STUDIES IN THE VĀKYAPADĪYA VOL I

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA

Critical Text of Cantos I and II
[ with English Translation, Summary of Ideas and Notes ]

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PRINTED EDITIONS AND MANUSCRIPTS USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE TEXT

1 Pandit Charudeva Sastri's edition of Canto I (Lahore—1934)

2 Benares edition of the Vākyapadiya, (Benares 1887)

3 Manuscript No 10924 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Canto—I, and portions of Bhartrhari's own commentary on Canto I of the Vākyapadiya

4 Manuscript No 8918 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Cantos I and II

5 Manuscript No 2392—C O belonging to the University Manuscripts Library and containing Canto II
Dedicated

to

the memory

of

my father the late

SHRI N SANKARA PILLAI
## CONTENTS

| 1 | Preface                  | ix        |
| 2 | Introduction             | xi-xxi    |
| 3 | Summary of Cantos I and II | xxiii-xxxvi |
| 4 | Text with translation    | 1-146     |
| 5 | Notes on translation     | 147-189   |
| 6 | General Index            | 191-195   |
| 7 | Sanskrit Index           | 196-222   |
| 8 | Index of Kārikās         | 223-232   |
| 9 | Bibliography with abbreviations | 233-236 |
| 10| Errata                   | 237-239   |
PREFACE

This volume contains a critically edited text of Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadiya with an English translation, introduction, notes, etc.

The translation was at first prepared as part of my PhD thesis which the University of London accepted in 1951.

My work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was supervised by the late Prof J R Firth, Professor of General Linguistics and Head of the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Prof J Brough, then Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, SOAS, University of London and now Professor of Sanskrit in the Cambridge University. Professor Firth's famous Wednesday lectures on Linguistics, my individual discussions with him, and my Thursday sessions with Professor Brough have been of immense value to me in my study of the Vākyapadiya. I am grateful to them. I must especially express my gratitude to the late Prof Firth and to Mrs Whitley, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics of the SOAS for their kindness in letting me, a member of the Research staff of the department, undertake research work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Mahopādhyāya K. Hariharā Sastrī, BA, Assistant Research Officer in the Oriental Research Institute & Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum, helped me with the collation of the Vākyapadiya manuscripts in the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum, and I thank him.

Shri Easwaran Namboodiri, MA, Lecturer in Sanskrit, University of Kerala, willingly undertook to prepare the indices and errata included in this publication. I am very thankful to him.

I am indebted to the Kerala University for having been able to make use of the Vākyapadiya manuscripts in the collections of the ORI and MSS Library.

I also thank Messrs Motilal Banarsidass for kindly undertaking to publish this work.

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K RAGHAVAN PILLAI
INTRODUCTION

General

The Vākyapadiya ranks among the principal authoritative works in Sanskrit Grammar. If the Astādhyāyī gives a study of the structure of the Sanskrit language with the rules governing its functioning, the Vārttika of Kātyāyana largely explains the sūtras of Pāṇini, sometimes taking positions different from those taken by the Sūtrakāra and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali besides extensively studying the topics in the Astādhyāyī and defending Pāṇini against the Vārttikakāra, also incidentally introduces subjects in linguistic philosophy, one can say with certainty that it is in the Vākyapadiya that a first full-fledged statement and discussion of a philosophy of Grammar is given.

There are rudiments of the doctrine of Sabdabrahman in Sanskrit texts right from the Vedas downwards. We find the supreme Word principle (Sabdabrahman) described under various names in the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. It is identified with mind, matter and Prajāpati and is described in terms like Vāk and Prajāpati. As the other self of Prajāpati speech functioned as the source of all Universe. In the Rgveda it is conceived as the ‘active power of Brahman’, it is identified with him and is personified as a ‘productive principle’. The four regions of the world are described as taking their being from the seas of water descending from Speech in streams and the universe as getting life from the imperishable flood which flows from it. In the Yajurveda we find Vāk considered as ‘the Supreme wifely Śakti of Prajāpati named as Vācaspati’. Coming to the Brāhmaṇas, the primeval waters are considered to have been created out of Vāk by Prajāpati. Again Vāk is

1 RV X—125
2 RV ’84, Satapathabrāhmaṇa VI i 9 Pañcavimśa VI i 3,
X 2 i XX 14 i 2
3 Kāthaka XII 5 and 27 i
4 Vyasasamhitā IX i
5 Satapatha VI i 9
described as Prajāpati’s ‘other self’ in the matter of creating the Universe. Vāk was the ‘nivid’ of the twelve syllables which emanated from Prajāpati while he was performing sacrifice and it was through Vāk that Prajāpati created all beings.

Sarasvatī is mentioned in some of the later Mandalas of the Rgveda in a few Brāhmanas and in some of the Purāṇas, and as a speech principle is identified with Vāk and conceived as the creative principle associated with Prajāpati. She is described as carrying out the function of creating the shape of the body (possibly of Indra) by bringing together the marrow, flesh, etc., in their proper places. She also creates the internal organs, and even generates the vyāna vāyu (life-breath) which pervades the body from head to foot. She stimulates and sustains the growth of the foetus in the womb.

In the Upanisads we find the identification of Vāk and Prajñā (intelligence) and also the world phenomena. Thus all speech is held together by Om just as all leaves are held together by one leaf stalk and Om is the world-all?

Although thus we find the beginnings of the concept of a supreme Word-principle in the early scriptural texts, the first complete postulation and discussion of Sabdabrahman according to the Sanskrit Grammarian is, as stated above, given in Vākyapadiya of Bhartrhari. In the first Canto of the work called Brahmakānda are given the basic ideas concerning the concept of Sabdabrahman. In the second called Vākyakānda the discussions are largely on the nature of words and sentences. We find in this canto the fundamental idea of the integral nature of the sentence and its meaning discussed. The third canto is the largest, in it, grammatical topics mostly concerning words are discussed. Thus canto is called Prakīrṇa and also Padakānda. I discuss later, whether this is a part of the Vākyapadiya.

Bhartrhari-biographical

Bhartrhari, the grammarian, was famous when I-tsong, the Chinese pilgrim visited India. I-tsong recorded that a
grammarian by that name who was a contemporary of Jayāditya, one of the authors of the Kāśikāvṛtti on the Astādhyāyī died in AD 650. I-tsing also recorded that Bhartrhari was of Buddhist persuasion. We have also I-tsing’s evidence to hold the view that Bhartrhari wavered between the ascetic life and secular life several times. I-tsing also approximately gave a somewhat accurate size of cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya.

There is the question whether Bhartrhari, the author of the Srngāra—the Vairāgya—and the Niti-Satakas is the same person as the author of the Vākyapadīya. The difference in the style would appear to disprove any identification although there is nothing making it utterly impossible that a poet writes a treatise on grammar in one style and adopts a different style, when he composes a work like the Srngārasataka.

Tradition has identified Bhartrhari with Bhaṭṭi, but it has also sometimes treated Bhaṭṭi as the half-brother of Bhartrhari. No doubt the strong phonetic nearness between Bhartr and Bhaṭṭi, and the fact that there is a well known grammatical work under each name led to the identification which, however, needs further proof for confirmation.

Works

The following are mainly considered to be the works of Bhartrhari, the grammarian—

1. Vākyapadīya (3 Cantos)
2. Vṛtti on the 1st and 2nd Cantos of the Vākyapadīya
   Commentators like Vrsabhadeva call the Vṛtti, Vivarana
3. A gloss (ṭīkā) on the 1st three pādas of the Mahā-bhāṣya. This is called Tripādi

Other works like a commentary on the Astādhyāyī and a commentary on the Brahmāsūtra seem to be mere conjectures at the moment (see Charudeva Sastri’s Sanskrit Introduction to Vākyapadīya 1935).

Editions of the Vākyapadīya

The first modern edition of the text was brought out in Benares in 1887, when Cantos I and II with what was des-
cribed as Punyārāja’s commentary were edited by Pt Ganga-
dhara Sastri Manavalli and published as Nos 11, 19 and 24 of
Benares Sanskrit Series under the general supervision of R T H
Griffiths and G Thibau. The third Canto of the text with
Helārāja’s commentary named Prakīrṇakapradāsa was also
published as No 95 in the Benares Sanskrit Series in 1905. This
was edited by Pt Ramachandri Sastri Koti Bhaskara, Pandit
of the Banaras Hindu College. It is now clear that the com-
mentary on Canto I described as Punyārāja’s by Pt Gangadhara
Sastri Manavalli was not a work of Punyārāja, it was an
abridgement of Bhaṭṭarāha’s own Vṛtti on Canto I of the
Vākyapadiya. This Vṛtti was later published first by Pt
Charudeva Sastrī and later by Prof. K. A. Subramoniam Iyer.
In 1935, Pandit Charudeva Sastrī published the 1st canto
of the Vākyapadiya with the commentary (Vṛtti) by Bhaṭṭarāha
himself. This publication of Bhaṭṭarāha’s commentary by
Pandit Sastrī was legitimately a significant event. He also used
several manuscripts in his edition of the 1st canto and it was
therefore a distinct improvement on the Benares editions in
which admittedly only a small number of manuscripts were
used.
In 1935 a part of the third Canto of the Vākyapadiya was
published as No C XVI in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series
Sri K. Sambasiva Sastrī, the then Curator of the Oriental
Manuscripts Library at Trivandrum, edited the work. The
publication also included the Prakīrṇakapradāsa—a com-
mentary by Helārāja With a part II edited and published in 1942,
by L. A. Ravi Varma the publication of the 3rd Canto with
Prakīrṇakapradāsa was completed in the Trivandrum Sanskrit
Series.
Canto I was again published by Pandit Suryanarayana
Sukla with his own gloss in the Kasi Sanskrit Series (Chaw-
khamba) in 1937. In more recent times, more than one edition
with or without translation of a part or other of the Vākyapadiya
have appeared.
Prof. K. A. Subramoniam Iyer’s edition of Canto I with
Vṛtti with a translation in English appeared in 1965 as No 26
in the Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee
Series, Poona.
In 1966, Prof. Subramoniam Iyer again published the 1st
Canto of the Vākyapadiya with the Vṛtti of Bhaṭṭarāha and the
commentary named Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva. This was published as No 32 under the Deccan College Monograph Series, Poona.

Also a text of the Vākyapadīya Canto I and Vṛtti in Roman script with a French translation was published in 1964 by M Biardeau (Bhartṛhari—Vākyapadīya, Brahmakānda, avec la Vṛtti de Hariyrsabhā, Traduction, Introduction et notes Publications de l’Institut de Civilisation indienne, Fascicule 24, Paris, De Boccard, 1964). It may be noted that the author does not consider the Vṛtti as Bharṭṛhari’s Hariyrsabhā, according to her, is different from Bharṭṛhari.

Vākyapadīya, Canto III, Part I with Helārāja’s commentary was published as No 21 in the Deccan College Monograph Series, Poona in 1963. The editor was K A Subramonia Iyer.

The Name Vākyapadīya

The first Canto of the Vākyapadīya is called the Brahmakānda, the second is called the Vākyakānda and the third is called the Padakānda. In the first Canto is given the concept of Śabdabrahman and the general philosophy of śpota and sruti. If we may say so, the first Canto largely gives the outlines of the metaphysics of Linguistic Philosophy, whereas in the second the linguistic topics are discussed in a linguistic background. Not that metaphysics are completely eschewed, but that they are given their proper place. In the third Canto problems connected with words are discussed.

The Problem of Canto III

But there is a problem concerning Canto III. Helārāja, the commentator on the 3rd Canto of the Vākyapadīya thinks that the name Vākyapadīya refers only to Cantos I and II (commentary on VP, III 154). He names his commentary on the 3rd Canto Prākīrnakaprakāśa. Indeed in some Lexicons the 3rd Canto of the Vākyapadīya is called Prākīrṇaka Vaidhamāna, the author of the Ganaratnamahodadhī also thinks that Vākyapadīya and Prākīrṇaka are separate.
works by Bhartrhari. He says that Bhartrhari was the author of Vākyapadiya and Prakīrnaka and author of a commentary called Tripādi on Mahabhāsya.

The question deserves careful consideration. A few stanzas which occur at the end of Canto II of the Vākyapadiya are of special importance in this discussion. In these verses a history of what happened to Sanskrit Grammar when Patañjali’s work was corrupted is given. We are also told that the author’s guru wrote the work, namely Vākyapadiya, meaning only, in accordance with the well-known humility of Hindu authors that the author wrote the work with the blessings of his teacher. The significant thing about this last section of Canto II of the Vākyapadiya is that it gives a strong indication that the particular work ended there. If the Vākyapadiya originally had a third canto as it now has it is difficult to see why the last few verses of Canto II should occur there instead of at the end of Canto III. It seems thus that Helārāja’s position that Prakīrnakānda was a separate work by the same author was not without foundation. It may also be remembered that Bhartrhari’s own vṛtti exists only on the 1st and 2nd Cantos, that Punyarāja is known to have commented only on Cantos I and II, and that I-tsing mentions the approximate size of Cantos I and II together. Further Helārāja’s commentary on the 3rd Canto alone is available as far as our present knowledge goes. All this may lead to the conclusion that Canto I and II alone formed the Vākyapadiya. It is, however, not forgotten here that most of the available manuscripts (but not all) describe the Prakīrnaka as the third canto of the Vākyapadiya. But how old is this tradition? and did it possibly supplant a more authentic earlier one which was represented by the colophon in some manuscripts which read: इति भगवद् सतू हरिकृते वाक्यपदीये ब्रह्माय काण्डम्। समाप्ता वाक्यपदीयकारिका इति।

Suppose the position is that the Vākyapadiya contained originally only two cantos. Then how does the name Vākyapadiya fit in? The answer is not difficult. The two cantos discuss together a system of linguistics in which the two meaning-conveying units in speech namely, the sentence and the word (vākyya and pada) are discussed. Of these the vākyya alone is complete and the pada is derived from it. There is also nothing inappropriate if we call the 1st Canto, the Vākya-
kānda, since in it are discussed the vākyavākyya sphoṭa being the most complete utterance. In the second canto, topics concerning the word, the noun, the verb, the nupāta, the karma-pravacaniya, etc., are discussed. The discussion of topics concerning padas or words takes the best part of the space in that kānda justifying its designation as Padakānda.

**Commentators on the Vākyapadīya**

1. **Bhartrhari himself**—He commented on Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya. The work is called Vṛtti.

2. **Punyarāja**—He wrote a commentary on the first and second Cantos of the Vākyapadīya. But only his commentary on the 2nd Canto is available. What was included in the Benares edition of Vākyapadīya (1887) and described as Punyarāja’s commentary by the editor Pt Manavallī was, as found by several scholars later and by me in my examination of the Vṛtti manuscript in the Trivandrum Manuscripts Library, really an abridgement of Bhartrhari’s own Vṛtti on Canto I. Punyarāja according to scanty information given at the end of commentary on Canto II was a Kashmirī and was also known as Rājānaka Suravarma and learned the 2nd Canto of Vākyapadīya from a Śasānkāsīsyā. What does Śasānkaśisya mean?—a disciple of Chandragomin the Grammarian?—or does it mean a disciple of Śasānkaadhara, namely Sahadeva who wrote a commentary on Vāmana’s Alankāra? This latter view is held by Pt Charudeva Sastri. We have to accept our uncertainty about Punyarāja and his date, except to suggest a date between 11th and 12th Century.

3. **HELĀRĀJA**—He wrote a commentary on the 3rd Canto of the Vākyapadīya. This commentary is called Prakīrṇakaprakāśa. He belonged to the family of Laksmana who was Minister of King Muktāpīda of Kashmir. He was the son of Bhūturāja. Helārāja may have lived in the second half of the 10th Century A.D. according to Pt Charudeva Sastri and others.

4. **VRSABHADEVA**—the author of a commentary by name Paddhati on Bhartrhari’s Kārikās and Vṛtti together. The
Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva is now available only in the Vrtti on Kanda I of the Vākyapadiya.

Nothing much is known about Vrsabhadeva except what he says in the introductory verses of his commentary that he was the son of Devayas as, an employee of King Visnugupta. We do not have enough material to identify this Visnugupta among the known Visnuguptas of Indian History. Vrsabhadeva's date, consequently has to be left undecided for the time being at least.

About the Present Work

In the years 1948-1951, I worked in the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. I also then undertook a study of the Vākyapadiya as my work for the Ph.D. degree of the London University. My thesis contained a study of Cantos I and II, a translation into English of the same, and notes I had used for the purpose of the translation the text published in the Benares Edition of 1887. This contained also what was described by the editor as the commentary of Punyarāja on Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadiya. However, it has been subsequently proved that what the editor of the Benares Edition considered as the commentary of Punyarāja on Canto I was only a condensation of Bhartrhari's own Vrtti on Canto I.

When I planned later to publish a text of Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadiya with a translation and notes, the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the Benares text of 1887 was felt. Of course, Pandit Charudeva Sastri's edition of Canto I, published with Bhartrhari's Vrtti and extracts from Vrsabhadeva's Paddhati was available, and it was a very good edition for Canto I. But there was no good reliable text for Canto II. And even in the preparation of his text for Canto I, Pt. Charudeva Sastri had not according to his own statement in his introduction, made use of the manuscripts of the work which belonged to the Oriental Manuscripts Library at Trivandrum because they were not made available to him. And these manuscripts contained good readings of the text with the Vrtti of Bhartrhari himself for Canto I, as well as the text of Canto II. I therefore felt that I could present a better text for the two Cantos making use of the hitherto-unused Trivandrum manuscripts.
In preparing the text of Cantos I and II included in this publication I have used the following printed and manuscript materials

**Printed Editions and Manuscripts Used**

**In the preparation of the edition**

1. Pandit Charudeva Sastri’s edition of Canto I (Lahore—1935)
2. Benares edition of Vākyapādiya (Benares 1887)
3. Manuscript No 10924 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Canto I, and portions of Bhartrhari’s own commentary on Canto I of the Vākyapādiya
4. Manuscript No 8918 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Cantos I and II of the Vākyapādiya
5. Manuscript No 2392—C O belonging to the University Manuscripts Library and containing Canto II

Since the text of Cantos I and II contained in this publication went to press (although the actual publication has been delayed for several reasons) before Prof K A Subramonia Iyer’s edition of Canto I with Bhartrhari’s Vṛtti and Vrsabhadeva’s Paddhati was published in 1966, I have not been able to use this latter publication in fixing the text. However, it may be noted that both the Vṛtti, and the Paddhati which he included in his 1966 publication had earlier appeared, the former fully and the latter in extracts in Pt Charudeva Sastri’s publication (1935), and the Vṛtti alone in the form of an English translation in Prof Subramonia Iyer’s own publication [of Canto I + Vṛtti (translation)—Poona], and in the form of a French translation by M Biardeau.

Prof Subramonia Iyer has omitted eight verses, (verses 108 to 115 both inclusive) in Canto I from his 1966 Poona edition, as he considered that they did not belong to the
Vākyapadīya I do not express any opinion on this, they, however, form part of the text adopted by me as they are found in all printed editions (except Prof Subramonia Iyer's Poona editions) and inferably in all manuscripts examined by earlier editors and in the Trivandrum Manuscripts which I examined.

I have noted in the footnotes in the text such changes in the numbering of the kārikās as have been necessitated.

I have also given notes where I felt that such were necessary to justify sound readings adopted in preference to others.

**About the Translation**

The translation prepared for my thesis based on the text of the Benares edition of 1887 had necessarily to be altered in places where a different text had to be adopted. Also, minor verbal changes had been occasionally made from the text of the translation as given in my thesis for the sake of clarity. The bracketed portions in the body of the translation of kārikās have been supplied in order to supply syntactical completeness of the sentences, or for greater clarity. The portion outside the brackets in the translation of each kārikā is by and large a literal rendering of the Sanskrit text. Very often introductory observations have also been given at the start of the translation for the sake of showing continuity of argument and logic.

**A running summary of the ideas in the two Cantos**

The Vākyapadiya is a difficult text. I have therefore thought it necessary to give a continuous statement of the ideas discussed in the two cantos of the text. This is given separately after the introduction. It is not claimed that every idea stated in the two cantos is given in this continuous statement. Where, for example, there are several examples given to illustrate a point, I may have dropped all but one or some examples. Sometimes where the author gives several variant views in one theme, I may have omitted a minor view. But it is claimed that the salient doctrines are discussed methodically from the beginning of Canto I to the end of Canto II giving in brackets the numbers of the kārikās of the text in which the particular ideas are expounded. Where the 1st Canto ends and
the 2nd starts is clearly marked in the summary. Hence the canto number is not always marked in the bracketed indication.

The notes on the Sanskrit text are given as foot-notes on each page of the text itself.

Notes on the Translation are given at the end (PP 147-189).

It is my hope that this publication will be useful to scholars, for the reason, among others, that it contains a more correct text than hitherto published of Canto II and the first ever translation of the same Canto to be published. It is also hoped that the detailed notes at the end, the summary of ideas in the introduction, and the introductory sentences in the body of the translation will lead to an increased understanding of this important text in Sanskrit grammatical philosophy.

Trivandrum, 29 5 1971

K RAGHAVAN PILLAI
CANTOS I and II—A SURVEY OF THE MAIN IDEAS

The Supreme Word principle or the Śabdabrahman is the source, the sustenance and the end of all manifestation (I—1-4). The Vedas reflect this Brahman. They are also the means of knowing It. We learn from the Vedas a multiplicity of spiritual disciplines, but all these disciplines subserve action. Various kinds of codes have also been formulated based on the Vedas. The Vedas, however, have not been interpreted in identical terms by all teachers. Some have given a monistic interpretation, while others have seen a dualistic import in the teachings of the Vedas. The true significance of the Veda is contained in the syllable ‘Om’—The Omkāra.

Grammar is the most important of the disciplines which have arisen from the Vedas (I—11). Grammar leads one to the realisation of Brahman in the form of the Supreme Word. We know the truth about things through words, and we know the truth about words through grammar. Grammar helps us purify our speech and mind. He who has a firm footing in this science and is capable of studying the Veda realises Brahman. The Supreme Word forms the essence of this Brahman. This Supreme Word is devoid of all distinctions, and such distinct entities like the R.K., the Sāman and so on have their distinct forms as apparent parts of that Word-principle (I, 11-22).

In Grammar the nature of words, meanings and the relationship between them and their different kinds are studied. The validity of a form is determined depending on whether or not it is recognised by the scripture, namely grammar (23-27).

Words fall into two categories, namely those which are created and those which are not. But both these can be described as eternal. The created word is only a manifestation of the Supreme Word-principle, about the eternal nature of which there is no question. The scripture prescribes this rule about the eternity of words (28-29).

Why should one rely on scripture to decide validity? Scripture is superior to logic or inference in choosing between right and wrong. There are many areas where inference fails.
and scripture has to take over Scripture is the record of the direct perception of those qualified for it, and direct perception is superior to inference Therefore a study of words is started based on scripture of impersonal origin and the codes of rules based on it (30-42)

Words are of two kinds—one, the cause of all words, and another, the kind of words used to convey a meaning Some consider that there is an intrinsic difference between them, according to others, the second type is only a manifested form of the first The Supreme Word principle and the spoken word are in a relationship similar to that between the fire which is inherent in the firewood, and that which is made manifest through rubbing fire-sticks together The nāda or the uttered sound is only the sphota or the Word-principle in manifest form But the manifested word has characteristics of its own, which are not of the sphota (44-49)

A word consists of its phonetic-part and its meaning-part The speaker’s mind first chooses the phonetic element and then employs it to convey a meaning The listener also first takes in the phonetic element and then passes on to the meaning part (50-53) A word has to be first heard, before it can convey a meaning (55-57)

Besides an object which a word conveys, as its meaning a word can also convey its own form as its import For example, the form of a word alone is meant most of the time when it is employed in grammatical sūtras (58-69)

Are different occurrences of a word different instances of the same word, or have we to consider them as different words altogether? (70) There are both views held on the subject

There are two schools of thought—those of the Monists and of the Pluralists—among the philosophers of speech According to the first, the sentence alone is the reality—the single unit The words and the syllables only appear to be complete entities According to the latter, the syllable has a reality of its own, the word is a sumtotal of the syllables and the sentence is only the words added together In the view of the Monists, the differences of diction and the like which belong to the category of the produced sounds are superimposed on the indivisible Word-principle named sphota, and are wrongly conceived to belong to the latter (71-77)
In the school of thought which holds that a word-principle is manifested as individual words through speech sounds there are three views as to how it is manifested. There are also different conceptions as to the method in which words are manifested by the uttered sounds, the way such uttered words are received, the sequence in which the uttered sounds operate in conveying a meaning and so on. But in the theory that speech sounds reveal an ultimate and indivisible Word-principle, the qualities which are peculiar to the speech sounds, and the process necessary for the speech sounds to reveal the speech principle should not be considered as belonging to the latter. Different views are held as to the raw material such as the breath which is converted into the speech sounds which, in their turn reveal the word principle.

Speech occupies a key place in the scheme of things. It is crucial in the process of comprehension and action. Consciousness is comprehended only as associated with speech. Speech is man’s self and Moksa or liberation is realising identity with Speech or Šabdabrahman. He who knows the secret of the functioning of words and attains the achievement of faultless speech enjoys Brahmā (118-131).

The Vedas are of impersonal origin and they do not perish even when all records of human wisdom perish. The wisdom enshrined in the Vedas is eternal and is not vitiated by the faults which are natural to human wisdom. Logic is not free from these faults. Reasoning becomes a sure guide if and when it is based on scripture. Employment of correct words is a must for spiritual elevation. Grammar leads one to the ability for it. A man devoid of culture employs corrupt speech. It is granted that incorrect forms can sometimes convey meaning. But they do not do it directly. An incorrect form which is uttered brings to mind the correct form of which it is a corruption and thus conveys the meaning of that correct form (132-156) (Enumeration of the ideas of Canto I concluded).

The second Canto of the Vākyapadiya starts with a definition of what a sentence is according to the different schools of thought (II, 1-2). According to the Monists among the Linguisticians or the Šabdabrahmavādins, a sentence is an integral unit incapable of any fundamental division. Any
division of the sentence into words, and syllables is only a pragmatic one for grammatical purposes and the like (7-12) What is said of the sentences is also true of the words at their level, that is, they are not basically divisible into the syllables, although one feels they are for pragmatic purposes

What exactly does this idea of the indivisibility of the sentence, the word etc mean? For one thing, it is a fundamental metaphysical necessity of the Sabdabrahmavādins to hold that Sabda or speech of which the Universe is a manifestation is in reality an immutable entity of which we can speak of manifestations, production, mutation and the like only in a very empirical sense.

On the level of studying speech as an instrument in conveying meanings the monistic doctrine means that a speech unit, whether it is a sentence or a word functions as a single unit as a meaning-conveying instrument. A total unit conveys a total meaning.

The Monists naturally do not accept the idea that larger speech units are built up from smaller units, and that meaning itself is conveyed through parts, and not as one unit in a flash. The Abhihitānaya view of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Anvītābhudhāna view of the Naiyāyikas are both denied by the Monistic Grammarians. According to the Monists, the division of speech units being merely a pragmatic necessity, grammatical rules based on such analysis are also merely pragmatic and once they serve their purposes, they can be discarded (7-117)

The Monistic school, and the Pluralistic schools hold different views on the status of a word and its meaning in the scheme of the sentence and its meaning. To the Monists, the word is only a convenient and conventional fiction created for the sake of pragmatic analysis. To the Pluralists, however, words are real, and the sentence is only built up from words. From either point of view, however, a discussion of word-meaning is necessary, although in one, it is only of pragmatic relevance, while in the other, it is basic. Twelve views on what constitutes the meaning of a word are stated (119-143)

The meaning of the sentence in the Akhanda School (Monists) is again discussed. The meaning of the sentence comes as a flash of insight (pratibhā) in it individual word-
meanings appear as parts, but the whole is simply not a sum-
total of the parts. This pratibhā or flash of insight is not a mere 
piece of knowledge, it is wisdom which guides man to right 
conduct (itukartavyatā). This flash of insight is derived 
from six sources, namely nature, action, practice, meditation, 
invisible causes, gift of the wise (144-152).

What does a word signify as its meaning? And what 
does it not signify? A word signifies an object like a cow and 
this object has qualities, but a word like gauh does not denote 
the qualities of the cow which it denotes. A knowledge of the 
qualities incidentally follows when the word denotes the object 
which has such qualities. There are, however, some exceptions 
to this. For example, may be mentioned, a word which means 
some kind of oil. There the meaning of the word is not merely 
the generic entity, but also the qualities of the oil. But gener-
ally a word functions whether the non-permanent attributes of 
the individual like colour are present or not. What then does 
the word exactly denote? What is never seen in separation 
from the object is the answer. This, of course, is the jāti, or 
the universal or genus (153-163).

What role do the root and suffix play in conveying the 
meaning of a word? Does the suffix express gender, number 
etc., or does it only illuminate these notions inherent else-
where? There are both views on the subject. There is also 
the view that the aggregate of root and suffix convey the mean-
ings of an object with its qualities like number, gender etc. In 
fact, there is quite a body of notions on the topics of root, 
suffix, root-suffix relationship and the relationship between the 
meaning of word, roots and suffix. In the same way too the 
prefix, how it modifies the meaning of the root, at what stage 
the modification takes place etc., are also discussed in the text.

What are conjunctions? And what are their functions? 
What is the type of organic relationship between a conjunction 
like ca and the things the aggregation of which it indicates? 
(163-176) The part of speech (karmapravacānīya) is also 
discussed.

With the discussion of the role of the part of speech named 
karmapravacānīya (197-204) the discussion of the five gram-
matical classes, namely nouns, verbs, prefixes, particles and 
karmapravacānīyas is closed. It may however be stated that
such a discussion of the different grammatical classes of words, though understandable and permissible under the point of view of the Pluralists, is only a purely pragmatic possibility and necessity for the Monistic Grammarian. To him, parts or avayavas in a sentence, namely, words are no more real than parts or avayavas in a word, namely, syllables. One may of course argue that if the aggregate is meaningful then parts also should be meaningful. As far as roots, suffixes etc which are parts of words are concerned, they are meaningful only in a technical sense, that is, they are not meaningful as complete units in the comprehension of a meaning. Copulative compounds, vrttis etc which, one may argue, should necessarily convey the meanings of the parts, really do not present any difficulty in the monistic scheme of the Grammarians. Grammatical technique which is necessarily analytical has to deal with parts of sentences and words, but this is only a pragmatic consideration necessary for grammar, and the grammatical processes. It is not really relevant to the indivisible unity which it seeks to reveal (205-250).

As stated earlier, the monistic grammarian, can discuss such questions as the primary, secondary and incidental meanings of words just as the Pluralists can do. The difference is that, for him, the whole thing is tentative, and on the assumption that there are parts and meaning of parts in a sentence and its meaning without taking these positions as ultimately real. The question is asked: When we say that the same word conveys a principal meaning, and a secondary meaning, what is the real philosophical position? Is it that the same word conveys different meanings or that, with each meaning, there is a change in the identity of the word? Both views are held by thinkers. It may be stated here that the same philosophical discussion occurs when synonyms and their meanings are discussed. This discussion has its bearing in a study of hymns repeated in ritual. When a hymn is repeatedly chanted in a sacrifice does it mean that with each repetition, a different hymn comes into being, or can the same hymn be considered to be repeated? There are both views held.

Just as there is a classification of meaning as primary and secondary, as in the well known example, ‘gangāyām ghosah, where ‘Gangā’ means the shore of the Ganges, in the same way
there can be the concept of an incidental meaning connected with a primary meaning. A word may be employed with the speaker's intention to convey a certain meaning. But it may incidentally convey some other meaning also. This latter is an incidental meaning.

The relationship between verbal expression and signification of meaning need special study. Sometimes the meaning conveyed in a context may be the one for which there is no verbal expression. This is so, in such an example as the expression 'ardhahravam' (half of a short vowel) where the expression actually means half of a mātrā and the word mātrā is not used.

When a word can convey different meanings, what factors help decide the exact import of the word in a particular context? Several factors can do this function. Such are the syntactical connection of words in the sentence, situation-context, the meaning of another word, propriety, place and time. There is also a slightly different list given in some texts. Constant association of two things, their dissociation, company, hostility, the meaning of another word, situation-context, evidence from another sentence, and the proximity of another word are the factors enlisted in this. It is idle to think that the form of a word alone is adequate to convey the required meaning in a particular context (251-323).

The ultimate source of all word-meaning, primary, secondary or incidental is the sentence, it is derived and abstracted from the sentence.

Even a single-word-utterance may be treated as a sentence, if it has a verb implied in it. For example, when the word vrksah is mentioned it implies the verb tisthati and forms a sentence vrksastisthati (there stands a tree). To this idea the Mīmāmsaka objects, and brings forth his śrutārthā-pattu view. According to this view, the heard word leads to the inference of the suitable unheard word, and the meanings of the two words thus juxtaposed in the intellect add up to convey the meaning of the sentence. This view is not accepted by the Grammarian (324-344).

It was stated that the meaning of the word is abstracted and derived from the sentence. For this the interpretation of the sentence is necessary. There are rules governing such
interpretation, from such rules is evolved a certain concept of
the relationship between sentences also For example, what is
the relationship between a sentence, which lays down a general
rule and another which states an exception to it The excep-
tion is really part of the import of the sentence dealing with
the general rule, although there is no verbal statement of it
there What the sentence dealing with the exception actually
does is to make explicit statement of the exception The rule
and the exception thus constitute one single statement (345-351)

In this context too may be discussed the integral status
of proper names like Devadatta, which, like any other word,
function as total units in conveying their meanings In other
words, the meaning which the name Devadatta conveys can-
ot be considered to be conveyed either by ‘deva’ or ‘datta’,
the parts thereof Datta and Deva only appear to be parts of
Devadatta, and are considered as parts of Devadatta, since
they are produced simultaneously with the latter For pur-
poses of grammatical study the word Devadatta may be and
is considered a combination of deva and datta But the same
thing cannot be said, let us add, about, say, jye and sthā which,
one may wrongly say, form part of the word Jyestha

Proper names which are clan-names do not require access-
sory factors to convey their meanings The permanance of
word-meaning relationship is true of proper names and their
meanings also, although it may appear to be less true there
This rule of the permanent nature of the indicator-indicated
relationship between word and meaning holds good for technical
terms like vṛddhi in grammar

Proper names in every day usage function through their
forms aided by other factors The long technical terms in
grammar also function along the same lines, and the presence
of causal factors is brought out by inference

In grammar, both proper names in every day usage and
coined technical terms which are called samjñās are employed
Sometimes the same technical term is used as a coined one and
as an every day one For example, the word sāmkhyā
Sometimes a term with a non-technical sense when uttered will
extend its application to become a coined one (a technical
one) For example, the word sambuddhī in the statement
dūrātsambuddhau (352-370)
The integral nature of utterances and the integral way in which they convey meaning have been discussed as the key doctrine of the Grammarian Philosopher. Now the question is asked: When the subject of a sentence is a group, who can be considered as doing the action—the group or the individual? Where a group is described as eating, the eating is naturally performed by individuals. The result of satisfying hunger is also achieved individually. But some verbs like 'drs' (to see) appearing in a sentence with a plural subject function collectively. Sometimes there is both individual and collective reference. For example, take a statement like Sudras should not enter the house. Here Sudras, individually and collectively are prohibited from entering the house. In the same way, the change of a into at takes place in spite of the intervention of at, ku, pu and ā collectively or individually, since all that is meant in the context is intervention—See Pāṇini atkupvānnumvyavāye’pi (371-388).

The status of the component sentence in a compound sentence is like that of words in a sentence. There are different views on this. Some consider that the component sentences accomplish their meanings individually. In this view, the compound sentence is a collection of clauses each having a different form. But this view is not acceptable to the Grammarian. He conceives the relationship between the compound sentence and component sentences on the pattern of the relationship between a sentence and the words in it. The component clauses are recognised only after the compound sentence is totally uttered and comprehended, the meaning of the component sentence is a subsequent abstraction following the comprehension of the meaning of the compound sentence (389-390).

It is a crucial idea of the Monistic Grammarian that a meaningful utterance whether it is a word, a sentence, or a compound sentence is an integral unit of speech and also functions integrally in conveying its meaning. The notion that the meaning of the aggregate of an utterance culminates in the meanings of the so-called parts is only another version of this idea (391-398).

What is the essential condition for a speech-unit to convey its meaning? This question needs discussion. This condition is that the speech unit should be actually employed to convey the
meaning  Purposeful utterance should precede the conveying of meaning  A word may have several meanings, and several words may convey one meaning  In this situation order is brought about by the fact of purposeful utterance  That is, a word conveys that meaning which is the intention of the speaker (399-402)

Some hold the view that when Vedic hymns are uttered in sacrifices, they do not have a factual meaning because utterance is not directed towards conveying any meaning, utterance is for the sake of utterance  But when hymns are taught, then the very phonetic form of the hymn becomes its meaning since the teacher intends that form to be understood by the student  But these hymns are considered to be meaningful by others since they are purposefully employed  Among those who hold this view there are those who consider that each repetition is a separate occurrence of the hymn and others who hold that it is the same hymn which is repeated  According to these latter the speaker does not have to aim a word at a particular meaning  He has only to utter the word, because a word has the capacity to convey its meaning  What situation-context and other factors do is not to reveal the meanings of totally different words in different contexts, but of apparently different words (403-407)

The relationship between the meanings of the words in a sentence and the meaning of the sentence itself according to the Monistic school of the Grammarians and the opposing Pada-schools (particularly the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas) may again be stated According to the Grammarian philosopher, words present a specific meaning of the sentence  These words themselves are not meaningful in the sense that the sumtotal of the meanings of the words will constitute the meaning of the sentence  An analogy is given  Nobody can say that the meaning of a word is the sumtotal of the meanings of the letters in it  Letters obviously have no meanings of their own  But words have individual meanings, one will argue  True, they have meanings but the meaning of the sentence is a unitary concept which is not a sumtotal of individual word-meanings  Word-meanings, however, play a more important role in the scheme of the meaning of the sentence as worked out by the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas  According to the Anvita-
bhūdhāṇa view held by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, the meaning of the sentence is built up gradually by the association of the words, and the meaning of the sentence remains accomplished in the meanings of the words.

In defence of the Monistic position that word-meanings are not recognised in the meaning of the sentence one may bring forward the analogy of the sense-organs. Each organ of sense has a separate object on which it acts, and it acts independent of other sense-organs. But all these sense-organs need the body through which alone they can function. In the same way words may independently denote objects, but their meaningfulness as expression of reality is derived from the sentence which alone completely expresses reality. Reality is expressible only in the form 'it exists' which means that a word, in order to express a reality has to be compounded with a verb form, namely 'exists'. This means that a word has to be part of a sentence in order to convey a meaningful meaning, if one may say so. If the verb is mentioned as expressing an action to be conveyed nouns are required to effect the action. The verb is more important than nouns and so it is mentioned first. However, this discussion of the meaning of a sentence as a system of relations is only valid from the point of view of the speaker. The ultimate truth is that it is an integral entity in which relationship is only a subsidiary reality (408-430, 437-441).

Reality is understood only through speech (language) and it is understood only in the form in which it is presented by speech (word or language). But language cannot describe the intrinsic nature of things, although we know things only in the form in which words describe them (431-437).

The position of the Sanskrit Grammarian Philosopher, then, is that a sentence is not a sumtotal of the words which appear to make it up. It is an integral unit in which words only appear as parts. The meaning of the sentence, in the same way is not the sumtotal of the meanings of the words. It is an integral entity presented by the meanings of the words. The Grammarian here makes a distinction between word-meaning which only mentions an object, and the meaning of the sentence which is primarily an action, effected by men through objects.
(xxxiv)

In the context of these ideas a discussion becomes necessary on the status of those types of sentences which appear to convey more than one meaning, or those which have more verbs than one and therefore militate against the notion of an integral unity. How is unity sustained in the face of the obvious multi-point nature of such sentences? For example, consider a sentence which has several finite verbs in it. Does this mean that the meaning of such a sentence is a multiple quantity since there can be a separate proposition around each finite verb in it, particularly so, in the context of Kātyāyana's definition of the sentence as having one finite verb? The answer to the question posed here is in the negative. In such cases too, the sentence with more than one finite verb is an integral entity with an integral meaning. Again, there may be a sentence like mṛgah pasyata yāti (Look, there goes a deer). Here, a finite verb is linked to another finite verb. Here too the integral nature of the sentence or its meaning is not affected by this fact. If a sentence is to be complete, there must be expectancy on the level of meaning and no expectancy on the word level. Even when a sentence implies something and there is nothing in it verbally stated about the things implied, even then the sentence is complete (438-446).

