Etymological explanations of words vary, where more than one meaning is possible a derivation is stated (for each meaning)

171 वैरासिद्धार्थायास्त्रैकारिकाय: ।
कृद्धित्वस्वभावायाता निमित्तावभिसकै॥

Words like “vairā”, “vāsittha, “girv’a” and similarly “ekāgārikā” and others are explained by various people in various ways through a variety of derivations

172 यथा यथा: समाथ्यात वृक्षवाल्मीकपत्तैं ।
अविश्वा गयादेवा मिलीश्व सहस्तारिम.॥

Just as the description of a path is possible through a tree, an anthill or a mountain, explanation of a word through different concomitant features is not impossible

173 अत्यंता च समाथ्यानस्वातस्मात्तिर्जित्वमेव।
स्रियते किंशुकार्जीनामेकदेशे ज्ञाताः॥

(The basis of employing a word to denote an object is discussed) —

Descriptions of objects like a kimsuka tree are made in different forms by those who can see them in different conditions and based on the partial understanding (of them)

202 रिब्बते —च
203 —किवचिद्यते—च
204 The first two lines are omitted in manuscript ढ— obviously a slip of the scribe
205 —रण्म—च
174. कैद्यचिल्लिमच भिन्न गिरतेगंजेलेग्येमे।
गुवतेगंजेलेग्येमयिप गौरित्यागुन्यच्छितम्॥

(Similarly) different derivations of the word ‘gauh’ from ‘girati’ (to swallow), ‘garjati’ (to roar), ‘gama’ (to go), ‘guvati’ (to void by stool) or ‘gadati’ (to speak arti-
culately) have been given by different interpreters.

175क. गौरित्येव स्वरूपाऽश्च गोष्ठवव गोषु वतते।
ब्युष्या बलस्ते न वा सर्वः॥

175ख. कैद्यचिल्लिमचयमयिते॥

175a (Another view on the basis of the function of a word is given.) ‘Or the word ‘gauh’ denotes the meaning ‘cow’, by virtue of its form ‘gauh’ Not all words are etymologically derived.

175b Both (i.e. the form of the word and features of the object it denotes) are so considered (i.e. as the basis of the operation of the word) by some.

176 सामायणोपवेशश्च शास्त्रे लघुस्थमाधित।
जात्यपन्न्घं स्प्यापिर बिशेषा। प्रतिपादकः॥

In grammar (different) forms are indicated by a common form for the sake of brevity. The particular ones are indicators of this (common form) as if it were another universal.

177 अर्थाप्लो च यद्वृत्तं तत्प्रकृत्यतरं विचु।
तुल्यहं न तत्वावच्यसिमाभंशस्यते॥

When a word denotes another meaning it is a different word altogether, where a form is fixed to one meaning by convention, the same form does not get linked with another meaning.

178 भिन्नविजियरी धातु नियतसौ विषयानांतरे।
कैद्यचिल्लिमचविघुर्दै चित्र हि प्रतिपादनम्॥

178 The two roots “‘yj” and “yaj” different from each other and established as functioning in different settings are
treated in different ways by different teachers. Indeed the treatment (of things) is found in different ways.

In this way treat the word “bālavāya” as identical (‘with vidūra’) in the same way as the word “jītvāri” is. There is no (mutual) contradiction in approaching words as different (from) or as identical with each other.

In grammar roots and prefixes are assumed to be different for the sake of establishing at, etc., but their combination is (really) the root.

Thus the injunction (of the operation of at) is made from the form “samgrāmāyati” Verbs are introduced in these ways (i.e. both in combination with and separation from prefixes).

Because of this the grammatical operations involving roots and prefixes are considered to be internal.

It is the root in that form (i.e. in combination with a prefix) which is related to the nominal cases.
183. प्रयोगा" हेंसु सिद्ध सन् भेत्तथ्यों " विनियते।
प्राक् च साधनसम्बन्धातः किञ्च नैवोपजायते॥

(An objection is raised against this view) —When they (i.e. the roots) are to be employed, their meaning (i.e. the action symbolised) which is to be qualified is first accomplished before (it is so qualified), an action is not accomplished before its connection with the accomplishing means (i.e. agent, instrument, etc).

184 बातो साधनयोगस्य भाविनः प्रक्रमाणः।
बातुत्वं कर्मभावस्च तथायतवपि दृष्टताम्॥

(But), just as through an anticipated association of the root with the accomplishing means, it is (admitted to be) a root and a verb, so let the other also be (i.e. so let it be considered as being with a prefix)

185 बीजकारेषु सम्बद्धा$ यथा लाभार्थसाध्य।
वर्णादिपरिवर्त्येन फलानसमुप्सुवर्ते॥

Just as the red-dye-juice, etc., which are associated (with a tree) in its stage as a seed serves the fruit through its change of colour and the like,

186. बुधिस्वादविभिन्नव्यङ्गाः धातूपरिवर्त्याः।
अभ्यतरीृ$ क्तौ भेष्य पदकाले प्रकाशते॥

—similarly, the modification (of an action by a prefix) which is made to exist as an internal feature between the root and the prefix by virtue of their mutual relation which exists conceptually, becomes manifest at the time of the formation of the word (by their combination)
187: The nature and function of prefixes are discussed. In some places possible modifications (of the actions) not denoted by the verbs without the prefixes are revealed through their association with the prefixes like “pra” and “parā”.

188: Sometimes a prefix expresses the particular features (of the action) as its (prefix’s) own meaning or it might illuminate those features which potentially exist (in the actions themselves). Or again it is used as a co-worker of the root for bringing out its powers.

189: Those features as “going” etc., which are not understood as existing in the uncompounded roots like “sthā” are conveyed by (the prefixes) “pra” and the like through two forms of inference.

190: When the prefixes “adhā” and “parat” are not used, a root denotes a certain other action (different from that which it conveys when compounded with a prefix). This root (by itself) does not convey the uncompounded meaning just as the prefixes by themselves are (meaningless).
191. Similarly some suffixes of the svāthika type (like ‘kan’) existing in combination with other elements and coalescing with these same elements which (themselves) do not convey a meaning, function as repeating the meaning of the (same) bases

192. (Conjunctions are now discussed) — Some particles illumine (meaning), (others) express meaning (of their own) independently, some like grammatical augments, convey the meaning while in union (with the words which govern them)

193. Whether they are used before or after or in different meanings, their being illuminators (of meaning) does not alter

194. Particles, like ‘ca’ although they are words, are not used by themselves, (just as) a suffix is not used by itself, although it expresses meaning

195a. And although they refer to something aggregated there is no separateness (between them and the aggregate which
would necessitate the use of a genitive case in the context.)

195b A particle denotes a thing which does not exist as well as something which exists, as its meaning, just as an action is also denoted by something different (i.e. by a noun besides by the verb itself).

196 In the case of attributives they are connected with the words (which they qualify and) which convey particular meanings, 'ca' and the like, on the other hand, are for the sake of others, even when they convey the idea of the combined

197 (After thus discussing nouns, verbs, prefixes and particles, a discussion on karmanprivacanîyas starts with this stanza. Karmanprivacanîya is a term for certain prepositions or particles not connected with a verb but generally governing a noun (either separated from it or forming a compound with it).

Certain verbs withdraw after generating (a relationship between nouns) and thus becoming the substratum of the relation. In some places, such relationship comes into being with the verb itself heard.

---

223a The reading in the Benares text is किया कारित्त सम्बन्धों विनिविलते. This is not right. Punyaraja interprets the text as follows: तत्र कारित्त सम्बन्ध जनविला किया विनिविलते यथा राजपुरुषो इति. अति हि राज पुरुषोऽयं प्राप्तस्त स राजा पुरुष विविलति, अति सरवलक्षणम् किया आयुर्विविलक्षण सम्बन्ध जनविला विवृत्ता। I have therefore accepted the reading given in the footnote in the Benares text with a modification. The footnote reading as given in the Benares text is किया कारित्त सम्बन्धिते—
198 (A point about the prescription of the genitive case in the expression “mātuh smaranaṁ” is discussed) — There, the genitive is especially enjoined in order to prevent a compound (from being employed), and the contrary example of an instrumental is given in order that it might be seen (that the word ‘guṇāḥ’ is an instrumental and not an accusative) 68b

199 (It was stated in 197 that sometimes a verb, after effecting a relation between nouns ceases to exist in the context This stanza continues that statement) — And when the relation has come into being and the verb has withdrawn, the Karmaprayacanīya establishes the relation (as being brought about by the verb)

200. येन क्रियाप्रक्षेप स कारकविभक्तिभि ।
युक्ते वियम्या तत्स्य लिखावनुपसर्गं ॥

201a It is found that the verb ‘tisthati’ is used in the verb apratyayajayan’

201b The (Karmaprayacanīya) ‘abhī’ functions uncompounded with the verb ‘sunvati’ in the sense ‘in the direction of’ 69
202 कर्मप्रवचनीयत्व क्रियायोगे विधीयते ।
शतवादिविचिनिवृत्त्वयः स्वत्यावृत्ता विधर्मणाम् ॥

202 ‘Su’, ‘ati’, etc., which are different in characteristics are
declared to be Karmapiavacaniyas when they are asso-
ciated with verbs, in order to avoid the change of ‘sa’
etc into ‘sa’ in certain forms the sa etc being different
from the latter.

203 हेतुहेतुसमतोयोगपरिचिते अनुना कुते ।
आर्माभाद्वाध्यते प्राप्ता तृतीया हेतुक्लकणा ॥

203 (Another specific function of the Karmapiavacaniya is
stated ) —When (the Karimpravacaniya) ‘anu’ denotes
the union of a cause and effect, the instrumental which
is to function in the cause is set aside.

204 क्रियाया ड्रोतको नाय सम्बन्धस्य न वाचक ।
नापि क्रियावाक्षेि सम्बन्धस्य तु न्येव ॥

204 (This stanza rejects the views already stated about the
function of the Karmpravacaniya) —It is not an illu-
minator of the verb, it does not express a relation, nor
does it imply a verb. It defines a relation.

205 अन्यथेकान्ता सङ्गठात् सार्थकोन्यथेकत्था ।
वर्णानां पदस्थानम् युक्त नावयवां पदे ॥

205 Having thus discussed the word as occurring as the five
parts of speech, the Akhandavadin’s position and criti-
cism of the Khandha theory are again stated ) —A
collection of letters which are meaningless by themselves
can be meaningful or meaningless (in combination), if
meaningful, it is a word, and there are no parts in a word

206. पदानामस्वयस्ताना सधातो सिद्धते पुनः ।
अर्थत्तावरोधेन सम्बन्धविविगमेन च ॥

206 A combination of meaningful words varies as giving rise
to another meaning or as not having any connection among
themselves.
207 If one of two (letter-groups) is meaningful and the other is not, when they are considered in separation, (as for example kutī and ra respectively) then they do not combine into a connected word. But some others say that they do combine (into a whole) as, for instance, in the words 'kutīra' and the like.

208 Some thinkers hold that if the aggregate is meaningful, the components also should be meaningful. —According to some, an aggregate with a distinct meaning is formed or not formed from meaningful words, as in compounds and svārthika-formations (respectively).

209 Some of these have fixed meaning while in combination and have their functions known on analysis. With some others, functions are attributed to their parts based on the test of association and (absence of) dissociation.

210 Only a technical significance is intended by the statement that syllables are meaningful, isolate syllables which are (technically significant) like roots etc are not meaningful in ordinary usage.
211 The meaning of krt and taddhita suffixes by themselves is technical. It is therefore that forms ending in these have no meaning before the addition of the case endings.

212 And the distinct meaning which one finds in words ending in these suffixes (i.e., krt and taddhita) is derived from factors like meaning of adjoining words and topic-context.

213 If words and sentences are not different in character from syllables, these syllables (and not words and sentences) would be expressive (of meaning) due to their power of possessing expectancy for one another.

214 If a collection (of letters) is meaningful when it is less than the normal by one letter, then (what happens is that) the whole is understood from a fraction of it assuming that the (reduced) form is not an entirely different word.

215 Under certain conditions it (i.e., the fraction) causes re-collection of the (complete) word which expresses the meaning as if it had been actually presented by the (whole) word.

216 Just as in ‘gaurakhara’ and other such words, there does
not exist any separate meaning of the component words and no such meaning is realised during the comprehension of the meaning of the combined word,

२१७ सम्बन्धित इवार्थिता पदार्थं यूरुष्यते ।
पदार्थस्तु तत्र तथैवानुपकारकम् ॥

217—similarly in the meaning of the sentence which appears to be a combination of word-meanings, the recognition of word-meanings is of no use

२१८ समुदायायव्यव्यार्थित्वम् च वृत्तिपु ।
युग्यह्यज्ञसंस्कृयं विश्वाब्रह्मज्ञिनो ॥

218 If in complex formations the complete word and the component parts have different meanings, then there is the co-existence of contradictory meanings, namely the analytic and the synthetuc

२१९ कस्चः साधनमात्रार्थस्य अध्यावृत्त परिकल्पनेत् ।
अप्रयुक्तपद्धार्थम् बहुव्रीहो कथा भवेत् ॥

219 (Another objection to the recognition of words and word-meanings in sentences, etc., is given) —Who will consider ‘adhiri’, etc., as purely having the meaning of the (locative) case? And how can a bahuvihi compound have its meaning when the word for it is not (actually) used?

२२०क प्रसुभाब्यव्यव्यावम् चास्तय्याध्विधारणस्य ।

२२०खः तस्मात्तथात एवंको विशिष्टार्थ्यिन्विठम् ॥

220a The meanings of words like ‘prajju’ and Samyju’ are not understood through their component parts

220b Therefore the combination as a whole is connected to a specific meaning

२२१ गर्गि इत्येक एवायं बहुव्रीयेल्ल वर्तते ।
हृदस्तनोपि सद्वगतो बहुनामोखयो ॥

221 [In the next few verses (221-225) the status of a dvanda or copulative compound in the philosophy of Akhandavada is raised and established. If an expression, that is, a sentence, compound etc. is an integral speech when it
conveys an integral meaning then how can a dvandva compound convey the meaning of its components as it necessarily should by virtue of the fact that it is a dvandva compound? This question is answered also are answered in other verses (226-227) the same questions in regard to virtus (complex grammatical formations) and negative compounds The sum total of the arguments is that in all these the abstraction of component words is only a grammatical necessity, and not the logical truth] The single void 'gargâh' denotes many people Similarly a combination of words known as a dvandva compound may denote many people

222 यथेकमेव भुज्यादि प्रत्येकसाधितते ।
कियोऽव हद्दवाच्ये सवः प्रत्येक प्रविभज्यते ॥

222 Just as 'bhuy' (to eat) and other verbs get related to the parts (of a collective subject) individually, similarly the verb is conceived separately for each (component) of the meaning (of the subject) denoted by a dvandva compound

223 यत्च हद्दपवार्थस्य तच्चिवेन व्यपेक्षणा ।
साथै व्यावृत्तरूपेऽथे सवंनामसङ्क्षपता ॥

223 And so far as representing the meaning of one component of a dvandva-compound by the pronoun 'tad' is concerned (as in the example janapadatadavadvahoh) in this case, there is only the appearance of a pronoun in the meaning of the compound

224 तथा च खदिरचदे भगेशु क्रमवाणिनि ।
तथा हद्दपवार्थस्य भगेशु क्रमवर्षनम् ॥

224 Just as in cutting the khadira tree, the (act of) cutting (which is a single act) has a sequence in its parts (in the form that the bark of the tree is first cut, then the inside and so on) similarly a sequence is seen in the meanings of the components of a dvandva compound
225. Particular actions which pertain to groups are considered to function through individuals. Similar is the case of the parts of a dvandva compound.

226. In discussing, for the benefit of the untutored, complex grammatical formations with (particular) reference to their (extended) sentence-forms, the chief significance is attributed to the meaning of one or other of the (component) words.

227. Since the meaning of a negative compound is (really) indivisible, diverse conceptions of the (comparative) significance (of their parts) are given as optionals in the Bhāṣya, these are nothing more than evils which are necessitated by the grammatical explanations (of these words).

228. The rejection of all (component) meanings is shown in the case of bahuvrīhi compounds by him (i.e. the teacher) who desires the rejection of all component meanings according to the view-point that ‘the individual words in a compound give up their meanings’.

---

231  श्री  
232  श्र जन्यस्ते  
233  सन्धे  
234  क्षयस्ते  
235  वस्ते  दे
229 (The point that conceptions used in the technique of grammatical analysis may not represent the logical truth about language is still further exemplified. One may break a unified utterance into parts for the sake of explanation, but still unity is the truth.)

In grammar the meaning of the root (in a word) is expressed by the suffix in some places, when the root has ceased to function, and (sometimes) the meaning of the suffix by the roots.

230 The same meaning which two different suffixes express in the form 'pacanti' is conveyed in some places by one of them, and in some (other) places the root conveys the same meaning without either of them.

231 The same suffix-meanings which in certain inumeratory texts are considered as linked to suffixes, are designated as root-meanings in other texts.

232a Similarly in grammar words like 'udvami' and 'kari' alone are used because they are well-known (as substitutes),

232b —since the analytical explanation of words adopted in grammar is (only) for the sake of ordinary usage.

233a It is Unreality which is described in the scriptures (like grammar) through various explanations.

236 वा निवृत्तः
233b And Reality itself remains unaffected by these differences of textual explanations.

234 अनिबद्ध निमित्तेषु निर्पाल्यम् फल यथा।
तथा विद्यायनाल्येऽरम्भः प्रवेष्यते॥

234 Just as an effect is not (definably) connected with its cause, nor is it describable, similarly the true knowledge which is indescribable is pointed out as having grammar as its means of realisation.

235 के यथाभास हि बागश प्रतिपाल समहते।
235ब स्वभाव इव चानात्मिकथ्यासो व्यवस्थं॥

235a It is practice (of grammar) which helps to create understanding in the meaning of words.
235b This practice is considered as unreal like the beginningless nature (of things).

236 उद्देशये सातार्य परमाणुपिँडित।
तथावापित युक्तमन्येववेव युत॥

236 (This beginningless and unreal nature of things is illustrated.) —The untutored imagines an atom as having parts and a whole having parts as being linked to other parts (of which it really is not made).

237 घटाविद्वद्वाललोकः परिविध्रोदसीयते।
समारम्भज्ञ स्रावा भावमास्तिस्य श्रद्धा शास्त्रत्स॥

237 The world is understood as limited from the sight of pots, etc. And because objects have a beginning, the timeless Brahman is (erroneously) understood as having a beginning.

238 उपया विश्वमार्या बलानामपलापना:।
असात्ये वर्तति सत्यत्वा तत् सत्यं समिहते॥

238 Means are intended as a concealment of the truth for the sake of the unwise who are learning. Remaining on the path of Unreality one strives after Reality.

239 अन्यथा प्रतिपाल यद्यन्ययुक्तकसम्।
कियते ते निर्वर्तते तत्मा सत्तस्तत्र नाध्येत॥

239 After grasping the meaning (of a word) in a certain form.
through the comprehension of the word, the same meaning is again grasped in the sentence in a different form

240 उपात्ता बहुवा्प्यता येंवत्ते प्रतिषेधनम्।
किंयते ते निर्वर्तते तत्समातास्त्र नाथ्येतु॥

240 Of the many meanings (of words) presented (to the reader of a sentence) those which in the end are repudiated (by the meaning of the sentence) are not operative. Therefore they should not be resorted to there (i.e. in the understanding of the meaning of the sentence).

241 बृक्षो नास्तिृति वाच्य च विशिष्टाभावलक्षणम्।
नाथ्यन्त बुढै सम्बन्धो निवृत्तरविषिद्ठे॥

241 [The impossibility of recognising words in sentences and word-meanings in the meaning of the sentence in the ultimate sense, is shown with reference to a sentence like Vrkso nasti (there is no tree)]. If we recognise ‘na’ as a separate word in the ultimate sense, what does it negate? The sentence ‘vrkso nasti’ has a particular negation as its significance. The meaning (of the word ‘vrksa’) cannot be considered to be connected in the mind (to the meaning of the particle ‘na’), because that would mean the negation of something which exists.

242 विचार्यदाःपतिपति च यद्यस्तीत्वपथर्गते॥
242 अशाल्ल्वाच्या सा बुढानिर्वर्त्तेतिस्थिता कथम्॥

242a If, when the sentence is understood analytically, the knowledge ‘there is’ (a tree) is formed, how can that concept which is non-verbal in character be removed (by the particle ‘na’).

243 अथ यद्यास्तीत्वमुत्पाद्य तत्सम्बिद्येति नभक् हृतम्।
243 नवन्तियो व्यापरामेदेवतिस्मृतिभावावगति: कथम्॥

243a Or again, the knowledge that there is (a tree) is falsified by ‘na’ (according to one view).

241 —प्रात्याः—व्य
243b How then, can the knowledge of an absence (of the tree) be obtained if the function of ‘na’ is modified like this?

244a Again can it be said that the particle ‘na’ functions in isolation, without reference to any of the sectional notions referred to above? No.

The use of the substratum, i.e., vṛksa be explained by the Bheda-school as follows —

Again, it may be said, that it (i.e., ‘vṛksa’) alone shall be its (i.e., the particle’s) substratum. (The defect of this position is that) a direct statement, then, becomes a restrictive statement.

245a Or (it becomes) a statement which brings out an implied restriction. Or it might become a repetition.

245b (Therefore if the sentence ‘vṛksa nāṣṭi’ is interpreted in the way stated in 244a, then) — only one word (i.e., ‘na’) will have meaning there, others will have no meaning.

246a (The argument against the recognition of word-meanings is further illustrated) —

Words ‘udahārī’ and others in the sentence ‘udahārī bhagīni’ etc enter into an incompatible kind of relationship (among themselves), and when the sentence is completed the meaning of the sentence is comprehended in a different form.
247. 

248. (The Pada-vādin’s position is again stated for repudiation —) Or it is the un-integrated meaning which remains in the words, and it is (also) the means for the construction of the integrated sentence-meaning

249. (But) that (meaning) which originally remains unintegrated in the words, and is then gradually built up is not any different from it, since it is like something restrung after being broken

250. (Granting that words are realities within the scheme of analysis, the question of primary and secondary signification of words is taken up for discussion.)

Other investigators say that the same word has more than one meaning, they say that the same word has many meanings due to various causes.

251a The simultaneity (of the functioning of the word in all its meanings) is avoided and the word is established in one meaning at a time, through (such contextual factors as) the meaning (of other words) or situation context or due to association with other words


252. यथा सात्रानिमान् पिण्डो गोशवेदनाभिधीयते ।
तथा स एव गोशवे वाहीकेत्यि व्यवस्थित ॥

Just as the mass (of flesh) with dew-lap, etc., is named by the word ‘gauḥ’, similarly the same word ‘gauḥ’ is established as conveying the meaning ‘a Vāhika’ (name of a tribe or person in the tribe).

253. समश्वतेस्तु तस्यच शब्दस्यानेकःधर्मण ।
प्रसिद्दंभेदावः गौणतः मुख्यतः चोपवर्ष्यते ॥

On the basis of the difference in the currency of the (corresponding) meanings, the same word is described as primarily and secondary, it having all potentialities and several aspects.

254. एको मन्त्रस्वाध्यात्मस्मदिवेद्वस्मधिविष्लु ।
असदृशुरेण सर्वां भिन्नवाचिकःधर्मवर्षित ॥

Thus the same hymn having various meanings and possessing different potentialities, is established as functioning in regard to the self, to a god and to the sacrifice, without its functions getting mixed up.

255. गोक्तवात्पुष्के वाहीके निपततात्वकःधिविष्यते ।
अर्थामात्र विपयत्स्त शब्द स्वायें व्यवस्थित ॥

The attribution of cow-ness on the Vāhika for (certain) reasons is desired by some (Thus) only the object denoted has changed, the word remains fixed in its meaning (namely cow-ness).

256. तथा स्वरूप शब्दाना सवर्येवनुष्मयते ।
अर्थामात्र विपयत्स्त स्वरूपे तु स्थिति-ौऽतिस्तिथरा ॥

Again the form of the word is associated with all its meanings. Only the objects denoted change. The word permanently remains linked to its (own) form (as its meaning).

244 —सत्तवहिधित घ
245 तु श्रुति स्थि—घ
257. एकत्र तु स्वरूपत्वाचछन्दयोगोऽणसुखयो ।
प्रातःरत्नःमेदेदिपि भेदमार्गानुवधिः ॥

Those who adopt the line of the plurality of words say that the one-ness between principal and secondary words is but formal, and that they are fundamentally different.

258क. सामिघेन्यन्तर चैवमावृत्ताबनुष्यते ॥

258ख. मन्त्राचें विनियोगेन लभते भेदमूह्वत् ॥

258a Thus a different sāmsthemi hymn is associated with (each) repetition (of the hymn).

258b Hymns become different by being employed just as they do when altered by a substitution.

259क. तायाम्यायान्तरायेः पतचतं करिच्चेव तु ॥

259ख. अनर्थकान्ता पाठो वा शोषस्त्रवयू प्रतियते ॥

259a (Nevertheless), they too (that is, those too which get their being through repetition) are Vedic hymns, only, certain ones are actually mentioned there (i.e., in the texts).

259b Or (alternatively) it is those which have no use as Vedic hymns which are mentioned there (Through them) the remaining ones come to mind.

260क. शाब्दस्वरूपमयंस्तु ॥

260ख. अत्यन्तेवेदस्तवाः तत्सम्बन्धातु तद्यंत ॥

260a Others describe that when a hymn is recited, its own form is its meaning.

260b Hence all hymns are totally different from each other and those other hymns (which are produced, so to say, from the recitation of the mentioned hymns) are also different from each other, they having their distinct forms, through their connection with the mentioned hymns.

246 कित्विचेव तु —च
261. अन्या संस्कारसावित्री कर्मण्यत्वा प्रश्नयते।
अन्या अपप्रयश्चिता सा त्वं केवल प्रश्नते॥

261 The Sāvitrī hymn which is the source of purification is one, a different hymn is employed in sacrifice, and a different one is employed in the contexts of muttering hymns. But all these appear to be the same.

262 अर्थस्वरूपं शब्दानां स्वरुपाः संकिरणायते॥
262व वाकवस्तया वाकायाः संकिरणवाच्यः॥

262a The functioning of words in their meaning is through their forms.
262b And the functioning of a sentence in conveying the meaning of the sentence is through its dependence on nothing else (other than the form of a sentence.)

263 अनेकार्थ्यार्थस्वरूपम् थे शब्दस्यातुपायते।
सिद्धायिन्धिन्ता तेना गौणस्मृत्य प्रकाशता॥

263 Those who follow the idea that the same word possesses several meanings base their conclusion regarding the meaning being primary or secondary on its being well-known or otherwise.

264 अर्थप्रकरणप्रेक्षा को यथा शब्दान्तरं सह।
यूक्त प्रत्ययाद्यत्तरं तं गौणसमपे विदु॥

264 Others think that a word which conveys its meaning depending on the meaning of other words or situation context or by association with other words, is called secondary.

265 शुद्धयोजनार्थे स्वार्थ्य प्रतिग्रहयो यथा गम्यते।
स मुख्य इति विज्ञेयो स्वपनात्मवन्धन॥

265 (The definition of a word which conveys a primary meaning is given according to the view of the Samgraha.) That word from which, when it is pronounced as an isolate, its own well-known meaning is understood and
which depends solely on its form (in conveying this meaning) should be known as primary.

