CANADA

IN THE

GREAT WORLD WAR
MEMORIAL EDITION
CANADA IN THE GREAT WORLD WAR

AN AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT OF THE MILITARY HISTORY OF CANADA FROM THE EARLIEST DAYS TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR OF THE NATIONS

IN SIX VOLUMES
BY VARIOUS AUTHORITIES

Vol. I

MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM OTTER, K.C.B., C.M.G.
MAJOR-GENERAL F. L. LESSARD, C.M.G.
LIEUT-COLONEL WILLIAM HENDRILL, C.M.G.
LIEUT-COLONEL W. W. LANG

MAKERS OF CANADA IN THE GREAT WORLD WAR

PUBLISHERS
FIELD MARSHAL HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT AND OF STRATHEARN, K.G.
GOVERNOR GENERAL AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF
THE DOMINION OF CANADA
1911-1916

From a photograph by Leatherdale
MAKERS OF CANADA WAR SERIES

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TORONTO
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CHAPTER I
PIONEER SOLDIERS OF CANADA

FROM the time when Jacques Cartier entered the St. Lawrence in 1535, trading vessels—English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish—had been visiting the great waterway to the heart of the North American Continent. These vessels were content to gather fish, seal oil, and furs, and to return each year rejoicing to Europe with their rich cargoes. Until the opening decade of the 17th century, the region now known as Canada was a No Man's Land. France, it is true, laid claim to the northern part of the continent by right of the discoveries of Jacques Cartier and had made several abortive attempts at settlement. England had a shadowy claim through the work of the Cabots, but she did nothing to substantiate her pretensions—the colonizing spirit not yet having taken possession of the nation. France had therefore a free field when, about 1600, she set seriously to work to establish trading posts in North America.

After several attempts to found trading stations in Acadia and on the Lower St. Lawrence, Samuel Champlain and François Gravé, Sieur du Pont, lieutenants of Sieur de Monts, who had been granted a monopoly of trade in New France, built, in 1608, a rudely fortified post under the shadow of the rock on which now stands the citadel of Quebec. In this little fortress, in which begins the military story of Canada, Champlain and his twenty-seven men, soldiers and traders, laid the foundation of New France, with visions of Empire before them. They were but a handful of men among a host of savages. North America, as Champlain found it, was a region of vast forest stretches drained by mighty rivers. Lakes and streams abounded, and by their banks nestled innumerable villages of savage tribes. The Indians, with
whom Champlain was to come into contact, were of three great families—the Algonquian, a wandering, shiftless people scattered from the Atlantic to the western plains; the Huron, living in populous villages in a limited area between Lake Simcoe and Georgian Bay; and the Iroquois, fierce hunters of men, who, though comparatively small in number, by their powerful league held paramount place among the tribes east of the Mississippi.¹

In the hope of making his colony secure, Champlain entered into an alliance with the Indians who visited Quebec—Algonquians and Hurons. To make permanent this alliance Champlain and some of his followers joined their allies in an attack on their hereditary foes the Iroquois, and in the early summer of 1609 set out westward on the first military expedition in which the French took part after permanently establishing themselves in New France. The result of this expedition was a forest skirmish on the shores of Lake Champlain, a slight affair in itself, but the initial battle of the hundred years war between the Iroquois and the French.

The Lake Champlain region in its primitive state might have been a veritable paradise for the Indian hunter and trapper; but the fates willed otherwise. Deadly tribal feuds, resulting in a perpetual state of savage warfare of the most brutal and destructive type, existed among the various races, and this particular lake was one of the most important links in the chain of water communication used by the Iroquois, or Five-Nations Indians,² and by the Algonquians and Hurons in the conduct of their unceasing warfare. One day a war

¹ Champlain estimated the population of the Hurons between 20,000 and 30,000, distributed in eighteen villages. The Five Nations in 1677 had a population of 16,000 and could not have been much less in Champlain's day. It is impossible to approximate the population of the Algonquian family, but it was vastly greater than the combined population of the Hurons and Iroquois.

² Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas. About 1726 the Tuscaroras joined the League of the Iroquois, which was henceforth called the Six Nations.
party of Iroquois would paddle northward in their heavy canoes for a raid upon the villages of the Hurons and Algonquians, returning in due course with scalps, prisoners, and booty. At another time the war canoes would hail from the north, and the sinewy arms wielding the paddles would be those of Huron and Algonquian braves, come to wreak vengeance upon their hereditary enemies.

On July 29th, 1609, an Iroquois war party proceeding northward and a party of Algonquian Indians going in the opposite direction, both paddling by night in the hope of avoiding observation by enemy scouts, had, a couple of hours before midnight, sighted each other as the rival flotillas of canoes approached a point of land projecting into the lake from the western shore. The Iroquois at once put ashore and began to erect a rough barricade. Their foes remained all night in their canoes, dancing the war dance as best they could in such a confined space, shouting defiance at their enemies, and taunting them with cowardice. Shortly after daybreak they landed, and in a disorganized, irregular fashion advanced on the barricade. The Iroquois, who bore wooden shields and wore a species of wickerwork armour, scorning to avail themselves of the protection of the breastwork they had erected, rushed out to meet them, the warriors on both sides discharging showers of arrows, brandishing tomahawks and war clubs, and making the air hideous with blood-curdling war-whoops. The opposing parties were within easy bowshot distance of one another when the Iroquois were struck with amazement, if not with fear, by a startling apparition. From among their dusky, feather-bedecked, paint-bedaubed, shrieking enemies stepped forth a white man, bearded, clear of eye, erect, calm, self-reliant, a typical European soldier of the period. Plumed metal casque on head, body and thighs encased in polished steel armour, he must have afforded a striking contrast to his half-naked, bronze-skinned, boastful companions; and small wonder if his dramatic appearance caused consternation among the Iroquois. They paused
in their advance; but, their first surprise over, they rushed forward again to the attack.

This armour-clad white man was Samuel Champlain, the first European to behold the sheet of water which bears his name. In his journal he gives an account of what followed his appearance in front of the Iroquois war party. He writes: “I looked at them, and they looked at me. When I saw them getting ready to shoot their arrows at us, I levelled my arquebuse, which I had loaded with four balls, and aimed straight at one of the three chiefs. The shot brought down two, and wounded another. On this, our Indians set up such a yelling that one could not have heard a thunderclap, and all the while the arrows flew thick on both sides. The Iroquois were greatly astonished and frightened to see two of their men killed so quickly, in spite of their arrow-proof armour. As I was reloading, one of my companions fired a shot from the woods, which so increased their astonishment that, seeing their chiefs dead, they abandoned the field and fled into the depths of the forest.”

Champlain by attacking the Iroquois won the friendship of the Algonquians and Hurons. But unfortunately those tribes were no match for the Iroquois, and Champlain’s act was destined, in the end, to result disastrously for New France. Years of savage reprisals resulted in the loss of valuable lives, in indescribable atrocities, and in disastrous destruction of property.

In June, 1610, accompanied by a few Frenchmen and a number of friendly Indians, Champlain left Quebec for a second expedition into the Iroquois country. A fight took place near the mouth of the Richelieu river, in which a defeat was inflicted upon the Iroquois, Champlain’s party losing three men killed and about fifty wounded, including among the latter Champlain himself. But the first ambitious military expedition of the French régime was Champlain’s foray into the central part of the Iroquois country in 1615. In midsummer, he set out from Montreal accompanied by twelve Frenchmen and a
small band of Indians, to fulfil pledges to his Huron allies to join them in an expedition against the Iroquois. The war party was to be organized in the Huron towns on the borders of Lake Simcoe, and Champlain and his small party proceeded in canoes up the Ottawa to a point near the present town of Mattawa, when a small stream was followed as far as it was possible to float canoes. Thence a portage brought them to the shores of Lake Nipissing. Crossing the lake to its outlet, Champlain followed his dusky guides down the French river, eventually reaching the broad expanse of Georgian Bay, the eastern shore of which was skirted to a point a little west of the present town of Penetanguishene. Thence they portaged the canoes through the heart of the Huron country to Lake Simcoe. Here, preparations for the raid were completed and the war party proceeded via the Trent river system to Lake Ontario. Crossing this in safety, the expedition landed near where the town of Sackett's Harbour now stands. Here the canoes were hidden, and the Indian warriors and their white allies travelled westward along the shore of the lake. They then struck into the forest, passed over to and round the head of Lake Oneida, and so reached the heart of the territory occupied by the ferocious and powerful Iroquois confederacy.

The attack upon one of the fortified villages of the Onondagas, which formed the climax of this expedition, was a hazardous and stirring venture. The inhabitants were taken by surprise, being actually engaged in the task of gathering the harvest of corn and pumpkins. The harvesters, however, beat off the attack and escaped to their stronghold, a stockaded village surrounded by open fields. By means of a system of open sluices or troughs, water could be brought from the near-by lake into the centre of the stockade, and thus a plentiful supply was on hand for general use and for extinguishing fires. The palisades were fourfold, formed of trunks of trees, thirty feet high, set aslant in the earth and intersecting each other near the top. Surmounting these
palisades were galleries well defended by timber barricades, and supplied with wooden gutters through which water could be run for the extinguishing of fires. On the galleries were supplies of stones for hurling at an attacking enemy.

The Hurons had based their hopes of success upon surprise. Having failed to rush the fortress, they appear to have lost heart, and Champlain had no easy task to induce them to persevere. Under his guidance was built a wooden tower, sufficiently high to overlook the palisade and large enough to shelter five men. Huge wooden shields were constructed, and protected by these the warriors dragged the tower, in which Champlain and some of his Frenchmen armed with arquebuses had placed themselves, to a position within ten feet of the palisades. It was thus possible to maintain a raking fire along the adjacent galleries of the stockade, and considerable execution was done. The Onondagas, undaunted by the discharge of firearms, defended themselves manfully, yelling defiance and hurling showers of stones and arrows upon the assailants. The Hurons, for the most part, stood at a distance launching harmless flights of arrows. But a particularly bold warrior, with flaming birch bark in hand, rushed to the palisade, followed by others bearing dry faggots, and attempted to set fire to the stockade. This attempt was brave enough, but the wind was unfavourable and the defenders easily extinguished the fire. After this failure, the Hurons lost heart and retired to a safe distance from the Onondaga town. Champlain, although severely wounded, urged a renewal of the attack, but the crestfallen Hurons turned a deaf ear to him, and immediately set out for their own country, bearing him back with them.

In 1627, an important change took place in the administration of New France, the trading companies (there had been four since the founding of Quebec) which had previously held the country under charter being replaced by the Company of One Hundred Associates founded by
Cardinal Richelieu, the great Prime Minister of Louis XIII. But Champlain was continued as resident governor, or factor, under the new company, his commission investing him with authority "to build forts, to appoint officers for the administration of justice, to cause the King’s ordinances to be observed, to make war and peace with the savages," etc., and "to exercise all the powers of a viceroy on behalf of His Most Christian Majesty."

The One Hundred Associates covenanted to send 300 tradesmen to New France at once, and to have 4,000 French inhabitants settled there before 1643. In consideration of their engagements, the Company secured a grant of the whole of New France, both Acadia and the St. Lawrence valley, including the forts and settlements. It was to provide for its own defence, the King reserving for himself the nomination of all military officers. But the fortunes of war prevented the Company from getting actual possession of its domain for several years.

Early in 1628, two fleets were sailing for Canada, one from France and the other from England. The first was a fleet of eighteen vessels, mainly transports, the property of the One Hundred Associates; the second consisted of three staunch, heavily-armed craft, commanded by Captain David Kirke and his brothers Lewis and Thomas. The English ships were privateers, owned by the Adventurers of Canada, organized by Sir William Alexander (Earl of Stirling) for the purpose of disputing with the French the possession of North America.

When the Kirkes reached the St. Lawrence, they made their headquarters at Tadoussac, and from this place a letter was sent to Champlain, demanding the surrender of Quebec. Champlain's little garrison was on the verge of starvation, but a defiant answer was returned, and the Kirkes, thinking the fort well defended, postponed its capture for the time being and went in search of the French fleet, which they knew to be coming to Champlain's relief. The enemy ships were encountered near Gaspé Bay, and after a sharp, short fight the Kirkes succeeded
in winning a complete victory. In the captured vessels there were large supplies of food and ammunition and 150 cannon. After this triumph, the Kirkes returned to England and Champlain was left to endure a year of privation.

The following year the Kirkes once more appeared at Tadoussac with a strong fleet. Lewis was despatched to Quebec with three ships, and Champlain, realizing that resistance was bound to result in failure, surrendered his charge on July 28th, 1629. Next morning the French marched out of the fort, 150 English soldiers took possession, and for three years the English flag was to wave over Quebec. Champlain was taken to England and on his arrival at Plymouth on November 20th learned that his fortress had been seized in time of peace.

In 1632, New France was, by the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, restored to the French, and in May, 1633, Champlain returned to Quebec as Governor under the One Hundred Associates. His death in 1635 removed one of the most valiant figures which have ever graced the pages of Canadian history. He was succeeded, in June, 1636, by Charles Huault de Montmagny.

After the restoration of the colony to France, the Company of One Hundred Associates showed no disposition to perform its obligations, failing to send out the number of colonists promised or to sustain an adequate military force for defence. Such troops as were sent out were really more traders than soldiers, the Company's main object being the temporary profits of the fur trade. The total white population of New France in 1640 did not exceed 200, including women and children, and the greater number of the inhabitants were agents of the Company and their servants. In that year a number of devotees in Paris formed a society for the promotion of a religious colony on the island of Montreal, and as a result the settlement of Ville Marie, or Montreal, was founded in 1642. The island of Montreal, situated at the junction of the St. Lawrence and Ottawa rivers, was
a favourite resort of the Iroquois, and the establishment of the new colony was consequently fraught with great danger. The society was empowered to appoint a governor, but was forbidden to build castles or forts other than those actually necessary for defence against the Indians. Forty men were to be sent to take possession of the site of the new settlement, intrench themselves, and raise crops. Paul de Chomedy, Sieur de Maisonneuve, a valiant soldier, was chosen to take charge of this little force and to act as Governor. The men comprising Maisonneuve's party were described as soldiers, sailors, artisans, and labourers, but all alike were required to act as soldiers in time of emergency.

An outstanding figure among Maisonneuve's followers was Louis d'Ailleboust de Coulonge, a soldier of wide experience, and during the summer and winter of 1642–1643 a palisaded fort, which gave the colonists comparative safety, was erected under his direction. The Iroquois apparently did not learn that the French were on the island of Montreal until these defences had been completed; but they soon began to harass the settlers, lying in wait for individuals as they emerged from the fort, and killing or making captives of quite a number.

Owing to the smallness of the force at his command, Maisonneuve persisted for a long time in remaining on the defensive, but eventually it came to his ears that by a portion of his force he was suspected of cowardice. He thereupon abandoned what he was convinced was the course of wisdom and led thirty of his men against a band of Iroquois who had been located in the thick wood between the fort and the mountain in the centre of the island. They had not proceeded far before they were attacked by 200 Indians. In the dense bush it was impossible to make headway against the hidden foe, and as the Indians had almost succeeded in surrounding them Maisonneuve gave the order to retire upon the fort. Under the pressure of numbers, the retirement might easily have become a rout, but the cool courage of
Maisonneuve, who was the last man to retire, saved the situation. When a few hundred yards from the fort he, single-handed, stood at bay, and by a well-directed pistol shot brought down the leader of the Iroquois. Seeing their war-chief fall, the Indians abandoned the pursuit and Maisonneuve followed his men into the fort. But the Iroquois continued their attacks on Ville Marie, and, in 1645, Maisonneuve, realizing that his colony was not strong enough for the work it had undertaken, proceeded to France to seek reinforcements. He was successful in his mission and returned in the following year with a considerable body of new settlers.

If Canada was without adequate means to defend the settlers, military display was not altogether lacking. Father LeJeune, writing of Quebec during the administration of Montmagny said: "We have a number of good, resolute soldiers. It is a pleasure to see them go through their military exercises in time of peace, and to hear the noise of the musketry and cannon called forth on occasions of joy, while our immense forests and mountains answer these salutes with echoes like rolling thunders which have neither thunderbolt nor lightning. The bugle awakens us every morning, we see the sentinels take their posts, the guard is always well armed, and each squad has its day of duty. In a word, Quebec is guarded in time of peace as well as a well regulated post in time of war."

A fortunate occurrence for Maisonneuve and his colony was the appointment, in 1648, of his friend and co-worker d'Ailleboust to be Governor of Canada. The new Governor, unlike his predecessor, Montmagny, cooperated heartily with Maisonneuve in strengthening the defences of Ville Marie. But still the place was subject to continuous attack, and in 1652 Maisonneuve again went to France for reinforcements and returned with upward of 100 men. These were described at the time as soldiers, and they had all, or nearly all, seen military service, but they were really engaged as farmers and
tradesmen, bound to serve as soldiers when occasion required. The settlement of Ville Marie now rapidly extended, settlers and traders establishing themselves outside the walls of the fort, fortifying their premises with palisades and thus creating many small outposts, generally along the banks of the river.

From 1648 to 1658, the Iroquois practically monopolized the ancient hunting grounds of the Hurons, and carried on hostilities against the French, infesting every post and settlement. In 1652, at Three Rivers, a trading post established in 1633 at the mouth of the St. Maurice river, Du Plessis Bochart, the commandant, and fifteen of his followers were slain and several taken prisoner. This was the worst military disaster sustained by the French colonists up to that date. In 1653, Jean de Lauson, who had succeeded d'Ailleboust, negotiated a truce with the Iroquois, in which he weakly granted them permission to adopt into the Five Nations some Hurons who had sought refuge at Quebec, and also bound himself not to intervene in a campaign the Iroquois were about to enter upon against the Eries, a haughty and powerful tribe inhabiting the country south of Lake Erie. In 1655, the Iroquois defeated the Eries in a desperate battle, and virtually extirpated the entire nation.

Having accomplished their purpose, the Iroquois considered it a matter of indifference whether peace with the French continued or not, and in the course of 1658, during a truce, killed several Frenchmen. D'Ailleboust, who, as Administrator, was once more in charge of the colony, issued orders to capture and hold as hostages all Iroquois found about any of the French posts. This wise measure brought a delegation of Mohawks to Quebec to endeavour to recover the captives belonging to their tribe; but the Governor sternly refused, and for a time a semblance of peace was thus forced upon the Iroquois. But in 1660 they once more went on the war-path, this time with the determination of wiping out all
the French settlements in Canada, and Ville Marie was chosen as the first object of their fury. During the latter part of the winter, two strong war parties of the Iroquois were gradually assembled west and east of Ville Marie, the one on the Ottawa river, the other near the mouth of the Richelieu. As the snow left the forests and the ice the rivers, these two war parties prepared for a concerted attack.