The verb constitutes the essential and minimal content of a sentence. So a study of the verb in a sentence will constitute a study of the sentence in its essential aspect. There can be one or more verbs in a sentence as stated earlier. When there are more verbs than one, in a proposition, the proposition can be re-stated with the comparative status of verbs changed, without effecting any change in the meaning of the proposition. For example, the sentence "Recite while moving about" can be re-stated as 'Move about while reciting.' What is a principal verb in one sentence becomes a subsidiary verb in another, but both sentences have the same import. This position really substantiates the doctrine of the Grammarians that the status or meanings of words in a sentence do not ultimately determine the meaning of the sentence itself. In the same way, a certain verb may be used in a sentence, and the action conveyed by it may be specifically different from what it says. The verb lends itself to these different meanings. Verbs con-
vey their meanings only in general and unspecified forms. For example, the sentence 'Kings will perform Asvamedha sacrifice, does not convey the idea of any particular form of a sacrifice, nor the difference between the sacrifices performed by one king and another. Then again take the sacrificial injunction 'He should offer to Prajāpati seventeen he-goats all of the same colour.' The verb used in the sentence is ālabheta. This verb which is singular lends itself for use with each one of the 17 he-goats, as if there were seventeen sentences with one he-goat as the object in each. Other examples of this kind may also be noted. All this means that a sentence will take one form when it is uttered, but in the stage of comprehension it may assume a different form. The verbal content of the sentence and the so-called individual word-components do not play the ultimate part in the scheme of the meaning of the sentence and the form of the meaning itself.

A verb may sometimes function in relation to a group-object taking the whole as one unit, or function in terms of the individuals of the group. Similarly a nominal form may be mentioned only once, but more than one verb may be employed. Then the verb gets itself connected with each meaning of the synonym as if it were used as a separate word. For example, take the sentence aksāh bhaksyantām bhojyantām divyantām, (Let the dice be eaten, broken or thrown.) Here the word aksāh is available as subject for each of the verb. The concept is that the form aksāh is employed as if it were a combination of three forms aksāh, aksaḥ, aksah. One utterance combines three possibilities. In fact, words are found to follow two rules when they convey their meanings. These are described as the rules of sequence and simultaneity. In the example aksāh etc. given above, the component forms aksah, aksah, aksah are connected to their verbal forms one after another.

On sentences, for which, due to the power of synonyms different meanings can be given, the Monist and the Pluralist differ in their approach. According to the Monist the same sentence functions in conveying different meanings through the exercise of different aspects or powers of it, the Pluralist, however, contend that the statements contained in a common form of the sentence are really different ones. One may remember here the same approach adopted by the two schools.
when words with more than one meanings were discussed (447-475)

The last few stanzas of the second canto of the Vākyapadiya are devoted to a brief discussion of the fortunes of Sanskrit Grammar. The Samgraha text of Vyādi, the grammarian, was condensed so much by writers that it became obscure in course of time. Then Patañjali wrote his Mahābhāṣya and brought back clarity and depth to the study of Sanskrit Grammar. However, Grammar could not avoid attack from votaries of dry logic like Bāji, Saubhava and Haryaksa. This led in course of time to the decline of grammar until it survived only in South Indian versions. The South Indian text was procured and the science cultivated by Chandra and other Grammarians who were followers of the School of Patañjali. Bhartrhari says that his teacher wrote this work Vākyapadiya in Sanskrit grammar. According to the commentator Punyarāja, the statement that his teacher composed the work only means that Bhartrhari wrote the work with the blessings of the teacher (See Introduction on this discussion)
The Vākyapadīya

Canto I

1. That beginningless and endless One, the imperishable Brahman of which the essential nature is the Word, which manifests itself into objects and from which is the creation of the Universe.

2. which though described in the Vedas as one is divided on the basis of its powers, and although it is not different from its powers appears to be different,

3. the indestructible powers of which functioning through the powers of Time become the six transformations, namely, both and the rest—the sources of all (these) manifold objects,

4. to which, Single One, the cause of all, belongs this manifold existence, under the forms of the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the enjoyment,

5. of that (Brahman) the Veda is both the means of realisation and the reflection and it has been handed down by the great Seers as if it consisted of many paths, although it (really) is One.
6 In the branches of the Veda are set out various paths, all at the service of one action (namely, ritual) and there (again) words are found to have a fixed capacity.

7 Codes of various kinds with objectives tangible and intangible have been formulated on the basis of it (i.e., the Veda) from its evidence by sages who are erudite in its meaning.

8 There are various controversies between the Monists and the Dualists arising from their own options regarding its explanatory sentences.

9 That true and pure knowledge alone proclaimed by that one word (namely Om) is stated there (in the Veda) under the form of the word Om—a knowledge which is not contradictory to any school of thought.

10 Different disciplines which are sources of knowledge and culture are developed as based on the divisions and the subdivisions of the Veda which (under the form of the Om) is the creator of the Universe.

11 The wise say that grammar, nearest to that Brahman and
the foremost spiritual training is the most important (of such) subsidiary texts of the Veda

12 It is a direct path towards that holiest of lights, that supreme essence of the kind of speech which has assumed distinctions of form

13 Words are the sole guide to the truths about the behaviour of objects, and there is no understanding of the truth about words without grammar

14 A gateway to liberation, a cure to the blemishes of speech, purifier of all (other) disciplines, it shines as being applied to them

15 Just as all thing-classes depend upon word-classes similarly, in this world, this (grammar) is the basis of all disciplines

16 It is the first rung on the ladder towards liberation, it is the straight Royal Road for those desirous of (reaching) that goal

17 The soul which has passed beyond errors in it (ie, in grammar) and is capable of studying the Veda observes that (Brahman) which is the source of the Vedas and the
very soul of which is constituted by the Veda (ie in the form of the Om)

18 तस्यत्तमितिभेदया यहाँ हृदन्तमस् । यद्यिमतनेव तमसं ज्योति शुद्ध चित्तम् ॥

18 That pure light which is the supreme essence of speech free of (any kind of) form, which appears to take several forms in this darkness (of manifestation),

19 —वैःसत समतिकान्ता भूतियापारवांतमस् ।
   व्यतीतयालोकतमसी प्रकाशं यथुपासले ॥

19 —which is worshipped by those who have transcended the (manifested) speech showing form and action, and who have passed beyond (the duality of) light and darkness,

20 यत्र वाचो निमित्तानि चित्तमातीवशरस्मृते ।
   तस्यन्तः यथेतेन भासले प्रतिबिम्बवत् ॥

20 —in which the symbols of speech, pointers as it were to the ‘one-letter scripture’ (Om) shine forth like reflections in association with that (ie Om) which is antecedent to all (manifested) speech,

21 अवर्णामानि धिृशास्य सामनयामन्युबह्यस्य च
   यस्स्मृत्यांतिकान्त च र्या पृथविश्वचरित्राय ॥

21 —and in which the various sorts of the letter-sounds of the Atharvan, the Sāman, the Rk and the Yajus exist with distinct identities

22 यदेक प्रक्ष्यामेवेंहुधा प्रविभाषते ।
   तद्याकरणानागाय पर व्रह्यामाह्याय ॥

22 —which, though one, is divided on the basis of the various explanations (of it),—that Supreme Brahman is attained by having recourse to grammar

4 मिताख्याय —ह
5 द्विनेव —ह
Words, meanings, and their relations are described in it as timeless by the sages, who are the authors of the Sūtras, the Vārttikas and the Bhāsyas.

In this science are described for the sake of the code rules, word-meanings which are analytically (i.e., etymologically) derived or fixed as such (by conventions, etc.), words which are indicative or descriptive, and (word-meaning) relations which are either of the nature of cause and effect or of (inseparable) identity. These which form accessories to conduct and understanding are described through their own names, or through characteristic features and as covering the valid and the invalid ones, some of these are also used (in non-scriptural contexts) according to rules.

Even if it is found that there is no difference (between two forms) in the matter of expressing the meaning, only those which are derived from the scripture (i.e., grammar) are valid as instruments for right conduct for the wise, the opposite ones are invalid.
28 Like living beings, words also have no (traceable) beginning whether they are eternal or created. This rule (about words) is called their eternity.

29 No one dare make this rule meaningless. Therefore, the eternal code of rules about validity has been composed.

30 (Scripture is essential, not reasoning alone) — Right conduct is not established by reasoning dissociated from scripture. Even the knowledge which the sages possess has the scripture for its reference.

31 No one can refute by reasoning or by argument of empirical obviousness those unbroken and traditional paths of right conduct.

32 Rarely are the natures of substances known from inference, since their properties vary with variations in (their) state, place or time.

33 The power which a substance is well-known as possessing.
towards a particular activity is obstructed when it comes into association with another specific object

34 यतेनानुमितरत्नतयथाकुशलत्वमातृभि।
अभिमुकतरत्नतरत्निक्षेपयोजनायते

35 Even a conclusion inferred after great consideration by clever logicians is decided to be otherwise by others more qualified

36 परेकालस्मात्यम्मात्यम्यासङ्गेभजाते।
मणिश्रेष्ठादिविज्ञानतत्तत्रत्नानामानिकम्।

37 Such a knowledge as discriminates between different diamonds, different coins, etc.—a knowledge which cannot be described to others—arises in those who possess it, only from practice, it is not inferential

38 प्रत्यक्षपतुवाच च व्यविक्रम्य व्यवस्थिता।
"पितुरक्ष्य पिशाचानां करण्या" एव सिद्धव।।

39 The supernatural powers which demons, departed souls and ogres possess, which transcend the perceptual and the inferential, are indeed the results of their actions (in previous births)

40 आविभूततप्रकाशानामतुस्मृतत्तत्तत्सा।
अतीतात्मायतत्तला प्रत्यक्षान्त विशिष्यते।।

41 The knowledge of the past and the future, which is possessed by sages, enlightened, and undisturbed in mind, does not differ (in certainty) from direct perception
The words of those who perceive the super-sensual and non-cognisable objects with the eye of a sage are not refuted by inferential reasoning.

When a man does not doubt the perceptual knowledge (of a reliable person) as if it were his own, how can another one (given to reasoning) make him who (thus) stands on the side of perception, turn back?

The scriptural truth is of equal use to all humanity down to the Cándalas in their judgements 'this is virtue' and 'this is sin.'

He who has got the Vedic knowledge which shines unbroken like consciousness is not influenced by the inferential arguments (of the logicians).

Like a (blind) man running along on an uneven path obtaining his knowledge (of the path) only from feeling from his hand, he, who relies on inference (for his knowledge) will speedily fall.
Therefore, basing themselves on the scripture of impersonal origin and the tradition of the precept-books with their binding precepts, the investigation of words is undertaken by the wise

Grammarians consider that there are two ‘word-entities’ (i.e., two elements) in functional words, one (i.e., the sphota) is the cause of the (production) of words and the other (the speech-sound) is used in connection with meanings.

Some, among the teachers of old considered that there was a difference in essence between these two. Others (on the other hand) speak of the same undivided entity being thought various, through a difference in concerning it.

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22 वा—ख
23 साहुलविषया स्मृति—च
24 Charudeva Sastrī’s Benares edition (क) gives the following verse in the commentary under stanza 44

Sastri adds the following note on it “This stanza is seen interpolated in all manuscripts except क-5. The commentary would indicate that the karika was by another author and has been given in the text by the author of the Vākyapadiya to show a particular view held by another author.”
46 Just as the light which is in the fire-stick acts as the cause for further lights, similarly the Word which is in the mind is the cause of speech-sounds.

47 The Word is examined in the mind, is then fixed to a specific meaning and then through the instrumentality of the speech-sounds produced through (their) causes.

48 The Word is neither a ‘previous’ nor ‘a subsequent’, because it is the speech-sounds which are produced in sequence. But the non-sequential is revealed as sequential as if it were divided.

49 Just as a reflection formed elsewhere (i.e., in water) appears, due to the activities of the water, to partake of the movements of the water, similar is the relationship between the Word and the speech-sound.

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25 This karika is numbered 47 in ‘ka’—an obvious mistake. Being numbered correctly as 46 in the text as given in the present edition, the numbering of karikas from this point onwards differs from ‘ka’. This agrees with the Benares edition.

26 kā
27 na
28 te

Bhartrhari's commentary contained in the Trivandrum manuscript (‘ga’) does not go beyond karika 50. The text alone is given after it.
50 Just as in (perceptual) knowledge, there can be seen both itself (i.e., the act of perceiving) and the object of knowledge (the thing perceived), so in the word there appears the meaning-element and the formal element.

51 The inner principle called 'speech' which exists egg-like, evolving into speech-activity, assumes sequence through its parts.

52 Just as a shape which is (a copy) of another shape, after it has become the object of a unified perception (having been first received by the senses as a complex-pattern of parts), is then painted (in stages) on the canvas, so likewise three stages (three aspects) are seen in the comprehension of speech.

53 Just as the mind of the speaker first dwells on the words (and not their parts when he wants to convey their meaning) similarly, the activity of the hearers first arises out of the words (and not their parts) in their attempt to understand their sense.

54 When certain meanings are conveyed the forms (which convey them), having (thus) become accessories to
(such) meanings, and having their purpose (thus) fulfilled, they are not perceived (as accessories to action), because they are (uttered) for the sake of another (namely, meaning).

55 ग्राह्यते ग्राहकत्वाच हे शब्दी तेजस्ते यथा।
तथैव सर्वव्यावानामेते पूर्णवस्थिते॥

Just as light has two powers, namely the power of being perceived and the power of causing the perception of objects, similarly all words have these two distinct powers.

56 विषयवस्तवसनापने शब्दनार्थः प्रकाशयते।
न सत्यवै तेतर्यणाः अगृहीता प्रकाशका॥

Meaning is not understood from words which (themselves) have not become objects (of the sense of hearing). Without being (thus) received, they do not express meaning by their mere existence.

57 अनुकृततुष्टतथाकिमहृद्यविभिन्दयते।
नेत्रियाणा प्रकाशेऽथन स्वरूप गृहाते तथा॥

Therefore when the form of the (uttered) word is not clear, the question ‘what did you say’ is asked (of the speaker), But the nature of the sense-faculties is not similarly grasped when an object has to be revealed by them.

58 शब्दानां गृहीतो ही शब्दमर्मावृद्धतो।
भेदकार्येऽतुष्ट शब्दमर्मविपरीतेऽशाच॥

These two aspects of the word, analysed and comprehended separately, act without mutual opposition as causes of different effects.

59 बृहदावयो यथा शब्दा स्वरूपयोपनिविन्यता।
आवृद्धावथापितं शब्दं सम्बल्य यात्ति स्वतिमित॥

Just as the words ‘vṛddhi’ and the like besides expressing their own form are also related to the sounds named by them, namely, those symbolised by ‘ādauc’ (i.e., ‘ā’, ‘ai’ and ‘au’), etc.
60 so this word ‘agni’ (‘fire’) besides being related to the
word ‘agni’ (meaning fire) is also related to that referred
to by the word ‘agni’ namely the form ‘agni’

61 A word which is uttered (in everyday use) is never linked
with grammatical operations (But) its capacity to
convey that other form (that is, its own form as the
meaning) is not obstructed

62 The word which is pronounced (in ordinary speech) being
secondary, since it is for the sake of the other (namely,
the thing-meant) is not linked with grammatical oper-
ations, and hence we adopt the convention that the gram-
matical operations are attached to words which symbolise
themselves

63 Whatever common attributes there exist in the object with
which anything is compared and the thing which is com-
pared to it, some attributes other than them also exist
in the object to which the comparison is made

64 Whatever quality which is the cause of the excellence (of
an object) is (itself) mentioned in the form of an object,
it's (own) excellence is caused by the qualities residing
in it
65  When a word (like ‘agni’ in the Sūtra ‘agnerdhak’), which has its own form as its meaning is pronounced (for conveying its form), then (from that word) is discriminated another word (namely, the word ‘agni’ which has ‘fire’ as its meaning)

66  Before being connected to the thing it means a name is capable of genitive and nominative constructions, because it has its own form as its meaning

67  The nominative is prescribed to a name because it is meaningful with its form (as its meaning), and it is from the same meaning that the genitive construction in the form ‘of it’ arises

68  Some consider that in the Sūtra ‘svam rūpam’ a name as a particular is meant, the universal attached to the particular undergoes grammatical operation

69  Others think that what is meant by the Sūtra is a particular instance of the named (and that it is the class which is the name) and that in any given instance one finds only a particular, the understanding of which is brought about by the universal\textsuperscript{17}
Both among those who uphold the eternity theory of words, and those who hold that words are created, there are some who uphold its sameness (in all instance of its occurrence). Again among the upholders of the doctrine of eternity and of the doctrine that words are created there are those who uphold the plurality of words (i.e., that every occurrence of apparently the same word, is really the occurrence of a different word).

The doctrine of an opponent school is stated regarding the comparative reality of letters, words and sentences. Even when the word is a different one, the identity of the letters is not impaired, and (in the same way) in different sentences the same word is observed. 

Therefore the word does not exist as more than its letters, nor is there a sentence existing as more than the letters and the words.

(The grammarian’s doctrine is given.) Just as there are no parts in letters (similarly) there are no letters in the word. Nor is there any reality in abstracting the word from the sentence.
People follow customary usage (and talk of ‘words’ and ‘letters’) though basing their theories on different views and on this (question) what is considered as primary by one school is taken in an opposite way by others.

People talk of difference of diction (as belonging to the utterance) of the Word, which itself is of undivided time, but (appears to) follow the time-pattern of the speech-sounds (uttered), in accordance with the differences in the causes of its being perceived.

With regard to the short, long and prolated vowels, since a speech-unit (here, a vowel) is (essentially) timeless, and (therefore) fundamentally different (from the speech-sound which reveals it), it is the time of the primary-sound which is metaphorically considered as belonging to the speech-unit.

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In interpreting the verse “svabhāva etc etc” Bhartrhari in his commentary as given by Charudeva Sastri (ka) quotes a verse from Samgrahakāra with the introduction evam hi Samgrahkārah pathati. The verse reads as follows:

The commentary given in the Benares edition does not give this verse. But the Benares version of the text gives this as part of the text with the difference that śrītāśadē in the third line is changed into वृत्ताशः. In the light of the
It is however after the word has been revealed (by the primary sound) that the modified sounds are presented to the mind as distinctions of diction (and hence a fortiori) the self of the Word is not divided into parts by them.

There are three views among those who hold the theory that words are manifested (1) the sounds act upon the sense-faculty, or (2) they act upon the word or (3) they act upon both.

(The first theory) would be analogous to the theory of sight—perception which held that) only the sense—faculty (of sight) is acted upon, namely, by attention and application of ointment; (The second theory would be analogous to a theory of smell-perception which held that) only the thing (for instance, the earth) is acted upon in order that its smell might be received.

evidence of Bhartrhari's own commentary, I have not included the verse in the text. Since, however, the idea given in the stanza is integral to the philosophy, I give below a translation:

"The cause through which the letter is perceived is defined as the primary speech sound while the modified speech sound is the cause of the difference in diction."
(According to the third theory) where however, the eye effects the reception of a cognition, it is clear that both the object and the sense-faculty are acted upon by the light, and speech-sounds operate in the same form

81 Certain theorists maintain that reception of the sound takes place without any separation of it from the form of the Word (sphota), others hold that the sound is not perceptible. According to yet others it is an independent manifesting agent.

82 Just as a chapter or a single verse is apprehended as a unit by means of saying over its component parts in order, but of course the book is not defined at each component parts,

83 —so likewise the form of a word is apprehended (as a unity) when the word is revealed by the sound through the agency of causal factors which are appropriate to the cognition (of the word), but which are not themselves (as such) apprehended (i.e., the hearer is not aware of the separate sense-data).

84 Simultaneously with the last sound, the word is apprehended by the mind in which the seed has been sown by the (physical) sounds, and in which ripening (of the speech) has been brought about by the telling over (of the sounds)
85 As far as the non-existent forms, which (a hearer) considers as existing in the interval (before the complete word has been pronounced), are concerned, this is merely incapacity on the part of the hearer, they are in fact, only means to the apprehension (of the complete word).

86 There is the semblance of distinctions in cognition, (similarly) the attributing of distinctions on words is always seen. The word appears to be produced in stages and cognition seems to be dependent on the cognised.

87 Just as earlier numbers (in a series) should be apprehended for the apprehension of subsequent ones, although the latter are different from the former, so is the apprehension of parts in a unit of speech (an aid to the apprehension of the whole).

88 When in reality revealing units in the syllable, word and sentence function independently of each other, they appear to function in combination, although they are entirely different.

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41 रूपायाः——ख
In interpreting this karika (86) Bhartrhari in his commentary quotes the following stanza

जैपेन न विना शान व्यवहारे उपचारः

नाभायेव वाचा कष्ठव्यंक्तविवशीलते ॥

"In this world there can be no knowledge without the known. A word which is not revealed in sequence never conveys a meaning."

42 वर्णाः चा—ख
89. याचेच दर्शने। पूवैं दूःर रात्सत्त्मसंज्ञि वा। अन्तःवाक्याविशेष विशेषवाक्यवाक्यवस्तित।

89 Just as on looking from a distance or in the dark, one at first misunderstands an object, and (later on) understands it otherwise (ie, in its true nature),

90 व्यज्ञानेन कथा वाक्ये वाक्यवाक्यविनिमित्तहुँि।
भागावल्प्रेण पूवैं बुझि प्रवत्ताते।

90 —similarly during the manifestation of the sentence by its causes (namely, the smaller units like letters and words), the mind first functions as comprehending the component units (as real units)

91 यथानुपर्वीनिययो विकारे श्रीरविश्वयो।
tथथैं प्रतिपद्या नियता बुझिणु क्रम।

91 Just as there is a (fixed) sequence (in the stages) of the transformation of milk (into curds) and the seed (into the tree), similarly there is a fixed sequence in the series of the hearer’s perceptions (of the intervening words, phrases, etc)

92 भागवत्वशी तेज्वेज िर्पाणेबो ध्वनें कमात्।
निभमात्ववश्वयायो वा भागैब्राह्मणम।

92 And when they (ie, sentences, words, etc ) are made up of real parts (granting the Mīmāṃsaka’s position), the difference in form (between two speech units for instance, two words, ‘nadi’ and ‘dīna’) is really due to the (difference in the) sequence of their sounds. And where words, etc, are considered as not made up of (real) parts (by the Akhandavādins), the fancying of parts is a means (to the realisation of the total unit)

42 This reading does not make sense since the reference in the the karika is to sounds (dhvanis) that reveal the sphota in the syllable, the word and the sentence, and not to the varna or the syllable. Nevertheless the reading is given here

४२ भेव——ख
It is considered by some that the Word is a universal suggested by a number of individuals (namely, speech-sounds), these individual speech-sounds (according to them) constitute the sound-pattern of the Word.

Just as light (reveals objects), the speech-sounds produced by (their) causes become the cause of the immutable Word.

(If the Word is revealed like this, does it not mean that it is not eternal? The answer is in the negative)—Being revealed is not established as invariably pertaining to non-eternal things. Universals which are eternal are also considered to be revealed by those (ie, the particulars) in which they inhere.

In life (only) concrete objects are found to have relation to place and the like (for instance, time). And even accepting the alternative (that difference in place, etc applies also to those that are not concrete objects), there is no (such) difference between the speech-sound and the Word (it reveals).

Just as there exists an invariable competence of the revealed and the revealer between a perceiving sense-organ and the thing it perceives, so does it exist between the Word and the speech-sounds.

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And it is seen (in our experience) that, in the case of (various) smells and the like which are perceived by the same sense-organ, there is a separate causal factor for each substance.

(The point that the attributes of the speech-sounds revealing the Word are transferred to the Word is again stated) —

The object revealed partakes of the attributes of the reflecting medium. This is obvious in the different kinds of reflections (of an object) produced in oil, water and the like.

And surely, concrete objects of the type of mountains cannot have existence (except as their reflections) in stones, a mirror-surface and the like of incompatible size.

Therefore the period of the speech-sounds and of (their secondary variations in the form of) diction is assigned to the syllable, word and sentence which are (themselves) without time-distinctions.

(The definitions of the sphota and dhvani by another school are given) —

The sphota is that which is produced by the union and
disunion of the speech-organs (like the vocal chords). And dhvans are sounds born of this sphota

\[103\] अल्पे महति वा शब्दे स्फोटालो न भिषयते।
परस्तु शब्दसतान प्रच्छापच्छातामक।

(103) The nature of the primary and modified speech-sounds is again stated from the author’s point of view —

Whether the speech-sound is short or long, the measure of the Word does not change. The subsequent sound (i.e., the modified speech-sound) which arises out of the primary speech-sounds is expanded or contracted in its form.

\[104\] हृदात्रभेव दीपस्य भविन्मात्र तु छलक्यते।
घण्टावदनां च शब्देवृयतो मेद स द्रुतयते।

(104) (The view-point of another school is stated) —

Like light from a lamp, merely the speech sound (undifferentiated as primary and modified) is heard from a distance. But in the sound of a bell and the like, the distinction is clearly noticed.

\[105\] द्व्याभिधातात्त्विण्डैः भिन्नो दीर्घं पलादविच।
कम्पे तूपरते जाता नावं व्याचिच्चियोक्त।

(105) (The discussion of the doctrine held by the Grammarians is taken up again) —

The long and prolated sounds which are different (from the short sound) are produced by the striking of the organs of speech. And the sounds which modify diction arise after the cessation of the movements (of the organs).

\[106\] आनवलिध्वात्स्पष्टकप्पेति कर्णे न्धवन्योपपरेः।
स्फोटायावपयायते ज्वाला ज्वालान्तरासिव।

(106) (The view of another school) —

Even before the vibrations of the speech-organs (which produce the word) have subsided, other sounds are formed from the word (sphoṭa) itself, as one flame from another.

49 Karika 106 is not seen in manuscript gha. Bhartrhari has his commentary on this, however. The Benares edition also gives the karika.

90 नय परे—च
107 (Now regarding what constitutes the substance of speech)
It is held by some (i.e., by three schools respectively),
that air, the atoms or consciousness become speech.
There is an endless number of variant views in this matter.

108 In this context, speaking etc.
spreading and vibrating etc.

108 (These views are expounded)—
The air which is stirred by the speaker's effort following
his desire to speak strikes the speech centres and produces
speech.

109 Even powerful objects are broken by air which possesses
the attributes of speed and accumulation, blowing with
the capacity to cause (such breaking).

52 After this the Trivandrum manuscript (ga) gives
the karika ""अजस्वृति etc"" given as 116 in the text given
here. The text in the said Trivandrum manuscript omits 9
karikas namely the following.

The manuscript gives the karika ""अजस्वृति etc"

as follows

अजस्वृतिः यता भयं तदाध्ययनस्य भवति "

Note the reading चारीये in the last line. In the verse
as given in Charudeva Sastria and the Benares edition, the
reading is प्रतीये.
(25)

110 (Regarding the atom-theory) —
The atoms, which unite and separate, transform themselves into shadows, light, and darkness and also into speech on account of their possessing all (possible) capacities (i.e., the capacity to be transformed into all things)

111 When their capacity is being revealed these atoms which are called speech, prompted by the effort (of the speaker) collect together like clouds (in the sky)

112 Finally, regarding the consciousness-theory) —
Again, the inner knower who exists in the subtle quintessential speech transforms himself into (audible) speech for the purpose of revealing his nature

113 It (i.e., consciousness) taking the form of the mind and ripening in the fire (of the stomach) enters the life-breath, and it is then uttered

114 The breath which has become the substratum of the mental principle is suffused with the mind’s attributes and manifested (after it passes) through the fire (of the stomach)

54 अभास क्षेत्राते नाद सूक्ष्मवातात्मक स्थितयोऽव—ख
Breaking up its inherent knots (i.e., its continuous current) the breath reveals the syllables through different and distinct speech-sounds and merges into those syllables themselves.

Yet another view about sound both of speech and of other kinds is given. –
Sound though it is ever-existing is not experienced because it is too subtle. It is realised through the appropriate causal factors just as air is through fanning.

The powers of speech resident in the breath and in the mind undergo transformation (into speech) at the centres of speech-production and assume the distinctions (of revealed speech).

The power which is based on words controls this universe. This universe which has a single Intelligence as its soul is perceived as manifold through the word as the eye.

Since, it is seen that distinctions between two things, for
instance, between a sadja and another musical note become clear when explained in words, therefore all manner of things are determined as being only (understood through) words

120 शब्दस्य परिणामोपमात्मायायविविधे बिहुः ।

शब्दोध्येन प्रथममेऽत्वदिव व्यबित्तत॥

120 Those who are versed in the Vedas know that this Universe is the transformation of speech. It was out of the Vedas that this universe was first evolved.

121 इतिकल्पितता लोकः सर्वाः शब्दव्याप्तया ।

या पूर्वविितस्तकारो बालोपि प्रतिपदयते॥

121 In this world the knowledge of the proper action (in a

61 Manuscript ग does not complete the karika and breaks off with the obviously wrong reading बलेिके (for बालोपि). After karika 120 the manuscript च gives as text four karikas which occur in Vrsabhadeva’s tīka under karika शब्दस्य परिणामोपम इत्यादि etc in Charudeva Sastri’s edition (क).

These karikas are the following —

1 विभज्य बहुचातमान सं छन्दस्य प्रजापति ।

छन्दोपयीप्रभावाभि बहुवृत्त विवेक ततू॥

2 साध्वी चामूर्यवार येषु पुरुषेऽव स्वस्वित ।

अधिक वर्तते वेषु पुरुषः रूपः प्रजापते॥

3 प्राणार्थ्य महज्जनत्सत्तमाश्रितम् सबूतम् ।

गरीरमेवे विदुषा स्त्वा योिनिषुपावानि॥

4 यदेतमप्रक भासक्तः धाम विविष्य राघस ।

तद्भवमितनमुष्य विदाया प्रविद्धयते॥

The karikas as given in the tīka have slightly different readings from the manuscript version. The differences are noted below —

karika 1: line 2 तत् instead of तत् ।

karika 2: साध्वीचामूर्यवारेषु पुरुषेऽव
context) entirely depends on speech. Even a boy has this knowledge of the proper action, having in him the accumulated experience of the past.

122 आदि करणविन्यास प्राणस्योध्र्वं समीरणम्।
स्थानानामसिधातः न चिना शब्दभावनात्॥

122 That first movement of the organs (of speech), the upward sending of the breath and its contact with the centres—these would not be possible but for verbal imagination (in the child).

123 न सोरस्तिः प्रत्ययो लोके व शब्दानुगमादुः॥
अनुविद्धसिव ज्ञान सर्वं शब्देन भासते॥

123 In this world no comprehension is possible except as accompanied by speech. All knowledge shines as permeated by speech.

124 वापूपता चेनुत्कामेदर्वोधस्य शाक्षीते॥
न प्रकाशं प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्ययमंत्रिनी॥

124 If it is denied that the permanent stuff of knowledge is speech, then that light (namely knowledge) will not shine (in the form of a recollection). It is speech (i.e., words) which makes recollection possible.

125 सा सर्वं विश्व। शिल्पाना कला चोपविधिनी॥
तेषुसांविभिषिन् तिन्वपति सर्वं वस्तु विभज्यते॥

125 It is speech which binds all branches of knowledge of arts and crafts. Everything when it is produced is classified through it.

126 तेषा सत्सारिणा सता बहिरन्त्रच वत्तेत्॥
तम्मत्रान्वीत्वल्कान् चेतन्य सर्वं जातिषु॥

126 This speech exists within and outside all living beings.
Consciousness can exist in all creatures only after it is preceded by speech.

127 अर्थकियासु वाक सर्वाल समोहयति देहिन ।
तुटुकातो विषज्ञो दृष्टये काठकुड़वत् ॥

It is speech which prompts all mankind to activity. When it is gone, man, dumb, looks like a log of wood or a piece of stone.

128 प्रविभागे यथा कर्ता तथा कायं प्रवत्तेते ।
अविभागे वश तथा सैव कार्यत्वेवावलिष्ठते ॥

It is when the distinctions (such as subject versus object) obtain, (i.e., in the state of wakefulness,) that the agent functions in connection with an object. But when such distinctions do not obtain (i.e., in the state of sleep,) speech itself remains in the form of an object.

129 स्वमात्रा परमात्रा वा शूल्या प्रकर्ष्यते यथा ।
तथेऽव एढ़नामेति तथा छायांना विधायते ॥

Whether things are (identified with) the self, or with the Supreme, they become established in the form in which they are introduced by words. It is words which establish things.

130 अत्यन्तमात्रामूले निमित्ते शूल्यपाश्यात् ।
वृहत्तेवेदचावजो वस्त्वाकारनिरूपणा ॥

Even when the cause for verbal expression (i.e., an object),

Karika 127 which follows is not given in the text in क. It is given in the commentary by Bhartrhari and some other texts give the karika in the commentary ग does not give the karika.

68 प्रविभागे—ग Obviously a wrong reading.

69 भौतिष्ठीयते—ग, घ

Charudeva Sastrī (क) rightly notes that the Vivaranagrantha shows that the reading घायो विधीयते is the author's reading. The Vivaranagrantha, in fact, says 'तथा छायां विधीयते.'
is entirely non-existent, description of the form of such a thing through words is found, as in the case of a circle made by a fire-brand.  

131 | अपि प्रयोक्तुरात्मान शब्दसंतरस्वस्थितम् ।
    | प्राहुर्महत्सुषभ येन सायुज्यसिद्धते ॥

131 Further, speech which exists within the speaker as his self is said to be the great Bull, identity with which is desired.

132 | तत्साध् शब्दसंतकार सा सिद्धि परसात्मन् ।
    | तत्स्य प्रवृत्तितत्त्वस्यहतःश्वास्थमतिमिद्यते ॥

132 Therefore, attainment of faultless speech is the attainment of Brahman. He who knows the secret of its functioning enjoys the immortal Brahman.

133 | न जातवकत्तै कं हिंच्छागम प्रतिपद्यते ।
    | बोज सर्वागमायायेत्रप्रेवातो व्यवसिता ॥

133 No one knows a collection of precepts which is of impersonal origin. When all such collections of precepts perish, the three Vedas alone exist as the root (of such collections).

134 | "अस्त याते पु वार्तेषु कल्पस्वविषेषं सत्सात् ।
    | श्रुतिसङ्कल्पित धर्म लोको न व्यवसिता ॥

134 Even when different schools (of Agamas) perish and there are no new authors, mankind does not transgress the duties prescribed by the scriptures and the books of precepts.

135 | सानेव स्वाभाविके नाथे "शास्त्रे कथचन विधते ।
    | धर्मं ज्ञातस्य हेतुवेतस्त्यामायो विनिवचनम् ॥

135 If knowledge were instinctive, then scripture is of no use.
but if virtue is the root of knowledge then the source of knowledge is the Vedas

136 (Regarding reasoning as a source of knowledge) — Reasoning which is not contradictory to the Vedas and the scriptures is an eye to those who do not possess the vision (into the significance of the Vedas) The sense of a Vedic sentence is not obtained from its form alone,

137 —for which reason, various kinds of the means of interpreting sentences have been classified by logic, such as, for instance the intended meaning of a sentence (is such and such), a statement is for a purpose different (from what is obvious) or, a meaning becomes clear from the evidence of another sentence

138 Human reasoning is the power of words. That reasoning is in accordance with the Word (i.e., the scriptures) which is not based on anything other than the scriptures

139 Just as different colours, etc., are found to possess (different and) fixed capacities, so are words (such as the words of a hymn) found (to possess capacity) in destroying poison etc
140 Just as these words have power to do that, so are they understood (as possessing capacity) in regard to virtuous conduct. Therefore correct words should be used by those desirous of elevation.

141 Men learn about matters which have transcendental effects from the Vedas. Contrary results also can always be stated from the scriptures.

142 This tradition of grammar has the knowledge of correctness as its subject. And it is directly based on the unbroken (series of) recollections of learned men.

143 It is the highest source of Speech, threefold as Vaikharī, Madhyamā and Pas’yantī and having various stages (through which it is realised).

144 It is seen as being constituted by two different features namely, the treatment (of words, etc.) in analytical terms or as integral units. The capacities of words are noticed by those wise in the attributes of objects.
The scripture is described as beginningless, authorless and endless. And the codes that have been composed by the wise do not perish.

Another view about the scripture and the codes is given.

In the scripture are the utterances, which are like dream-words, of those (i.e., the sages) who have evolved from the Integral (Brahman). And the codes have been composed (by their authors) after knowing the truth about existent things through the (appropriate) evidence.

Whatever impurity there exists, of the body, of the word and of the mind, their purification is effected through the sciences of physical treatment, grammar and spiritual welfare respectively.

That ungrammatical form (for instance, ‘goni’) which is employed to denote a particular object when (a correct form for instance) ‘gauh’ is required to be used, is considered as a corrupt form.

This karika is not given in manuscript. However, Bhartrhari notes this.

The reading ‘अय्यवचछत्रा’ given in the Benares edition is obviously a mistake. It should be अवयवचछत्रा as is given in the Charudeva Sastri’s edition and in all manuscripts.
149. Words like ‘asva’ and ‘goni’ are correct forms when used to denote other objects (i.e., objects other than a horse and a cow respectively). Correctness is everywhere determined on the basis of what meaning a word is to convey.

150. These (incorrect forms) which through inference cause the comprehension of the meaning of the correct forms, apparently identify themselves (with the correct forms) and convey their meaning.

151. Because these incorrect forms are understood neither by the learned nor by grammar as valid synonyms (of the correct forms), they are not capable of expressing the meaning directly.

152. When a boy who is being instructed indistinctly utters ‘ambā’ ‘ambā’, those who know the correct form understand it through the indistinct one.

89 तव तु-खः, ग
90 This karika is not given in manuscript ग
91 नुमन्यते—ग
92 य भ्राष्टे—क, ग
93 This karika is not found in manuscript ग
94 योज्यचाब—ख.
Similarly, the meaning covered by a correct form is conveyed by an incorrect form which is used where the correct one ought to be.

And where there are in current use, forms which have become current among corrupt speakers from generation to generation, in such cases, the correct form is not the one which conveys the meaning.

This divine Speech (Sanskrit) has been intermixed with incorrect forms by incompetent speakers. Those who hold the view that the word is non-eternal, (for instance the Naiyāyikas), hold a contrary view on this.

And even according to the view that there is no difference between correct and incorrect forms, (as held by the upholders of the doctrine of the non-eternal word) a word used with the intention of using some other word, does not convey the meaning of the latter.

End Canto I
Theorists hold different views as to what a sentence is. Thus a sentence is defined as (1) the verb (2) a close combination of words (3) the universal which resides in a close combination of words (4) an utterance which is one and devoid of parts (5) a sequence (of words) (6) the transformation of consciousness (7) the first word (8) all the component words severally and possessing expectancy for one another.

The definition of the sentence given in grammar (by the author of the Vārttika) to establish the dropping of accent, etc., as an entity whose parts possess mutual expectancy, is not parallel (to that given by the Mimāṃsakas) in all respects.
4 (The Mīmāṁsakas' definition of the sentence is incidentally given) —
A sentence is one which has its parts possessing mutual expectancy when they are considered separately, but not possessing expectancy for anything else (outside) when in combination, which has the verb as its principal element, and has qualifying words and one unified meaning.

5 Certain possible objections to the Vārttakārā's definition of the sentence are answered in 5 & 6) —
The word in the vocative (in a sentence) qualifies the verb, this being so, in the sentence 'vrajāṁ Devadatta' (Let me go, Devadatta), the vocative loses its accent.

6 Just as several infinitives can qualify a finite verb, similarly a finite verb (which, in such a case, is taken as a principal verb) can qualify another finite verb.

7 (The Akhandavādin's position that the sentence is an indivisible whole (definition 4 above) is stated and illustrated (7—12) —

104 This reading makes no sense. It may only be an error of the scribe for the reading however, is noted here since the good variant is given in this manuscript.
Just as an unified perception of a composite (picture) can be analysed (into the perception of the component parts), depending upon which part is required to be perceived, so likewise is the understanding of the meaning of the sentence.

8. चित्रस्वकर्प्पस्य यथा भेदनिबर्जने:।
    नीलाविभीषे: समाध्यानं जिथ्यते भिन्नलक्षणे:।

8. Just as a single homogeneous picture is described through various features as being blue (green, etc.) as a result of its being perceived in different ways,

9. तथे वेक्षयस्य वाक्यस्य निराकांक्षस्य सवैत्:।
    शब्दात्तरे: समाध्यानं "साकाक्षेरनुगम्यते।

9. —similarly the sentence which is single and does not possess expectancy is described in terms of words which possess mutual expectancy.