266 यक्ष्यायथ प्रयोगेन यत्नदिव नियुक्ते ।
तमप्रतिष्ठ मन्यते गौणार्थिभिनविधिनम् ॥

266 That word which is made to convey the meaning as if with difficulty, though the use of another word is considered obscure and connected to a secondary meaning.

267 स्वर्णः प्रवर्तत्त्माभ्य प्रस्थार्थः योजनान्यते ।
निमित्त तत्र मुख्य स्थानः निमित्ती गौण हृद्यते ॥

267 When a word (in conveying a secondary meaning) depends on itself as functioning in its own meaning (i.e., the principal meaning), then the principal meaning acts as the basis (for the secondary meaning) and the secondary meaning is based on it.

268 पुरात्तितिः सन्देशेः यो वर्तते विरोधिनः ।
अर्थप्रकरणपैक तयोर्गवधारणाम् ॥

268 (Contextual derivation of meaning will not always necessarily lead to a primary—secondary classification. As for example, The words ‘purā’ and ‘ārād’ each of which conveys meanings which are different and mutually contradictory are understood through the meanings (of other words) and the situation context, (but both meanings of each word is a primary meaning) (purā—distant or near in time ārād—distant or near in time).

269 वाक्यस्थार्थत्त्पतिवाष्टमभर्ताः प्रकविते ।
शब्दान्तरेण सम्बन्धः कस्यक्षणपैक तत्त ॥

269 (Siddhānta or the Akhanda view) When the analysis of word-meanings from the meaning of the sentence is artificial, how can any (word) properly have relation with another word?

270 यन्त्रायेक पदं दृष्टं चरितास्तिक्रिय वचित्त ।
तद्व वाक्यान्तरस्याद्वाहुं तदव्येन युक्तस् ॥

270 Where it is seen sometimes that a single word possesses a complete verb ‘to be’ (implied in it), that word is
considered as a complete sentence, and it is not constructed with another word

२७१. यथा कोणसिति घसि गौरवं इति चौच्छते।

प्रश्न एवं किष्टा तत्र प्रकाश्या दर्जनाविष्कर।

271 As the answer ‘cow’ or ‘horse’ is given to the question ‘what is it’, words like ‘drsyate’ (seen) are included in the question itself (i.e., koyam who, what is it)

२७२क नैवाविष्कर्त्व धर्मणा न्यूनता वा प्रयोजिका।

२७२ख आविष्कर्त्वपि मन्यते प्रति इन्यूनता कवचित्।

272a (Another view on primary-secondary classification of meaning is stated) The criterion (for judging whether a word is principal or secondary with reference to a meaning) is not whether it conveys more or less of the attributes (of the object denoted)

272b Conveying more (such attributes) is considered as the basis of the word being well-known (in some places) while, in some other places, conveying less is so considered

२७३. जातिशब्दोद्वेष्टनेणापि जाति यत्र प्रयूज्यते।

सम्बन्धविश्वासान्तरित्तं गौणपरे बिदु।

273 (Other views on primary-secondary classification.) Others consider that a secondary meaning is that to convey which a word whose significance is a universal is used without its having to signify the universal, on the basis that it (the object) has attributes similar to those of the individual associated with the universal

२७४. विश्वासाविवार्त्तय यत्रार्तिततासिव।

मन्यते स गवाविस्तर गौण इत्युक्तते कवचित्।

274 Where a meaning (of a word) is taken to be another apparently by mistake, then (such) words like ‘gauh’ are considered by some as ‘secondary’
275 Just as objects like a plough, a sword or a pestle which possess specific forms and powers are invariably taken as instruments of specific actions,

276 —but when used for other actions they do not possess these powers, and are invariably associated with their (proper) actions right from their forms,

277 —similarly a word which has its meaning settled on the basis of its formal capacity is used (to convey) a different meaning by virtue of a (different) potentiality

278 (How then is the primary-secondary distinction to be understood in this case?) —
When on merely listening, one understands the word as having a (certain) meaning, that meaning is considered to be principal, and the meaning is secondary where it has to be explained

279 When words like “gauh’ ‘yusmat’ and ‘mahat’ convey a different meaning (from what they ordinarily mean) through the operation of the suffix ‘cvr’, there we find the identification of the principal meaning with the other meaning

248 नियन्त ख
249 त मुख्यस्व मन्यन्ते च, ढ
250 संज्ञाच —च
280 (An objection arising from the idea in the stanza above is stated) —
Bigness and Whiteness remain in their original state
But that (state) when looked at in different ways become
the basis of the secondary nature (of the meanings of the words) 76

281 (Yet another objection is answered) —
Words like ‘Agni’ and ‘Soma’ which are connected to
their forms (as their meanings) are secondary when they
are used as names of persons because they are well-known
as the names of gods 77

282 On the other hand, the word ‘Agni’ used as (an abbre-
viated) substitute for the word ‘Agni-datta’, having given
up its own meaning conveys a secondary meaning since
it (also) conveys the meaning of the word ‘Datta’

283 If their etymological derivation is approached from dif-
ferent angles there is the existence and the non-existence
of the augment ‘sut’ in words like ‘Hariscandra’ 76

284 If words which have become established as names of
sages and the like are used to denote some one different

281 अनिस्वादमयि शब्दो येः स्वरूपिनित्वाद् स्वार्थपोषणः ॥
282 अनिवर्ततत् योङ्गिनिः स्यात्तत्र स्वार्थपोषणः ॥
283 निमित्तमेवात्प्राकाशः स्वभाव्यस्तिकर्मणि ॥
284 ऋष्यादृः प्राप्तसस्कारो य शब्दोज्ज्येन युक्तते ॥

---

281—च
282—च
283—च
(i.e., an ordinary person) then grammatical changes
effect in the body of such words (when they mean
sages, etc.) do not revert (although the words themselves
are in the second instance used in their secondary signifi-
cation and therefore in the light of what has been said
above, grammatical operations should not take place in
these cases)

285. अत्यन्ततिपरिवर्तनापि यदा योद्धवत्सवार्थायते।
यथासम्प्रत्ययः शब्दस्तत्र मुख्य प्रवत्तते॥
285 (The problem of primary—secondary classification is
approached from a different angle) —
Even when a meaning completely antithetical (to the
normal meaning of the word) is conveyed by it the
word is functioning in a primary capacity since the mind
is at that time comprehending it in that way

286. यत्रपि प्रत्ययाधीनस्वतंतत्तवाधारणस्।
न सर्वं प्रत्ययस्तिप्रसिद्धं इव जायते॥
286 (Arguments are given now to show that here too classi-
fication of words into primary and secondary is possible)
Although the comprehension of the true nature of an
object is dependent on how it is conceived, conception
is not everything in it, as is evident) in the case of an
imperfect comprehension of an object

287. दर्शन सलिले तुल्य मृगतृणायंविद्वान्।
तुल्यते दर्शनाविद्वान् न जल मृगतृणिका॥
287 Seeing (an object) in water resembles seeing (it) in a
mirage But while its apprehension, etc., (in the two
media) are thus, similar, water is not mirage

288 यदसाधारण कायम प्रसिद्ध रज्जुस्पर्यो।
तेन मेदये वर्षाचेताय प्रतिपक्षास्त्रयोज्यते॥
288 What effect there is which a rope and a serpent have not
in common, by that is determined a difference between
them in spite of their similar appearance (in certain conditions like twilight)

289 A difference (in an object) effected through a cause which caused a contrary appearance of (such) a well-known object, is also considered unreal

290 And digging, etc., are not possible in the place where a picture (of a mountain etc.) showing elevations and depressions, resembles the mountain

291 It is possible for a (real) wheel to have continuous contact with the hand (which holds it), but that is not the case with an imaginary wheel of fire caused by a revolving torch, it breaks when it is touched

292 While a rampart, a fort, or a turret in a real city can be touched, covered and so on, the same cannot be done with those in a magic city

293 Actions of the type performed by the original animals are not performed by their models made of clay Therefore (the suffix) ‘kan’ is added to such words (for forming the words which denote the models)

294 A large space is occupied by real mountains and the like But their images are found to occupy only a small space
While real poison, etc., can cause death, they are not able to produce the same effects in a dream.

A thing which appears otherwise, due to differences in time, place, or the sense-organs (with which it is perceived), is, nevertheless, finally understood in the form in which it is well-known to the world.

The knowledge whose source is an error, and the knowledge which is not about the world (of sense-experience) are beyond words. Words are instruments of empirical knowledge.

When a lamp is used associated with a pot with a specific purpose (of revealing the pot), the lamp also reveals another (additional) object (like a wall) in association with its original specific purpose.

Similarly whatever (particular) meaning, out of the many meanings (of a word), operates as the (specific) cause for the employment of the word, the word also
(105)

(incidentally) conveys meanings other than that operative one

300 निष्ठ-वन्य यथार्थोऽन्यर्थमपपादितम्।
                      धूममध्यन्तिरैत जनयत्येकसाधनम्॥

300 Just as the churning of two kindling sticks performed to produce fire produces also the unintended smoke, which has the same cause as the fire,

301 तथा शब्दोपि कौस्तुम्भत्तत्त्वायायं विवक्षिते।
                      अविवक्षितस्वर्थं प्रकाशयति सनिघे॥

301 —similarly, when a certain meaning which is to be conveyed is intended (when using a word), the word also conveys the unintended meaning due to its proximity (with the intended one) ॥

302 यथेवात्यन्तसस्तत्त्वकुमोिनं न शक्यते।
                      तथाशब्दोपि सत्त्वस्त्री प्रविवेकतु न शक्यते॥

302 Just as it is impossible to discard an object which is in close connection with another similarly a word which is in (intimate) connection with all its meanings cannot be divided (in its function)

303 “क्ष्यर्थानि सनिघानेपि। दति बैया प्रकाशने।
                      प्रयोजकोऽर्थं शब्दस्त्रूपांशेलेपि शस्यते॥

303 Even when unequred meanings are present and revealed, the meaning which is operative is accepted word-from remaining the same

304 क्वचिद्दृष्टप्राप्तत्त्वत्त्वात्मानमविवक्षितसम्।
                      क्वचित्तावित्तस्यस्येपां प्रतिपत्तावकारणम्॥

304 (A discussion follows about the relation between primary meaning and secondary meaning) —

In some places the distinction of meaning into primary and secondary is not intended And in some (other) places even the presence of a secondary meaning does
not act as the cause for the word to operate (in the context)

305 यच्चानुपातः १२ शब्देन तत्कस्मिन्दिच्छत्रतीयते ।
क्वचित्रप्रथानमेवायथाः भवत्यन्यस्य लक्षणेऽ ॥

305 In some (other) places the meaning which the word actually conveys is the one which it does not verbally indicate. Elsewhere the principal meaning points to another meaning.

306 आश्यात तद्विंत्यध्यस्य यक्तिकिन्न्वुपद्दार्थकम् ।
गुणप्रथानमभवस्य तत्र वृत्ते विपर्ययः ॥

306 When the verb conveys the idea of a taddhita, the primary and secondary meaning are seen to exchange their status.

307क निदेशे चित्त्वस्फाना सत्त्वार्थानमकारणम् ।
307ख प्रमाणसेव हस्तवाहनुपात प्रतीयते ॥
307a (Even) when gender and number are expressed, their presence is not the operative cause (for the word to function in the context).
307b In the expression "a short vowel" etc. what is understood is a mātra, and this is not stated.

308 हस्तस्वादैः च यथृष्ट तत्त्वससिद्धावपि ।
हस्तस्य लक्षणायत्तात्त्वविवाचित्तेऽ ॥

308 And when it is stated "half of a short vowel" this is understood in the same way (i.e., as meaning a mātra) even in the contexts of long and prolonged vowels, since the expression "short vowel" is used in a representative sense.

309क दीर्घाशुभाय तस्य स्यात् साक्ष्या वा विशेषणम् ।
309ख जातेवा लक्षणा यस्मातसवं भस्तपर्णवत् ॥
309a (Three ways of interpreting the word (ardhahrasvam' (half of a short vowel) in the sūtra referred to above are discussed.) —

259 Stanzas 305, 306 and 307 a are omitted in manuscript
It (i.e., the word ‘ardha’) applies also to the long and the prolonged (vowels, apart from applying to the short vowel), Or it might qualify (and apply to) a मात्रा

309b Or again a class might also be understood by implication from it

310 गत्त्वयं वृक्ष्यता सूर्यं इति काल्यं लक्षणे।
नावयतां कालं इत्येवत्सोपायमभवतीयते॥

310 (This stanza illustrates the point stated in the second half of 307) —
‘We must go now. Look at the sun’—when time is indicated by implication in this way the idea ‘know the time’ is conveyed through its means

311 विभवत्तयः वर्त्तमानमविशेषेण निनिध्याते।
सामान्यमात्रायं शब्द्येऽं कस्चिच्छात्रतिपादक॥

311 (The same idea is further illustrated) —
In the injunction, ‘Pierce without a bow’ a general instrument is indicated by the particular. The basis of the capacity (for the instrument to pierce) is provided for by any (object)

312 काकेन्नो रक्ष्यता सापिरिति बालोपिंची चोबित।
उपवातपरं बाले न महाविष्यों न रक्षित॥

312 A boy who is instructed to protect clarified butter from crows does not prevent himself from protecting it from dogs and the like, the (instructing) sentence having the significance of protecting (the clarified butter), in general

313 प्रकाश्यन शारावाना स्थालीना रूपं मार्ज्यं तथा।
अनुकूलमपि रूपेण भृश्क्यज्ज्त्वात्मतीति॥

313 (Sometimes secondary ideas are conveyed as accessories to the principal meaning without making an actual statement of them) —
(From the very expression ‘Give him food’) the (ideas

260 स्थानगर्माणे —व
of the) washing of the plates and the scrubbing of the pots are conveyed although they are not mentioned by words because they form accessories to the act of eating

314 वातावटकरणावद्धे चित्तावदेशकालत्।
शब्दार्थिः प्रविष्कृतान्ते न रूपादेव केवलात्॥

314 (The factors which help to determine the meaning of a word are now discussed.) —
The meanings of words are determined from (their) syntactical connection (in the sentence), situation-context, the meaning of another word, propriety, place, and time, and not from their mere form

315 साहचर्य विप्रयोगस्व साहचर्य विरोधिता।
অর্থঃ প্রচলিত লিঙ্গ শব্দস্বাচ্ছন্দ সতিষ্ঠি।

315 (Another list) (Constant) association (of two things), (their) dissociation, company, and hostility, the meaning (of another word), situation-context, evidence from another sentence, and the proximity of another word

316 भेदपर्षेपरि साह्याद्विवार्त्यार्थै प्रतिपल्ल्ष।
नियता भान्तिभव्यविकित शब्द प्रकरणाविभि॥

316 Even according to the view of the plurality of the word (i.e., in the view that with each meaning a word becomes a different entity although it may retain its phonetic form,) words which have the same form but which, on realisation are found to be different in meaning have their meanings understood after they are determined by means of situation-context and the like

261 अथप्रकरणालिल्ज्ञादी —ष
262 अथप्रकर —इ
263 After this verse, the following verse is found which is not found in the Benaras text (८)
सामर्थ्यप्राप्ति देश कालो ब्रह्मस्वरादय ।
शब्दार्थवाच्चनचेतहैं सिद्धिप्रमुतिहेतु॥
264 —पद्योष्णु —ष
317 Words, which, according to their application in one way or another, are either nouns or verbs though of identical form, do not have the meaning which they are to convey understood from their form alone (but also from context etc).

318 The employment of praise and censure as incentives to action and inaction is understood by a clever hearer as being not literally intended.

319 That action which has been enjoined (in the Vedas) as productive of result tangible or intangible is praised, and praise is only an incentive to the performer.

320 Just as a child is dissuaded from crying by the threat of a tiger and the like (eating it), similarly an evil result (of the non-performance of a sacrificial action) is stated, which is not true.

321 When an evil result of this sort is laid down, no wise man performs an action (thus) prohibited, after avoiding it (i.e., the evil result).

322 The prohibition 'Do not eat (puroduśa) with the teeth'
should not be set aside by avoiding the serpents through effective spells and medicines

323. वचनचित्तसमाख्यान कियते स्तुतिनिन्नयो ।
तत्त्वपि च प्रवृत्तिः च निवृत्तिः चोपविविधतेः ॥

323 In some places, praise and censure are made as the real meanings (of the passages), but even in these places action and abstention from action are enjoyed.

324. रूप सर्वपदार्थानां वाक्यार्थोपनिविष्टनम् ।
324 च सापेक्षा ये तु वाक्यार्थं पदार्थं रेखा ते समा ॥

324a The nature of all word-meaning is dependent on the meaning of the sentence.
324b That meaning of a sentence (i.e., of a clause) which is itself dependent (on the meaning of other sentences) is comparable to the meaning of a word.

325. वाक्य तत्त्वं मन्यते यत्च चरितकाॅम् ।
325a A single word which has a verb implied in it is also considered as a sentence (and therefore is a final reality as an utterance). ۸۲

325 आलोक्यात्मकं नियतं साधनं यत्र गम्यते॥
325b That verb in which a specific nominal category is
325a (automatically) understood (as existing by implication) is also called a sentence because it has a completed meaning. ۸۳

268 After this, the manuscript ध gives two additional lines. They are

अन्तर्यन्त कियाश्बद्ध
वाक्यादेवानिविश्वानात्

269. —ाप्सार्थ—ध
326b (To the Mimāṃsaka, a single word-utterance is not an integral sentence. According to him, in such cases too, the meaning of the sentence is made up through the addition of word-meanings. He expounds the theory of srutāthāpatti in this connection.)

The act of intellection in which the uttered word intervening (between itself and the unuttered word) and working in association with the unuttered word is considered as causing the comprehension of the meaning of the letter through inference.

327a integral sentence  According to him, in such cases too the meaning of the sentence is made up through the addition of word-meanings  He expounds the theory of srutāthāpatti in this connection.

327b (The grammarians' objection to such inference is given.)

328a When a certain utterance is made and a meaning is conveyed through it, that meaning is considered as the meaning of that utterance alone. None else is the definition of meaning.

328b (Cases of utterances conveying the meaning of the unuttered also are given.) In the case of secondary words with a verbal significance, that action (which is the meaning) of the verbs whose place they occupy is understood. And the sense of 'gone' etc., is understood from indeclinables like 'ṁhi' themselves in complex combinations.

270 After this the manuscript gives the following stanza—

अपरे तु पदाघात सर्वप्रतिक्रियानां
शब्दात्तरार्थिन्यस्मातः प्रस्तुतयाच ।

271 यथा प्रतीतयात्—व
329b (If thus, the meaning of the sentence 'vrksastusthadi' can be obtained from the utterance of the word 'vrksah' then why use the word 'tisthati' at all in such utterances as 'vrksastusthadi'? —a question put to the grammarian.)

They (i.e., the word 'vrksah' as meaning an object as its referent, and the word 'vrksah' as an utterance implying the verb "tisthati") are two different pieces and are comparable to synonyms in everyday language. And their own meanings are determined by the meaning of the accompanying words, situation-context, etc.  

331a Words which are means of the understanding (of the meaning of the sentence) for each individual person are not necessarily connected directly to the thing meant.  

332 (If meaning of an utterance is what is understood when the utterance is made (327b and 328a) then non-comprehension of meaning or comprehension of a false-meaning can also form meanings of utterance.) Even when there is no comprehension of meaning (from a word) or when a wrong meaning is comprehended, such words remain fixedly connected to their own meanings.
(Therefore the Mimāmsaka re-states the ‘Srūtārthāpatti-view stated in 326b and 327a )
When the word ‘dvāram’ (door or way) in the accusative is head, either (the meaning) ‘close the door’ or (the meaning) ‘allow to enter the door’ is obtained according to the situation context, in accordance with the intention of the speaker

(The grammarian’s view that the one-word utterance ‘vrksa’ which is a sentence conveys the meaning of ‘vrksasthitat’ without bringing the unuttered word in the context is criticised by the Mimāmsaka) Since a word (like ‘vrksah’) symbolises a means (i.e., the word-meaning which is the means to the realisation of the meaning of the sentence) and is connected to an existent (as its meaning), it cannot convey the meaning (of a sentence like ‘vrksasthitat’) which is principal and is to be accomplished

(The Mimāmsaka re-states the Śrūti thāpatti-position) — It (i.e., the word ‘vrksah’), having expressed its meaning alone, retires with expectancy, and its meaning which is connected (to another meaning) brings to light the proximity (of the latter)

(The grammarian criticises the Mimāmsaka’s view) —

278 Manuscript 7 does not give the second half of this stanza beginning with nārāyaṇādhvastus etc.
Since the other meaning is not specifically given, the proximity of another word cannot be obtained from the (uttered) word, nor the proximity of the word from the meaning of the uttered word, nor the proximity of the meaning (of the unuttered word) from the (uttered) word

337. नष्टरूपपरिवार्यात्माकारित वर्णवाचिनः
यदि प्राप्त प्रधानतः युग्यप्रभावस्थियोः

337 (Another criticism of the grammarian’s position is made by the Mimamsaka vrksah is a noun, tisthati is a verb How can the one convey the meaning of the other also?) If the verb whose form has, so to speak, disappeared is also brought to light by the word (in the accusative) which conveys (the idea of) the object, then there shall be the simultaneous presence as primary ideas (in the same word) of ‘becoming’ and ‘existence’ (i.e., the verbal and the nominal notions) 88

338. क. तेन्तु नामसहरूपवाच्यात्माकारितयोऽपवष्ण्यते
338. a. अवस्थागतिरिववाच्याववाच्याविभाज्यते

338a (The Grammarian replies)—
The verb is described by them (i.e., by the teachers of the school of grammar) as having a form similar to the noun

338b And usage is distinguished on the evidence of the principle of association and (absence of) dissociation

339. क. न च चापि रूपात्मकवेदे साधकवति निवर्तते
339. ख. अर्थे पश्चोत्तरीयोऽयथा सामर्थ्यतिः प्रसिद्धत्तेऽ

339a Even when there is doubt (as to the proper meaning of a word), due to its having the same form in its several occurrences, the expressives power of the word is not affected

\[ \underline{279.} \quad \text{वादिना ख, घ} \]
\[ \underline{280.} \quad \text{स्थायिक क्रम्यते —घ} \]
\[ \underline{281.} \quad \text{रिति —घ} \]
339b As is found in the case of the meaning of (the expression) ardham pasoh (half of the sacrificial animal), in the same way it (i.e., expressive capacity of words) is decided on the basis of competency as the factor.

340 सर्ब सत्वपद शुद्ध विद्याविनिवत्तनम्।
सत्वगुण च विभक्तोऽर्थ तत्त्वार्थोऽन पूर्वम्यथादि॥

341 (Another objection against the grammarian’s Akhandaposition — If all ‘existence-words’ (i.e., nouns) are linked with ‘becoming’ (i.e., the verbal notion) in combination, and have no separate meanings as isolates,

341. क्रियाप्रक्षेपतामाहात नाम्ना सत्त्वप्रव्हानला।
चत्वारि पदजातानि सर्वमेतदिव्यते॥

341 —then all such (statements of grammar) as “a verb primarily denotes an action”, “nouns primarily denote existence” and “there are four kinds of words” stand contradicted.

342 वाक्यस्त्रृ वृद्धो नित्यान्तसंयोगः च लौकिकरू॥
वृद्धेऽवृद्ध नात्स्तीति ॥६७वाताक्षयुक्तवर्गायनौ॥

342 (Grammarian’s answer) Vārttākṣa and Audumbara-yana hold that there are no four classes of words, when it is considered that the sentence is real (only) in the mind, and that its being linked with word-meanings is only (a matter of) ordinary practice.

343 व्याप्तिमाद्व लघुस्वचवं व्यवहार पदाश्रयः।
लोके गास्त्रे च कार्यार्थ विभागनेव कल्पित॥

343 In life and in grammar, the description (of a sentence) in terms of words, is (both) wide (in its use) and is (also) easy and it is artificially employed, following (the technique of) analysis.

_—————--—————--—————--—————--—————--————--———--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--——--—
In life, listeners do not obtain (the meaning of the sentence) as associated with word-meanings. Therefore other than the sentence, there is nothing which is more than (a mere matter of) ordinary practice.

The meaning of words not determinable (by themselves) because of the lack of specification in their forms is determined only from the sentence on the basis of evidence stated elsewhere.

(A discussion of the problem of rules and exceptions follows. This naturally is connected with the grammarian's central theme of the integral nature of utterances, and their meanings.) An exception which is verbally made in a general rule, (verbally made because it forms part of the significance of the general rule) but apparently without a specific verbal statement of it, is stated separately in a statement of exception and its meaning accrues elsewhere (i.e., to the general rule).

The injunction about sour-milk for Brahmins is previously made excluding the Mātharas (and the statement of) the Māthara being connected with curds declares this as a real fact.

It is considered by some that a rule and an exception
form one sentence (statement) even if they have several verbs. Only, they appear to be different sentences.

349a Thus a restriction or prohibition forms part of the general injunction, and since this is so, commentators say that the prohibition of ‘luk’ (in Panini Chapter VI) forms part of the enjoining of ‘luk’ in Chapter 2.

350 (Here the upholder of the doctrine that such sentences are really distinct intervenes) —

When the sentences have no expectancy (for anything outside) and are at rest so to speak, they are independent of one another. Therefore, since there is the absence of a relation of one being for the sake of the other, how can they together form one sentence?

351 (The upholder of the view that the two form one sentence replies) —

A special rule causes the remaining part of a sentence (i.e., the prohibitory sentence here) to be inferred because it (the special rule) needs such inference. Therefore, there is in the object to be prohibited as much expectancy as there is in the object of the special rule.

352 (If the recognition of parts in a sentence and the meaning of the sentence is wrong, the recognition of parts in a word is equally meaningless.) There is no elision of a part of a proper name. A proper name which is coined in a particular form does not relinquish that form.
(119)

358. एकदेशास्तम्यत्विभिः सदृश्यं जायते कथः।
कथं प्रतीयमान स्वाधःक्षबोऽर्धस्याभिधायकः।

358 (This view is criticised) —
(But), through a part (of the word) how can there occur a recollection of the aggregate which is different from it? How can a word which is recollected convey a meaning?

359 एकदेशायाश्च तत्तैलिप्यं नम न चः समविपत्ता।
अनुविश्वसिद्धां शब्दं सतातु समविपस्थिता।

359 (The author’s doctrine is stated) —
Words which have the appearance of being parts of a name, and have their own marks (for distinguishing them) are fixed (as parts) in names because they are produced along with the names.

360 साधारणतः भार्गवादिगाः सामवेदिन्यायतः।
तेषा ये साधवस्तेषु शास्त्रेऽ लोपाभि विद्यते॥

360 Words (like ‘Deva’ and ‘Datta’) which are ambiguous in meaning due to their having a common form (for different meanings), which nevertheless convey (through combination) a fixed meaning (like Devadatta) by virtue of their fixed capacity and are, therefore, considered correct usage are enjoined for elision and the like in grammar.