Their intentions soon became known in Ville Marie and throughout the whole colony of New France, and the prospect of successfully defending the colony appeared slight. But Adam Dollard or Daulac, Sieur des Ormeaux, a gallant young Frenchman, believed that, by appealing to the spirit of devotion which animated the youth of the colony and by using proper strategy, the Iroquois might be held off. He planned having a party of volunteers intrench themselves on the route over which one or other of the enemy expeditions must pass, to impede, as long as possible, the advance of the war party. The plan appealed to Maisonneuve, but the force at his disposal was distressingly small, and he warned Dollard that, in the event of his approving of his scheme, he could spare him but few soldiers, as it was necessary that sufficient men should be left behind to guard Ville Marie and its outlying posts. Once his project was authorized, Dollard had little difficulty in securing volunteers to accompany him, sixteen of the bravest young men of the little garrison binding themselves by oath to fight with Dollard to the death, and to accept no quarter. Before embarking upon the enterprise each man made his will, and, their worldly matters disposed of, all proceeded to the little chapel of the Hôtel Dieu, where they received the Blessed Sacrament. The heroic band then set out on their adventurous mission, passing the Lachine rapids, entering the Ottawa, and crossing the Lake of the Two Mountains. Up the Ottawa river, Dollard and his party travelled for several days, landing close to the foot of a rapid or fall, and encamping near a little stockade which had been previously
thrown up by a hunting party of Indians. This stockade is generally supposed to have been beside the rapids of the Ottawa river near the present town of Grenville. Wherever it was, the place seemed suitable for making a stand, so Dollard decided to strengthen the stockade and there await the Iroquois. His little party included his sixteen French companions, three Huron Indians from near Quebec, and thirty-nine Christian Algonkins from Three Rivers. These Indians had started out on a hunting and fighting expedition on their own account, and, on reaching Montreal and hearing of Dollard’s project, had obtained permission to join him.

There had been no time to make any appreciable improvement in the defences of their little post, when the more advanced canoes of the Iroquois were sighted and promptly fired upon. Several of their occupants escaped and brought news of the French force to their comrades. Thereupon the enemy, 300 strong, came racing down the rapids and immediately attacked the stockade. But Dollard and his men offered a gallant resistance, and with steady musketry fire held the Indians in check. Every tree and rise in the ground sheltered an Indian warrior, and at intervals the shrieking savages would make a rush at the stockade in the hope that some of them would be able to climb the walls. But the defenders kept up a deadly fire, and many of the Iroquois bit the dust. Several of Dollard’s men were seriously wounded during the first few hours of the attack; and the ranks of the enemy were constantly increasing, while the strength of the besieged was reduced by the desertion of all but five of their Indian allies. Day succeeded day, but still the defenders of the stockade held out, suffering more from lack of water, food, and sleep than from the weapons of their foes.

For a time it seemed as though Dollard’s brave band might turn the foe back from Montreal without sacrificing their own lives. Some of the Iroquois, disheartened by the determined resistance, were for returning home;
others declared it would be an eternal disgrace to lose so many at the hands of so paltry a force and yet fail to take revenge. The arguments of the latter prevailed, and it was resolved to make a general, final assault. Volunteers readily offering, shields of split logs, four or five feet high, were made. Protecting themselves behind these, the chosen party advanced, followed by the whole body of warriors. In spite of a brisk fire maintained by the starving defenders, they reached the palisades, and crouching below the loopholes hacked furiously with their hatchets to cut their way through. The main body followed the forlorn hope closely, and, swarming like hornets around the little stockade, joined in the attempt to demolish the defences. In preparation for such an extremity, Dollard had crammed a large musketoon with powder, and plugged the muzzle. Lighting a fuse inserted in the muzzle, he tried to throw this improvised grenade among the savages outside, but unfortunately it struck the top of the palisade, and, falling back among the defenders, exploded, killing and wounding several and nearly blinding others. In the confusion which followed, some of the bolder of the Iroquois got possession of the loopholes, and in a moment had torn a breach in the palisades. Nerved with the energy of desperation, Dollard and his followers sprang to the breach, but while their attention was thus occupied another opening was made in the slender wall, and then another. Dollard was struck dead, but the survivors kept up the fight. With sword or hatchet in one hand and knife in the other, they threw themselves against the mass of enemies, striking and stabbing with the fury of madmen, till the Iroquois, despairing of taking them alive, shot them down. All was over, and a burst of triumphant yells proclaimed the dear-bought victory.

Although Dollard and his companions had fallen, they had accomplished their purpose. The Iroquois had had enough of fighting for the time being, and dreading to attack the much more formidable defences of Ville Marie,
guarded by such men as Dollard, they returned disconsolately to their homes, humiliated and crestfallen.

In 1662, the French Government became impressed with the importance of taking vigorous steps to protect its infant colonies along the St. Lawrence, and, in August of that year, the desponding spirits of the colonists were revived by the arrival at Quebec of a company of soldiers from France and an assurance from the King that these troops were but the forerunners of a whole regiment.

March 21st, 1663, is a date to be remembered in the military history of New France, for on that day was issued the edict replacing the government of the Company of One Hundred Associates by Royal Government, in which the authority rested in a "Supreme Council," modelled after the Parliament at Paris, the principal functionaries of which, including the Governor and Royal Intendant, were appointed by the King and were held immediately responsible to him. Up to this time the Governor, although in his military capacity a King's officer, had been virtually little more than the head agent of the chartered company for administering its affairs in the colony, and had been hampered by the interference of company officials. Under the new régime, as the direct representative of the sovereign, the Governor had absolute control of the military force, and special charge of the external relations of the colony. The first Royal Governor was Augustin de Saffray, Chevalier de Mézy, who landed in Quebec in September, 1663, bringing with him a number of officers, some soldiers, and several hundred settlers.

When the Marquis de Tracy arrived in Canada in June, 1665, as lieutenant-general of all the American possessions of France, he brought with him a second instalment of the Carignan-Salières Regiment, four companies having arrived earlier in the season. He was commissioned among other things to exterminate the Iroquois, who persisted in their incursions into Canada, attacking not merely the French traders and the Canadian Indians, but also the natives from remote regions who came to
trade with the French. He lost no time in taking steps to carry out his instructions. Soon after his arrival several companies of the regiment, accompanied by some volunteers from the inhabitants, were despatched from Quebec to occupy and fortify advantageous positions along the water route leading to the Iroquois country via the Richelieu river and Lake Champlain. Other bodies of soldiers and volunteers were sent forward at intervals during the summer and autumn, by which time the entire Carignan-Salières Regiment had reached Quebec.

Before November, forts to provide magazines, hospitals, and barracks had been erected at the most important points along the more exposed sections of the proposed route of advance. The first, built at the point where the Richelieu discharges into the St. Lawrence near the head of Lake St. Peter, was in charge of Captain Sorel; the second, placed at the first obstruction to navigation, near the Richelieu rapids, was in charge of Captain Chambly; while the third, called Ste. Thérèse, some nine miles higher up the stream, near the present town of St. Johns, was constructed and commanded by Colonel de Salières, the commanding officer of the regiment. These works consisted of squares enclosed within double, loopholed, wooden palisades from twelve to fifteen feet high, the face of each side of the square protected by bastions at each corner affording an enfilading fire. Within the enclosure were sheds and wooden buildings for the magazines, hospitals, and barracks. During 1666, a fourth fort, Ste. Anne, was built on an island in Lake Champlain.

A secure line of communication having thus been established, Daniel de Rémy, Sieur de Courcelles, who, in 1665, had succeeded Mézy as Governor, left Quebec, under the direction of Tracy, in January, 1666, at the head of an expedition consisting of 300 of the Carignan-Salières and 200 volunteers. All wore snowshoes, and each carried from twenty-five to thirty pounds of bread and other necessaries. The first part of their route lay over the ice, and the long march to Fort St. Thérèse was one of great
hardship. From that point their difficulties increased. There had been an exceptionally heavy fall of light, soft snow, making progress painfully difficult. As the Mohawk country was approached, the Indian guides through fear became unreliable, and some even deserted to the enemy. The French seem to have had but one brush with their foes. In this they lost an officer and several men. Courcelles was in despair, his men were half-starved and half-frozen, and, being unable to maintain himself in the country, withdrew to the forts along the Richelieu, his column being followed by parties of Mohawks, who dispatched and scalped, or made prisoner, all stragglers. In his retreat Courcelles lost sixty men from hunger and cold.

Impressed with the need of inflicting a really crushing blow on the Iroquois, Tracy set out in September of the same year from Quebec with the most formidable expedition yet seen in Canada. The gallant veteran had reluctantly assented to the representations that, at his advanced age, it would be impossible for him to endure the mid-winter campaign; but he insisted upon commanding the autumn one in person, being carried at the front in a chair. Courcelles was in charge of an advance guard of 400 men, which preceded the main body by four days. Upwards of 300 boats and canoes had been constructed and placed at various stages of the water route. The force included 600 picked men of the Carignan-Salières Regiment, the same number of French Canadians, two small field-pieces, and 100 Huron and Algonquian Indians.

Of the five nations forming the Iroquois confederacy, the Mohawks, who at this time had from 300 to 400 warriors, occupied the territory which had been invaded by Courcelles. Westward lay the cantons of the Oneidas, who had 140 warriors; next to them the country of the Onondagas, with 300; next the hunting grounds of the Cayugas, with some 300; and farthest to the west, and south of Lake Ontario, the powerful Senecas, who boasted no fewer than 1,200.
The expedition followed the same route that Courcelles had taken the previous winter, and by the end of October the whole force was assembled at Fort Ste. Anne on Lake Champlain. The advance into the Mohawk country from this point proved extremely trying, the transportation of supplies and the two light pieces of artillery being particularly difficult. The provisions carried were reduced to a minimum; as a result the force was threatened with starvation, the situation being relieved only by the discovery of a district which provided an abundance of chestnuts.

The Mohawks, in view of the strength of the expedition, deemed it unwise to make a stand, and, as their first villages were reached, they abandoned them to the invaders, retiring through the forest and taunting the French to attack them in their hiding places. Four Mohawk villages were thus abandoned by their inhabitants and occupied by Tracy. They had all been roughly fortified, and contained ample stores of provisions, including water, which had been stored in bark cisterns. Some of the cabins were constructed of timber and in some cases finished with planks, showing carpentering work which would have done credit to white men. On reaching the fourth of the Mohawk villages, Tracy called a council of war to consider whether the expedition should proceed to the villages of the Oneidas; in view of the distance and the lateness of the season, it was decided that this would not be prudent. The four Indian villages, with all their contents not required for the return march, were burned, and Tracy and the main portion of his army arrived back in Quebec early in November. No French lives were lost in battle, but on the return trip eight officers and men were drowned in a storm on Lake Champlain.

Deprived of their shelters and supplies, 400 of the Mohawks perished of starvation and exposure, and pestilence succeeded the famine. In their extremity, the cowed tribe sent emissaries to Quebec to sue for peace. Hostages were given, and several Frenchmen
who had been held in captivity were released. Tracy, his task accomplished, left Canada for France in the autumn of 1667, and for the following eighteen years New France was saved from the scourge of Indian war.

In 1669, the Carignan-Salières Regiment was disbanded, most of those composing it settling in Canada. Talon, the capable Intendant, recognizing the splendid qualities of the men of the regiment, projected the plan of dividing the colony into fiefs or seigniories, which were to be granted as far as possible to men of military experience and other special qualifications. Seigniories were granted to the principal officers of the Carignan-Salières Regiment, such as Berthier, Sorel, Boucherville, Contrecœur, Varennes, and St. Ours, and the non-commissioned officers and men became tenants under their former officers, each common soldier receiving a gift of 100 francs, each sergeant 150 francs.

During the preceding few years the colony had grown rapidly, having more than doubled in population. Under the influence of a sound system of military protection, new settlements had sprung up along the St. Lawrence and Richelieu rivers, and the island of Montreal in particular had witnessed the establishment of villages around its shores. These were practically the most remote outposts of New France. Adventurous explorers proceeding thence advanced some distance into the interior of the country, and when Courcelles and Talon returned to France in 1672, the establishment of forts far west of the island of Montreal had been projected, and the permanency of the colony of New France seemed assured.

While the struggle against primitive nature and savage men was taking place along the St. Lawrence, a little colony was battling for existence down in Acadia. In 1604 Pierre du Guast, Comte de Monts, who had been granted a monopoly of the trading rights in New France, made a disastrous attempt at establishing a settlement on an island in the St. Croix river in New Brunswick.
In the following year the promoters of this settlement removed what was left of their colonists and belongings to Port Royal (Annapolis Basin), and opposite what is now Goat Island, about six miles from the present town of Annapolis, built a somewhat pretentious fort. The fort and the trading rights in Acadia were granted by de Monts to Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt, Baron de Saint Just, and the grant was afterwards confirmed by the King of France. Champlain, the future founder of Quebec, was active in this attempt to plant the Lilies of France on American soil. After two years, Port Royal was abandoned and for three years the place remained untenanted. In 1610, it was once more occupied and a number of settlers found homes within range of the guns of the little fort. But, in 1613, the existence of Port Royal was for the time being to come to an end. In that year, Captain Samuel Argall of Jamestown, Virginia, totally destroyed "the fort and all monuments and marks of French power."

In those days England claimed Acadia by right of the discoveries of the Cabots, and King James I made a very wide grant in this region to Sir William Alexander. As a result, a colony of Scots was planted not far from the site of the French fort. Between the years 1621–1631 these colonists struggled to maintain a foothold in New Scotland, as they had re-christened Acadia. But, in 1631, King Charles, then on friendly terms with France, ordered Alexander "to demolish his fort and leave it altogether waist and unpeopled as it was at the time your sone landed there." This was done and save for some of the colonists who stayed in the country, having married Indian women or daughters of the first French settlers who had taken up a forest life, not a trace of Alexander's colony remained.

For the next thirty-odd years there were petty quarrels in Acadia between holders of trading rights, and Port Royal, established in 1633 or 1634, on the site of the present town of Annapolis, and Port Latour, at the
mouth of the St. John river in New Brunswick, were the scenes of frequent conflicts.

The English had a jealous eye on the growing settlements in Acadia, considering them a menace to the New England colonies. So in 1654, under Cromwell's orders, Major Robert Sedgwick attacked Port Royal and compelled its commander to surrender, and the place was to remain in the hands of the English until restored to France in 1667 by the Treaty of Breda.

So far Acadia had been largely independent of Canada, but with the coming of Royal Government its affairs were to be controlled mainly from Quebec. Acadia had now a number of scattered settlements, but the only considerable fortified settlement was at Port Royal, which could boast a population of 361 and had 364 acres of land under cultivation. The settlers lived on the most friendly terms with all the Indians, and Acadia never suffered from Indian wars. In this way there was not the same need of military preparedness as along the St. Lawrence and, excepting for the few soldiers stationed in the forts, there was no military life in the country.
CHAPTER II

THE SOLDIER GOVERNOR

COUNT FRONTENAC, the most illustrious of the governors of New France, arrived at Quebec in 1672, and at once proceeded to carry out some of the more important projects proposed by Courcelles and Talon. One of his first tasks was to build up a more effectual organization for defence. In spite of the wish of the Home Government to keep the people grouped together in a few settlements, the frontiers had extended, and the problem of providing for the defence of the colony was important. According to the feudal system, introduced into the country with the first organized settlement, every man, with the exception of the clergy, was liable to be called upon for military service and without pay; but the law had not hitherto been rigorously enforced, and the quotas of men raised for service in the Indian wars had been composed of volunteers. By 1648, some of the inhabitants in Acadia and along the St. Lawrence had been organized into militia companies, and in 1649 the first call upon the inhabitants of New France for actual military service appears to have been made, a company of some fifty men being placed under arms to repel an Iroquois attack.

That same year 100 volunteers were called out as a camp volant to patrol the country between Montreal and Three Rivers, and this service appears to have been main-

1 Louis de Buade, Comte de Palluau et de Frontenac, twice Governor of New France, was born in France in 1620 and entered upon a military career at an early age. He saw service and won renown in Holland under Maurice, Prince of Orange, and also in France, Italy, and Germany. The great Turenne gave him the command of the reinforcements despatched to Candia when that island was attacked by the Turks. He is said to have been a colonel of horse at seventeen and a lieutenant-general after twelve years' service.
tained continuously until 1651. On April 3rd, 1669, the King of France instructed Courcelles to organize all the male inhabitants of New France into companies, but nothing appears to have been done to carry out this order.

On his arrival Frontenac set to work to organize the inhabitants for defence, practically creating a colonial militia and giving it the form it retained until 1760. According to his plan all the able-bodied men of each parish or coté formed a company of milices, but to be brigaded in time of war only. He next devoted his attention to the construction of a fort at Cataraqui (Kings-
ton) on Lake Ontario, at the mouth of the Cataraqui river. But he lacked money, munitions of war, means of transportation, and troops, and was largely dependent upon the goodwill and assistance of the settlers, who were anything but enthusiastic over the project. He issued a peremptory order requiring the inhabitants of Quebec, Three Rivers, Montreal, and the settlements along the Richelieu to furnish him, at their own cost, a certain number of armed men and the requisite number of canoes to convey them and the supplies for the expedition from Montreal to Lake Ontario. In a more conciliatory style he invited the military officers who had settled in the country to join him, and the response was, on the whole, very gratifying. In June, 1673, as he passed up the St. Lawrence from Quebec to Montreal, he landed at the various settlements and seigniories on the way, and most of the seigneurs and their following joined him.

Frontenac remained two weeks in Montreal, where he had a busy time organizing the militia and adjusting disputes which had arisen among the officers regarding questions of rank and precedence. Boats, canoes, artillery, ammunition and all other necessaries were eventually forwarded by water to the site of the new fort during the summer of 1673, and 400 men were sent to build it. A small detachment of soldiers was also sent to guard the workmen at their tasks, and to remain behind as a garrison. So vigorously was the work prosecuted under
Frontenac's direction, that in the brief period of a week the new fort was made fit for occupation and some twenty acres of land adjacent were prepared for cultivation.

The first Fort Frontenac had a wooden palisade 120 yards in circumference. When it was rebuilt by Robert Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle, to whom it was granted in 1675, the walls had a circumference of 720 yards, and the faces of the fort were protected by four stone bastions. It contained a row of barracks of square timber, a guardhouse, a lodging for officers, a forge, a well, a mill, and a bakery. Nine small cannon were mounted on the walls. Two officers and a surgeon, with ten or twelve soldiers, at first made up the garrison; and three or four times that number of masons, labourers, and canoeemen were at one time maintained at the place.

The strategical value of the new fort, commanding as it did the outlet of Lake Ontario and the fine hunting country to the north drained by the Cataraqui river, will be at once apparent, and also its usefulness as an advance base for the ambitious schemes of exploration and inland trade which La Salle had in view. It represented the first link in a chain of outposts which he proposed to establish at various points along the route leading to the upper lakes, a second link in contemplation being a fort near the mouth of the Niagara river.

During the first administration of Frontenac, the colony was free from Iroquois attacks, but there were frequent occasions when a decision between peace and war hung in the balance. The Five Nations kept up hostilities with the Illinois and Miamis, and other friends and allies of the French. They likewise protested against the erection of Forts Frontenac, Niagara, and others—Michilimackinac, La Baie des Puants (Green Bay), St. Joseph, and Fort Crèvecœur—farther west. In consequence, there were many negotiations between Frontenac and the Iroquois, who displayed a growing indifference to the maintenance of friendship with the French. At length Frontenac invited them to send deputies to Catar-
The savages demanded that the meeting should take place at Chouagen (Oswego). The Governor rejected this proposal, and, when the Iroquois subsequently expressed their willingness to proceed to Cataraqui, Frontenac haughtily declared that in view of their unfriendly attitude, he would go no farther to meet them than Montreal. In the end the stern Governor, who understood the Indian temperament admirably, had his way, and a great meeting was held at Montreal in 1680, at which the Iroquois, while professing friendship for the French and acceding to most of Frontenac's demands, would not agree to cease hostilities with the Illinois. The relations between the Five Nations and the French colony consequently remained on an uncertain footing. Affairs were in this state when misunderstandings between Frontenac and the Intendant, Jacques Duchesneau, brought about the recall of both to France in 1682.