10. यथा पदे विभज्यते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादयः।
    अपोदातस्तता वाक्ये पदानामु"ं पदवर्ण्यते।

10. Just as roots and suffixes are analysed from a word, similarly words are analysed from sentences.

11. वर्णन्तरस्यापि च वर्णमहे वृत्त्यते।
    पदान्तरस्यापि पदभागां"ं अवस्थिता:।

11. Parts of some letters (like conjunct consonants) appear as separate letters (though, of course, it is well-known that it is artificial to look at them in that way); so do parts of the word appear as separate words (while in truth, they are not).
The words ‘vṛsabha’, ‘udaka’ and ‘yāvaka’ are composed of parts which do not possess any meaning (It should also be noted that the rule on the association and (absence of) dissociation (between the word on the one hand and the root and suffix on the other) is only for pragmatic purposes 38

(Just as sentences, words, etc., are indivisible so are their meanings) —

The Word has no parts, how then can its meaning have any parts? The ignorant person gets a different idea of its formation by splitting it into parts

Just as the idea of ‘Brāhmaṇa’ does not exist in the meaning of the word ‘Brāhmaṇakambalam’, similarly words like ‘Devadatta’ have no (independent) meaning in a sentence 39

(The Mimāmsaka’s definition of the sentence as a mere combination (samghātā) of words with mutual expectancy and syntactical relationship is criticised. This is the abhihitānvaya position) The word which possesses a general meaning disappears when uttered in a context, and therefore is not associated with a particular meaning (which the context demands). Why should the word which exists (namely, with a general meaning) be abandoned and how does a word thus abandoned continue to exist?
16. If the fact of words being a collection, and being in
syntactical relationship constitutes the sentence, then
logically it is not words, but their combinedness, and
syntactical relationship which convey meaning of the
sentence. This leads to wrong positions. If the meaning
of a sentence is not derived from the (component) words
then the meaning of the word (itself) cannot be (consi-
dered as) derived from them (i.e., the component sounds
in it). This being so, is not the word’s relation with its
meaning broken?

17. Definitions 7 and 8 of the sentence are stated. These
are held by the anvitābhidhāna school of Mīmāṃsakas.
According to the view of certain thinkers, words which
(at first sight) appear to be universals are revealed
to the listeners as being particulars because of their con-
nection with the other words in the sentence.

18a. According to their view, the total meaning of the sentence
exists in each of the individual words.

18b. (But) listeners get the meaning of the sentence through
the clear utterance of (all) the words in it.

19. The sentence and its meaning are again discussed from
the point of view of the Akhanda-school of Grammar.
This Speech is described as indistinct, sequential or as uttered in a low voice. The non-sequential appears as being stretched out (i.e., having sequence) when the mind dwells on it.

20 यथा""कामविशेषस्य कर्मभेदो न गृह्यते।  
आवृत्तिः व्यक्तिः जाति कर्मभिध्रं मणारिभिः।

20 (Definition 3 of the sentence is stated, that it is a universal, (Jātsphota). This position is also the doctrinal position of the Akhandavādi—grammarians) Just as (in an action of whirling round and round) the character of the action is not understood at each of the repeated revolutions, but the class of the action is revealed through the repetition of revolutions,

21 वर्णवाक्यपदेशेष्व तुल्योपन्यासम् श्रुतिः।  
अत्यत्तमेष्व तत्वस्य ""सहस्येव प्रतीतिः।

21—in the same way, in letters, words, and sentences the speech-sounds, being produced at the same centres as the Word-principle, appear to resemble it, although they are fundamentally different from it.

22 नित्येषु न कुत्त पूर्वं पर वा निर्माणतः।  
एकस्येव न सा शब्दित्यवस्मभासते।

22 (This Speech, in reality, is timeless) Now, in reality, can there be a preceding and subsequent part in timeless entities? This appearance (of sequence) is a result of the powers inherent in the integral entity itself.

23 चिर क्षिप्रमितिः ततो कालभेतादिते यथा।  
भिन्नकाले प्रकाशते स यथं हुस्तविध्यो।

23 Just as the cognitions ‘a long time’ and ‘a short time’ do not differ in time (because they are cognitions and not time-measures) and yet appear as if they have different durations of time, similar is the nature of the long and short (sounds).

114 यथोपन्यास—ध
115 सहस्येव—ध
24a (But, can one say that an indivisible entity becomes multiple on the basis of the media of its revelation? That would mean a change in its integrity. Yes.) — Does not time which is indivisible appear to be divided into periods by durations taken by other things (like an atom)?

24b (But such measuring of time on the basis of the behaviour of other things is not sound.) What sequence can there be in the absence of recurring periods?

25a The cognition arising from these (ie periods measured on the basis of the behaviour of other things) is one without parts.

25b It is due to the power inherent in it that sequence appears in it as if it has parts.

26a This is because it can be described in terms of sequence.

26b (This is wrong.) — Whatever be the seeds (of the behaviour of atoms, etc) laid in the mind, a description of it either as identified with

116 न नि— घ, ध।
117 एकासी भागवाजिता। घ। सा भागवाजिता। घ।
The sentence which is (really) indivisible becomes capable of division when it is (analytically) conceived and due to this the meaning which is, in fact, indivisible, is presented to the mind as if it consisted of parts.

If these words (which are abstracted by analysis) exist as real entities in a sentence and letters similarly exist in words then letters themselves should be capable of division, just as atoms are (according to some schools of thought divisible).

Since the identification of (self-sufficient) parts is not, any way, possible (in a letter) there would be neither letter nor (as a consequence) the word, (if we follow the position of the Pada-school) And when neither letter nor word can be established how can anything else (i.e. meaning) be conveyed?

(The definition of the sentence as a transformation of consciousness (def no 6) is stated) —

Others say that speech is that indivisible inner Word-principle revealed through speech-sounds, and thus too it possesses unity in the sentence.
31a According to them meaning is an inner principle which is revealed by means of pieces of (verbal) meaning.

31b Speech and meaning being the two halves of one fact, are not distinct and separable.

32 The power of being the revealer and the revealed, the cause and the effect, eternally belongs to the Word-principle which is essentially internal.

33 It (i.e. the time-less Word-principle) has in fact the two powers of having or not having (attributes like sequence), the appearance of sequence in the non-sequential being merely dependent on pragmatic considerations.

34 (The following arguments are given against the Pada-school) —Since (their) evidence for the existence of word-meaning (as a real unit in the meaning of the sentence) is its cognition, this will result in the meaninglessness of the preceding words in a collection of word-meanings (which is the meaning of the sentence, in this view), since the mind leaves (cognising them as it passes on to the meaning of subsequent words).

35a The form rāja conveys the meaning ‘king’ in different forms.

31a अर्थमाधिक्षरत तेषामान्तरस्य प्रकाशते ।
31ख एकस्वेतात्मनो भेदी शब्दायाँवपृथक्कृतयो ॥

32 प्रकाशकप्रकाशयत्व कार्यकारणस्या ।
अत्मानात्मानस्तस्य शब्दतस्वस्य सर्वंदा ॥

33 तस्येवास्तित्वनास्तित्वसामथेऽ समस्ततित्वाः ।
अक्षमेऽक्षमिर्मि व्यवहारिनिन्दने ॥

34 समस्ततथ्यप्राप्तात्वा हस्तांहस्तिनास्यालयपने ।
पदार्थायुतस्य त्यागावायेष्य प्रसावधते ॥

35 राजश्वेन्न राजायो भिन्नत्तो गमन्ते ।
35ख वृत्तायामात्सवृद्धं पदमनाथ्युज्यते ॥

35a The form rāja conveys the meaning ‘king’ in different forms.
35b And the same word ‘rāja’ occurring in a complex grammatical formation though similar to a verbal form is (nevertheless) employed in a different sense (from the verb).

36 Just as, when the word ‘asvakarna’ is uttered a certain definite meaning which has no reference to ‘as’vā’ (a horse) is conveyed (to the listener), the same is the case in all verbal cognitions.

37 (An objection against the akhanda-school) If the meanings of all compounds are realised as single units, does this not make the distinction between rūdhi and yaugika (etymologically explained) words superfluous? No) — In reckoning (the degree) of similarity (between a complex word-formation and the sentence analysing it) certain words, because of their transfer to another meaning in the sentence, are understood to be rūdhi—but only in grammar.

38a (Grammarians) propound means (for the understanding of language) which, once grasped, can be thrown overboard.

38b And there is nothing necessarily absolute in the methods (of grammatical analysis).

39a) The meaning is realised by a person in some manner

39b (Summing up) — Therefore (all meaning of) parts (of a sentence, like a word) are derived from the sentence, whether (such parts remain) as isolates or in combination.
40 When the unity between a sentence and its meaning is grasped by the mind—a unity expressible in the form 'this is that' then, in some places, a single letter of the sentence is sufficient to convey the meaning of the sentence.

41 (The concept of the meaning of the sentence according to the (samghāta) theory of the Abhihitānvantavyāvādi Māṁsakas is stated.)

Words, say some, when used in a sentence convey the same meanings as they convey as isolates. And the additional meaning which arises when they are in mutual relation, is described by them as the meaning of the sentence—a meaning which is dependent on several words.

42 (According to some in this school) the meaning of the sentence although it resides in several words reveals itself through the individual words (in turn), just as a class (reveals itself through the particulars). Others hold that it is realised in the totality of words just as numbers are.

43 (The Anvītabhidhāna position is stated) Others consider that it (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) is a unified whole in which all the parts are mutually compatible and that it partakes of the character of the meanings of the parts.
(47)

(ie., of the words) because of the association of the meaning of one part with that of another 48

45. भेदाभावाना ज्ञातसम्बन्ध या परिप्रेक्ष्यमानाना।
   अवज्ञानति समज्ञाता विशेषे विवेचनान्॥

45 As regards the uncertainty (as to the meaning of the sentence) while it is still requiring (other) parts for its completion, that is removed when the meaning is understood as localised in the individual parts thus revealing its nature of being a connected whole.

46. कार्यावलिकसम्बन्धे रूप तस्य न वृक्षते ॥
    असत्वभूतसम्बन्धत्वमपि श्रद्धान्ते॥

46 (The meaning of the sentence is thus nothing more than the inter-connection of word-meanings. And being a connection it is not perceptible, it has to be inferred.) The interconnection (of the parts) is inferrable from its effect (namely, the collection of words-meanings conveying a new sense). It has no form. Therefore it is known as being non-existent in the ultimate analysis 49

47 नियतं साधने साध्यं क्रिया नियतसाधनं।
     स सलिलदानार्थं नियम सत् ॥

47 (The same point is further explained.) The means being present, the effect is fixed, and a verbal action has a fixed means of accomplishment. Thus, the meaning of the sentence being something fixed reveals itself by the mere juxtaposition (of verb and object).

48. गुणाधिक्षेत साधनाम तत्र नाम प्रवर्तते।
    साध्यत्वमेव निमित्तवनि ॥

48 (But the expectancy resident in verbs and nouns is different from each other) —

The noun functions in this respect as possessing expectancy.

126 विचार—ष
127 समकालक—ष
128 —तादि—ष
for the verb in the form of a subsidiary and the verb possesses expectancy for its subsidiary (i.e., the noun) as a thing to be performed

49 सत्तएव विद्या ये पवांशयु व्यवस्थिता ।
तेन क्रीडादुगम्यते न वाक्यरहितायकम् ॥

49 (The sentence is a sequence of words, definition no 5) Those functional features which already exist in the meanings of the words (i.e., the features of being the subject, object, etc.) are conveyed (to the listener) by the sequence of words and there is nothing distinct as a sentence conveying them.

50कः शब्दानां क्रमसारे च नान्यः हिंदुस्तान तांक।
50ख क्रमोपिः धर्म कालस्य तेन वाक्य न विद्यते ॥

50a As long as there is some sequence of words there is no need for any other speech-entity to convey the meaning.
50b And sequence is an attribute of time and, therefore, there is no sentence.

51 ये व सम्भविहौ भेदा ॥ पवांशयविभाविता ।
तेन सत्तिदाने व्यवस्थिते न तु वर्णोऽव क्रम ॥

51 The functional features which are inherent in the meanings of words, but which are not manifest are revealed when the words are in each other's proximity. But the same is not the case with the sequence of letters (i.e., wordmeaning is not a revelation of meanings of letters).

52क वर्णां च पवानां च क्रमांतलिनिवेशिनी ।
पवांशयं वाक्यसः च ॥

52a 'Word' and 'sentence' are respectively the names given to the sequence which resides in letters and words.
52b (But) the status of a speech-entity (conveying a complete-meaning) is not given to them (i.e., to the letter and the word)

53 Even if they have thus equal status as non-speech-elements, understanding is seen to proceed from the word, and there is no such understanding at each separate letter. Hence they say that meaning belongs to the word.

54 (The three different definitions of the sentence just discussed are re-stated in the following three stanzas. First the samghātā-view is re-stated)—

55 (The sequence-view is re-stated)—

56 (The vākyā-sphota view is summarised)—
Whether we consider that the individual speech-unit (here a sentence) is imperishable or that there is a generic entity (which is common) to a group of particulars, it is the unitary sentence which is meaningful in an invariable manner.

57. अभेद्यार्थको नेवा किलिता वाक्यवाचिनि।
57a Those who consider the sentence as an indivisible unit consider (the recognition of) words (in it) as pragmatic and as subsequent to indivisibility (in the order of reality)
57b And those who take a word as a real entity consider the indivisible sentence as subsequent to words

58. पदप्रकृतिमाक्षरिः वृत्तिभेदते वर्णेत।
58a The definition of a connected discourse (given in the Rgveda prātisākhya) is explained in different ways
58b (They are) —
A connected discourse is the source of words or it is built up from words

59. पदान्तायनक्षरः यथात्व. सहिताया निर्विभेकः। नियत्सत्तश कथ कार्यं पद लक्षणविशेषान्त।
59 (The second view is criticised) If the Pada-text being other (than the Samhita) is the original of the Samhita and is itself not created, how is the Pada-text to be constructed according to rule? (how can that which is eternal be also constructed or created?)

60. प्रतिवर्णसमवेतः पदार्थप्रत्ययो यथाः। पदेष्टेवान्तीयः वाक्यार्थस्य निरूपणम्।
60 Just as one does not get the cognition of the meaning of the word at each one of its letters similarly the form of the meaning of the sentence is not realised at each of the words (taken individually)
61 (The Pada-school replies that letters are not after all meaningless) —

Just as the meaning of the sentence resides in words occurring side by side, similarly the meaning of the word exists in letters occurring side by side

62 Just as a small object is perceived when it is in the company of another object, similarly a letter too when it is united with another letter, conveys a meaning

63a Just as a certain meaning is understood (by the listener)

63b from the utterance of a word, similarly the same sense is understood (by the listener) from the presence of the letters

64 (Again, five difficulties arise if the pada-position that the meaning of a sentence is understood through the meanings of the component words is not accepted The first of which is discussed in 64-71) —

Since the scriptural hearing of that which is (already) implicitly legitimate is for the purpose of restriction, if the general is completely ruled out by this very different particular,
65. यज्ञेति यदा द्रव्य प्राप्त सामर्थ्यलक्षणम्।
ब्रह्मचर्या निवर्तेत न स्यात्प्रतिनिधिस्वतः॥
—and if a substance (in general) legitimate as being indicated by the implicit power of the verb ‘yajeta’ were to be ruled out by the word ‘vrīhi’, then no substitution would be possible.

66. तस्माद् ब्रीहित्वमणिक ब्रीहिशब्दः प्रकल्पयन्।
द्रव्यविविश्ववत्वात्प्राप्त्यर्थ सन् न बाधते॥
Therefore the word ‘vrīhi’, while prescribing rice in addition (to the general ‘sacrificial substance’ implied by the verb), being (simply) for the purpose of providing (the general concept with a particular meaning), does not prohibit substance (in general), since the two things are not mutually exclusive.

67. तेन चापि व्यविच्छिन्ने द्रव्यतः सहचारिणि।
असम्भवाहिष्ठोप्रणा तत्रात्येवात्मर्मणम्॥
And when (the concept of) substance (in general) which is part of (the verbal concept) is particularised by it (i.e., by the word ‘vrīhi’), there is then no appearance of other particulars, because of the impossibility (of two objects occupying the same logical space).

68. न च सामान्यबत्तुस्व किमाजासदें लक्षिताः।
विशेषा न हि सवेशा सता शब्दोपशिर्यः॥
The verb (like yajati—‘to sacrifice’) does not indicate every particular substance (with which the sacrifice can be performed) as it does the idea of substance in general. A word, of course, does not denote (at one and the same time) every existent (which can be named by it).

69. शुक्लाभ्यो गुणा सत्तो यथा तत्राविविहिता।
तथा स्विचारा भेदां द्रव्यतासहचारिणाः॥
Just as the qualities ‘white’ etc., though they are existents,
are not (immediately) intended to be conveyed (by the word ‘vṛṇhi’) so also all the various substances which are associated with the concept of substance are not intended in the context (by the verb ‘yājati’)

70 A substitute is enjoined in the absence (of the normal material) so that the performance of a compulsory ceremony, or of an optional ceremony already undertaken may not be cut short

71 (But substitution will be impossible if the position that the meaning of the sentence is an integral whole is accepted)
According to him who considers that the meaning of the sentence is an action (i.e., the meaning of the verb) qualified by (or accomplished through the nominal agents viz, instruments, etc.), it would be a different action if the material is absent and a substitute is employed

72 (Now the second of the five objections against the Akhanda-position is stated) —
When (in a sentence like ‘vanāt pika āniyatām’ in which there are familiar and unfamiliar words), the meaning of the familiar word (or words) is conveyed, the question ‘what is it’ is asked about words like ‘pika’ which are not familiar

73 (The third objection is stated) —
If a thing which could be understood by implication (from a statement) is, nevertheless, stated for the sake of clarity then such direct statement supersedes the authority of syntactical connection and evidence stated elsewhere.

74. अप्राप्तो यस्तु शुक्लादे सम्भवानेत गम्यते ।
    स यत्नप्राप्तितो वाक्येऽयुतिविलक्षणं ॥
(As for the difference between direct statement and syntactical connection) when ideas like ‘whiteness’ are conveyed not directly (from a direct statement), but from the proximity (of the relevant word to other words in a sentence), such conveying of the idea through a syntactical connection is of a different nature from its being conveyed through a direct statement ॥

75. अभिन्नमेव वाक्यं तु यथासिद्धांश्चित्यते ।
    ततस्मात् युद्धामहत्कान्त यथावं विरोध्यते ॥
If it is considered that a sentence is an indivisible whole conveying an indivisible meaning then since all (relations) are from a direct statement, there is no (question of any) conflict (of syntactical connection or anything else) with direct statement ॥

76. वाक्यायात् समुदायस्थवर्तमान अनेकार्यप्रसिद्धव ।
    साक्षाद्यथविवस्त्त वाक्यायाः घोषिनः न विद्यते ॥
(The next objection against the Akhanda-position is stated —)
Where we have a group of clauses (as in a mahāvākyā, i.e., a complex or compound sentence) all intended to build up one principal idea and having expectancy for one another, then there would not be any meaning for the component parts (if the Akhanda-position of the indivisible sentence conveying the indivisible meaning is accepted)
(55)

77 A fifth objection is raised against the Akhaṇḍa-position. The acceptance of the position will lead to the meaningless of the rules employed in interpreting Vedic texts in order to decide such questions as the sequence of sacrifices, the relation of subsidiary and principal actions and so on (77-87)—

This (action) should be performed as an incidental one, while this (other) should be performed according to the principle of tantra (i.e., different forms being contained in a single form), (again) this action should be performed (by several persons) using the same means one after another, and this (other) action should be performed, each person using a separate means, there is (the operation of) sublation and combination in this place.

78 A substitution is valid here, and here the connection of the word (is carried on from one sentence to another), a transference of the general attributes of an object is indicated here, and (in this other place) some special attributes are transferred (from one object to another).

79 Here (a person’s) need to do an action (is shown) and (in this other place) his competence (is indicated), in this third sentence, the object of the two (i.e., of the person’s need and his competence) is the same,
he (who performs the sacrifice mentioned here) has scriptural authority to do so, he has not the authority to perform (that) other action.

80. इन्द्र शुल्या क्रमप्राप्तियमुच्चारणादिभि ॥
    क्रमोयमत्र बलवानस्मस्तु न विवश्चित. ॥

80 The sequence here is fixed by direct statement, and in this, the sequence is fixed on the basis of pronunciation, the sequence, here, is powerful and no sequence is intended in this (other one).

81. इदं पराग्रहसङ्केर्षकार्याद्यकरणस्तथायमः
    प्रयोजकमिव तेषामेऽव नान्तरीयाययमः ॥

81 This non-operative one among the accessories is connected (to the principal) through the other (operative) accessories, among them (i.e., the accessories), this is the one which effects the action and thus (other) is incidental.

82. इदं प्रधान शेषोऽय विनियोग्रक्षमस्तथायमः
    साधारणाविपकारीविभिन्नार्द्धशेषकरणमः ॥

82 (Among the actions) this one is principal and this is subsidiary, and this is the order of performance of the two (actions). This means serves the action directly and this other indirectly.

83. शाक्तिव्यापारभेदोऽभिमन्नलमत्र तु सि विद्वते
    सम्बन्धः इयात्भेदोर्ज्ज्ञात्वेदः भेदोक्तविवश्चिति ॥

83 The things mentioned here have different potentialities and functions, and the results (of the action mentioned here) vary, thus (particular) object has changed due to its association (with something else), no distinction is intended in that (other) place.
84. (Further, besides these rules of interpretation, there are also others which will be nullified by the Grammarian's position (84-86). They are —This is the negation of a possible case, and this (other) is a prohibition of a particular thing without enjoining an alternative, this word has a secondary meaning and this other, a primary meaning, the scope of the meaning of the word here is wide, the method employed here is a complex one, in this other place a simple method is employed.

85. "There is a divided relation of whole and parts in this sentence and an option of different things (in this other context), a restriction is enjoined here, and here the appropriateness of another thing is stated.

86. The specification of this thing is inferred from the evidence of another sentence, the meaning of this word is obtained by analysis, after the word itself is detached from (the context of) its usage.

87. The above-mentioned methods of exposition in sentences based on the meaning of words would not have been considered if a word were not a meaning-expressing agent.

88. (The criticisms of the Padavādin are now answered) — The objections raised (by the Padavādin) do not con-
tradict (our position) because (we concede that) the meaning of the sentence which is an undivided whole lends itself to division along the (lines of) the included clauses on the basis of its different aspects.

89 यथेवेकस्य गण्धस्य भेदेन परिकल्पना ।
पुष्पाविषु तथा वाक्येष्वर्यम्भेदोजिन्यते॥
89 Just as a single composite scent is analysed into (the component elements such as) the smell of flowers, etc in the same way are different meanings (as meanings of clauses, phrases and words) pointed out in the sentence.

90 गच्छे नरसिंहे वाप्येकमानावते॥ यथा ।
भाग ज्यात्यन्तरस्येव सहृदयं प्रतिपद्यते॥
90 (The objection regarding words like ‘pika’ is answered) — Just as in a Bos gavaeus or a man-lion which is the object of an integral cognition, a part of it assumes resemblance with another species.

91 अप्रसिद्धः तु यथभागभृत्तमनुष्यति ।
तात्वकस्यांस्विव मूढः सम्बन्धं प्रतिपद्यते॥
91 —and when an ignorant person perceives that certain parts (of the Bos gavaeus etc) have not been seen by him before and are unknown to him, he is (really) having an absence of understanding of the whole.

92 तथा पिकाबिरोग्यकाव्येवत्तविद्वशेषः ।
सहृदयेव सजान्तलो श्वेष्य सम्बन्धे॥
92 Similarly, when, by the use of words like ‘pika’ the sentence has become totally different, (the ignorant person) imagines to see in it something which resembles a meaning which (in fact) does not exist there.

93 एकस्य भागे साधुः भागे भेदयच लक्ष्यते ।
निर्माणस्य प्रकाशस्य निर्माणेनैव चैतन्या॥
93 Just as light and the mind which are both integral and
partless are found to be similar to each other in certain respects, and dissimilar in other respects,

94. तत्वेऽ भागे सांवृज्ज्य भागे भेदोऽवस्यस्यते ।
    भागाभागे वाक्यात्मकत्व भिन्नव्यवस्थाम्॥

—similarly sentences which (in reality) are integral wholes are imagined to be similar to each other in certain parts and dissimilar from each other in certain other parts

95. रूपनाशे पदाना स्या कथय चाविधकल्पना ।
    अगृहीतावधां शब्दे कथमर्थं विविधते ॥

(The Akhandavadin now criticises the Padavadin) — When the forms of words are impaired (in junctions) how can the boundaries of the word be determined? And without determining the boundaries of the word how can its meaning be identified?

96. ससर्गं ह्व रूपणा शङ्केन्द्रयः व्यवस्थित ।
    नानास्पेषु तद्यु पालन्यात्वरस्मिधते ॥

(The objection based on sentences like ‘śveto dhāvati’ is answered) — Another school (i.e., another section of the Akhand school) holds the view that in a form (like sveto), there is the conjunction, so to speak, of several forms and that the one form (rather than the other) is preferred among the various possible forms on the basis of tantra (i.e., different forms being contained in a combined form)

97. तत्सिद्धग्रहेदेनेवञ्जाना ससर्गं ह्वः वर्तते ।
    हृष्य हृपान्तरतत्त्वामात्यत्यत्त्वाभिभैरते ॥

There is, so to speak, in the one undifferentiated form the coalescence of different words, and hence the one required form though outwardly identical (with others) can be distinguished (by contextual factors)
(The following few stanzas discuss incidentally, the problem whether a meaning and that which conveys the meaning are identical or different) —

In one grammatical statement the view is held that there is identity between that which expresses a meaning, and the meaning expressed, while in some other places it is stated that there is no such identity.

Thus by the use of the identity-principle the sound ‘ū’ is used to indicate the three kinds of u-sounds, the short, the long and the prolated.

In symbolising lrn and lrt (by the sound lr) there is a difference (in numbers) assumed between the symbolised (and the symbol).

The form ‘yasya’ which is (genitive of yam-combined form of ‘a’ and ‘i’) expresses those symbolised by it (namely, the vowels ‘a’ and ‘i’ short or long). No understanding of a thing is possible as conveyed by something which is itself ‘a symbolised’.

This sound ‘ū’ (prolated) which is non-different from the sounds of which it is the symbol, is also the basis of the different sentences (into which the original sutra is analysed). It is understood in two ways just as a pararūpa is in regard to two meanings.
(61)

102. प्रत्ययाद्विवृद्धि च समाहारमचोस्थया ।
व्युत्स्यता पुनर्भेद शब्दव्यवस्थमार्थित ॥

102 (The view held by Kātyāyana the author of the Vārttika —
He (i.e., the author of the Vārttika), who rules that
(1) the component parts of a prolated diphthong are
themselves not prolated and (2) that a conjunction of
vowels (with udātta and anudātta tones) is not a svarita-
vowel, has (thus) adopted the position that there is an
ultimate distinction among speech-sounds (i.e., that for
instance, there is no numerical parity between the com-
ponent-elements in the word ‘sveto’ on the one hand
and the word itself in the sentence ‘sveto dhāvat’)

103. अवर्तचर्यायु शब्देऽऽुपभेदः कमाद्यम ।
तत्तत्तत्त्वेशब्दत्रे भिन्नतत्त्त्वम शून्यरूपम ॥

103 Just as in words like ‘ardharca’, a form is (assumed by the
component elements) different (from their forms while in
the analysed sentence), due to the difference in their
sequence (of occurrence), so likewise, even when a word
remains the same, there is the (discriminative) hearing of
different words from it

104. सहितविशेषः चरण स्वह्येपाविकारिण ।
शब्दान्तरत्ब यात्तीव शस्त्रयतरपरिवाहलु ॥

104 Letters which themselves are unchanging appear to be-
come different ones when in combination because they
assume different capacities

105. इद्धियाद्विविकारण दंष्ट प्राध्यूष वस्तुषु ।
आत्मत्यागार्ते भिन्न प्रहः स श्रोतिः ॥

105 It is observed about objects that, without their giving up
their real nature, they are perceived as different due to
changes in the perceiving sense organs (and other factors
like the angle of vision) The same is the case with heard
sounds (i.e., the same sound is heard in different forms in
combinations and the like)

105 —षया व—व
106. अभिधानकिया" भेदाभासविबिक्तेऽनि ।
रूपस्थित्वंतभेदेन तद्वैकं प्रकाशते ॥

106 (When words are uttered in combination) even though they remain intrinsically unchanged, a form will be heard at the very same time, as absolutely different due to the changed manner of pronunciation.

107 ऋचो वा गीतिमात्र वा साम प्रक्षान्तर न तु ।
"भोगिते भेदाभासितानि ता एव विकुटाः ऋचः ॥

107 (How does this apply to the Vedas?) —
The Sāma-verse are either only the Rk-verses or only the music. It is not a different entity altogether. And the same Rk-verses are heard as altered, due to the difference through the music.

108. उपयाच्छु तिस्माते भिन्नात्मकशष्टिगणाम् ।
तत्रजीविचारणे तेषा शास्त्रे साधुवे भिन्नतिःभिध्यते ॥

108 When there are forms which are different among themselves, but have one of them capable of including the others, the texts concede that they are valid in that manner of combined utterance.

109 परिले"भव शृङ्ख चैंक "रूपं" भेदवतामपि ।
तत्रजीविचारण काययक्यथा ते न साधव ॥

109 (Therefore in a situation of this kind) words, even though they are different from each other should be uttered with a common form of utterance. If used otherwise they are not valid.
110. Sentences which are similar to each other get a common valid form which is prescribed by the texts, when they are uttered with a common form of utterance.

111. Just as one (wind) takes various forms depending on how it is received (i.e., by a flute or by other musical instrument, similarly in the present instance various forms can take a common form.

112. (The Pada-school’s objections regarding subsidiary clauses (stanza 76) is answered) — Again, clauses do exist and they can be compared to words, at the same time they will have independent meanings, if there were not another sentence (of which they form parts).

113. (In this connection the Mimamsaka view that “purpose” is the significance of a sentence is criticised with special reference to the problem of the subsidiary clauses) — He who holds that meaning belongs to the word and that the significance of the sentence is its purpose cannot consistently admit any kind of relation between subsidiary clauses.

114. (This argument is refuted and possibility of recognising...
subsidiary clauses is discussed from the angle of the Anvīta-bhidhāna view of the Mīmāṃsakas) —
It is the verbs (in the subsidiary clauses) which expect each other. Therefore a mutual relation is seen (among them), as based on the verbs

115 (An objection about the Anvītabhidhāna view is answered in this connection) — Repetition (of the meaning of the sentence conveyed by the first word, in subsequent words), is a repetition for the sake of defining the meanings of the (individual) words. The meaning of the sentence which is completed in the individual words (thus) resides in the collection

116a Even though the meaning of the sentence did not vary, various different views, as discussed in this section, were held on it by the ancient teachers, depending on their (various) conceptions

117 (The Akhadha-position on the meaning of the sentence is stated) — Others held that the total utterance caused instantaneous mental conception as a result of practice just as in the matter of conveying a meaning to children or animals
118. Some consider this practice to be a convention which has existed from times immemorial and it imparts the knowledge of the kind "after this, this should be done"

119. (Granting the Khandavādin's position that the meaning of the sentence is built up by the meaning of words, different views are now given on what word-meaning is, and how it is conveyed) "Words all have a (general) meaning"—such a definition of the meaning of the word has been put forth by some, as being applicable as much to words like "gauh" as to words like "apūrvam" "devatā" and "svargah"

120. What understanding of the form of an object is obtained through the use of a word, through seeing the object and through repeating the act of connecting the two, that is due to these other efforts, it does not pertain exactly to the field of the function of the word

121. (Another view about the denotation of words is stated) — Some differentiating features (of the object like the universal residing in it) are conveyed by the word as its signification, while some others which are incidental are (also) taken to be the meaning of the word
122. जातिप्रत्ययोऽशब्दे या व्यक्तिरनुष्णिणी।
न तान् व्यक्तिगतान् भेदान् जातिशाब्दोऽवलम्बते॥

122 (This view is criticised) —
When the idea of an individual attaches itself to the word whose meaning is the universal, that class-word does not denote the particular features of the individual.

123 घटावोऽन चाकारान् प्रत्यायति वाचक।
बस्तुप्रभुत्वनिबिन्दूर्त्तित्वात् निर्तित्वातंत्रीयको॥

123 The word does not denote the shape (and such other attributes) of objects like pots, because words denote only the mere object (divested of its attributes) The attributes are conveyed incidentally.

124 क्रिया विना प्रयोगेण न दृष्टा शब्दचौद्रिता।
प्रयोगस्वलङ्कवाविश शब्दामेति मन्यते॥

124 (An example of the incidental expression of an idea by a word is given) —
An action enjoined by a word (i.e., by a verb) is never seen except as accompanied by those which bring it into being (like agent, instrument, etc) The idea of this relation of the action with agent, etc., is an incidental meaning of the word (while the action itself is its meaning).

125 नियतास्तु प्रयोगा ये नियत वच्च साधनम्।
तेषा शब्दाभिमित्तव्यवहारपरेतनुस्मरन्ते॥

125 (Still another view about the denotation of a word is stated) —
Whatever relations (of the verb with agent etc.) are constant, and whatever instruments (agent, etc.) are constant, they form part of the (directly conveyed) meaning of the word according to others.

126क. समुदायोऽवतिैःथेयः स्पष्टविकल्पस्मृत्व्यच।
126ख. असत्येण वाच्याय सत्यः शब्दाय प्रकटितविष्णु॥

126a (A fourth view is stated) —

127 योद्धाशृंगो वाच्याबिष्ट॥
The word denotes the totality of the attributes of the object (and it denotes it) neither as members one after the other nor as an addition.

126b (A fifth view is given) —
Some think that a word denotes an association (of the object with the universal, etc) — an association which is unreal.

127a (The sixth view) —
Or Reality revealed through (the flux of) the Unreal is what the word denotes.

127b (The seventh view) —
Or the word (falsely) assumes the character of being produced and becomes (its own) meaning.

128 When a word has its form identified with its meaning in the manner which can be described as ‘this (i.e., the word) is that’ (i.e., the meaning), then the word is considered as ‘produced’.

129 Although (in theory) the identity of a word and the thing denoted by it is invariable, in some places (both in ordinary and textual usage) one of them does stand out as prominent.

130a (In life the thing denoted is more prominent) —
130a In life the word functions by becoming identified with the thing denoted by it.

130b In grammar words are studied as divided into both kinds (namely those which convey an external object as their meaning, and those which convey their own form as meaning).

131 (The eighth and the ninth views regarding what a word denotes) —
Something (for instance, an action) which might be looked upon either as having powers of all kinds or as having no power of any kind, is so described (as an action etc.) invariably through words.

132 (The tenth view) —
A conception formed about an external object is (erroneously) understood to be the object and considered as the connotation of the word by some people.

133 (The eleventh view) —
Some words present meaning as comprising the (detailed) appearance (of the objects) and as producing their vivid recollection, Others, present it as a mere indefinite idea.
134. यथेन्द्रियं सन्तप्ततः चित्तेऽस्त्रोतरं दश्यक्षरम्।
तथेष शब्दार्थं प्रतिपत्तिरनेकंध।
134 (The twelfth view) —
Just as a defective sense-organ reveals an object in an unusual form, similarly meaning is understood from words in various different forms.

135 वेदान्तयथेव प्रक्तातो मिलेषु प्रतिपत्तूषु।
स्वप्रत्ययानुकारेण शब्दार्थं प्रविष्टयते।
135 (Thus) a word-meaning intended in a certain way by a speaker takes different shapes in different hearers depending upon the comprehension of each.

136 एकस्मिन श्लोकं वृद्धे ज्ञेयं विभिन्नं भिक्षु।
कालात्तः श्लोकं वै कोटिपि त प्रयत्नक्याः स गुन:।
136 Although the same object is perceived, its perception varies (from person to person.) Again, even the same person perceives the same object in a different form on another occasion.

137 एक्षयापि च शब्दस्य नित्यसक्तिर्विस्तादम्।
एकं बहुभिवच्चायों बहुं परिवध्यते।
137 The same person (at different times), and different persons, understand the meaning of the same word in different forms due to the changing conditions of understanding.

138 तत्साधिकृष्टतत्त्वानां सापरां बहुचछलम्।
दश्यं वचनं ‘चापि नित्यवेवाँ नवबिश्यन्तम्।
138 Therefore, both the comprehension and report of people who have not seen the truth (about things) are defective, unreliable and perpetually inconsistent.
139. (Nor can we stabilise meaning and usage on the basis of the vision of sages) —
That vision of the sages which is based on Reality cannot be put to ordinary use, their vision is not linked with words.

140. (Nor can any reliance be placed on the perceptions of people) —
The sky is seen as a surface, and the glow-worm seen as a (spark of) fire, but there is no surface in the sky nor any fire in the glow-worm.

141. Therefore a wise man should see through (the eye of) logic even a thing which he perceives with his eye. Let him not determine a thing on the evidence of his (physical) perception.

142. When pragmatic people give pragmatic descriptions of things whose essential nature is beyond words, the wise man does not take them (as statements of reality).

143. The meaning of the sentence as a flash of insight (pratibhā) is described —
When the word-meanings in a sentence are detached (from out of the sentence) and (thus) understood, a different flash of insight is produced (out of it). That (flash of insight) presented by the word-meanings is described as the meaning of the sentence.

It is by no means describable to others in such terms as “it is like this.” Having been formed from the function of one’s inner self, its nature is not known even to the person.

It effects the fusion of the (individual) word-meanings, without itself being logically thought out, and it is comprehended as seemingly taking the form of the collection (of the word-meanings).

In the matter of the knowledge of what to do, no one trangresses it (i.e., this flash of insight) which is either produced directly from speech or is a result of recollection.

The whole world looks upon it as authority (for their conduct). Even in animals the knowledge of the beginning of behaviour dawns by virtue of it.
148. यथा दश्यविशेषाणं परिपक्वरूपान्तः ।
मल्लविद्याक्षयेऽवृष्टा प्रतिभास्तहतां तथा ॥

149. Just as qualities like softness are seen to belong to particular objects without further effort by virtue of their ripeness alone, so is the flash of insight in those who possess it.

149. तर्कत्वं विकुर्दते मध्यो पुष्कोकलस्य क ।
जन्तुवाद्य कुलायादिकरणं केवलो शिक्षिता: ॥

149. Who alters the note of the cuckoo in the spring? By whom are creatures taught to make nests and so on?

150. आहा, योविभिषेकानां विद्याक्षयात् ।
जन्तुवाद्यमस्त्रातु प्रमोक्ता सूक्ष्मपद्धिनाम् ॥

150. Who directs animals and birds in functions like eating, loving, hating and leaping which are well known to each species or family?

151. भाववानुगताः वेतवागमातेव ज्ञयते ।
असततिविश्वस्यायामानसमु विशिष्यते ॥

151. And this (flash of insight) arises from precepts accompanied by recollection. The precept is qualified by either proximity or distance. (That is, it may be of the near past, or of ancient times)

152. तर्कत्वं विद्याक्षयं ज्ञयते चैति प्रतिभा घटितविविधु: ॥

152. That flash of insight is considered to be of six kinds, as obtained (1) by nature (2) by action (3) by practice (4) by meditation (5) by invisible causes and (6) as handed down by the wise.

153. यथा समयगिनि इत्यद: लक्षितेऽवि प्रयुक्तोते ।
गोविषम्बो न त्वस्तु तेषा विशेषाणं प्रकाशकः ॥

153. (A discussion of the division of words as primary and

\[\text{193} \quad \text{शिक्षिता कथम्—च}
\[\text{194} \quad \text{—गमाति—च}\]
secondary depending on the meaning conveyed is given. Just as the word "gauh" is applied to an object which is in conjunction with and recognisable by, (other) material things, but the word (itself) does not denote those (material things) which (so) qualify (the object).  

154. आकारवर्णविवेर्ती सत्तुष्टेऽर्वा गवाविर्तु।
शब्द प्रवर्त्तान्तरोपषेपं न तान्त्रिकरूपम्।

154. (Similarly) although a word functions as denoting an object, which is associated with shape, colour and parts, it does not denote these (as part of its meaning).

155. सर्वाकारवर्णविवेर्ती वद्य भ्राज्यते।
शब्दे न तस्यायवे प्रवृत्तिर्पल्लभम्।

155. (However), words (signifying colour, etc.) employed to refer to an object qualified by shape, colour and parts, do not denote those (qualifying) constituents alone.