361 तुव्यामानुसूचायतो ज्ये भा य इत्यसाधव।
न हृद्वाचार्यको शास्त्रे तेषु व्याख्याविवस्मृति॥

361 (But) parts like ‘jye’) (from ‘Jayestha, for instance), ‘drā’ (from ‘drāksā’, for instance) and ‘gha’ (from ‘māgha’, for instance) are not valid (as capable of conveying the meaning of the whole), although they are also produced simultaneously with the whole words. These are not (therefore) mentioned in the explanatory section (of grammar)

287 —स्वेदे —च
362 Words like 'kharanas' are technically immutable after the change (of 'n') into 'n' is effected. They are considered as correct forms because they convey the idea of integral objects.

363 They (the proper names) are described as clan-names, and since they possess the power of proper names, they do not necessarily require an (external) cause to aid them to convey their meanings.

364 Sometimes the use of a proper name is limited to one 'named' for (convenience of) usage. But the word-meaning relation is permanent in the case of (proper names) 'Datta' and the like as in the case of (words like) 'gauh'.

365 (The permanent nature of the mutual connection between word and meaning is true also of technical terms in grammar.)

288 After this the manuscript gives the following additional verses:

289 Manuscript does not give stanza 365, but comments on it.
And in grammar (technical terms) 'vrddhi' and the like bear (with their meanings) a relation which is (fundamentally) not started (by any agent), but, which is characterised (only) by a particularisation in their function as in the case of (the relation between a qualifier and a qualified).  

366. सज्जास्वरूपाध्याविश्वातीति सति लौकिकि ।
काचित्सम्बन्धे काचिचित्रितासन्निधावपि ॥

366 Some everyday proper names function through their forms aided by causal factors, others even in the absence of such

367 शाल्ने तु महती सज्जा स्वरूपोपनिवन्धना ।
अनुमान निमित्तस्य सर्वथा प्रतीते ॥

367 The long technical terms used in grammar depend on their forms (in conveying their meaning) And inference reveals the presence of causal factors (aiding the understanding of the meaning of these terms).

368 आवृत्तेवरुमान वा सहाय्यात्तू सम्भवते ।
शब्दादेवरुमान वा शक्तिभेदस्य वा गति ॥

368 (On repeating such a long technical term as an experiment to understand its relation with its parts) the inference is either made on the basis of the sameness of form, that it is a repetition (of the same word), or that they are two different words, or that there is a difference in the aspect of the functioning of the same word.

369 । काचिचित्रिषयभेदेन कृत्रिमा व्यवस्थिण्यः ।
369 ॥ सत्यायामेकविषय व्यवस्थान हृद्योरपि ॥

369a (Two kinds of technical terms used in grammar are discussed) —
In some places (in grammar) coined technical terms are used with different significations.
369b In the Sūtra on numbers the same technical term (namely ‘samkhya’) is used as a coined one and as a natural one.  

370 (Sometimes) a term with a non-technical sense when uttered might extend in application as a coined one. It is in this way that both are understood from the statement ‘dūrātsambuddhau’.

371 (The following discussion is whether the verb in a sentence with a group subject refers to the individual or to the group) —  
The verb (i.e., the verbal meaning) (in a sentence) is considered by some to be connected to a group, or an individual or a dvandva compound (as the subject), depending upon its ‘meaning-capacity’.

372 Eating, both in regard to the result of the act and the act itself is accomplished by the individual. Considered otherwise the meaning of verb cannot be understood.

373 All (the Brahmins) individually perform the action of eating which assumes such forms as the taking of food, etc., and which has the satisfaction of hunger as its result, unlike actions such as dancing.
374. भुजि करोलि भुज्यर्थ न तत्रेण प्रवीणवत्।

Like the ceremony of washing of feet the verb ‘bhuj’ (‘to eat’) remains attached to individuals because of its ‘meaning-capacity’. Unlike a lamp, the verb ‘bhuj’ does not accomplish its purpose (namely, satisfying hunger) on a group-basis.

375. वृज्याविस्तु कियकापि तथास्तेषु कर्मसं।

On the other hand a verb like ‘dṛṣ’ (‘to see’) although it is stated only once (in a sentence with a plural subject) functions, in bringing about the appropriate actions as pertaining to the group without their being repeated.

376. भिन्नव्यापारहृपाणा व्यवहाराविन्दवने।

As for the aspects of performance, etc., (namely, holding the food, heating it, etc., which unite to make up the act of cooking), the different aspects of the agents (i.e., Devadatta, the pot and the fire), which have different tasks to perform unite to accomplish the meaning (of the verb).

377. लक्ष्यस्य लोकसिद्धत्वाचतात्वे लिङ्गस्य दर्शनात।

The technical term ‘vṛddhi’ refers individually to its ‘symbolised’, namely, ‘ā’, ‘a’, and ‘au’ since supporting examples are obtainable from life and evidence is seen in grammar.

378. शालाताने ्ध्रापान्तवादु बण्डने शतसंके।

In the matter of taking 100 (pieces as a fine from Gargās),

379. समाप्ते घ
380. ——दानप्रथा—घ, द
since the prime sense lies in the fining which has the hundred as its object, this countable meaning is not divided up although there is a qualitative distinction between the individuals to whom the meaning of the word 'Gargāḥ' refers 105

379 When considered from the view-point that names are given to ‘the named’ (as different from the view that the connection between a name and a named is timeless), the terms ‘samāsa’ (compound) and ‘abhyasta’ (re-duplicated) describe the aggregate (of the components of the words) to which they are used to refer

380 When an instruction in reference to an action is made in regard to certain persons mentioning them in a representative capacity, the statement is considered to refer to them in a collective and individual capacity alike

381 —just as in the sentence ‘Vrsalas should not enter this house’ the entry (of Vrsalas) individually and collectively is prohibited 106

382 When a collective prohibition of an action like coveting wealth is made, the application (of the prohibition to the individuals) is not prevented on the ground that they have not been severally prohibited
383. व्यवायलक्षणार्थत्वाद्कुप्कारादिभिष्टथा
प्रत्येक वा समस्तं गतव न प्रतिषिध्यते॥
The change of ‘n’ into ‘ṅ’ (in words) takes place in spite of the intervention of an, ku, pu, ō etc., individually or collectively because the mention of these has the representative significance of ‘intervention’

384. “अनुग्रहार्थ भोक्तृणा भुजिरामयते यदा।”
देवकालाह मेदेन नातुपृः गाति तानसो॥
(The discussion on the act of eating is resumed) —
When the act of eating is begun for the satisfaction of the eaters does it not satisfy them without reference to place, time, etc?

385. पात्राविभेदवानानात्वं प्रस्त्यक्ष्योपदिश्यते॥
विप्रध्यं वा भिन्नस्य तस्त्याक्तव प्रकल्पते॥
That single one (act of eating) to which plurality is attributed due to the difference of the plates (used) and the like is alternatively considered (by an opposite school) as being really different but assumed to be one.

386. सहस्त्रापि च कुर्वणा भेदेन प्रतिपाविता॥
स्व स्या भोजय विभागेन प्राप्त समूहं भुज्यते॥
When the action of eating is performed collectively, but is stated individually then they eat together having each taken his own food separately.

387. वीप्साया विषयाभावाद्विरोधाक्त्यसहनया॥
ढिशा समास्त्योगाच्च शत सघेक्वरिष्टते॥
(The sentence ‘Gargāḥ s’atam dandhyantām’ is again discussed) —
Because there is no scope for reference to the individuals one after another since another number will contradict the sentence, and because it is impossible for the verb

---
295 This karika is not seen after 383 in manuscript ः
Instead the karika पात्राविभेदका——etc is given
to have a dual application (i.e., to the individual and the group), the (meaning of the) word ‘s’atam’ (‘hundred’) is located in the group.

When eating with others is prescribed by a dvandva compound or by an ekasesa (like pitarau for father and mother), there also the meaning of the sentence terminates both in the individual and in the group because of its representative significance.

Some consider that as far as the constituent clauses (of a compound sentence are concerned) each accomplishes its meaning separately and in this way the compound sentence is a collection of clauses (each) having different form.

There are no separate clauses which are presented by the compound sentence (during its utterance) (Only), after the latter is uttered, these others, which are parts are recognised.

(The Akhanḍavādin in this connection criticises the Padavādin) —

To those, according to whom the total meaning of the sentence culminates in the parts (i.e., in the words) individually, what is the need for the existence of a separate word-meaning?
392. अथ तैरेव जनित सोयं भिमेशु वत्सते।
पूर्वस्यार्थस्य तेन स्त्राढिरौध सह वा सिद्धति॥

If the sentence-meaning which is formed out of them (i.e., the words) culminates in the separate parts of the sentence, (i.e., in the words), then either it contradicts the original word-meanings or coexists with them.

393. क सहस्थितो विरोधित्व स्त्राहिदिशिष्टाविशिष्टयः।
ल व्यभिचारी तू सम्ब-धस्यास्येऽस्य प्रस्तुते॥

If they co-exist then there will be incompatibility between the qualified and the unqualified.

393a  (And) in the dropping of its meaning (by the word) the relation (between, word and meaning) will have become inconstant.

394. एक साधारणो बाय्य. प्रतिशब्दमवस्थित।
सधे सघेशु चार्यत्मा सभिधानिनिवर्त्तक॥

(The Akhandavadin’s notion of the sentence-meaning culminating collectively is discussed.) —
The expressible meaning of the sentence which is common (to all the words) and which is established word by word exists in the aggregate and also in the component parts as is shown by the proximity (of the components with each other).

395. यथा साधारणे स्वतं त्यास्य च फल धने।
प्रतिश्चविकला तद्वत् सम्बद्धायेन तद्वत।॥

Just as there is the sense of possession, the (meritorious) result of giving and perfect happiness (for a group) in a common wealth, similar is the relation borne to meaning by those (i.e. the sentence and its parts) possessing it.

396. वर्णनामवर्यवत्तथा तेनवायनेन तद्वत।
समुदायेन चाकन्त भेदेन व्यवहिष्ठे॥

(In this connection the topic that case-endings are added to the aggregate of the letters and not to each letter, in a word is discussed.) If the letters are individually meaningful then by virtue of the same meaning, it is in the aggregate which possesses that meaning and not individually that the singular suffix is added.
397 Just as several people see a common treasure with one lamp, similarly grammatical number is expressed by one ending

398 (Therefore) meaningfulness does not exclusively belong to letters, words or sentences (but to aggregates)

398a (But this does not contradict the Akhand view stated originally that meaningfulness resides in the sentence) — When a person is accustomed to a view, other views appear to be incompatible with it (but only appear to be so)

399 (The essential condition for a word to convey its meaning is discussed) — A word does not convey its meaning without its being employed (for it) It is considered that the relationship between the meaning and the word conveying it has utterance as its gateway

400 Just as the eye serves for seeing, only when directed (towards the object), so the word expresses its meaning only when it is purposefully uttered

401 The relation between the 'instrument' and 'object' is found to be effected through the intervention of the verbal action (between them), similarly utterance governs the relation between a word and its meaning
402. बहुव्यक्ताभिन्नतात् सबैवमार्थणाकारिषु ।
यत्रोक्ततामिलनात्ते शब्दस्त्राविष्ट्त्वा ॥

When several meanings may be conveyed by one word and several words may convey one meaning, a word operates on that meaning towards which the speaker directs it.

403. आत्मायाश्वदानायाये केवलाहरुतर्थकाल् ॥
स्वहृदंशकृत्वा परेषा प्रतिपादने ॥

Some say that Vedic words are meaningless when they are repeated (for practice) and when they are being taught to others they have their forms as their meaning.

404. अभिवादनकिया भेदार्थंत्व प्रतिपादकान् ॥
नियोगः भेदान्त्वत्स्य तान्वेक्तवर्यस्य ॥

Those who uphold the doctrine of the sameness of the word throughout all the instances of its occurrence consider these same (Vedic words) as expressing (a 'thing-meant' as their) meaning (when they are employed in sacrificial actions) due to the difference in (the purpose of) their utterance, and due to their being (thus) directed otherwise.

405. तेषामत्वतन्तनात्त्वात् नानात्वव्यवहारिणः ॥
अक्षादिवर्णविब । प्राप्तःरकात्तमसमत्वायात् ॥

Those who consider that the word is different in every so-called instance of its occurrence, hold that these are really different words and are only treated under one class-form as, for instance, the words 'aksas' and others.

406. प्रयोगाभिन्नतालेन नत्र विधते ।
विषयो भतातिविवात्स्तु तत्रा व्यवस्थितः ॥

298  —यायोगः —च
298ए —पदकाल् ख
299  The reading given in the Benares text is सप्रदेक्तन?
This makes no sense Manuscript अ gives the reading सप्रदेक्तन which makes sense
(130)

406 (Therefore, according to them), the speaker has not got to aim the word at the meaning (it is to convey) apart from (merely) uttering it. Because a word has the fixed capacity to denote a particular object, it remains connected to that meaning.\(^5\)

407 (And) it is the (real) difference (between apparently identical words) which is understood from (factors like) the meaning of another word, and situation-context and not at all the employment of words-with-one-meaning in another meaning (of the same word).

408 Our discussion is about the sentence, which appears as a word and is dependent on the verb ‘astu’ (for its character of being a sentence) and not about a word which is part of a sentence.\(^6\)

409 Just as (according to the Pada-school) letters which individually have no meaning present a specific word-meaning, similarly (according to our school) words having no meanings (of their own) present (the sentence which has) a specific meaning.

410 That cognition of the meaning of words, which arises in the interim is a means to the understanding (of the meaning of the sentence), since we do not understand (the meaning of the sentence) in the beginning.\(^7\)

411 In the beginning the sentence is the understanding of the meaning. Then the sentence and the understanding of it are identical.
411. The nature of the meaning of the sentence is discussed.
First the view according to the Anvītābhūdāṇavāda of the
Mīmāṃsaka is stated —
At the time when the meaning (of each subsequent words)
is associated with the meaning of the preceding words,
the coalescence (of the individual word-meanings) resides
as an accomplished fact in these word-meanings.

412. According to some, the means is implied in the end
which is to be effected. The actual mentioning of the
case-relationships again is to restrict their sphere-of-
operation.

413. Without this restriction of the sphere-of-operation no
direct implication of it (i.e., the means) appears. It has
a possible existence through potentiality and the actual
mention of it is to rule out other (possibilities).

414. Considering the verbal action as the meaning of the
sentence. The action (that is the meaning of the verb),
which is different from other actions, and the means of
which has a specific sphere-of-operation (i.e., itself), is
here stated (as the meaning of the sentence). Words
(used in the sentence) are for the hearers to understand
the meaning (of the sentence).

415. (The Akhandaposition about the sentence and its mean-
ing is re-stated) —
According to others the sentence as well as its meaning is an integral entity revealed by the words which are in a certain order, but it itself does not show the order of the words.

416 स्वरूप विद्यते यस्य तस्यात्मा न निरुप्यते।

नातिं यस्य स्वरूप तु तस्येवात्मा निरुप्यते॥

We do not investigate the real nature of that (here, the word-meaning) which (obviously) has a form of its own. It is only when a thing (here, the meaning of the sentence) does not have such a form that we seek for its essential nature.

417 अशास्रसपरश्र्यं रूपनिद्वारण विदु।

अर्थविमातारपि हि शब्दे भुजो जायते सम्बूलि॥

There are others who think that the understanding of the meaning of the sentence is not through words. The words only give rise to a mental recollection which has the appearance of the meaning (of the sentence)।

418 अन्यथा वाहुश्रवेन शाहङौ दाहौः। अर्थां प्रतीयते॥

There is an instance of a burnt man understanding burning in a certain way from his (direct) contact with fire, but the meaning 'burning' is conveyed by the word (burning) in a different way.

419 पृथक्कदिनिविश्वेत्तत्तवानं पृथ गर्भानुपातिनां।

इन्द्रायाः यथा कार्यमृते बेहाल कल्पते॥

Just as the sense organs which possess separate principles, and act on their objects independently of each other cannot function except through the body.

420 तथा सत्या सार्वेषा पृथगर्भनिविश्विनां।

वाक्येयं प्रविभक्तानां अर्थवत्ता न विद्यते॥
Similarly words which are fixed to their meanings independently of each other have no meaningfulness apart from sentences

The meaning of the sentence is grasped as of the nature of a synthesis, when the individual word-meanings are in mutual association. Its essential nature is not presented (at the individual word-meanings) since it is seen as not being constituted of word-meanings.

A perception is not identical with its actual constituents (i.e., the sense-data), and similarly that formless one (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) is understood in the form of the synthesis of the word-meanings.

Yet another argument to prove that the meaning of the sentence is conveyed only by the sentence. —Since a fact is conveyed either as existent or as non-existent, only a sentence is used to convey it.

The point is further clarified that word-meaning, whether positive or negative, is not in practice understood without its being associated with a verb. Therefore it does not (in reality) exist.

The statement ‘existence’ (which is a one-word-sentence) is not understood in the form ‘there was existence’ ‘there is no existence’ or ‘there is no existence’ except through its association to the mention of a verb.
426 When the meaning-expressed-by-a-verb is connected with nominal accessories, its expectancy is not satisfied without the mention of the ‘existence-idea’ (i.e., the meaning of the nominal accessories).

427 The action-part of the meaning of a sentence is first picked out because of its primacy. The nominal accessories used to effect the objective-to-be-accomplished (i.e., the verbal action) are (therefore) secondary. However, the effect which the action (itself) brings about is its (own) result (for instance, the satisfaction of hunger in the case of the verb ‘bhuy’).

428 It is only the speaker who conceives the notion of ends and means or desires to construe the meaning (of the sentence) as a system of relations (between the end and means).

429 The action of ‘cooking’ is taken as an object in (the sentence) ‘I do cooking’. And when ‘cooking’ is expressed as the action-meaning of a verb, it is seen as an-objective-to-be-accomplished.

430 With whatever use (in view) a meaning is sought to be conveyed by the speaker, the meaning is established like that (in that context), because a meaning has several capacities.
431 Sometimes a connection (of contact) is said to exist between things which exist far from each other, and sometimes things in contact appear as being apart.

432 ससूष्ट्यानां "विविक्तल िससर्गभव विरेक्षिनाम्।
नानालमकानामकत्व नानालव च विपर्यये॥

433 सर्वस्तम्कत्वादर्थस्य नैराल्प्यादा व्यवस्थितम्।
अत्यन्तत्वावस्थांत्वावलंस्य एव निष्कृतनम्॥

432) The separation of the (really) united, the union of the
433) (really) separated, the unity of the (really) diverse and
the diversity of the (really) single,—(in this way) things
are established (as existing in contrary forms), either
because they have many forms or have no forms. The
only binding factor (in the determination of what is
meant whenever reference is made to them) is the word
because it has its capacity fixed.

434 वस्तुपल्क्षणं शब्दो नोपकारस्य वाचकः।
न स्वसशस्ति पदार्थाना सत्सः तेन नाध्यते॥

434 A word is only a designation of an object, not an expres-
sion of (the essential nature of) such an object. It is
not possible for words to deal with (i.e., to express the
nature of) objects.

435 सम्बन्धिषम् संयोग स्वस्वदेनामिभीते।
सम्बन्धः "समवायः समस्तित्वेन गम्यते।

435 (Two examples are given to illustrate the point)
It is a 'conjunction' which is an attribute of the conjoined
which is named by the word for it (i.e., the word 'sama-
yoga'). Again, it is a relation which is implied in (the
relation of) conjunction which is named 'samavāya' ('in-
separable connection').

310 The karka is numbered wrongly in the Banaras text.
436 Objects are known not in their intrinsic nature, but as they are desired. The same object is described in different ways according to the use to which it is put.

437 The set-of-relationship (of the word-meanings) which resides in the meaning of the sentence is not localised in any part (of the sentence). But in discussions (i.e., in every-day language) men talk of the meaning of the sentence as having the nature of word-meanings.

438 It (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) is not really localised anywhere in the individual word-meanings or in the aggregate (Only), it is apparently divided into the word-meanings.

439 Through that analysis (of the sentence) undertaken to explain it as a means of understanding it, there is presented another meaning (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) the parts of which, when analysed show expectancy for one another.

440 It is the single (sentence-meaning) possessing several meaning-capacities that is considered as divided (on the basis of these capacities). That the meaning of the sentence is a single (entity) is understood from sentences of a small measure (i.e., having a single word, for instance).
441. सम्प्रत्यार्थीं बाह्योऽयं सन्नसन् वा विभजयते ।
बाह्योऽयं विभागत्तुं शक्त्योऽऽशरूक्षणः।।

It is a meaning which is external to the conceptual meaning that is analysed whether such (external-meaning) is real or not. The division of the meaning after it is thus externalised is characterised by the analysis of the component-faculties (i.e., the word-meanings).

442. बहुवल्पि तिर्गते च वाक्येष्वेतरवाक्यता ।
तिर्गतेभ्यो तिर्गतस्य पर्युऽस्तत्तरवाणां ॥

Even when there are several finite verbs (in it), a sentence is one, if they are mutually expectant. The prohibition of the dropping of accent in a finite verb preceded by other finite verbs is thus meaningful.

443. एकतिकः वर्षस्य वाक्य सा स्त्रेय स्त्रियार्थवर्ण।
तस्य तिर्गतार्थोऽऽस्तत्तरवाणां वाक्यमेवदान विद्यते ॥

As regards him (i.e., Kātyāyana the author of the Vārttika) who has fixed the characteristic of a sentence as having (only) one finite verb, his stipulation of 'one finite verb' does not mean that the meaning of a sentence (which has several finite verbs) is divided since (there being several verbs) there are several sentences (as the opponent might wrongly argue).

444. तिर्गतान्तरपुस्तः सुक्तपुस्तः वा पुनः ।
पुण्यपश्यत् यतीति भेदाभेदो न तिष्ठत ॥

In the case of (sentences) where (the verb) is linked to another verb, or alternatively is linked to another word (which is) linked to the first verb, e.g., the sentence 'mrghah pas' yata yāti' the explanation that the sentence as (exclusively) one or several does not hold.

---

314 The following karika is found after this in manuscript:  :
प्रत्यार्थितात्मनियत्तत्वाह्या म्यावस्थित ।
अत्यत्त व ततो न व्यासामपुल्लयते ॥

315 —कारकः छ
316 पुस्तकेश्वः छ
(138)

445. इतिकार्यतार्थस्य सामाध्यविद्यस्य "कारक्षयते ।
अशबबलक्षणाकारक्षयः समाप्तार्थं तदुपचयते ॥

446. तत्वाव्याख्यानमात्रेतु यावानयोजनयते ।
विनापि तत्प्रयोगेण शेषवाक्यं समाप्त्ये ॥

446. When a mere statement of a thing is made (in a sentence) and there is something connected with it, (even then) the sentence is complete verbally without that (something) being stated.

447. चक्रक्रमार्णोऽस्थित्वं जयक्रमकरमण कुरु ।
तार्थविषयाबिषेक्षणि शाब्दारूढ़ै प्रतीयते ॥

447. In the two sentences ‘Recite while moving about’ or ‘Move about while reciting’, although there is no difference in the significance of the two, a distinction (as to whether ‘kram’ (to move about) is primary or secondary) can be gathered from the verbal form.

448. फलवत् क्रियासेवाः क्रियात्तरनिबन्धनाः ।
असाध्यातः क्रमदेवशैरकार्यायतः" लितबन्धनाः ॥

448. (If usages differ when meaning remains the same, sometimes meaning also differs when usages do not differ) — Actions which have (different) effects and are dependent on other (subsidiary) actions (which help their performance) are conveyed by the same verb-form, without numerating them individually from the points of view of their methods or their effects.

Manuscript does not give the second half of this karika—obviously an omission by the scribe.
449. It is (in general and) as divorced from (particular) differences that all actions are expressed by verbs It is impossible to distinguish the differences (between actions) merely based on their sentential forms.

450. In examples like 'as vamedha yakṣyante rājanah' (kings will perform the asvamedha sacrifice) and satram āsate brāhmaṇāḥ (Brahmins perform sacrifice), the difference (between the performing of sacrifice by one king and by another and between sacrifice by one Brahmin and by another) is not conveyed by the verb-forms used.

451. The verb mentioned once, without repetition, with reference to the 17 (sacrificial goats) for Prajapati, is divided (so as to apply to each of the 17) by virtue of its potential significance.

452. (In the sentence Devadatta yajñadattavisnumitrā bhojyantām) either the action of 'eating' is concluded in (each of the subjects) Devadatta, etc singly, or the sentence is split up (into three sentences) in terms of the three subjects.

453. Sentences, when uttered are received in a certain form, and when understood are presented in a different form.

319 The reading in the Banaras text is not in accordance with the manuscript which does not seem to make sense. The manuscript gives the sensible reading accepted in the text here.
454. The sūtra Kartant is a sentence which (at first) conveys a meaning in general. It then is particularised into (statements about particular objects like) an animal, etc.

455. (In fact such a comprehension of the meaning of a sentence at a subsequent reading is necessary.) —If the expectancy about a thing which causes it is satisfied by listening to it once, then it (i.e., the thing) cannot be connected with another thing) by any means.

456. Thus a sentence which is finally a unity, but has several meanings and is thus a substratum for, and the source of component sentences remains as it were non-different from them.

457. In some places a verb accomplishes its objective in terms of particulars, (subject, object etc.), while in some others it accomplishes it in general terms.

458. Those distinctions (in verbs) which are distinctions of tense and distinctions such as are caused by words like ‘ustrāśāka’ do not cause the essential verbal word to be divided (in its signification) when it is used to denote its action meaning as a class.

321. This karikā is missing in manuscript B, although the commentary is given there.
459 (The converse case to that stated in 452 is stated here, that is, the case of a sentence in which there is one noun form and several verbal forms) —

When in a sentence the nominal form is mentioned only once and there are verbs different from each other by virtue of their class, etc., then the verbs are related to it separately provided there is numerical parity (between the verbs and the meanings of the noun).

460 —just as to a word like 'aksāh' verbs like 'bhanj' (break'), 'bhaks' (eat) and 'div' (gamble), different from each other are separately connected, even where there is no difference in the time of the utterance of the nominal word (so far as the verbs are concerned) i.e., although there is only a single utterance of the noun).

461 (The same idea is discussed according to the principle of tantra) Words like 'aksāh' which are capable of being used under a common form are used in that way. Their having the same form is the basis (of such use). These same words when separated from each other are used in succession, when used with a common form they are uttered only once.