Immediately following the departure of Frontenac, there succeeded a period of renewed trouble with the Iroquois, who had been kept in restraint by the Governor's dominating personality. Encouraged by Colonel Dongan, Governor of New York, they proclaimed themselves allies of the English, disputed the territorial claims of the French, and renewed their attacks upon the Illinois and other tribes friendly to them. The Senecas were the leaders in this trouble, and Le Febvre de la Barre, who had succeeded Frontenac as Governor, not being able to bring the savages to reason, prepared for war. He convoked at Quebec an assembly of the leading men of the colony to consider raising a military force. Under the law, every male inhabitant was eligible for military service; siegneurs, tenants, and officials holding their lands, leases, and positions on the condition that they might be called upon to assist in the defence of the country. During the Iroquois raids, the settlers and traders had, up to this time, spontaneously and unhesitatingly placed their services at the disposal of the military authorities. But with an increase of population and the growth of the mer-
RENÉ ROBERT CAVELIER, SIEUR DE LA SALLE
cantile and agricultural class many were reluctant to leave family and home for distant military duty.

At the Quebec assembly there were present among others Varennes, the Governor of Three Rivers, d’Aillebouost, from Montreal, and some members of the famous LeMoyne family. According to the reports of those present, it was considered possible to raise 1,000 men in the colony;¹ but the wisdom of making such a big draft was questioned, owing to the importance of keeping the ground under cultivation, and the need of leaving sufficient men in the settlements for local protection. La Barre, therefore, appealed to France for troops. In this appeal he reported that there were no regular troops in Canada, thus ignoring apparently the soldiers of his bodyguard and those acting in the same capacity under the commandants at Three Rivers, Montreal, and other forts. But certainly there were not sufficient men to constitute an effective military unit, and to admit of drill and discipline being maintained. As a matter of fact, the soldiers at the principal posts seem to have been employed mainly in civil and domestic capacities, and even at Quebec and Montreal their principal duties appear to have been those of police and court officials. Desertions were common, and the ranks of the coureurs de bois were continually being augmented by soldiers from the garrison.

In response to La Barre’s appeal for troops, three companies, raised in France by the Minister of Marine for service in Canada, arrived in Quebec in 1683. Each of these companies was composed of fifty-two men uniformed and equipped as infantry. This was the first body of organized troops to reach Canada since the arrival of the Carignan-Salières Regiment, and was the vanguard of the force of troupes de la marine or “Colony Troops” which from this time figured so conspicuously in the history of the French régime.

¹ In 1666, the white population of Canada was 3,418, of whom 1,344 were men capable of bearing arms; in 1671, it was 6,000; in 1673, 6,705; in 1681, about 10,000.
The colonies were administered by the French Department of Marine, and it had decided to raise and maintain an army of its own for colonial service, distinct from the Royal army. The officers of this service, while on duty in Canada, signed themselves as "Captain" or "Lieutenant" —as the case might be—"of a Company of the Troops detached from the Marine, in Canada." The Colony Troops wore white uniforms of the period,—including three-cornered hats, long coats with turned-back skirts and black facings, leggings, etc., of similar pattern to those of the French service regiments. The companies appear to have been despatched on foreign service as soon as they could be raised and equipped, without any care being bestowed in France on their organization, training, and discipline, and before accommodation was provided for them in the colony, for Chevalier Jacques de Meulles, the Intendant (1682–86), writing to the Home Government, complained that there were no guard-houses for the troops at Three Rivers and Montreal. Most of the commissions were given in France, but some were allotted to prominent colonists, former officers of the Carignan-Salières Regiment or sons of seigneurs and colonial gentry.

Early in 1684, La Barre made preliminary arrangements for a punitive expedition against the Iroquois, assembling a number of friendly Indians at Fort Frontenac, and reviewing them on April 17th. He was awaiting reinforcements from France, and on June 5th wrote to the French Government praying that the troops asked for might be sent, or that he might be permitted to resign and return to France. Meantime he proceeded with his preparations for the expedition, gathered a force of Canadians and Indians at Fort Frontenac, and again held a review there on August 14th. When in September La Barre finally set out from Montreal on what was to prove an abortive expedition, his force consisted of about 700 Canadians, 130 regulars, and 200 Mission Indians. He was expecting more Indians and a body of coureurs de bois under Du Lhut and La Durantaye to meet him at
Niagara. One of the officers of the Colony Troops was Baron la Hontan, the historian of the expedition. The force was transported from Montreal in flat-boats and birch-bark canoes. The regulars were assigned to the boats, but the task of rowing them up the rivers and carrying them over the portages seems to have been allotted to the Canadians.

From Fort Frontenac La Barre crossed to the south shore and landed at a point a short distance east of Oswego, long afterwards known as *La Famine*, on account of the force suffering greatly from lack of food. A quantity of the supplies had been lost in the rapids while being taken up the St. Lawrence, and more were found to be badly damaged. At this juncture, deputies arrived from the Iroquois cantons. They expected to find La Barre at the head of a powerful army, but sickness among his troops and lack of food had forced him to send all save a guard homeward. When the Indians found the Governor surrounded only by a small body of pale and emaciated men they became contemptuous and defiant, and flatly refused to accede to the request of the French that they should forego further operations against the Illinois. But they made a few trifling concessions, and on the strength of these, La Barre came to terms with them, and concluded a peace which his principal officers, all the Canadians, and also his Indian allies, considered most inglorious.

The French Government had looked to the Governor to administer severe chastisement upon the Iroquois, and his failure to do so led to his recall. La Barre was succeeded in office in 1685 by the Marquis de Denonville, a peculiar combination of colonel of dragoons and religious enthusiast. Denonville brought with him from France 350 soldiers as reinforcements for the Colony Troops, the remnant of 500 who had embarked with him in France. An attack of scurvy accounted for the remainder.

Denonville found a difficult situation confronting him, for the English of New York were pressing their claims to
the whole country south of the Great Lakes, while the Hudson’s Bay Company, founded in 1670, was rapidly securing a monopoly of the northern and western fur trade. The English colonists, led by Governor Dongan of New York, were intriguing with the Iroquois, sustaining and encouraging them in acts of hostility towards the French. Fortunately for New France, Dongan was greatly hampered by the unsettled state of affairs in England, James II being then upon the throne, and confronted with a revolution which resulted in the loss of his crown. Denonville, experienced soldier as he was, realized, none the less, the weakness of the colony, and appealed to France for reinforcements. “Nothing can save us,” he wrote, “but the sending out of troops and the building of forts and block-houses, yet I dare not begin to build them, for if I do it will bring down all the Iroquois upon us before we are in a condition to fight them.” In 1686, Louis XIV sent a generous supply of troops, money, and munitions, and ordered Denonville to attack the Iroquois towns.

In the spring of 1687, a force consisting of 1,000 Canadians, 800 regulars, and about 300 Indians—Hurons, Algonkins, Abnaki, and Caughnawagas—assembled in Montreal. With this force, Denonville, on July 1st, arrived at Fort Frontenac, where he received the welcome intelligence that Henri de Tonti, a fur trader from Fort St. Louis, southwest of Lake Michigan, with about 200 warriors of the Illinois tribe, Nicholas Perrot, with a contingent of Indians from the west side of the same lake, and La Durantaye, with a party of Hurons, were on their way eastward to join him. While at Fort Frontenac, Denonville, in accordance with orders received from France, caused a number of Iroquois chiefs and warriors to be enticed to Fort Frontenac, and there seized and placed in confinement. These were ultimately sent to France to work in the King’s galleys, an act of treachery never forgotten and never forgiven by the Iroquois.

Crossing to the south side of Lake Ontario, Denonville
constructed a small stone fort near the mouth of the river Genesee, to serve as a protection for the boats and bateaux, and a place of refuge in case of disaster. Here the reinforcements of western Indians joined the expedition, raising the strength to 2,000 men. Leaving 400 men to guard his newly established base, Denonville advanced into the enemy territory. The Governor was in supreme command, his chief of staff being Philippe de Rigaud, Chevalier de Vaudreuil, who had recently arrived in Canada with a reinforcement of 800 Colony Troops.

The Canadians and the regulars were each organized into four battalions of about equal numerical strength. Friendly Indians and some of the coureurs de bois were assigned scouting and flanking duties, and the whole vanguard of 800 or 900 coureurs de bois and Indians was commanded by Louis Hector de Callières, Governor of Montreal, one of the most capable officers of the country. Behind these came the main body, Canadians and regular battalions alternating. The regulars were in their usual white regimentals, the Canadians in their ordinary attire of coarse cloth or buckskin, with little or no attempt at uniformity. Among the seigneurs were Berthier, Lavaltrie, Grandville, and Longueuil—men whose names are perpetuated in Canada to-day by thriving settlements on the banks of the St. Lawrence.

The march through the thick forest proved a very trying one to the troops, burdened as they were with thirteen days' rations, besides their arms, ammunition, and equipment. It was the middle of July, the heat was intense, the flies almost unbearable, and on the first day only ten miles were accomplished. On the second day, as the column was approaching the first fortified post of the Senecas, the advance party under Callières, when about fifteen miles southeast of the present city of Rochester, was suddenly fired upon from all sides by a body of 800 warriors. At the first impetuous onset of the Senecas, the western allies of the French were speedily
put to flight, their retirement occasioning some disorder in the ranks of the formed battalions of the main body. Denonville and some of his senior officers rallied their men and eventually won a victory at the cost of eleven killed and twenty wounded. The Senecas retired into the forest, leaving twenty-seven dead on the field, and Denonville with his army moved upon the nearest stockaded village, which after a brief resistance was set on fire by its inhabitants, who sought shelter in the forest. Stores of Indian corn and a large number of hogs were found; these were destroyed or appropriated. After a halt of about ten days, Denonville judged it expedient to retire, as there was no enemy to fight, and the troops had been attacked by dysentery, due to indulging too freely in the Senecas' fresh pork and green corn.

Before returning to Montreal, Denonville proceeded west with his whole force, and, near the mouth of the Niagara river, on the right bank, a fort was constructed and left in charge of 100 men. Denonville attached much importance to the establishment of this fort, as the proposal to build it was one of the causes of the trouble with the Senecas, and he considered it a notice to the Senecas and to the English colonists that his expedition had accomplished its object. Unfortunately the provisions left to supply the garrison were bad, and the result was an epidemic of dysentery and scurvy, which caused the death or incapacity of most of the officers and men. The position became so desperate that, much to Denonville's annoyance, the survivors abandoned the fort.

The effects of this campaign were disastrous to the Senecas, who were reduced to about one-half their former number by famine and disease. Moreover, their discomfiture disarranged for a season the plans of the English traders among the Western tribes. But the more immediately beneficial effects to the French were soon afterwards neutralized by renewed activity on the part of the Iroquois, who endeavoured to revenge themselves by invading the colony and ravaging the
country along the Richelieu. For the defence of the colonists from these assaults, a body of 120 coureurs de bois was armed and placed under Vaudreuil, and on the island of Montreal small forts were constructed as places of refuge for the inhabitants on the approach of their merciless enemies. A sort of outlying fortress was built on an elevation near the river close to the St. Mary's Current, where a windmill had been erected.

Meanwhile, James II of England and Louis XIV of France, by mutual agreement, sent secret orders to their representatives in America to abstain from hostilities. Denonville, in reply, sent word to the French minister that it was important to continue the war with the Iroquois, and asked for a reinforcement of 800 soldiers, and 150 labourers. But the French minister answered that the King had need of his soldiers elsewhere, and, as only 300 men could be spared, counselled him to make peace with the Iroquois on almost any terms. As a consequence, in June, 1688, the Iroquois were invited to send peace delegates to Montreal. On their arrival they demanded the demolition of Fort Niagara and the restoration of their tribesmen who had been treacherously seized by Denonville at Fort Frontenac and sent to France. As Fort Niagara could not be maintained, the Governor willingly acceded to the first condition; as to the second, he stated that he had already written to France requesting that the prisoners should be sent back. The result was a promise of peace, a promise not worth the document to which the chiefs affixed their totems. Indeed the years 1688–89 proved disastrous, almost fatal, to the French colony, now numbering nearly 12,000 souls. The Five Nations, instigated by the English colonists and animated by an ardent desire to wreak vengeance on the

1 This work was gradually strengthened and eventually was regarded as the citadel or main defence of the town. It so remained at the surrender of the town to the British in 1759. The hill has since entirely disappeared. The summit was removed many years ago to facilitate the construction of streets, some of the material being used to grade the present Champ de Mars.
French on account of their supposed double-dealings and the late destructive French incursion upon the Senecas, resumed hostilities. In addition, the troubles of the unfortunate colonists were grievously increased by small-pox, dysentery, scurvy, and fever, which caused the death of about 1,400 persons during a single year.

While carrying on his campaign against the Senecas, Denonville had taken rigorous measures to invade the Hudson Bay country, where the presence of the English was most detrimental to the fur trade of New France. The most friendly relationship had always existed between the Indians and officials of the Hudson’s Bay Company, who freely advanced supplies to the Indians, while the latter seldom failed to pay their debts. The first trading post or fort was established by the Company in 1668, two years before it received its charter. It was at the southern extremity of James Bay, and was named Fort Charles, in honour of the British sovereign of the time. By 1686 there were five other posts—at Albany River, Hayes Island, Fort Nelson, New Severn, and Moose River. These posts were all protected by light stockades, and were provided with guns of small calibre. But they were more trading posts than forts, and were generally in charge of civilian clerks.

With a view of competing effectively with the English company in Hudson Bay, the French formed, in 1682, a new trading company called the Company of the North, which in 1685 despatched to the bay two ships from Quebec laden with merchandise suitable for the fur trade. Towards the end of the season these vessels, having had very poor success, were returning practically without any furs, when they encountered a Hudson’s Bay Company’s boat, the *Perpetuana*, bound from England for Fort Nelson deeply laden with merchandise. Although England and France were at peace, the *Perpetuana* was taken as a prize to Quebec, and her crew thrown into prison.

The same year Denonville despatched the Chevalier Pierre de Troyes, one of the best officers of the Colony
Troops, with a party of regulars, Canadians, and Indians, overland from Montreal to Hudson Bay, via the Ottawa river, Lake Timiskaming, Lake Abitibi, Black river, Abitibi and Moose rivers to Hudson Bay. With Troyes were three of the famous sons of Charles Le Moyne—d'Iberville, Saint-Hélène, and Maricourt—who, as volunteers, had under their command eighty or a hundred Canadians, including a number of *coureurs de bois*. Apart from the thirty Colony Troops, the greater part of the force were merely hardy woodsmen, skilled boatmen, and when required, good fighters.

The trip to Fort Moose, their first objective, took three months, but no tidings of the approach of the expedition had reached the English trading post. No summons was made, and the fort with its furs and merchandise, fourteen cannon, and 3,000 pounds of powder, was in the possession of the war party before the commander and his garrison of sixteen men realized the presence of any enemies. Fort Charles was next captured; it offered some slight resistance, but it was manned by too small a force to oppose successfully the French party, and it surrendered after the death or injury of five of the garrison. The French also seized a sloop, manned by fourteen men, on which Governor Bridgar, who had arrived to take charge of the fort, was a passenger. Here again the Hudson’s Bay Company’s men were taken by surprise, a guard being killed before he could sound an alarm, and the crew awakened from their sleep by the stamping of the French on the decks. Fort Albany, the next to be attacked, was, in its way, a formidable stronghold, having four bastions, and being armed with no fewer than forty-three cannon. The garrison was, however, a weak one, composed almost entirely of clerks and fur traders with no military experience, and hampered by the presence in the fort of women and children. The French landed cannon and opened a brisk bombardment, to which the garrison replied for two days. A breach was made in the walls, the ammunition was exhausted, and surrender
could not long be delayed. At this moment, d'Iberville sent Bridgar to the commander of the fort, Henry Sargeant, with a flag of truce. Sargeant had done his best, it would have been folly to renew the fight, and so, after brief negotiations, Fort Albany was handed over to the French.

In 1686, with the intention of preventing strife in the Northern wilderness, the Kings of France and England signed a treaty stipulating the neutrality of colonies even in the event of war in Europe, but it was ignored by the rival fur traders. In the following year d'Iberville once more proceeded to Hudson Bay and seized a couple of Hudson's Bay Company's vessels. In 1688, this active officer attacked and captured a fort established by the Company at New Severn. The same year the English despatched two ships to Fort Albany for the purpose of retaking that place, but d'Iberville succeeded in capturing the crews of both vessels, and in one of the ships, deeply laden with furs, sailed in triumph for Quebec. By the close of 1688 Fort Nelson was the only surviving English fortified post on Hudson Bay.

In 1688–89, the Indian trouble, which had been brewing since Denonville's expedition into the Seneca country, reached a bloody climax. During a violent thunderstorm on August 9th, 1689, the Iroquois, 1,400 strong, made a surprise onslaught upon the island of Montreal. The settlements on the borders of Lake St. Louis were attacked and many men, women, and children were ruthlessly killed or made captives. The whole island, excepting the fortified posts into which the soldiers and colonists threw themselves for protection, and out of which they dared not move, continued in the occupation of the Iroquois for more than two months. In one of these posts, Fort Roland, the Chevalier de Vaudreuil remained shut up with a considerable garrison under strict orders from Denonville on no account to risk action in the open. In consequence, some soldiers and Indians, coming to reinforce, or take shelter in, the fort, were killed almost
to a man, within sight of the garrison. A state of terror prevailed until the Iroquois, glutted with murder and laden with plunder, retired to their cantons, carrying with them a large number of prisoners.

Denonville had proved himself a hopeless failure and was recalled. Count Frontenac, the only man capable of retrieving the situation was reappointed Governor of Canada, and landed at Quebec amid popular rejoicings, October 15th, 1689, to find before him a most formidable task. Not only were the Iroquois causing very serious concern, but the English colonists to the south were now avowed enemies, for, in the previous May, Louis XIV, as an ally of the dethroned King James II, had declared war upon William of Orange. The English, however, were at a military disadvantage. All military authority in New France was in the hands of one man; in the English colonies there was no unity of purpose, and what authority was grudgingly acknowledged was distributed between several governors and as many popular assemblies.

Frontenac was much chagrined to learn that Denonville had ordered the evacuation and destruction of Fort Frontenac. He instantly equipped twenty-five canoes, with provisions and ammunition and an escort of 300 men, to hurry to the fort. But Frontenac was too late. M. de Varennes, the commandant of the fort, arrived at Lachine with his garrison while the relief force was still there, having destroyed the defences, ammunition, and provisions.

Frontenac now devoted his attention to maturing a plan for dealing with the Iroquois question, and for retaliating upon the English colonies, which he considered largely responsible for the Indian incursions. He finally decided that by a series of surprise raids against the frontier of the British colonies, he would give an exhibition of military efficiency which would have a salutary effect on the Iroquois, demoralize the English colonists, and restore the morale of the people of Canada. The condition of the colony admitted of no delay, and, as soon as the Iro-
quois bands had withdrawn for the winter to their villages south of Lake Ontario, he caused three bodies of French Canadians and Indians to be equipped at Montreal, Three Rivers, and Quebec. These were to leave their respective stations simultaneously and penetrate by three different routes into English territory. In spite of deep snow and rigorous weather, the three war parties started on their murderous adventure in midwinter, 1690.