156. वुर्लभ कत्याचिलोके साराविवेर्तनम्।
केवलित्तेर्वदृश्येऽद्य तुष्णोद्वभायते।

156. The perception of all parts of any object is rare in this world, from some perceived parts, the whole is inferred.

157. "यथा जात्रुत्पत्तिविवा गवेन सहचारीनाम्।
नित्यसमबन्धिता बृहत्य गुणानमवार्याम्।

157. —just as we see that through the instrumentality of the scent of a jasmine, or of a lotus flower, the accompanying qualities (of shape, colour, etc.), which are invariably associated with the scent, are also apprehended.

158. सर्वाकारवर्णसंस्थानिरपेक्ष प्रवर्तते।
बिन्दुः च समुद्धाये च वाचक सहिलाविर्तु।

158. The word ("water") functions as denoting water—whether it is a drop or a mass—without reference to attributes, number, quantity and location.
159. But words which function as denoting oil, etc., which are delimited by (attributes like) refinement, denote quantities of it and such words do in fact function in relation to parts

160. A word withdraws from functioning when separated from that meaning linked to which it has been used

161. Whatever non-permanent distinctions a word might be used to imply (in the object it denotes) the word does not necessarily require their presence for its operation

162. Just as the word “gauh” is seen (functioning) even in the absence of horn, hoof, etc., (in the animal it is used for), it does not likewise, function dissociated from the universal

163. Therefore while there may be comprehension of the non-permanent things from the word, the thing which is never seen in separation (from the object) is the one connected with it (i.e., the word)
164a (The place of root and suffix in the scheme of the meaning of the word is now discussed according to various views held on it) —
  "The suffixes denoting duality and the like can be expressive or illuminating"
164b "Or perhaps the aggregate of (root and suffix) denotes an object with its number, etc"

165 "Or words like "gauh" convey through a change in their forms a meaning which contains the idea of number, etc, without (actually) mentioning them"

166 The meanings of those words which have a permanent connection (with their meaning) and the powers of which become clear when analysed, are analysed (into root-meaning and suffix-meaning) through (the test) of association and absence of dissociation

167 Where they (i.e. association and absence of dissociation) can be established without exception, (there alone) it is obligatory (that the root and suffix are significant elements), but there is no such rule about "nut" "sap", etc

168 Where such exists (i.e the root and the suffix having distinct meanings), the implication of one meaning (by the other) is not conceived. The powers of word-elements
root and suffix) raise expectancy (for each other)

when in combination

169 न कृप्यावणामन्योत्धेत् 
अतो वर्त्तवाचित्वं सधारस्येत् गम्यते ॥

169 The words “kūpa”, “sūpa” and “yūpa” have no parallelism of meaning, therefore the capacity for expressing another idea belongs to the combination of letters

170 अव्यायानाति भिन्नते शब्दयुतिक्रियां । 
बहुता सम्भवे वर्त्तनां निमित्त विच्छेदते ॥

170 Etymological explanations of words vary, where more than one meaning is possible a derivation is stated (for each meaning)

171 वेदवालिष्ठगिरिशास्त्रस्य व्याकरणाकायः । 
कृतिक्षकवदश्यायः निमित्ताविवर्णकः ॥

171 Words like “vairā”, “vāsistha, “gīra’sa” and similarly “ekāgārākā” and others are explained by various people in various ways through a variety of derivations

172 यथा पथः समाक्ष्यान्वस्थामेवकर्षते । 
अवविश्व गवास्चिन्नेव सहचारिभिः ॥

172 Just as the description of a path is possible through a tree, an anthill or a mountain, explanation of a word through different concomitant features is not impossible

173 अन्यायच समावक्ष्यात्मकेष्वाभिष्म ॥

173 (The basis of employing a word to denote an object is discussed) —

Descriptions of objects like a kimsuka tree are made in different forms by those who can see them in different conditions and based on the partial understanding (of them)
(Similarly) different derivations of the word ‘gauh’ from ‘girati’ (to swallow), ‘garjati’ (to loar), ‘gama’ (to go), ‘guvati’ (to void by stool) or ‘gadati’ (to speak articulately) have been given by different interpreters.

Another view on the basis of the function of a word is given. "Or the word ‘gauh’ denotes the meaning ‘cow’, by virtue of its form ‘gauh’ Not all words are etymologically derived.

Both (i.e., the form of the word and features of the object it denotes) are so considered (i.e., as the basis of the operation of the word) by some.

In grammar (different) forms are indicated by a common form for the sake of brevity. The particular ones are indicators of this (common form) as if it were another universal.

When a word denotes another meaning it is a different word altogether, where a form is fixed to one meaning by convention, the same form does not get linked with another meaning.

The two roots “yj” and “yaj” different from each other and established as functioning in different settings are
treated in different ways by different teachers. Indeed the treatment (of things) is found in different ways.

179 In this way treat the word “bālavāya” as identical (‘with vidūra’) in the same way as the word “jitvari” is. There is no (mutual) contradiction in approaching words as different (from) or as identical with each other.

180 In grammar roots and prefixes are assumed to be different for the sake of establishing at, etc., but their combination is (really) the root.

181 Thus the injunction (of the operation of at) is made from the form ‘samgrāmayati’. Verbs are introduced in these ways (i.e. both in combination with and separation from prefixes).

182a Because of this the grammatical operations involving roots and prefixes are considered to be internal.

182b It is the root in that form (i.e. in combination with a prefix) which is related to the nominal cases.
An objection is raised against this view. — When they (i.e., the roots) are to be employed, their meaning (i.e., the action symbolised) which is to be qualified is first accomplished before (it is so qualified), an action is not accomplished before its connection with the accomplishing means (i.e., agent, instrument, etc.)

(But), just as through an anticipated association of the root with the accomplishing means, it is (admitted to be) a root and a verb, so let the other also be (i.e., so let it be considered as being with a prefix).

Just as the red-dye-juice, etc., which are associated (with a tree) in its stage as a seed serves the fruit through its change of colour and the like,

— similarly, the modification (of an action by a prefix) which is made to exist as an internal feature between the root and the prefix by virtue of their mutual relation which exists conceptually, becomes manifest at the time of the formation of the word (by their combination).
187 (The nature and function of prefixes are discussed.) — In some places possible modifications (of the actions) not denoted by the verbs without the prefixes are revealed through their association with the prefixes like “pra” and “parā”.

188 Sometimes a prefix expresses the particular features (of the action) as its (prefix’s) own meaning or it might illuminate those features which potentially exist (in the actions themselves). Or again it is used as a co-worker of the root for bringing out its powers.

189 Those features as “going” etc., which are not understood as existing in the uncompounded roots like “stha” are conveyed by (the prefixes) “pra” and the like through two forms of inference.

190 When the prefixes “adhā” and “parī” are not used, a root denotes a certain other action (different from that which it conveys when compounded with a prefix). This root (by itself) does not convey the uncompounded meaning just as the prefixes by themselves are (meaningless).
Similarly some suffixes of the svaithika type (like ‘kan’) existing in combination with other elements and coalescing with these same elements which (themselves) do not convey a meaning, function as repeating the meaning of the (same) bases

(Conjunctions are now discussed) — Some particles illumine (meaning), (others) express meaning (of their own) independently, some like grammatical augments, convey the meaning while in union (with the words which govern them)

Whether they are used before or after or in different meanings, their being illuminators (of meaning) does not alter

Particles, like ‘ca’ although they are words, are not used by themselves, (just as) a suffix is not used by itself, although it expresses meaning

And although they refer to something aggregated there is no separateness (between them and the aggregate which
would necessitate the use of a genitive case in the context) 67

195b A particle denotes a thing which does not exist as well as something which exists, as its meaning, just as an action is also denoted by something different (i.e. by a noun besides by the verb itself) 68

196 In the case of attributives they are connected with the words (which they qualify and) which convey particular meanings, ‘ca’ and the like, on the other hand, are for the sake of others, even when they convey the idea of the combined

197 (After thus discussing nouns, verbs, prefixes and particles, a discussion on karmapravacaniyas starts with this stanza Karmapravacanīya is a term for certain prepositions or particles not connected with a verb but generally governing a noun (either separated from it or forming a compound with it) Certain verbs withdraw after generating (a relationship between nouns) and thus becoming the substratum of the relation. In some places, such relationship comes into being with the verb itself heard 68a

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223a The reading in the Benares text is किया कार्तिक सम्बन्ध बनिकरते This is not right. Pūṇyārāja interprets the text as follows: तत्र क्वचित् सम्बन्ध जनमित्वा किया बनिकरते यथा राज्युरुप इति. अत हि राज्य पुष्पोऽयस्मात् स राजा पुष्प विभाजित, अत बरणपद्धता किया आश्वयत्वयायाविविधक्षण सम्बन्ध जननित्वा निवृत्ता I have therefore accepted the reading given in the footnote in the Benares text with a modification. The footnote reading as given in the Benares text is किया कार्तिक सम्बन्धिते—
198 (A point about the prescription of the genitive case in the expression "mātuh smaranam" is discussed) —
There, the genitive is especially enjoined in order to prevent a compound (from being employed), and the contrary example of an instrumental is given in order that it might be seen (that the word 'gunāh' is an instrumental and not an accusative) 68b

199 (It was stated in 197 that sometimes a verb, after effecting a relation between nouns ceases to exist in the context. This stanza continues that statement) —
And when the relation has come into being and the verb has withdrawn, the Karmapravacaniya establishes the relation (as being brought about by the verb)

200 That (Karmapravacaniya) (with which a verb starts) which implies the existence of another verb (in the context) is connected with (the nominal and the pronominal) case-forms in the sentence, as for instance, does (the Karmapravacaniya) 'vi', when used with (the root) 'likh' it does not have the status of (being) a prefix

201a It is found that the verb 'tisthati' is used in the verb apratyajayan'

201b The (Karmapravacaniya) 'abhī' functions uncompounded with the verb 'sunvati' in the sense 'in the direction of' 69
202 कर्मप्रवचनीयत्व कियायोगे विचारायते। बत्ताविद्विनिबृत्तवर्म स्वत्तादीना विधम्भणाम्॥

202 ‘Su’, ‘atii’, etc., which are different in characteristics are declared to be Karmaprvacan'iya'ys when they are associated with verbs, in order to avoid the change of ‘sa’ etc into ‘sa’ in certain forms the sa etc being different from the latter.

203 हेतुहेतुमतोऽथोगरिच्छेदे ज्ञाता क्रते। आर्माधार बाध्यते प्राप्ता तृतीया हेतुलक्षणा॥

203 (Another specific function of the Karmaprvacan'iyas is stated) —When (the Karmaprvacan'ya) ‘anu’ denotes the union of a cause and effect, the instrumental which is to function in the cause is set aside.

204 कियाया छोटको नय सम्बन्धस्य न वाचक।

लापि कियायाक्षेपि सम्बन्धस्य तु अंतरक॥

104 (This stanza rejects the views already stated about the function of the Karmaprvacan'ya) —It is not an illuminator of the verb, it does not express a relation, nor does it imply a verb. It defines a relation.

205 अन्यंकाना सद्यात्म. सार्थकोन्यक्षस्तथा।

वर्णतां पदस्थाये युक्त नावर्यवा पदे॥

205 Having thus discussed the word as occurring as the five parts of speech, the Akhandavadin’s position and criticism of the Khandav theory are again stated) —A collection of letters which are meaningless by themselves can be meaningful or meaningless (in combination), if meaningful, it is a word, and there are no parts in a word.

206 वद्वामयर्युक्ताना सधातो विचारते पुनः।

अर्थार्थरवर्णेऽर्थम्यस्मान सम्बन्धविधामेन च॥

206 A combination of meaningful words varies as giving rise to another meaning or as not having any connection among themselves.
207 If one of two (letter-groups) is meaningful and the other is not, when they are considered in separation, (as for example kuti and ra respectively) then they do not combine into a connected word. But some others say that they do combine (into a whole) as, for instance, in the words ‘kutira’ and the like.

208 (Some thinkers hold that if the aggregate is meaningful, the components also should be meaningful) — According to some, an aggregate with a distinct meaning is formed or not formed from meaningful words, as in compounds and svārthika-formations (respectively).

209 Some of these have fixed meaning while in combination and have their functions known on analysis. With some others, functions are attributed to their parts based on the test of association and (absence of) dissociation.

210 Only a technical significance is intended by the statement that syllables are meaningful, isolate syllables which are (technically significant) like roots etc are not meaningful in ordinary usage.
The meaning of krt and taddhita suffixes by themselves is technical. It is therefore that forms ending in these have no meaning before the addition of the case endings.

And the distinct meaning which one finds in words ending in these suffixes (i.e., krt and taddhita) is derived from factors like meaning of adjoining words and topic-context.

If words and sentences are not different in character from syllables, these syllables (and not words and sentences) would be expressive (of meaning) due to their power of possessing expectancy for one another.

If a collection (of letters) is meaningful when it is less than the normal by one letter, then (what happens is that) the whole is understood from a fraction of it assuming that the (reduced) form is not an entirely different word.

Under certain conditions it (i.e., the fraction) causes recollection of the (complete) word which expresses the meaning as if it had been actually presented by the (whole) word.

Just as in 'gaurakhara' and other such words, there does
not exist any separate meaning of the component words and no such meaning is realised during the comprehension of the meaning of the combined word,

217 समन्वित इवार्थत्मा पदार्थं ये प्रतीयते।
पदार्थनां तत्र तथेऽवनमकारकम्॥

217—similarly in the meaning of the sentence which appears to be a combination of word-meanings, the recognition of word-meanings is of no use

218 समस्यायवयवोभिःस्थ्यवते च बृत्तिः।
युगुप्तसंसारं विश्वासवृष्टिः॥

218 If in complex formations the complete word and the component parts have different meanings, then there is the co-existence of contradictory meanings, namely the analytic and the synthetic

219 कश्च साधनात्मात्मानं अध्यादेवं परिकल्पयेत्।
अप्रयुक्तपदश्चाथायं बहुवल्कौ कथा भवेत्॥

219 (Another objection to the recognition of words and word-meanings in sentences, etc., is given) —Who will consider ‘adhi’, etc., as purely having the meaning of the (locative) case? And how can a bahuvrīhi compound have its meaning when the word for it is not (actually) used?

220 क प्रात्मा भववध्वाद्वैत्यविधारणम्॥

220ख. तत्मात्मधात्य एवेको विश्वासविद्या-वनम्॥

220a The meanings of words like ‘prajñā’ and samjñā’ are not understood through their component parts

220b Therefore the combination as a whole is connected to a specific meaning

221 गर्गि हत्यक्क एवायं बहुवल्कू वतंते॥
हन्तस्मातिर्यः सद्यातो बहुनामसिद्धायक।॥

221 [In the next few verses (221-225) the status of a dvanda or copulative compound in the philosophy of Akhandavāda is raised and established. If an expression, that is, a sentence, compound etc. is an integral speech when it
conveys an integral meaning then how can a dvandva compound convey the meaning of its components as it necessarily should by virtue of the fact that it is a dvandva compound? This question is answered also are answered in other verses (226-227) the same questions in regard to vrtus (complex grammatical formations) and negative compounds. The sum total of the arguments is that in all these the abstraction of component words is only a grammatical necessity, and not the logical truth. The single word 'gargāh' denotes many people. Similarly a combination of words known as a dvandva compound may denote many people.

222 Just as 'bhuj' (to eat) and other verbs get related to the parts (of a collective subject) individually, similarly the verb is conceived separately for each (component) of the meaning (of the subject) denoted by a dvandva compound.

223 And so far as representing the meaning of one component of a dvandva-compound by the pronoun 'tad' is concerned (as in the example janapadatadavadhyoh) in this case, there is only the appearance of a pronoun in the meaning of the compound.

224 Just as in cutting the khadira tree, the (act of) cutting (which is a single act) has a sequence in its parts (in the form that the bark of the tree is first cut, then the inside and so on) similarly a sequence is seen in the meanings of the components of a dvandva compound.
225. Particular actions which pertain to groups are considered to function through individuals. Similar is the case of the parts of a dvandva compound.

226. In discussing, for the benefit of the untutored, complex grammatical formations with (particular) reference to their (extended) sentence-forms, the chief significance is attributed to the meaning of one or other of the (component) words.

227. Since the meaning of a negative compound is (really) indivisible, diverse conceptions of the (comparative) significance (of their parts) are given as optionals in the Bhāṣya, these are nothing more than evils which are necessitated by the grammatical explanations (of these words).

228. The rejection of all (component) meanings is shown in the case of bahuvrīhī compounds by him (i.e., the teacher) who desires the rejection of all component meanings according to the viewpoint that ‘the individual words in a compound give up their meanings’.
(90)

229 शास्त्रे कवचित्रप्रकृति यथानिलये सवथुभिः ॥
प्रकृतो विनिवृत्तात्त्र यथाप्रस्तावं धातुभिः ॥

229 (The point that conceptions used in the technique of grammatical analysis may not represent the logical truth about language is still further exemplified One may break a unified utterance into parts for the sake of explanation, but still unity is the truth.)

In grammar the meaning of the root (in a word) is expressed by the suffix in some places, when the root has ceased to function, and (sometimes) the meaning of the suffix by the roots

230 यथासाध्यायनात्मक च इव तस्मात् ॥
कवचित्राय पर्वताय धातुस्तायम्यां चिन्ता कवचित् ॥

230 The same meaning which two different suffixes express in the form 'pacanti' is conveyed in some places by one of them, and in some (other) places the root conveys the same meaning without either of them

231 अन्तवर्तमानस्मृति ये च प्रत्ययाधिक निलचन्दनस् ॥
निन्दिता ॥ स्त्रोतेऽपि प्रकृत्याधिक स्मृत्यवत्तर उवाहतः ॥

231 The same suffix-meanings which in certain enumeratory texts are considered as linked to suffixes, are designated as root-meanings in other texts

232 प्रतिधारितविस्परिधारितेऽव शास्त्रे अस्तिवृत्तेऽव ॥
232 ख व्यवहाराय सन्यस्ते शास्त्राधिकाय क्यत ॥

232a Similarly in grammar words like 'udvami' and 'kari' alone are used because they are well-known (as substitutes ,

232b —since the analytical explanation of words adopted in grammar is (only) for the sake of ordinary usage

233 प्रकृत्याधिकायं वेदविद्यायं विद्यायं विद्यायं विद्यायं ॥
233 ख. अनागमविकल्प तु स्वयं सद्योपवर्ष्टेऽव ॥

233a It is Unreality which is described in the scriptures (like grammar) through various explanations

236 वा निदु—ष
233b And Reality itself remains unaffected by these differences of textual explanations.

234 अनिश्चित निश्चित्क निश्चाल्य स्फल यथा।
तथा विज्ञानायाय दार्शनिकायेन लक्ष्यते।

234 Just as an effect is not (definably) connected with its cause, nor is it describable, similarly the true knowledge which is indescribable is pointed out as having grammar as its means of realisation.

235 क यथायथ निव वाक्यमें प्रतिपाद समोहते।
235८ सब्याइ इव चानानिर्माणयासो व्यवस्था।

235a It is practice (of grammar) which helps to create understanding in the meaning of words.

235b This practice is considered as unreal like the beginningless nature (of things).

236 उद्देश्यंते सावध नरसाम्रात्प्रमिडत।
तत्यायविविल युक्तमयायविते पुन।

236 (This beginningless and unreal nature of things is illustrated)—The untutored imagines an atom as having parts and a whole having parts as being linked to other parts (of which it really is not made).

237 घटाविद्यायालौ: परिचितांसारसीयते।
संभाव्यर प्राणामाणि भयो शास्त्रसु।

237 The world is understood as limited from the sight of pots, etc. And because objects have a beginning, the timeless Brahman is (erroneously) understood as having a beginning.

238 उपयो विकस्मार्या बालानान्मपलापना।
असत्यं वर्त्तमी द्वितृया तत् सत्यं समीहते।

238 Means are intended as a concealment of the truth for the sake of the unwise who are learning. Remaining on the path of Unreality one strives after Reality.

239 अन्यथा प्रतिपादाय पद्यहिण्यपूर्वकं।
किमेते ते निवर्त्तमेते तत्सास्तास्त्तत्र नाशयेत।

239 After grasping the meaning (of a word) in a certain form...
through the comprehension of the word, the same meaning is again grasped in the sentence in a different form.

240 Of the many meanings (of words) presented (to the reader of a sentence) those which in the end are repudiated (by the meaning of the sentence) are not operative. Therefore they should not be resorted to there (i.e. in the understanding of the meaning of the sentence).

241 The impossibility of recognising words in sentences and word-meanings in the meaning of the sentence in the ultimate sense, is shown with reference to a sentence like Vṛkṣo nāsti (there is no tree). If we recognise 'na' as a separate word in the ultimate sense, what does it negate?

The sentence 'vṛkṣo nāsti' has a particular negation as its significance. The meaning (of the word 'vṛksa') cannot be considered to be connected in the mind (to the meaning of the particle 'na'), because that would mean the negation of something which exists.

242a If, when the sentence is understood analytically, the knowledge 'there is (a tree)' is formed, how can that concept which is non-verbal in character be removed (by the particle 'na')?

243a Or again, the knowledge that there is (a tree) is falsified by 'na' (according to one view).

244
243b How then, can the knowledge of an absence (of the tree) be obtained if the function of ‘na’ is modified like this?

244क निराकारप्रवृत्तिः च प्राक्क्रमणित्वित्तम भवेत्।
244ख अथातः स एवम् नियमार्थः श्रुतिमभवेत्॥

244a Again can it be said that the particle ‘na’ functions in isolation, without reference to any of the sectional notions referred to above? No)

If ‘na’ is functioning without reference to any substratum, then it should be employed (in the beginning) before (all the others)

244b (Can the use of the substratum, i.e. vrksa be explained by the Bheda-school as follows) —

Again, (it may be said) that if (i.e. ‘vrksa’) alone shall be its (i.e. the particle’s) substratum (The defect of this position is that) a direct statement, then, becomes a restrictive statement.

245क नियमस्थोतनार्थः वासुबधोत्वाय घात्वे॥
245ख कविच्यवाजवास्तवः शब्दात्नोपास्वतवायकः॥

245a Or (it becomes) a statement which brings out an implied restriction Or it might become a repetition

245b (Therefore if the sentence ‘vrksa nāsti’ is interpreted in the way stated in 244a, then) —only one word (i.e. ‘na’) will have meaning there, others will have no meaning

246. विशेष चार्टमास्त्रवयव्रुत्वाहार्यविधि कृतम्।
वाक्ये समाप्ते वाक्यार्थमत्यथा प्रतिपद्यते॥

246 (The argument against the recognition of word-meanings is further illustrated) —

Words ‘udahāri’ and others in the sentence ‘udahāri bhaginī’ etc enter into an incompatible kind of relationship (among themselves), and when the sentence is completed the meaning of the sentence is comprehended in a different form
247. In the case of sentences with praise or censure as their import the meaning of the sentence is not the same as is constructed by its analysis into words

248. (The Pada-vādin’s position is again stated for repudiation —) Or it is the un-integrated meaning which remains in the words, and it is (also) the means for the construction of the integrated sentence-meaning

249. (But) that (meaning) which originally remains un-integrated in the words, and is then gradually built up is not any different from it, since it is like something restrung after being broken

250. (Granting that words are realities within the scheme of analysis, the question of primary and secondary signification of words is taken up for discussion.) Other investigators say that the same word has more than one meaning, they say that the same word has many meanings due to various causes.

251a The simultaneity (of the functioning of the word in all its meanings) is avoided and the word is established in one meaning at a time, through (such contextual factors as) the meaning (of other words) or situation context or due to association with other words
252. Just as the mass (of flesh) with dew-lap, etc., is named by the word ‘gauh’, similarly the same word ‘gauh’ is established as conveying the meaning ‘a Vāhika’ (name of a tribe or person in the tribe).

253. On the basis of the difference in the currency of the (corresponding) meanings, the same word is described as primary and secondary, it having all potentialities and several aspects.

254. Thus the same hymn having various meanings and possessing different potentialities, is established as functioning in regard to the self, to a god and to the sacrifice, without its functions getting mixed up.

255. The attribution of cow-ness on the Vāhika for (certain) reasons is desired by some (Thus) only the object denoted has changed, the word remains fixed in its meaning (namely cow-ness).

256. Again the form of the word is associated with all its meanings. Only the objects denoted change. The word permanently remains linked to its (own) form (as its meaning).
Those who adopt the line of the plurality of words say that the one-ness between principal and secondary words is but formal, and that they are fundamentally different.

Thus a different sāmīdhemi hymn is associated with (each) repetition (of the hymn).

Hymns become different by being employed just as they do when altered by a substitution.

(Nevertheless), they too (that is, those too which get their being through repetition) are Vedic hymns, only, certain ones are actually mentioned there (i.e., in the texts).

Or (alternatively) it is those which have no use as Vedic hymns) which are mentioned there (Through them) the remaining ones come to mind.

Others describe that when a hymn is recited, its own form is its meaning.

Hence all hymns are totally different from each other and those other hymns (which are produced, so to say, from the recitation of the mentioned hymns) are also different from each other, they having their distinct forms, through their connection with the mentioned hymns.
261. अन्या संस्कारसाधनियों कर्मण्या प्रयज्यते ।
अन्या अप्रवश्येषु तां त्वेकैव प्रतीयते ॥

The Sāvitrī hymn which is the source of purification is one, a different hymn is employed in sacrifice, and a different one is employed in the contexts of muttering hymns. But all these appear to be the same.

262a अर्थस्वल्पे शब्दाना स्वह्याभितिरिबियते ॥
बाक्यहृदयं वाक्यायें बलिरत्यानपेक्षा ॥

262b The functioning of words in their meaning is through their forms.
And the functioning of a sentence in conveying the meaning of the sentence is through its dependence on nothing else (other than the form of a sentence).

263 अनेकार्थव्यवस्थायं ये शब्दस्यालगम्यते ।
सिद्धयसिद्धिहि तेषा गौणस्वत्यप्रक्षणा ॥

Those who follow the idea that the same word possesses several meanings base their conclusion regarding the meaning being primary or secondary on its being well-known or otherwise.

264 अर्थप्रकरणातिको यो वा शब्दान्ततः सह ।
यूक्त प्रत्यायप्यस्य तं गौणमयपे विदु ॥

264 Others think that a word which conveys its meaning depending on the meaning (of other words) or situation context or by association with other words, is called secondary.

265 शुद्धरोज्ज्वारेण स्वार्थं प्रसिद्धो यस्य गमते ।
स मूः स्वतं इति विभेष्यो खसमात्वनविनवन ॥

265 (The definition of a word which conveys a primary meaning is given according to the view of the Samgha.) That word from which, when it is pronounced as an isolate, its own well-known meaning is understood and
which depends solely on its form (in conveying this meaning) should be known as primary.

266. यस्तवर्धनव मन्यते गौणार्थिभिनिविधितम्।

That word which is made to convey the meaning as if with difficulty, through the use of another word is considered obscure and connected to a secondary meaning.

267. स्वच्छ प्रवर्तमानस्य यथार्थ योजनमयं।

When a word (in conveying a secondary meaning) depends on itself as functioning in its own meaning (i.e. the principal meaning), then the principal meaning acts as the basis (for the secondary meaning) and the secondary meaning is based on it.

268. (Contextual derivation of meaning will not always necessarily lead to a primary—secondary classification. As for example The words 'purā' and 'ārād' each of which conveys meanings which are different and mutually contradictory are understood through the meanings (of other words) and the situation context, (but both meanings of each word is a primary meaning) (purā=distant or near in time ārād=distant or near in time)

269. (Siddhānta or the Akhanda view)

When the analysis of word-meanings from the meaning of the sentence is artificial, how can any (word) properly have relation with another word?

270. यल्लाप्यस्य पवित्र वृद्धं चरितास्तिक्रियं कवचित्तु।

Where it is seen sometimes that a single word possesses a complete verb ‘to be’ (implied in it), that word is
considered as a complete sentence, and it is not constructed with another word

271. स्वयं कोझसिति प्रश्ने गौरर्व इति चोज्यते।
 प्रश्न एव किया तत्र प्रकान्ता वर्णालाकिका॥

As the answer ‘cow’ or ‘horse’ is given to the question ‘what is it’, words like ‘drsyate’ (seen) are included in the question itself (i.e., koyam who, what is it)

272a (Another view on primary-secondary classification of meaning is stated) The criterion (for judging whether a word is principal or secondary with reference to a meaning) is not whether it conveys more or less of the attributes (of the object denoted)

272b Conveying more (such attributes) is considered as the basis of the word being well-known (in some places) while, in some other places, conveying less is so considered

273 (Other views on primary-secondary classification) Others consider that a secondary meaning is that to convey which a word whose significance is a universal is used without its having to signify the universal, on the basis that it (the object) has attributes similar to those of the individual associated with the universal

274 Where a meaning (of a word) is taken to be another apparently by mistake, then (such) words like ‘gauh’ are considered by some as ‘secondary’
275 Just as objects like a plough, a sword or a pestle which possess specific forms and powers are invariably taken as instruments of specific actions,

276 —but when used for other actions they do not possess these powers, and are invariably associated with their (proper) actions right from their forms,

277 —similarly a word which has its meaning settled on the basis of its formal capacity is used (to convey) a different meaning by virtue of a (different) potentiality

278 (How then is the primary-secondary distinction to be understood in this case?) —
When on merely listening, one understands the word as having a (certain) meaning, that meaning is considered to be principal, and the meaning is secondary where it has to be explained

279 When words like “gauh” ‘yusmat’ and ‘mahat’ convey a different meaning (from what they ordinarily mean) through the operation of the suffix ‘cvi’, there we find the identification of the principal meaning with the other meaning
(An objection arising from the idea in the stanza above is stated) —
Bigness and Whiteness remain in their original state. But that (state) when looked at in different ways become the basis of the secondary nature (of the meanings of the words) 76

Yet another objection is answered) —
Words like 'Agni' and 'Soma' which are connected to their forms (as their meanings) are secondary when they are used as names of persons because they are well-known as the names of gods 77

On the other hand, the word 'Agni' used as (an abbreviated) substitute for the word 'Agnidatta', having given up its own meaning conveys a secondary meaning since it (also) conveys the meaning of the word 'Datta'

If their etymological derivation is approached from different angles there is the existence and the non-existence of the augment 'sut' in words like 'Hariscandra' 78

If words which have become established as names of sages and the like are used to denote some one different
(i.e., an ordinary person) then grammatical changes effected in the body of such words (when they mean sages, etc.) do not revert (although the words themselves are in the second instance used in their secondary signification and therefore in the light of what has been said above, grammatical operations should not take place in these cases)

285. अत्यन्तविपरीतोपि यदा योद्धाविवाहार्यते।
यथासम्प्रत्यय शब्दस्त्रो मुख्य प्रवर्तने॥
285 (The problem of primary—secondary classification is approached from a different angle) —
Even when a meaning completely antithetical (to the normal meaning of the word) is conveyed by it the word is functioning in a primary capacity since the mind is at that time comprehending it in that way

286. यद्यपि प्रत्ययाद्वीपस्वतत्वावधारणस्
न सर्वं प्रत्ययस्त्वस्मिस्वासिद्ध इव जायते॥
286 (Arguments are given now to show that here too classification of words into primary and secondary is possible) Although the comprehension of the true nature of an object is dependent on how it is conceived, conception is not everything in itself, as is evident in the case of an imperfect comprehension of an object

287. वर्णं सच्चेदे तुल्यं मृगतृणाविविधशैं।
तुल्यते दर्शनावो न जल मृगशैविका॥
287 Seeing (an object) in water resembles seeing (it) in a mirage But while its apprehension, etc., (in the two media) are thus, similar, water is not mirage

288. यदसाधारण कार्यं प्रसिद्ध रज्जुस्वप्यो।
तेन भेदः।२८४ परिच्छेदस्यस्य तत्तैतिस्य सर्वं ||
288 What effect there is which a rope and a serpent have not in common, by that is determined a difference between
them in spite of their similar appearance (in certain conditions like twilight)

289 A difference (in an object) effected through a cause which caused a contrary appearance of (such) a well-known object, is also considered unreal.

290 Though their appearance differs, their nature remains the same.

291 And digging, etc., are not possible in the place where a picture (of a mountain etc.) showing elevations and depressions, resembles the mountain.

292 It is possible for a (real) wheel to have continuous contact with the hand (which holds it), but that is not the case with an imaginary wheel of fire caused by a revolving torch, it breaks when it is touched.

293 Actions of the type performed by the original animals are not performed by their models made of clay. Therefore (the suffix) ‘kan’ is added to such words (for forming the words which denote the models).

294 A large space is occupied by real mountains and the like. But their images are found to occupy only a small space.
While real poison, etc., can cause death, they are not able to produce the same effects in a dream.

(The argument is concluded) —

A thing which appears otherwise, due to differences in time and place, or the sense-organs (with which it is perceived), is, nevertheless, finally understood in the form in which it is well-known to the world.

The knowledge whose source is an error, and the knowledge which is not about the world (of sense-experience) are beyond words. Words are instruments of empirical knowledge.

(After discussing the classification of meaning as primary and secondary, a primary-incidental classification of meaning is now discussed) —

When a lamp is used associated with a pot with a specific purpose (of revealing the pot), the lamp also reveals another (additional) object (like a wall) in association with its original specific purpose.

Similarly whatever (particular) meaning, out of the many meanings (of a word), operates as the (specific) cause for the employment of the word, the word also
(incidentally) conveys meanings other than that operative one

300 निन्त्यः यथार्थयोग्यसत्यमुपपादितम्।
धृतस्मध्यनिमेतं जनयत्येकाधारनम्॥

Just as the chinning of two kindling sticks performed to produce fire produces also the unintended smoke, which has the same cause as the fire,

301 तथा शब्दवृत्तिकर्षितत्त्वात्यायां विवक्षिते।
अविवक्षितंत्वस्य प्रकाश्यति सतिः॥

—similarly, when a certain meaning which is to be conveyed is intended (when using a word), the word also conveys the unintended meaning due to its proximity (with the intended one).

302 यथावात्यन्तस्यस्त्त्वकर्षितुर्मयः न शक्यते।
तथाशब्दवृत्तिकर्षितस्य प्रविष्कर्षितुर्मयः न शक्यते॥

Just as it is impossible to discard an object which is in close connection with another similarly a word which is in (intimate) connection with all its meanings cannot be divided (in its function).

303 "क्योर्षाना सन्निधानेपित सति चैत्यः प्रकाशने।
प्रयोजकोक्षन्य शब्दस्य रूपांस्वेदेपित शक्यते॥

Even when unequered meanings are present and revealed, the meaning which is operative is accepted word-from remaining the same.

304 क्वचिन्द्वृत्तिकर्षितत्त्वात्यायांमात्रविवक्षितम्।
क्वचिन्द्वृत्तिकर्षितस्येषां प्रतिपत्तिकारणम्॥

(A discussion follows about the relation between primary meaning and secondary meaning) —

In some places the distinction of meaning into primary and secondary is not intended. And in some (other) places even the presence of a secondary meaning does
not act as the cause for the word to operate (in the context)

305 यच्चानुपातः शब्देन तत्कस्मिनिष्ठतः रोगे
क्यतिचिन्द्रास्मेवाऽऽौ भावलयन्तर्य लक्षणम्

305 In some (other) places the meaning which the word actually conveys is the one which it does not verbally indicate Elsewhere the principal meaning points to another meaning

306 आस्थ्यान् तद्विर्याच्य प्रक्षिपत्वुपदशंकम्
गुणप्रधानमाभ्यस्त तत्र दृष्टे विपर्ययः

306 When the verb conveys the idea of a taddhita, the primary and secondary meaning are seen to exchange their status

307क निर्देशे चिन्तितसञ्चारा सन्निधानसमकारणम्
307ख प्रमाणसेव हस्तदाव्युपात चर्याये

307a (Even) when gender and number are expressed, their presence is not the operative cause (for the word to function in the context)

307b In the expression “a short vowel” etc what is understood is a mātra, and this is not stated

308 हस्तव्यायूः च यदृ वृष्ट तत्त्वासविधावपि
हस्तस्य लक्षणार्थायत्तदेवाविभाजीयते

308 And when it is stated “half of a short vowel” this is understood in the same way (i.e., as meaning a mātra) even in the contexts of long and prolonged vowels, since the expression “short vowel” is used in a representative sense

309क दीर्घांक्ताभ्या तस्य स्त्रात् साध्वया वा बिशेषणम्
309ख जातेवां लक्षणा यत्त्वासवें तत्त्वाभिषेकत्

309a (Three ways of interpreting the word (ardhahrasvam’ (half of a short vowel) in the sūtra referred to above are discussed) —

259 Stanzas 305, 306 and 307a are omitted in manuscript ४
It (i.e., the word ‘ardha’) applies also to the long and the prolonged (vowels, apart from applying to the short vowel), Or it might qualify (and apply to) a mātra

309b Or again a class might also be understood by implication from it

310 गन्तव्यं वृवश्यात सूर्यं इति कालः लक्षणे।
हायता कालं इत्येवत्संप्रायोपायकथिते।

310 (This stanza illustrates the point stated in the second half of 307) —
‘We must go now. Look at the sun’—when time is indicated by implication in this way the idea ‘know the time’ is conveyed through its means

311 विभवत्ववन्यद्वत्र विश्वेषण निदर्शनं।
सांस्कृतिकांश्च शब्दं तत्तत्त्रतिपादयं।

311 (The same idea is further illustrated) —
In the injunction, ‘Pierce without a bow’ a general instrument is indicated by the particular. The basis of the capacity (for the instrument to pierce) is provided for by any (object)

312 काकेभ्यो रक्षयता सप्तिरिति बालोपि चोवित।
उपवात्तपरे वाक्ये न व्वादीभ्यो न रक्षति।

312 A boy who is instructed to protect clarified butter from crows does not prevent himself from protecting it from dogs and the like, the (instructing) sentence having the significance of protecting (the clarified butter), in general

313 प्रकाशलेखशाराबाणा स्थालिना रूपं मार्ज्यं तथा।
अनुक्रमयात्रिपूर्णं भृज्यस्यात्मातिश्रृष्टं।

313 (Sometimes secondary ideas are conveyed as accessories to the principal meaning without making an actual statement of them) —
(From the very expression ‘Give him food’) the (ideas
of the) washing of the plates and the scrubbing of the pots are conveyed although they are not mentioned by words because they form accessories to the act of eating

314 "वाक्यात्मककरणाद्वितीयादि" न्यायात्मकारणकालत्।
शब्दार्थः प्रविष्टायते न रूपादेव केवलत॥

314 (The factors which help to determine the meaning of a word are now discussed) —
The meanings of words are determined from (their) syntactical connection (in the sentence), situation-context, the meaning of another word, properties, place, and time, and not from their mere form

315 समानं विप्रयोगस्य साहित्यं विरोधिता।
अर्थं वैः प्रकरण लिङ्गं शब्दस्यात्मकम् सत्यिष्ठ॥अः

315 (Another list) (Constant) association (of two things), (their) dissociation, company, and hostility, the meaning (of another word), situation-context, evidence from another sentence, and the proximity of another word.

316 शेषप्रश्नोपि साहित्याभिव्यक्तिः प्रतिपलितः।
नियता यात्मभव्यक्तं शब्द प्रकरणाविभि॥

316 Even according to the view of the plurality of the word (i.e., in the view that with each meaning a word becomes a different entity although it may retain its phonetic form,) words which have the same form but which, on realisation are found to be different in meaning have their meanings understood after they are determined by means of situation-context and the like

261 अर्थत्प्रकरणालङ्कारी —ष
262 अर्थप्रकर—ङ
263 After this verse, the following verse is found which is not found in the Benaras text (८)
सामान्यभौतिकी देश कालो व्याक्तित्वादय।
शब्दस्यानवच्छेद्व विषयमूर्तिष्ठेत॥
264 —पूर्व—ष
317 Words, which, according to their application in one way or another are either nouns or verbs though of identical form, do not have the meaning which they are to convey understood from their form alone (but also from context etc).

318 The employment of praise and censure as incentives to action and inaction is understood by a clever hearer as being not literally intended.

319 That action which has been enjoined (in the Vedas) as productive of result tangible or intangible is praised, and praise is only an incentive to the performer.

320 Just as a child is dissuaded from crying by the threat of a tiger and the like (eating it), similarly an evil result (of the nonperformance of a sacrificial action) is stated, which is not true.

321 When an evil result of this sort is laid down, no wise man performs an action (thus) prohibited, after avoiding it (i.e., the evil result).