462 There are two established methods in which different words are used. They are succession and union, (simultaneity and nobody bypasses these two.
463. क कमे॥ विभिन्नेते रूपं यौगिकः न भिन्नः।
ख किया तु यौगिकः कमरूपानुपस्तिनां॥

463a Words employed one after another have different forms,
but words used in union have the same form ४४२
463b But even when words are used in union, the verb follows
the pattern of their successive use (i.e., as if the words
are used in succession)

464. क भेदसंगमात्तिः हृ शब्दाद्विंच्ये इत्य चित्ते।
ख यौगिकः समिकाले ज्ञाते स्वतः॥

464a These two powers (of words), namely, the power to
remain apart or to be in union appear as if they do not
belong to words (but to something like ‘time’ outside
them) (while, in truth, they are powers inherent in
words themselves)
464b Even when several words are uttered under a common
form the utterance is split severally (by the comprehending
listener)

465. अभिनं भेदहृदयं य एकस्यं विवक्षितः।
तत्वात्यवाचस् समुद्भायोजनुगृहः॥

465 (A different way of interpreting the word ‘अक्षाह’ in the
above-mentioned sentence is given) —
When it is desired to describe a composite of several
meanings (like the meaning of the word ‘अक्षाह’) in terms
of its components, then the relationships which the latter
have (namely, being connected with the appropriate
verbs from the verb-group, etc) are associated with the
composite meaning ४४३

466. भेदनिर्बन्धनेत त्वस्य प्रत्येक वा समाप्तः।
श्रुतिनिर्बन्धनिर्ब्धा वा वाक्यभेदविभाजितः॥

466 (Yet other ways of looking at the problem are stated) —
On explaining words (like ‘अक्षाह’) in terms of the com-
ponents they lend themselves for being split for use in the
individual sentences (formed from the composite utterance

—मे विभिन्नते—च
‘aksāh bhaksyantām, bhojyantam, divyantam’
Or the word with its number altered, lends itself for use in
the individual sentences

467. tatrakṣavacanātta va sośkaśaśabdhā pravijyate 1
pratyekā ca bhūtvan pravibhāgo vyākhyātā 2

467a (The two alternatives are stated in reverse order) —
There the word ‘akṣa’ is used in the singular number

467b Or the word is used in its plural number in the individual

sentences

468. vibhīstāni yāṇi vākyāṇi leṣāhyeśvadbodhīnām 1
akṣavravatārākṣasāvastavyasākhyātā 2

468 (The problem of the sentence with two meanings is
approached from the point of view of the Akhaṇḍa-
school) —
According to those who uphold the sameness of the Word
(ṣaṃkṣaṇa), the meaning-capacity of the single sentence is
divided on the basis of the difference (in the aspects) of
that capacity, in such sentences as have two meanings

469 aṣṭāṅgasāmyogaḥ sva速度trāyogāsthdalakṣaṇaḥ 1
upāyasthaṃ sarjāṃ pratiśāstraḥ viśvātā 2

469 (The upholders of the Bheda doctrine hold a different
view on this) —
Or we have there the use of two entirely different state-
ments, (the means of such use) being the employment of
a common form, the coalesced form is split according to
the understanding of the listener

470. bhedenaśyaṃ pūrvā śabdi tulyabhūti punaḥ
tratāṇa pratiṣṭhātā. pratyakṣa pratiṣṭhātā 2

470 (The same point as in 469) —
Two words which have the same form and which were
originally apprehended as different are used in such a
way that the listeners are made to apprehend them by the
speaker under a common form

123 sā śakti —b
471. क एक्समापि विभक्तायामन्तरिथिपि पर।
ख विनांर्विभसितविवा शब्द शक्तिह्य ॥

471a (In this stanza the view of a section of the Bheda school is considered) —
One of the two (words possible to be conveyed by a common form) is intended by the speaker, the other is conveyed incidentally.

471b Without such intention on the part of the speaker the word will work with (both) meaning-capacities.

472. अन्तःशब्दिर्भेक्षण युगस्वल्लीते ॥
अभिनात्र शकाशापहां भपक्षत्राय निरुक्ते ॥

472 Sometimes several capacities of the same thing are made use of at the same time. Fire is used in the same place both for heat and for light.

473. (The views of the Bheda and Abheda schools are again summarised) —
On hearing but once a sentence which conveys several meanings, either through its being repeated or through the exercise of different powers (respectively according to the Bheda and Abheda views), it presents itself as being divided either through evidence got from other passages or through the principle that several capacities reside in the same form.

474. सम्प्रसारणसभाया लिङ्गाभ्या वर्णवाक्ययो।
प्रविभागस्त्रूत्र एकत्रिष्णेय कलयते ॥

474 In the case of the term samprasārana the distinction (as to its application to) the letter or to the sentence on the evidence of other Sūtras is quite properly included in that one Sutra.  

---

324 नापि सम्बल्चिना —ष
325 प्रत्ययते ्ष
326 शूष्यते ्ष
327 —निम्प्रकाशा —ष
(145)

475. तथा दिष्टचलीति तन्त्रोपायाविलक्षण ।
एकशेषेन निर्देशो भाष्य एवोऽपर्वणित ॥

(An example how the Mahabhāṣya makes use of the principle of tantra is discussed.)—Similarly it is described in the Bhāṣya itself that in the aphorism (of Pāṇini) dvirvacane'cit’ there is through the mentioning of a thing once (the conveying of its occurrence twice) on the principle of tantra.

476. प्रायेण सक्षेरवचीन्तयविद्यापीत्रहत् ।
समाप्त्य वैयाकरणात् संग्रहेऽस्तम्यादि ॥

(The next few stanzas trace the history of Sanskrit grammar.)—When the Samgraha falling in the hands of such grammarians as had a tendency to summarise and had only a limited knowledge, became almost forgotten,

477. क्लेवद्ध पतञ्जलिना गुरुणा तीर्थोद्विजना ।
सर्वेषा व्यायामीजाना सहभाष्ये निर्लिखिते ॥

478. अतब्रवायं गामोऽहितावस्तानवं तीष्ठवात्
तत्त्वप्रकृतब्धवीयां नौवागवित्तनिश्चयं ॥

(And Patanjali, the master who was learned in all Vedic lore composed the Mahābhāṣya, the source of all principles, unfathomable because of its profundity, (and) clear because of its excellence of style, the uneducated could not comprehend its meaning.

479. वैज्ञानिकवृहत्क्षे शुष्कतर्कानुसारित्मः ।
आर्थं विलाविते प्राप्ये समाहृतप्रतिकृष्णुके ॥

480. यथा पतञ्जलिशास्त्रायेव भ्रमो व्याकरणाग्रम ।
काले स हासिनायेशु पाबन्धात्रे व्यवस्थ्यत् ॥

—the science of grammar which (thus) slipped away from the disciples of Patanjali in course of time came to survive only in Southern versions.
481. And then the texts were procured from the mountain and the science of grammar once again made the multi-branched one (that it was) by the teacher Candra and others who were followers of the principles of the Mahā-bhāṣya.

482. This summary of the science (of grammar) was composed by my teacher after learning the various other systems and our own system.

483. Here (i.e., in Cantos I and II) only the bare essentials of a few systems are given. There will be a study in details in Canto III.

484. Thought becomes clear by a study of different systems of thought. What points can possibly be contradicted by him who learns (only) his system.

485. The knowledge of people who imagine things to be such and such, without (relying on) the ancient science (in interpreting them) and who have not studied the older teachers, will not be very clear.
NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION

1 The words 'artha' and 'prakriyā' are doubtless used in the stanza with a double reference, 'artha' being also the 'thing meant' and 'prakriyā' being also the grammatical formation of words.

2 Cf Yaska, Nirukta 12 sad bhāvavikārā bhavantīti Vārsāyamī, jāyate sti viparinamate vardhate' pakṣiyate vinās'yatīti. This is in reference to the definition of the verb as having 'becoming' as its chief aspect (bhāva-pradhānāh). Similarly in MBh I p 258—lines 13-14.

3 Cf MBh I—p 13—Line 22 mahatā devena nah sāmyam syādityadhyeyam vyākaranam Kāryaṭa commenting on this line says 'mahatā parena brahmena ityarthah'.

4 Cf MBh Vol I—p 1—line 14-19 kānī punah sabdānuśāsanasya prayajanāṁ rakṣohāgamalaghvasandehah prayajanam pradhānām ca śadangesu vyākaranam, pradhāne ca kṛto yatnah phalavān bhavati

5 This stanza discusses the scope of the function of grammar. Of the two aspects of speech, namely, the supreme Word-principle and its manifestation in the form of human speech which exists in such distinct forms as syllables, words and sentences, it is the second which is the concern of grammar.

6 Words are employed to state the behaviour of objects and not the fundamental truth about them (artha-pravṛttitattvam vivakṣāna tu vastūnāṁ svarūpena sattvamasattvam vā—Punyarāja).
See also VPII—434 and 436
Punyarāja also gives two alternate interpretations of the stanza as follows

(i) Or the behaviour of objects is general before it is associated with words. It is words which give them a specific form by describing them (yadvā arthapravṛtti-tattvam sāmānyam, tasya śabdā nibandhanam ityarthah) see also VP I—119

(ii) Or the actions of objects, i.e. the six changes like birth (production) which are conveyed by the verbal forms, the fact of their being manifested in Time, similarly the nature of words and their validity—all these when understood from grammar are valid, otherwise not (yadvā arthānām pravṛtt- terākhya-topattajanmādikriyāyastattvam, sādhya- tattvam sādhana-kāṅkṣārūpam kālabhīvyaktyakṣhetravam ca tatha śabdānām sa sādhurasya vyākaranāvagatah samskāro'vikalah tadvikalastvapabhrams'ā iti)

8 thing-classes (arthājātayah)
Words signify thing-classes, and when they convey these, they are conceived differently either as a class or as an individual

9 For translation the second line is read as

vyavasthā nityatā ucyate

The combined reading vyavasthānityatā does not seem to make sense cf MBh Vol I p 7

athavā nedameva nityalaksanam dhruvam kūṭastham aviccāli anapāyopajānavikān anupattyavrddhyavyapā- yogi yat tannityamti tad api nityam yasmīnstatvam na vīhāyate—Thus, as the quotation shows, is a definition, a vyavasthā (a convention) about the idea of nityatā (eternity) See also VP I 29 using vyavasthā as an isolate and directly referring to its use in the previous stanza
That use shows that the previous stanza has been discussing a certain vyavasthā (convention), and not using vyavasthā as an adjective forming part of a compound vyavasthānityatā.

10 The reading hastasparsādbandhena accepted in the Benares text does not seem to make sense. Nevertheless it is given as an alternate reading in the footnote in the text.

11 The interpretation of the second line differs from Punyarāja’s. He takes ‘eko nimmattam sabdānām’ as referring to ‘dhvani’ and ‘aparo’the prayujyate’ as referring to ‘sphota’. But cf. Karika 46 below which clearly states that sphota is the cause (kāram) (which is the same as nimmattam), of sūtraks which are the same as dhvani. The production of speech-sounds is caused by the need for the sphota to be revealed, i.e., when the meaning-conveying principle is to function.

However, the difference between Punyarāja and the translator in the interpretation of the stanza does not make any difference in the fundamental notions themselves about sphota and dhvani.

12 Causes such as the vocal chords. The alternative reading ‘karanebhyah’ given in the foot-note directly mentions this.

13 Punyarāja explains the three stages as follows — tathā vyāvahārāno vaikharirūpaḥ sabdah kramagrāhyopī pratisamhrtakrama ekabuddhi visayo bhūtvā niravaya-vakramarūpena buddhvissayo ‘ntah karane bhūtvā’ ntahkaranavrtturūpākramarūpadhvanidharmāpattya punarapi vyavahārāramavataraṭi.
14 There are points of similarity and contrasts between words and the sense-faculties. The similarity between them is that both are instruments through which the nature of objects is understood. But there is the contrast between them that in the case of the word its form must be perceived before it conveys its meaning, while in the case of the sense organ the knowledge of the faculty itself is not an essential pre-requisite for it to act as the instrument of the perception of the object.

15 It was stated above that the word ‘agni’ which is uttered in everyday life, say in the kitchen, to convey a thing-meant is not linked with grammatical operations. But this does not mean that utterance of the word is not necessary for grammatical operations to be linked with it. There is, for the word uttered in a grammatical situation, the capacity to be linked with a grammatical rule. In other words, the common point of utterance between the word used in the two situations, is still further qualified by association with grammatical operations in the grammatical situation. This is illustrated in the stanza.

16 The stanza is intended to illustrate the same point as in the previous verse. The structure of the idea must a third storey, so to speak. To explain

uccārana, the common point between utterance of a word in life and in grammar, is qualified in the case of grammar by its being linked with grammatical operations (62).

The common feature between an upamāṇa and an upameya is still further qualified, in the case of the upamāṇa, by other attributes (63).

In the same way, the attribute which qualifies an object is itself qualified by other attributes (ie, a third
link in the chain of relations) For instance, śuklām paṭam—white cloth (a case of ‘white’ being a qualifier).
But in śuklātaram rūpam, a colour which is whiter (clearer whiteness) the whiteness is qualified, and there it is mentioned as a dravya (svātāntreyena).

That a word has its form as meaning is also necessary in grammar. This is explained in Karkas 66, and 67. A form does not become a meaningful base (prātupadikā) unless it has a meaning. It is to prātupadikas that suffixes are prescribed to be added. Therefore meaningfulness of the form is a necessary pre-condition before case-suffixes are added. The two specific case-suffixes mentioned here are nominative and genitive. Examples may be given in gaurbāhikā (nominative) and uṇo (pragṛHYam) (genitive). The first does not mean that a cow is a Bāhikā (member of a particular tribe). It means the word gauh is used to refer to a bāhikā. The word gauh has to mean its own form; the nominative construction is to be possible. The second means that uṇo is known as pragṛHYam in grammar. The genitive in uṇ is possible only if it primarily has a meaning, namely its form.

17 Pāñjū I 1 68
Kāśika on it reads śAstre śabdasya svarūpam bodhanīyam na bāhyo’rthah angārādhībhyasca na dhak
In grammar the meaning of the word is its form. Thus the word ‘agni’ in the sūtra “agnerdhak” means the form agni and not the thing fire. The sūtra does not mean “add dhak to embers” cf MBh Vol 1—p 176—lines 25-28 and p 177—lines 1 and 2 śabdenārtha-gaṛthasya sambhavāt advācinaḥ samjñāpratisedhārtham svamrūpavacanam (Vārttika) śabdenaccantenārtha gan-yate gāmānaya dadhyasaṇētyartharē añiyate arthaśa bhūyate arthasyāsambhavat iha vyākaranē’rthe kārya-
śyāsambhavah "agnérḥak" iti na śakyate ‘ṅgārebhyah paro dhak kartum

Regarding the question whether a word is a genus or a particular see VPI 45 above and MBh Vol I-p 6-8—where the ākṛtamātyatva of words is discussed under the topic “nitya śabdārtha sambandhe” Ākṛti as conceived there refers both to words and things, and when considered as nitya (eternal) it means ‘genus’ See also P S Subramonya Sastrī—‘Lectures on Patanjali’s Mahabhāsya’ p 56

The two verses 68 and 69 state two different views on what is meant by the term “own form” or ‘svamrūpam’ in the sūtra ‘svamrūpam etc’. They ask the question whether, for example, in the sūtra “agnérḥak”, the word agni means a name or a named and a particular or a universal. If the word agni means the form agni in grammar, then it is both a name (samjñā) and a named or meaning (samjñī). It can also be a particular or an universal. According to stanza 68, agni in the sūtra means the word agni as a particular. But it does not mean that the enjoined grammatical operation takes place only on that particular instance of the word as given in the āutra. That is obviously absurd. The grammatical operations take place with all instances of the word agni, that is, with the genus. That is, the genus is brought into the situation by virtue of grammatical operations.

The view expressed in 69 is different from this. According to it, agni in the sūtra is the form-meaning of the word agni and occurring as it does in one instance, it is a particular. But any particular occurrence is a particularisation of a genus. The prescribed grammatical operation takes place on each instance, or each particular, which is a specific occurrence of the genus.
18. That is, in A’s pronunciation of the word ‘suta’ the ‘u’ may be of the same length as in B’s pronunciation of the word ‘sūta’, but it is only after the listener has understood the word via the prākṛtadhvani, that he can say that the length there belongs to the prākṛtadhvani.

19. Abhūvyaktvādīnāḥ are the Mīmāṃsakas.
Cf Śāstradīpikā (Transl. D Venkataramaiah) p 196
A sabda (dhvani) that comes to light after the effort is made, need not be an effect exclusively, that it comes to light after the effort fits in with the view that sabda is revealed (abhūvyangya).

20. Those who hold this view, argue that if the object also were acted upon, then the object could equally well be perceived by another sense-organ.

21. The theory that cognition is essentially integral in its nature is cited here. In an act of knowledge, there is identity of the cogniser, cognition and the cognised. In the same way, while an object is perceived, one feels that its perception is through its parts. However, in all these, apprehension of parts, or of subject—object difference in cognition is only apparent, it is only an aid to an integral perception. The same is true of the perception of syllables, words and sentences. Thus there is a letter ‘ga’ in the sound-pattern which reveals the word ‘gauh’.

and listeners when they hear the sentence ‘gām ānaya’ will think that they are listening to the letter “ga” which reveals the word “gauh” and similarly think that they recognise the word “gauh” in the sentence. But this is an illusion. What we get here is a confusion of two different ga-letters.
22 There are two philosophies on the constitution of speech-units (syllables, words and sentences) and on the apprehension of their meanings. These are given the names akhandavāda and khandavāda. According to the first position, syllables, words, and sentences are integral units. They only appear to have parts. The comprehension of their meanings is also in an integral manner, and parts play their role in this only in a transitory way. While parts are comprehended, the final cognition of the speech-unit is in a flash, as an integral cognition. Thus the appearance of parts in a syllable, of syllables in a word, and of words in a sentence are less real than the final cognition of the syllable, word, and sentence respectively, and the cognition of parts merges in the integral perception which is the culminating point. What is said above about the perception of speech-units is true also of the perception of their meaning.

As opposed to this is the view of the Khāṇḍavādins, that is, those who hold that the part is the reality and the whole is only an addition of parts. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Nārāyānikas, broadly speaking, hold this view. khanḍa = part

23 See Note 17 above.
Cf. also MBh Vol I—p 26—lines 1 and 2 athavā, ubhayatah sphaṭamātram urdhvyate rasruter-las' rutubhavatītu, this view, is the view of the jātisabdavādins and Patañjali means the sound-genus when he uses the word sphaṇa.

24 The Benares commentary gives two reasons for the absence of difference between sphaṇa and dhvam namely, ‘since
both śphoṭa and dhvani are placed in the same substratum namely space', or 'since it is the inner speech-principle which is revealed in the form of the sounds'.

25 It was stated above that the lengthening or shortening which takes place as a feature of individual diction is a secondary feature of sound. This stanza seeks to remove a possible misconception that the long or prolated vowels could thus be grouped as a secondary modification made by the speaker on the primary short-sound. The long and prolated sounds are like the short one, a kind of primary sound (prākṛtadhyāmi). As far as dictional changes are concerned, they are produced subsequent to the cessation of vibration, in other words through the momentum produced in the body of the sound already produced.

26 This stanza explains the process of the transformation of breath into speech-sounds, and the letters (i.e. meaningful speech-sounds) being revealed through them. The breath which contains the potentiality for transformation into speech-sounds like ka, ca, etc., undergoes such transformation at the centres of speech production. Through these speech sounds are revealed the meaningful units like letters and words.

The breath dividing itself into various speech-sound might be usefully compared to molten metal flowing through various grooves in a machine and forming itself into various shapes according to the shape of the groove.

27 In this kārka the word 's'abda' is used to refer both to physical sound and to speech-sound. Hence it is translated with the common term 'sound'.

28 Sādja Name of one of the 7 svaras or primary notes in music.
29 Cf VP II—147

kārye pravarttate—caitanyam nirvṛttikṛṣṇāprāptibhisca
kāryesu pravarttate
svarūpavibhāge tu saiva vāk bāhyavasturūpatayā
nirvṛttikṛṣṇāprāptisu karmabhāvam prapadyatityarthah

31 The terms svamātrā and paramātrā are descriptive name, of two kinds of cosmology. According to the theory of svamātrā, all manifestations are apparent externalisations of the inner soul. It remains inside, but looks as if it exists in the form of external objects. According to the other doctrine (paramātrā) the relation between the All-soul and the ceated world is something like that between a fire and a spark which flies away from it.

32 Cf Theory of Speech and Language—p 31, para 2

33 Cf catvāri srngā trayo’syapādā dve śīrse saptahastāso’
asya, trīthā baddho vṛṣabho roraviḥ maho devo martyā
āviveśa (R V IV 58 3 (Quoted in MBh Vol I—p 3)

34 Cf VPII—307a, 308—for interpretation of one sentence through the evidence from another sentence we may give the following as an example

‘aktāh sarkārā upadadhāt’ (Place anointed candy) The sentence does not say with what substance the candy is to be anointed. This means that the meaning of the word ‘aktāh’ and through it that of the injunction is not definite. We decide with what material the candy is to be anointed from the evidence of another sentence. ‘tejo vai ghrtam’ (ghee is splendour) From this, a praise of ghee the conclusion is reached that the candy is to be anointed with ghee.
paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī are the names given to speech at the three stages through which it evolves into utterance. At the first stage pasyantī, speech is the speech-principle in which the capacity for revelation is inherent, but not explicit. At that stage, speech is un-differentiated principle, it has not yet started into a process. It is only identical with consciousness or perception in its intrinsic form. Pasyantī—the seeing, the perceiving one.

At the second stage, speech has already become a dynamic process, and is mental. It is linked to an object or an idea, and has already reached the stage of concretization on the level of the mind. But it has not yet been uttered. It is madhyamā, or intermediate, since it is between the stage of being a principle and being uttered.

The third stage is vaikharī, when speech is an uttered realization. It is articulate speech.

According to some thinkers, prior to pasyantī there is a stage called parā, when speech is the supreme principle. In this view, there are four stages: parā, pasyantī, madhyamā, and vaikharī. (See R V IV 58 3 quoted in note 33 above.)

See Pāṇini VIII 1 28 and 22.
VIII 1 28 says: “A finite verb is unaccented when preceded by a word which is not a finite verb. E.g. devadattah pacati.
VIII 1 22 says: “yusmad” and “asma” are substituted for the genitive and dative singular “te” and “me”, respectively, (when these are preceded by a word), and they are unaccented. The ‘ādi’ in the kāṅkā refers to this substitution of “yusmad” and “asma.”
See also the following references, Pāṇini VIII 1 19.
and 122 cf MBh Vol III—p 376—lines 10-13
sāmānavākye nighāta yusmadasmadādes 'ah (Vārttika)
sāmānavākyya iti prakrtyā nighātayusmadasmadādes'a
vaktavyah kim prayojanam nanavakyam bhūvan-
nti ayam dando harānena odanam paca tava bhavisyati
mama bhavisyati See also note 37 below

37 Pāṇini VIII 1 19
All the syllables of a vocative are unaccented when a
word precedes it and it does not stand at the beginning
of a hemisticheg vrajāmi devadatta

But the condition for a vocative being unaccented is
that it should be in the same sentence as the preceding
word which causes the dropping of the accent (samana-
vākyay) Now the vocative is not included as forming part
of the sentence as defined by the Vārttikakāra Hence in
our example it is not in the same sentence as the prece-
ding word Therefore the rule regarding the dropping
of the accent seems to be violated This stanza answers
this objection The vocative is included as forming part
of the sentence, since it is considered as belonging
to the category of adverbs Hence the definition of
the sentence 'ākhyātam sāvyayakārakaviśesam ekatān
(Vārttika on Pāṇini II 1 1) includeds the vocative
also as the kind of word which can exist in a sentence
consistent with the definition See also note 36 above

The argument in this context may be briefly stated
as follows Kāyāyana, the author of the Vārttika on
Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī has given a definition of a sentence
as "a verb accompanied by indeclinables, nominal case
forms and qualifying and modifying words, and a
sentence will have only one principal verb" (ākhyātam
sāvyayakārakaviśeṣa nam ekatān)
The Mīmāṃsakas’ definition of the sentence is given in VPII-4. It may be noted that in Kātyāyana’s definition and the Mīmāṃsaka’s definition, the verb is the principal part of the sentence. Does this mean that the two definitions are basically identical? No. The application of these definitions brings out different results. For example, Kātyāyana’s definition does not come as a violation of Pāṇini’s rule on accentuation of verbs, whereas the Mīmāṃsaka definition causes a violation. How is this? Pāṇini VIII 1.28 says that a finite verb in a sentence will be unaccented provided a word which is not a finite verb precedes it and the two are in the same sentence (sāmānāvākyāya). Now according to Kātyayanat a sentence can have only one finite verb (ekatīt). According to this definition a sentence like yam danda harānena (‘this stick, with this take’) is really two sentences, since after ‘danda’ there is the verb ‘astī’ understood. Hence the verb ‘hara’ is accented, since ‘ayam dando hara anena’ are two sentences, it having two finite verbs, there is consequently no samānāvā-kyatva.

In the Mīmamsaka definition, however, the verb ‘hara’ will be accented since there is sāmānāvākyata (the state of being in the same sentence). To the Mīmāṃsaka, a collection of words having expectancy for one another, which has a verb as its principal member, and which has a common purpose is a sentence. The piece ‘ayam danda harānena’ satisfies all these conditions, above all the primary condition of having a common purpose. The whole piece is intended as an instruction to perform sacrifice. Since then, according to the Mīmāṃsaka’s conception of the sentence, the verb hara’ has words which are not finite verbs preceding it in the same sentence it should be unaccented, which is wrong.
Two arguments are given in this stanza in favour of the contention that the word is a complex whole and parts of it are not real. One is that the word vṛṣabha, udaka and yāvaka are not found to possess meaningful parts. Another is that assumptions of the kind that a word is formed whenever there is a combination of roots and suffixes, and nowhere where there is none such, are only pragmatic assumptions. They do not prove that words are composed of real parts like roots and suffixes.

Cf MBh Vol I p 362

Ime tarhyekārthibhāvavisēsah samkhyāvisesō vyaktā
bhudhānamupasaranavisesam cayo g (lines 12-13)
Vyaktābhudhānam bhavati vākye brāhmanasya kambalas-
tishtatī Samāse punaravāktam brāhmanakamba-
lastishtatī In the context the difference between a sentence and a compound is discussed. In the latter there is a fusion of the meanings of the components.’’

This is a variety of the akhanda view. According to it speech and meaning are aspects of the same reality, namely, the inner consciousness.

If the padavādī says that the evidence for the existence of real units of word-meanings in the sentence is that they are perceived then they can be proved to be non-existent if the evidence be proved non-existent. That is what the stanza seeks to do. The mind perceives word-meanings in a sentence in a series according to the padavādī, that means the perception of a preceding word-meaning has to terminate when the mind passes on to the next word-meaning. The meaning of this statement is that the evidence for the existence of the individual word-meaning does not exist. Consequently the doctrine that the meaning of a sentence is formed from the meaning of words also stands discredited.
—in different forms like rāja, rājñā, rājni, etc. This shows that there is no fixed forms of the word. Different forms convey the same meaning.

The word rāja in a compound like “rājapurusa” has the same form as rāja, the Imperative second person singular of the verb rāj—to shine. Hence an expression like ‘he rājapurusa’—you king’s servant’ can also convey the meaning Oh! ‘Man, you shine’ ‘brājasva purusa’)

Cf. the English ‘blackbird’—just as the idea ‘black’ plays no part in the scheme of the meaning of the word, similarly the idea of horse has no part, in the semantic realisation of the word ‘aśvakarna’ ‘Aśvakarna’ is the name of a tree. Even though originally the tree got that name from its leaves being shaped as the ears of a horse (see Monier-Williams), every time the word is uttered, the listener’s mind does not picture the ear of a horse in understanding the meaning of the word.

rūdhī—words are those whose meanings are not derived etymologically, but are conventionally fixed “taila-pāyikā”, does not mean “a woman who drinks oil” as the explanation of the word from the component words (taila-oil, pāyka—a woman who drinks) may lead one to believe. The word means a cockroach.

—cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein ‘Tractus Logico—Philosophicus’—p 189 ‘My propositions are elucidatory in this way. He who understands them finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it. He must surmount these propositions, then he sees them rightly.
47 In this kārka the view known as the abhūhitānvayavāda on what constitutes the meaning of a sentence is given. In this view, words individually convey in the sentence that meaning they convey as isolates. This meaning of the word as isolate is a thing-meant. In the sentence, however, the words convey an added element through their mutual relationship. This additional element is the meaning of the sentence (abhūhitānām anvayah). In other words, words convey a thing-meant, sentence conveys a relationship. See also D. M. Datta "The Six Ways Of Knowing" (London 1932) pp 289-293.

48 This discusses another view known as anvītābhūdhāna, this also falling within the main subdivision of the view that a sentence is an aggregate of words, and the meaning of a sentence is an aggregate of word-meanings (samghātapaksa).

In this view the relationship of words among themselves in the structure of the sentence takes place first, through this relationship then, both the meaning of the sentence, and the meaning of the word are formed. In other words, the syntactical relationship of words not only produces the sentence and its meaning, they also invest a word with its meaning, which is derived from its syntactical relationship with other words in forming the sentence (anvītānām abhūdhānah).

To restate the difference between the abhūhitānvaya and the anvītābhūdhāna positions in the first, significant words enter into a syntactical relationship leading to the formation of the meaning of the sentence, in the second, words become significant through their syntactical relationship with each other. (1) abhūhitānām anvayah—syntactical relationship of the significant and (2) anvītānām abhūdhāna—signification by the syntactically related, through such relationship.
49 Words are the tangible facts in what is known as the sentence. The interconnection of words is a factor to be inferred from the result that the association of words conveys a meaning which is more than the meanings of the words.

49a The reference is to the well-known statement padapraṣṭhī samhūtā occurring in the Rgveda Prātiṣākhya. This is capable of a double interpretation depending on how the compound padapraṣṭhī is broken. It can be broken as padānām prakṛtā or pada eva prakṛtā. According to the former, the samhūtā (the connected utterance, or the sentence) is the original, and the pada-text or the word is derived from it, according to the second, the pada-text or the word is the original and the samhūtā (the sentence) is built from it.

50 In other words, the same meaning as is conveyed by a word can be considered as being conveyed by the collection of the letters which form the word.

51 This is serious as it will result in the non-performance of the sacrifice which means the violation of injunction 'yajeta'.

52 This would be impossible if the total meaning of the sentence were conveyed in one instalment without reference to the meaning of the words. In such cases the listener's familiarity or otherwise with the meaning of any word or words would be a matter of no significance.

53 The reference is to the sentence “śvetam chāgam āla-bheta (sacrifice a white goat).

54 The essential difference between śruti direct, statement and vākyā (sentence) is that śruti conveys the meaning.
of a sentence right from listening, while to get its meaning from a syntactical connection, the sentence has quite obviously to be interpreted with reference to the relationship between the component words.

55 The idea is that the meaning of a phrase, or a clause or a word in the sentence is the meaning of the total sentence viewed in terms of analysis.

56 The example is given to show that perception of parts in integral cognitions is commonly experienced seen.

57 The translation takes a different line of interpretation from Pūnyarāja’s Pūnyarāja interprets the stanza as follows: Just as two cognitions, for instance, the cognition of ‘blue’ and the cognition of ‘yellow’ are alike in that they are both cognitions, and at the same time different when viewed from the angle of the objects perceived (i.e., since one is a cognition of ‘blue’ and the other a cognition of ‘yellow’) etc.

58 See Pāṇini I 2 27
59 See Pāṇini III 1 33
60 See Pāṇini I 2 27

61 Thus the word ghāṭa means not ‘roundness’ and ‘being made of clay’, nor ‘roundness’ or ‘being made of clay’. It means “roundness”, “being made of clay”, etc., without any such inter-relation of combination or alternation.

62 The idea which the mind forms on hearing a word is its meaning, and this idea is linked up with an external object and thus we get the word-meaning-object triangle.

63 The meaning of individual words find unity in the meaning of the sentence itself as revealed by a process.
The word ‘gauh’ means ‘a cow’ but the idea of a bell which hangs from the cow’s neck or a flea which rests the cow’s head is not included in the limit of the reference of the word.

**Nut(n) 165** is an āgama and is found in words like kartnām and gurūnām. It is not a significant element in words because we can find genitive forms like bhavatām without it. Similarly sāp, the conjugal sign a, is not found in examples like ‘attu’ cf on Panini III 1 67

bhāvakarmakartāraḥ sārvadhātukārthāścedekādvibahusu niyamānupapattaratadarthatvāt (Vārttika) vikaranārthā iti cettābhubhute vikaranābhāva (Vārttika). Also See MBh Vol II—p 57—lines 23, 27

In other words if a verb is to get ‘being’ in a sentence it must first, be associated with prefixes Why? Because for an action to be accomplished, nominal agents, or instruments, are necessary and a verb is the name of an action.

Cf MBh Vol I—p 434—lines 9 and 10—kah punāscena krtorthah, samuccayo’nvācayah itaretarayogah samāhāra iti

See Panini I 4 57 and MBh Vol I-p 341 line 1-9

The first part of the kārika explains what is implied in a word like rājapurusah, meaning the king’s servant. A man is a king’s servant since the king controls him. But the verb (bibharti—controls, governs) is itself not present there. It was withdrawn after effecting the relationship of governor and governed, or controller and controlled.
between the king and the servant. See also note 223 under Sanskrit text.

68b The discussion is about the expression “mātuh smaranam.” Why is the word mātuh in the genitive? It is a śesā-saṣṭhi, and conveys the idea of the accusative mātuh smaratī means mātaram smaratī. If the genitive is already there in the expression, why then is a special injunction on saṣṭhi in the sūtra prātipadyena adhīgartha etc as applying to expressions like mātuh smaranam? The answer to this is that it is an injunction of restriction (nyāma). The injunction means that saṣṭhi alone be used, and let there not be a compound like mātṛsma- ranam. The counter example referred to is karmamati kum māturgunaḥ smaranam? That is, if mātuh smaranam means mātaram smaratī it means mātaram gunaḥ smaratī and not mātuh gunaḥ smaratī (not that ‘one remembers the qualities of the mother, but that ‘one remembers the mother through her qualities’). Ultimately thus mātuh smaranam means mātuh gunaḥ smaranam.

69 See Pāṇini—I 4-91

70 The view that individual letters are not meaningful is exemplified. Example the form ‘iskartāra’ which is ‘niskartāra’ minus ‘n’ conveys the meaning of the latter. Assuming that the two are not two different words, having the same meaning, the interpretation of this is that a part of a word can stand for the whole which means the missing syllable is not significant from the point of view of meaning.

71 ‘Udvami’ is used as an abbreviated form of udvamati= to vomit and ‘kari’ is used for representing ‘karomi’ and ‘karosi’.
Grammatical rules are not everything. They do not deal with Reality in its ultimate aspects. Their concern is with the manifested world of things and names.

The argument in the stanzas 241-247 is that the meaning of the sentence 'vṛkṣo nāsti' (there is no tree) is a total and undivided one and it cannot be built up from the meanings of the components, since according to the doctrine of the indivisibility of the sentence and the meaning of the sentence, such components or their meaning do not exist.

The author examines possible ways in which the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence through analysis is possible. First, can the meaning of the single word vṛksa be negated by the particle 'na'? That is, can it effect the negation of the object, namely, tree? The answer is no. The object cannot be negated if it exists. That would mean making an existent into a non-existent and is impossible.

Next can the existence of the tree be negated by the particle 'na'? No, because such a concept is non-verbal in character (since it is a concept, a buddhi). Therefore its negation by the particle 'na' is not possible. A concept has to be verbal if it is to be negated by the particle 'na'.

Or again a third alternative is considered. Can we say that particle 'na' states that the concept of the existence of the tree is false? This way of looking at the sentence is also wrong. This gives 'na' a function which it normally does not have. Its normal function is to state a non-existence, rather than to falsify a concept of existence.

Again, can it be said that the particle 'na' functions without any reference to a substratum? In that case,
'na' should be stated first in the sentence and not as we have in the sentence under examination.

Or can it be argued that the word 'vrksa' is used to limit the substratum of the operation of 'na' to 'vrksa' the tree)—This also is wrong, because it would convert a direct statement (i.e., a statement of a positive fact) into a statement laying down a restriction, or one which indicates a restriction. Again if the word 'vrksa' is given to limit an already understood substratum, then it is a repetition. Thus considered in all possible ways the recognition of word-meanings in the sentence is impossible.

In the next kārīka another example is given to illustrate the point that the sentence conveys a meaning which is different from the word-meanings i.e., that the recognition of word meanings in the ultimate analysis is wrong. The reference is to the sentence udahāri bhagini yātvaṃ śirasā anadvāham vahasi sā tvam prācīnam kumbham abhidhāvantam adrāksīh.

The ultimate meaning of the sentence is different from the meanings of the word-meanings.

74 The question discussed in this connection is whether or not the identity of a word changes with each different meaning it has. A word may be entered in the dictionary several times, each time it having a different meaning. There are at least two ways of constructing this position. It can be argued that each time the word has a different meaning it is a different entity, or that it is only the same word, with different meanings. In the text both views are discussed.

75 A hymn when used or repeated becomes logically different. And these latter hymns which get their entity from the repetition of the already existent hymns of the Veda are
Indeed, those are the really meaningful hymns and the stated ones are only pointers to them. In other words, the significance of a hymn is derived from its use. Thus if the sāmīdhena hymn is repeated, we have as many different hymns as there are numbers of repetitions.

According to Panini V 4.50, the affix "cvi" comes after a word when the agent has attained to the new state expressed by the word, what the thing previously was not and when the roots kr (to make), bhū (to be) are conjoined with it. (C S Vasu) Thus we get "asuklah suklah sampadyate tam karoti =suklikaroti.

In the same way there can be a form 'gorbhavati' from 'agor gaur sampadyate go'bhavat (some one who is not a cow has attained to the state of a cow, he became a cow). Now, some one like a Bāhuka can become a cow only when cow-ness is attributed to him. In other words, the meaning of the word 'gauh' is secondary (gauna) in that context.

In 'sukli bhavati', on the other hand, something which is not white can become white in a real sense (uttarāvasthā vastusatyāvā-Punyārāja). Therefore the meaning of the word 'ṣukla' is not secondary.

The grammatical significance of 'gauh' in the example quoted above being considered as conveying a secondary meaning is that it will not have the designation of 'praghṛya' (as required by Panini I 1.15 in association with I 4.51 which respectively say that a nipāta which ends in the vowel 'o' will be known as 'praghṛya' and 'ūri' and 'dāc' when in association with verbs will be known as gatīs). This is because between primary and secondary meanings of a word it is with reference to the primary meaning that grammatical
operations apply to the word Thus the MBh evamtarhi gaunamukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratya 11-vol I. p 70

A question might be asked here. If grammatical operations take place only on such words as are used as conveying their primary meaning then how do the sutras VI 1 90 and VI 1 93 operate in regard to words like "go" as is evident in the resultant forms in sentence like 'gaurbāhikasthiṣṭati' and 'gām bāhikāmānaya' respectively when obviously the word is used in its secondary sense.

The answer to this question is that the statement about grammatical operations not taking place in regard to words which convey a secondary meaning applies only where words are concerned as distinct from prātipadikas or bases. The rule about vrddhi in VII 1 90 applies to prātipadikas, for instance to 'go', which with the change of the vowel 'o' into 'au' becomes 'gauḥ' in the sentence 'gaurbāhikasthiṣṭati'. Similar is the 'a' in accordance to VI 1 93 in such examples like 'gām bāhikāmānaya'.

In verse 280 another objection is answered. This concerns the expressions mahābhūtaścandramāh, śukībhavati pataḥ. Mahābhūtaścandramāh means the moon has become full, and it refers to the fullmoon. Now here the full moon is a fact on full moon day and no new condition has emerged. There is no astitāpūrvāvastā upacāritottarāvastā. There is no superimposition of a new state on an existing condition, which superimposition is necessary for the use of the suffix 'cvi'. Similarly the cloth is white, and the expression śukībhavati pataḥ (the cloth becomes white) does not add any new element
of meaning. How then is ‘cvi’ used here and how is there any secondary meaning? The answer is given in verse 280. True, no new condition is added to the meaning, but it is assumed by the speaker that a new condition is superimposed and the use is based on that of MBh Vol I—p 71—lines 14-21.

77 Pāṇini VII 3.82 Therefore no change of s into s in expressions like agnīsomau mānaṇakau

78 Pāṇini VI 1.153

Thus sut comes in hariścandro mānaṇakah

79 Such as a defect in vision, etc., causing the vision of a duplicate moon

80 The four cases stated above are explained and illustrated in 306, 307a, 307b, 308, 309a, 309b and 310, 311, 312, 313

80a The discussion here is about the significance of a svarita accent as occurring in short vowels, as well as in long and prolonged vowels. A svarita is a combination of udāṭta and anudāṭta accents. This causes no difficulty where long and prolonged vowels are concerned, since these latter have in them definable vowel limits and therefore they can hold an udāṭta svara and an anudāṭta vowel. But in the short vowel, how can one have limitable parts, one of which is udāṭta and the other anudāṭta? The answer to this is given by the grammatical dictum “tasyādīta udāṭtamardha hrasvam.” That is, the first half of a short vowel will be udāṭta.

In the kārikas under discussion, the meaning of the term hrasva in the above-given dictum is discussed. Hrasva does not mean here a short vowel, which is the term’s
primary meaning It means here a mātra Further
hrasva is representative of hrasva, dirgha and pluta
(short, long, and prolonged vowels)

81 See Technique of Semantics by J R Furth, Transactions
of the Philological Society, London 1934

82 The reference is to one-word-sentences such as “vrksah”
The word implies the verb sthāṇati (one of the possible
verbs) Thus vrksah means ‘here is a tree’

83 Eg (Punyarāja) varṣati = (devo)
varṣati (jalam)

84 More examples to prove the point that an uttered piece
 can convey more than what is warranted by its form
 alone In other words, it also conveys the meaning of
some word or words implied in it For example in the
expression edhebhayo vrasati (He goes for fuel), the
expression means edhāharanāya vṛṣati In this, āhrana
(bringing) is a subsidiary action to the main action of
going The uttered form edha brings this also to the
context Sthāṇi means the unuttered verb Similarly
niskausāmbi means niskṛāntakausāmbi (Gone out of
Kauśāmbi)

On stanza 328b, see Panini II 3-27

Regarding the function of upasargas (stanza 329 a)
see MBh Vol I—p 365—lines 17-19 in a slightly
different context upasargaśca punarevamātmakah
yatra kaścitknyāvācī sabdah prayuyate tatra kavyāvīśesa-
māhuḥ

85 They the utterance ‘vrksa’ and the utterance ‘vrksasthi-
ṣṭhati’ It was stated earlier that the piece ‘vrksah’ can
convey the meaning of ‘vrksasthi’ Then why
should the latter be used at all? Why not always use
Thus the way one student analyses a sentence as an aid to his understanding of the meaning of the sentence will be different from that adopted by another student. And these are all nothing more than devices.

Punyarāja constructs the third line as ‘tasya sambandhi arthah’ (the meaning connected to it, that is, its meaning). This is, of course, possible. But it seems it is better to interpret the line as ‘its meaning which is connected to the meaning of another word which is not uttered, but which can be inferred ‘sambandhi’ correlating the word ‘arth’ with the word ‘artha’ understood (Punyarāja, in fact, uses the latter word in this connection). However, the general idea of the stanza, is the same which ever way it is interpreted.

The reference here is to the definitions of noun and verb. Nouns have existence (sattva) as their meaning, verbs mean becoming (bhāva). The contradiction here is that the one sabda (e.g., dvāram), if it brings the verb also into the context, will be discharging both nominal and verbal functions.

cf. Yaska Nirukta I 1 on nouns and verbs.

cf. Yāśaka Nirukta I 1

\textit{Indriyanityam} vacanam audumabarāyanah

\textit{Indriya} is here rendered as \textit{buddha}.

Also Nirukta I 2 tatra catusṭvam nopapadyate

’sāstrakriyāyogācca vyāptumatvacca tu

The meaning of the word arthayogam is taken in the translation in a different way from Punyarāja’s He
interpret it as ‘tasyaiva arthena pratībhālaksanena yogam sambandham drstvā’

The translation interprets ‘vākyasya arthayogam’ as the connection of artha (word-meaning) to the sentence, and this connection is laukikam, i.e. something that is ascribed to it as different from being a fundamental fact cf 344 below

‘na loke pratīpatrnām
arthayogātprasiddhayah, which also Punyarāja interprets in a different way He takes artha as ‘a thing in reality’

90 Cf Nirukta quoted above
vyapṭumatvāt tu anīyastvācča

91 An exception which is implied in a statement strictly forms part of the statement of the rule itself; and therefore it can be considered as being verbally made (sabdavat) in the rule itself, but since there is no distinct statement of it, apparently it is not verbally made (aśabdātmva) As the next stanza says, the śrutī, i.e., the statement about Brahmanas and dadhi (sour-milk) is made including the exception of the Mātharas And the further statement connecting Mātharas with takra (butter-milk) makes a re-statement of this fact

92 According to this it is the word which has become an object of sense-perception, i.e. an object of the ear which conveys the meaning,
cf V P I 56

93 According to the dictum ‘caturthah, anajādau, ca lopah pūrvapadasya ca’ etc quoted by Punyarāja
See Mahābhāṣya Vol 2 p 425 (on Pānini V 3 83 thājādāvūrdhvam dvitiyādacakā) caturthāt—caturthāllopo vaktavyah, brhaspatidattakah brhaspatikah Prajāpati-dattakah prajāpatikah anajādau ca, anajādau ca lopo vaktvāvyah devadattakah devakah yajñadattakah
yajñaakah, lopah pūrvapadasya ca purvapadasya ca
lopo vaktavyah, devadattakah dattakah yajñadattakah
dattakah and so on

94  Pāṇini VII 4 3
95  Cf VPI 56 and Pāṇini II 1 57

96  Long technical terms such as samkhya (according to one
view) (MBh Vol I-page 81—lines 26-29) upasaraṇanam
(MBh Vol I p 215—lines 7-11) kāraka (MBh I p
324—lines 7-9), and karmapravacanīya (MBh Vol I p
346—lines 15-18). These are called long technical terms
because they are longer than a samjñā ought to be and
are explainable through their component elements
Nimitta Punyarāja explains ‘nimitta’ as the component
element of the word In a long technical term which is
interpreted in terms of this component element, they,
obviously, form the causal factors in the understanding
of the meaning of the term Patañjali explains a nimitta
as some thing known and a nimitti as something un-
known (nirjñātōrtho nimittam, anirjñātīrtho nimittī
MBh Vol II p 1 lines 16 and 17)

97  It is on repetition that the meaning of such a technical
term is conveyed through its elements In the case of
a technical term which is not a product of smaller units,
such a secondary stage is not necessary, to explain its
meaning To still further explain the process of under-
standing the meaning of a long technical term with
reference to an example, let us take the term kāraka,
One gets the explanation of the term ‘karoti kārakam’
on repetition (MBh Vol I p 324 line 9). Indeed
the purpose of coming such long terms is that such terms
must be understood as being expressive of their signifi-
cance (tatra mahatyā samjñāyāh karana etaprayojanam
anvarthasamjñā yathā vijñāyeta Karoti kārakamiti MBh
same as above—lines 8 and 9
The Vakyapadiya also discusses in this connection the use of proper names and technical terms in the grammatical texts. The term, *samjña*, is applied mostly to denote technical terms in the works of Pāṇini and other grammarians although in these there are places where the term is used to refer to ordinary proper names. The use of the term *samjña* in such a context as the ‘*samjña-prakarana*’ is to mean a technical term. Such terms, for instance, as *karta* (subject), *karma* (object) are examples of *samjñas*.

Technical terms are used in Sanskrit grammar broadly in four ways. They are (1) the use of a technical term in a non-technical sense (2) The use of a technical term in a technical sense (3) the use of a term both in the technical and non-technical sense in the same discussion (4) the use of a technical term in a non-technical sense, but definitely intended to include the technical sense also. Let us take some examples. In the sūtra ‘karta karmavyathiha’ the word *karma* is used not in the technical sense which it has in the grammatical system, but in the sense of the word in ordinary usage. This latter meaning is ‘action.’ But there are other sūtras where this word ‘*karma*’ is used in its technical sense, viz. ‘object.’ For the word being used in its grammatical sense as in the subject-predicate-object group the sūtra ‘*karanam aṇ*’ provides an example. To take two other examples, the term ‘*karanam*’ is used in a non-technical sense in the sūtra ‘*sabdavair karane*’ and in its technical sense in the sūtra ‘*karti-karanostrīyā*’ Now to illustrate the use in the same context of a word, both in its technical and non-technical sense, Pāṇini uses the word ‘*samkhyā*’ (number) in both senses in his discussion on numbers. Thus in the sūtra ‘*bahuganavadudat samkhyā*’ he defines the term *samkhyā* (number) in its technical sense. The sūtra means that words like ‘*bahu*’ and ‘*gana*’ will be known as *samkhyā* (numbers), and they are mentioned here as *samkhyās* (numbers) in the grammatical sense. In other words when the sūtra
lays down that the word ‘bahu’ is a samkhyā, it does not mean that it is a samkhyā in that it will have a numerical value when it is used in the context. It only means that the word (bahu) will be technically known as a samkhyā thus bringing it under the operation of the rules which particularly refer to samkhyās. In the scope of this same sūtra are also included samkhyās (numbers) in the ordinary sense, like one which are referred to in a later sūtra, namely ‘samkhyāyā atis adantayah’.

We will now illustrate the fourth kind of the use of technical terms. In this group, we have the use of words in their non-technical sense. The scope of the non-technical meaning of the word includes the possibility of its interpretation as a technical term. The sūtra ‘ekaśruta dūrātsambuddhau’ provides an illustration. The word ‘sambuddhi’ means ‘calling’ in its non-technical sense, and in its technical sense it is the name for vocative singular. As used in the sūtra quoted above, it means ‘calling in its non-technical sense, but the technical sense of the word has also relevance in the sūtra since ‘sambuddhi’ in that sense is also a word of ‘calling’.

98 Pāṇini I 1 23 and VI 1 22. See also MBh Vol I athavā ācāryapravṛttijñāpayati bhavatyekādikāyāh samkhyāyāh samkhyāpradeśesu samkhyāsampratyaya iti, yadayaṁ samkhyāyāh atiṣadantayah kan iti tisadantāyāh pratiṣedham śāstu.

99 Pāṇini I 2 33 and II 3 49. See also MBh Vol I p 20—lines 1-4.

100. Cf MBh Vol I p 41—lines 10-16.

101 Service done to Brahmins while performing sacrifice.
Cf MBh Vol I p 41, lines 10-16
na cocyate pratyekamati pratyekam ca bhuji samāpyate

The employment of the same lamp by several students to read is an example of the operation of the principle of tantra—or the principle by which something discharges its function on a group-basis

See MBh Vol I—pp 37-41
atha samjñeta prakṛtyā vṛddhyādayah śabdāḥ
pathtāvyaḥ (p 37 l 26) yathā laukikavāyikās (p 38 l 14 Vārttika) lingena vā (p 39 l 1 Vārttika), pratyekam vṛddhi-gunasamjñie bhavata iti vaktavyam kim prayojana-nam samudāye mā bhūtāmiti (p 41 l 5-6), pratyavayavam ca vākyaparipāṃpateh (p 41 l 10 Vārttika)

See MBh above p 41—(lines—11 14)

This is because the fact of Vṛṣala-ness is satisfied by one of them

See Pāṇini VIII 4 2 MBh Vol III (p 453)
A non-technical illustration MBh above (l 16-17) gargaih saha na bhoktavyamiti pratyekam ca na bhoktavyam samuditaśca

When the sentence is given in the form ‘devadatta—yajnaddatta—visnumitrāḥ bhujyantām’

vīpśa cf Pāṇini VIII 1 4

See stanza 416—or a similar use of the word ‘abhudhiyate’
Just as words are not recognised in the sentence when the listener comprehends the sentence, so is the case of clauses in a mahāvākyā

That is, according to the Anvitaabhudhāna view of the Padavādi Mīmāṃsakas (See VPII 44) According to them, then, the meaning of the sentence is realised
(179)

in parts at the focal points of the words The Mimāṃsakas, therefore, uphold the notion of pratyekam parsamāpti "culmination of the meaning of the sentence in the component parts individually" in interpreting the meaning of the sentence, its nature and realisation.

112 The original meaning of the word is an unqualified meaning and the meaning which the word gets from its connection with other words in the sentence is a qualified meaning. Thus the word 'gauh' which as an isolate means 'the animal with dew laps, etc' means the same thing qualified by the act of 'brining' while used in the sentence 'gām ānaya' (bring the cow).

113 pratyekam tu samaptārthah sahabhutesu vartate VPII—117

114 Cf MBh Vol I p 220—10-24

samghātasyaikārthyāt subabhāvo varnāt
Thus occurs in the context of the discussion whether individual letters in a word are meaningful or not. The notion stated in 403 is not accepted by Patañjali himself and Bhartrhari follows him in that The Vākyapadiya states the view not necessarily approving of it, though it does not make a statement of its disapproval.

115 Cf MBh Vol I (p 219 l 26 and 200 I-1-2)
bahavo hi sabdā ekārthā bhavantu tadyathā indraḥ sakrah puruhūtah purandarah ekasca sabdo bahvar-thāh tadyathā aksāh pādāh māsā iti

116 Cf MBh Vol II (p 386—lines 4 and 5)
evam yosāvāmnāye'syavāmasabdah paṭhyate sosya padārthah

117 See also above in the text the discussion on sāmidhem hymn VP-II 257-261

118 See Note 115 above
The text is wrongly printed in the Banaras text.

Punjaraśa interprets it 'prayogādabhisandhānamanyat-padesu na vidyate'

cf VP I 6

The Nānasʿabdavādin is speaking here. Since according to him, all so-called instances of the same word are really different words, there is no question of the same word having several meanings thus necessitating the special aiming of the word at the meaning which is to be conveyed, as the Ekaśabdavādin holds.

Cf VPII 325b 326a 326b

Cf VP I-86, where however, the understanding of parts which are unreal is stated to be caused by the incapacity of the speaker.

According to the anvītābhudhāna-view, thus, the synthesis between the various word-meanings constitutes the meaning of the sentence and that synthesis is not something built up word by word but something which already exists in the very first word.

Cf MBh Vol III (p 57—line 14)
(see also lines 15-28 and page 58—lines 1-7)
siddham tu dharmopadesane'navayavavijñānāt (p 57 line 14)

Nāgesabhaṭṭa Sphoṭavada p 14

evam ghaṭamānaya 'ityādau samsargarupō vākyārthah
samudāyas'akyah

The argument is continued from the previous stanza. Reality is expressed in the forms of statements and statements, either positive or negative are in the form of sentences. It follows from this that only sentences and not words can convey reality, which has the form of the meaning of the sentence. Therefore it is wrong to con-
ceive that the meaning of a sentence is conveyed from the words composing it. Even when we mention the name of a single object it takes the form of a sentence.

cf. VPII 325 b, 326 a, 327 a, 328 a and 335
125a MBh Vol I (p 367 lines 10-16)

They are not final truths in the ultimate analysis.

The term ‘karana’ in line 2 does not mean instrument, it means ‘action’, the word being used as the noun form of the root kr = to do. Punyarāja explains it as follows. In the sentence ‘pacikriyām karom’ (I do cooking) ‘cooking’ is a noun and is used as an accessory to the action of ‘doing’ and therefore is a sādhana. In the sentence ‘pacāmi’ (I cook), the verb is ‘cook’ and hence its meaning is the sādhya, the thing to be accomplished, the objective.