The Montreal force, directed against the New York frontier, consisted of 210 men, of whom ninety-six were Indian converts, the rest being Canadians. The leading officers, men of nerve and experience in Indian warfare, were d'Ailleboust de Mantet and LeMoyne de Sainte Hélène, sons of Charles LeMoyne. The Canadians wore their usual winter clothing, including a sort of blanket coat with a hood and capuchin which they pulled over their head dress in severe weather, and carried hunting guns, long knives, and hatchets, dragging their blankets and provisions on Indian sledges or toboggans.

It was at first given out that the objective was Fort Orange (Albany) and, until the head of Lake George was reached, the party seemed to be heading in that direction. From that point the trail to Schenectady, then called Corlaer, was taken up. This settlement of the colony of New York was the nearest to Canada, and was distant about fifteen miles from Fort Orange. It was a small oblong palisaded village, with two gates; and the only part of the defences which had any strength was a block-house near the eastern gate, which was occupied by eight or nine Connecticut militiamen, under Lieutenant Talmage. Talmage had urged the inhabitants to guard against possible danger, and to keep the gate of the palisade closed. The population, some sixty or eighty families, mostly Dutch, ridiculed this advice, insisted upon keeping the gates open, and in derision roughly moulded a figure of snow and placed it outside the gates in imitation of a sentry. The place was surprised on the night of February 18th, 1690, while the inhabitants were buried in
sleep, some sixty persons were slain, as many taken prisoner, and the village committed to the flames. The only resistance offered was at the block-house, where Talmage and his men put up a stiff fight until the doors were battered down. The Indians and Canadians then rushed in and the defenders were either killed or made prisoners. The Canadians lost only two men in this attack, but on their retreat they were pursued by a party of Mohawks, accompanied by fifty young men from Albany, and before they reached Montreal, their losses amounted to no fewer than twenty.

The second of Frontenac's war parties, that which left Three Rivers to raid the New Hampshire frontier, was commanded by François Hertel, and included twenty-four Canadians and about an equal number of Indians. This party proceeded southward, via the St. Francis and Connecticut rivers, and reached Salmon Falls, now Portsmouth, on the 27th of March. This settlement was surprised in a similar manner to Schenectady. Some thirty of the inhabitants were killed, and the number of prisoners taken exceeded the force of the invaders. The village was looted, the domestic animals slain, and the torch applied to the buildings. As Hertel and his men were retiring, they were overtaken by 140 frontiersmen at Wooster river. Making a stand at a bridge-head, the French party beat back the English, killing or wounding a number of them and then continued their homeward journey without further molestation.

The third expedition, raised in Quebec to attack the settlements along the frontier of Maine, was placed under the command of a Quebec officer named Portneuf, who had as his principal lieutenant another Canadian named Courtemanche. This party consisted of fifty Canadians and some sixty Abnaki Indians. On their march along the Chaudière and Kennebec rivers, they were reinforced by more Abnaki, and by the Three Rivers men, whom they met on their way back from their raid on Salmon Falls. The objective of this force, now numbering be-
tween 400 and 500, was a fortified station, Fort Loyal, on Casco Bay, the site of the present city of Portland. Great hardships were encountered in the wilderness journey, and four months elapsed between Portneuf's departure from Quebec and his arrival at Casco Bay. The defences of Fort Loyal consisted of a palisaded work, with eight cannon, and four block-houses. The fort and block-houses were occupied by 100 men, chiefly settlers of the neighbourhood, under Captain Sylvanus Davis, a local trader. Davis tried to keep his men within their defences, but he was unable to enforce his commands, and thirty, acting on their own initiative, made a sortie, but, falling into an ambush, they were all either killed or taken prisoners. That night the whole force of the settlement was concentrated in Fort Loyal.

Portneuf now summoned Davis to surrender, but his offers were refused and the siege was undertaken with vigour. Two or three days were spent by the raiders in sapping their way to within striking distance of the walls of the little fort. When they had achieved this, Davis considered that further resistance would be folly and the garrison surrendered on Portneuf's terms, which included the right of those in the fort to proceed to the nearest English settlement. But after the capitulation the place was apparently abandoned to the Indians. Some thirty of the settlers were killed and some seventy men and a large number of women and children taken prisoners. After burning all the buildings and demolishing the defences, the invaders retired into Canada, reaching Quebec towards the end of June.

Frontenac found that while, on the whole, the three expeditions had been successful, ruthless violence was not the way to strike terror into the hearts of Anglo-Saxons. He soon learned that the New England colonies were preparing to exact revenge for the blood shed by the three Canadian war parties. These border forays had created a grim determination to destroy French power in North America. New York and the New England colonies
appealed to England for assistance, and, burying for the time their local jealousies, called a congress of representatives of the various colonies in May, 1690. It was then decided to raise and equip at Albany a land force of 1,300 men to march to Montreal, and at Boston a combined sea and land force of thirty vessels, 1,500 seamen, and 1,300 militia for the capture of Quebec. The two expeditions were to advance simultaneously against Montreal and Quebec, neither of which was considered strong enough to oppose singly the forces planned for its attack. Both expeditions were placed under the supreme command of Sir William Phips, who, previous to sailing with the main expedition, was despatched to Acadia in command of seven vessels and some 700 men. He quickly took possession of all of the French posts in that colony, including Port Royal, Penobscot, La Hève, and Chedabucto, and returned to Boston on the last day of May having with him as prisoners Robineau de Menneval, Governor of Port Royal, two priests, and fifty-nine soldiers belonging to the Colony Troops.

During his absence preparations for the Quebec expedition had gone on. Massachusetts had asked the mother-land for assistance. England could render no aid to her children overseas, so Massachusetts had to depend on her own resources. Volunteers offered readily as sailors or soldiers, but impressment had to be resorted to before the requisite complement of 2,200 was obtained. Thirty vessels were requisitioned, most of them of small capacity. The largest was a West India trader carrying forty-four guns, called the *Six Friends*, the second largest, the *John and Thomas*, of twenty-six guns. Three vessels were contributed by the colony of New York, one of twenty-four guns, one of eight, and the other of four.

Phips set sail from Nantasket for Quebec in August, but owing to adverse winds the fleet did not arrive at Tadoussac until October 3rd, and it took twelve days more to reach the Island of Orleans. The difficulties of ascending the river were increased owing to the lack of a competent
river pilot. Attempts were made to induce some of the inhabitants to serve as pilots, but the Canadians did all in their power to impede the progress of the invaders.

One of the stories of this period, which is still recounted with much satisfaction at gatherings of the older habitants along the Lower St. Lawrence, is that of Francheville, the curé of River Ouelle. According to this story, while a landing was being attempted from some of Phips' ships, the curé doffed his clerical garb, clothed himself in habitant costume, including cape, capote, and sash, and musket in hand, led his parishioners to the river. Selecting a hiding place near a point where the New Englanders' boats were expected to land he placed his followers in ambush. When the boats drew near the shore they were met by a deadly volley and driven back to their ships with greatly diminished crews. All along the St. Lawrence similar parties of armed habitants followed the course of the fleet, and at each attempted landing the boats were greeted with volleys of musketry.

The only chance of success for the expedition had been in taking Quebec by surprise, but this was lost owing to the delays in preparing the expedition in New England, to the time wasted in negotiations with the Home authorities, and to the unavoidable and long delays due to contrary winds. Reports early reached Canada of the preparations in the New England colonies, and steps were taken to improve the defences of Quebec. It was not, however, until the fleet was well in the St. Lawrence that Frontenac instructed Callières, Governor of Montreal, to come to his assistance with such force as he had at his disposal, mustering the inhabitants of the settlements between Montreal and Quebec on the way. The response to Frontenac's appeal for assistance was most satisfactory, men flocking in from all the parishes, far and near. When Phips' vessels hove in sight, 2,700 armed men were gathered within the fortifications, and the "armed inhabitants" of Beauport and Ste. Anne de Beaupré were
stationed along the river bank below Quebec to resist any attempt at landing from that quarter.

The artificial landward defences of Quebec, which, at the best, were weak, consisted of palisades strengthened by a deep embankment and flanked at intervals with square stone towers. There were batteries at advantageous places, and a number of light pieces were held in reserve for the defence of any threatened points. What is now called Lower Town was outside the main fortified position, but was covered by guns on the cliffs, while there were two batteries of 18- and 24-pounders at the edge of the river to protect the landing. The strength of the position, however, lay in its natural advantages.

After a wearisome wait down the river for a fair wind, Phips' fleet cast anchor between the Island of Orleans and the town of Quebec on October 16th. A boat at once put out from the Admiral's ship bearing a flag of truce. Canoes met it half way and took ashore a young lieutenant who announced himself as the bearer of a letter from Sir William Phips to Count Frontenac. After being blindfolded he was escorted to the Governor through the jeering inhabitants. The grim old warrior, surrounded by a number of distinguished French and Canadian officers, defiantly received the bearer of Phips' demand of surrender, and short and sharp came his reply: "I will answer your General only by the mouths of my cannon, that he may learn that a man like me is not to be summoned after this fashion. Let him do his best and I will do mine."

After holding a council of war, Phips decided to attempt to establish a strong force on the elevated plateau behind the town, with a view to delivering a combined attack from the river and from the rear. A detachment of 1,200 militia under Major Walley was landed below Quebec on the Beauport shore, with instructions to cross the St. Charles river by a ford which was practicable at low water, climb the heights near the right bank of the river, and gain the rear of the town.
But on reaching land they found themselves checked by Canadian sharp-shooters disposed in the thickets along their front. A charge was ordered, Walley's men rushed with great impetuosity upon their assailants, and in spite of two volleys drove them back in confusion. Reinforced, however, the French made a stand, and, fighting in Indian fashion from behind cover, inflicted considerable loss upon the invaders. Towards evening the French force retired, and Walley advanced towards the St. Charles and encamped for the night, some small armed vessels that were to assist in the crossing of the river having failed to arrive.

While Walley's force was in this position, Phips moved his larger ships before the town and began a cannonade, which, however, had very little effect. His guns were no match for those of the fortress, and scarcity of powder made it necessary to reduce the charges, so that their normal efficiency was very much impaired. A picturesque touch is given to this phase of Phips' attack by the capture of the flag of the Admiral's own ship. A well-aimed shot from the shore batteries cut the flagstaff, staff and flag together falling into the river. They were drifting with the tide towards the town when some Canadians secured them and brought them ashore in triumph. After having two of his ships badly mauled, Phips withdrew his fleet out of range.

While the attack from the river was taking place, Walley's force lay in bivouac near the St. Charles, the men devoid of shelter, wet, famished, and suffering from small-pox. The smaller vessels which had been ordered to assist Walley in crossing the St. Charles were also to have supplied him with food rations, but the masters of these light craft, many of whom were also the owners, hesitated to risk them in the narrow channel. The only reinforcement which seems to have been received by Walley consisted of six small field-pieces, but they were only a burden, as there were no means available for moving them across the muddy Beauport flats.
The magazines of the ships had been exhausted by the bombardment and there was not sufficient ammunition left to supply the land force. However, after the fleet withdrew, Walley's men advanced along the shores of the St. Charles towards the ford, but a considerable force of French troops disputed the crossing, and Canadian and Indian sharp-shooters who had crossed the ford opened fire upon the enemy from the thickets on the river bank. Towards evening these sharp-shooters withdrew and the New Englanders encamped for the night.

On the following day, the invaders were left undisturbed, and parties of New Englanders scoured the thickets which had sheltered the Canadians and Indians. They captured a number of cattle, which were most welcome, as the men were almost starved, and on the day of the main skirmish their rations had consisted of but one biscuit per man. Towards evening a considerable force of Canadians once more stole across the St. Charles, and lively skirmishing again took place, the invaders upon this occasion being threatened by troops who attacked them on their right flank and rear. The Canadians fought like Indians, hiding behind the trees and stumps or among the thickets. To relieve the pressure, the New Englanders again advanced, driving back the French and Indians, but as the fighting became closer, the French made a stand among the buildings of a farm, and there they remained until night, taunted by the New Englanders, who challenged them to come out and try conclusions in the open.

Towards night on the 20th, Walley, after four wretched days ashore, fell back to the landing-place, where, as soon as it grew dark, the re-embarkation of the force began. The sick and wounded were all safely sent on board, but five of the cannon had to be abandoned. The following day, Phips, after holding a council of war, decided to abandon the enterprise. Forthwith the ships weighed anchor, and before long had disappeared from the view of the people of Quebec. On their homeward journey
the autumn storms destroyed a number of the vessels and many seamen and soldiers found watery graves. Between battle, shipwreck, and small-pox Phips lost about 1,000 men, and accomplished nothing.

Very poor progress was made at Albany with the arrangements for the overland expedition to Montreal. New York was to provide most of the men, but Massachusetts and Connecticut had agreed to send contingents, and the whole expedition was placed under command of a Connecticut officer, Fitz-John Winthrop. Massachusetts, fearing for her frontiers, failed to send her quota, and Winthrop at the head of only 200 or 300 Connecticut men reached Albany to find everything in confusion; but after perfecting as much organization as possible, he set out towards Montreal. On reaching Wood Creek at the southern extremity of Lake Champlain, he had to halt for supplies. While encamped at this spot, small-pox and dysentery broke out in the force, and disagreements occurred with the Mohawk, Oneida, and Mohegan Indians accompanying the expedition. Difficulties arose between the Connecticut and New York men, and those from the latter colony quarrelled among themselves. Then a lack of canoes caused a serious transportation problem.

Winthrop decided to abandon his enterprise, and returned to Albany with the main body of the survivors of his force, nearly all of them sick. But Captain John Schuyler, the mayor of Albany, with a small party comprising most of the healthy men, proceeded to Canada on a minor raid, and attacked the village of Laprairie, opposite Montreal. Frontenac quite recently had been encamped here with a considerable force in anticipation of an overland attack from Albany, but had broken up his camp to proceed to Quebec, word having reached him of Phips' arrival in the Lower St. Lawrence. Schuyler declined to attack a small fort established at Laprairie by Frontenac, and contented himself with burning a number of farmhouses, killing some cattle, and making a few
prisoners. And so ended the great adventure against Canada by way of Montreal.

In 1691, mainly with the object of encouraging their Indian allies, the English of New York raised a war party at Albany to conduct a raid in the direction of Montreal. Major Peter Schuyler was placed in command, having under him 120 English and Dutch settlers, 80 Mohawks, and 66 Mohegans. Scouts having brought warning of the approach of this party, Callières had crossed the St. Lawrence to Laprairie with two small battalions of Colony Troops and a number of Canadians and Indians, in all from 700 to 800 men. The regulars encamped in an open field near a small fort, while the Canadians and Indians occupied the fort or were stationed near the river bank. Early one morning during a drizzling rain, Schuyler attacked Callières' force. His men crept up until within striking distance of the Canadian position. A sentry observed them, gave the alarm, and fled, being followed by the New Yorkers to the gate of the fort. In the first onset some of the Indians and Canadians who were resting under their canoes on the beach were killed. The regular troops, roused by the alarm, sprang to arms, but were met by a volley that laid fifty of them low, the rest falling back upon the fort in disorder. Rallying, they attacked the invaders, and Schuyler withdrew his men to a neighbouring ravine, where he was able to make a successful stand, repeatedly driving his assailants back. This had all taken place in the darkness or early dawn, and by the time it was bright daylight the New York men, having inflicted what they considered a severe blow upon the French, slowly fell back towards the Richelieu river.

In their retreat Schuyler's force fell in with 160 French regulars and Canadians and about 100 Indians, under command of Valrenne, an officer of ability. Valrenne had prepared an ambush near Chambly, which almost proved successful; for Schuyler's men, underrating the enemy's strength and ignorant of his dispositions, charged
impetuously, and were repulsed with considerable loss. Taking time to reconnoitre, they repeated the attack with greater fury and succeeded in dislodging the French. Then ensued one of the hottest and most stubborn fights ever known in Canada. In the excitement, bushranger, coureur de bois, and Indians forgot their customary tactics, and came to hand to hand fighting. Eventually Schuyler's forces fought their way through their enemies, and then turned and attacked them from the rear, driving them back some distance. They then continued their march towards their canoes, which they had left on the Richelieu, carrying their wounded, but leaving forty dead on the field of battle.

Above Three Rivers, constant attack made it almost impossible for the habitants to cultivate their farms. Fields were sown only by the united help of the whole community. The inhabitants of a parish would band together and pass from farm to farm putting in the crops, some of them acting as sentinels in the adjacent woods. Occasionally parties of regulars were detailed to assist the settlers in this way. A typical incident of the perils and heroism of this pioneer period is the defence of "Castle Dangerous," when Magdeleine de Verchères, the fourteen-year-old daughter of a former officer of the Carignan-Salières Regiment, with the assistance of two soldiers, a man of eighty, and her two young brothers, held at bay for a week a large party of Iroquois. Her conduct won for her the title of Heroine of New France.

In 1693, Frontenac learned that the New England colonies were preparing, with the aid of a fleet from England, to make another formidable attempt upon Quebec by sea. The Governor at once set to work to prepare for the threatened attack. At Quebec new redoubts were constructed, and the means of defence further improved by the completion of gateways surmounted by battlements at the two western points of exit, the gates of St. John and St. Louis. But these preparations turned out to be unnecessary. An English fleet, under Admiral Wheeler,
did indeed sail with upwards of 4,000 sailors and soldiers for the purpose of capturing Martinique in the West Indies, and then proceeding to Boston to take on additional troops for an attack on Quebec. But the attempt to capture Martinique ended in a repulse with heavy loss; then an infectious disorder broke out, which carried off more than three-fourths of the soldiers and crews. Arriving at Boston, the fleet communicated the disease to the citizens, of whom a large number perished. The Admiral, therefore, discouraged by his failure in the West Indies, and unable to repair his losses at Boston, relinquished the idea of proceeding to Quebec and returned to England.

A destructive incursion made by the French in 1693 against the Iroquois had humbled that warlike people. They sent several emissaries to Montreal and Quebec to negotiate a treaty, and, after some delay, a truce was agreed to in 1694; but Frontenac realized that with England and France still at war, and with the English colonists encouraging the Iroquois to make raids on New France, there could be no satisfactory peace. Again, the Iroquois strongly objected to the re-establishment of Fort Frontenac, a cherished purpose of Frontenac. In 1695, in spite of the hostility of the Iroquois and the expressed wishes of the Government of France, a force of 36 officers, 400 regulars and Canadians, and 200 Indians was sent to Fort Frontenac. Under the Marquis de Crisasy, a Neapolitan noble, as commandant, the old fort was repaired and in the course of fifteen days made sufficiently strong to withstand assault. A garrison of forty-eight soldiers reoccupied the place, and small parties of Indians were sent across the lake to harass the Iroquois, who in due course took to the war-path, and fire and tomahawk once more ravaged the frontiers.

During the spring of 1696, Frontenac made preparations for a decisive campaign against the Iroquois. The Canadian militia, the Hurons from Lorette, the Abnaki from the Chaudière, and the 800 regular soldiers were
to assemble at Isle Perrot, on Lake St. Louis. Provisions, means of transport, and all other necessary supplies were to be provided, so that a completely equipped force, numbering upwards of 2,200 men, might be ready to begin active operations early in July. The militia were rather more numerous than the regular soldiers, and the Indian auxiliaries furnished over 600 warriors. M. de Callières, Governor of Montreal, M. de Ramesay, commandant at Three Rivers, and M. de Vaudreuil commanded, respectively, the three corps into which the army was divided. Frontenac himself, although seventy-six years old, accompanied the expedition as Commander-in-Chief. The Indian auxiliaries were led by Maricourt, a younger brother of d'Iberville.