322 The prohibition ‘Do not eat (purodāsa) with the teeth’
should not be set aside by avoiding the serpents through effective spells and medicines

323 In some places, praise and censure are made as the real meanings (of the passages), but even in these places action and abstention from action are enjoyed

324a The nature of all word-meaning is dependent on the meaning of the sentence

324b That meaning of a sentence (i.e., of a clause) which is itself dependent (on the meaning of other sentences) is comparable to the meaning of a word

325a A single word which has a verb implied in it is also considered as a sentence (and therefore is a final reality as an utterance)

325b That verb in which a specific nominal category is (automatically) understood (as existing by implication) is also called a sentence because it has a completed meaning

268 After this, the manuscript घ gives two additional lines: They are

अन्तरेण कियास्व
वाक्यादेववाचित्वानां

269 —मान्तावः—घ
326b (To the Mīmāṁsaka, a single word-utterance is not an integral sentence. According to him, in such cases too the meaning of the sentence is made up through the addition of word-meanings. He expounds the theory of Sūrūthāpatti in this connection.)

The act of intellective in which the uttered word intervening (between itself and the unuttered word) and working in association with the unuttered word is considered as causing the comprehension of the meaning of the letter through inference.

327a When a certain utterance is made and a meaning is conveyed through it, that meaning is considered as the meaning of that utterance alone. None else is the definition of meaning.

328b (Cases of utterances conveying the meaning of the unuttered also are given.) In the case of secondary words with a verbal significance, that action (which is the meaning) of the verbs whose place they occupy is understood. And the sense of ‘gone’ etc., is understood from indeclinables like ‘nim’ themselves in complex combinations.

270 After this the manuscript gives the following stanza—

अपरे तु पद्याव्य समन्न भूमिखालयो
शब्दात्तत्त्वात्शीलसमन्न भूमिखालयो
If thus, the meaning of the sentence ‘vrksastisthati’ can be obtained from the utterance of the word ‘vrksah’ then why use the word ‘tisthati’ at all in such utterances as ‘vrksastisthati’? — a question put to the grammarian)

They (i.e., the word ‘vrksah’ as meaning an object as its referent, and the word ‘vrksah’ as an utterance implying the verb ‘tisthati’) are two different pieces and are comparable to synonyms in everyday language. And their own meanings are determined by the meaning of the accompanying words, situation-context, etc.

Words which are means of understanding (of the meaning of the sentence) for each individual person are not necessarily connected directly to the thing meant.

(If meaning of an utterance is what is understood when the utterance is made (327b and 328a) then non-comprehension of meaning or comprehension of a false-meaning can also form meanings of utterance.) Even when there is no comprehension of meaning (from a word) or when a wrong meaning is comprehended, such words remain fixedly connected to their own meanings.
333 Therefore the Mimamsaka re-states the ‘Srutartha-patti-view stated in 326b and 327a.)
When the word ‘dvaram’ (door or way) in the accusative is heard, either (the meaning) ‘close the door’ or (the meaning) ‘allow to enter the door’ is obtained according to the situation context, in accordance with the intention of the speaker.

334 The grammarian’s view that the one-word utterance vrksa which is a sentence conveys the meaning of ‘vrsastisthati’ without bringing the unuttered word in the context is criticised by the Mimamsaka.) Since a word (like ‘vrksah’) symbolises a means (i.e., the word-meaning which is the means to the realisation of the meaning of the sentence) and is connected to an existent (as its meaning), it cannot convey the meaning (of a sentence like ‘vrsastisthati’) which is principal and is to be accomplished.

335 (The Mimamsaka re-states the Srutathapatti-position.) — It (i.e., the word ‘vrksah’), having expressed its meaning alone, retires with expectancy, and its meaning which is connected (to another meaning) brings to light the proximity (of the latter).

336 (The grammarian criticises the Mimamsaka’s view) —

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278 Manuscript does not give the second half of this stanza beginning with "nabha-rakshasavas etc."
Since the other meaning is not specifically given, the proximity of another word cannot be obtained from the (uttered) word, nor the proximity of the word from the meaning of the uttered word, nor the proximity of the meaning (of the unuttered word) from the (uttered) word.

337. नामस्तूमध्यात्माक्षितः कर्मवाचिनः
यदि प्राप्त प्रधानतः युगपद्भावसर्वायो

338. (Another criticism of the grammarian's position is made by the Mimamsaka. vrksah is a noun, tisthati is a verb. How can the one convey the meaning of the other also?) If the verb whose form has, so to speak, disappeared is also brought to light by the word (in the accusative) which conveys (the idea of) the object, then there shall be the simultaneous presence as primary ideas (in the same word) of 'becoming' and 'existence' (i.e., the verbal and the nominal notions).

338a. (The Grammarian replies) —
The verb is described by them (i.e., by the teachers of the school of grammar) as having a form similar to the noun.

338b. And usage is distinguished on the evidence of the principle of association and (absence of) dissociation.

339. Even when there is doubt (as to the proper meaning of a word), due to its having the same form in its several occurrences, the expressives power of the word is not affected.
339b As is found in the case of the meaning of (the expression) ardham pasoh (half of the sacrificial animal), in the same way it (i.e., expressive capacity of words) is decided on the basis of competency as the factor.

340 सर्व सत्त्वव हुझ यवि भाविववच्यम्।
ससगे च विभक्तोऽर्जय तस्य तस्यायों न पृथ्विवदि॥

(Another objection against the grammarian’s Akhandaposition — If all ‘existence-words’ (i.e., nouns) are linked with ‘becoming’ (i.e., the verbal notion) in combination, and have no separate meanings as isolates,

341 क्रियाध्वनमाहस्यत नाम्ना सत्त्रधानता।
चत्वारि वदजातानि सर्वेषस्रविण्यते॥

—then all such (statements of grammar) as “a verb primarily denotes an action”, “nouns primarily denote existence” and “there are four kinds of words” stand contradicted.

342 वाक्यत्थ बृह्दै नित्यत्वमयंयोग च लौकिकम्।
बृह्द्वा चतुष्ठव नास्तीति ॐवालझशौभृमयनौ॥

(Grammarian’s answer) Vārttikāsa and Audumbara-yana hold that there are no four classes of words, when it is considered that the sentence is real (only) in the mind, and that its being linked with word-meanings is only (a matter of) ordinary practice.

343 व्याप्तिमाद्व समुदाचव व्यवहार पदार्थ।
लोके शास्त्रे च कार्यार्थिविभागनेत्र कल्पित॥

In life and in grammar, the description (of a sentence) in terms of words, is (both) wide (in its use) and is (also) easy and it is artificially employed, following (the technique of) analysis.

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282 —भक्तस्य —च
283. वदयौभृमयन —च
In life, listeners do not obtain (the meaning of the sentence) as associated with word-meanings. Therefore other than the sentence, there is nothing which is more than (a mere matter of) ordinary practice.

The meaning of words not determinable (by themselves) because of the lack of specification in their forms is determined only from the sentence on the basis of evidence stated elsewhere.

(A discussion of the problem of rules and exceptions follows. This naturally is connected with the grammarian's central theme of the integral nature of utterances, and their meanings.) An exception which is verbally made in a general rule, (verbally made because it forms part of the significance of the general rule) but apparently without a specific verbal statement of it, is stated separately in a statement of exception and its meaning accrues elsewhere (i.e., to the general rule).

The injunction about sour-milk for Brahmans is previously made excluding the Mâtharas (and the statement of) the Mâthara being connected with curds declares this as a real fact.

It is considered by some that a rule and an exception.
form one sentence (statement) even if they have several verbs. Only, they appear to be different sentences.

349a Thus a restriction or prohibition forms part of the general injunction, and since this is so, commentators say that the prohibition of 'luk' (in Panini Chapter VI) forms part of the enjoining of 'luk' in Chapter 2.

350 (Here the upholder of the doctrine that such sentences are really distinct intervenes) —

When the sentences have no expectancy (for anything outside) and are at rest so to speak, they are independent of one another. Therefore, since there is the absence of a relation of one being for the sake of the other, how can they together form one sentence?

351 (The upholder of the view that the two form one sentence replies) —

A special rule causes the remaining part of a sentence (i.e., the prohibitory sentence here) to be inferred because it (the special rule) needs such inference. Therefore, there is in the object to be prohibited as much expectancy as there is in the object of the special rule.

352 (If the recognition of parts in a sentence and the meaning of the sentence is wrong, the recognition of parts in a word is equally meaningless.)

There is no elision of a part of a proper name. A proper name which is coined in a particular form does not relinquish that form.
358. This view is criticised.

But), through a part (of the word) how can there occur a recollection of the aggregate which is different from it? How can a word which is recollected convey a meaning?

359. The author's doctrine is stated.

Words which have the appearance of being parts of a name, and have their own marks (for distinguishing them) are fixed (as parts) in names because they are produced along with the names.

360. Words (like 'Deva' and 'Datta') which are ambiguous in meaning due to their having a common form (for different meanings), which nevertheless convey (through combination) a fixed meaning (like Devadatta) by virtue of their fixed capacity and are, therefore, considered correct usage are enjoined for elision and the like in grammar.

361. (But) parts like 'jye' (from 'Jayestha, 'for instance), 'drä' (from 'dräksä', for instance) and 'gha' (from 'mägha', for instance) are not valid (as capable of conveying the meaning of the whole), although they are also produced simultaneously with the whole words. These are not (therefore) mentioned in the explanatory section (of grammar).
362 Words like 'kharanasa' are technically immutable after the change (of 'n') into 'n' is effected. They are considered as correct forms because they convey the idea of integral objects.

363 They (the proper names) are described as clan-names, and since they possess the power of proper names, they do not necessarily require an (external) cause to aid them to convey their meanings.

364 Sometimes the use of a proper name is limited to one 'named' for (convenience of) usage. But the word-meaning relation is permanent in the case of (proper names) 'Datta' and the like as in the case of (words like) 'gauh'.

365 (The permanent nature of the mutual connection between word and meaning is true also of technical terms in grammar.)

After this the manuscript gives the following additional verses:

388 After this the manuscript gives the following additional verses.
And in grammar (technical terms) ‘vrddhi’ and the like bear (with their meanings) a relation which is (fundamentally) not started (by any agent), but, which is characterised (only) by a particularisation in their function as in the case of (the relation between a qualifier and a qualified). 95

366. सन्तास्मिनाभिक्ष्य निमित्ते सति लौकिकक | कालिर्दश्यते कालितिमितासनन्दायि | 11
Some everyday proper names function through their forms aided by causal factors, others even in the absence of such

367 शास्त्रे तु महती सज्जा स्वप्रोपनिबन्धना | अनुमान निमित्तस्य समिखाने प्रतिपद्यं | 11
The long technical terms used in grammar depend on their forms (in conveying their meaning) And inference reveals the presence of causal factors (aiding the understanding of the meaning of these terms). 96

368 आवृत्तेनानुमान वा साङ्ग्यात्वनु लभ्यते | शब्दप्रवृत्तानुमान वा शक्तिमेवधर्म वा गति | 11
(On repeating such a long technical term as an experiment to understand its relation with its parts) the inference is either made on the basis of the sameness of form, that it is a repetition (of the same word), or that they are two different words, or that there is a difference in the aspect of the functioning of the same word). 97

369a. क्वचिपित्यभेदन कृत्रिमा व्यविष्टात | 369 ए सह्यमेकविषय व्यवस्थान द्योरिप | 11
(Two kinds of technical terms used in grammar are discussed) —
In some places (in grammar) coined technical terms are used with different significations 97a
369b In the Sūtra on numbers the same technical term (namely ‘samikhyā’) is used as a coined one and as a natural one.

370 (Sometimes) a term with a non-technical sense when uttered might extend in application as a coined one. It is in this way that both are understood from the statement ‘dūrātsambuddhau’.

371 (The following discussion is whether the verb in a sentence with a group subject refers to the individual or to the group) —

The verb (i.e., the verbal meaning) (in a sentence) is considered by some to be connected to a group, or an individual or a dvandva compound (as the subject), depending upon its ‘meaning-capacity’.

372 Eating, both in regard to the result of the act and the act itself is accomplished by the individual. Considered otherwise the meaning of verb cannot be understood.

373 All (the Brahmins) individually perform the action of eating which assumes such forms as the taking of food, etc., and which has the satisfaction of hunger as its result, unlike actions such as dancing.

(122)
Like the ceremony of washing feet, the verb ‘bhuj’ (‘to eat’) remains attached to individuals because of its ‘meaning-capacity’. Unlike a lamp, the verb ‘bhuj’ does not accomplish its purpose (namely, satisfying hunger) on a group-basis.

On the other hand a verb like ‘drs’ (‘to see’) although it is stated only once (in a sentence with a plural subject) functions, in bringing about the appropriate actions as pertaining to the group without their being repeated.

As for the aspects of performance, etc., (namely, holding the food, heating it, etc., which unite to make up the act of cooking), the different aspects of the agents (e.g., Devadatta, the pot and the fire), which have different tasks to perform unite to accomplish the meaning (of the verb)

The technical term ‘vrdhchi’ refers individually to its ‘symbolised’, namely, ‘ā’, ‘au’, and ‘au’ since supporting examples are obtainable from life and evidence is seen in grammar.

In the matter of taking 100 (pieces as a fine from Gargas),
since the prime sense lies in the fining which has the hundred as its object, this countable meaning is not divided up although there is a qualitative distinction between the individuals to whom the meaning of the word ‘Gargāh’ refers.

379 When considered from the view-point that names are given to ‘the named’ (as different from the view that the connection between a name and a named is timeless), the terms ‘samāsa’ (compound) and ‘abhyasta’ (re-duplicated) describe the aggregate (of the components of the words) to which they are used to refer.

380 When an instruction in reference to an action is made in regard to certain persons mentioning them in a representative capacity, the statement is considered to refer to them in a collective and individual capacity alike.

381 —just as in the sentence ‘Vrsalas should not enter this house’ the entry (of Vrsalas) individually and collectively is prohibited.

382 When a collective prohibition of an action like coveting wealth is made, the application (of the prohibition to the individuals) is not prevented on the ground that they have not been severally prohibited.
383. The change of ‘n’ into ‘n’ (in words) takes place in spite of the intervention of an, ku, pu, ā etc., individually or collectively because the mention of these has the representative significance of ‘intervention’.107

384. (The discussion on the act of eating is resumed) — When the act of eating is begun for the satisfaction of the eaters does it not satisfy them without reference to place, time, etc?

385. That single one (act of eating) to which plurality is attributed due to the difference of the plates (used) and the like is alternatively considered (by an opposite school) as being really different but assumed to be one.

386. When the action of eating is performed collectively, but is stated individually then they eat together having each taken his own food separately.108

387. (The sentence ‘Gargāh’ s’atam dandyantām’ is again discussed) — Because there is no scope for reference to the individuals one after another since another number will contradict the sentence, and because it is impossible for the verb

295 This karika is not seen after 383 in manuscript § Instead the karika पायादि़शेषादी—etc is given
to have a dual application (i.e. to the individual and the group), the (meaning of the) word ‘s’atam’ ('hundred') is located in the group.

388. भूजिदीश्वरकेशा-भ्या यत्रायं सह दिशायते।
तत्रादि लक्षणार्थंत्वादिष्ठा वाक्य समाहयते॥

388 When eating with others is prescribed by a dvandva compound or by an ekasesa (like pitarau for father and mother), there also the meaning of the sentence terminates both in the individual and in the group because of its representative significance.

389 वाक्यान्तरणां प्रत्येक समाहित कौन्तिविविधत्ते।
ह्यान्तरणं युक्तानं वाक्यानं तेन सङ्ग्रहत॥

389 Some consider that as far as the constituent clauses (of a compound sentence are concerned) each accomplishes its meaning separately and in this way the compound sentence is a collection of clauses (each) having different form.

390 न वाक्यस्याभिधेयानि भेदवाक्यानि कारिकत।
तत्स्मस्तुञ्चिरते भेदवास्तवायानि प्रतिपदत॥

390 There are no separate clauses which are presented by the compound sentence (during its utterance) (Only), after the latter is uttered, these others, which are parts are recognised.

391 येषां समस्तो वाक्यायं प्रतिमेव समाहयते।
तेषां तदानां भिन्नतयं कि पवयण्य सत्या॥

391 (The Akhanḍavādin in this connection criticises the Padavādin) —

To those, according to whom the total meaning of the sentence culminates in the parts (i.e. in the words) individually, what is the need for the existence of a separate word-meaning?
392. अथ तेनेव जनित सोव्यों भिन्नेशु वर्तते।
पूर्वायत्नेय तेन स्वाहिद्रोध सह वा स्विति।

392 If the sentence-meaning which is formed out of them (i.e., the words) culminates in the separate parts of the sentence, (i.e., in the words), then either it contradicts the original word-meanings or coexists with them.

393. क सहस्त्रयोऽ विरोधितव स्वाहिद्रिश्चविशेष्यंतः।
खर्वभिवधारीं तू सम्बंधस्यांवर्तनेयं प्रसज्ञते।

393a If they co-exist then there will be incompatibility between the qualified and the unqualified.

393b (And) in the dropping of its meaning (by the word) the relation (between, word and meaning) will have become inconstant.

394. एक साधारणो वाच्यं. प्रतिशर्मवस्थित।
साधे सर्बेशु चार्यतमा सत्रधानिक्षर्क।

394 (The Akhandavadin's notion of the sentence-meaning culminating collectively is discussed) —
The expressible meaning of the sentence which is common (to all the words) and which is established word by word exists in the aggregate and also in the component parts as is shown by the proximity (of the components with each other).

395. यथा साधारणो स्वतं स्यायस्य च फल धने।
प्रातिश्चविकला तहतृ सम्बंधोऽवेयां तहताः।

395 Just as there is the sense of possession, the (meritorious) result of giving and perfect happiness (for a group) in a common wealth, similar is the relation borne to meaning by those (i.e., the sentence and its parts) possessing it.

396. वर्णनामयंवत्तत्वा तेनवायनेन तहतित।
समुदायेन चैक्तव मेदेन व्यविष्टतेः।

396 (In this connection the topic that case-endings are added to the aggregate of the letters and not to each letter, in a word is discussed) If the letters are individually meaningful then by virtue of the same meaning, it is in the aggregate which possesses that meaning and not individually that the singular suffix is added.
397 Just as several people see a common treasure with one lamp, similarly grammatical number is expressed by one ending.

398 When a person is accustomed to a view, other views appear to be incompatible with it (but only appear to be so).

398a (Therefore) meaningfulness does not exclusively belong to letters, words or sentences (but to aggregates).

398b (But this does not contradict the Akhanda view stated originally that meaningfulness resides in the sentence) — When a person is accustomed to a view, other views appear to be incompatible with it (but only appear to be so).

399 (The essential condition for a word to convey its meaning is discussed) — A word does not convey its meaning without its being employed (for it). It is considered that the relationship between the meaning and the word conveying it has utterance as its gateway

400 Just as the eye serves for seeing, only when directed (towards the object), so the word expresses its meaning only when it is purposefully uttered.

401 The relation between the 'instrument' and 'object' is found to be effected through the intervention of the verbal action (between them), similarly utterance governs the relation between a word and its meaning.
402 When several meanings may be conveyed by one word and several words may convey one meaning, a word operates on that meaning towards which the speaker directs it.

403 Some say that Vedic words are meaningless when they are repeated (for practice) and when they are being taught to others they have their forms as their meaning.

404 Those who uphold the doctrine of the sameness of the word throughout all the instances of its occurrence consider these same (Vedic words) as expressing (a 'thing-meant' as their) meaning (when they are employed in sacrificial actions) due to the difference in (the purpose of) their utterance, and due to their being (thus) directed otherwise.

405 Those who consider that the word is different in every so-called instance of its occurrence, hold that these are really different words and are only treated under one class-form as, for instance, the words 'aksā' and others are.

299 The reading given in the Benares text is मथवेक. This makes no sense Manuscript ॐ gives the reading अन्वरेक which makes sense.
406  (Therefore, according to them), the speaker has not got to aim the word at the meaning (it is to convey) apart from (merely) uttering it. Because a word has the fixed capacity to denote a particular object, it remains connected to that meaning.

407  (And) it is the (real) difference (between apparently identical words) which is understood from (factors like) the meaning of another word, and situation-context and not at all the employment of words-with-one-meaning in another meaning (of the same word).

408  Our discussion is about the sentence, which appears as a word and is dependent on the verb 'asti' (for its character of being a sentence) and not about a word which is part of a sentence.

409  Just as (according to the Pada-school) letters which individually have no meaning present a specific word-meaning, similarly (according to our school) words having no meanings (of their own) present (the sentence which has) a specific meaning.

410  That cognition of the meaning of words, which arises in the interim is a means to the understanding (of the meaning of the sentence), since we do not understand (the meaning of the sentence) in the beginning.

411  That understanding is presented as a specific sentence.

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119

120

121
The nature of the meaning of the sentence is discussed.
First the view according to the Anvītābhūdhānāvāda of the Mīmāṃsaka is stated —
At the time when the meaning (of each subsequent words) is associated with the meaning of the preceding words, the coalescence (of the individual word-meanings) resides as an accomplished fact in these word-meanings.¹²²

According to some, the meaning is implied in the end which is to be effected. The actual mentioning of the case-relationships again is to restrict their sphere-of-operation.

Without this restriction of the sphere-of-operation no direct implication of it (i.e., the means) appears. It has a possible existence through potentiality and the actual mention of it is to rule out other (possibilities).

(Considering the verbal action as the meaning of the sentence) The action (that is the meaning of the verb), which is different from other actions, and the means of which has a specific sphere-of-operation (i.e., itself), is here stated (as the meaning of the sentence). Words (used in the sentence) are for the hearers to understand the meaning (of the sentence).

(The Akhanda-position about the sentence and its meaning is re-stated) —

¹²²
According to others the sentence as well as its meaning is an integral entity revealed by the words which are in a certain order, but it itself does not show the order of the words

416 स्वरूप विद्याते यथा तत्त्वात्मा न निरूप्यते।
नासित्त यथा स्वरूप तु तत्त्वात्मा निरूप्यते॥

416 We do not investigate the real nature of that (here, the word-meaning) which (obviously) has a form of its own. It is only when a thing (here, the meaning of the sentence) does not have such a form that we seek for its essential nature.

417 अशाब्दस्यपरर्वस्य रूपनिद्वारण विदु।
अर्थावलम्बस्य ह्रर्षःशब्दस्यो जाते स्पृति॥

417 There are others who think that the understanding of the meaning of the sentence is not through words. The words only give rise to a mental recollection which has the appearance of the meaning (of the sentence).

418 अन्यथावानिरस्म्बन्धाद्रवाह बश्चोभिमत्यते।
अन्यथा वाहशब्रि वाही शश्च प्रतीयते॥

418 (Illustration for the notion that the real nature of things can be different from what one understands from words) — The burnt man understands burning in a certain way from his (direct) contact with fire, but the meaning 'burning' is conveyed by the word (burning) in a different way.

419 पृथविनिष्ठततच्चनां पृथ गर्भनुपातिनां।
इनिवानं यथा कार्यमृते वेहान्न कल्यते॥

419 Just as the sense organs which possess separate principles, and act on their objects independently of each other cannot function except through the body,

420 तथा वश्चवा सचेष्वा पृथगर्भनिवेष्टिनाम्।
वाक्येयम् प्रतिबद्धतानां अर्थवत्ता न विद्याते॥
Similarly words which are fixed to their meanings independently of each other have no meaningfulness apart from sentences.

The meaning of the sentence is grasped as of the nature of a synthesis, when the individual word-meanings are in mutual association. Its essential nature is not presented (at the individual word-meanings) since it is seen as not being constituted of word-meanings.

A preception is not identical with its actual constituents (i.e., the sense-data), and similarly that formless one (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) is understood in the form of the synthesis of the word-meanings.

(Yet another argument to prove that the meaning of the sentence is conveyed only by the sentence) — Since a fact is conveyed either as existent or as non-existent, only a sentence is used to convey it.

The point is further clarified — Word-meaning, whether positive or negative, is not in practice understood without its being associated with a verb. Therefore it does not (in reality) exist.

The statement ‘existence’ (which is a one-word-sentence) is not understood in the form ‘there was existence’ ‘there is no existence’ or ‘there is no existence’ except through its association to the mention of a verb.
426. When the meaning-expressed-by-a-verb is connected with nominal accessories, its expectancy is not satisfied without the mention of the ‘existence-idea’ (i.e., the meaning of the nominal accessories).

427. The action-part of the meaning of a sentence is first picked out because of its primacy. The nominal accessories used to effect the objective-to-be-accomplished (i.e., the verbal action) are (therefore) secondary. However, the effect which the action (itself) brings about is its (own) result (for instance, the satisfaction of hunger in the case of the verb ‘bhuj’).

428. It is only the speaker who conceives the notion of ends and means or desires to construe the meaning (of the sentence) as a system of relations (between the end and means).

429. The action of ‘cooking’ is taken as an object in (the sentence) ‘I do cooking’ And when ‘cooking’ is expressed as the action-meaning of a verb, it is seen as an-objective-to-be-accomplished.

430. With whatever use (in view) a meaning is sought to be conveyed by the speaker, the meaning is established like that (in that context), because a meaning has several capacities.
Sometimes a connection (of contact) is said to exist between things which exist far from each other, and sometimes things in contact appear as being apart.

The separation of the (really) united, the union of the (really) separated, the unity of the (really) diverse and the diversity of the (really) single,—(in this way) things are established (as existing in contrary forms), either because they have many forms or have no forms. The only binding factor (in the determination of what is meant whenever reference is made to them) is the word because it has its capacity fixed.

A word is only a designation of an object, not an expression of (the essential nature of) such an object. It is not possible for words to deal with (i.e., to express the nature of) objects.

(Two examples are given to illustrate the point) —

It is a ‘conjunction’ which is an attribute of the conjoined which is named by the word for it (i.e., the word ‘samyoga’). Again, it is a relation which is implied in (the relation of) conjunction which is named ‘samavāya’ (‘inseparable connection’).
436 Objects are known not in their intrinsic nature, but as they are desired. The same object is described in different ways according to the use to which it is put.

437 The set-of-relationship (of the word-meanings) which resides in the meaning of the sentence is not localised in any part (of the sentence). But in discussions (i.e., in every-day language) men talk of the meaning of the sentence as having the nature of word-meanings.

438 It (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) is not really localised anywhere in the individual word-meanings or in the aggregate (Only), it is apparently divided into the word-meanings.

439 Through that analysis (of the sentence) undertaken to explain it as a means of understanding it, there is presented another meaning (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) the parts of which, when analysed show expectancy for one another.

440 It is the single (sentence-meaning) possessing several meaning-capacities that is considered as divided (on the basis of these capacities). That the meaning of the sentence is a single (entity) is understood from, sentences of a small measure (i.e., having a single word, for instance).
441. It is a meaning which is external to the conceptual meaning that is analysed whether such (external-meaning) is real or not. The division of the meaning after it is thus externalised is characterised by the analysis of the component-faculties (i.e., the word-meanings).

442. Even when there are several finite verbs (in it), a sentence is one, if they are mutually expectant. The prohibition of the dropping of accent in a finite verb preceded by other finite verbs is thus meaningful.

443. As regards him (i.e., Katyayana, the author of the Varttika) who has fixed the characteristic of a sentence as having (only) one finite verb, his stipulation of 'one finite verb' does not mean that the meaning of a sentence (which has several finite verbs) is divided since (there being several verbs) there are several sentences (as the opponent might wrongly argue).

444. In the case of (sentences) where (the verb) is linked to another verb, or alternatively is linked to another word (which is) linked to the first verb, e.g., the sentence 'mrgah pas' yata yāti' the explanation that the sentence as (exclusively) one or several does not hold.

314 The following karika is found after this in manuscript:

445. प्रत्ययायात्मनित्यत्तक्तयो न व्यवस्थित.
वार्त्ता च ततो रूप न ह्यासामुपपर्ययते.

315 काव्यस्य घ
316 पुनःस्तेषु इ
(138)

445. इतिकाल्यात्यायस्य सामथ्याविषयस्य कारक्याते। अश्रव्यावस्याकारक्यां सामप्टार्थ्यं तदुच्चायते॥

445. The question what makes a sentence complete is discussed. — That sentence in which there is expectancy for the means (of the action stated) because of the nature of the meaning of the sentence (but) which has no expectancy on the word-level is (also) described to be complete in meaning.¹³³

446. तत्त्वान्वितयायामात्रे तु यावानयोङ्गुज्यिते। विनापि तत्त्योऽण्यो शुद्धेऽक्यं सामायते॥

446. When a mere statement of a thing is made (in a sentence) and there is something connected with it, (even then) the sentence is complete verbally without that (something) being stated.

447. चद्दक्ष्मयामोऽदिशेषत्वं जयश्चिंक्षण कुर। तात्त्विब्याविशेषेश्च शाब्दाञ्जूव प्रतीयते॥

447. In the two sentences ‘Recite while moving about’ or ‘Move about while reciting’, although there is no difference in the significance of the two, a distinction (as to whether ‘kram’ (to move about) is primary or secondary) can be gathered from the verbal form.¹³⁴

448. पल्लवत जियायेवः कियात्तितिनिब्ध्याना। असत्वात्: कमोहेमोरेकाक्यात्॥ निब्ध्याना:॥

448. (If usages differ when meaning remains the same, sometimes meaning also differs when usages do not differ) — Actions which have (different) effects and are dependent on other (subsidiary) actions (which help their performance) are conveyed by the same verb-form, without numerating them individually from the points of view of their methods or their effects.¹³⁵

¹³³...
¹³⁴...
¹³⁵...

Manuscript does not give the second half of this karika—obviously an omission by the scribe.
It is (in general and) as divorced from (particular) differences that all actions are expressed by verbs. It is impossible to distinguish the differences (between actions) merely based on their sentential forms.

In examples like 'asvamedhena yaksyante rājānāh' (kings will perform the asvamedha sacrifice) and satram āsate brāhmanāh' (Brahmins perform sacrifice), the difference (between the performing of sacrifice by one king and by another and between sacrifice by one Brahmin and by another) is not conveyed by the verb-forms used.

The verb mentioned once, without repetition, with reference to the 17 (sacrificial goats) for Prajapati, is divided (so as to apply to each of the 17) by virtue of its potential significance.

(In the sentence Devadatta yajñadattavisnumitrā bhoyantām’’) either the action of ‘eating’ is concluded in (each of the subjects) Devadatta, etc singly, or the sentence is split up (into three sentences) in terms of the (three) subjects.

Sentences, when uttered are received in a certain form, and when understood are presented in a different form.

319 The reading in the Banaras text is which does not seem to make sense. The manuscript gives the sensible reading accepted in the text here.
The sutra Kartari’ is a sentence which (at first) conveys a meaning in general. It then is particularised into (statements about particular objects like) an animal, etc.

(In fact such a comprehension of the meaning of a sentence at a subsequent reading is necessary.) —If the expectancy about a thing which causes it is satisfied by listening to it once, then it (i.e., the thing) cannot be connected with another thing) by any means.

Thus a sentence which is finally a unity, but has several meanings and is thus a substratum for, and the source of component sentences remains as it were non-different from them.

In some places a verb accomplishes its objective in terms of particulars, (subject, object etc.), while in some others it accomplishes it in general terms.

Those distinctions (in verbs) which are distinctions of tense and distinctions such as are caused by words like ‘ustrāśkā’ do not cause the essential verbal word to be divided (in its signification) when it is used to denote its action meaning as a class.

This karika is missing in manuscript, although the commentary is given there.
459 (The converse case to that stated in 452 is stated here, that is, the case of a sentence in which there is one noun form and several verbal forms)  —  When in a sentence the nominal form is mentioned only once and there are verbs different from each other by virtue of their class, etc., then the verbs are related to it separately provided there is numerical parity (between the verbs and the meanings of the noun)

460 असाधिकृत्य यथाभिष्करणो विनियोजितविविधिकृता ।
प्रयोगविधा वेदवियो प्रतिवेदिव पृथक्को स्थिता ॥

460 —just as to a word like aksāh’ verbs like bhanj’ (break’), ‘bhaks’ (eat) and div’ (gamble), different from each other are separately connected, even where there is no difference in the time of the utterance of the nominal word (so far as the verbs are concerned) i.e., although there is only a single utterance of the noun)

461 असाधिकृत्य तत्त्वणां तत्त्वमुपायासमुत्त्युपपत्ता ।
एषा कमो विभक्तानां तत्त्वबद्धा सक्षरतिति ॥

461 (The same idea is discussed according to the principle of tantra) Words like aksāh’ which are capable of being used under a common form are used in that way. Their having the same form is the basis (of such use) These same words when separated from each other are used in succession, when used with a common form they are uttered only once

462 द्वार्म्यपूर्वः शब्दानां प्रयोगे समविच्छिन्नो ।
कमो वा योगशः वा यो लोको नातिनिविष्टे ॥

462 There are two established methods in which different words are used. They are succession and union, (simultaneity and nobody bypasses these two
463. क त्रिभुवनेन विभिन्न रूपं यौगिकान्ते।
व निष्ठाते।

463a Words employed one after another have different forms, but words used in union have the same form 142
463b But even when words are used in union, the verb follows the pattern of their successive use (i.e., as if the words are used in succession)

464. क भेदसंपन्नांकी स्व शब्दातिल्ले इव स्थिते।
व यौगिकाण्यनंकेन प्रयोगे विभिन्ने श्रुति।

464a These two powers (of words), namely, the power to remain apart or to be in union appear as if they do not belong to words (but to something like "time" outside them) (while, in truth, they are powers inherent in words themselves)
464b Even when several words are uttered under a common form the utterance is split severally (by the comprehending listener)

465. अभिन्नं भेदरूपं य एकोच्यों विचित्रत।
तवायवशस्यं समुदायोजनूृष्टो।

465 (A different way of interpreting the word ‘aksāḥ’ in the above-mentioned sentence is given) —
When it is desired to describe a composite of several meanings (like the meaning of the word ‘aksāḥ’) in terms of its components, then the relationships which the latter have (namely, being connected with the appropriate verbs from the verb-group, etc.) are associated with the composite meaning 143

466. भेदनिर्वेचने तयः प्रत्येक वा समाप्तै।
श्रुतिर्निर्वेचनमभिं वाक्यभेदबंविचित्रत।

466 (Yet other ways of looking at the problem are stated) —
On explaining words (like ‘aṅkṣāḥ’) in terms of the components they lend themselves for being split for use in the individual sentences (formed from the composite utterance

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423 नेविभिन्ने वच
‘aksāh bhaksyantām, bhojyantam, divyantam’) Or the word with its number altered, lends itself for use in the individual sentences 144

467. तत्त्रैकवचनात्तो वा सोङ्ख्यशब्दः प्रयुज्यते।
प्रस्यंक वा बहुविवन प्रविभागो व्याख्यति ॥

467a (The two alternatives are stated in reverse order) —
There the word ‘aksा’ is used in the singular number 145

467b Or the word is used in its plural number in the individual sentences 146

468. द्विष्ठानि यानि वाक्यानि तेष्वप्येक्षवदशीनाम्।
अनेकशक्तिरेकस्य स्वशक्तिः "प्रविभागते।”

468 (The problem of the sentence with two meanings is approached from the point of view of the Akhanda-school) —
According to those who uphold the sameness of the Word (s’abda), the meaning-capacity of the single sentence is divided on the basis of the difference (in the aspects) of that capacity, in such sentences as have two meanings 147

469. तत्त्रभएतत्नस्योब् स्मात्तायोगस्तत्तचलक्षण।
उपायस्तत्र सत्सं। प्रतिप्रतृतु विद्यते।”

469 (The upholders of the Bheda doctrine hold a different view on this) —
Or we have there the use of two entirely different statements, (the means of such use) being the employment of a common form, the coalesced form is split according to the understanding of the listener

470. भेदेनावगतो पूर्व शब्दी तुल्याभ्यो पुनः।
तत्त्रेण प्रतिप्रत्तारु। प्रयोक्त्रा प्रतिपादिता।”

470 (The same point as in 469) —
Two words which have the same form and which were originally apprehended as different are used in such a way that the listeners are made to apprehend them by the speaker under a common form

१२३ सा शक्ति —च
471 (In this stanza the view of a section of the Bheda school is considered) —
One of the two (words possible to be conveyed by a common form) is intended by the speaker, the other is conveyed incidentally

471b Without such intention on the part of the speaker the word will work with (both) meaning-capacities

472 Sometimes several capacities of the same thing are made use of at the same time. Fire is used in the same place both for heat and for light.

473 (The views of the Bheda and Abheda schools are again summarised) —
On hearing but once a sentence which conveys several meanings, either through its being repeated or through the exercise of different powers (respectively according to the Bheda and Abheda views), it presents itself as being divided either through evidence got from other passages or through the principle that several capacities reside in the same form.

474 In the case of the term samprārasāna, the distinction (as to its application to) the letter or to the sentence on the evidence of other Sutras is quite properly included in that one Sutra.

148
475. तथा दिवर्चनेश्वरीति सतद्रोपायाविलक्षणं।
एकांशेः निबेशो भाष्यं एवोऽपवर्णितं॥

(An example how the Mahabhashya makes use of the principle of tantra is discussed.) —Similarly it is described in the Bhāṣya itself that in the aphorism (of Pāṇini) dvrvacane‘ct’ there is through the mentioning of a thing once (the conveying of its occurrence twice) on the principle of tantra.

476. प्रायेण सक्षेपश्चिन्त्यविवर्णपरिग्रहाः॥
सप्रायं चैवाकरणान् संग्रह्द्वस्तुपाते॥

(The next few stanzas trace the history of Sanskrit grammar.) —When the Samgraha falling in the hands of such grammarians as had a tendency to summarise and had only a limited knowledge, became almost forgotten,

477. कुलेऽव पतञ्जलिना गुरुणा तीर्थविवर्णाः॥
सर्वेषा ध्यायबोधाना सहभाष्येष निबिधते॥

478. अन्तऽवगारे गामीयविवर्णानन्दः सौष्ठवात्॥
तत्समस्तप्रकृतिविधीनाः नौवास्तिमयति।॥

—and Patanjali, the master who was learned in all Vedic lore composed the Mahabhashya, the source of all principles, unfathomable because of its profundity, (and) clear because of its excellence of style, the uneducated could not comprehend its meaning.

479. वैज्ञानिकवह्यं शुक्तकार्यनुसारिभः।
आर्यं विलाचितं प्रवेशं सप्रायीतकार्यं॥

And then, when that sacred text, which was a criticism of the Samgraha was submerged by Baiju, Saubhava and Haryaksa, the followers of dry logic,

480. व. पतञ्जलिधात्वेऽथं धर्मं व्याकरणारसम्।
काले स धातिकारणेऽथं प्रवर्तणां व्यवस्थर॥

—the science of grammar which (thus) slipped away from the disciples of Patanjali in course of time came to survive only in Southern versions.
And then the texts were procured from the mountain and the science of grammar once again made the multi-branched one (that it was) by the teacher Candra and others who were followers of the principles of the Mahābhāṣya.

This summary of the science (of grammar) was composed by my teacher after learning the various other systems and our own system.

Here (i.e., in Cantos I and II) only the bare essentials of a few systems are given. There will be a study in details in Canto III.

Thought becomes clear by a study of different systems of thought. What points can possibly be contradicted by him who learns (only) his system.

The knowledge of people who imagine things to be such and such, without (relying on) the ancient science (in interpreting them) and who have not studied the older teachers, will not be very clear.
NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION

1 The words ‘artha’ and ‘prakriya’ are doubtless used in the stanza with a double reference, ‘artha’ being also the ‘thing meant’ and ‘prakriya’ being also the grammatical formation of words.

2 Cf Yaska, Nirukta 12 sad bhāvavikāra bhavantīti  
Vārṣāyamīh, jāyate’ sti viparīnamate vardhate’ pakṣiyate vinās’yatīti  
This is in reference to the definition of the verb as having ‘becoming’ as its chief aspect (bhāvaprādhānāh) Similarly in MBh I p 258—lines 13-14.

3 Cf MBh I—p 13—Line 22 mahatā devena nah śāmyam śādityadhīreyam vyākaranam  
Kaiyāṇa commenting on this line says ‘mahatā pareṇa brahmena ityarthah’

4 Cf MBh Vol I—p 1—line 14-19  
kāṇi punah sabdānuśāsanasya prayojanāmi  
rakṣoḥgāmalaghvasandehah prayojanam  
prādhānām ca  
ṣadangesu vyākaranam, pradhāne  
ca krto yatnah phalavān bhavati

5 This stanza discusses the scope of the function of grammar  
Of the two aspects of speech, namely, the supreme Word-principle and its manifestation in the form of human speech which exists in such distinct forms as syllables, words and sentences, it is the second which is the concern of grammar.