The same point is made that objects, that is the referents of words have several and sometimes conflicting possibilities and that it is the use of the word with a specific intention by the speaker which specifies a particular aspect of a meaning as operative in a certain context (Sec VP 434) cf Tractus Logico-Philosophicus p 35 ‘Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs’.

In other words since ‘conjunction’ is an attribute of the conjoined a description of the conjoined objects is necessary to describe the character of ‘conjunction’. This means that the mere word ‘samyoga’ does not describe the nature of the relation it names. Similarly the relationship known as ‘samavāya’ is expressed by implication in the relation samyoga.

mātrayā-yadā tasya mātrayā nyatasmakhyākena alpyasā tabdēna yogo ‘bhūsambandho drṣyate—Punyarāja
Example 1gyanah samprasāranam Pāṇini I. 1.45 The
sūtra means that the substitutes 1, u, r, and 1 which come in the places of y, v, r and 1 will be known as samprāsāranas Eg yaj—istam, vap = uptam

Or, alternatively, the sentence 'igyanah' meaning the substitution of 1k (i, u, r, l) for yan (y, v, r, l) will be known by the name samprasāranam

Now the point of quoting this example is to present an argument in favour of the akhanda-position that sentences convey their meaning as indivisible units. The sentence of which the name is samprasāranam, that is which is constituted by the single word 'samprasāranam' conveys the meaning of substitution of '1k' for 'yan'. Being a single-word-sentence, it cannot be argued by any one that the sentence conveys its meaning through its component parts.

Cf MBh Vol I p 111 and p 112

131 Pāṇini VIII 1 23 also VPII 2-6

132 Mrgah paśyata yāti (see, there goes a deer.) The sentence mrgah paśyata yāti is such that it can neither be exclusively interpreted as a single sentence, nor as a combination of more sentences than one. In the view that it is a composite of two sentences, the two component sentences are mrgah yāti (the deer runs) and (etam mrgam) paśyata (you see the deer)

Another school of thinking considers that mrgah paśyata yāti is one sentence. Since the verbs are interconnected (yuktayukta)

133 Eg vṛihayo bahavo 'vahanyakām (Let lots of cultivated rice be threshed.) Here, there is a logical incompleteness, since the agent, instruments, etc., of the action of threshing are not mentioned, but there is no
134 In this connection it is stated that there need not be complete parity between the manner of the use of words in sentences and the meanings they convey. Thus, in the two sentences ‘cankramyamāna’ dhusva’ (Recite while moving about) and ‘japamscankrmnam’ kuru’ (Move about while reciting), the word ‘cankramyamāna’ is secondary in the first sentence and primary in the second, being a subsidiary verb in the former and a principal one in the latter. Similarly with the word jap (or adhisva) also there is a difference in the manner of their use. But despite this distinction in the nature of the use of the words, there is no difference in the meaning that they convey since the meaning of the sentence in either case is an injunction to perform the act of reciting.

Punyarāja also gives an alternative explanation of the examples. According to this explanation it is only the word ‘cankramyamāna’ whose nature and use is studied here. There is no difference in the function of the word in the two sentences. In both it serves the purpose of being an action subsidiary to recital. But there is a distinction in the nature of their usage. In the first sentence it is used as an auxiliary verb while in the second sense, as a principal verb.

135 1 The method which must consist in the order in which the subsidiary actions are to be performed, thus gradually building up the main action. 2 The effect i.e., whatever is stipulated as the fruit of the action—heaven, children, and so on.

136 The passage referred to is saptadasa prajāpatyān eka-varnān ajāmstu uparānālabheta (He should sacrifice for Prajāpati, 17 hornless he-goats all of one colour)
This stanza cites and explains another example for the point stated in kārika 451 that the same verb can be applicable to several sentences. The verb bhuj = to eat in the sentence ‘devadatta yajñadattavisnumitrā bhojyantām’ (Devadatta, Yajñadatta and Visnumitra are to be fed) refers individually to the three subjects combined in the compound ‘devadattayajñadattavisnumitrāh’. That is, the meaning of the sentence pertains to the three individuals individually.

Pāṇini III 4 67 (kārtarī krt) which says the krt-suffix occurs in the sense of the agent (e.g., pācakah). This is a general statement which means that the sūtra has a general meaning. This meaning is later on particularised in specific examples, like—pasu (an animal).

Eg ‘devadattah pacati’, ‘yajñadattah pacati’. In these sentences the action is particularised by the individual subject and other particular factors. Thus we can paraphrase the verb in the sentence (1) as devedattakartrkapacati kriyā (the action of cooking with Devadatta as its agent). In sentences like ‘pacati’, yajate’, etc. on the other hand, the verb has a general signification.

Even when verbal forms show distinction of tense, as for instance in pacati, apāksīt, pakṣyatī (cooks, cooked, will cook respectively), or distinctions caused by the nouns associated with them, as for instance in ‘uṣrāśikā āsyante’ (there is the sitting like the sitting of camels), or ‘hataśāyikā śayyante’ (there is the lying like the lying of the dead), the verb fundamentally conveys the verbal idea in general when used to do so (see next stanza) cf MBh I (p 256 lines 19 & 20) katham punarjñāyate bhāvacanāḥ pacādaya tī. yadesām bhavatā śāmānādhīkaranyam, bhavatī pacati, bhavatī pakṣyati, bhavatyapāksīditī and Vol II p 57 lines 3 and 4.
In both cases the verb is used in the impersonal passive (bhāve) and conveys the verbal idea in general as its meaning. Nevertheless the verb is used in the plural, as an exception to the general rule that when they are used in the impersonal passive, verbs will be in the singular. Thus in these two sentences the verb shows the plural number of the noun (sādhanam) with which it is linked. Camels have various ways of sitting and a plurality is inherent in the meaning of the noun form 'ustrāśikā' itself. Thus plurality also appears in the verb 'āsyante' Similarly the dead lie in many ways, and the plurality thus inherent in the very meaning of the noun, hatasāyikā' appears also in the verbal form form "śayyante" of Nagesabhaṭṭa's Mahābhāṣya-pradīpodyota (Biblio Indica No. 1231) Vol. 4—pages 332 and 336 Foot-note).

ustrāṇāṁ hi āśikāḥ svarūpata eva vilaksanaḥ hi, hatasca nānaprakāram serate, uttāna avatānah viṁnākeśah visra stavastrah ityādi tatsādrśyādākhyātavācyasyāpi bhāvasya svarūpāgatabhedāvabhāsādbahuvacanam bhavatyeva

140 aksah (1) a certain kind of seed, (2) the pole of cart, (3) seed of a plant used in dice
The sentence in question is "aksāḥ bhaksyantāṁ bhojyantāṁ divyanantām". Let aksāḥ be eaten, bent or thrown. This kind of composite utterance is not usual in actual life. But like the sentence sveto dhāvati" it can be quoted for illustration

141 When the word aksāḥ is used as stated in the previous stanza, it is a common form under which three different
words, aksāh, aksāh, aksāh are uttered cf. The explanation of the word ‘s’veto’ in ‘sveto dhāvati’ according to the principle of tantra (See V P II 111)

142 Thus the words ‘aksā’ and ‘yakṣa’ for instance have necessarily to be used one after the other, because they do not possess a common form under which they can be uttered in union. But in the word ‘aksāh’, we have according to one view three different words, ‘aksāh’, ‘aksāh’ and ‘aksāh’ uttered in union. This is because they have a common form and they are different words because they have different meanings.

143 That is, this view, instead of considering that ‘aksāh’ is a composite of three different words considers its meaning as a composite of three different meanings, the word itself being a single entity.

144 Thus the word ‘aksāh’ is a composite of the three words aksāh, aksāh and aksāh and from the composite utterance “aksāh bhaksyantām bhojyantām divyantām” we get ‘akso bhaksyatām’, ‘akso bhojyatām’ and ‘akso divyatām’, using the word aksa in the singular we must connect the plural noun with the verb as aksāh bhaksyantām etc.

145 See note on 466

146 See Note on 466

147 Examples of such sentences śveto dhāvati (VP II 113) and ighyaṇaḥ samprāsāraṇam (Pāṇini I 1 45)

See note 130 above
cf. MBh Vol I—(page 111-112)
vibhaktvisesanirdeśastu jñāpakaḥ ubhayasamjñātvasya

148 See Notes 130 and 147 above The reference is to the sūtra ighyaṇaḥ samprāsāraṇam
The term liṅga-ṛṇāpaka of Mahābhāṣya (See quotation under 147 above).

149. The sūtra referred to is Pāṇini I. 1.59. The Kāśika paraphrases the sūtra as: dvīvacananimittēci ajādesah sthānivabhavati dvīvacana eva kartavye—that is, when followed by an affix having an initial vowel, which causes re-duplication, the substitute which takes the place of a vowel is like the original vowel only for the purpose of re-duplication. E.g. papaṭuḥ.

(The formation of this form in the 3rd person dual number from the root pā = to drink will illustrate this sūtra. To form this, the affix ‘atus’ is added to the root. So we get pā = atus = p + zero + atus according to Pāṇini VI. 4.64 which states that the ā of the root is elided before ārthadhatuka affixes beginning with a with a vowel and which are kit or nit and before it. (कित्, हित् or before it).

The next stage is the re-duplication of the root according to Pāṇini VI 1.8 which states that a root consisting of a single vowel is re-duplicated before the terminations of the perfect. Now, since what remains of the root after the elision of ā is only p, the provision according to VI 1.8 of the root consisting of a single vowel does not exist. To remove that difficulty we have the operation of the rule under discussion (i.e. I. 1.59). According to this rule, the zero which comes in the place of the ā in the root pā (i.e., in the setting p + zero + atus), must be treated like the ā itself. That is, for the purpose of the operation of re-duplication we should consider that the ā is still there. Hence it may be considered that the root which is to be re-duplicated is pā—that satisfying the condition for VI. 1.8).

Now the point of the Vākyapadīya referring to
Patañjali’s discussion of this sūtra is to quote a remark which is made in that connection in the Mahābhāṣya regarding the employment of principle of ekasesa or tantra in the use of words or word-combination. To explain, if a single use of a word is intended to convey its occurrence more than once, then the word is used according to the principle of ekasesa or tantra. In the sūtra in question namely, dvirvacane’ci, the word dvirvacane (re-duplication) is used to stand for the occurrence of the word twice in the sūtra. It will be noted that the paraphrasing of the sūtra by the Kāśika, given above, contains the word dvirvacane mentioned twice. See undelined. According to the Mahābhāṣya the single mention of dvirvacane in the sūtra is a combination of two instances of its occurrence and therefore can stand for both.

See MBh—Vol I (p 156 lines 17 and 18) katham punarekena yatnena unbhāyam labhyam ekasesa-nirdeśo’yaṃ dvirvacanam ca dvirvacanam ca dvirvacanam

150 S K Belwalker suggests the possibility that Baiji, Saubhava and Haryaksa are traditional elaborators of the Pāṇinian system sometime between 470 A D — 650 A D. See Systems of Sanskrit Grammar p 35 footnote 1. But this obviously is impossible as the three authors must have lived before Candara’s time if Bhartrhari’s account is to be relied upon as Belwalker himself does on p 41 of his work.

151 The mountain referred is Trikūṭa. The legend is that on Trikūṭa was found the text of the science of grammar composed by Rāvana. A certain Brahmarañkasas took it away and gave it to teachers like Candara and Vasu-rātagaru. They then developed it into a science with
many branches. On Candra and Vasurāta see Systems of Sanskrit Grammar pp 57-62

152 The teacher referred to is Vasurāta mentioned in 151 above. According to Punyarāja, the statement 'this was composed by our teacher' only means 'composed through the blessings of the teacher'.

153 Cf Tractus Logico Philosophicus p 77
'The object of Philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.

'The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions" but to make propositions clear.'
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page, Verse etc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Atharvan 4-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abheda School</td>
<td>144-473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhihitānvaya</td>
<td>39-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhihitānvayavāca</td>
<td>162-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhihitānvayavādu</td>
<td>46-41, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhīvyaktūvādinah</td>
<td>153-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhīvyangya</td>
<td>153-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āgama</td>
<td>30-134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhanda positio 53-72</td>
<td>165-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54-76, 55-77, 64-117,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115-340, 131-415, 182</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhanda School of Grammar</td>
<td>40-19, 45-37,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59-96, 143-468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhandavāda 87-221, 154-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhandavāda 20-92, 37-7,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-20, 59-95, 81-205,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126-391, 127-394</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhandavīva 98-269, 128-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>398 b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ākṛtiganatva 152-para 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksa 185-140, 141, 142,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143, 144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anudāta 171-80 a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anvītābhudhāna 40-17, 46-44,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-114, 115, 131-411,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162-48, 178-111, 180-122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>artha 147-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ārthadhātuka 187-149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arthaprakrtya (thing-classes)</td>
<td>148-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajī 145-479</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>188-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beilwalkar, S K 188-150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benares Commentary 154-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benares edition 9-foot note</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 3, 10-fn 1 4, 16-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fn 1 7, 23-fn 1 3, 24-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fn 1 11, 33-fn 1 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benares text 82-fn 1 1, 6, 7,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112-fn 1 1, 135-fn 1 2, 139-fn 1, 149-10, 189-119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benares version 16-fn 1 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhartrhari 10-fn 1 8,16-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fn 1 1, 17-fn 1 1 19-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fn 1 2, 21-fn 1 2, 23-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fn 1 2, 29-fn 1 2, 33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fn 1 2, 179-114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāsyas 5-23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāva 173-88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāvaprādhāna 146-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bheda School 93-244b,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144-471, 473</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bheda doctrine 143-469</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibli Indica 185 para 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahman 1-1, 5, 2-11, 3-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17, 4-22, 30-132, 33-146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Brahmaraksas 188—151
Brāhmin 122—373

G
Candālas 8—40
Candra (ācārya) 146—481, 188—151
Gārudeva Sāstrī 9—fn 1 3, 16—fn 1 2, 24—fn 11, 27—fn 1 7, 29—fn 1 7, 33—fn 1 5
Codes 2—7
consciousness theory 25—112

D
D M Datta 162—47
dhvani 22—102, 149—11, 153—19, 154—24
doctrine 15—71
dravya 151—para a 1
Dualists 2—8

E
ekasesa 188—ime 3
Ekaśabdavadāmin 180—119
English 161—44

F
Firth J R 172—81

G
grammar 2—11, 3—13, 15, 17, 5—27, 32—142, 33—147, 34—151, 36—3, 45—37, 145—480, 146—481, 482

H
Haryaksa 145—479, 188—150
history of Sanskrit grammar 145—476
hrasvā 171—80a

J
Jātiabdavadāmin 154—23
Jātisphota 41—20

K
Kaiyāta 147—3
Kāraka 175—96
Karana 176—97 a, 181—127
Kārlika 9—fn 1 9, 10—fn 1 1, 3, 9, 19—fn 1 2, 20—fn 2, 23—fn 2, 3, 24—fn 3, 5, 26—fn 6, 27—fn, 29—fn, 33—fn, 135—fn, 137—fn, 138—fn 140—fn, 149—11
Karma 176—87 a, Karmapravacaniya 82—197, 83—199, 200, 201 b, 84—202, 203, 175—96
Kartā 176—97 a
Kāśikā 151—17, 187—149
Kātyāyana 61—102, 137—443 158—37
Khandā theory 84—205
Khandavāda 154—22
Khandavādin 65—119

L
Lectures on Pātañjali’s Mahābhāṣya 152—17
logic 145—479
logicians 8—41
Ludwig Wittgenstein 161—46
madhyamā—157—35
Mahābhāṣyapradīpodyota
(by Nagesabhaṭṭa) 185—para 2
Mahāvākyā 54—76, 178—110
Manuscrīpts 9—fn 1 8, 10—fn 1 9, 23—fn 1 2, 24—fn 1 7, 26—fn 27—fn, 33—fn 37—fn, 76—fn, 106—fn, 110—fn, 113—fn, 120,—fn, 125—fr, 137—fn, 138—fn, 139—fn, 140—fn
Monier Williams 161—44
Monists 2—8

N
Nāgesabhaṭṭa 180—124, 185 para 2
Naiyāyikas 35—155, 154—22
Nānāśabdavādin 180—119
nimitta 175—96
nimittu 175—96
Nirukta 147—2, 173—89, 174—90
nitya (eternal) 152—para 2

O
Om 2—9, 10, 4—17, 20

P
padapraṇāth 163—49 a
Pada School 43—29, 44—34, 51—61, 63—112, 130—409
Pada-text 50—59, 163—49a
Padavādī( n) 57—88, 59—95, 94—248, 126—391, 160—41, 178—111
Pāṇini system 188—150
Parā (a stage of speech) 157—35
Paramātra 156—31
Paśyantī 157—35
Patañjali 145—477, 478, 480, 154—23, 175—96, 179—114, 188—line 1
philosophy 17—fn 1 3
pragṛhya 169—76
prakṛiyā 147—1
prākṛta-dhvanī 153—18, 155—25
prātpadika 151—para 2, 170—para 3
R
Rāvana 188—151
Rgveda-prātiṣakhya 50—58a, 163—49a

Rk 4—21
Rk verses 62—107
RV (Rgveda) 156—33, 157—35
rūdhī 45—37, 161—45

S
Śabda 153—19, 155—27
Śabdavat 174—91
Śādhyā 181—127
Śadhanā 181—127, 185—para 2
Śādya (Svara) 155—28
Śages 5—23
Śāman or Śāma 4—21, 62—107
Samavāya 181—129
Sambandhī 173—87
Sambuddhī 177—para 2
Samghāta 46—41, 42, 49—54
Samghātapakṣa 162—48
Samgraha 97—265, 145—476, 479
Samgrahakāra 16—fn 1 3, 4
Samhitā 50—59, 163—49a
Śāmidheni hymn 169—75, 179—117
Samjñā 152—para 3, 176—97
Samjñāprakarana 176—97a
Samjñinī 152—para 3
Samkhya 175—96, 176—97a
Sampradārana 182—1 2
Samyoga 181—129
Śaṃskṛt 36—155
Śaṃskṛt grammar 176—97a, para 2
Śaṃstādipākā 153—19
Sattva 173—88
Saṃbhaga 145—479, 188—150
Śāvitrī hymn 97—261
Scripture 6—30, 31—138, 32—141, 33—145, 146
School of grammar 114—338a
Science of grammar 188—151
Seers 1—5
Śesasāshti 166—68b
Southern version 145—480
Sphota 9—44, 18—81, 20— fn 1 2, 22—102, 149—11, 154—23 24
Sphoṭavāda (Nāge-abhāṭa)
180—124
Śrutārthāpati  view 113—33, 335
Śruti 163—54
Subrahmanyā Śāstrī 152—17
PS
Śūtras 5—23, 14—65, 68, 69, 122—tra 1 1, 152—para 3, 176—97 a para 2
176—97a, 182—line 1, 187—149, 188—1 1
Śvamātrā 156—31
Śvarta 171—80a
Systems of Sanskrit grammar
188—150

T
tantra 178—103, 188—para 4
Technique of Semantics
(by J R Firth) 172—81
Theorists 36—1
Theory of Speech and Language
(by Sir Alan Gardiner)
156—32
The Six ways of Knowing
(by D M Datta) 162—47
Tractus Logico—Philosophicus 181—128, 189—153
Trikūṭa (mountain) 188—151
Trivandrum manuscript 10— fn line 8, 24—fn 2, 4
U

Udātta 171—80, a
Universe 1—1, 2—10, 27—120
Upamāna 150—16
Upameya 150—16
Upāsārjanam 175—96
upholders of doctrine 15—70, 35—156

V

Vaikhari 157—35
Vasu, C S, 169—76
Vākyā 163—54
Vākyapadiya (V P) 9—fn 10, 176—97a 179—114, 187—149
Vākya-sphoṭa 49—56
Vārttika (s) 5—23, 115—342, 36—3, 158—36, 37, 178—104,
Vārttakāra 37—5, 158—37
Vasūrātaguru 188—151, 189—152
Veda(s) 1—2, 5, 2—6, 7, 9, 10, 3—11, 17, 168—75, 27—120, 30—133, 31—136, 32—141, 62—107, 55—77,
Vedic lore 145—477, 478
Venkataramanah D 153—19
Vivarana-grantha 29—fn
Vṛddhi 170—para 3
Vṛsabhadvīpa 27—fn

W

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 161—46

Y

Yajus 4—21
Yakṣa 186—142
Yaśka 147—2, 173—89
Yaugika 45—37
## INDEX OF WORDS

In the text of the Vākyapadiya Cantos I and II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अ</td>
<td>अतिन्नन्त्रि ८-३८</td>
<td>अतिन्नत्रि ८-३८</td>
<td>अत्यत्र ९-२३, २९-१३०, ४१-२१, ६७-४६, ५८-६४, ६२-६६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अकारण १०५-१०४, १०६-३०७</td>
<td>अवधनु ४-२१</td>
<td>अवधान ५-६७</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अश्लि ९-२३</td>
<td>अवृज्ज्ञ ७२-१५२, ७१-१६३, १०९-३११</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अक्षर १०२-१०५, १४१-४६०, १४१-४६१, १४२-४६६</td>
<td>अक्ष्म २२-१४६</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनार १-१</td>
<td>‘अवि’ (prefix) ८०-१९०, ८७-२१९</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बलसतित ४-२०</td>
<td>अबिकर ६७-१६६</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बनिन १०२-२८१, २८२</td>
<td>अबिकर्तु ६५-२५४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बनिनदत १०२-२८२</td>
<td>अबिकर्तु ६५-२५४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बन्धुरता १२-१५६</td>
<td>अब्वत २०-६३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बज्ज र०-१२, ५६-५८, ६२-१०२, ६३-४२७</td>
<td>अब्वत २०-६३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बज्जता २-६</td>
<td>अब्वत २०-६३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बज्ज्ञिष्ठाधि ५७-८४</td>
<td>अब्वत २०-६३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अभ्दरु ४-२१</td>
<td>अब्झ २०-६३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अभ्याहार (Pratyāhāra) ६६-१०२</td>
<td>अभ्याम प०-१००, १०२-१०४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अभ्यास २६-१०६</td>
<td>अभ्यास २६-१०४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अर्धांगन १७-३०</td>
<td>अभ्यास २६-१०४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘अद  (suffix) ७८-१८०</td>
<td>अभ्यास २६-१०४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘अद्वृत्वादि’ (prefix) १२५-३८३</td>
<td>अभ्यास २६-१०४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘अण’  (suffix) ६०-१००</td>
<td>अभ्यास २६-१०४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अणु २५-१०३, २५-१०३</td>
<td>अभ्यास २६-१०४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्मात २९-१३०</td>
<td>अभ्यास २६-१०४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्तित्व २४-२५१</td>
<td>अभ्यास २६-१०४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अतिवस्त ६१-४५६</td>
<td>अत्वान्त ८३-४५२</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अत्वात्त ८३-४५२</td>
<td>अत्वात्त ८३-४५२</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words Page and Verse</td>
<td>Words Page and Verse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनित्य २१-९५</td>
<td>अनेक ३७-६, १४२-४६४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनिवर्दित ३५-१५५</td>
<td>अनेकान्त १६५-२५३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनिवर्षित ८०-१८३</td>
<td>अनेकपुकल ६३-१११</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनिवर्ण ९६-२३४</td>
<td>अनेकनामित १३६-४४०</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनिवर्त १२-५७</td>
<td>अनेकार २५-२५०</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुकार १५, ३७-७, ६६-१३५</td>
<td>अन्त २८-१२६</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुगम ३७-६७, ६१-१६५</td>
<td>अन्त करण २५-११४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुग्रह १२५-३४७</td>
<td>अन्तरजुल १०१-२८४</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुवर्त ५-२३</td>
<td>अन्तरजल ५८-१८२</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुवर्तित ७३-१३४</td>
<td>अन्तराल १६-४४, १३०-४१०</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुवर्तित १०९-३६१</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुवर्तित ६६-२४४</td>
<td>अन्तरदुर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुपाकरण ८७-२१७</td>
<td>अन्तरदुर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुपकारित ६२-३५०</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुलकित १३५-४३१</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुलखित ४२-२६</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुलखित ८३-२००</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुपास्य १६-३३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुपास्य १०६-३०५, ३०७</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुपास्य १४२-४६३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुपास्य १४६-४८५</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुपास्य ७-३३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुमान ७-३६, ८-३८, ४२, ३४-४५</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुमान ८०-१८६, १११-३७६, १२१-३७६, ३६८</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुमान ७-३३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुमान ४७-४६</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुमान १८-८२</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुमान ६४-१६५, ६६-२४५</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुमान ४१-१५१</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुमान २८-१२३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुभव ७-३३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुभाव ५-२३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुभव ८३-३१९</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुभव २८-१२३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुभव ९५-२३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुभव ६३-२१४, १३३-४२३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुभव ४२-२४५, ५१-३७३, ५५-२६५, १३३-४२३</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुभव ६६-१२२, ८३-२१८</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुभव ३६-१</td>
<td>अन्तर १२२-३०३</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Words Page and Verse

अभिमुक्त ८७-२१८, १११-३२६
अभियोग ८०-१९०
अभियोजक ५६-८१
अभिरूचि ५८-१९१, ८९-२६३
अभाव ५४-६४
अभाव ७१-२४२, ७२-२४१, ७२-२४३, १०१-२४२
अभिलेख ३३-१४६
अभिचार २२-१०५, २८-१२२
अभिमन्युज्वल ६३-१२५
अभिज्ञान ६३-१२८
अभिन्न ७२-१५०
अभिव्यक्त ३४-३५४
अभिव्यक्त ३५-१५७, १५५
अभिचार ७२-१६०, ७५-१६५, १६८, ८२-१६५, ८२-१६६, १२८-३६३, १२७-४०१, १२१-४०२, १२३-४२२, १३४-४२३
अभिचाराकृतिया ६१-४०५, १२९-४०२
अभिव्यक्तकार ३५-१५६, ४६-१५४, ५५-४०५, ५५-४०६, ५६-४०८, ६०-१००, ७५-१५४, ७५-१५५, ७६-२१३, २१२, ७६-२१३, ११६-३५५
अभिव्यक्तारू ६४-२२३, ७५-१६२, ८३-१३५
अभिव्यक्त ८२-१९६
अभिचेत १४-६५, ६३-१६२, १२८-४०१, ५६-१२५, १२६, ६६-१२७, १२६-३६०
अभिलेख ५४-३५५, ६०-२०८, २५२-५३५
अभिलेखित २८-१२५
अभिमन्यु ८८-२१२
अभिमन्यु १५३-३७०, १०९-३०, २८-९६, २६-१२१, १०८-३१६
अभिलेखितविद्यु २५-१२०
अभिमन्यु २५-२१२
अभिमन्यु २८-२५०, ४०६, १३४-२५१