Preceded by a number of canoes and two large bateaux carrying a couple of field-pieces and provisions, the troops left Isle Perrot on July 7th and arrived at Fort Frontenac on the 19th. Thence they crossed Lake Ontario, and landed at the mouth of the Oswego river. The customary difficulties of moving through a wild and marshy country were encountered. The aged governor was carried in a chair, and Callières, almost as infirm as his chief, rode the only horse which accompanied the expedition, and which had been transported from Montreal on a bateau. The advance towards the Iroquois settlements was conducted with the greatest regularity and precision, one half the force under Callières and Ramesay following the route of the south bank of the river, and the other, under Frontenac and Vaudreuil, that of the north. On reaching the small stream, through which the water of Lake Oneida empties into the Oswego, the two divisions reunited and marched towards the nearest Onondaga village. The Iroquois, afraid to risk battle, burnt their village with its fort, and withdrew into the recesses of the forest. When the French arrived at the scene of the conflagration, they found the remains of some French captives, who had been killed and mutilated on
the approach of their countrymen. No living inhabitant was found, except one very old man.

As the wily Indians would not make a stand, all that the French could do was to destroy the neighbouring villages, and all the standing crops. On August 9th, the return journey was begun, and the force reached Montreal after a march of eleven days. Only four men were lost by the French during this expedition, of whom three perished on their way homeward in one of the rapids of the St. Lawrence. The immediate consequence of this expedition was to impose upon the Iroquois a period of famine and distress, and as scarcity in the English colonies hindered them from obtaining aid there, they were soon impelled to resume negotiations for peace.

During the period of strife, Hudson Bay was the frequent scene of armed conflict. In 1691, a French frigate was despatched to the Bay, and appeared before Fort Nelson when most of the Company's employés were absent on various inland trading expeditions. The Governor, Phipps, realizing that a successful defence was impossible, destroyed the fort by fire, and retired into the wilderness. In 1692, Fort Nelson, re-named York Factory, was rebuilt by the Hudson's Bay Company, and from this base an expedition was despatched in the following spring against the French at Fort Albany. The party met with an easy success, and the French trading post was transferred to the British flag.

In September, 1692, d'Iberville once more arrived at the mouth of the Hayes river, near Fort Nelson, with two French frigates, the Joli and the Salamander. After a gallant defence, extending over a period of three weeks, Governor Bayly, in charge of the post, was compelled to surrender, d'Iberville spending the winter at Fort Nelson, and re-naming it Fort Bourbon.

In 1696, Captain William Allen, an officer of the Hudson's Bay Company, arrived in the bay with two ships, the Bonaventure and the Seaforth. Fort Nelson was promptly attacked, and at the conclusion of a couple of
days' bombardment, La Forest, d'Iberville's lieutenant, who had been left in charge of the post, surrendered.

In 1697, d'Iberville, accompanied by his brother, Serigny, was despatched to Hudson Bay by the French government with five warships, the Pelican, the Palmier, the Wesp, the Profound, and the Violent. The Pelican, d'Iberville's ship, became separated from her consorts in the ice fields and reached Fort Nelson first. While the French commander meditated landing to attack the place, three of the Hudson's Bay Company's vessels, the Hampshire, Dering, and Hudson's Bay, approached his anchorage. D'Iberville, having the advantage of heavier guns and a stronger ship, attacked the English vessels without hesitation, and after a hot fight, the Hampshire, the largest of the Company's ships, was sunk with all hands, the Hudson's Bay was forced to surrender, while the Dering made her escape. The Pelican and the Hudson's Bay were so badly damaged as to be almost unmanageable, and during a fierce storm which arose while the fight was in progress they were driven aground and became complete wrecks. It is interesting to note that on board the Pelican were a company of Canadians and some Indian sharp-shooters in charge of La Potherie, the historian of this thrilling naval battle. D'Iberville and his followers succeeded in reaching shore, but lost everything excepting their arms and a few effects. They were in a most precarious condition until the arrival of the remainder of the French ships, which had finally succeeded in extricating themselves from the ice. A strong landing party having been put ashore, heavy-gun batteries were established and mortars landed from the ships, and a regular siege was begun. Bayly, the Governor, did his best, but his small guns were no match for the heavier artillery of the enemy, and he was compelled to surrender. He was accorded all the honours of war, and his motley garrison of traders, clerks, and apprentices marched out with arms and baggage, drums beating and colours flying. When
hostilities terminated with the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick, May 7th, 1697, the Hudson’s Bay Company found itself shorn of all of its old trading forts, with the exception of Fort Albany.

The Treaty of Ryswick was scarcely signed before new trouble arose between Frontenac and the Governor of New York over the settlement of the Iroquois affairs, and while correspondence on the subject was still in progress, Count Frontenac breathed his last at Quebec on the 28th of November, 1698, after an illness of a few days’ duration. With his death ended one of the most notable chapters in the military history of Canada.
CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE FOR CANADA

The great "Fighting Governor" was no more, but his achievements had a most stimulating effect on New France. Under the régime of Louis Hector de Callières, who in 1699 succeeded his old chief and comrade-in-arms as Governor of Canada, the country experienced exceptional growth. Settlements were extended up the St. Lawrence, the Chaudière, the Richelieu, and the Ottawa, and new trading posts were established in the west and southwest. Callières put the relations with the Iroquois on a somewhat more satisfactory footing, and, in 1703, when war was once more declared between England and France, Canada was spared serious trouble with the Five Nations, while the English colonists suffered severely from the frequent incursions of the Abnaki. In revenge, the English invaded the Abnaki country with fire and sword, whereupon the French, to assist their allies, sent against the English colonies a war party under M. de Rouville, who fell upon Deerfield, on the river Connecticut, in the night time, and the fearful scenes of Schenectady and Salmon Falls were again enacted. The town was burnt, about fifty persons slaughtered, and upwards of 100 prisoners carried off. Later on the town of Haverhill was raided, but here the attack was made in broad daylight, and about fifty soldiers aided the inhabitants in their fruitless resistance. These bloody incursions strengthened in the English colonies the determination utterly to destroy the French colony, and in 1709 the people of New England, in conjunction with the Home Government, made preparations on a large scale for ending French rule in Newfoundland, Acadia, and Canada.
Late in 1709, information reached Canada that several regiments were to be sent from England to unite with a force raised in Massachusetts and Rhode Island for an attack upon Quebec, while another army levied in New York and the other colonies was to advance by way of Lake Champlain against Montreal. When all was ready in the English colonies, the troops promised from England were sent elsewhere and the expedition against Quebec was abandoned. But the movement from New York had actually begun, and Colonel Francis Nicholson with a considerable number of colonial troops and a large body of Iroquois, won to the British cause by gifts and rum, advanced towards Lake Champlain, with the intention of first capturing Fort Chambly, and then falling upon Montreal. But the expedition got no further than Lake Champlain.

On October 6th, 1710, a British naval force from Boston, including 400 British Marines, and four New England regiments, the whole commanded by Nicholson, now a general, captured Port Royal in Acadia, the French garrison under Subercase capitulating, and the name of the place being changed to Annapolis, in honour of Queen Anne. On his return from Annapolis, General Nicholson went to England to urge the Government to persevere in its determination to drive the French from North America. His application was supported by a petition of the New York Legislature, presented by Colonel Schuyler. This appeal set forth that: “The French penetrate all the country behind your Majesty’s plantations among numerous tribes of Indians; they send agents and priests with toys and trifles, next traders, then soldiers, and finally build forts among them.” The British ministry acceded to the requests of the colonists, and a powerful fleet under Admiral Hovenden Walker, conveying five regiments of marines, was despatched to Boston in the summer of 1711. At the end of July this armament sailed for the St. Lawrence to effect the capture of Quebec. At the same time a land force of regulars and
colonials under General Nicholson began its march northwards, with Montreal as its objective.

Exceptionally stormy weather at sea, lack of efficient pilots, and the difficulties of the navigation of the St. Lawrence caused the naval expedition to miscarry. Arriving in the Gulf of St. Lawrence about the middle of August, Walker's fleet encountered a thick fog, followed by strong winds. A number of ships were wrecked at Isle-aux-Œufs on the north shore of the Gulf, and upwards of 800 men drowned. Among the wrecked vessels were several store-ships, and, as there remained provisions sufficient for only ten weeks, it was determined at a council of war to abandon the enterprise and return home. General Nicholson, on receiving tidings of this disaster, naturally decided to retire, as his land expedition was only part of a concerted scheme. Leaving 150 men as a guard for the frontier, Nicholson marched back to Albany and disbanded his force.

The signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, March 31st, 1713, was followed by thirty-one years of peace between France and England. This treaty dispossessed France of Acadia and Newfoundland, and of any rights in Hudson Bay, but left her undisturbed in Canada, and accorded to her sovereignty over Cape Breton and Isle St. Jean (Prince Edward Island). The fisheries of the banks of Newfoundland were of supreme importance to France, both for their commercial value and as a training ground for the French navy. A strongly fortified sea-port within reach of the Newfoundland banks, which would also serve as a naval base for the protection of the approaches to the St. Lawrence, was an absolute necessity. As Newfoundland itself had been ceded to England, it was decided that the best position available was a harbour on the island of Cape Breton, Hâvre à l'Anglais, for many years a resort of English fishermen. The garrison of Placentia in Newfoundland was transferred to this place in 1713, under its Governor, Costebelle,
who thus became the first Governor of the new establishment, which was given the name of Louisbourg.

The entrance from the sea to the harbour of Louisbourg was less than a quarter of a mile wide, while it had a circuit of nearly twelve miles. The anchorage was excellent, it had a depth of about forty feet, and ships could conveniently be beached for repairs. After some years piers, magazines, and fortifications were constructed under the direction of engineers from France, and in course of time Louisbourg became the strongest fortified seaport of America except Quebec. In about twenty years, the French Government is said to have expended 30,000,000 livres in fortifying Louisbourg. The hills, which at a short distance from the shore followed the windings of the coast, were crowned with works of solid masonry, the highest point being selected as the site for the Citadel, or King’s Bastion. The works as a whole were built on the Vauban system, and completely encircled the town on the land side, the entrance to the harbour being defended by outlying bastions known as the Dauphin’s and Queen’s Bastions, and by a battery placed on the shore of the harbour. The complete works had embrasures for 148 cannon. An important outpost was a battery of thirty-six guns on the island commanding the narrow entrance to the harbour, while facing the entrance was the Royal Battery with thirty guns.

In 1744, France declared war on England, and the American colonies were speedily involved in the conflict which ensued. Before the English colonists became aware of the precise state of affairs in Europe, a force from Louisbourg surprised and captured a small English outpost on the Strait of Canso. In consequence, the New Englanders immediately took up arms; and, learning that France and England were now at war, made preparations for co-operating in the reduction of Louisbourg. Massachusetts under the leadership of her Governor, William Shirley, took the initiative, though the House of Assembly gave a majority of but one in
support of the proposal. The other English colonies were invited to join, but only Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island agreed to help. A fleet was prepared and seven weeks after Massachusetts came to a decision, her contingent of 3,250 men sailed for Canso, where they were joined by 516 from Connecticut and 304 from New Hampshire, making a total of some 4,000 men, entirely untrained and very poorly equipped, all under the command of a New England merchant, William Pepperrell, a colonel of militia, but with little experience in the management of troops.

When the Massachusetts's contingent left Boston, the troop-ships were convoyed by an insignificant naval force of three colonial frigates and a few smaller vessels hastily equipped in Massachusetts. It was realized that this convoy was altogether too feeble, but it was hoped that before a French fleet could arrive, the expedition would be joined by the British fleet then in the West Indies under Commodore Peter Warren. Although this assistance had been hoped for, rather than expected, Warren and his fleet actually joined the expedition at Canso, and took it in safety to Louisbourg.

And indeed the New Englanders met with uniformly good luck. The commandant of Louisbourg, Chambon, was a weakling. Du Vivier, one of the most efficient officers of the garrison, was absent, having gone to France to solicit aid. The place was short of munitions, and the troops, 2,000 in all, influenced by the Swiss companies of the garrison, were in a state of mutiny, and it was feared that there would be wholesale desertions on the approach of the enemy. When Pepperrell’s expedition left its base, it was wholly unprepared with siege guns, but the New Englanders, before leaving Boston, had planned the capture of some of the enemy’s heavy guns and the use of them against the defences. With singular assurance they actually had cast, and took with them from New England, a supply of large cannon balls for the guns they expected to capture. And this astonishing scheme
was carried out to the letter, for a party of the invaders obtained possession of the Royal Battery, which had been deserted by the French, and in its guns used their home-made ammunition for battering down the walls. Later on, ten large French cannon, which had been buried by the enemy at low tide, were unearthed and added to the batteries of the attackers. After the siege had proceeded for some time, British ammunition and supplies ran low, and a crisis was approaching, when the French man-of-war, *Vigilant*, carrying an abundance of munitions and stores, hove in sight and was captured by the blockading fleet,—another gift from the goddess of chance!

The siege began on April 30th, 1745, and on June 15th Louisbourg surrendered. A provincial force garrisoned the fortress until the following spring, when it was replaced by regular troops, who held it until 1749, in spite of several attempts by France to recover possession. Eleven French ships of the line, with transports carrying 3,000 soldiers, were despatched in 1746, under Admiral d'Anville, to co-operate with a body of troops from Canada under M. de Ramesay, in an attempt to retake Cape Breton. This undertaking proved a failure, owing to adverse weather and the breaking out of an epidemic in the fleet when near Chibucto Bay (now Halifax Harbour). Admiral d'Anville and 2,400 of his men were carried off by the disease, which also proved destructive to large numbers of French Canadians and Abnaki who had gone down to the coast to join d'Anville.

Another strong fleet consisting of six ships of the line, and thirty transports, under Admiral de la Jonquières, left France in the spring of 1747 on the same errand. La Jonquières had been appointed Governor of Canada, to succeed the Marquis de Beauharnois, and was to retake Louisbourg on his way out to his post. But Admirals Anson and Warren, in command of an English fleet, fell in with La Jonquières's squadron and on May 3rd, 1747, captured all the French war vessels, and a large part of the convoy.
In 1748, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, peace was concluded between the contending European powers. By this treaty, all captured territories were to revert to their former owners, and in the following year Louisbourg was handed back to the French.

In 1752, there arrived in Canada as Governor, a soldier-sailor whose name figures in the military history of Canada as the reorganizer of the Colony Troops and Canadian militia, the Marquis Duquesne de Menneville. This old warrior, a rigid disciplinarian, was scandalized by the condition of the military establishment. Many of the commandants of posts were concerned in trade, and careless about their proper duties. The officers were reluctant to go on active service, and the composition of the troops was defective, men too old and boys too young being enlisted. The soldiers were insubordinate and disrespectful towards their superiors, and desertions were common. The Governor applied himself vigorously to the work of correcting these evils, and of mustering the whole defensive force of the colony, regulars and militia. The population was such that the militia could now be raised to 15,000, and Duquesne organized it into companies and had as many as possible thoroughly drilled.

As thus reorganized, the military administrative organization in each district, outside of Quebec, where the colonial administration was located, consisted of a governor, a lieutenant du roi, and a town major, all under salary. In every parish there was a captain of militia (a seigneur or former officer of regulars), responsible for the drill and discipline of his men, while the more influential and experienced seigneurs were sometimes commissioned as field-officers. Retired soldiers settled in the country were used as non-commissioned officers. Special inducements were offered to non-commissioned officers and men of the Colony Troops to settle in Canada on their discharge from the regular service, and such as accepted the terms offered were supplied with arms. From the year 1754 every parish was a garrison, commanded by a captain of
militia, whose authority was not only acknowledged but rigidly enforced. The militia of Quebec, Montreal, and Three Rivers were frequently exercised. The Quebec militia included a carefully trained artillery company, and the Montreal town militia, a battalion of infantry. The governors in cases of emergency decided what quotas were required from each seigniory and town, and forwarded a requisition therefor to the town majors of Quebec, Montreal, Three Rivers, etc., and to the seigneurs in the rural districts. These officials in turn decided upon the strength of the quotas of the various parishes, and made requisitions on the captains of militia, who in turn raised the men by a draft, and marched them under escort into the nearest town, where the town major furnished each militiaman with a gun, a capote or worsted toque, a Canadian cloak, a cotton shirt, a cap, a pair of leggings, a pair of moccasins, and a blanket.

Many duties of a civil nature in connection with the administration of the law, the regulation of statute labour, the making and maintenance of roads and other public utilities were imposed upon the captains of militia, these useful officials being compensated in times of peace by grants of powder and ball.

Duquesne, having received orders to persist in excluding English traders from the Ohio valley, decided on the establishment of several new posts. Under his directions Contrecœur, an officer of the Colony Troops, built a substantial fort, named Fort Duquesne, near the confluence of the rivers Monongahela and Alleghany with the river Ohio, on the site of the modern city of Pittsburgh. Another, Fort Venango, was built at the junction of the Rivière-aux-Bœufs with the Alleghany.

In 1753, Governor Dinwiddie, of Virginia, contending that the Ohio valley was British domain, despatched thither a force under George Washington, with orders to establish himself there, and to notify the French that they were unlawfully occupying British territory. In
May, 1754, Washington, then but twenty-two years of age, passed with his command along the banks of the Monongahela. His advance guard, under Ensign Ward, constructed near Fort Duquesne a small fort or blockhouse, which was forthwith attacked and captured by the French, and its defenders made prisoners. Contre-cœur, the commandant at Duquesne, sent an officer named Jumonville, with an escort of thirty-four men, to seek the English leader in his camp at Great Meadows, and to warn him off what he claimed to be French territory. Jumonville arrived by night near Washington's camp about the end of May. His detachment was observed by Washington's scouts and promptly surrounded. Jumonville gave no indication that he was on a diplomatic mission, and the men under him rushed to arms as soon as they saw the English troops. A skirmish resulted, in which Jumonville and nine of his party were killed, the remainder, with the exception of one man who escaped by flight, being taken prisoner. Governor Dinwiddie approved of Washington's attack on Jumonville, claiming that the French officer owed his fate to his own imprudence. This affair, when it became known in Canada and in France, excited intense feeling, the death of Jumonville being characterized by the terms murder and assassination.

After his encounter with Jumonville, Washington constructed a stockaded post, Fort Necessity, situated in a hollow between two eminences, and surrounded on three sides by a thick forest. From this point he proposed marching against Fort Duquesne, but was delayed while awaiting reinforcements from Virginia. Contre-cœur, at Fort Duquesne, on learning of the fate of his subordinate officer, immediately commissioned Jumonville's brother, Coulon de Villiers, to lead a band of 600 Frenchmen and 100 Indians against the English. Villiers, arriving near Fort Necessity on July 3rd, disposed his troops within gunshot on the contiguous high land, but concealed among the bushes and trees,
and vigorously attacked it. In the narrow confines of the English position about 350 men were huddled together. For ten hours they sustained a heavy musketry fire, and then, having lost about seventy men in killed and wounded and finding his position untenable, Washington capitulated. In this affair, known as Great Meadows, the French had only some twenty casualties.