6 Words are employed to state the behaviour of objects and not the fundamental truth about them  
(arthapraṇārṣatīttavam vivaksā na tu vastūnām svarūpena sattvamasmāttavam vā—Punyarāja).
See also VPII—434 and 436
Punyarāja also gives two alternate interpretations of the stanza as follows

(i) Or the behaviour of objects is general before it is associated with words. It is words which give them a specific form by describing them (yadvā arthapraṇāvṛtti-tattvam sāmānyam, tasya śabdā nibandhanamāṁityarthah) see also VP I—119

(ii) Or the actions of objects, i.e. the six changes like birth (production) which are conveyed by the verbal forms, the fact of their being manifested in Time, similarly the nature of words and their validity—all these when understood from grammar are valid, otherwise not (yadvā arthānām pravṛtterākhyatopaṭtajānmaṇḍikriyāyastattvam, sādhyatvam sādhanākānksārūpam kālābhivyaktiḥetutvam ca tathā śabdānāṁ sa sādhūrasya vyākaranāvagataḥ samskāro’vikalah tadvikalastvapabhrams’ā tī)

8 thing-classes (artha-jātayah)
Words signify thing-classes, and when they convey these, they are conceived differently either as a class or as an individual

9 For translation the second line is read as
vyavasthā nityatā ucyate
The combined reading vyavasthānityatā does not seem to make sense cf MBh Vol I p 7
athavā nedameva nityalaksanam dhruvam kuṭaṣtham avicāli anapāyopajanaṇaṇīkāṁ anutpattavyarāddhyavyāpapayoti yat tannityamāṁ tadāpi nityam yasyāmmastvatvam na vṛhanyate—This, as the quotation shows, is a definition, a vyavasthā (a convention) about the idea of nityatā (eternity) See also VPII 29 using vyavasthā as an isolate and directly referring to its use in the previous stanza
That use shows that the previous stanza has been discussing a certain vyavasthā (convention), and not using vyavasthā as an adjective forming part of a compound vyavasthānityatā

The reading hastasparsādbhandhena accepted in the Benares text does not seem to make sense. Nevertheless it is given as an alternate reading in the footnote in the text.

The interpretation of the second line differs from Punyarāja's. He takes 'eko numittam sabdānām' as referring to 'dhvāni' and 'aparo'rthe prayujyate' as referring to 'spota'. But cf. Karika 46 below which clearly states that spota is the cause (kāraṇam) (which is the same as numittam), of sūtras which are the same as dhvānas. The production of speech-sounds is caused by the need for the spota to be revealed, i.e., when the meaning-conveying principle is to function.

However, the difference between Punyarāja and the translator in the interpretation of the stanza does not make any difference in the fundamental notions themselves about spota and dhvāni.

Causes such as the vocal chords. The alternative reading 'karanebhyah' given in the foot-note directly mentions this.

Punyarāja explains the three stages as follows -
tathā vyāvahānko vaikharirūpah śabdah kramagrāhyo'pi pratisamhrtakrama ekabuddhi visayo bhūtva mraavyavakramarūpena buddhavisayo 'ntah karane bhūtvā' ntahkaranavṛttrūpakramarūpadhvamdharmāpattya pu-narapi vyavahāramavataraṭi
14 There are points of similarity and contrasts between words and the sense-faculties. The similarity between them is that both are instruments through which the nature of objects is understood. But there is the contrast between them that in the case of the word its form must be perceived before it conveys its meaning while in the case of the sense organ the knowledge of the faculty itself is not an essential pre-requisite for it to act as the instrument of the perception of the object.

15 It was stated above that the word 'agni' which is uttered in everyday life, say in the kitchen, to convey a thing-meant is not linked with grammatical operations. But this does not mean that utterance of the word is not necessary for grammatical operations to be linked with it. There is, for the word uttered in a grammatical situation, the capacity to be linked with a grammatical rule. In other words, the common point of utterance between the word used in the two situations, is still further qualified by association with grammatical operations in the grammatical situation. This is illustrated in the stanza.

16 The stanza is intended to illustrate the same point as in the previous verse. The structure of the idea must a third storey, so to speak. To explain uccārana, the common point between utterance of a word in life and in grammar, is qualified in the case of grammar by its being linked with grammatical operations (62).

The common feature between an upamāna and an upameya is still further qualified, in the case of the upamāna, by other attributes (63).

In the same way, the attribute which qualifies an object is itself qualified by other attributes (62).
link in the chain of relations) For instance, śuklām 
ptām = white cloth (a case of ‘white’ being a qualifier) 
But in śuklātaram rūpām, a colour which is whiter 
(clearer whiteness) the whiteness is qualified, and there 
it is mentioned as a dravya (svātantryena)

That a word has its form as meaning is also necessary in grammar This is explained in Karkas 66, 
and 67 A form does not become a meaningful base 
(prātupadika) unless it has a meaning. It is to prātupadikas that suffixes are prescribed to be added. Therefore 
meaningfulness of the form is a necessary pre-condition before case-suffixes are added. The two specific 
case-suffixes mentioned here are nominative and genitive. Examples may be given in gaurbāhika (nominative) 
and uño (pragrhyam) (genitive). The first does not mean that a cow is a Bāhīka (member of a particular 
tribe). It means the word gauh is used to refer to a bāhīka. The word gauh has to mean its own form if this 
nomina tive construction is to be possible. The second means that uño is known as pragrhya in grammar. The 
genitive in uño is possible only if it primarily has a meaning, namely its form.

17 Pāṇini I 1 68
Kāśika on it reads śastre śabdasya svarūpam bodhanī-
yam na bāhyo’rthah angārādhīhyasca na ṇhak
In grammar the meaning of the word is its form. Thus 
the word ‘agni’ in the sūtra “agneredhak” means the 
form agni and not the thing fire. The sūtra does not 
mean “add ṇhak to embers” cf MBh Vol 1—p 176—
lines 25-28 and p 177—lines 1 and 2 śabdenārthagater-
arthasya sambhavāttadvācinah samjñāpratisedhārtham 
svamṛūpavacanam (Vārttika) śabdenoccantenārtho gam-
yate gāmānaya dadhyasānetyartha āniyate arthaśca 
bhūjyate arthasyāsambhavāt iha vyākarane’rthe kārya-
Regarding the question whether a word is a genus or a particular see VPI 45 above and MBh Vol I-p 6-8—where the ākṛtṁtyatva of words is discussed under the topic "nītye śabdārtha sambandhe" Ākṛtī as conceived there refers both to words and things, and when considered as nītya (eternal) it means 'genus' See also P S Subramonya Sastri—'Lectures on Patanjali's Mahabhasya' p 56

The two verses 68 and 69 state two different views on what is meant by the term "own form" or 'svam rūpam' in the sūtra 'svamrūpam etc' They ask the question whether, for example, in the sūtra "agner dhak", the word agni means a name or a named and a particular or a universal If the word agni means the form agni in grammar, then it is both a name (samjñā) and a named or meaning (samjñī) It can also be a particular or an universal According to stanza 68, agni in the sūtra means the word agni as a particular But it does not mean that the enjoined grammatical operation takes place only on that particular instance of the word as given in the ūtra That is obviously absurd The grammatical operations take place with all instances of the word agni, that is with the genus That is, the genus is brought into the situation by virtue of grammatical operations

The view expressed in 69 is different from this According to it, agni in the sūtra is the form-meaning of the word agni and occurring as it does in one instance, it is a particular But any particular occurrence is a particularisation of a genus The prescribed grammatical operation takes place on each instance, or each particular, which is a specific occurance of the genus.
18. That is, in A's pronunciation of the word 'suta' the 'u' may be of the same length as in B's pronunciation of the word 'sūta', but it is only after the listener has understood the word via the prākrtadhvani, that he can say that the length there belongs to the prākrtadhvani.

19. Abhivyaktivādinah are the Mīmāṃsakas

Cf Śāstradīpīkā (Transl D Venkataramaiah) p 196

A sabda (dhvani) that comes to light after the effort is made, need not be an effect exclusively, that it comes to light after the effort fits in with the view that sabda is revealed (abhivyangya).

20. Those who hold this view, argue that if the object also were acted upon, then the object could equally well be perceived by another sense-organ.

21. The theory that cognition is essentially integral in its nature is cited here. In an act of knowledge, there is identity of the cogniser, cognition and the cognised. In the same way while an object is perceived, one feels that its perception is through its parts. However, in all these, apprehension of parts, or of subject—object difference in cognition is only apparent, it is only an aid to an integral perception. Thus there is a letter 'ga' in the sound-pattern which reveals the word 'gauh',

and listeners when they hear the sentence 'gām ānaya' will think that they are listening to the letter "ga" which reveals the word "gauh" and similarly think that they recognise the word "gauh" in the sentence. But this is an illusion. What we get here is a confusion of two different ga-letters.
22 There are two philosophies on the constitution of speech-units (syllables, words and sentences) and on the apprehension of their meanings. These are given the names akhandavāda and khandavāda. According to the first position, syllables, words, and sentences are integral units. They only appear to have parts. The comprehension of their meanings is also in an integral manner; and parts play their role in this only in a transitory way. While parts are comprehended, the final cognition of the speech-unit is in a flash, as an integral cognition. Thus the appearance of parts in a syllable, of syllables in a word, and of words in a sentence are less real than the final cognition of the syllable, word, and sentence respectively, and the cognition of parts merges in the integral perception which is the culminating point. What is said above about the perception of speech-units is true also of the perception of their meaning.

As opposed to this is the view of the Khaṇḍavādins, that is, those who hold that the part is the reality and the whole is only an addition of parts. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Nāyāyikas, broadly speaking, hold this view. khaṇḍa = part

23 See Note 17 above
Cf also MBh Vol I—p 26—lines 1 and 2 athavā, ubhayataḥ sphaṭamātram uṛduṣyate rasruter—las’ rutarbhavatiḥ, this view, is the view of the jātāśabdavādins and Patañjali means the sound-genus when he uses the word sphaṭa.

24 The Benares commentary gives two reasons for the absence of difference between sphaṭa and dhvam, namely, ‘since
both sphaṭa and dhvani are placed in the same substratum namely space, or 'since it is the inner speech-principle which is revealed in the form of the sounds.'

25 It was stated above that the lengthening or shortening which takes place as a feature of individual diction is a secondary feature of sound. This stanza seeks to remove a possible misconception that the long or prolated vowels could thus be grouped as a secondary modification made by the speaker on the primary short-sound. The long and prolated sounds are like the short one, a kind of primary sound (prākṛta-dhvani.) As far as dictional changes are concerned, they are produced subsequent to the cessation of vibration, in other words through the momentum produced in the body of the sound already produced.

26 This stanza explains the process of the transformation of breath into speech-sounds, and the letters (i.e. meaningful speech-sounds) being revealed through them. The breath which contains the potentiality for transformation into speech-sounds like ka, ca, etc., undergoes such transformation at the centres of speech production. Through these speech sounds are revealed the meaningful units like letters and words.

The breath dividing itself into various speech-sound might be usefully compared to molten metal flowing through various grooves in a machine and forming itself into various shapes according to the shape of the groove.

27 In this karika the word 's'abda' is used to refer both to physical sound and to speech-sound. Hence it is translated with the common term 'sound.'

28 Saḍja Name of one of the 7 svaras or primary notes in music
( 156 )

29  Cf VP II—147

30  kārye pravarttate—caitanyam nirvṛttikṛṣṭāpaprāptibhusca kāryesu pravarttate
    svarūpavibhāge tu saīva vāk bāhyavasturupatayā nirvṛttīkṛṣṭāpaprāptisu karmahāvam prapadyatītyarthah

31  The terms svamātrā and paramātrā are descriptive names of two kinds of cosmology. According to the theory of svamātrā, all manifestations are apparent externalisations of the inner soul. It remains inside, but looks as if it exists in the form of external objects. According to the other doctrine (paramātrā), the relation between the All-soul and the created world is something like that between a fire and a spark which flies away from it.

32  Cf Theory of Speech and Language—p 31, para 2

33  Cf catvāri sṛngā traya’syapāda dve śīrse saptahastāsa’ asya, trīthā baddho vṛśabho roravit mahō devo martyrā āviveṣa (R V IV 58.3 (Quoted in MBh Vol I—p 3)

34  Cf VPII—307a, 308—for interpretation of one sentence through the evidence from another sentence we may give the following as an example

‘aktāh sarkarā upadadhāti’ (Place anointed candy) The sentence does not say with what substance the candy is to be anointed. This means that the meaning of the word ‘aktāh’ and through it that of the injunction is not definite. We decide with what material the candy is to be anointed from the evidence of another sentence. ‘tejo vai ghratam’ (ghee is splendour). From this, a praise of ghee the conclusion is reached that the candy is to be anointed with ghee.
pasýanti, madhyamā and vaikhāri are the names given to speech at the three stages through which it evolves into utterance. At the first stage pasýanti, speech is the speech-principle in which the capacity for revelation is inherent, but not explicit. At that stage, speech is un-differentiated principle, it has not yet started into a process. It is only identical with consciousness or perception in its intrinsic form. Pasýanti—the seeing, the perceiving one.

At the second stage, speech has already become a dynamic process, and is mental. It is linked to an object or an idea, and has already reached the stage of concretization on the level of the mind. But it has not yet been uttered. It is madhyamā, or intermediate, since it is between the stage of being a principle and being uttered.

The third stage is vaikhāri, when speech is an uttered realization. It is articulate speech.

According to some thinkers, prior to pasýanti there is a stage called parā, when speech is the supreme principle. In this view, there are four stages parā, pasýanti, madhyamā, and vaikhāri (See R V IV 58 3 quoted in note 33 above).

See Pānini VIII 1 28 and 22. VIII 1 28 says ‘A finite verb is unaccented when preceded by a word which is not a finite verb. Eg devadattah pacati. VIII 1 22 says “yusmad” and “asmad” are substituted for the genitive and dative singular “te” and “me” respectively, (when these are preceded by a word), and they are unaccented. The ‘ādi’ in the kānkā refers to this substitution of “yusmad” and “asmad”. See also the following references, Pānini VIII 1 19.
and 1.22 cf MBh Vol III—p 376—lines 10-13
sāmānāvākye nāghāta yusmadasmadādes 'ah (Vārttika)
sāmānāvākyā iti prakṛtyā nāghātayusmadasmadādes'a
vaktvayāh kim prayaojanam nanavākye ma bhūvan-
miti ayam dando harānena odanam paca tava bhavisyatā
mama bhavisyatā See also note 37 below

37 Pāṇini VIII 1 19
All the syllables of a vocative are unaccented when a
word precedes it and it does not stand at the beginning
of a hemistich. Eg vṛajāni devadatta

But the condition for a vocative being unaccented is
that it should be in the same sentence as the preceding
word which causes the dropping of the accent (saṃna-
vākya.) Now the vocative is not included as forming part
of the sentence as defined by the Vārttikakāra. Hence in
our example it is not in the same sentence as the prece-
ding word. Therefore the rule regarding the dropping
of the accent seems to be violated. This stanza answers
this objection. The vocative is included as forming part
of the sentence, since it is considered as belonging
to the category of adverbs. Hence the definition of
the sentence ‘ākhyātām sāvyayakārakavīsesanamekatin
(Vārttika on Pāṇini II 1 1) includes the vocative
also as the kind of word which can exist in a sentence
consistent with the definition. See also note 36 above

The argument in this context may be briefly stated
as follows. Kāyāyana, the author of the Vārttika on
Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī has given a definition of a sentence
as “a verb accompanied by indeclinables, nominal case
forms and qualifying and modifying words, and a
sentence will have only one principal verb” (ākhyātām
sāvyayakārakavīsesa nam ekatā̄).
The *Mimamsakas*’ definition of the sentence is given in VPII-4. It may be noted that in *Kātyāyana*’s definition and the *Mimamsaka*’s definition, the verb is the principal part of the sentence. Does this mean that the two definitions are basically identical? No. The application of these definitions brings out different results. For example, *Kātyāyana*’s definition does not come as a violation of *Pāṇini*’s rule on accentuation of verbs, whereas the *Mimamsaka* definition causes a violation. How is this? *Pāṇini* VIII 1.28 says that a finite verb in a sentence will be unaccented provided a word which is not a finite verb precedes it and the two are in the same sentence (*sāmānava-kyāya*). Now according to *Kātyāyana*, a sentence can have only one finite verb (ekatī) according to this definition's sentence like *yam dando harānena* ‘this stick, with this take’ is really two sentences, since after ‘danḍa’ there is the verb ‘asti’ understood. Hence the verb ‘harā’ is accented, since ‘ayam dando hara anena’ are two sentences, it having two finite verbs, there is consequently no *sāmānava-kyātva*

In the *Mimamsaka* definition, however, the verb ‘harā’ will be accented since there is *sāmānava-kyātva* (the state of being in the same sentence). To the *Mimamsaka*, a collection of words having expectancy for one another, which has a verb as its principal member, and which has a common purpose is a sentence. The piece ‘ayam dando harānena’ satisfies all these conditions, above all the primary condition of having a common purpose. The whole piece is intended as an instruction to perform sacrifice. Since then, according to the *Mimamsaka*’s conception of the sentence, the verb ‘harā’ has words which are not finite verbs preceding it in the same sentence it should be unaccented, which is wrong.
Two arguments are given in this stanza in favour of the contention that the word is a complex whole and parts of it are not real. One is that the word vṛsabha, udaka and yāvaka are not found to possess meaningful parts. Another is that assumptions of the kind that a word is formed whenever there is a combination of roots and suffixes, and nowhere where there is none such, are only pragmatic assumptions. They do not prove that words are composed of real parts like roots and suffixes.

Cf MBh Vol I p 362
ime tarhyekārthibhāvavīsesah samkhyāvīseso vyaktā-bhūdhānāmupasarjanavīsesam ca yoge (lines 12-13) Vyaktābhūdhānam bhavati vākye brāhmanasya kambalastisṭhatī tī Samāse punaravāktaṃ brāhmanakambalastisṭhatī In the context the difference between a sentence and a compound is discussed. In the latter there is a fusion of the meanings of the components’

This is a variety of the akhanda view. According to it speech and meaning are aspects of the same reality, namely, the inner consciousness.

If the padavādi says that the evidence for the existence of real units of word-meanings in the sentence is that they are perceived then they can be proved to be non-existent if the evidence be proved non-existent. That is what the stanza seeks to do. The mind perceives word-meanings in a sentence in a series according to the padavādi, that means the perception of a preceding word-meaning has to terminate when the mind passes on to the next word-meaning. The meaning of this statement is that the evidence for the existence of the individual word-meaning does not exist. Consequently the doctrine that the meaning of a sentence is formed from the meaning of words also stands discredited.
— in different forms like rāja, rājñā, rājñī, etc. This shows that there is no fixed forms of the word. Different forms convey the same meaning.

The word rāja in a compound like “rājapurusa” has the same form as rāja, the Imperative second person singular of the verb rāj—to shine. Hence an expression like ‘he rājapurusa’—you king’s servant—can also convey the meaning Oh! ‘Man, you shine’ ‘brājasva purusa’.

Cf. the English ‘blackbird’—just as the idea ‘black’ plays no part in the scheme of the meaning of the word, similarly the idea of horse has no part, in the semantic realisation of the word ‘aśvakarna’ ‘Aśvakarna’ is the name of a tree. Even though originally the tree got that name from its leaves being shaped as the ears of a horse (see Monier Williams), every time the word is uttered, the listener’s mind does not picture the ear of a horse in understanding the meaning of the word.

rūdhi—words are those whose meanings are not derived etymologically, but are conventionally fixed “taila-pāyikā”, does not mean “a woman who drinks oil” as the explanation of the word from the component words (taila-oil, pāyika—a woman who drunks) may lead one to believe. The word means a cockroach.

— cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein ‘Tractus Logico—Philo-

sophic—is’—p 189 ‘My propositions are elucidatory in this way. He who understands them finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it. He must surmount these propositions, then he sees them rightly.
47 In this kārka the view known as the abhūhitānvayavāda on what constitutes the meaning of a sentence is given. In this view, words individually convey in the sentence that meaning they convey as isolates. This meaning of the word as isolate is a thing-meant. In the sentence, however, the words convey an added element through their mutual relationship. This additional element is the meaning of the sentence (abhūhitānām anvayāh). In other words—words convey a thing-meant, sentence conveys a relationship. See also D M Datta “The Six Ways Of Knowing” (London 1932) pp 289-293.

48 This discusses another view known as anvītābhūdhāna, this also falling within the main subdivision of the view that a sentence is an aggregate of words, and the meaning of a sentence is an aggregate of word-meanings (samghātapaksa).

In this view the relationship of words among themselves in the structure of the sentence takes place first, through this relationship then, both the meaning of the sentence, and the meaning of the word are formed. In other words, the syntactical relationship of words not only produces the sentence and its meaning, they also invest a word with its meaning, which is derived from its syntactical relationship with other words in forming the sentence (anvītānām abhūdhānah).

To restate the difference between the abhūhitānvaya and the anvītābhūdhāna positions in the first, significant words enter into a syntactical relationship leading to the formation of the meaning of the sentence, in the second, words become significant through their syntactical relationship with each other (1) abhūhitānām anvayāh—syntactical relationship of the significant and (2) anvītānām abhūdhāna—signification by the syntactically related, through such relationship.
Words are the tangible facts in what is known as the sentence. The interconnection of words is a factor to be inferred from the result that the association of words conveys a meaning which is more than the meanings of the words.

The reference is to the well-known statement padaprākṛtiḥ samhitā occurring in the Rgveda Prātisākhya. This is capable of a double interpretation depending on how the compound padaprākṛtiḥ is broken. It can be broken as padānām prakṛtiḥ or pada eva prakṛtiḥ. According to the former, the samhitā (the connected utterance, or the sentence) is the original, and the pada-text or the word is derived from it, according to the second, the pada-text or the word is the original and the samhitā (the sentence) is built from it.

In other words, the same meaning as is conveyed by a word can be considered as being conveyed by the collection of the letters which form the word.

This is serious as it will result in the non-performance of the sacrifice which means the violation of injunction ‘yajeta’.

This would be impossible if the total meaning of the sentence were conveyed in one instalment without reference to the meaning of the words. In such cases, the listener’s familiarity or otherwise with the meaning of any word or words would be a matter of no significance.

The reference is to the sentence “śvetam chāgam ālavbheta (sacrifice a white goat).”

The essential difference between śruti, direct statement, and vākya (sentence) is that śruti conveys the meaning.
of a sentence right from listening, while to get its meaning from a syntactical connection, the sentence has quite obviously to be interpreted with reference to the relationship between the component words.

55 The idea is that the meaning of a phrase, or a clause or a word in the sentence is the meaning of the total sentence viewed in terms of analysis.

56 The example is given to show that perception of parts in integral cognitions is commonly experienced seen.

57 The translation takes a different line of interpretation from Punyarāja’s Punyarāja interprets the stanza as follows. Just as two cognitions, for instance, the cognition of ‘blue’ and the cognition of ‘yellow’ are alike in that they are both cognitions, and at the same time different when viewed from the angle of the objects perceived (i.e., since one is a cognition of ‘blue’ and the other a cognition of ‘yellow’) etc.

58 See Pāṇini I 2 27
59 See Pāṇini III 1 33
60 See Pāṇini I 2 27

61 Thus the word ghaṭa means not ‘roundness’ and ‘being made of clay’, nor ‘roundness’ or ‘being made of clay’. It means “‘roundness”, “being made of clay”, etc., without any such inter-relation of combination or alternation.

62 The idea which the mind forms on hearing a word is its meaning, and this idea is linked up with an external object and thus we get the word-meaning-object triangle.

63 The meaning of individual words find unity in the meaning of the sentence itself as revealed by a process.
above logical thinking—a sort of integral process functioning and presenting the meaning in a flash

64 The word 'gauh' means 'a cow' but the idea of a bell which hangs from the cow's neck or a flea which rests the cow's head is not included in the limit of the reference of the word

65 Nut(n) is an āgama and is found in words like kārtmām and gurūnām. It is not a significant element in words because we can find genitive forms like bhavatām without it. Similarly sap, the conjugational sign a, is not found in examples like 'attu' cf on Panini III 1 67

bhāvakarmakartārah sārvadhātukārthāścedekadvibahusu niyamānumapattiradadarthatvāt (Vārttika) vikaranārthā iti cetkṛabhhihte vikaranābhāv (Vārttika) Also See MBh Vol II—p 57—lines 23, 27

66 In other words if a verb is to get 'being' in a sentence it must first, be associated with prefixes Why? Because for an action to be accomplished, nominal agents, or instruments, are necessary and a verb is the name of an action

67 Cf MBh Vol I—p 434—lines 9 and 10—kah punaścena krtorthah, samuccayo'nvācayah itaretarayogah samāhāra iti

68 See Pānini I 4 57 and MBh Vol I-p 341 line 1-9

68a The first part of the kārīka explains what is implied in a word like rājapurusah, meaning the king's servant. A man is a king's servant since the king controls him. But the verb (bibharti-controls, governs) is itself not present there. It was withdrawn after effecting the relationship of governor and governed, or controller and controlled.
between the king and the servant. See also note 223 under Sanskrit text.

68b The discussion is about the expression “mātuh smaranam”
Why is the word mātuh in the genitive? It is a sesā-sasthi, and conveys the idea of the accusative mātuh smarati means mātaram smarati. If the genitive is already there in the expression, why then is a special injunction on sasthi in the sūtra prātipadyena adhīgartha etc as applying to expressions like mātuh smaranam. The answer to this is that it is an injunction of restriction (niyama). The injunction means that sasthi alone be used, and let there not be a compound like mātrsmaranam. The counter example referred to is karmantū kim māturgunaṁīh smaranam? That is, if mātuh smaranam means mātaram smarati it means mātaram gunaṁīh smarati and not mātuh gunaṁīh smarati (not that ‘one remembers the qualities of the mother, but that ‘one remembers the mother through her qualities). Ultimately thus mātuh smaranam means mātuh gunaṁīh smaranam.

69 See Pāṇini—I 4-91

70 The view that individual letters are not meaningful is exemplified. Example the form ‘iskartāra’ which is ‘niskartāra’ minus ‘n’ conveys the meaning of the latter. Assuming that the two are not two different words, having the same meaning, the interpretation of this is that a part of a word can stand for the whole which means the missing syllable is not significant from the point of view of meaning.

71 ‘Udvami’ is used as an abbreviated form of udvamati= to vomit and ‘kari’ is used for representing ‘karomi’ and ‘karosi’. 
Grammatical rules are not everything. They do not deal with Reality in its ultimate aspects. Their concern is with the manifested world of things and names.

The argument in the stanzas 241-247 is that the meaning of the sentence ‘vrkso nāsti’ (there is no tree) is a total and undivided one and it cannot be built up from the meanings of the components, since according to the doctrine of the indivisibility of the sentence and the meaning of the sentence, such components or their meaning do not exist.

The author examines possible ways in which the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence through analysis is possible. First, can the meaning of the single word vrksa be negated by the particle “na”? That is, can it effect the negation of the object, namely, tree? The answer is no. The object cannot be negated if it exists. That would mean making an existent into a non-existent and is impossible.

Next can the existence of the tree be negated by the particle ‘na’? No, because such a concept is non-verbal in character (since it is a concept, a buddhi). Therefore its negation by the particle ‘na’ is not possible. A concept has to be verbal if it is to be negated by the particle “na”.

Or again a third alternative is considered. Can we say that particle ‘na’ states that the concept of the existence of the tree is false? This way of looking at the sentence is also wrong. This gives ‘na’ a function which it normally does not have. Its normal function is to state a non-existence, rather than to falsify a concept of existence.

Again, can it be said that the particle ‘na’ functions without any reference to a substratum? In that case,
'na' should be stated first in the sentence and not as we have in the sentence under examination.

Or can it be argued that the word 'vrksa' is used to limit the substratum of the operation of 'na' to 'vrksa' the tree)—This also is wrong, because it would convert a direct statement (i.e. a statement of a positive fact) into a statement laying down a restriction, or one which indicates a restriction. Again if the word 'vrksa' is given to limit an already understood substratum, then it is a repetition. Thus considered in all possible ways the recognition of word-meanings in the sentence is impossible.

In the next kārīka another example is given to illustrate the point that the sentence conveys a meaning which is different from the word-meanings i.e., that the recognition of word meanings in the ultimate analysis is wrong. The reference is to the sentence udahāri bhagīni yātvam śirasā anadvāham vahasi sā tvam prācīnam kumbham abhidhāvantam adrāksīh.

The ultimate meaning of the sentence is different from the meanings of the word-meanings.

The question discussed in this connection is whether or not the identity of a word changes with each different meaning it has. A word may be entered in the dictionary several times, each time it having a different meaning. There are at least two ways of constructing this position. It can be argued that each time the word has a different meaning it is a different entity, or that it is only the same word, with different meanings. In the text both views are discussed.

A hymn when used or repeated becomes logically different. And these latter hymns which get their entity from the repetition of the already existent hymns of the Veda are
also Vedic. Indeed, those are the really meaningful hymns and the stated ones are only pointers to them. In other words the significance of a hymn is derived from its use. Thus if the sāmīdheni hymn is repeated, we have as many different hymns as there are numbers of repetitions.

According to Panini V 4.50, the affix “cvi” comes after a word when the agent has attained to the new state expressed by the word, what the thing previously was not and when the roots kr (to make), bhū (to be) are conjoined with it’ (C S Vasu). Thus we get “asuklah suklah sampadyate tam karoti =suklikaroti

In the same way there can be a form ‘gorbhavati’ from ‘agor gaursampadyate go’bhavat (some one who is not a cow has attained to the state of a cow, he became a cow). Now, some one like a Bāhika can become a cow only when cow-ness is attributed to him. In other words the meaning of the word ‘gauh’ is secondary (gauna) in that context.

In ‘sukliḥbhavati’, on the other hand, something which is not white can become white in a real sense (uttarāvasthā vastusatyāva-Punyarāja). Therefore the meaning of the word ‘śukla’ is not secondary.

The grammatical significance of ‘gauh’ in the example quoted above being considered as conveying a secondary meaning is that it will not have the designation of ‘pragrhya’ (as required by Panini I 1 15 in association with I 4.51 which respectively say that a nipāta which ends in the vowel ‘o’ will be known as ‘pragrhya’ and ‘ūri’ and ‘dāc’ when in association with verbs will be known as gatis). This is because between primary and secondary meanings of a word it is with reference to the primary meaning that grammatical
operations apply to the word. Thus the MBh evam tar hi gaunamukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratyaya iti-Vol I. p 70

A question might be asked here. If grammatical operations take place only on such words as are used as conveying their primary meaning, then how do the sūtras VI 1.90 and VI 1.93 operate in regard to words like “go” as is evident in the resultant forms in sentence like ‘gaurbähikastisthati’ and ‘gām bāhikamānaya’ respectively when obviously the word is used in its secondary sense.

The answer to this question is that the statement about grammatical operations not taking place in regard to words which convey a secondary meaning applies only where words are concerned as distinct from prātipadikas or bases. The rule about vṛddhi in VII 1.90 applies to prātipadikas, for instance to ‘go’, which with the change of the vowel ‘o’ into ‘au’ becomes ‘gauh’ in the sentence ‘gaurbähikastisthati’. Similar is the ‘a’ in accordance to VI 1.93 in such examples like ‘gām bāhikamānaya’.

In verse 280 another objection is answered. This concerns the expressions mahābhūtaścandramāh, śuklībhavati pataḥ Mahābhūtaścandramāh means the moon has become full, and it refers to the full moon. Now here the full moon is a fact on full moon day and no new condition has emerged. There is no astitaśūrvavasthā upacetottaravasthā. There is no superimposition of a new state on an existing condition, which superimposition is necessary for the use of the suffix ‘cvi’. Similarly the cloth is white, and the expression śuklībhavati pataḥ (the cloth becomes white) does not add any new element.
of meaning. How then is 'cvi' used here and how is there any secondary meaning? The answer is given in verse 280. True, no new condition is added to the meaning, but it is assumed by the speaker that a new condition is superimposed and the use is based on that of MBh Vol I—p 71—lines 14-21

77 Panmi VII 3 82 Therefore no change of s into s in expressions like agnisomau mānvakau

78 Panmi VI 1 153
Thus sut comes in hariścandro mānvakah

79 Such as a defect in vision, etc., causing the vision of a duplicate moon

80 The four cases stated above are explained and illustrated in 306, 307a 307b, 308, 309a, 309b and 310, 311, 312, 313

80a The discussion here is about the significance of a svarita accent as occurring in short vowels, as well as in long and prolonged vowels. A svarita is a combination of udātta and anudātta accents. This causes no difficulty where long and prolonged vowels are concerned, since these latter have definite vowel limits and therefore they can hold an udātta svara and an anudātta vowel. But in the short vowel, how can one have limitable parts, one of which is udātta and the other is anudatta? The answer to this is given by the grammatical dictum “tasyādita udāttamardha hrasvam.” That is, the first half of a short vowel will be udātta.

In the kārikas under discussion, the meaning of the term hrasva in the above-given dictum is discussed. Hrasva does not mean here a short vowel, which is the term's
primary meaning. It means here a mātra. Further hrasva is representative of hrasva, dirgha and pluta (short, long, and prolonged vowels).

81 See Technique of Semantics by J. R. Firth, Transactions of the Philological Society, London 1934.

82 The reference is to one-word-sentences such as "vrksah". The word implies the verb tisthāti (one of the possible verbs). Thus vrksah means 'here is a tree'.

83 Eg (Punyaṛāja) varsati = (devo) varsati (jalam).

84 More examples to prove the point that an uttered piece can convey more than what is warranted by its form alone. In other words, it also conveys the meaning of some word or words implied in it. For example, in the expression edhebhino vṛjatī (He goes for fuel), the expression means edhāhāranāya vṛjatī. In this, āhrāna (bringing) is a subsidiary action to the main action of going. The uttered form edha brings this also to the context. Sthāni means the unuttered verb. Similarly miskausāmbi means miskrāntakausāmbi (Gone out of Kauśāmbi).

On stanza 328b, see Panini II 3-27.

Regarding the function of upasargas (stanza 329 a) see MBh Vol I—p 365—lines 17-19 in a slightly different context upasargaśca punarevamātmakaḥ yatra kaścitkṣnyāvācī śabdah prayujyate tatra kṣnyāvisesa- māhuḥ.

85 They the utterance 'vrksa' and the utterance 'vrksasthāti'. It was stated earlier that the piece 'vrksah' can convey the meaning of 'vrksasthāti'. Then why should the latter be used at all? Why not always use...
"vrksa" for "vrksastisthati" That question is answered in the stanza

Thus the way one student analyses a sentence as an aid to his understanding of the meaning of the sentence will be different from that adopted by another student. And these are all nothing more than devices.

Punyarāja constructs the third line as 'tasya sambandhī arthah' (the meaning connected to it, that is, its meaning). This is, of course, possible. But it seems it is better to interpret the line as 'its meaning which is connected to the meaning of another word which is not uttered, but which can be inferred 'sambandhi' correlating the word 'artha' with the word 'arthāntarasya' understood (Punyarāja, in fact, uses the latter word in this connection). However, the general idea of the stanza, is the same which ever way it is interpreted.

The reference here is to the definitions of noun and verb. Nouns have existence (sattva) as their meaning, verbs mean becoming (bhāva). The contradiction here is that the one sabda (e.g., dvāram), if it brings the verb also into the context, will be discharging both nominal and verbal functions.

cf Yaska Nirukta I 1 on nouns and verbs

Indnyamtyam vacanam audumabarāyanah
Indnya is here rendered as buddha

Also Nirukta I 2 tatra catuṣṭvam nopapadyate 'sāstrakriyāyogācca vyāptimatvācca tu

The meaning of the word arthayogam is taken in the translation in a different way from Punyarāja's He
interpret it as 'tasyaiva arthena pratibhālaksanena yogam sambandham drstvā' 

The translation interprets 'vākyasya arthayogam' as the connection of artha (word-meaning) to the sentence, and this connection is laukikam, i.e. something that is ascribed to it as different from being a fundamental fact cf 344 below

'na loke pratipatrnāṁ
arthayogātprasiddhayah, which also Punyarāja interprets in a different way He takes artha as 'a thing in reality'

90 Cf Nirukta quoted above vyaptimatvāt tu anīyastvācca

91 An exception which is implied in a statement strictly forms part of the statement of the rule itself, and therefore it can be considered as being verbally made (sabdavat) in the rule itself, but since there is no distinct statement of it, apparently it is not verbally made (āsabdvmva) As the next stanza says, the Śrutis, i.e. the statement about Brahmanas and dādi (sour-milk) is made including the exception of the Mātharas And the further statement connecting Mātharas with takra (butter-milk) makes a re-statement of this fact

92 According to this it is the word which has become an object of sense-perception, i.e. an object of the ear which conveys the meaning, cf V P I 56

93 According to the dictum 'caturthah, anajādau, ca lohome pūrvapadasya ca' etc quoted by Punyarāja See Mahābhāṣya Vol 2 p 425 (on Pāṇini V 3 83 thājādāvūrdhvam dvitīyādacaḥ) caturthāt—caturthāllopo vaktavyah, brhaspatدادahkan brhaspatikah Prajāpatu-
dakkah prajāpatikah anajadauca, anajādau ca lopadevadattakah brhaspatikah yajñadattakah
(175)
yajñakah, lopah pūrvapadasya ca purvapadasya ca
lopo vaktavyah, devadattakah dattakah yajñadattakah
dattakah and so on

94    Pāṇini VII 4 3
95    Cf VPI 56 and Pāṇini II 1 57

96 Long technical terms such as samkhya (according to one
view) (MBh Vol I-page 81—lines 26-29) upasarjanam
(MBh Vol I p 215—lines 7-11) kāraka (MBh I p
324—lines 7-9), and karmaprvacanīya (MBh Vol I p
346—lines 15-18) These are called long technical terms
because they are longer than a samjñā ought to be and
are explainable through their component elements
Nimitta Punyarāja explains ‘nimitta’ as the component
element of the word In a long technical term which is
interpreted in terms of this component element, they,
obviously, form the causal factors in the understanding
of the meaning of the term Patañjali explains a nimitta
as some thing known and a nimittī as something un-
known (nirjñāto’rtho nimittam, anirjñāto’rtho nimittī
MBh Vol II p I lines 16 and 17 )

97 It is on repetition that the meaning of such a technical
term is conveyed through its elements In the case of
a technical term which is not a product of smaller units,
such a secondary stage is not necessary, to explain its
meaning To still further explain the process of under-
standing the meaning of a long technical term with
reference to an example, let us take the term kāraka,
One gets the explanation of the term ‘karoti kārakam’
on repetition (MBh Vol I p 324 line 9) Indeed
the purpose of coming such long terms is that such terms
must be understood as being expressive of their signif-
cance (tatra mahatyā samjñayāh karana etatprayojanam
anvarthasamjñā yathā viññāyeta Karoti kārakamī MBh
same as above—lines 8 and 9

The Vakyapadiya also discusses in this connection the use of proper names and technical terms in the grammatical texts. The term, samjñā, is applied mostly to denote technical terms in the works of Pāṇini and other grammarians although in these there are places where the term is used to refer to ordinary proper names. The use of the term samjñā in such a context as the ‘samjñā-prakarana’ is to mean a technical term. Such terms, for instance, as kartā (subject), karma (object) are examples of samjñās.

Technical terms are used in Sanskrit grammar broadly in four ways. They are (1) the use of a technical term in a non-technical sense (2) the use of a technical term in a technical sense (3) the use of a term both in the technical and non-technical sense in the same discussion (4) the use of a technical term in a non-technical sense, but definitely intended to include the technical sense also. Let us take some examples. In the sūtra ‘kartaḥ karmavyatihāre’ the word karma is used not in the technical sense which it has in the grammatical system, but in the sense of the word in ordinary usage. This latter meaning is ‘action’. But there are other sūtras where this word ‘karma’ is used in its technical sense, viz ‘object’. For the word being used in its grammatical sense as in the subject-predicate-object group the sūtra ‘karmanā a’ provides an example. To take two other examples, the term ‘karanam’ is used in a non-technical sense in the sūtra ‘sabdavair karane’ and in its technical sense in the sūtra ‘kartkraranayostrīyā’. Now to illustrate the use in the same context of a word, both in its technical and non-technical sense, Pāṇini uses the word ‘samkhyā’ (number) in both senses in his discussion on numbers. Thus in the sūtra ‘bahuganavadudati samkhyā’ he defines the term samkhyā (number) in its technical sense. The sūtra means that words like ‘bahu’ and ‘gana’ will be known as samkhyā (numbers), and they are mentioned here as samkhyās (numbers) in the grammatical sense. In other words, when the sūtra
lays down that the word ‘bahu’ is a samkhya, it does not mean that it is a samkhya in that it will have a numerical value when it is used in the context. It only means that the word (bahu) will be technically known as a samkhya thus bringing it under the operation of the rules which particularly refer to samkhya. In the scope of this same sutra are also included samkhya (numbers) in the ordinary sense, like one which are referred to in a later sutra, namely ‘samkhya ātis adantayah’.