Words Page and Verse

अभिसार १५४-३७१
अभिसार ४०-१३७, ४६-४०, ६०-१२८, ६५-४०५, ७४-४५३, १२२-४३२, १२२-४३२, १३४-७२८, १३६-५३३, १४०-७५५
अभिसार १२२-४००
अभिसार ५०-१७३, ५२-१७३, ६०-१७६, ७६-१७६, ९२-१७६, २५-१२७, १५७-४५४, २५५-१२५
अभिसार १२२-३३९
अभिसार ६४-१२७, ६५-१२८, ६६-१२४, १२०, ३२-१५२, ५२-१३५, १२८-३१८, ९२-४०२
अभिसार २५-३४
अभिसार ३२-१४०
अभिसार ७६-१२७
अभिसार २०-२८, २४-३२२, १२२-३३२, १९४-४५२
अभिसार २५-१३१
अभिसार ३०-१३२
अभिसार १००-३२४
अभिसार ३०-३२०
अभिसार २५-३२०
अभिसार २५-३२०
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अबध २३-१०२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अल्यविषातिष्ठ १४५-४६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अभगत १४३-५६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अभगति ९२-२४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अबिक्रीत १२-५४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अवनह ६५-१२०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अब्राख्य २०-२५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अबरागण ७२-३६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>असात्म ६-२२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वाद ५८-२९</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्तयोग ११५-३४२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्रुप ५१-५०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वश भाव ६१-२३</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>असधु ५०-४६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वस्त १२३-२१</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वविद्य २६-१६९</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वविन ६३-२५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वविज्ञान ३२-१४४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वीकार १३-२२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अद्वैत ६२-१९३</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अद्वितीय ६२-१७२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अद्वितीय २२-६०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अद्वितीय २२-१०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अद्वैत ६२-१४५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अद्वितीय ४६-६५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अल्यविषातिष्ठ १४५-४६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अभगत १४३-५६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अभगति ९२-२४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अबिक्रीत १२-५४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अवनह ६५-१२०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अब्राख्य २०-२५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अबरागण ७२-३६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>असात्म ६-२२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वाद ५८-२९</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्तयोग ११५-३४२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्रुप ५१-५०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वश भाव ६१-२३</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>असधु ५०-४६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वस्त १२३-२१</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वविद्य २६-१६९</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वविन ६३-२५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वविज्ञान ३२-१४४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अस्वीकार १३-२२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अद्वैत ६२-१९३</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अद्वितीय ६२-१७२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अद्वितीय ४६-६५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक</td>
<td>५२-६६, ७६-७६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>१२-२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>१४-१३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>२४-६४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>८५-८३, १०५-१०६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>२४-३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>३२-२९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>५२-३१, ३३-१४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>६९-३७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>१५-१५५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>१२-३४, ६८-३३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>५०-१६, १६६-३४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>१३२-४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>४९-५३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>२२-२४२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>०४-९६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>१२-३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>१२-९०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>१३८-४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>१५२-४७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>५८-९६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>८३-२८, १८-६८, ५०-६०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>९४-२४८, २४९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>४५-२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>१३-५१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>३४-६८, ८१-१६५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>६६-१२६, ९२-३२८, १०३-२८९, १०५-३२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>३३-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>३३-३०, १०६-३०८</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अविलक</td>
<td>६३-६५, ७०-१५२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>१२-४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>१३-१३७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>१३६-४८, १३७-१४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>१३८-४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>१३७-१४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>१३८-४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>५३-३०, १०६-३०८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>१२-४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>१२-४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक म</td>
<td>१२-४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक र</td>
<td>१२-४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविलक ल</td>
<td>१२-४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আদিত্ত্ব</td>
<td>৯১-২৩৭</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধার</td>
<td>৮১-১৮৮</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারাচ</td>
<td>৯৩-২৪৪, ১৩১-৪১২</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারায়</td>
<td>৪১৩, ৪১৪</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারক্ষ</td>
<td>৯৯-২২২</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারক্ষণ</td>
<td>৪৪-৩৩</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারক্ষণুরাণ</td>
<td>৪৬-৪৪</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারেক্ষণিয়ম</td>
<td>২০-১১</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারেক্ষণনিক</td>
<td>৩-১৫</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারেক্ষণনিকর</td>
<td>২৫-১২২, ৪৪-৩১</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারেক্ষণনিকরেক্ষণ</td>
<td>৮৩-২০১</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারেক্ষণনিকরেক্ষণত</td>
<td>৭২-৯৮৬</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিত</td>
<td>১-২</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষ</td>
<td>২৭-১২৫, ৩০-১৩৫, ৯৬-২৫৯, ১২৯-৪০২</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষত</td>
<td>৪৮-২০৩</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগ</td>
<td>৫৬-৮২, ৯৮-২৬৮, ১৩৫-৪৩১</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগস</td>
<td>১২৩-৩৩৭</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসে</td>
<td>১৪৫-৪৭৯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেই</td>
<td>৫৪-১৯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইম</td>
<td>১০৩-২১২</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইমম</td>
<td>৫৮-৭০</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইমমত</td>
<td>১৮-৪৮</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইমমতে</td>
<td>১৮৮, ৪১-২০, ৫৫-৭৭, ৬৪-১১৫, ৯৬-২৫৮, ১২২-৩৬৬, ১২৩-৩৭৫, ১৪৪-৪৬৩</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইমং</td>
<td>২৫-১৪৫, ১০৭-৩১১, ১২২-৩৭১</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইমংম</td>
<td>১৩-৬৩</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইমংমত</td>
<td>১২৩-৪৩৪</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইমংমতে</td>
<td>২১-২১</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইমংমতেই</td>
<td>৭২-১৫১</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধারিতাক্ষগসেইমংমতেইম</td>
<td>৭২-১৫১</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>আধার্য</td>
<td>৭২-১৫০</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ই

'ইষ্টা' ৭৩-১৭৮
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>उपयोग 83-201</td>
<td>90, 69-137, 119-162, 136-140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपराम 83-205</td>
<td>एकता 43-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपरस्त 83-19</td>
<td>एकतिड़ 137-143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपलक्षण 135-143</td>
<td>एकत्त 15-70, 71, 60-98, 96-97, 124-385, 135-432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपलक्ष्य 14-16</td>
<td>एकत्तवचन 143-468, 129-404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपलय 26-115</td>
<td>एकत्तवचन 2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपलक्ष्य 31-145</td>
<td>एकरूप 140-246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपम 70-180, 181, 182, 70-185, 80-187</td>
<td>एकरूपता 63-111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपमर्जन 81-54, 101-282</td>
<td>एकवचन 143-467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपमहत 72-152</td>
<td>एकवाक्यता 137-350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपमानु 40-19</td>
<td>एकलोक (विन्द्र) 122-371, 126-388, 424-375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपमान 39-15, 91-238</td>
<td>एकलोकित 62-108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपमान 4-38</td>
<td>एकलरूप 98-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपभाषात्वम 9-44</td>
<td>एकलरूप 38-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपवाच 16-75</td>
<td>एकलरूप 136-171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपवत्त 49-55</td>
<td>एकलरूप 136-440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपय 140-455</td>
<td>एकलरूप 23-128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपलेख 4-56</td>
<td>बौधिक 108-314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपरामका 140-558</td>
<td>बौधम्बरायण 115-342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपरामका 140-558</td>
<td>बौधम्बरायण 109-322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>क</td>
<td>क</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>एक 41-22, 42-25, 50-89,</td>
<td>'कर्न' (suffix) 103-293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कर्म 22-105, 106</td>
<td>कर्म 10-42, 22-102, 23-106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>करण 28-122, 128-201</td>
<td>करणरूप 134-429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Words Page and Verse

कलि २६-६२, ७६-१४४, १०४-३२, ३३, १२३-३७६
कर्म २-४, ३४-४, ४१-२०, ५३-३०, ९६-२६, १००-२७, १०६-३८, ११३-३३३, १२८-४०१
कर्माल १२४-४२९
कर्मकल्प ८३-१९९
कर्मकल्पकल्प ८४-२०२
कर्मदात ७९-१८४
कर्मदेव ४३-२०
कर्मदिवस्मू १३४-३३७
कला २८-१२५
काक १०३-३१२
काम्य ५३-७०
काय ३३-२४७
कारक ८३-१९८, २००
कारण २४-१०९, ४४-३२
कार्य १३-८२, २६-२२, ४४-३२, ७६-२६, ५०-१९, ५५-७७, ६५-१२५, ७५-१२५, १०२-२५, १०७-२५, १३३-२५९
काय कारणमात्र ५-२५
कार्यल ५३-७०, २६-२२
काद १६-७६, ४५-५०, १०४-२९६, १०७-२२, १०८-२२, १२५-२८४, १४९-५५२, १५५-५२, १५६-४७१
कार्यमेद ४६-२३
कालशाप १-३
cालम्ब ६-३६
काण २६-१२७
कुड़ा २६-१२७
कुलाय ७५-२५९
कुशल १०५-३२८
कुप ७६-१६१
होर ८६-२५१
हतम ५-२८
(203)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>कीर</td>
<td>२०-९४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>क्षेपविशेष</td>
<td>४६-२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ख</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बदिर</td>
<td>४८-२२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>खंडोल</td>
<td>२०-४४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ग</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गन्ध १७-७३, २२-९८, ५८-८९,</td>
<td>७३-१५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गन्धवन्नर १०३-२९२</td>
<td>'गम्य' ७३-१३४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गर्ग ८७-२२१</td>
<td>गवय ५८-९०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गारीय १४५-४६८</td>
<td>गाय १४५-४६८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गिरवा ६६-१३७</td>
<td>गीति ६२-१०७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गुण १३-६२, ६४, ३३-४, ५२-६९,</td>
<td>६३-१५७, ८८-१६६, ११५-३०४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गुणभाव ४६-४८, १०६-३०६</td>
<td>गुणमेद १२३-३३८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गुर ५७-४८, १४५-४६७, १४६-४८२</td>
<td>गृह १२४-३८१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गृहीता १२-५३</td>
<td>गो १००-२७९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'गोणी' ३४-६४९</td>
<td>गोत्र १२०-२६३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गोव ६५-२२३, ३३-१४४</td>
<td>गोि ५३-३८४, ६६-२५७, ६७-२६३, २६४, ६८-२५६, २६७, ६९-२७३, २६४, १००-३७८, १०१-२८२</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>गौणता</td>
<td>१०१-२८१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गौणत ओ ९५-२५३, १०६-२८०</td>
<td>गौर खर ८६-२१६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ग्रन्थित ४१-२७९</td>
<td>ग्रन्थ १४५-४६९, ४८०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ग्रन्थि २६-२१५</td>
<td>ग्रहण १६-७५, २१-३७, ६०-९८, ९९, १००, १०१, ७०-२४३, १२२-३७०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ग्रहणक ४२-२७४</td>
<td>ग्रहक २१-३७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ग्रहकत्व १२-५५</td>
<td>ग्रह ५२-६२, ६०-९८, ९९, ६६-१०५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ग्रहतच १२-५५</td>
<td>घट ६६-५२३, ६६-३३७, १०४-२९७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गण्डा २३-१०४</td>
<td>च</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Words  Page and Verse

श

छन्दसु २-१२, ३-१७, २७-१२०
छन्दस्य ३-१७
छन्दोपयं ३-१७
छल ६९-१२८
छाया २५-११०
छिम ९५-२४९
छेद ८८-२२४

ज

जस्त १-१
जन्म ७५-१४९
जाप्रतिव ६७-२६१
जहूस्वर्ष ८९-२२८
जाति १६-६९, २१-१३, ९५, ३६-१, ४१-२०, ४६-४३, ४९-६, ६६-१२२, ६६-१५०, ७३-२१, ७३-२१, ७३-२१, १०६-३०९, १२२-४५, ५९९-५५९
जातिक्य ११५-५५८
जातिवत्व ९३-२६३
जाज्ञात ५८-९०
जिवरी ७८-१७९
ज्वाला २३-१०६
ज्योतिष ३-१२, ४-१८, १०-४६

श

शात ६८ ३३२
शाया २५-१२२
शान ६-३०, ८-२९, १६-८६, २४-१०७, २४-१२२, ३०-१३९, ४१-२३, ५८-१०, ७६-२६५, ९२-२४३, १०४-२९७, १३०-४८०
( 206 )

Words Page and Verse

तुल्यलक्षण ३६-३
tुम्मिया ८५-२०३
tुपित १२२-२०३
तेजस १७-२०, २५-११३, ११४
tेल २२-१९
त्याग १२७-१३३, १२६-३१५
कवी ३०-२३२, ३२-१४३
त्रिदय ११-५२, १४-१५

द

दश १३२-४१८
दशन १२३-३७८
देश १८५-२४३
दशि १९५-२४५
द्रवण १६-७५, २६-५६, २४-१६७, ६५-१२०, ६१-३१६, १२७, ७०-१३७, ७०-१४१, ७०-२७०, १०२-२८५, ११३-४२२, १४५-४८२, ४८५
दाह १३२-६१८, १४७-६७२
दाहिकणाल ४३-५८०
दीप २३-२२१, २०४-२१८
दीवी १६-७६, २३-१०५, ४७-२६, १०५-६३७
दुलभ ६२-२५७
दुरातुसबुद्री (पाणिनिसूत्र) १२२-३७०
दुध १२३-३७५
दुष्क २७-२६, ६९-१२६, ७०-१४५
दुष्टि ७३-७५, १०९-२४५
देवता ६५-२४५
देवदर्श १२३-२५६
देश २५-१९५, १०३-२१४, १०४-२०५, १०७-२४६, १२५-२४५
देहिन २६-२६७
देंगि ३५-४५
दोष ८५-२३६

 Words Page and Verse

घोतक ८०-१८८, ८१-१९२, ८४-२०४
घोतकल ८५-१९३
घोतन ९३-२४५
घोलिक ७५-१९४
ध्वर ६-३२, २२-२६, २३-१०५, ५२-५४, ५३-९१, ६६-१२६, ७२-१४४, १३३, १२०-६६२
ध्वन्त ५२-६६२, ६६, ६६
ध्वन्तर ६२-१०७
ध्वन ८३-२२१, ८८-२२३, २२४, ८३-२२५, १२५-२६८
धार १३३-३३३, २२९-३९९
धिल ७६-२६४
‘दिव्वंचनेचित्र’ (पाणिनिसूत्र) १४५-४७५
धिष्ठ १४३-४६४
धैतिन २-८

घ

घन १२६-३६४, १२७-३६७
घम ५-२५, ६-२०, ३५, १०-४६, १३-६३, ३०-६३१, ६३५, ३२-१६०, ४२-२३, ४८-५०, ५७-४६, ६४-२६१, ८०-२६२, ९२-२६३, २३२, १२४-३६०
घर्मसाधन ५-२७
घात ७३-१६८, ७३-१६५, १२२, ५९-२६, ६६, १०-२१८, १२०, ८५-२१०, १०-२२९, २३०
घातुव ७६-१६५
घष १०५-३००
घु १९-८६
घोन १०-२४७, १६-३५, ५५, ५६-३६, ६५, १८-४८, ८५, ६४, २०-२२, २४-२३, ९४, ४६,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>नगर १०३-२९२</td>
<td>नाम नाथ (अत्यधिक) ९२-२४३</td>
<td>१३०, ४७-४८, ६९-३७७, ३६-१७०, १७१, ६९-२१५, १५-२३४, ९४-२५०, ९५-२५५, २४-२६६, १००-२८३, १०३-२८५, १०४-२६५, १२१-३६६, ३६७</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नाथ समास ८९-२२६</td>
<td>नारायण ५८-९०</td>
<td>निसर्ग १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निसर्गी ९८-३६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नाथस्वरूप १२४-३६३</td>
<td>नाम १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निमन १०३-२६७</td>
<td>निमन १०३-२९०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नाग १००-२४५, ७८-५७, २४-२२५, २२-१०४, २३-१५५, ४३-३०</td>
<td>निष्पादन १३०-२६७</td>
<td>नियम १३०-२६७</td>
<td>नियम १३०-२६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नावाल १२५-३७२</td>
<td>नाती ५६-८८, ६६-८२३, ४७-४८, १०७-३३६</td>
<td>नियम १३०-२६७</td>
<td>नियम १३०-२६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नातराजिक ५६-८८, ६६-८२३, ४७-४८, १०७-३३६</td>
<td>कर्म नाम १००-२६७</td>
<td>नियम १३०-२६७</td>
<td>नियम १३०-२६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नाम ११४-३३८</td>
<td>नामक ६३-१११</td>
<td>निष्पादन १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निष्पादन १३०-२६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नामितक ४४-३३</td>
<td>निष्पादन १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निष्पादन १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निष्पादन १३०-२६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निष्पादन ३६-३, ३७-५, १३७-४४२</td>
<td>निशान ५२-२९, ५६-६१, २६-९५, ४५-२२, ५०-५९, ५३-७०, ६९-१३८, ६५-१६६</td>
<td>निष्पादन १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निष्पादन १३०-२६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नियत ५-२५, ५-२८, ६-२१, २६-९५, ४५-२२, ५०-५९, ५२-७०, ६९-१३८, ६५-१६६</td>
<td>निरायक ५२-२९</td>
<td>निरायक ५२-२९</td>
<td>निरायक ५२-२९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नियता ५-२८, १५-७०, १६-३६५, ४७-४८, १०७-३३६</td>
<td>निर्मित १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निर्मित १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निर्मित १३०-२६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निर्मितबाद ११२-३३२</td>
<td>निर्मित १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निर्मित १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निर्मित १३०-२६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निर्माण ५०-५९</td>
<td>निर्माण ५०-५९</td>
<td>निर्माण ५०-५९</td>
<td>निर्माण ५०-५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निर्माण ३८-८, ८५-२०७</td>
<td>निर्माण ५०-५९</td>
<td>निर्माण ५०-५९</td>
<td>निर्माण ५०-५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निर्माण ५२-२९, १०७-३३६, ११०-२२३</td>
<td>निर्मित १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निर्मित १३०-२६७</td>
<td>निर्मित १३०-२६७</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Words Page and Verse

निविष्ट १३२-४१९
निवृत्त ३९-५६, १३७-४४९
निकृति ८३-२१८, २८-२०२, ९२-२४३, १०६-३१८, २९०-३२३, १३१-४१३
निरचय १४५-४७८
निरचित २६-११९
नील ३८-८
‘तुट’ (suffix) ७५-१६७, १०१-२८३
नालाम्य १३५-१३३
न्यमण १४६-२८३
न्याय ३२-१३७, १३८, २४५-४७७, १४५-४८२
न्यायवादित् ३६-२
न्याय ५५-७८, २१९-२४८, ११६-३४८
न्यून ८६-२१४
न्यूनता ९९-२७२

व

पक्त १३४-४२९
पक्ष ७२-१५०
पाञ्जुक्य १३४-४२९
पत ११-५२
पतन्त्रिक २४५-४७७, ४८०
पवित्र ७६-१६२
पदकाल ७९-१८६

Words Page and Verse

पदजात १६५-२४१
पदल ८५-१६४
पददिन्य ५०-५७
पदमाग ३८-१९
पदस्य १ॱ-६१
पदप २४०-२०८
पदांग ५०-५९
पदार्थ ४०-१६, २८-२०९, ९५, ७९-५५, ५०-२०, ५६-२०९, ५५-२०, ७०-१३३, ८५-२०१, ९७-२०, १२०-२०५, १३३-४२४, १२४, १३६-२०५, ४३८
पर १००-४५, ३३-२, ४९-२२
परतन्त्र ५३-६२, ७२-९२
परमाणु २४-२९२, ४२-२३
परमा २५-१६, ५२-२४, ६१-२३६
परमाला ३०-१३२
परमाभ २८-२२९, ४२-२४
परमार्थ ४२-२२९
परम ६०-१०१
परतातु ८२-१३६
परा (suffix) ८०-१६७
पराभ ५५-८१
परार्थ १७-५४
परि (suffix) ८०-१९०
परिभा ९६-२५, ९१-२३३
परिवेष ५४-२०३
परिवेष १०२-२८८
परिणाम २५-१६०, २७-१२०, २७६-२८९
परिष्क १८-२४, २२-५४
परिलक्षम १४५-४७५
परिमार्थ ५६-३
परिमाण २२-१००
परीक्ष १२-२५
परंपर ३४-८१, २५-२१, ८२-१२,
परुं ५५-९२, ५३-२३, ५३-८७
| পালক ২২-১০০, ৭৬-১৭২, ১০৩- ২৯০, ২৯৪, ১৪৫-৪৮১ |
| পালিচ্ছ ৩-১৪ |
| পাসু ১০৩-২৯৩ |
| পাসুনী ৩২-১৪৩ |
| পায় ২৯-১১৩ |
| পাখ ১১৫-২৩৫ |
| পাখ ১২৩-৩৬৪ |
| পাঞ্জ ৮-১০ |
| পাঞ্জময় ৩৫-১৫৪ |
| পাঞ্জমময় ৩১-১৩৭, ১৩৩-৩৩৬ |
| পিক ৫৮-৯২ |
| পিণ্ড ৬৫-২৫২ |
| পুষ্করিণী ৬২-২৪৯ |
| পুষ্প ৮৪-৬ |
| পুষ্পক ৪৫-৩৯, ১১১-২৩৩ |
| পুু ৯৭-২৬৮ |
| পুরাণ ১৪৬-৪৮৫ |
| পুরায় ৫৮-৬৪ |
| পুরো ১০-৪৮, ৪১-২২, ৪৪-১১৬, ১৩০-৪১১ |
| পূর্ণ ১৩২-১২০ |
| পূর্নকর ১-২ |
| পূর্নচর ৮১-১৯২ |
| 'প' (prefix) ৮০-১৭৬ |
| পঞ্চস ৩৬-২৯২, ১৪-২৫৪, ১৭- ২৬৪, ১৮-২৬৮, ১০৮-৩১৪, ৩১৫, ৩২৪, ১১২-৩৩০, ১১৩- ৩৩৩, ১৩০-৪০৭ |
| পঞ্চস ১৩-৬৪ |
| পঞ্চম ৭০-১৪৬ |
| পঞ্চাশ ২৮-১২৪, ৫৮-৯৩, ১৪৪- ৪৭২ |
| পঞ্চাশ ২২-৯৭, ৪৪-৩২, ৭২- ১১৩ |
| পঞ্চাষণ ১০৪-২৬৮, ১০৫-৩২৩ |
| পঞ্চয ১২৫-৩৭, ২২-৯৭, ৪৪- ৩২ |

| প্রক্ষিত ৩৮-১০, ৬৭-১৭২, ৮১- ৯০, ১০২-২২, ১৩৪, ১৪৮- ২৮০ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ৫০-৫৮ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ১৩-৬৪ |
| প্রকৃম ৪৬-৪০, ৭২-১৪৫, ১২৮- ৩৯৬, ১৩০-৪১০, ১৪০- ৫৫৮ |
| প্রকাশ ৬১-১৩২, ৮৯-২২৫, ১০৫- ২৪৩, ১৩০-৪১১, ১৩১- ৪১৪ |
| প্রক্ষিত ১-৪, ৩৩-২৬, ৮৯-২২৭, ৯০-২৩২, ২৩৩ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ১-৭, ৭৬-১৭২, ১০৫-২২৬ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ১৩-৬৪ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ১০৩-২৯০ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ৫২-৬০৭, ৭২-৭০, ৭৮ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ৪২-৭০, ২০-২২, ৪০- ৩৭, ৬৯-৩১৫, ১০৯-৩১৫, ১১৬-৩৭৪, ১৩৩-৪১৪, ৪৪৩- ৪৬৬, ৪৭০ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ১০-৪০, ৭২-১৪৫, ১২৮- ২৩৫, ১৩২-২৪১, ১০৫-৪০৫, ১০৮-৩১৫, ১১২-৩৩০, ১৩০- ৪৫০, ১৩০-৪৩৯, ১৩১- ৪১৪ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ১৩-৬৪ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ৬৩-১১০, ১৩৫-৩৮৬, ১৪০-৪০০ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ১৩-৬৪ |
| প্রক্ষিপ্ত ৬৩-১১০, ১৩৫-৩৮৬, ১৪০-৪০০ |
( 211 )

Words Page and Verse

প্রাকার ১০২-২৯২
প্রতিভ ১৬-৩৬
প্রজাপতি ১২৯-৪৫১
প্রাণ ৩০-১৪২
প্রাণ ২৫-১১৩, ২৬-২১৫, ১১৭, ২৮-৬২২
প্রাণায় ৮৯-২২৬, ৮৯-২২৭, ৬৭-১২৯, ১২৪-২২৭
প্রতিভ ১২৭-৩৯৫
প্রাণায় ৩০-১৪২
প্রাণায় ১১৯-৩৭৬
প্রতিভ ৮২-১৫০
প্রাণ ১২৩-৪০২
প্রাণ ৩২-১৫০
প্রতিভ ১৬-৬১৬, ২৩-১০৫, ৬১-১০২, ১০৬-৩০৯

ফ

ফল ৫৭-৮৩, ৬৭-১৮৫, ৯৬-২৩৪, ১২২-২৩২, ১২৬-৩৯৫, ১৩৪-৪২২
ফলবতু ১৩৮-৪৪১

ব

বলবতু ৫৬-৮০
বহি ২৮-১২৬
বহি ৭৬-১৬০
বহি ১৪৬-২৩৭
বহি ৮৭-২১৯, ৮৯-২২৭
বাচ ৫৫-৩৭৬
বাচক ১১৬-৩৪৬
বাচক ৫৩-৩৮
বাল ৫৪-১১৭, ৬২-২৩৮, ১০৭-২৪২, ১০৫-২৩০
বালবায় ৭৮-১৬৭
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>मुणि</td>
<td>३-3५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मंत</td>
<td>३६-२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मधु</td>
<td>७२-१४९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मध्यमा</td>
<td>३२-१४२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मनोभाव</td>
<td>२५-११३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मन्त्र</td>
<td>६५-२५४, ६६-२५५, १०९-३२२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मन्त्र</td>
<td>१२२-१४८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मरण</td>
<td>१०४-२९५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मच</td>
<td>३३-१४७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>महत्त</td>
<td>२३-१०३, १००-२७९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>महानी</td>
<td>१२४-३६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>महत्त्व</td>
<td>१०१-२८०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>महाभाषा</td>
<td>१४५-४७७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मात्र</td>
<td>१२६-३७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मात्र</td>
<td>४४०</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>मेदनक</td>
<td>४४-२०४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मध्यमा</td>
<td>१०८-३१६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मिया ९९-२३५, ९२-२५३, ११२-३३२</td>
<td>योग्यभाव ५-२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मुख्य १६-३७४, ५०-७४, ६६-२५७, १५७-२६३, २६५, ६८-२६७, १००-१०७८, ७७९, १०२-२८५, १०२-२८५, १०२-२८५, १०२-२८५</td>
<td>योग्यभाव १६-२५१, १४१-६४२, १४२-६४३, ७६४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मूल्यत्व ५५-२५३</td>
<td>र</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मूल्य १००-२४५</td>
<td>रजस १०२-२७८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मृत्यु ५८-९१</td>
<td>रस ३-१२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मृत्यु ४-१९, ४६-१२, २४-१०९</td>
<td>राजा १३९-४५०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मृण्मय १०२-२९३</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मृण १३-१५०, १०३-२९३</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मृणालिण्य १०२-२८५</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मृणालिण्यकार १०२-२८५</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'ज्ञान' ७३-१७८</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>यज्ञसू ४-२१</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>यदनविक ३३-१३९, १२३-१३६</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>यदनविपितव १३५-२३३</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>यत्त ५४-७४, ६३-२४८, ६८-२६६</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>यतनात्तु ६५-१२०</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>यत्नार्थ १२५-३४७</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>यत्नास्यव ६०-९९</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>याका ३९-१२</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>युक्त १३-२३५, १२-२६४, ६३१-४४४</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>युक्ति ७०-१४१</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>युगांध ६८-२१८</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>युग ६५-२०९</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>युगमाव १००-२७५</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>युग ७५-१६९</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>युग ७२-१५२, ७९-१५२, ९४</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>योगांत्र २१-२६</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>योग्यत्व ५७-८५</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>लक्षण ३३-१२९, ३८-२, ५०</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>लक्षण ५६-१६९, ७९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>लक्षण १०६-२०९</td>
<td>कृष्ण २९-१२६, २९-१२६, ४६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115-343</td>
<td>लघु 51-84, 77-116, 115-343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127-185</td>
<td>लाखारस 77-185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124-382</td>
<td>लिङ्गा</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117-349</td>
<td>लेह, 60-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-99</td>
<td>लेह</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-37</td>
<td>लोक 20-134, 67-130, 71-87, 89-236, 104-217, 115-343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119-360</td>
<td>लोप 193-352, 193-360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-210, 112-330, 1135-342, 213-370</td>
<td>लौकिक</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**व**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69-135</td>
<td>वस्तर</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69-198, 142-466</td>
<td>वचन</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-2100</td>
<td>वचन 103-292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-11</td>
<td>वर्णभाग</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143-483</td>
<td>वर्णमाला</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Words Page and Verse