These occurrences did not lead to immediate hostilities between France and England, but preparations were made by both for the war which they saw to be inevitable. General Braddock was sent with two regiments from England to New York, while Field-Marshall Baron Dieskau was appointed to command six regiments of French soldiers, numbering 3,359 officers and men, who embarked at Brest at the end of April, 1755, on board the fleet of Admiral de la Motte. This fleet, consisting of fourteen line-of-battle ships, four frigates, and numerous transports bearing supplies, had a long and hazardous passage. In June, three of the battleships, which had separated from the others, were attacked off Cape Race by an English fleet, two being captured, while the third escaped into Louisbourg. The remainder of the squadron arrived safely at Quebec in the month of July. With the reinforcements came the new Governor, Pierre de Vaudreuil-Cavagnal, who had been appointed to succeed Duquesne.

At a council of the English colonial governors, attended by General Braddock, as well as by a number of the Iroquois chiefs, it was determined to despatch four expeditions: one to expel the French from those portions of Acadia still in their possession—the Isthmus of Chicagneeto and what is now the southern part of New Brunswick; another to the Ohio valley; a third against Fort Niagara; and a fourth in the direction of Lake Champlain, to capture the position at Crown Point.

Massachusetts furnished 600 or 700 troops and a sufficient number of small transports to act against Acadia in conjunction with the forces already in Nova
Scotia. Two or three frigates also entered the Bay of Fundy to co-operate. Charles Lawrence, Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia, placed the forces at his command under Colonel Monckton, who moved with a portion of them against the French forts at the head of the Bay of Fundy. Fort Beauséjour on the south side of the Isthmus of Chignecto, and Fort Gaspereaux, on Bay Verte on the north side, surrendered with scarcely a show of resistance. The entire isthmus thus fell into the hands of the English.

The expedition of Braddock into the Ohio Valley resulted in disaster, his main force being defeated on July 9th at the crossing of the Monongahela river by a party of Canadian Colony Troops, militia, and Indians, under a regular officer, Captain de Beaujeu. Braddock was mortally wounded, and half of his men were killed or wounded. The retirement of the beaten army developed into a disgraceful rout, cannon and baggage being abandoned.

Shirley was in command of the expedition whose objective was Fort Niagara, but while on his way through the territory of the Iroquois towards Lake Ontario, news reached him of Braddock's defeat and death. This discouraged his followers, intimidated the Iroquois from joining him, and disarranged his plans to such an extent that he abandoned his enterprise.

The expedition against Crown Point was placed under command of General (afterwards Sir William) Johnson of New York, and was concentrated at the head of the Hudson river, where Fort Lyman was erected as a base. This completed, and a garrison of several hundred men being left to guard it, the army of about 2,200 soldiers and 300 Indians, advanced to the south shore of Lake George, where Johnson established it in a well-selected position. As a French force, under General Dieskau, had been despatched from Quebec by way of the Richelieu river to defend Crown Point, General Johnson judged it prudent to advance no farther at present
towards Lake Champlain, but to strengthen his camp and await the course of events.

General Dieskau's force amounted to 3,000 men, composed of 700 regulars of the regiments Languedoc and La Reine, 1,500 Canadian militia, and 800 Indians, of whom nearly one half were converted Iroquois from Caughnawaga and the Lake of Two Mountains. Dieskau resolved to take Fort Lyman by surprise, before its defences could be strengthened, and moved forward from Crown Point with half of his army on September 3rd. On the 7th, when within a few miles of the English fort, the Caughnawaga Indians refused to proceed farther. At the same moment, a scout brought word of the approach of a corps of over 1,000 men, detached by General Johnson from his camp to succour Fort Lyman. Dieskau thereupon placed his men in concealment in the forest and awaited the unsuspecting enemy, hoping to attack them on the flank and in the rear. His Indians prevented the complete success of his plan by appearing prematurely, their action being due to their reluctance to fight against their own kindred who were serving in Johnson's army.

The English column, however, fell into the ambuscade, and after a sharp fight retired upon their camp at the lake, followed by Dieskau, who now resolved to bring on a general engagement with the whole of Johnson's army. General Johnson had, in the meantime, intrenched his position, and protected it by felling trees to form a breastwork. Dieskau's Caughnawaga Indians hung back, and the French Canadians also were intimidated by the unexpected strength of Johnson's position, so that it was left for the regulars and a few Abnaki to face the fire of the enemy. In the conflict, which lasted several hours, the French regulars were badly cut up, and the English finally came out from behind their breast-works and drove off their besiegers with great slaughter. The defeated troops in their flight encountered another body of New England militia hastening to Johnson's assistance. Another fight took place, which ended in
the complete rout of the French forces. The British loss was 262 in killed, wounded, and missing, that of the French, according to their own report, 228, but it was probably much greater. General Johnson was slightly wounded, Dieskau severely.

Johnson was then urged to resume his march against the French forts at Crown Point and Ticonderoga (Carillon), the latter recently constructed between Lake Champlain and Lake George. He declined, however, as his men were but poorly armed, and unfit to oppose the well-equipped and disciplined French regulars. On the site of the recent conflict, he caused a wooden stockade or fort to be built, which he named Fort William Henry, and manned it with a garrison of New England militia. He also strengthened Fort Lyman, and changed its name to Fort Edward, after one of the King's grandsons.

Despite Dieskau's severe defeat, the general result of the campaign of 1755 was not unfavourable to the French. Three out of the four English expeditions had failed, for the French remained undisputed masters of the Ohio valley, and they still held Niagara and Crown Point.

During the winter of 1755-1756 extensive preparations for prosecuting the war were made by both sides in Europe and America. The English proposed to continue the operations attempted the previous year, and new generals and additional troops were promised by the mother-country. France sent 1,000 troops and four generals,—the Marquis de Montcalm, as Commander-in-Chief, with Chevalier de Lévis, Comte de Bougainville, and Chevalier de Bourlamaque as brigadiers.

Montcalm was most unfavourably impressed by the conditions he found in the colony, and in a letter he speaks of more or less disorder in all parts of the administration; dishonesty on the part of most of the public functionaries; weakness of the Governor; jealousies and ill-feeling among the officers of the three branches of the military service,—the regular army, the Colony Troops, and the militia; controversies between the civil and
military officials; and the difficulties attendant upon warfare carried on by inconsiderable forces in an immense country without roads and covered by forests.

Montcalm's first effort was devoted to the reduction of Oswego, the only English post on Lake Ontario. The nearest supporting troops in rear of this position were at Albany and Forts Edward and William Henry, all under the command of General James Abercomby. To occupy that general's attention, Lévis, with 3,000 men, was sent to Lake Champlain, while a similar force, including the La Sarre, Guienne, and Bearn regular regiments, was mobilized at Fort Frontenac, for an attack on Oswego.

All was in readiness by August 4th, but Oswego was not reached until the 10th. On the 13th, Bourlamaque attacked and captured one of the outworks called Fort Ontario. This was occupied, and its guns turned against the principal position. At the same time Pierre François Rigaud, brother of Governor Vaudreuil, led a force to the adjacent elevated ground, which commanded Oswego, and planted a battery there. The garrison of Fort Oswego—which in reality included three works, viz., Fort George and Fort Ontario, in addition to the principal fort—consisted of 1,800 men under Colonel Mercer, and was well supplied with provisions and munitions of war. Nevertheless, it held out for only three days, capitulating on the 16th, after the loss of its commander and about 160 men.

In the middle of the ensuing winter Rigaud led a column of 1,400 Canadians and Indians in an attempt to surprise Fort William Henry. But the garrison was found to be on the alert, and the place too strong for the French to venture to attack.

War had at length been formally declared between England and France, May 12th, 1756. The two nations were more solicitous about the struggle in Europe and on the ocean than about assisting the colonists in their quarrels respecting inland boundaries in North America, but it was proposed in England that Louisbourg should be
reduced, and that the forces of the colonies should co-operate in the undertaking. In January, 1757, a conference of colonial governors, attended by the English Commander-in-Chief, Lord Loudoun, was held at Boston. The result was to defer the offensive operations against Canada, and to confine proceedings to the defence of the frontiers and the maintenance of the posts then held, it being agreed that in the meantime the Commander-in-Chief, with six regiments of regulars and some colonial troops, should take part in an attempt on Louisbourg.

In the spring of 1757, Lord Loudoun with an army of 5,000 men embarked at New York. Soon after the transports reached Halifax it was learned that three French squadrons had arrived at Louisbourg, and the united French fleet being of superior strength to that convoying Loudoun's forces, the reduction of Louisbourg was not attempted. However, in the hope of drawing the French ships out into a general naval action, a British fleet under Admiral Holborne, consisting of sixteen ships of the line, proceeded to Louisbourg, where lay twenty-two French ships of the line and some frigates. But La Motte, the French admiral, decided to retain the advantage the shore batteries gave him and remain in the harbour, and the British fleet blockaded the place until dispersed by a September hurricane.

Montcalm meanwhile, taking advantage of the absence in Nova Scotia of most of the English regular troops, concentrated some 7,500 men near Fort William Henry and began its siege. This force included about 3,300 regulars, 2,900 French Canadians, and 1,800 or 1,900 Indians.

The force under Lieut.-Col. Monro, in command of the fort, consisted of about 3,000 men, chiefly provincials. Some 500 occupied the fort, and the rest were posted in an intrenched camp near by. A road led southward to Fort Edward, where General Webb was stationed with a considerable body of troops, but owing to the character of
the intervening country, it was impossible for Webb to give prompt aid to the garrison, had he felt disposed to do so. He wrote to Monro telling him that help could not be sent until the arrival of reinforcements of colonial militia, which were expected daily, and counselling him to hold out as long as possible, and if compelled to surrender, to secure the best terms he could.

On August 3rd, Montcalm formally summoned Monro to surrender, but Monro refused, and resisted as long as his guns, ammunition, and provisions held out, hoping for relief from Webb. But, on the morning of the 9th, a white flag was displayed on the fort, and on the same day the English garrison, conformably to the articles of capitulation, moved into the intrenched camp, preparatory to retiring upon Fort Edward. They had lost about 350 killed and wounded. A detachment of 300 French troops, with officers as interpreters, as well as two chiefs belonging to each of the various tribes, were to accompany the paroled prisoners to Fort Edward, and to protect them from the Indians; but the latter could not be restrained, and, attacking the prisoners, slew a number and carried off many others. The captives were eventually purchased by the French and sent to Halifax. This massacre has been the subject of much discussion, and it seems evident that the French did not take proper precautions to ensure the safety of the paroled garrison.

Montcalm had intended to attack Webb at Fort Edward, but, after the affair at William Henry, found himself in no position for such an undertaking. He had not the necessary transport, supplies were running short, the Canadian militia had to be sent home to harvest the crops, and hundreds of the Indian allies, satisfied with the scalps and plunder they had taken, returned to their villages. So, after destroying the captured British fort, Montcalm retired, and distributed the regular troops among the garrisons of the French forts along Lake Champlain and the Richelieu river.

Owing to the failure of the British operations of 1757,
Lord Loudoun was recalled, and General Jeffery Amherst was appointed to succeed him as Commander-in-Chief. Pitt had decided to persevere with his project of expelling the French from America, and, while prosecuting the war vigorously in Europe, perfected plans for despatching reinforcements across the Atlantic. The various colonial governments were asked to raise as many troops as possible for service in the campaign of 1758, and the call was responded to at once by offers from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire to furnish at least 15,000 men. In the course of the winter, preparations were made for resuming operations, the objectives being Louisbourg in Cape Breton, Ticonderoga and Crown Point on Lake Champlain, and Fort Duquesne on the Ohio.

Amherst personally assumed command of the expedition against Louisbourg, the defences of which had been considerably improved since its restoration to France. When it was evident that the British contemplated another attack, the French despatched a fleet there, but it was intercepted by Holborne's squadron, and forced back to the protection of its home ports. Another French relief fleet was dispersed by Hawke at the island of Aix, and, for some time before Amherst's arrival, the fortress had been blockaded by a fleet under the command of Sir Charles Hardy. Admiral Boscawen's fleet, which convoyed Amherst's army to Louisbourg, consisted of twenty-three ships of the line and eighteen frigates. The army included 12,000 men of all ranks, Amherst having Whitmore, Lawrence, and Wolfe, as brigadier-generals, with Colonel Bastide as engineer-in-chief.

The garrison of Louisbourg consisted of four battalions of regular army troops, namely, the regiments of Artois, Bourgogne, Cambis, and les Volontaires Étrangers, two companies of regular artillery, twenty-two companies of Colony Troops, a body of militia, and a band of Indians, the whole force being about 5,000 men including 3,080 regulars. In the harbour were five ships of the line, and seven frigates, carrying 544 guns and about 3,000 seamen.
The whole was under the command of the Governor, Chevalier de Drucour, an able seaman, but inexperienced in land operations.

The invading force arrived off Louisbourg on June 1st, but owing to rough weather a landing was not effected until the 8th. Brigadier-General James Wolfe ably led the landing party, getting his division ashore in the face of a strongly defended position, strengthened by a masked battery, and routing the party posted to dispute the landing. Every effort was concentrated on getting the troops, siege train, and supplies ashore, and Amherst, establishing himself on a low-lying marshy area behind the fort, began preparations for its capture by bombardment and sapping operations. Meanwhile, Wolfe, who displayed throughout great energy and skill, made a detour around the harbour with a column of 1,200 men and took possession of Lighthouse Point, which had been abandoned by the French. Guns and mortars were in due time installed upon this position, and fire opened on the Island Battery guarding the entrance of the harbour. The guns of this battery being silenced, Wolfe on the 25th rejoined headquarters. With characteristic deliberation Amherst pushed forward his intrenchments towards the landward defences of the place, while the French attempted a couple of gallant sallies, but were driven back. To prevent the British fleet from entering the harbour after the Island Battery had been dismantled, the French sank six of their large ships in the entrance. One frigate, the Arethuse, broke through the blockading fleet and put to sea, while the greater part of the crews of the remaining vessels went ashore to assist in manning the guns. In July, Boishébert, with some 400 Canadians, Acadians, and Micmac Indians, made a half-hearted attack upon some of the British outposts, but was easily driven off. On July 16th, a party under Wolfe captured an eminence known as Gallows Hill, some 300 yards from the Dauphin's Bastion, and promptly dug themselves in, using the position for a new approach. A few days afterwards
three of the remaining French warships were destroyed by fire, and two days later British sailors cut out the two still left, the Bienfaisant and Pendant. Under the vigorous fire of the British batteries, the defences were slowly but surely being battered down, when, on the 26th, the last gun defending the land side of the place having been silenced, a white flag was displayed over a breach in the Dauphin’s Bastion. As a result of the ensuing parley, Governor Drucour surrendered the fortress on the following day, and, as soon as possible, the entire garrison, including 5,637 officers, soldiers, and sailors, was transported to England as prisoners of war. The surrender included the whole of Cape Breton and Isle St. Jean.

Drucour had prolonged the defence as long as possible, in the hope of preventing Amherst from detaching a reinforcement to the British army on Lake Champlain in time for it to be of use before the close of the season, and in this he succeeded. This army, under command of General Abercromby, with Lord Howe as his brigadier, was mobilized at and about Albany. As soon as the necessary supplies arrived from France in the spring of 1758, General Montcalm concentrated all his troops at Lake Champlain. He had concerted with Governor de Vaudreuil his plan for opposing Abercromby’s advance northward, which, it was understood, was to be directed upon Montreal if the positions at Ticonderoga and Crown Point were carried early enough in the season. Arriving at Ticonderoga on June 30th, Montcalm found that the troops already there, together with a corps on its way under Lévis, would total between 3,500 and 4,000 men, most of them veterans.

The British had already reached Lake George. They numbered more than 16,000, including 9,000 colonial troops, with 500 Iroquois under Sir William Johnson, and some 7,000 regulars. More than 1,000 boats and barges had been prepared near the site of Fort William Henry, and in these they embarked and crossed to the north end of Lake George. It had been determined in council at
Montreal, that, whatever the odds against the French might be, the passage by the enemy of the narrows at Ticonderoga and Crown Point should be vigorously disputed. On July 5th a skirmish occurred, in which Howe, the ablest of the British leaders, was killed. "In Lord Howe, the soul of General Abercromby's army seemed to expire." Late on the 7th, the main body arrived near the French intrenched position of Ticonderoga, and established itself on ground near-by, chosen by Colonel Bradstreet, who led the vanguard.

The position at Ticonderoga had been rendered as difficult of access as possible. A formidable abattis or breastwork had been thrown up in front of the fort, behind which Montcalm marshalled his regulars and militia in divisions, commanded by such experienced officers as Lévis, Bourlamaque, and Senezergues. At points of advantage, batteries of cannon were stationed. Abercromby, who apparently had failed to have the enemy's position thoroughly reconnoitred, or possibly had been misled by incapable scouts, seems to have relied upon his superior numbers and the quality of his troops to force the position at Ticonderoga without cannon. By means of simple flank movements he could have compelled the French to retire, or, if he had waited for his artillery, could have demolished the temporary breastwork. Ignorant of the strength of the position held by his enemy, impressed with the importance of acting before expected reinforcements could reach Montcalm, and throwing caution to the winds, he precipitated his soldiers in four strong columns upon the protected front of the French. But Montcalm repelled all attacks. It was a battle in which superiority in numbers, the utmost valour and obstinacy, and persevering efforts during about five hard hours of gruelling fighting proved unavailing to dis-

1 Viscount Howe was a worthy member of a distinguished family, and the elder brother of Admiral Lord Howe, of "The Battle of the Nile." A far abler soldier than Abercromby, his loss was irreparable. To his memory there stands in Westminster Abbey, a monument erected by the Province of Massachusetts Bay.
lodge a brave foe, advantageously placed and commanded by resolute and skilful officers. Six times the British columns attacked, but the muskets and cannon of the French wrought havoc in their ranks. Some of the attacking corps lost half their numbers, a very large proportion being officers. Astonished at the unexpected resistance, Abercromby towards evening drew off his troops and held a council of war. After an hour's interval, the whole strength of the army was united for one more desperate assault. Once more the British soldiers hurled themselves against the French position and once more they were beaten back. A loss of nearly 2,000 men had been incurred; it seemed useless to continue the attack at such frightful cost, and the defeated British general reluctantly ordered a retirement from in front of a position held by an enemy whose number was still scarcely one-fourth of his own. On the following morning he took his force across the lake to Fort William Henry, where he intrenched. This important victory was won by Montcalm with the sacrifice of less than 500 men.

Shortly after his retirement, Abercromby despatched Colonel Bradstreet with a mobile force of 3,000 colonial troops to capture and destroy Fort Frontenac. A few of the Onondagas and Mohawks accompanied the British force across the lake to the Canadian shore. When Bradstreet landed near Fort Frontenac on August 25th, he found the fort almost denuded of defenders, owing to the mobilization of all the available French troops at Lake Champlain. There were thirty guns and sixteen mortars mounted on the defences, but the insignificant garrison of 120 soldiers and forty Indians was not of sufficient strength to man them. Two days after his arrival, Bradstreet had planted batteries in readiness for commencing a bombardment, when the commandant, de Noyan, surrendered. Thus this post, the chief interior military stronghold of the French, by means of which they had secured the control of Lake Ontario, fell into the hands of the British, without the loss of a single life,
This exploit was far-reaching in its influence on the progress of the war, but its significance was lost sight of at the time on account of the spectacular fight at Ticonderoga. The victors captured, besides a large quantity of munitions and other military stores, nine armed vessels, including those taken from the British at Oswego. Before withdrawing across the lake, Bradstreet razed the fort to the ground. His achievement imperilled French power in the west, and the reduction of Fort Niagara at the upper end of Lake Ontario became a foregone conclusion.