We will now illustrate the fourth kind of the use of technical terms. In this group, we have the use of words in their non-technical sense. The scope of the non-technical meaning of the word includes the possibility of its interpretation as a technical term. The sutra ‘ekaśruti dūrātsambuddhau’ provides an illustration. The word ‘sambuddhi’ means ‘calling’ in its non-technical sense, and in its technical sense it is the name for vocative singular. As used in the sutra quoted above, it means ‘calling in its non-technical sense. But the technical sense of the word has also relevance in the sutra since ‘sambuddhi’ in that sense is also a word of ‘calling’.

98 Pāṇini I 1 23 and VI 1 22. See also MBh Vol I athava ācāryapraevrttijāpayati bhavatyeśadikāyāḥ samkhya-śāyāḥ samkhya-pradeśesu samkhya-sampratvaya iti, yadayāṃ samkhya-śāyāḥ atīsadantayah kan iti tisadantayah pratise-dham śāsti

99 Pāṇini I 2 33 and II 3 49
See also MBh Vol I p 20—lines 1-4

100. Cf MBh Vol I p 41—lines 10-16

101 Service done to Brahmans while performing sacrifice
102 Cf MBh Vol I p 41, lines 10-16
na cocyate pratyekamiti pratyekam ca bhuṣi samāpyate

103 The employment of the same lamp by several students to read is an example of the operation of the principle of tantra—or the principle by which something discharges its function on a group-basis

104 Pāṇini I 1.1
See MBh Vol I—pp 37-41
atha saṃjñetī prakṛtyā vṛddhyādayah śabdāḥ
pathitavyāḥ (p 37 l 26) yathā laukikavaidikesu (p 38 l 14 Vārttika) lingena vā (p 39 l-1 Vārttika), pratyekam vṛddhi-gunasamjñī bhavata iti vaktavyam kim prayojanam samudāye mā bhūtāmiti (p 41 l 5-6), pratyaya-vavam ca vākyaparinsamāpeh (p 41 l 10 Vārttuka)

105 See MBh above p 41—(lines—11 14)

106 This is because the fact of Vṛṣala-ness is satisfied by one of them

107 See Pāṇini VIII 4.2 MBh Vol III (p 453)
A non-technical illustration MBh above (1 16-17)
gargash saha na bhoktavyamiti pratyekam ca na bhoktavyam samuditaśca

108 When the sentence is given in the form ‘devadatta—yajnadatta—visnumitrāḥ bhōjyantām’

109 vīpsā cf Pāṇini VIII 1.4

110 See stanza 416. or a similar use of the word ‘abhidhiyate’
Just as words are not recognised in the sentence when the listener comprehends the sentence, so is the case of clauses in a mahāvākyā

111 That is, according to the Anvitābhudhāna view of the Padavādi Mimāṃsakas (See VPII 44) According to them, then, the meaning of the sentence is realised
in parts at the focal points of the words The Mīmāṃsakas, therefore, uphold the notion of pratyekam parsamāṭṭi “culmination of the meaning of the sentence in the component parts individually)” in interpreting the meaning of the sentence, its nature and realisation

112 The original meaning of the word is an unqualified meaning and the meaning which the word gets from its connection with other words in the sentence is a qualified meaning Thus the word ‘gauh’ which as an isolate means ‘the animal with dew laps, etc’ means the same thing qualified by the act of ‘bringing’ while used in the sentence ‘gām ānaya’ (bring the cow)

113 pratyekam tu samaptārthah sahabhutesu vartate VPII—117

114 Cf MBh Vol I p 220—10-24 samghātasyaikārthyāt subabhāvo varnāt This occurs in the context of the discussion whether individual letters in a word are meaningful or not The notion stated in 403 is not accepted by Patañjali himself and Bhartrhari follows him in that The Vākyapadiya states the view not necessarily approving of it, though it does not make a statement of its disapproval

115 Cf MBh Vol I (p 219 l 26 and 200 I-1-2 ) bahavo hi sabdā ekārthā bhavantī tadyathā indraḥ sakrah puruhūtah purandarah ekasca sabdo bahvar-thāḥ tadyathā aksāh pādāh māsā itī

116 Cf MBh Vol II (p 386—lines 4 and 5) evam yosāvāmnāye ‘syavāmasabdah pathyate sosya padārthah

117 See also above in the text the discussion on sāmidhem hymn VP-II 257-261

118 See Note 115 above
The text is wrongly printed in the Banares text. Punyarāja interprets it 'prayogādabhisandhānāmanyat-padesu na vidyate

cf VP I 6

The Nānās'abdavādin is speaking here. Since according to him, all so-called instances of the same word are really different words, there is no question of the same word having several meanings thus necessitating the special aiming of the word at the meaning which is to be conveyed, as the Ekaśabdavādin holds.

Cf VP II 325b 326a 326b

Cf VP I-86, where however, the understanding of parts which are unreal is stated to be caused by the incapacity of the speaker.

According to the anvītabhidhāna-view, thus, the synthesis between the various word-meanings constitutes the meaning of the sentence and that synthesis is not something built up word by word but something which already exists in the very first word.

Cf MBh Vol III (p 57—line 14)
(see also lines 15-28 and page 58—lines 1-7)
siddham tu dharmopadesāne'navayavavijñānāt (p 57 line 14)

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa Sphoṭavada p 14
evam ghaṭamānaya 'ityādau samsargarupovākyārthah samudāyas'akyah

The argument is continued from the previous stanza. Reality is expressed in the forms of statements and statements, either positive or negative are in the form of sentences. It follows from this that only sentences and not words can convey reality, which has the form of the meaning of the sentence. Therefore it is wrong to con-
ceive that the meaning of a sentence is conveyed from the words composing it. Even when we mention the name of a single object it takes the form of a sentence.

cf. VPII 325 b, 326 a, 327 a, 328 a and 335
125 a MBh Vol I (p 367 lines 10-16)

126 They are not final truths in the ultimate analysis.

127 The term ‘karana’ in line 2 does not mean instrument, it means ‘action’, the word being used as the noun form of the root kr = to do. Punyarāja explains it as follows: In the sentence ‘pacikriyām karomi’ (I do cooking) ‘cooking’ is a noun and is used as an accessory to the action of ‘doing’ and therefore is a sādhana. In the sentence ‘pacāmi’ (I cook), the verb is ‘cook’ and hence its meaning is the sādhya, the thing to be accomplished, the objective.

128 The same point is made that objects, that is the referents of words have several and sometimes conflicting possibilities and that it is the use of the word with a specific intention by the speaker which specifies a particular aspect of a meaning as operative in a certain context (Sec VP 434) cf. Tractus Logico-Philosophicus p 35 ‘Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs’.

129 In other words since ‘conjunction’ is an attribute of the conjoined a description of the conjoined objects is necessary to describe the character of ‘conjunction’. This means that the mere word ‘samyoga’ does not describe the nature of the relation it names. Similarly the relationship known as ‘sarnavāya’ is expressed by implication in the relation samyoga.

130 mātrayā-yadā tasya mātrayā niyata samkhyākena alpyasā tabdēna yogō ‘bhūsambandho drṣyate—Punyarāja. Example 1gyanah samprasāranam Pāṇini I. 1 45 The
sūtra means that the substitutes ū, ū, ū, and ū which come in the places of y, v, r and ū will be known as sampāsāranas Eg yaj—istam, vap = uptam

Or, alternatively, the sentence ‘īgyanah’ meaning the substitution of īk (ū, ū, ū, ū) for yan (y, v, r, ū) will be known by the name sampāsāranam

Now the point of quoting this example is to present an argument in favour of the akhanda-position that sentences convey their meaning as indivisible units. The sentence of which the name is sampāsāranam, that is which is constituted by the single word ‘sampāsāranam’ conveys the meaning of substitution of ‘īk’ for ‘yan’. Being a single-word-sentence, it cannot be argued by any one that the sentence conveys its meaning through its component parts.

Gf MBh Vol I p 111 and p 112

131 Pānmi VIII 1 23 also VPII 2-6

132 Mrgah paśyata yātı (see, there goes a deer) The sentence mrgah paśyata yātı is such that it can neither be exclusively interpreted as a single sentence, nor as a combination of more sentences than one. In the view that it is a composite of two sentences, the two component sentences are mrgah yātı (the deer runs) and (etam mrgam) paśyata (you see the deer)

Another school of thinking considers that mrgah paśyata yātı is one sentence. Since the verbs are interconnected (yuktayukta)

133 Eg vṛihayo bahavo ‘vahanyantām (Let lots of cultivated rice be threshed) Here, there is a logical incompleteness, since the agent, instruments, etc., of the action of threshing are not mentioned, but there is no
incompleteness in utterance. Hence the sentence is considered as having a complete meaning.

In this connection it is stated that there need not be complete parity between the manner of the use of words in sentences and the meanings they convey. Thus, in the two sentences ‘cankramyāno’ dhusva’ (Recite while moving about) and ‘japamscankrmanam’ kuru’ (Move about while reciting), the word ‘cankramyāna’ is secondary in the first sentence and primary in the second, being a subsidiary verb in the former and a principal one in the latter. Similarly with the word jap (or adhisva) also there is a difference in the manner of their use. But despite this distinction in the nature of the use of the words, there is no difference in the meaning that they convey since the meaning of the sentence in either case is an injunction to perform the act of reciting.

Punyarāja also gives an alternative explanation of the examples. According to this explanation it is only the word ‘cankramyāna’ whose nature and use is studied here. There is no difference in the function of the word in the two sentences. In both it serves the purpose of being an action subsidiary to recital. But there is a distinction in the nature of their usage. In the first sentence it is used as an auxiliary verb while in the second sense, as a principal verb.

1 The method which must consist in the order in which the subsidiary actions are to be performed, thus gradually building up the main action.
2 The effect is, whatever is stipulated as the fruit of the action—heaven, children, and so on.

The passage referred to is saptadasa prājāpatyān eka-varnān ajāmstu uparanālabheta (He should sacrifice for Prajāpati, 17 hornless he-goats all of one colour).
This stanza cites and explains another example for the point stated in kārka 451 that the same verb can be applicable to several sentences. The verb bhuj = to eat in the sentence ‘devadatta yajñadattavisnumitra bhojyantām’ (Devadatta, Yajñadatta and Visnumitra are to be fed) refers individually to the three subjects combined in the compound ‘devadattayajñadattavisnumitrāh’ That is, the meaning of the sentence pertains to the three individuals individually.

Pāṇini III 4 67 (kartarī krt) which says the krt-suffix occurs in the sense of the agent (e.g., pācakah) This is a general statement which means that the sūtra has a general meaning. This meaning is later on particularised in specific examples, like—pasu (an animal).

E.g., ‘devadattah pacati’, ‘yajñadattah pacati’ In these sentences the action is particularised by the individual subject and other particular factors. Thus, we can paraphrase the verb in the sentence (1) as devedatta-kartapkacatiknyā (the action of cooking with Devadatta as its agent). In sentences like ‘pacate’, yajate’, etc. on the other hand, the verb has a general signification.

Even when verbal forms show distinction of tense, as for instance in pacati, apāksīt, pakṣyati (cooks, cooked, will cook respectively), or distinctions caused by the nouns associated with them, as for instance in ‘ustrāṣiṅkā āsyante’ (there is the sitting like the sitting of camels), or ‘hataśāyikā śayyante’ (There is the lying like the lying of the dead), the verb fundamentally conveys the verbal idea in general when used to do so (see next stanza) cf MBh I (p 256 lines 19 & 20) katham punarjñāyate bhāvavacanāḥ pacādaya iti. yadesāṁ bhavatīnā sāmaṇādhikaranyam, bhavati pacati, bhavati pakṣyati, bhavatyapākṣidita and Vol II p 57 lines 3 and 4.
In both cases the verb is used in the impersonal passive (bhāve) and conveys the verbal idea in general as its meaning. Nevertheless the verb is used in the plural, as an exception to the general rule that when they are used in the impersonal passive, verbs will be in the singular. Thus in these two sentences the verb shows the plural number of the noun (sādhanam) with which it is linked. Camels have various ways of sitting and a plurality is inherent in the meaning of the noun form 'ustrāsikā' itself. Thus plurality also appears in the verb 'āsyante'. Similarly the dead lie in many ways, and the plurality thus inherent in the very meaning of the noun, 'hatasāyikā' appears also in the verbal form form "śayyante" of Nagesabhaṭṭa's Mahābhāṣyapradīpodyota (Bibhī Indica No 1231) Vol 4—pages 332 and 336 Foot-note.)

140 aksah (1) a certain kind of seed,
(2) the pole of cart,
(3) seed of a plant used in dice
The sentence in question is "'aksāh bhaksyantām bhōjyaṃtām divyaṃtām' (Let aksās be eaten, bent or thrown.) This kind of composite utterance is not usual in actual life. But like the sentence sveto dhāvati' it can be quoted for illustration.

141 When the word aksāh is used as stated in the previous stanza, it is a common form under which three different
words, aksāh, aksāh, aksāh are uttered cf. The explanation of the word 'śveto' in 'śveto dhāvat' according to the principle of tantra (See V P II 111)

142 Thus the words 'aksa' and 'yaksa' for instance have necessarily to be used one after the other, because they do not possess a common form under which they can be uttered in union. But in the word 'aksāh', we have according to one view three different words, 'aksāh', 'aksāh' and 'aksāh' uttered in union. Thus is because they have a common form and they are different words because they have different meanings.

143 That is, this view, instead of considering that 'aksāh' is a composite of three different words considers its meaning as a composite of three different meanings, the word itself being a single entity.

144 Thus the word 'aksāh' is a composite of the three words aksāh, aksāh and aksāh and from the composite utterance "aksāh bhaksyantām bhohjyantām dīvyantām" we get 'akso bhaksyatatām, 'akso bhohjyatām' and 'akso dīvyatām', using the word aksa in the singular we must connect the plural noun with the verb as aksāh bhaksyantām etc.

145 See note on 466

146 See Note on 466

147 Examples of such sentences śveto dhāvat (VP II 113) and īgyaṇaḥ samprasāranam (Pāṇini I 145)

See note 130 above
cf MBh Vol I—(page 111-112)
vibhaktviśesanirdeśastu jñāpakaḥ ubhayasamjñātvasya

148 See Notes 130 and 147 above. The reference is to the sutra īgyaṇaḥ samprasāranam
The term liṅga=jñāpaka of Mahābhāṣya (See quotation under 147 above).

149. The sūtra referred to is Pāṇini I. 1.59. The Kāśika paraphrases the sūtra as: dvirvacananimitte’ci ajādeśaḥ sthānivadbhavati dvirvaca eva kartavye—That is, when followed by an affix having an initial vowel, which causes re-duplication, the substitute which takes the place of a vowel is like the original vowel only for the purpose of re-duplication Eg. papatuḥ.

(The formation of this form in the 3rd person dual number from the root pā = to drink will illustrate this sūtra. To form this, the affix ‘atus’ is added to the root. So we get pā = atus = p+zero + atus according to Pāṇini VI. 4.64 which states that the ā of the root is elided before ārthadhātuka affixes beginning with a with a vowel and which are kit or nit and before it. (कित्, हित् or before it).

The next stage is the re-duplication of the root according to Pāṇini VI 1.8 which states that a root consisting of a single vowel is re-duplicated before the terminations of the perfect. Now, since what remains of the root after the elision of ā is only p, the provision according to VI 1.8 of the root consisting of a single vowel does not exist. To remove that difficulty we have the operation of the rule under discussion (ie I. 1.59). According to this rule, the zero which comes in the place of the ā in the root pā (ie, in the setting p + zero + atus), must be treated like the ā itself. That is, for the purpose of the operation of re-duplication we should consider that the ā is still there). Hence it may be considered that the root which is to be re-duplicated is pā—thus satisfying the condition for VI. 1.8).

Now the point of the Vākyapadiya referring, to
Patañjali’s discussion of this sūtra is to quote a remark which is made in that connection in the Mahābhāṣya regarding the employment of principle of ekassesā or tantra in the use of words or word-combination. To explain, if a single use of a word is intended to convey its occurrence more than once, then the word is used according to the principle of ekassesā or tantra. In the sūtra in question namely, dvirvacane’ci, the word dvirvacane (re-duplication) is used to stand for the occurrence of the word twice in the sūtra. It will be noted that the paraphrasing of the sūtra by the Kāśi̐ka, given above, contains the word dvirvacane mentioned twice. See underlined. According to the Mahābhāṣya the single mention of dvirvacane in the sūtra is a combination of two instances of its occurrence and therefore can stand for both.

See MBh—Vol I (p 156 lines 17 and 18)
katham punarekena yatnena unbhayam labhyam ekasesanirdeso’yam dvirvacanam ca dvirvacanam ca dvirvacanam

150 S K Belwalker suggests the possibility that Baiji, Saubhava and Haryaksa are traditional elaborators of the Pāṇiniyan system sometime between 470 A D—650 A D See Systems of Sanskrit Grammar p 35 footnote 1. But this obviously is impossible as the three authors must have lived before Candra’s time if Bhartrhari’s account is to be relied upon as Belwalker himself does on p 41 of his work.

151 The mountain referred is Trikūṭa. The legend is that on Trikūṭa was found the text of the science of grammar composed by Rāvana. A certain Brahmāraksas took it away and gave it to teachers like Candra and Vasa-vrāntaguru. They then developed it into a science with
many branches. On Candra and Vasurāta see Systems of Sanskrit Grammar pp 57-62

152 The teacher referred to is Vasurāta mentioned in 151 above. According to Punyarāja, the statement ‘this was composed by our teacher’ only means ‘composed through the blessings of the teacher’

153 Cf Tractus Logico Philosophicus p 77

‘The object of Philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts

‘The result of philosophy is not a number of “philosophical propositions” but to make propositions clear’
**GENERAL INDEX**

*(For the Translation and Notes)*

*(Note References are to page and verse or page and note or page and foot-note line (fn 1) The arrangement is according to the English alphabet)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page, Verse etc</th>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page, Verse etc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abheda School</td>
<td>144—473</td>
<td>Atharvan</td>
<td>4—21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhiihata Vayana</td>
<td>39—15</td>
<td>atom theory</td>
<td>25—110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhiihata Vayava Vaca</td>
<td>162—47</td>
<td>Audumbarayana</td>
<td>115—342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhiihata Vayava Vadi</td>
<td>46—41, 42</td>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhivyakta Vadinah</td>
<td>153—19</td>
<td>Bayi</td>
<td>145—479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhivyanga</td>
<td>153—19</td>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>188—150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agama</td>
<td>30—134</td>
<td>Belwalkar, S K</td>
<td>188—150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhanda Position</td>
<td>53—72, 54—76, 55—77, 64—117, 115—340, 131—415, 182 para 1</td>
<td>Benares Commentary</td>
<td>154—24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhanda School of Grammar</td>
<td>40—19, 45—37, 59—96, 143—468</td>
<td>Benares edition 9—foot note line 3, 10—fn 1 4, 16—fn 1 7, 23—fn 1 3, 24—fn 1 11, 33—fn 1 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhanda Vaidya</td>
<td>87—221, 154—22</td>
<td>Benares text 82—fn 1 1, 6, 7, 112—fn 1 1, 135—fn 1 2, 139—fn 1, 149—10, 189—119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhanda Vaidya 20—92, 37—7, 41—20, 59—95, 84—205, 126—391, 127—394</td>
<td>Benares version 16—fn 1 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhanda view 98—269, 128—398 b</td>
<td>Bhartari 10—fn 1 8, 16—fn 1 1, 17—fn 1 1 19—fn 1 2, 21—fn 1 2, 23—fn 1 2, 29—fn 1 2, 33—fn 1 2, 179—114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>akrtiganatva 152—para 9</td>
<td>Bhavyas 5—23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksa 185—140, 141, 142, 143, 144</td>
<td>Bhava 173—88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anudatta 171—80 a</td>
<td>Bhavapradhana 146—2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anvitabhidhana 40—17, 46—44, 64—114, 115, 131—411, 162—48, 178—111, 180—122</td>
<td>Bheda School 93—244b, 144—471, 473</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>artha 147—1</td>
<td>Bheda doctrine 143—469</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arthinadhauka 187—149</td>
<td>Biblio Indica 185 para 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arthaparakttaya (thing-classes) 148—8</td>
<td>Brahman 1—1, 5, 2—11, 3—17, 4—22, 30—132, 83—146</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Brahmaraksas 188—151
Brāhmin 122—373

G
Candālas 8—40
Gandra (ācārya) 146—481, 188—151
Gāruđeva Sāstri 9—fn 1 3,
16—fn 1 2, 24—fn 11,
27—fn 1 7, 29—fn 1 7,
33—fn 1 5
Codes 2—7
consciousness theory 25—112

D
D M Datta 162—47
dhvanī 22—102, 149—11,
153—19, 154—24
doctrine 15—71
dravya 151—para a 1
Dualists 2—8

E
ekāsesa 188—line 3
Ekaśabdavādin 180—119
English 161—44

F
Firth J R 172—81

G
grammar 2—11, 3—13, 15,
17, 5—27, 32—142, 33—
147, 34—151, 36—3, 45—
37, 145—480, 146—481,
482
grammarians 9—44, 15—73,
23—105, 48—38, 57—84,
111—327 b, 112—330 b,
113—334, 336, 114—337,
338a, 115—340, 342,
145—476, 176—97a

H
Haryaksa 145—479, 188—
150
history of Sanskrit grammar
145—476
hrasva 171—80a

J
Jātuśabdavādin 154—23
Jātusphoṭa 41—20

K
Kaiyāta 147—3
Karaka 175—96
Kārūka 9—fn 1 9, 10—fn 1
1, 3, 9, 19—fn 1 2, 20—
fn 2, 23—fn 2, 3, 24—
fn 3, 5, 26—fn 6, 27—
fn, 29—fn, 33—fn, 135—
fn, 137—fn, 138—fn 140
—fn, 149—11
Karma 176—87 a,
Karmapravacaniya 82—197,
83—199, 200, 201 b, 84—
202, 203, 175—96
Kartā 176—97 a
Kāśikā 151—17, 187—149
Kātyāyana 61—102, 137—
443 158—37
Khanda theory 84—205
Khandavāda 154—22
Khandavādin 65—119

L
Lectures on Pātañjali’s Mahā-
bhāṣya 152—17
logic 145—479
logicians 8—41
Ludwig Wittgenstein 161—46
M
madhyama—157—35
Mahabhasyapradipodyota
(by Nagesabhatta) 185—para 2
Mahavaky 54—76, 178—110
Manuscripts 9—fn 1 8, 10—fn 1 9, 23—fn 1 2, 24—fn 1 7, 26—fn 27—fn, 33—fn 37—fn, 76—fn, 106—fn, 110—fn, 113—fn, 120,—fn, 125—fr, 137—fn, 138—fn, 139—fn, 140—fn
Mimamsa 20—92, 36—3, 37—4, 39—15, 40—17, 46—41, 42, 63—113, 111—326 b, 113—333, 334, 335, 336, 114—337, 131—411, 153—19, 154—22, 153—37, 178—111, 179—1 1
Monier Williams 161—44
Monists 2—8

N
Nagesabhatta 180—124, 185 para 2
Naiyayikas 35—155, 154—22
Nanasaabdavadin 180—119
nimitta 175—96
nimittu 175—96
Nirukta 147—2, 173—89, 174—90
nitya (eternal) 152—para 2

O
Om 2—9, 10, 4—17, 20

P
padaprakrtih 163—49 a
Pada School 43—29, 44—34, 51—61, 63—112, 130—409
Padavadi(n) 57—88, 59—95, 94—248, 126—391, 160—41, 178—111
Pannian system 188—150
Parva (a stage of speech) 157—35
Paramatra 156—31
Pasyanti 157—35
Patañjali 145—477, 478, 480, 154—23, 175—96, 179—114, 188—line 1
philosophy 17—fn 1 3
pragrya 169—76
prakriya 147—1
prakrtvdhvan 153—18, 155—25
pratipadika 151—para 2, 170—para 3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>Saubhaga 145—479, 188—150</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rāvana 188—151</td>
<td>Sāvitra hymn 97—261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rgveda-pratīṣakhyā 50—58a</td>
<td>Scripture 6—30, 31—138 ,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32—141, 33—145, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rk 4—21</td>
<td>School of grammar 114—338a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rk verses 62—107</td>
<td>Science of grammar 188—151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RV (Rgveda) 156—33, 157</td>
<td>Schoolers 1—5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—35</td>
<td>Sesa-Asasthi 166—68b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rudhi 45—37, 161—45</td>
<td>Southern version 145—480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sphota 9—44, 18—81, 20—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fn 1 2, 22—102, 149—11,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>154—23 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sphoṭavāda (Nāge-abhaṭṭa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>180—124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Śrutārthāpatti view 113—33,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Śrutī 163—54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subrahmayana Śāstri 152—17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Sūtras 5—23, 14—65, 68,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69, 122—tra-1 1, 152—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>para 3, 176—97 a para 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>176—97a, 182—line 1, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>187—149, 188—1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabda 153—19, 155—27</td>
<td>Śvamātrā 156—31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabdavat 174—91</td>
<td>Śvara 171—80a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāddhya 181—127</td>
<td>Systems of Sanskrit grammar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadhana 181—127, 185—</td>
<td>188—150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śadja (Svara) 155—28</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sages 5—23</td>
<td>tantra 178—103, 188—para 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāman or Sāma 4—21, 62—</td>
<td>Technique of Semantics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>(by J R Firth ) 172—81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samavāya 181—129</td>
<td>Theorists 36—1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambandhī 173—87</td>
<td>Theory of Speech and Lang-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambuddhi 177—para 2</td>
<td>uage(by Sir Alan Gardiner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samghāṭa 46—41, 42, 49—</td>
<td>156—32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>The Six ways of Knowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samghāṭapakṣa 162—48</td>
<td>(by D M Datta ) 162—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samgraha 97—265, 145—</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>476, 479</td>
<td>Tractus Logico—Philloso-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samgrahakāra 16—fn 1 3, 4</td>
<td>phicus 181—128, 189—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samhitā 50—59, 163—49a</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śāmidheni hymn 169—75,</td>
<td>Trikūṭa (mountain) 188—151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179—117</td>
<td>Trivandrum manuscript 10—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samjñā 152—para 3, 176—</td>
<td>fn line 8, 24—fn 2, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samjñāprakarana 176—97a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samjñāni 152—para 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samkhya 175—96, 176—97a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samprasārana 182—1 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samyoga 181—129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śāṃskṛt 36—155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śāṃskṛt grammar 176—97a,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śāstradīpikā 153—19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sattva 173—88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U

Udātta 171–80, a
Universe 1–1, 2–10, 27–120
Upamāna 150–16
Upameya 150–16
Upasārjanam 175–96
upholders of doctrine 15–70, 35–156

V

Vaikhari 157–35
Vasu, C S, 169–76
Vākya 163–54
Vākyapadīya (V P) 9–fn 10, 176–97a 179–114, 187–149
Vākya-sphota 49–56
Vārttika(s) 5–23, 115–342, 36–3, 158–36, 37, 178–104,

Vārtkakāra 37–5, 158–37
Vasurātaguru 188–151, 189–152
Veda(s) 1–2, 5, 2–6, 7, 9, 10, 3–11, 17, 168–75, 27–120, 30–133, 31–136, 32–141, 62–107, 55–77,
Vedic lore 145–477, 478
Venkataramaiah D 153–19
Vivaranagrantha 29–fn
Vṛddhi 170–para 3
Vṛsabhadeva 27–fn

W

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 161–46

Y

Yajus 4–21
Yakṣa 186–142
Yāṣka 147–2, 173–89
Yauṣṭika 45–37
### INDEX OF WORDS

In the text of the Vākyapadiya Cantos I and II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अक्षरक</td>
<td>२०-१३२, ३२-१४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अकड़ारण</td>
<td>१०५-१०४, १०६-२०७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अक्षरक</td>
<td>९-४३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अक्षरविद्या</td>
<td>१४५-२७८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अक्षरिम</td>
<td>१२०-२६५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>अन्न</td>
<td>१०९-२१, २८२</td>
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<td>१०२-२८२</td>
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<td>१२-५६</td>
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<td>४-२१</td>
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<td>अख्क (Pratyāhāra)</td>
<td>६१-१०२</td>
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<td>२४-१०३, २५-१००</td>
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<td>५५-६७</td>
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<td>४८-१००</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(198)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अग्रमूल ४७-२१९, १११-३२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अग्रोध २०-१६०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अग्रोक ५६-८१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अग्ररिद ५८-९१, ९८-२५६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अग्रात ५४-७४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अवूच ८९-२९६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अश्व ४२-२४, ६२-२४१, ९२-२४३</td>
</tr>
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<td>अश्वक्ष ३३-१४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अभिनय २३-१०५, २८-१२२</td>
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<td>अभिवाच्य ६६-१२७</td>
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</tr>
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Words Page and Verse

Words Page and Verse

अल्प २३-२०३
अल्पविद्यापरिवर्त्तन १४५-१५६
अवगत १४३-१४०
अवगति १२-२४३
अवगृहीत १२-२८
अवग्रहुः ६५-१२०
अवचछेद १२०-३६५
अवधारण ७३-१५७, ७६-१७३,
८७-२०२, १०२-२४६
अवधि ५९-२५४, ७९-२७६
अवधोक २८-२१४
अवधान ४१-२२, १३२-४२५
अवधान ४१-२२
अवधात सौ १३-३५, ४५-१२१,
अवविय सौ १३-३५, ४५-१२१,
अवविय नौ १३-३५, ४५-१२१,
अवविय १३-३५, ४५-१२१,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
अवविय २२-२२, २२-२२,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कार ५२-५६, ७६-१७२</td>
<td>अनातमय सूर्यनाथ १७-५, ७०-१४२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविरोध ६२-६८</td>
<td>असागारण १०२-२८८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविरोधी ३४-१३६</td>
<td>असामु ६-२५, २७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविवोध ३४-३७</td>
<td>असित १००-१२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविविक ५२-६९, ६६-८३, १०६-२०१, २०४</td>
<td>असिद १०२-२८६, ६६-२६३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविविष्ट १२७-१३३</td>
<td>असार्व ४२-३३, २४, १३२-४२३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविविष्टलक १२३-३३६</td>
<td>‘अस्त्र’ ३४-१४९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविविष्ट ३४-१५२, ४०-१५</td>
<td>ता</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कार ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आकाशा ३६-३, ३७-५, ३७-५, १३४-१२९, १३६-१२९, १४८-४७५, १५०-५५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आकार ६५-१२०, ६६-१२३ ७२-१५४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आकारक ६८-१३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आकारकतु १८४-२३७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आकारप ८३-२००, १३१-४१३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आकारपिन्न ८४-२०४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आकारात ३६-५, ३७-३५, ७६-१६७, १०६-२०१, २०९-१०७, ३०-३२५, २०४-२३७, ३३८, ४१६-३४८, १३३-२३६, १३६-५५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आमक ६-२०, ८-२४, ३०-२३३, ३२-१४२, ७२-१५४, ८४-१०५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आमक ६-२०, ८-२४, ३०-२३३, ३२-१४२, ७२-१५४, ८४-१०५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आमक ६-२०, ८-२४, ३०-२३३, ३२-१४२, ७२-१५४, ८४-१०५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आमक ६-२०, ८-२४, ३०-२३३, ३२-१४२, ७२-१५४, ८४-१०५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आमक ६-२०, ८-२४, ३०-२३३, ३२-१४२, ७२-१५४, ८४-१०५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आमक ६-२०, ८-२४, ३०-२३३, ३२-१४२, ७२-१५४, ८४-१०५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आमक ६-२०, ८-२४, ३०-२३३, ३२-१४२, ७२-१५४, ८४-१०५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविष्कारण ६५-१६७</td>
<td>आमक ६-२०, ८-२४, ३०-२३३, ३२-१४२, ७२-१५४, ८४-१०५</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Words Page and Verse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>उपयोग</th>
<th>८३-२०१</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>उपनिष्ठ</td>
<td>८६-६५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपद्धार</td>
<td>३५-४४४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपलब्धि</td>
<td>२१-९४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपलब्धि</td>
<td>२६-१५५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपभाषण</td>
<td>४०-२४, ४१-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपवेष्ठ</td>
<td>३६-५५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपस्य</td>
<td>७८-१८०, १८२, १८२, ६६-१८४, ६०-१८७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपर्युक्त</td>
<td>१२-५२, १०२-२८२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपस्तिः</td>
<td>३२-१५२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपासक</td>
<td>४०-१९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपाय</td>
<td>३९-१५, ६१-२३८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपाधि</td>
<td>४५-२८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपाधितत्व</td>
<td>९-४४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपाधि</td>
<td>१६-७१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपयोग</td>
<td>१-५, ११-८५, ६७, ४८-२९, ६२-१०५, २१-२३, १०७-३१, ११६-३३३, २१-२६५, १४१-६५४, १४३-४६९, १४५-४७५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपर्युक्त</td>
<td>४९-५५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपेक्षा</td>
<td>१५०-५८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उपर्युक्त</td>
<td>५५-७८, ६२-२६</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Words Page and Verse

| ९०, ६९-१३७, ११९-३६२, १३६-४४० |
| एकता ४५-३० |
| एकतर १२७-४४३ |
| एकत्र १५-३०, ७१, ६०-१८, ९६-२५७, १२५-३८५, १३५-४३२ |
| एकत्रविश्वास १४३-४६८, १२९-४०४ |
| एकत्रित २-४ |
| एकत्रित ६७-१७३, ७८-२२२, ৮৬-২২১, ১২৬-৩৫৬, ৩৫৭, ১১৭-৩৫৯ |
| एककृप ४५-३५६ |
| एककृपता ६५-११ |
| एकवचन १४३-४६७ |
| एकवाक्यता १०६-३५६ |
| एकदृश (ब्रह्म) १२२-३७४, १२६-३८५, ३५७-३७५ |
| एकदृशिन्द ६२-१०८ |
| एकस्वरूप ३८-८ |
| एकाग्रशासन ७६-१७१ |
| एकाय १५-३६ |
| एकार्य १३६-४४० |
| एकीकृत ६७-२२ |

### ब्रह्म

| ब्रह्म १०८-२१४ |
| ब्रह्मकृत्यं १२५-३४२ |
| ब्रह्मण १०९-३२२ |

### क

<p>| 'कर्म' (suffix) १०२-२९३ |
| कर्म २३-१०५, १०६ |
| कर्म १०-७६, ২২-১০২, ২৩-১০৬ |
| ২৮-১২২, ১২৬-৩১১ |
| करणमूल १३४-४२९ |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>कद्दमा २९-१२८, ७४-१४४, १०८-३१३, १२३-१३६</td>
<td>कुमार १२२-३६९, १२२-३६०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कमें २७-१२, ३७-४, ४१-२०, ५३-७०, ९७-२६१, १००-२७५, १०७-३११, ११३-३३३, १२८-४०१</td>
<td>कत्तन ४०-१८०, ७३-१५६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कर्मन १२४-३३९</td>
<td>केवल ८०-१८५, ८५-१९४, ८१-१९७, ८५-२१८, १०४-२१६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कर्मवश्चनीय १३-१६९</td>
<td>कल्व १०-१२८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कर्मवश्चनीयत्व ४४-२०२</td>
<td>कत्त्व ३७-६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कर्मसाध ७९-२१८</td>
<td>कज १२-५६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कर्मवेद ४१-२०</td>
<td>काम १२-९०, २०-१६१, ६६-२४९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कर्मवाचिक ११४-३३७</td>
<td>कवित ४०-१९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कला २८-१२८</td>
<td>कक्षा ३७-४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>काक १०४-३१२</td>
<td>कक्षाध १२४-३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>काम्य ५३-१०</td>
<td>कक्षान ४०-१९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कांक १२३-२६</td>
<td>कक्षान ४०-१९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कारण २४-२०८, ३४-३२</td>
<td>कीव ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कार्य १३-६२, २९-१२८, ४४-२२, ४६-२६, ५०-१४, ५५-६७, ६५-११४, ७४-२६, १०२-२६, १३५-४३, १३५-२४६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कार्यकारणावा ५-२५</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कार्यज्ञ ५०-१४, २९-१२८</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>काल १६-६६, ४८-५०, १०४-२९६, १०७-३१०, १०८-३१४, १२५-३८४, १४०-५५, १४५-४८०</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कालमंद ४६-२३</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कालशिल्प १-३</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कालालाल ६६-२३६</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>काण २९-१२७</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कुटुम २९-१२७</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कुलम २२-६५</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कुलम २२-६५</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कुलम २२-६५</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कुप ७८-१५९</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कुसुम ९७-२७</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कितकल ५-२८</td>
<td>कियां ३७-३४, ४४-२४, ५३-२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>श्रीर २०-९१</td>
<td>श्रीपरविशेष ४१-२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ग</td>
<td>ख</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ख़ज़ाल ७०-१४०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ग</td>
<td>गन्ध १७-७९, २२-१२, ५८-८९, ७३-१५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गन्धवन्दन १०३-२९२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गान्धी १४५-२४७</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गवय ५८-९०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गारीय १४५-२४७</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गार १४५-२४७</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गैलिया ७६-१५२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गीती ६२-१०७</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गुप्त १३-६२, ६४, ३६-४, ५२-३९, ७३-१५७, ८२-१९६, १०५-३०४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गुणभाग ७६-४८, १०६-३०६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गुणमेड १२३-३२८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गुल ५३-४७, १५७-४७७, १४६-४८२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गुह १२४-३८५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गुल्मोत १०५-५३</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गो १०६-७६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गोिन ३४-५४९</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गोिय २२-१६३</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गोिय ९५-२४६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गोिय ६५-१२६, ७६-१६४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गोिय ७३-६४६, १६३-२६३, २६४, २६४-२६६, २६६, २६६-२६३, २६४, १००-२६६, १०१-२८२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गौणता १०६-२८१</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गौणत ९५-२५३, १००-२८०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>गौरबर ८८-२१६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतित ६४-२४९</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राच १४५-२४७, ४८०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राण २६-१५२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राभ ९६-७५, २१-१७७, ६०-९८, ९९, १००, २४८, ७०-१४३, १२२-३७०</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रागर १४०-५७४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राह २४-६७</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राहतव १२-५५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राहत ६५-१२३, ९६-२३७, १०४-२९८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रण २२-१०४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>च</td>
<td>चक १०३-२९१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चलसु १७-८०, ३१-१३६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चलिकमिरण १३८-४७७</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चंद्राल ८४०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चंद्राचार्य १४६-४७१</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चरण ७२-१५२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चरित ९५-९५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चरितकिरिय १०३-२८५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चरितार्थ १६-७४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चित्तिलक ४३-७४७</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चित्र ३८-६, ७६-१६४, १०३-२९०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चित्र ४३-१५२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चित्र ४-२०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चित्र ५८-२३</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चलित ८-४५, २८-१२६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Words Page and Verse

च

छन्दसू २-१७, ३-१७, २७-१२०
छन्दस्य ३-१७
छन्दोपनि ३-१७
छल ९५-११८
छाया २५-११०
छिन्न २४-२७९
छेद ८८-२२४

ज

जगत् १-१
जानु ७२-२४६
जाप्रवर्त ६३-२६७
जहानरायण ८१-२२४
जाटि १४-६९, २१-१३, १५, ३६-
, ४८-२०, ४५-४३, ६१-
, ५६, ६६-१२२, ७२-५६, ७२-
, ७६, ७६-६२, २३-१६, ३६-
, २०, ३०-२०, २२-४५,
, ६१-४५, ७४-४५
जातिकाम १४-६५, ७४-२६४
जातिशाख १३-२६३
जातनश ५८-१०
जिखर ७८-१६३
ज्वाला २३-१०६
ज्योतिष ३-२२, ६-१८, १० ४६

श

शात ०८ ३३२
शाता २५-१२२
शाम ६-३०, ८-५६, १६-४६, २४-
१०७, २८-१२२, ३०-२३५, ४१-२३, ५८-१०, ६५-१०६,
, २२-२४३, १०४-२२७, १३०-
४५०
Words Page and Verse