विवेक ४३५-४३२
विश्वविद्या ५०-५७, ३३-३४६
विश्वविद्याभिषेक ६५-१०२
विवेक ५५-६५९, १४६-४८४
विवेकिन ४३५-४३२
विश्वविद्या ४५-३६, ५३-३६, ७२-
१६२, ३२-३५५, ७२-१३६,
२५-२०८, ९२-२५१, ९४-
२४९, ११३-३६, १२५-३६३,
१३०-४०९
विश्वविद्याभिषेक ३३-१५८, ८७-२०
विद्युंड ३५-२१०
विद्युंड २-९, ३३-१४७
विद्युंड २५-१५, ४८-४१, ५५-६४,
५२-५३, ५२-२८, ५५-५८,
३२-१४८, १५४, १५२, ३७-
५६, ९०-२७४, १०६-२०१
विद्युंड २३-१०५, ३३-५, ३७-६,
१५६-१३
विद्युंड ३०५-३०९, १२०-३६५,
१५६-१५०
विद्युंड २६-१६७, २७-२०
विद्युंड २५-१३७, १३-२६, १३-२६,
१६-५६, २६-२५०, २७-६०,
१७८, १०२-२०३, १२५-३८०,
२५९-४०६
विद्युंड ७५-१४४
विद्युंड १२५-३६९
विद्युंड ५५-२०२
विद्युंड ८३-२६८
विद्युंड १२५-३१३
वृक्ष ६६-१३२, ७२-२४१
वृक्ष ७६-१६७, २२६-२०३
वृक्ष ११४-५९, १६-५७, १३-३६,
२५-२०५, ४४-३५, ६५-१४४,

शब्दतत्त्व १-१, ४३-३०, ४४-३२
शब्दतत्त्व ४१-५२
शब्दनिवन्धन ६५-१२७
शब्दपुर्ण ४-२१
शब्दभावना २८-१२२
शब्दसंयोग १२१-३६८
शब्दसंयोग १२६-२४६
शब्दसंयोग २८-१२२
शब्दसंयोग ९६-२६०, ११८-३५५
शब्दसंयोग ९८-२५४
शब्दसंयोग १८०-५२८
शब्दसंयोग २७-१२२
शब्दतत्त्व १२१-२७२
शब्दतत्त्व १२२-२७२
शब्दसंयोग ६६-१०४
शब्दसंयोग ३६-४५०, ६४-१२४
शब्दसंयोग ६५-२४३
शारीर १०७-३२३
शाश्वत २५, १४५-५४
शाश्वत ११४-२३७
शाश्वत २८-६२४
शाश्वत ६०-१५३, ३१-१३५
शाश्वत ३६-३, ४५-२०, ५५-३०, ६०-९८, ६२-१०४, ६३-११०
शाश्वत ६७-१२३, ७६-१२६
शाश्वत ७६-२५०, १०२-२५०, २३२, २३३
शाश्वत ३०-३२१, ३१-३४६, ११९-३६०, १२३-३७६, ५३७-३८३
शाश्वत ८५-२०१
शाश्वत ९८-२३४
शाश्वत २४-२३४
शाश्वत ३४-१५२, ९१-२३८
शाश्वत २५-२५२
शाश्वत २२-२४२, ४४-२४५, ३४-५०४
शुक्ल ५२-२९, ५५-७४
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words Page and Verse</th>
<th>Words Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>स्नितिशास्त्र ३४-१५१</td>
<td>२६७, १००-२७९, १२२-३३०, ११६-३४९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नकाल २२-१०१</td>
<td>स्वामिक (suffix) ८०-१९०, ७५-२०८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नल १२७-१९५</td>
<td>ह</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नतमच १८-८१</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नन ३३-१४५, १०४-२१५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नमाव १६-१३६, ३२-१४४, ४२-१५२, ६१-१२३५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नमाव २२-१२२</td>
<td>हरिष्णव १०१-२८३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नवार्त ७२-१४९</td>
<td>हवय १४५-३७९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नवस्य १२-१५, १२-५७, ५९, ६८-८३, ६१-१०८, ७५-२६५, ६७-११७, ९५-२५६, ६६-२६२, १०४-२८४, ४३२-४३६</td>
<td>हवयाव ७०-१३०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नवस्य ९६-२५७</td>
<td>हवयाव ७०-१४०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नग ६५-१९१</td>
<td>हेतु २०-१०, ३०-१३५, ५४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नशब्द ५-२६</td>
<td>२०३, ६१४-२२७, ६१६-४१४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नशास्त्र ४२-२५, १३५-२३४</td>
<td>हेतुव १२-५८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नसत्तम १३-६४</td>
<td>हेतुमत ८४-२०३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नमात्मिक ३०-१३५</td>
<td>हेतुकषण ८३-२०३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्नाय ६५-२५५, ७३-२६५, ९८-</td>
<td>हवय ४५-२८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>हवय १६-७६, ४१-२३, १०६-३०७, ३०८</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## INDEX OF VERSES

| अ | अनेकोऽवरीत्वसिद्धयः | 241 |
|   | अनेकाक्षरात्मक्यं | 116 |
| अक्षाण तत्त्वं तत्त्वत् | 149 |
| अक्षाख्यं यथा भिषजः | 149 |
| अनितस्य योगी त्वात् | 130 |
| अनितस्य सत्यवायम् | 131 |
| अनितस्योदः श्रवं | 131 |
| अन्सरकेतु तु केषाम्बरी | 26 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तम् | 78 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तमां | 25 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 8 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 143 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 29 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 30 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 52 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 58 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 127 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 54 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 62 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 79 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 82 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 65 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 44 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 1 |
| अध्यात्मवाचसप्तानि | 42 |
| अन्नाजातिक्षुयपम् | 84 |
| अन्नाजातिक्षुपम् | 49 |
| अन्नाजातिक्षुपम् | 23 |
| अन्नाजातिक्षुपम् | 65 |
| अन्नाजातिक्षुपम् | 1 |
| अन्नाजातिक्षुपम् | 33 |
| अन्नाजातिक्षुपम् | 91 |
| अन्नाजातिक्षुपम् | 125 |
| अनन्तकोऽवरित्य रात्रि | 144 |
| अनन्तकोऽवरित्य रात्रिः | 136 |
| अनन्तकोऽवरित्येऽर्थम् | 3 |
अर्ध्मान्नास्तथा तेषाम्
अर्ध्मदृश्यों विशिष्टार्थां
अर्ध्मस्वलोऽश्वनान्
अत्तनारे च यदृकुसूक्त
अधित्वमह सामधेः
अधिपिपणीशुरुतान्
अर्ध्मचिंद्रो शाब्देः
अल्बमगाथ्यं गार्भीवादे
अल्ले समहारे वा शाखे
अवस्यादेशकालाना
अवस्तक्षेपिणि वाक्यार्थेः
अविकारायश्च शब्देः
अविभक्तेषुपि वाक्यार्थेः
अविभाज्य तु शाब्देः
अभ्यास कम्यान शब्द
अवकाशे सर्वस्थाप्ते
अवभ्रमणस्यायूः
अर्ध्मो यदि वाक्यार्
अर्ध्मेन यथात्
असत्तथात्ततरः
असत्ति प्रतिपत्ति च
असत्तयोगाचि यततः
असत्तयी प्रतिनिविच
असमाशयर्ततत्ततः
अस्त यथोक्तो वाक्याः
अस्तित्वानुष्ठानां
अस्तथः सर्वशब्दाः
अन्य वाक्यांकरे वृष्टार्
अवगोष्ठायाय शब्दा

आ

आकारणस्त सुनेवा
आकारवन्वयं
आव्यात तवद्याधिकर्षः
आव्यात्मेवद्वायोऽवेश्यः
आव्यातस्तव सवातो
शुश्चितायां नियत
आव्यात्मविमिशायानो
आत्मवेदयो केतिः

आत्मेदो न चेतुस्वतितु
आत्महृप यथा जाते
आद्वकारणविप्रयासः
आत्महिरीमाभावातः
आत्मायशवायम्
आराद्वृत्तिः समस्वतः
आवविभागानुज्जताना
आविभूतायकानाम्
आवृत्तिरत्रवादो
आवृत्तिशक्तिभिः
आवृत्तरेतुभृत्याः
आवृत्तिश्रवणं वा
आत्मानं ब्रह्मणस्ततः
आवहारीविशिष्टेः

इ

इतिकालःन्यायपस्य
इतिकालःन्याया लोके
इति वाक्येपु ये वर्मो
इद परारुः स्वमृ
इद पुष्पमिद पप्प
इद प्रधान शोषोऽयः
इद दाराचा पदवाय
इद विनिष्कार शब्द
इद विनिष्कार सकार समा
इद विनिष्कारकृष्णाय
इद श्रुत्या क्रमापित

उ

उत्क्रिय न पुरस्तत्वातः
उच्चारणे हुः वाक्याः
उत्क्रिये सावत्य
उत्तरायणं यथाक्षातः
उपरियात्मपरस्ताः
उपलेख्यावार्ताना
उपाताः बुधोऽवेश्यः
उपवेदयापि ये हेया
उपात्मा विष्कारणाः
उपवेदाय वित्तहारे
उपवेदाय विचित्रपि
गौरित्येव स्वरूपाणाः

गणप्रामाण्यो निर्द्धा

प्राणप्रारथना च

इ

वषंदिवसशीनांलोक

वषंदिशा यथा धीरो

वषंदीना न चाकारान्

उ

चक्षुः प्राप्यकारिते

चक्रसम्पूर्णाव्योभवाव

चादयो न प्रपुज्यते

चित्तेऽनाचकप्रयो

चिंता विप्रभेदित जाने

जन्यसामीय यवचायम्

ज

जनविलख्यो क्रिया कारितूः

जलन्त्वायव्यक्तले च

जातितिलायके शाश्वे

जातिजाऊंकतरंगार्यापि

जानेन स्वामार्थिके नाथं

त

तत्तुष्येव माणान

तत्तवाध्यायान्माणे तु

तत्त्र किमापदाने च

तत्त्र षडी प्रतिपद

तत्त्रे रोङ्काग्यानमा

तत्त्रे रूपकान्तनावे च

तत्त्रे द्वितीयबोधिति

तत्त्रे पदाना संवेष

तत्त्रे निम्नदिशेयोनेन

तत्त्रे धयोधोपि कक्षातिच्च

( २२६ )
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>पाठ</th>
<th>पृष्ठ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>दीर्घपूर्वायामः तस्य स्यात्</td>
<td>१०६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>दुलभ कस्यचित्तोऽकोऽकरीमस्य</td>
<td>७३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>दुराभ्रेष्ठो दीर्घस्य</td>
<td>२३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>दुमयहिस्तु निखुदृयैवपि</td>
<td>१२३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>देशाकलेजिंद्रयाने</td>
<td>१०४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>देशावदिसृष्ट सम्बन्धोऽ:</td>
<td>२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>देशवदतालिषु भूजि</td>
<td>१३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>दैवी वास्मयमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>३५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>द्वाराभिवचताप्रणिधितो</td>
<td>२३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>द्वारयूपेन्यो शब्दतामा</td>
<td>१४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>द्वारामण्डलकाश्चरु</td>
<td>९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>द्विलोचन यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>१४३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>धर्मस्य चायवचित्तनया</td>
<td>६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बातो साधनोस्य</td>
<td>७९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न कृपसूपपाताम्</td>
<td>६६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न च सामान्यवत्तस्य</td>
<td>५२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न चाचामाबूद्धे धर्म</td>
<td>६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न चाचामाबूद्धे धर्म</td>
<td>२१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न चापूर्वतु सवेदः</td>
<td>१४४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न जातकर्तुकं कार्यकाद्</td>
<td>३०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न चापूर्वतु सवेदः</td>
<td>११६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न चापूर्वतु सवेदः</td>
<td>२२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न चापूर्वतु सवेदः</td>
<td>३४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>१३८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>२८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>१४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>१०६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>१२८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>१३०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>६८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>१३०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>१२८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नादेश्यमेतोर्णयस्</td>
<td>३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>१४३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>१२९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>२१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>२९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>१४४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>५८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>४४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>६२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>१४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>१२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>२३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाँचीका यानि वाचयानि</td>
<td>३५</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
यच्च कोञ्जःमिति प्रश्ने 99 यथवान्यक्तवेच 130
यच्च इन्द्रपदार्थम् 88 यथवान्यक्त गणवस्य 58
यच्च नित्यायुष्माते विचे 103 यथवान्यक्त तन्म 32
यच्चायुष्माते शब्देन 106 यद्यम शब्दवस्त्र तु 43
यच्चायुष्माते पद वृष्ट 98 यद्यम शब्दवस्त्र तु 130
यथोपराध मान 104 यदसादारायणार्थ 102
यथोपराध वेद 52 यदेक ब्राह्मणोऽहेतु 4
यथोपराध वेद 31 यदापि सत्यावेशेऽतृत 102
यथोपराध वेद 7 यदारायणार्थ 140
यथोपराध वेद 4 यदसादारायणार्थ 140
यथोपराध वेद 13 यस्मात् सत्यावेशेऽतृत 111
यथोपराध वेद 41 यथोपराध वेद 60
यथोपराध वेद 88 यथात सत्यावेशेऽतृत 74
यथोपराध वेद 42 यथात सत्यावेशेऽतृत 109
यथोपराध वेद 48 यथात सत्यावेशेऽतृत 74
यथोपराध वेद 3 यथात सत्यावेशेऽतृत 8
यथोपराध वेद 48 यथात सत्यावेशेऽतृत 74
यथोपराध वेद 3 यथात सत्यावेशेऽतृत 8
यथोपराध वेद 3 यथात सत्यावेशेऽतृत 8
यथापलुण्ड श्लोकोऽ वा 37 यथापलुण्ड श्लोकोऽ वा 75
यथापलुण्ड स्थान 37 यथापलुण्ड स्थान 126
यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 37 यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 126
यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 37 यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 126
यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 37 यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 126
यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 37 यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 126
यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 37 यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 126
यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 37 यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 126
यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 37 यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 126
यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 37 यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 126
यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 37 यथापलुण्ड पदस्तत्ताम 126
| स्त्रूप विद्वते यस्य | १३२ | हृ  |
| स्त्राक्ति व्यज्ञमानाया | २५ |
| स्त्रायंमात्र प्रकाश्यासो | ११३ | हस्तस्यांशीविवाल्भेन | ८ |
| स्वाधेय प्रवर्त्मानस्थ | ९८ | हेतुहेतुमसेवायोग— | ८४ |
| हस्तस्यार्थ च यद्य द्रष्ट | १०६ |
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Aitareyabrāhmana
Bādarāyana

Beardeau M (ed)
Vedāntā Sūtras
Bhartrhari, Vākyapadiya,
Brahmakānda, Paris 1964

Belwalkar, S K
Systems of Sanskrit Grammar,
Poona 1935

Bendale, Cecil & Rouse,
Siksāsamuccaya,
W H D
Translation

Brhadāranyaka-pāniscad

Chakravarti, Prabhat Chandra
The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar

Cowel E B & Gough A E
Sarvadars’ anasamgraha,
Translation

Das Gupta, S N
A History of Indian Philosophy
—Vol I

Datta, D M
The Six Ways of Knowing,
London 1932

Firth, J R
The Tongues of Man

Gardiner, Alan H
The Theory of Speech and Language

Genesis

Gospel according to St John
Griffiths, R T H
The Hymns of the Rig veda
Translation Vol 4

Iyer, K A Subramonia (ed)
Vākyapadiya Canto I Poona
1965, 1966
Vākyapadiya Canto III
Poona 1963

Iśvara Kṛśna
Sāmkhya Kārikās

Jagadīśa
Śabdasakti-prakāśikā

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa
Nyāyamanjarī

Jhā, Gangānāth
Gautama’s Nyāya Sūtras—
—Translation

—do—
Tattvasamgraha, Translation

Jespersen, Otto
The Philosophy of Grammar
Kaiyata
Kapila
Kāthaka-Samhitā
Kātyāyana
Kerth, A B
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa
Mādhavācārya
Malinowski, B

Mammata
Monier-Williams, Monier, Su
Müller, F Max

Nāgesa Bhaṭṭa
—do—

—do—
Ogden, C K, and
Richards, J A
Pancavāma-brāhmaṇa
Patañjali
Patañjali
Pāṇini
Prabhākara Misra
Punyarāja

Ravi Varma, L A (ed)

Rgveda
Rgveda-prāntākhyā
Russell, Bertrand

Sapir, E
Sayce, A H

Sastri Charudeva (ed)
Sastri K A Sambasiva (ed)

Commentary on the Mahā-bhāṣya
Sāmkhyasūtras

Vārttika on the Astādhyāyī
Karmamīmāṃsā
Ślokavārttika
Sarvadarśanasamgraha
Coral Gardens and their Magic
Vol II
Kāvyaprakāśa
A Sanskrit—English Dic
tionary

The Six Systems of Indian
Philosophy

Sphotavāda
Vyākaranasiddhāntalaghu-
manjūsā
Mahabhāsyapradipodyota

The Meaning of Meaning

Mahābhāṣya
Yogasūtras
Astādhyāyī
Brhatī
Commentary on the Vākya-
padiya
Vākyapadiyam Canto III
Part II Trivandrum 1942

An Inquiry Into Meaning And
Truth
Language
Introduction to the Science of
Language Vol I
Vākyapadiya, Brahmakāṇḍa
Lahore 1935
Vākyapadiyam Canto III
Part I Trivandrum 1935
Sastri, P S Subrahmanya, Vidyāratna
Śatapathabrāhmaṇa
Śrīkṛṣṇabhaṭṭa Maunu
Śukla, Pandit Śrī Sūrya- nārāyana
Stern, Gustaf
Tattvārtha-rāmānūṇa
Tattvārtha-prācīnākhya
Vasu, Srīsa Chandra
Vājasaneyī-Samhitā
Vāmana and Jayāditya
Venkatramiah, D
Varma, Siddheswar
Vṛṣabha Deva
Vidyābhūsana, Satī Chandra
Vyāsa
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Yāska

Lectures on Patañjali's Maha bhāṣya
Sphoṭacandrika
Commentary on the Vākyapādiya, Brahmakanda
Meaning And Change of Meaning
Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, Translation, Vols I and 3
Kāśikāvṛtti on the Aṣṭādhyāyī
Śāstradīpikā—Translation
Critical studies in the Phonetic Observations of Indian Grammarians
Commentary on the Vākyapadīyavṛtti
A History of Indian Logic
Commentary on the Yoga Sūtras
Tractus Logicus—Philosophicus
Nirukta

Articles

Brough, J
De Groot, A
Firth, J R

The Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians (Paper read before a meeting of Philological Society—March 3, 1951—Unpublished)
Structural Linguistics and Syntactical Laws (Word Vol 5 No I—1949)
Atlantic Linguistics (Archivu r. Linguisticum I u 1949)
| The Technique of Semantics (Transactions of the London Philological Society London 1935) |
| Stcherbatsky, Th |
| The Soul Theory of the Buddhists (Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences in Russia 1920) |
| Sramonia Iyer, K. A |
| The Doctrine of Sphota (Journal of the Gangānāth Jhā Institute—February 1948) |
## ERRATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Verse—line etc</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Read</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>बाङ्क स्मलाना</td>
<td>बाङ्क स्मलाना</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>छन्दोमयीतठु</td>
<td>छन्दोमयीसीतठु</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>छन्दस्यजळदसा</td>
<td>छन्दस्यजळदसा</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>मेदादिमलानसु</td>
<td>मेदादि मलानसु</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>ये</td>
<td>यो</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>footnote line 9</td>
<td>Karika</td>
<td>Kārikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>तेव्याना अगृ—</td>
<td>तेव्यानामगृ—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>लज्जना</td>
<td>लज्जनी</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>कठ्ठवन</td>
<td>कठ्ठवन</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>70—translation line 2</td>
<td>are</td>
<td>are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>शब्दस्युध्वं</td>
<td>शब्दस्युध्वं</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>व्यतिरिः</td>
<td>व्यतिरिः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>—सह्य</td>
<td>—सह्य98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>Speechsounds</td>
<td>Speech-sound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>मेवोहिः</td>
<td>मेवो हिः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>footnote</td>
<td>Karika</td>
<td>Kārikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>foot-note</td>
<td>Karika</td>
<td>Kārikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>119 trans 1 1</td>
<td>sadja98</td>
<td>sadja98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>भाव्यान्तु</td>
<td>भाव्यान्तु</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>121 trans 1 3</td>
<td>past92</td>
<td>past92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>इष्ठे</td>
<td>इष्ठे</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>ज्ञूंस्तफलानार्यान्</td>
<td>ज्ञूंस्तफलानार्यान्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>वस्रुम्</td>
<td>वस्रुम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>भिष्टानामिद</td>
<td>भिष्टानामिद</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>footnote line 5</td>
<td>sine</td>
<td>since</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>31 क</td>
<td>प्रकाशते</td>
<td>प्रकाशते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>58a trans 1 2</td>
<td>ways49</td>
<td>ways49a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>विश्वापौपलिदिस्यते</td>
<td>विश्वापौपलिदिस्यते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>विद्यते</td>
<td>विद्यते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>footnote line 2</td>
<td>भिव—</td>
<td>भिव—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>93 trans 1 2</td>
<td>respects</td>
<td>respects57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>105 translation line 1</td>
<td>without their giving up</td>
<td>without giving up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>अभिजलायत्व</td>
<td>अभिजलायत्व</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>127 footnote line 1</td>
<td>जन्य</td>
<td>जन्य—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Verse—line etc</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>162 translation line 2</td>
<td>horn</td>
<td>hair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>व्यवस्थित</td>
<td>व्यवस्थित</td>
<td>(of things)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>335b trans 1 2</td>
<td>(of thing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>translation line 2</td>
<td>primary</td>
<td>primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>268 translation line 3</td>
<td>example</td>
<td>example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>context</td>
<td>context</td>
<td>context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>301 trans 1 4</td>
<td>one</td>
<td>one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>तथाकथित</td>
<td>तथा शब्दोपि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>303 trans 1 3</td>
<td>word from to be omitted remaining the same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>translation line 1</td>
<td>operate</td>
<td>operate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>305 trans 1 4</td>
<td>meaning</td>
<td>meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>307b trans 1 2</td>
<td>stated</td>
<td>stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>प्रत्येक</td>
<td>प्रत्येक</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>translation line 1</td>
<td>set</td>
<td>set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>335 trans 1 5</td>
<td>of the latter group basis of the latter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>युक्त</td>
<td>यत्विकत</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>347 tra line 2</td>
<td>भुज</td>
<td>भुज</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>374 trans 1 1</td>
<td>bhuj</td>
<td>bhuj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>group basis</td>
<td>group basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>शाताराने</td>
<td>शाताराने</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>383 tra line 2</td>
<td>शतकर्मके</td>
<td>शतकर्मके</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>396 trans 1 6</td>
<td>an</td>
<td>at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>—सः तथा —सः तथ</td>
<td>added</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>407 tra line 4</td>
<td>Words-with-one-meaning</td>
<td>Words with one meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>—क्यायो —क्यायो</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>line 1</td>
<td>The nature</td>
<td>(The nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>421 trans 1 5</td>
<td>word-meaning</td>
<td>word meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>—भिसन्वय</td>
<td>—भिसन्वय</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>कथिचिद</td>
<td>कथिचिद</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>व्यवहारेवदारण्य</td>
<td>व्यवहारे पदारण्य</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>साकाश्चो</td>
<td>साकाश्चो</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>445 tra line 2</td>
<td>discussed</td>
<td>discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Verse—line etc</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>—अजीव्वत्व</td>
<td>—अजीव्वत्व</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>447 tran 1 1</td>
<td>moving about</td>
<td>moving about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>448 tran line 6</td>
<td>numerating</td>
<td>enumerating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>—जध्यादि वस्त्रिःर्तम्</td>
<td>—जध्यादिव सिन्हास्यन्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>विचारते</td>
<td>विचारते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>वधापिन्या</td>
<td>वधापिन्या</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>प्रयोगकाला भेदेदिपि</td>
<td>प्रयोगकालापेदिपि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>युगप्रत्यायते</td>
<td>युगप्रत्यायते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>474 tra 1 1</td>
<td>(as to its application to)</td>
<td>(as to its application to)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>एकशोष्येन</td>
<td>एकशोष्येन</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>नौवावस्तिःसत्व-</td>
<td>नौवावस्तिःसत्व-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>वैज्ञ</td>
<td>वैज्ञ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>480 tra 1 2</td>
<td>विशेषेष</td>
<td>विशेष</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>प्रज्ञाविबेक</td>
<td>प्रज्ञाविबेक</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>Note No 3—</td>
<td>brahma</td>
<td>brahma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>line 4</td>
<td>brahma</td>
<td>brahma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>last line but one</td>
<td>Svarūpena</td>
<td>Svarūpen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>Note 16—2</td>
<td>must a</td>
<td>must have a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>para 2 line 13</td>
<td>utra</td>
<td>Sūtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>Note 21</td>
<td>There is wrong spacing in the middle of the Para. The lines read together</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>line 2</td>
<td>sāmānāvākye</td>
<td>sāmānāvākye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>, , 3</td>
<td>sāmānāvākye</td>
<td>sāmānāvākye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>line 9</td>
<td>Mīmāṁsaka</td>
<td>Mīmāṁsaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>line 13</td>
<td>Kātyayanat</td>
<td>Kātyāyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>Para 3—line 3</td>
<td>pataḥ</td>
<td>pataḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>Note 91—l 6</td>
<td>asabdmiva</td>
<td>asabdamiva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>, , 91—l 7</td>
<td>Brahmanas</td>
<td>Brāhmanas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>, , 91—l 8, 9</td>
<td>Mātharas</td>
<td>Māthara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>, , 119—l 1</td>
<td>Banaras</td>
<td>Benares</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A few more misprints especially regarding diacritical marks in words such as Karika for Kārikā have unfortunately crept in, but have not been here indicated.