The British expedition for the capture of Fort Duquesne, composed of 1,500 regular troops and some 5,000 colonial militia, was commanded by General Forbes. It left Philadelphia in July, but, owing to the difficulties encountered in crossing the Alleghany mountains, the Monongahela river was not reached until four months later. Captain Ligneri, who commanded at Duquesne, endeavoured to check Forbes' advance by sending out small parties of scouts and bush-fighters to harass his troops while passing through rough and timbered country, but the British force was not materially impeded, and on November 23rd Ligneri evacuated the fort after destroying by fire as much of it as he could. The British, after restoring the damage done, established themselves in the place and called it Pittsburg. Thus was sealed the fate of the other French posts in the valley of the Ohio, the links connecting Canada with her sister French colony, Louisiana.

1 On a map in the British Museum it is stated that the French had on the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario in 1757, four government vessels, La Marquise de Vaudreuil, La Louise, Le Victort, and La Huzalt. The Marquise de Vaudreuil and La Huzalt were topsail schooners of sixteen and fourteen guns respectively, La Louise, a schooner of ten guns and Le Victort a sloop of eight guns. According to the same authority the British flotilla on Lake Ontario and the Upper St. Lawrence in 1758, after the capture of Fort Frontenac, included the following vessels: Montcalm (captured from the French), George, Lively, Vigilant, Ontario, and another, the name of which is unrecognizable. Judging from the pictures on the map mentioned, the Montcalm was a brig of twenty guns, the George one of eighteen, the vessel with the undistinguishable name, a topsail schooner of twelve, the Vigilant a sloop of twelve guns, and the Ontario one of ten guns.
This ended the operations for the year, and despite the brilliant success at Ticonderoga, the net result was most discouraging for the French. Although the British attempt to drive the French from Lake Champlain had failed, the defeated British general had been able to detach from his army a force which had destroyed the chief military depot on the Great Lakes and had reduced the naval armament on Lake Ontario to such an extent that its military efficiency practically disappeared; the chief French post in the Ohio valley had been occupied by the enemy, and the only French naval base on the Atlantic seaboard had been reduced. There was a shortage of nearly every warlike necessity in Canada, and, due to Britain's mastery of the sea, the colony was cut off from the mother-country. The possession of Louisbourg and Halifax, now a considerable naval station, gave the British practical control of the approaches to the St. Lawrence. 

During the autumn and winter of 1758, the British Government, in concert with the colonial authorities in America, formed plans on a large scale for completing the reduction of Canada. A strong military force, under General Jeffery Amherst, was to resume offensive operations against the French positions on Lake Champlain, the Richelieu, and the Upper St. Lawrence, with Montreal as its ultimate destination. At the same time, a powerful fleet under Admiral Saunders and an army under General Wolfe were to move up the St. Lawrence against Quebec. A third expedition, under General Prideaux, was to be directed against Fort Niagara, with a view to ending French power in the Great Lake region. Moreover, strong detachments, under General Stanwix, were to re-establish the principal British positions south of the Great Lakes, and to capture the line of French military posts extending from Lake Erie towards the Ohio.

Meanwhile, Vaudreuil, as Governor of Canada, and Montcalm, as commander of the troops in the field, were agreed as to the importance of remaining on the defensive, but there was no cordial feeling or mutual confidence
between them. Vaudreuil considered the commander of the forces over-rated as a general, and too exacting and unjust towards the Colony Troops, the Canadian militia, and the Indians. Montcalm, on the other hand, looked upon the Governor as vacillating and irresolute, the tool of corrupt civil officials. Again, the officers and men of the regular army had but little in common with the Colony Troops, while the members of both branches of the service held the militia in contempt. The internal conditions, therefore, were not altogether satisfactory.

In January, 1759, a census was taken of the population, which was found to amount to 82,000 souls. Of able-bodied males between the ages of sixteen and sixty about 15,000 were enrolled as militia, the Quebec district having 7,500, Montreal 6,400, and Three Rivers the remainder. The regular troops, consisting of French regiments and Colony Troops, amounted to about 6,000.

For the local marine and transport service, two frigates of thirty-two and thirty-six guns respectively, and half a dozen smaller vessels, mounting from twenty to twenty-four guns each, were available at Quebec, together with a sufficient number of bateaux, boats and rafts. On Lake Champlain there were several armed vessels, besides small craft required for the transport of troops and stores; and on Lakes Erie and Ontario, notwithstanding the destruction wrought by Bradstreet at Fort Frontenac, a few vessels were still left.¹

In the month of May General Amherst concentrated at Albany and Fort Edward the troops for the Lake Champlain operations. In his advance into that region, he followed the route taken by Abercromby the year before—from Fort Edward to the head of Lake George, thence to its outlet, in bateaux and on rafts, thence overland to Ticonderoga. Profiting by the disasters experienced by Braddock, Dieskau, and Abercromby, he proceeded with great caution. His column was preceded by scouts, and

¹ See footnote, p. 76.
THE STRUGGLE FOR CANADA

New France and the British Colonies, 1756-1760
the country for miles on either flank was carefully reconnoitered.

Amherst spent a whole month in the transport of stores and cannon from Fort Edward, and in providing the necessary bateaux and other craft for his future operations, and it was not until July 22nd that he arrived near Ticonderoga, the scene of Abercromby's bloody defeat. Mindful of the lesson there taught, he carefully reconnoitred the French position, and as carefully and methodically made his dispositions for carrying it on the morrow. But Bourlamaque, who commanded the place, in obedience to his instructions from Montcalm, retired to Crown Point on Amherst's approach. Hebecourt, his second in command, held out for three days under a brisk fire and then escaped with his garrison after setting fire to the magazine, but only one bastion of the fort was destroyed. With the same deliberation as before, Amherst strengthened Ticonderoga, accumulated necessary supplies, and completed transport arrangements for a further advance. On August 4th, the English army took possession of Crown Point, the French having vacated this post also and retreated to Isle-aux-Noix.

For more than two months Amherst was busy strengthening the works at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and in making ready to advance down Lake Champlain. The French had four armed vessels on the lake, and he judged it necessary to have an equally strong fleet constructed to protect his communications with his base. The middle of October had arrived before the French naval force had been driven from the lake, and arrangements had been completed for pursuing the French to Isle-aux-Noix, but the lateness of the season and the unfavourable state of the weather put an end for that year to all further progress. Amherst then settled his troops for the winter at Crown Point, Fort George, built by him on the site of Fort William Henry, and Albany. He had not succeeded in reaching the St. Lawrence and aiding Wolfe in his attack upon Quebec—the main object
of his expedition—but he had attained results that were to bear fruitage in the following year.

Early in August Amherst had despatched a message to Wolfe relating the progress of the Lake Champlain operations, which reached Wolfe at Quebec in about a month’s time via the circuitous route of the Kennebec and Chaudière rivers. About the same time he tried to communicate with Wolfe by a more direct overland route, but the Abnaki Indians south of Lake St. Peter captured the messengers. To punish these Indians, Amherst despatched Major Robert Rogers, in September, with a party of 140 rangers overland from Missisquoi Bay at the north end of Lake Champlain to the Abnaki settlements on the St. Francis river, a few miles from its mouth, with orders to take revenge upon the “enemy’s Indian scoundrels,” for the barbarities committed by those “dastardly villains,” but to take special care “that no women or children be killed or hurt.” Although a French war party started in pursuit, Rogers and his rangers succeeded in crossing the forest wilderness where now are the counties of Missisquoi, Brome, Shefford, and Drummond, surprised the principal Abnaki town, slew some 200 of the braves, practically the whole male adult population, released five English prisoners, and destroyed the town by fire. From poles over the doors of the houses were found dangling in hundreds English scalps, including many of women and children taken in raids upon the New England frontier settlements. Beating a hasty retreat via the St. Francis river, Lake Memphremagog, and the Connecticut river, Rogers and most of his men reached the New England colonies. The others were either killed or captured by the pursuers, or starved to death in the forest.

In the meantime, the force under General Prideaux, consisting of three battalions of regular troops, two regiments of New York provincials, and a body of Indians, had advanced to Oswego, where a strong detachment was left under the command of Colonel (afterwards Sir Frederick) Haldimand, for the double purpose of maintaining
communications with Amherst, and of providing a place of refuge in case of need. From Oswego, Prideaux conducted his troops in bateaux and canoes along the southern shore of Lake Ontario. Arriving at Fort Niagara on July 5th, he immediately laid siege to the place. On July 19th, General Prideaux was killed in the trenches by the premature explosion of a shell from one of his own guns, and the conduct of the siege devolved upon Sir William Johnson. The French commandant, Captain Pouchot, had previously asked the commanders of the French forts lying between Lake Erie and the Ohio valley to send a force to his relief. They complied, and a few days after Prideaux's death a considerable body was advancing against the English troops before Niagara. Johnson, leaving enough men to guard his batteries, took his regulars and Indians to meet these new enemies, and on July 24th succeeded in defeating them. On the following day Pouchot, realizing the hopelessness of his position, surrendered. The capture of Fort Niagara involved the easy capture of the other French forts by General Stanwix.

It is now time to consider the most important operation of this widespread campaign, the attack on Quebec. The naval force destined for the reduction of Quebec consisted of a fleet of fifty vessels, including twenty-two men-of-war, of from fifty to ninety guns each, five frigates, nineteen sloops-of-war, and seven or eight cutters, together with a considerable number of transports, store-ships, etc., under Admirals Saunders, Holmes, and Durell. The fleet conveyed 7,600 soldiers and 1,000 marines, commanded by Major-General James Wolfe. This force consisted of three brigades under Brigadier-Generals Monckton, Townshend, and Murray, respectively, and included eight full regiments, the 15th, 28th, 35th, 43rd, 47th, 48th, 58th and 78th, two battalions of the 60th, or Royal Americans, and companies of light infantry, rangers, and grenadiers, as well as corps of artillery and marines.

Durell advanced up the St. Lawrence some time before Saunders and Holmes, and stationed his squadron off
Isle-aux-Coudres, about sixty miles below Quebec. With the hope of entrapping French vessels his fleet sailed under French colours, but succeeded in capturing only two store-ships. Bougainville, with two frigates (La Pomone of thirty-two guns, and L'Atalante of thirty-six) and fifteen or sixteen transports carrying troops and stores for Quebec, had passed up the river before Durell reached the St. Lawrence. By the end of June the whole British fleet had reached the basin of Quebec. The troops were at once landed, and camps formed on the island of Orleans, and afterwards on the south side of the river, opposite the city, near Point Lévis. Hostilities commenced in earnest, about July 1st, before which date, however, several minor encounters had occurred.

The Marquis de Vaudreuil, General Montcalm, and the Chevalier de Lévis had arrived at Quebec in May. Montcalm at once devoted himself to the organization of the military forces and the defences of the city, while Lévis made a thorough reconnaissance of Quebec and its environs. Montcalm felt that the steep cliff above Cape Diamond would make it impossible to land a force west of the town and concluded that the enemy would be disposed to follow the plan attempted by Walley during Phip's attack, namely, to force a crossing of the St. Charles river below Quebec, and gain the plain in rear of the city by climbing the steep hill skirting at some distance the right bank of the St. Charles. As little dependence could be placed upon the ancient walls for withstanding a regular siege, a possible landing on the Beauport shore was provided against by means of a series of intrenchments and redoubts extending from the banks of the St. Charles to the Montmorency. The defensive line thus created was all the more formidable in that the shore was skirted throughout its entire length by a stretch of very wide, muddy flats. Near the mouth of the St. Charles, a strong boom was constructed, and protected by a battery of four guns situated on the left bank. A bridge of boats connected the intrenched camp with the city. The right of
the intrenched line was protected by batteries of guns and mortars, located on the ascending steeps forming the north and northwest slope of the promontory upon which Quebec stands. On the north shore above Quebec the natural defences had been strengthened by a battery or two, a few guards, and a strong patrolling force. The bulk of the army, to the number of 10,000 men, was stationed behind the intrenchments along the Beauport shore. Within the walls of the city, 600 or 700 men, mostly armed citizens and militia, with Colony Troops and sailors to work the guns, constituted the garrison. Arrangements had also been made for the transport of supplies in convoys of barges and boats from depots established at Montreal.

Montcalm fixed his own headquarters near the centre of the Beauport line of intrenchments, having with him the greater part of the regulars, including the La Sarre, Royal Roussillon, Languedoc, Guienne, and Béarn regiments, under the command of Senezergues, as Brigadier-General, and next in military rank to Lévis. On the right were stationed the militia of the districts of Quebec and Three Rivers; while the left wing, under Lévis and Bougainville, was composed of militia of Montreal city and district, about 4,000 strong. A mobile reserve of upwards of 2,000 Colony Troops and Indians, and a body of 350 horsemen, specially organized for the campaign, was placed on the ascending ground in rear of the centre.

One of the three brigades of Wolfe's army, including a portion of the artillery, landed on the south shore of the St. Lawrence, near Point Lévis, to erect batteries for bombarding the city. This brigade, commanded by General Monckton, included the 15th, 43rd, 48th, and 78th regiments, and a portion of the corps of light infantry and rangers, all told about 3,050 men. The brigade had to march some distance through the forest and along the shore, where several encounters, attended with loss on both sides, occurred between the English light troops and the Canadians and Indians, and several
AMPAIGN OF 1759

THE UPPER MAP (1)

QUEBEC from the days of the Island of Orleans under
British works of attack. British encampments at
French works of defense. French encampments in
British regiments.

A. Artillery
B. Louisburg Grenadiers
C. Light Infantry
D. Reeds

THE LOWER MAPS

Landing of the British, and Battle on the Plains.
The Battles of the Renegades.
In the British Army numbers are

CITY OF

a. C. Diamond
b. L. Glacier
C. St. Louis

This map, a composite one, was
by Major WILLIAM WIND, under
consultation with Major Col.
Artillery, and E. A.Depont.
The composite of the "Engine Plot"
"Siege of Quebec" is by permit.
errors in original are correct.
The "Engineer" plot battle by three engineers of Wolfe
in ordinary. Capt. Helmack of the Royal Artillery
were executed with scholar's list
grapher, Map Department. The

IV

III

Ottawa

River St. Lawrence
days elapsed before the force, which was subjected to a brisk cannonade from the batteries of the city, found itself securely intrenched on the high ground opposite Quebec. On the night of July 12th, Monckton's batteries were completed and the bombardment was begun with six heavy guns and five mortars, supported by several vessels in the harbour.

In the meantime the other two brigades, a part of the rangers and artillery, and a body of grenadiers had disembarked on the island of Orleans. The grenadiers consisted of 300 men, belonging to the 22nd, 40th, and 45th regiments, and were commanded by Colonel Guy Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester and Governor of Canada. General Townshend's brigade, which, on July 9th, was transferred to a position on the left bank of the River Montmorency, consisted of the 28th and 47th regiments, together with a battalion of the 60th or Royal Americans, and numbered 1,450 men. The remaining brigade, under General Murray, was made up of the 35th and 58th regiments, with another battalion of the 60th, amounting to 1,900 men.

At the Montmorency, where General Townshend's brigade was encamped, Wolfe had caused batteries and redoubts to be established. From these the left of the French line of intrenchments was cannonaded, while frequent approaches for the same purpose were made by the smaller armed craft of the British. During July several detachments of troops were passed above the city and either landed at or threatened various points where the French had established defensive positions or depots of stores. As a result of these movements the French batteries along the north shore above Quebec were strengthened, and a force of observation under Bougainville was detached to guard the river bank.

Meantime, Montcalm persisted in remaining behind his lines, and Wolfe, realizing that his success depended upon his ability to draw the French into a general action, attempted, on July 31st, to force the extreme left of Mont-
calm's position on the Beauport shore, near the Montmorency. The failure of this attempt, due to the impetuosity of the small force of grenadiers, who were the first to land, entailed a loss of from 450 to 500 men killed and wounded, and convinced Wolfe that it was impossible to succeed by a frontal attack.

Perplexed and worried at the difficulties which his task involved, Wolfe was stricken with fever. While still confined to his quarters, he summoned a council of war, and discussed the question of bringing the campaign to a decisive issue. In a report to this council, dated September 2nd, the General stated that he had given his approval to a proposal that a corps of 4,000 or 5,000 men be despatched above the town, in the hope of drawing the enemy from their intrenched position and bringing them to action. In furtherance of this design, the naval force above Quebec was steadily reinforced, and Montcalm, on his side, despatched additional reinforcements to Bougainville. On September 3rd, the British troops which had been encamped near the Falls of Montmorency were transported to the island of Orleans, and from there to Point Lévis, the French making no effort to interfere with the movement.

About this time, Wolfe received Amherst's communication explaining the slow but successful progress of the Lake Champlain campaign. The news had also reached the French headquarters, and Lévis, with several hundred men, was sent to Montreal to make arrangements for its defence, with instructions to co-operate with Bourlamaque on the Richelieu and Lake Champlain.

From September 5th, Bougainville and his detachment were kept in a state of anxiety and perplexity by the constant movement of the British shipping above Quebec. Several times British ships came to anchor, and the troops they carried were placed in the small boats, as if to effect a landing, but this was done partly to deceive the French and partly to train the troops.

By September 10th, Wolfe had matured a plan of action
by which he hoped to force the surrender of Quebec. He had carefully reconnoitred the district above the city and concluded that his only hope of success was in scaling the heights there and bringing Montcalm’s army to a general action. He had even picked out his landing place—the Anse-au-Foulon (now Wolfe’s Cove). But he kept his own counsel, concealing the details of his plan from even his brigadiers, and revealing them only to Admiral Holmes and Captain Chads, whose co-operation was essential to him in the initial stages of his enterprise.

Everything was ready on the 12th, and on that day boats moved up and down the Beauport shore as if seeking a suitable landing, and the guns of Saunders’ fleet searched the French lines. As night fell, the bombardment increased, and Montcalm concentrated his forces at Beauport, confident that he was about to be attacked from that quarter. Meanwhile, above the city, Holmes’ fleet, laden with troops, moved up the river, apparently intending to attempt a landing in the region of Pointe-aux-Trembles. But Wolfe’s plan was to wait for the ebb-tide, and then have his landing force drift down silently from Cap-Rouge to the Foulon and there make a landing and scale the heights.

At two o’clock on the morning of the 13th began the initial step in one of the world’s most decisive battles. The troops on Holmes’ fleet took to the boats and silently sped towards the landing spot Wolfe had selected. Twice they were challenged by French sentinels on the shore, but they tricked the sentinels by pretending that they were French provision boats. Landing at the Foulon, a scaling party quickly climbed the heights, overpowered the weak guard there, capturing the commander, Vergor, and rushed the Samos Battery near at hand, thus clearing the way for the main army. And at daybreak 5,000 British soldiers, confident and eager for battle, were assembled on the Plains of Abraham.