तुल्यलक्षण ३६-३
tूतीया २४-२०३
tूतीमा १२२-२७३
कैजस १७-१०, २५-११३, ११४
tैल २२-९९
t्याग १२७-११३, १२७-१६५
चरी ३०-२३३, ३२-४१३
t्रितय १५-५२, ५९-५५

द

दम १३२-४०८
दण्डन १२२-३७८
dत्त १६-३५३
दिल १६६-३५९
dवर्ण १६-६५, २०-२६, २४-२०६,
६५-१२०, ६९-२३७, १३८,
७०-१२७, ७०-२४१, ७०-२४७,
१०२-२८४, १३३-४२२, १४६-४८४
वाह १३२-४१८, १४६-४२७
वारिणम् १५४-४०
दीप २३-१०४, १०४-२९८
दीवीं १६-७७, २३-१०५, ७४-२३,
१०६-३०९
धुलम ७७-३६६
डुरातुमुखी (पाणिनि) १२२-३७०
द्वृ १२३-३७७
दुर्ग २७-३, ६९-१३६, ६०-१४४
dुर्थ दृष्ट ७३-१५७, १०९-३२९
देवता ६५-११९
देवदत्त १३२-७४२
देश २९-१६, १०३-२१४, १०४-२१६,
२५५, १०८-३१४, १२५-३८४
dेवेन २९-२२७
dेवी ३५५१४
dोष ८७-२२७

Words Page and Verse

भौतक ८०-१৮৮, ৮১-১৯২, ৮৪-২০৪
भौतकल ৮৪-১৯৩
भौत ১৯১-২৪৫
भौतिक ৭৫-১৬৪
ব্য ৬-৩৩, ২২-৯৮, ২৩-১০৫, ৫২-৬৫, ৫৩-৭১, ৬৬-১২৬, ৭২-১৪৪, ১২৩, ১২০-৩৬২
ব্যায় ৫২-৬৬, ৬৭, ৬৮
ব্যায়াত ৬২-১০৩
ব্যার ৮৩-২২১, ৮৮-২২৩, ২২৪, ৮৫-২২৫, ১২৫-৩৮৮
ব্যার ১২৩-২৩৩, ১২৪-২৩৯
ব্যার ৭৫-১৬৪
ব্যার ১২৩-৪৬৮
ব্যার ৯-২৮

ব্যার ১২৩-৩৬৪, ১২৪-৩৬৭
ব্যার ৫-২৫, ৬-৩০, ৩৪, ১০- ৪৫, ৪৩-৬৩, ৩০-১২৩, ৪৩৫, ৩২-১৪০, ৪১-২৩, ৪৮-৫০, ৫০-৭৮, ৭৪-১৬৪, ৫০-১২৯, ৯৯-২৩২, ২৩৩, ১২৪-৩৮০
ব্যার ৫-২৭
ব্যার ৬৭-১৭৮, ৭৮-১৮০, ১৮২, ৩৯-১৪৪, ৪৮, ৫০-১৪৮,
১৯০, ৫০-২৪০, ১০-২২৯, ২৩০
ব্যার ৬৭-১৭৪
ব্যার ১০৫-৩০০
ব্যার ১৯-৫৬
ব্যার ১০-৪৬, ১৫-৫৭, ৫৬, ১৭- ৫৬, ৮৩, ৮৫-৮৯, ৮৩, ৮৪, ২০-৯২, ২১-৩৩, ৯৪, ৮৬,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>नगर १०३-२९२</td>
<td>नगर १०३-२९२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'नन्द' (स्त्रोत) ९२-२८३</td>
<td>'नन्द' (स्त्रोत) ९२-२८३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नन्द समसाम ८९-२२७</td>
<td>नन्द समसाम ८९-२२७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नारायण ५८-२०</td>
<td>नारायण ५८-२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नचाँ ११४-२३७</td>
<td>नचाँ ११४-२३७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नाथान्जिम्य १२२-३६३</td>
<td>नाथान्जिम्य १२२-३६३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नाध १०-२४, ५८-२४, २८-१७, २२-१०२, २३-१०२, ४३-३०</td>
<td>नाध १०-२४, ५८-२४, २८-१७, २२-१०२, २३-१०२, ४३-३०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नानापक्ष १२५-२४२</td>
<td>नानापक्ष १२५-२४२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नानाल ५४-३०, ६७-२६, १२५-३८५, १२९-४०५, १३०-४०७, १३५-४३२</td>
<td>नानाल ५४-३०, ६७-२६, १२५-३८५, १२९-४०५, १३०-४०७, १३५-४३२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नानालव्याहारिक १२९-४०५</td>
<td>नानालव्याहारिक १२९-४०५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नानाग्रीयक ५६-८१, ६६-१२३, ४७-४८, १०८-३४</td>
<td>नानाग्रीयक ५६-८१, ६६-१२३, ४७-४८, १०८-३४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नाम ११४-३३८</td>
<td>नाम ११४-३३८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नालिक ६२-१११</td>
<td>नालिक ६२-१११</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नालिकव ४४-३३</td>
<td>नालिकव ४४-३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निसात ३६-३, ६३-६, १३३-४२२</td>
<td>निसात ३६-३, ६३-६, १३३-४२२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नियता ५-२५, ५०-३०, ६६-०२, ७६-४२, ४५-५६, १०५-३२</td>
<td>नियता ५-२५, ५०-३०, ६६-०२, ७६-४२, ४५-५६, १०५-३२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नियतसबद १२२-३३</td>
<td>नियतसबद १२२-३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निदरक्ष ५०-१९</td>
<td>निदरक्ष ५०-१९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निदर्षन ३८८, ८५-२०७</td>
<td>निदर्षन ३८८, ८५-२०७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निवा ९३-२१८, १०६-१०८, १००-२३</td>
<td>निवा ९३-२१८, १०६-१०८, १००-२३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निवात ८२-१२</td>
<td>निवात ८२-१२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निवायाना २३-१४५</td>
<td>निवायाना २३-१४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निवस्व ३०-३३५, ४७-३३</td>
<td>निवस्व ३०-३३५, ४७-३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निववा २६-११६</td>
<td>निववा २६-११६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>निवनत २६-२४, २६-२६६, २६-</td>
<td>निवनत २६-२४, २६-२६६, २६-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पवत</td>
<td>२२-१००, ७६-१७२, १०३-२९०, २८४, १४५-४८१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पव क्रिया</td>
<td>३-१४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पल</td>
<td>१०३-२९३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पायनी</td>
<td>६२-१४३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाक</td>
<td>२५-११३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाव</td>
<td>१२५-३८५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाध</td>
<td>१२२-३६४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाप</td>
<td>८-४०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पारय</td>
<td>३५-१५४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाराय</td>
<td>३१-१३७, १८३-३३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पिक</td>
<td>५८-९२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पिण्ड</td>
<td>९५-२५२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पुस्कोकिल</td>
<td>७२-१४९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पुथ</td>
<td>४५-३१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पुल</td>
<td>९८-६६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पुवण</td>
<td>१७६-४८५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पुण</td>
<td>५६-८२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पूर्ण</td>
<td>१०-४६, ४१-२२, ५६-१६६, १३०-२५१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पूर्वक</td>
<td>१३३-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पूरक</td>
<td>२-२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पूर्ण</td>
<td>८९-१०२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्र (prefix)</td>
<td>२०-१०७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रकरण</td>
<td>४६-२२२, २४-२५४, १२-२६४, ८७-२६७, १०८-३१४, ३५७, ३६८, १०२-३२०, १३२-३३३, १३०-२०७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रकरण</td>
<td>१३३-६४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रकल्पन</td>
<td>७०-१४१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रकाश</td>
<td>२८-१२४, ५८-३३, १४४-४७२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रकाश</td>
<td>२२-१९६, ४४-२२, ७२-१५३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रकाशन</td>
<td>१०४-२७६, १०५-३०३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रकाश</td>
<td>१२-५७, २३-९९, ४४-३२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रक्रिया</td>
<td>३८-२०, ६६-१६७, ८१-२०८, १२२, २३६, २०४-२३३, २३८-२३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रक्रिया</td>
<td>२२-२०, ८०-७२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रक्रिया</td>
<td>६६-१६७, २३६-२३२, २३८-२३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रक्रिया</td>
<td>६०-१०, १२५-३८६, १४३-४६०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रक्रिया</td>
<td>५-२०, १०-४९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिविष्क</td>
<td>22-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिवाच</td>
<td>143-331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिभा</td>
<td>64-117, 70-143, 72-148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिभात्मा</td>
<td>26-198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिमुदार</td>
<td>40-18, 46-19, 126-321, 194-360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिज्ञ</td>
<td>109-312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिवेच</td>
<td>117-349, 124-382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिलोक</td>
<td>92-240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिलोमान</td>
<td>60-100, 119-258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिन</td>
<td>2-36, 17, 8-39, 30-149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय स</td>
<td>6-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय लल</td>
<td>28-124, 42-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय य</td>
<td>109-320, 109-321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय यक</td>
<td>16-60, 80, 98, 66-122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय याय</td>
<td>5-27, 16-61, 16-124, 100-299, 128-256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय यायपिक</td>
<td>12-15, 14-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय याय</td>
<td>60-86, 65-199, 105-301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय यावह</td>
<td>22-198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय यक</td>
<td>88-222, 124-328, 125-323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतिय यक</td>
<td>4-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति</td>
<td>127-326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>56-87, 64-247, 105-304, 106-305, 113-350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति पल</td>
<td>114-327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति पाल</td>
<td>100-326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>100-91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>123-104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>44-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>44-34, 51-144, 73-158, 106-307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>24-308, 25-211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>89-193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>30-123, 72-170, 134-228, 140, 143-270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>65-120, 66-224, 125, 19-160, 79-183, 18-269, 129-205, 138-446, 141-262, 142-446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>54-312, 174-219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>303-203, 304-247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>63-193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>99-242, 101-280, 199-321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>32-154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>2-8, 27-137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>67-130, 63-420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>29-128, 94-247, 136-440, 129-449, 143-460, 144-460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>117-243, 103-302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>18-325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>53-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>73-155, 93-244, 109-318, 110-223, 124-328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>300-132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>99-271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>124-247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>93-265, 102-288, 103-289, 294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रति प</td>
<td>146-282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाकार १०३-२९२</td>
<td>बाला ६४-१३२, १०१-२८४, १३७-४४४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पत्रकर ६६-७६</td>
<td>बिनु ७३-१५८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राणायम्य १२१-४५१</td>
<td>बीज २०-१३३, २०-२६, ४२-२६, ७९-१८४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राण २९-११३, २६-११५, १६७, २५८-२२</td>
<td>शुद्ध १०-२६, ४७, १०-५३, २०-२०, ९५, २६-१३१, ३६-१४६, ४०-१९, ४२-२६, ४६-४०, ६८-२३२, ७९-१८६, ९२-२४२, २४२, ११४-२५२, ११५-३४२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राणायम्य ८८-२२६, ८८-२२७, ६६-१२९, १२३-२२७</td>
<td>वृद्धमेंद ६-२४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राणायम्य ७०-१४१</td>
<td>वृद्धिविपर्यय ३५-१५५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राणायम्य ७२-१५३</td>
<td>बौज १३५-४४७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्राणायम्य १२३-४०२</td>
<td>बालाश १-२, २-११, ४-२२, २०-१३२, ९२-२२३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्लवन ७३-१५३</td>
<td>बालावन १९-३४७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्लवन १६-३५६, २३-१०५, ६६-१०२, १०६-२०७</td>
<td>बालावन १६०-४५०</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| पल ५३-८२, ७९-१४५, ९६-२३४, १२२-२३२, १३७-३९५, १३५-४२५ | भ |}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>बालवन ५६-८०</td>
<td>भाग ३९-१२, ४३-२६, ५८-९०, ९१, ३३, ५९-६४, ८८-२२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बशि २८-१२६</td>
<td>भागवत २०-१७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बशि ७६-१३०</td>
<td>भागवती ४२-२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बशिव १९४-४६७</td>
<td>भागवत २०-१५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बशिव ९७०-२१९, ८५२२८</td>
<td>भाग र२-१२०, ३२-२७४, ५१-१३५, ९१-२३७, ४०१-२३७, ११४-३३७, ६५५-३४०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बावस्म ३३-१४५</td>
<td>भावतान ६२-२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बावन ४२-२५, ६४-१३३, ६१-१४६, ३२-२५१</td>
<td>भावेश ८-३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बावल ५२-२३</td>
<td>भावविकार ४-३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बावल ६४-१२१, ६१-२३८, १०७-३४२, ४०९-३२०</td>
<td>भावपान ६३-८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>बावलाव ७८-१७९</td>
<td>धन ६२-२३, ८९-१२७, १०५-४७५, ४६५-४८५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>धन ६२-२३, ३५-२, ३८-८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>मुद्रायु २६-१२८, १४२-४५९</td>
<td>सेवपुर्व ५०-५७</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
वदन का १०२-२८७

योगवाचक ५-२५
योति ५०-५८, १४०-१५६
योगदान ९४-२५१, ९४१-७६२,
१४२-४६३, ४६४

र

रज्जु १०२-२८८
रत ३-१२
राजा १३७-४५०
खंड २९-१२०
खर्च ४५-३७, ६३-१२९,
७७-१७६
रूप ४-१८, २५, ११२, ३१-३१९-
३६-४६, ५६-७४, ६६, ६७,
६०-१००, ६२-१०६, ६३-
६०, ६६-१२४, ४००-२९५,
२७६-२९६, २३७-३१४, १००-
३२४, २२२-३७२, १३३-४२२,
१३३-६७३, १३३-६७३
रूपाला २०-६२, ६०-१०३
रूपाला ५०-१६, १२६-३८९
रूपाला १९६-३ ४५
रूप ३-३५
रौम ७४-१६२

ल

लक्षण ३३-१५७, ३८-८, ५०
५९, ७५-१६८, १०६-३०५;
१०७-३१०, १२४-३८०, १३६
४३६
लक्षण १०६-३०६
लक्षणहृष्ट १०६-३०८, १२६-३८८
लक्षणहृष्ट १२५-३८३
लक्षित ५२-६८, ७२-१५३
लक्ष १२३-३७७
### Words Page and Verse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>लबु ५५-७४</td>
<td>वलमीक ३६-१३२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>लाक्षार ६३-१८५</td>
<td>बस्तु २८-१२९, ६६-१०५, ६६-१२२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>लिङ्ग २-७, ५-२६, ३४-२३६, ६६-६१२, ७६-६१२, १०६-३०२, १०८-३१४, ११६-३४५, ११९-६३६, १२२-३७५, १४४-५७३, २७४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>लिप्या १२४-३८२</td>
<td>बाक २-१२, ९-१८, १०-१६, २९-१२९, ३२-१४३, ३३-६४३, ३५-२६५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>लक २०-३३५, ३७-१०३, ११-६३, ६१-२३६, १०४-२९७, ११५-३४३</td>
<td>वाक्यमैद १२-६६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>लोक १३३-३५५, १६९-३६०</td>
<td>वाक्यमैद १२-४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>लोकिक ८५-२१०, ११२-३२६, १२५-२४२, २२२-३७०</td>
<td>वाक्यमैद १२-४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वस्त्र ६६-१३५</td>
<td>वाक्यमैद १२-४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वतन ६६-१३५</td>
<td>वाक्यमैद १२-४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वध २२-१००</td>
<td>वाक्यमैद १२-४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>व्रज १०३-२६२</td>
<td>वाक्यमैद १२-४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वर्णमैद ३८-१६</td>
<td>वाक्यमैद १२-६६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वर्ण १४५-२६३</td>
<td>वाक्यमैद १२-६६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वाचकत्व ८१-१९४</td>
<td>विनिवेश ७४-१६०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वाचिक ७५-१६४</td>
<td>विनिवृत्त ८३-१६९, ९०-२२९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वाचिवल ७६-१६९</td>
<td>विपरीत ३२-१४१, १०२-२९५, १३३-४२४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वाच्य ८९-२२६, १२७-३९४, १३४-४२६</td>
<td>विपर्यय १६-३७४, १०६-३०६, १२५-२८५, १३५-४३२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वाच्यताः ६७-१२७</td>
<td>विपर्यत्त २६-२५५, २५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वाद १५-६८, ३०-३३४, ३५-१६५, ६४-१६६</td>
<td>विपर्याय ३-२७, २५-२७४, १०३-२८९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वायु २४-२०६, २४-२०८, २५-२१२, ११८, २६-२१६</td>
<td>विस्मृति ७२-१६९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वातावरन १५५-३४२</td>
<td>विस्मृय ६४-१६२, १५३, १०८-३६५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वातिक ७६-१६९</td>
<td>विप्रकाश १५५-७६९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वात्तीक ९५-२५५, २५५</td>
<td>विप्रकृत ४५-६०, १०५-३४०, १४५-२६१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विकल ६४-१६६, ६०-३३३</td>
<td>विप्रकृति ७५-१६४, ८३-२००, ८६-२११</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विकल्पन ७६-१६०</td>
<td>विप्राग २२-१०२, ३२-१४४, ३९-१३, ५७-३८, १०६-३४३, १२५-२८५, १३६-४२६, ५४५-४२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विकल्पत ८२-२२६</td>
<td>विप्रागाय १४०-४५६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विकार २०-१९५, ६८-१०४</td>
<td>विप्रागोऽ १३०-२०४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विक्रत २१-१९४, ६२-१००</td>
<td>विषद ८७-२१८, ५३-२५६, ४२८-३६८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विमान ८४-२०६</td>
<td>विषोऽ ६१-१६१, १२५-३८४, १२६-२६१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विमान १५५-३४२</td>
<td>विषोऽविवि १००-३१५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशेषद ४०-१६३, ९२-२४२</td>
<td>विषोऽविवि १२३-१९३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशाल ५३-३०२</td>
<td>विषोऽविवि ९८-२८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशार ४०-१९५</td>
<td>विषोऽविवि ५४-३४, ५८-९२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशार १२४-३६५</td>
<td>विषवा ३५-१५४, ६४-१३३, १४४-४२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशाराद २०-१०</td>
<td>विषवा ५५-२०, १०५-३०४, १५२-१६४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशाराद ६०७-१६३</td>
<td>विषवा २५-११२, २५-११४, २७-३०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशाराद १२४-१०२</td>
<td>विषवा २९-१६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशाराद ६२-१००</td>
<td>विषवा ३३-१०२, ६३-२५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशाराद १२४-१०२</td>
<td>विषवा ४५-१७१, १०५-२८५, १२५-३३८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशाराद ४०-१६३</td>
<td>विषवा ५५-२०, १०५-३०४, १५२-१६४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशाराद ६२-२५९</td>
<td>विषवा २५-११२, २५-११४, २७-३०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विशाराद १२४-१०२</td>
<td>विषवा २९-१६७</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(215)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words Page and Verse</th>
<th>Words Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>विविक्ताल २७५-४३२</td>
<td>८८-११३, ७३-२१४, ८९-२२५, ६१-२६२, ६०-२८२, २५५-२२९, ६५-६०७, २३५-२१९, ५६-१४४,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विवृत १०-२७८, ३३-१४९</td>
<td>१०३-२३३, १२३-२५२, १३३-२५२, २५५-२२९, ६५-६०७, २३५-२१९, २४५-२१९,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विवृद्ध ६७-१०२</td>
<td>२५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विवेक ७५-१६४, ५४-४८४</td>
<td>२५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९, २५५-२२९,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विविषात ४५-३६, ५४-६, ७२-१२४, ७२-१२४, ७२-१२४, ७२-१२४, ७२-१२४,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विविषाक २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विवेचन २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विविषाय ४५-३६, ५४-६, ७२-१२४, ७२-१२४, ७२-१२४, ७२-१२४, ७२-१२४,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विवेचनात्मक ३३-१५८, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विवेचन २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>विवेचनात्मक ३३-१५८, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विवेचनात्मक ३३-१५८, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५, २५-१०५,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(211)
Words

Words

Pages and Verse

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ST^TT \-\6,
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words Page and Verse</th>
<th>Word Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>शब्दभाव १-२, ४२-३०, ४४-३२</td>
<td>शुक्लभाव १०१-२८०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दभाव ४२-५२</td>
<td>शुद्ध ५६-२२, ४३-२५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दनिकाय ६६-१२७</td>
<td>शुद्ध १६-८२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दसूत्र ४-२१</td>
<td>शेष ५६-२०, २६-२५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दशक्ति २८-१२२</td>
<td>शृणु १६-३४६, १३९-४५०, १२४-५६३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दायुग १६-१२९</td>
<td>४६२-४२०, ४६०-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दात्मा १४०-५५८</td>
<td>४६०-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दावस्था १२८-१२३</td>
<td>४६०-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दावसंधि १२८-१२३</td>
<td>४६०-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दावस्थावर्तमान १२८-१२३</td>
<td>४६०-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दबीमार्य १२८-१२३</td>
<td>४६०-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दबीमार्य १२८-१२३</td>
<td>४६०-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दबीमार्य १२८-१२३</td>
<td>४६०-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>शब्दबीमार्य १२८-१२३</td>
<td>४६०-४२०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सम्बोध १३६-४१४</td>
<td>सब्बोध ३७-५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सवध २२-३०, ६५-१५, ६६-२३६</td>
<td>सवध २२-१००, ६५-१५, ६६-२३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सब्बध ७०-१६७, ७९-१८९, ८१-२००, ८२-२१५, ८६-२३८, ८८-२४३, ९२-२६२, ९३-२७३, ९४-२८४, ९५-२९५, ९६-३०६</td>
<td>सब्बध १३६-४१४</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(219)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Page and Verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>सब्बध २२-१००, ६५-१५, ६६-२३६</td>
<td>सब्बध १३६-४१४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सब्बध ७०-१६७, ७९-१८९, ८१-२००, ८२-२१५, ८६-२३८, ८८-२४३, ९२-२६२, ९३-२७३, ९४-२८४, ९५-२९५, ९६-३०६</td>
<td>सब्बध १३६-४१४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सब्बध १३६-४२६</td>
<td>सब्बध ६१-१३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सब्बध २२-१००, ६५-१५, ६६-२३६</td>
<td>सब्बध २२-१००, ६५-१५, ६६-२३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सब्बध १३६-४२६</td>
<td>सब्बध २२-१००, ६५-१५, ६६-२३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सत्वपाद १५५-३४०</td>
<td>समुक्षय ५५-३७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सत्वप्रयान १५५-३४१</td>
<td>समुक्षत ५५-३७, ६६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सह्य ५८-९०, ९२</td>
<td>समुक्षत ५५-३७, ६६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सन्तत १०३-२९९</td>
<td>समुक्षत ५५-३७, ६६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सन्तपत २०-८९</td>
<td>समुक्षत ५५-३७, ६६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सन्तवा ११९-३६०</td>
<td>समुक्षत ५५-३७, ६६-१२६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सन्तवन ४७-३७, ४८-५५, ५४-७४, ६५-१२४, १०५-३०३, १०६-३०३, १२७-३९४</td>
<td>सन्तवन ४७-३७, ४८-५५, ५४-७४, ६५-१२४, १०५-३०३, १०६-३०३, १२७-३९४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सन्हार १०५-३०३, १०८-३१५</td>
<td>सन्हार १०५-३०३, १०८-३१५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सन्हान ११३-३३५</td>
<td>सन्हान ११३-३३५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सन्हसर २४-१०९</td>
<td>सन्हसर २४-१०९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समन्थ ११३-३३५</td>
<td>समन्थ ११३-३३५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समनवेत २३-३३६</td>
<td>समनवेत २३-३३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समविन ११३-३३५</td>
<td>समविन ११३-३३५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समव १५-१९८</td>
<td>समव १५-१९८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समवसंत २७-२४८, २८-४६२</td>
<td>समवसंत २७-२४८, २८-४६२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समवय १३५-४३३</td>
<td>समवय १३५-४३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समसत १२४-३८०, १२५-३८३, १२६-३९१</td>
<td>समसत १२४-३८०, १२५-३८३, १२६-३९१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समायान २८-४</td>
<td>समायान २८-४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समायान ७०-१४२, ७६-१६२, ७६-१६३, १२०-३२३</td>
<td>समायान ७०-१४२, ७६-१६२, ७६-१६३, १२०-३२३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समायान १०७-३७</td>
<td>समायान १०७-३७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समान ४९-५३</td>
<td>समान ४९-५३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समान ४९-५३</td>
<td>समान ४९-५३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समान ६४-१४५, ६५-२४६, १३६-३३८</td>
<td>समान ६४-१४५, ६५-२४६, १३६-३३८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समार्थ १२५-३८७, १२६-३८८, ३८९</td>
<td>समार्थ १२५-३८७, १२६-३८८, ३८९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समार्थ ७५-१६७, ९२-३३७</td>
<td>समार्थ ७५-१६७, ९२-३३७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समाव ५८-१२८, ८५-२०८</td>
<td>समाव ५८-१२८, ८५-२०८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समासाज १२४-३७९</td>
<td>समासाज १२४-३७९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समाखर ४७-३३५</td>
<td>समाखर ४७-३३५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समीत्व २८-२२२</td>
<td>समीत्व २८-२२२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समीत्व २८-२२२</td>
<td>समीत्व २८-२२२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समीक्षा २९-१४१</td>
<td>समीक्षा २९-१४१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समीक्षा २९-१४१</td>
<td>समीक्षा २९-१४१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सात्नादिमान ९५-२५२</td>
<td>१२६-२५२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>साहचर्य १०८-२६४</td>
<td>१३४-२६४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सिद्ध ७४-१२४, ६९-११३, ६०-</td>
<td>२०९, ६०९-२३२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सज्ज ३-१६, ३०-२३२, ४०-२८,</td>
<td>९७-२६३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सीर १००-२७५</td>
<td>'सु' (suffix) १२६-२६७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सुधम २५-२६२, २६-२६६, ५५-</td>
<td>६२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सूत्र ५-२३, ६३-६९, ६४-२६६</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सूत्र १०३-२६०</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सोम १०१-२६१</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>समर्पण १३५-२६९</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सिद्ध १३५-२६८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्तुति ९४-२६२, १०९-२६८, ३६-</td>
<td>९१-२६३, १२४-२६०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्यान २४-२६०, २६-२६६, २८-</td>
<td>२६२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्यामिनू १०४-२६८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्याली १०४-२६८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर २६-२६४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर २६-२६४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर्ण १०३-२६२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर्ग १०३-२६२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सिद्ध १३५-२६८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्यान २४-२६०, २६-२६६, २८-</td>
<td>२६२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्यामिनू १०४-२६८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्याली १०४-२६८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर २६-२६४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर्ण १०३-२६२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर्ग १०३-२६२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सिद्ध १३५-२६८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्यान २४-२६०, २६-२६६, २८-</td>
<td>२६२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्यामिनू १०४-२६८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्याली १०४-२६८</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर २६-२६४</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर्ण १०३-२६२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वर्ग १०३-२६२</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words Page and Verse</td>
<td>Words Page and Verse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्मृतिशास्त्र ३४-१९१</td>
<td>२६७, १००-२७९, ११२-३३०, १६६-३४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्मृकाल २२-१०१</td>
<td>स्वाभिक (suffix) ८०-१९०, ७५-२०८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वत्स १२-२९५</td>
<td>ह</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वतन्त्र १८-८६</td>
<td>हरिवंश १०९-२८३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वभाव १६-७५, ३२-१४४, ७२-१५२, ९७-२३५</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वभावा २९-१२९</td>
<td>हर्षवर्धन १४५-६७९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वरुपति ७२-१४६</td>
<td>हर्षवर्द्धन ३०-१४०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वरूप ११-१००, १२-५७, ७२, ८८-८३, ६१-१०४, ६५-१६५, ७७-१७५, ७५-२६२, १७२-२६२, १०४-२८९, ३३२-४२१</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वपुत्र ६६-२५७</td>
<td>हेतुवन २०-९०, ३०-१३५, ८४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वग ६५-११९</td>
<td>२०३, ११४-२२७, १३१-४१४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वचित्र ५-२६</td>
<td>हेतुवन १२-५८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वाक्षरित ४२-२५५, १३५-४३४</td>
<td>हेतुदल ८४-२०३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वातन्त्र्य १३-६६</td>
<td>हेतुलक्षण ८४-२०३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्वाभाविक ३०-१३५</td>
<td>हेतु १६-७६, ४१-२३, १०६-३०६, ३०६, ३०८</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# INDEX OF VERSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beginning of Verses</th>
<th>Page number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अ</td>
<td>अनेकाध्यक्षाधिक्ष्यम्‌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मताः</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मकम्‌</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मकम्‌</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मत्रां</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनेकाध्यात्मां</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>स्तर</td>
<td>विषय</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३</td>
<td>काकेश्यो रक्तयता सपित</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>कायवापुरुविविधया</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>४</td>
<td>काय्यकारणभावेन</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५</td>
<td>काय्यंतिंतित्वायुरुत्त्विता</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६</td>
<td>कायाण्यांसतरज्ञवर्णम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>७</td>
<td>कायानुस्तंभपञ्चवाचो</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>८</td>
<td>कालभिन्नाचाच्च संवादे रिया</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>९</td>
<td>केताःत्ततायाद्वीपमिति</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१०</td>
<td>केताःद्वायाथ्युपसंतिसिद्धार्थ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>११</td>
<td>केतेविद संवाद प्रकाशाते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१२</td>
<td>केतेविद पदेनाधिावानो</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१३</td>
<td>केतेविद पदेनाधिः नेत्रीताओ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१४</td>
<td>केवलानुविन्यो भिन्न</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१५</td>
<td>केवलानुविन्यो निःसङ्गतिः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१६</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१७</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१८</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१९</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२०</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२१</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२२</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२३</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२४</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२५</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२६</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२७</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२८</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२९</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३०</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३१</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३२</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३३</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३४</td>
<td>क्रमे विविधते रूप</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
गौरिक्रेव स्वप्नपात्रा ७७
ग्याणप्राप्तयो विद्वा २१
मानव प्राहुक्तव च ६२


च

चक्षु राघ्नकारित्वेव १७
चंकयामणि अभोजनात्र १३८
वादयो न प्रमुखन्ते ८१
चित्रं चक्षुपस्य ३८
चिरं विश्वासित ज्ञाने ४५
चेतायमि गवहयम् ८


ज

जनयित्वा क्रिया कारितु ८२
जहृतस्वर्चितकले च ८९
जातिराखके शाक्ये ६६
जातिकलाजन्तराणिय ९९
जाने स्वाभाविके नाथं ३०


ल

तत्र दुर्गृहश्च १४६
तत्र हस्त वायुपालयेव १३२
तथा प्रतिद्वं धम ६३
तत्र त्रिविंद्रत्वम् ८३
तत्र शाधकत्वम् १२४
तत्र शालोभपी कल्पनगितः १०५
यज्ञ कोजामित्र प्रसनने 99 शुद्धावथर्यकंरेव 130
यज्ञ इवपदार्थसंय 88 शुद्धावथकसंपथ 58
यज्ञ निन्नोते विषय 103 वेयेशा तत्र सामायकं 32
यज्ञानुपाल श्रद्धन 106 यदन्त श्रद्धाशः च 43
यज्ञाच्याय पद धूपत 98 यदन्तराज्ञे शान् 9 130
यज्ञोपातास्मृण 104 यदसाधारणास्मृण 102
यज्ञोत्तेन यथा द्वथ 52 यदेकं प्रकृत्यन्ते 4
यज्ञोदिवशक्र पारारथ 31 यथापि प्रत्यावायनम् 102
यज्ञानुपोषितेषुपथ 7 यथाकाल निवर्तनं 140
यज्ञ चाव्यभिषारेण 75 यमंदमाहुमिनिनी 90
यज्ञ याचो निमित्तातन 4 यस्यत्वं यथेऽपि 98
यज्ञ सातानुविद्यः 113 यस्मिन् तृतिते शब्दे 111
यज्ञो लोकितोपयथ 41 वस्येत्यदेणो भव 60
यज्ञा च बादरजङ्कः 88 यास्तु मभविनो धर्मस् 74
यज्ञा जात्युपनन्दनी 73 दृश्यं द्रव्यविनिववधु 109
यज्ञावस्तुसम्रापनम् 19 ये न सभविनो भेदः 48
यज्ञ द्रव्यविशेषणा 72 वेत सक्ह्यादापिष 89
यज्ञाजुपुरीनिनी 20 वेनाय्योनाभिसब्रह्मस 74
यज्ञानुपोषक ष्टोको वा 8 ये स्त्र स्त्रितत्वः 90
यज्ञोनेकपिक क्वातां 37 ये च चव्या निमित्तातन 79
यज्ञा पदसमाख्यव 76 वेषा समवो वायार्य 126
यज्ञा पदसमाख्यव 63 यो य उत्तायते शब्दो 139
यज्ञा पदद विभक्तनी 38 यो वाताभुविनिवयो 98
यज्ञा प्रकरण दार्मिक 113 योषिः वेनापकारेण 134
यज्ञा प्रमितहल चबु 128 योगप्रभुत्तिवन्त 94
यज्ञा प्रयोक्तु प्रामृत्वदि 111 राजावर्धने राजायो 44
यज्ञावस्तु समवो 91 रूप समवदार्थादि 110
यज्ञावस्तु समवो 74 रूपादो यथा धूप त 99
यज्ञावस्तु दर्शने स्वतं 45 ल परमायुक्तो 31
यज्ञा सामायथे वरणी 127 लक्षणाधवतिष्ठते 136
यज्ञा सातानादिवमानु दिष्को 49 लक्षणावथं लिन्तृता 124
यज्ञानुस्य सामपदसंध 95 लक्षणायारं स्तुतिभया 124
यज्ञाक्षे एव शर्य 69 लक्षण्य: लोकसंनिग्धतात 123
यज्ञाक्षे एव शर्य— 37 लक्षणिकम पदवेने 24
यज्ञाक्षे एव शर्य— 88 लोकसंनिग्धता शाबद् 67
यज्ञाक्षे एव शर्य— 11 लक्षणाधवतिष्ठतः 136
यज्ञाक्षे एव शर्य— 20 लक्षणाधवतिष्ठतः 69
यज्ञानुस्य सातानादिवमानु दिष्को 105 लक्षणाधवतिष्ठतः 136
( 231 )

सम्प्रचिताभिवासनेिपि व्यति—

81
87
86
66
63
92
93
99
105
146
155
157
46
164
161
162
173
177
178
185
187
95
148
147
135
138
139
32
80
77
37
71
73
53
193
194
195
196
197
74
85
86
87
( 232 )

स्वरूप विद्यं कर्मस्य ।
स्वतत्तित्र व्यज्ञानाय।
स्वार्थमात्र प्रकाश्यांसि। ।
स्वाधेष व्यवस्थानस्य।
१३२ ।

हृद्यस्यांस्यव्यास्य ।
हृद्यते तुम्मतो। ।
हुस्यां च ययु दृष्ट ।
१३५ ।

हृद्यस्यांस्यव्यास्य ।
हृद्यते तुम्मतो। ।
हुस्यां च ययु दृष्टि ।
१३५ ।
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Malinowski, B
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Müller, F Max
Nāgesa Bhaṭṭa
—do—
—do—
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Richards, J A
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sastri, P S, Subrahmanya, Vidyaratna</td>
<td>Lectures on Patañjali’s Maha bhāṣya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Šatapathabrahmana</td>
<td>Sphoṭacandrikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrīkṛṣṇabhaṭṭa Mauni</td>
<td>Commentary on the Vākyapadiya, Brahmakānda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Śukla, Pandit Śri Sūryanārāyana</td>
<td>Meaning And Change of Meaning</td>
</tr>
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<td>Stern, Gustaf</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Taitturiyabrahmana</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Taitturiyaprūśākhya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vājasaneyi-Samhitā</td>
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<td>Vāmana and Jayāditya</td>
<td>Kāśikāvärtti on the Aṣṭādhyāyī</td>
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<td>Venkatramiah, D</td>
<td>Śāstradīpikā—Translation</td>
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<td>Varma, Siddheswar</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Tractus Logico—Philosophicus</td>
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<td>Yāśka</td>
<td>Nirukta</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Work</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Verse—line etc</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Read</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>चन्द्रोमयीतनु</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>चन्द्रोमयीतनु</td>
<td>चन्द्रोमयीतनु</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>मेवादिसनाय</td>
<td>मेवादिसनाय</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>यो</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>foot note line 9</td>
<td>Karika</td>
<td>Kārikā</td>
</tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>तेल्यांत अगु</td>
<td>तेल्यांत अगु</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>शिनी</td>
<td>शिनी</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>कण्ढवन</td>
<td>कण्ढवन</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>70—translation line 2</td>
<td>ar are</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>शब्दस्वर्णं</td>
<td>शब्दस्वर्णं</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>व्यतिरि—</td>
<td>व्यतिरि—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>—सिंह</td>
<td>—सिंह</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>Speechsounds</td>
<td>Speech-sound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>मेवोहि</td>
<td>मेवो हि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>foot-note</td>
<td>Karika</td>
<td>Kārikā</td>
</tr>
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<td>27</td>
<td>foot-note</td>
<td>Karika</td>
<td>Kārikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>119 trans 1 1</td>
<td>sadja&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>sadja&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>मावनात्तु</td>
<td>मावनात्तु</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>121 trans 1 3</td>
<td>past&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>past&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>ब्रह्मते</td>
<td>ब्रह्मते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>—जुष्क्षकाभानाणि</td>
<td>—जुष्क्षकाभानाणि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>ब्रह्मतेः</td>
<td>ब्रह्मतेः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>विष्टानामिद</td>
<td>विष्टानामिद</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>foot note line 5</td>
<td>sine</td>
<td>since</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>31 क</td>
<td>प्रकाशते</td>
<td>प्रकाशते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>58a trans 1 2</td>
<td>ways&lt;sup&gt;49&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>ways&lt;sup&gt;49a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>विष्टोपोगतिपितिस्यते</td>
<td>विष्टोपोगतिपितिस्यते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>विबच्यते</td>
<td>विबच्यते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>foot note 2</td>
<td>मिश्च—</td>
<td>मिश्च—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>93 trans 1 2</td>
<td>respects</td>
<td>respects&lt;sup&gt;57&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>105 translation line 1</td>
<td>without their giving up</td>
<td>without giving up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>अभिज्ञाताः</td>
<td>अभिज्ञाताः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>127 foot note line 1</td>
<td>जन्य—</td>
<td>जन्य—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Verse—line etc</td>
<td>For</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>162 translation line 2</td>
<td>horn</td>
<td>hair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>204 translation line 1</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>व्यवस्थ</td>
<td>व्यवस्थ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>335b translation line 2</td>
<td>(of things)77</td>
<td>(of thing)72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>translation line 2</td>
<td>primary</td>
<td>primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>268 translation line 3</td>
<td>example</td>
<td>example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>268 translation line 6</td>
<td>context,</td>
<td>context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>translation line 1</td>
<td>one)80</td>
<td>one)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>301 translation line 4</td>
<td>तथासवबोधि</td>
<td>तथा शब्दोधि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>word from</td>
<td>to be omitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>303 translation line 3</td>
<td>remaining the same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>translation line 1</td>
<td>operate</td>
<td>operate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>305 translation line 4</td>
<td>meaning</td>
<td>meaning80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>307b translation line 2</td>
<td>stated</td>
<td>stated80a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>प्रतीपते</td>
<td>प्रतीपते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>translation line 1</td>
<td>set</td>
<td>set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>335 translation line 5</td>
<td>of the latter group</td>
<td>of the latter87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>basis 102</td>
<td>युक्तत्व</td>
<td>युक्तत्व</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>Matharas</td>
<td>Mathara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>347 translation line 2</td>
<td>bhuj</td>
<td>bhuj102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>374 translation line 1</td>
<td>group basis102</td>
<td>group-basis103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>378</td>
<td>शातावाणि</td>
<td>शातावाणि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>शाताकर्मीक</td>
<td>शाताकर्मीक</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>383 translation line 2</td>
<td>an</td>
<td>at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>396 translation line 6</td>
<td>added115</td>
<td>added115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>—स्वं तथा</td>
<td>—स्वं तथा</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>added</td>
<td>—स्वं तथा</td>
<td>—स्वं तथा</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>407 translation line 4</td>
<td>Words-with-one-meaning</td>
<td>Words with one meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>—रूपायो</td>
<td>—रूपायो</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>translation line 1</td>
<td>The nature</td>
<td>(The nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>421 translation line 5</td>
<td>word-meaning</td>
<td>word meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>मनसच्चु</td>
<td>मनसच्चु</td>
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Note: A few more misprints especially regarding diacritical marks in words such as Karika for Kārikā have unfortunately crept in, but have not been here indicated.