Montcalm at Beauport learned, with grave misgivings, that Wolfe’s redcoats were on the plains back of the city.
He galloped across the St. Charles on his black charger and saw for himself the long lines of British soldiers advancing along the Ste. Foy road. He at once called up every available man from the Beauport position, but received from Vaudreuil not half the number he expected and by 9:30 a.m. he had a force of barely 5,000 men ready to engage the British.

About 10 a.m. the fighting began with a scattered fire from the French, who advanced in eight small, six-deep battalions of Colony Troops and regulars with Canadians and Indians on their flanks. To meet this attack, Wolfe had drawn up his army in a "thin red line" two-deep, and calmly awaited the impetuous onrush of the enemy. He had ordered his men, who stood with double-shotted muskets, to hold their fire until the French were within forty paces. And calmly they waited, though death thinned their ranks, Wolfe himself being twice wounded.

A single gun had been dragged into the field of action by British sailors; with this weapon well in front of the line Captain York played on the advancing battalion, and when danger threatened it the sailors, under a galling fire, rushed it out of range. Steadily the long grim line stood facing death, waiting the command to fire. At length the order came, and then a storm of lead swept the approaching battalions. Quickly the British line advanced twenty paces, and, rapidly reloading, poured one volley, then another, into the wavering, reeling white masses. Suddenly the charge sounded, and like hounds from the leash, the British rushed at the foe, who were soon in precipitous flight towards Quebec and the bridge over the St. Charles. At this moment York's gun poured grape-shot into the disorganized masses and one discharge reached Montcalm. He reeled on his horse, mortally wounded. About the same moment Wolfe, too, received a mortal wound, but lived long enough to know that his efforts had been crowned with success.

Through the gates of the city and north of it to the bridge of boats at Vaudreuil's headquarters the beaten
army fled, seeking safety behind the strong Beauport lines. Vaudreuil and his officers were in a panic, and for a moment it looked as if the whole French army would be destroyed or captured. But a large force was coming down from the west, Wolfe was dead, Monckton was seriously wounded, and the army was in no condition to follow up its victory. The work of intrenching on the battlefield was at once begun and preparations made for the bombardment of Quebec. Meanwhile, Vaudreuil with his army, now a disorganized rabble, was skirting the rear of the city in hurried flight towards Montreal.

On September 17th, the British artillery on the west of the city and the British ships of war in front of it were ready to concentrate their fire on its defences. The citizen soldiers under Ramesay had no heart for resistance. They had been abandoned by the army and surrender or destruction was inevitable. So Ramesay sent out a flag of truce to the British camp, and entered into negotiations with Townshend, now in command of Wolfe’s army, preliminary to capitulation. Next day Quebec capitulated, and the advance guard of the British army marched into the city, lowered the Fleur-de-Lis, and replaced it with the Union Jack. Some of the units of the British Army were at once embarked for home, or for the old English colonies in America, and late in October the British fleet in front of Quebec weighed anchor and left for various stations. General Townshend returned to England, General Monckton went to New York, while General Murray was left in command at Quebec, with some 7,000 men, a force under ordinary circumstances sufficient to withstand any army Lévis could bring against it.

The main body of the French army retired directly to Montreal, leaving strong detachments posted in a fortified position which defended the crossing of the Jacques-Cartier river. From this position small parties were sent out from time to time to worry the English and keep them in a state of constant alarm. Notwithstanding
the result of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, Lévis did not consider the position of the French in Canada hopeless, and laid plans to attack the British garrison as soon as the spring weather would permit. As winter advanced he learned that Murray’s army was greatly weakened by sickness and he apparently believed that it would be possible to recapture Quebec before the garrison could receive reinforcements from England.

Quebec and its fortifications were in a dilapidated condition from the effects of the siege. Barrack accommodation for the troops was quite inadequate, there was a shortage of fuel and warm clothing, and throughout the winter, which was unusually severe, all ranks suffered severely. The hospitals were crowded. Fever, dysentery, and, worst of all, scurvy prevailed in the garrison during the whole winter. The strength of Murray’s force at the end of October was 7,313 of all ranks; in February, 1,760, the number fit for duty was 4,800; two months later, towards the end of April, it was only 3,400.

Early in April Murray learned that French forces were being assembled in Montreal for an advance on Quebec, and when navigation opened about the middle of the month he sent a schooner to Halifax with despatches asking the British naval commander to hasten to his assistance. He knew that the plan of Lévis was to descend the river on transports, bateaux, and rafts, land his troops and military stores at Cap-Rouge, and then march direct upon the city. To prevent this, and to check his advance, or at least gain time by compelling him to make a detour by routes scarcely passable, he went in person to Cap-Rouge and fortified the heights near the mouth of the Cap-Rouge river. Lévis, after landing with his force at Pointe-aux-Trembles on the 26th, made a detour and crossed the Cap-Rouge river at a point several miles above its mouth. Murray had caused all the bridges to be broken down, but neither this nor the rainy weather and extremely bad roads prevented the French from advancing and occupying the whole forest
between Lorette and Ste. Foy. Levis' army comprised 6,910 fighting men, including the following regular regiments: La Reine, Languedoc, La Sarre, Béarn, Royal Roussillon, Guyenne and Berry (two battalions), besides cavalry, 200; Indians, 278; Montreal town militia battalion, 287.

On the morning of Monday, April 28th, General Murray, through lack of confidence in the "wretched fortifications" of Quebec and being anxious to prevent the French from establishing batteries and making regular approaches, led his troops through St. Louis and St. John gates towards Sillery and Ste. Foy. He had the advantage of Levis in field artillery, and in the event of failure could retreat to Quebec and hold out to the last extremity; then, if necessary, retire to the island of Orleans to await reinforcements.

Murray marched out with all the force he could muster, some 3,000 men, one-third of whom had that day come voluntarily out of the hospitals, and formed his little army on the heights of Ste. Foy. While his line was forming, he reconnoitred the enemy, and perceived that their van had taken possession of rising ground three-quarters of a mile in his front, but that their main column was still upon the march. With quick resolution he decided to attack them before they had time to form up. He drew up his line of battle in the following order: The right wing, consisting of Amherst's (15th Regiment), Anstruther's (58th), Second Battalion of Royal Americans (60th), and Webb's (48th) under command of Colonel Burton; the left wing, composed of Kennedy's (43rd), Lascelles' (47th), Highlanders (63rd, 78th), and Bragg's (28th), commanded by Colonel Fraser; the reserve, composed of Otway's (35th), and Third Battalion of Royal Americans (60th) under Colonel Young. Major Dalling, with a corps of light infantry, covered the right flank; Captain Donald McDonald, a brave and experienced officer, with a company of volunteers and Hazen's Rangers, the left. Each battalion had two field-pieces.
Murray at once rushed to the attack. His light troops on the right flank met with marked success, but got into a position which prevented the troops next in line from supporting them, or satisfactorily protecting themselves. The result was some confusion, which necessitated a rearrangement of that part of the line. A somewhat similar situation developed on the left, and the resulting unsteadiness led to a retirement. The ground was still covered with snow in the hollows, and elsewhere was soft and muddy. Some of the guns stuck, and the soldiers, weakened by sickness, were unable to extricate them, and spiked and abandoned them. The retirement became a disorderly retreat, and the French followed in pursuit until the British had gained the protection of the block-houses which formed outposts of the city defences. The loss of the British in this action was 1,124 killed, wounded, and missing, while the loss of the victorious French was about 1,700 killed and wounded, including 110 officers of the regular troops. This action had a very depressing effect upon the British garrison, and some insubordination was manifested. But when Lévis failed to follow up the success he had obtained, the spirits of officers and men rapidly recovered.

The evening after the action, the French ships which had escaped up the St. Lawrence and had wintered at Sorel and other points, appeared above Quebec and anchored off Wolfe's cove, while Lévis proceeded to bombard the city; reinforcements, guns, and ammunition being transported up the heights by the very path by which Wolfe's army had ascended.

On May 9th, a British war vessel, the frigate Lowestoffe, arrived at Quebec, followed on the 16th by several others. Immediately, a line-of-battle ship, the Vanguard, and two frigates, worked up the river past the city with the tide, and captured the French shipping in Wolfe's cove. Drifting back with the ebbing tide, the captain of the Vanguard brought an enfilading fire on the French trenches. Lévis now saw that his position was no longer tenable, and,
during the night of May 16th, the French made so precipitate a retreat, that they abandoned their sick and wounded, cannon, war material, and intrenching tools. Lévis retired upon Montreal, leaving detachments of troops at Jacques-Cartier, Three Rivers, and Sorel, for the purpose of observing, and, if possible, impeding the movements of any troops sent against Montreal.

So disheartened were the Canadians and Indians by this failure that they deserted in large bodies, and when Lévis reached Montreal and vicinity the militia were despatched to their homes subject to call, while those of the regulars who were not retained in quarters at Montreal were dispersed among the inhabitants for subsistence.

It is now time to return to Sir Jeffery Amherst. That cautious British general had spent the winter of 1759–60 at Crown Point making arrangements for completing his operations begun the previous year. He was sanguine that this year would see the conquest of Canada, and he decided to give to the movement against Montreal a wider sweep than he had at first planned. A force from Quebec was to ascend the St. Lawrence, capture the intervening French posts, and accept the surrender of the Canadian people on the way. At Albany and Schenectady a large force was to be assembled for the main expedition, but instead of sending it in one column, via Lake Champlain and the Richelieu, Amherst decided to divide it, he himself going with the bulk of his army to Oswego, and thence down the St. Lawrence to Montreal, while a second column under Colonel Haviland would travel overland by the old route, reaching the St. Lawrence at or near Montreal. The three contingents, Amherst's, Haviland's, and Murray's, would then combine and attempt the reduction of Montreal. Amherst thus contemplated the concentration of an overwhelming force upon the headquarters of the enemy, and the leaving of no dangerous posts on the flanks of his advance. The result was one of the most extensive and comprehensive enveloping movements ever attempted in military history.
In May, General Amherst began his preparations for his attack on Montreal, assembling his troops at Albany and Schenectady. Time was lost in providing means of transportation, in accumulating supplies, etc., but Amherst was a safe, undramatic general, deliberate in his movements, and taking no risks which he did not consider absolutely necessary. The route was via Schenectady and Lakes Oneida and Onondaga to Oswego, and thence down the St. Lawrence. But when Amherst reached Oswego he found the arrangements he had ordered not nearly completed, and he was detained there till the second week in August. The force was composed of 10,142 men and officers, not counting a considerable body of Indians. Colonel Haldimand, accompanied by Lieut.-Col. Amherst, a brother of the Commander-in-Chief, led the first division, which left Oswego on August 7th. General Amherst himself left on the 10th, and Brigadier-General Gage followed on the 12th with eight battalions of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut troops. The expedition was guarded by two armed vessels, the Onondaga and the Mohawk, which Amherst had ordered down from Niagara as a defence against two or three armed French ships still at large in the Lake Ontario region.

On the 17th, one of the French vessels was captured after a sharp fight near La Galette, or La Présentation, near the site of the present city of Ogdensburg. A fort and arsenal had been established at La Galette after the capture of Fort Frontenac, and this was also captured. At Isle Royale, near the head of the rapids a little below La Galette, the French had established another post, called Fort Lévis, to command the passage of the river. The capture of this fort occupied General Amherst's army seven days, and five more days were employed in repairing it. When the fort fell, some of Amherst's Indian allies wished to plunder the place and massacre the garrison, but this Amherst sternly forbade. His action gave so much offence to his Indians that a large number of them
immediately deserted. Amherst, however, bluntly informed the Indians, that, while he wished to retain their friendship, he would assuredly punish them severely if they should commit any cruelties when returning to their villages—a threat which had due effect.

While running the rapids of the St. Lawrence, sixty-four boats were dashed to pieces against the rocks, eighty-eight men perished, and some artillery and stores were lost. On September 6th, Amherst landed at Lachine on the island of Montreal, with the advance division of his army. Ten pieces of artillery were at once taken ashore, and the army moved rapidly towards the northwest side of Montreal. There was no attempt by the French to impede the advance of the column; and, when Amherst reached the settled part of the island, numbers of the inhabitants flocked to his camp to tender their submission, and to take the oath of neutrality.

The troops under Colonel Haviland had been assembled at Crown Point in July, and were transported in August to the vicinity of Isle-aux-Noix, where there was a French fort. Haviland, who had with him a force of some 3,000 men, regulars and provincials, proceeded to establish batteries on the right bank of the Richelieu river, within striking distance of the fort, but, on August 27th, before the batteries could open fire, the post was evacuated, and Haviland moved on to St. Johns. Here a further delay occurred, but again the French commander withdrew without waiting to be attacked. The advance was continued to Fort Chambly, which also yielded without any resistance. From this point Haviland struck across the country direct to the St. Lawrence, reaching Longueuil, on the opposite side of the river from Montreal, on the 5th of September.

General Murray embarked from Quebec early in July with 2,450 men. Accompanied by the sloops Diana and Porcupine, the flotilla bearing the troops passed Deschambault on July 15th, being fired upon while passing that point. The expedition was delayed on several occasions
by the necessity of landing troops to drive off straggling bodies of the enemy, or to administer the oath of neutrality to the inhabitants. Three Rivers was reached on August 6th, when it was learned that 2,000 of the enemy were then in the neighbourhood; but these retreated to the head of Lake St. Peter and formed part of a force which attacked Murray's brigade as it drew near Sorel. This force had been intended either for service on the St. Lawrence or to threaten the flank of any detachment moving from the Richelieu to Montreal, but owing to the concerted movement of the three British columns, no opportunity presented itself for massing it at any one point, and it was frittered away in detail. Shortly after Murray arrived at Sorel he was joined by a reinforcement of two regiments from Louisbourg under command of Lord Rollo. He then continued slowly up the St. Lawrence until the island of Montreal was reached. On the way several skirmishes occurred with the enemy, the inhabitants joining in the attacks. But as Murray advanced on Montreal news of the converging operations spread among the inhabitants, and many Canadians voluntarily took the oath of neutrality, among them 1,400 men of the seigniory of Boucherville alone. A number of the Colony Troops deserted to Murray's outposts, while many of the rural militiamen, considering the country lost, surrendered their arms.

On September 5th, General Murray got into touch with Colonel Haviland at Longueuil, and the following day the landing of the troops and artillery of both columns on the island of Montreal began. The French offering no opposition, the combined force began the march towards Montreal. At noon, on the 7th, it reached a position to the northeast of the city and the commanders established communication with Amherst, who lost no time in making dispositions for the bombardment of Montreal. Vaudreuil, the Governor of Canada, sent out a flag of truce to negotiate terms of surrender, but for the time it looked as though negotiations would come to nothing,
because Amherst refused to accede to the demand made by Lévis, as the Commander-in-Chief of the regular troops, that the garrison be accorded the honours of war. Lévis, in anger, proposed, if this were not granted, to retire with the regular troops to St. Helen Island, and there resist to the last extremity. Amherst persisting in his stand, for the purpose, as he put it, of manifesting his disapproval of the acquiescence of the French throughout the war in the barbarous acts of their Indian allies, Vaudreuil, on September 8th, 1760, affixed his signature to the Articles of Capitulation, which, subject to subsequent treaty, not only sealed the fate of Montreal, but formally surrendered to Britain all of New France from the Mississippi to Cape Breton.

The next day a detachment of the British army under Colonel Haldimand entered Montreal to take formal possession, and at the Place d'Armes the regular regiments of the French garrison were drawn up and surrendered their arms. The British force at once mounted guards and posted sentries, and that night for the first time English drums beat the sunset tattoo in the streets of Montreal. The French regulars and officials were, in accordance with the terms of capitulation, sent to France. The English colonial troops with Amherst's armies were also returned to their homes.

After the capitulation had been signed, Major Rogers, with 300 of his trusty rangers, was sent to receive the final submission of the outlying French posts at Detroit, St. Joseph, Michilimackinac, Ste. Marie, and La Baie des Puants (Green Bay), and to escort their commanders to Quebec. Having delivered despatches to General Monckton at Fort Pitt, Rogers soon reached Presqu' isle (Erie, on Lake Erie), where he was joined by some Indians and provincials. Dividing the combined force into two parties, Rogers and his detachment proceeded to Detroit in boats, while the remainder went by land. On landing one evening before reaching Detroit, he was confronted by Pontiac, an Ottawa chief, who demanded by what
right he had advanced through his territory with a hostile band. After mutual explanations, Pontiac allowed him to continue on his journey; but the chief evidently felt that in the fall of French authority at Quebec fell also that Indian balance of power between the two great nations who had been contending for supremacy on this continent. Detroit and the forts in its neighbourhood were taken over by Rogers, but on account of the lateness of the season he could not reach the posts on Lake Huron and Michigan, and these remained in the hands of the French until the following year. About the end of December Rogers left Detroit and went to Fort Pitt.

New France was no more; but the chivalry which had been transplanted from *La Belle France* to the banks of the St. Lawrence survived, and still lives. The language, the daring, the love of kindred and race, the devout religious spirit, the best things for which the *Fleur-de-Lis* stood, exist to-day in the country which Champlain nursed into being, which brave old Frontenac held secure, and which the chivalrous Montcalm and Lévis strove so valiantly, so gloriously, but so vainly to defend. History presents many striking spectacles; but few so remarkable as the one we have forcibly impressed upon our minds in the years of stress and bloodshed through which we are now (1917) passing, by the presence of a great Canadian army "somewhere in France," in which, under the Union Jack, descendants of men who fought under Abercromby, Amherst, and Wolfe are fighting shoulder to shoulder with the descendants of those who served under Drucour, Montcalm, and Lévis.
CHAPTER IV
FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF BRITISH RULE

THE Articles of Capitulation of Montreal, as confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, February 10th, 1763, ended French rule in Canada, and thus cancelled all commissions issued in the name of the King of France. But the ink upon the Articles was scarcely dry before the British authorities provided for the re-commissioning of such of the militia officers as would take the oath of allegiance, the object being to obtain their services in their civil or municipal rather than in their military capacities. The administration of justice, and of public and communal affairs generally, including such public works as roads, bridges, etc., had under the French régime been in the hands of these militia officers, and it was thought that, to some extent, the old officials might safely be entrusted with these duties.

The interim military government established by Amherst divided the country into three districts as in the French régime—Quebec, Montreal, and Three Rivers. General James Murray was appointed Governor of Quebec, General Thomas Gage of Montreal, and Colonel Ralph Burton of Three Rivers. Although Amherst was still Governor-in-Chief, the three governors seem to have been left pretty much to their own discretion in carrying out the details of their system of administrations; but the various governments were all of a military pattern.

In the district of Montreal the militia officers found themselves reinstated in practically all their former functions—indeed, their authority was increased. General Gage authorized the parochial militia captains to settle, according to their own discretion, any differences among the people, but dissatisfied litigants had the right of ap-
peal to the nearest British commandant or to himself. In the event of capital crimes, officers of militia were authorized to arrest the criminals and their accomplices, and to conduct them under guard to Montreal, furnishing also an account of the crime and a list of witnesses. In civil cases involving small amounts not exceeding twenty livres, all officers of the militia were individually granted authority to adjudicate, with right of appeal to the militia courts of the district, and they were especially enjoined to maintain peace and order within their respective localities. Provision was made for the payment of the militia officers for these special duties, by a scale of fees, a treasurer being appointed for each court. This employment of the officers of the old French militia was clearly an honest attempt to place the administration of the French laws, the temporary continuance of which had been promised to the Canadian people at the capitulation of Montreal, in the hands of those best versed in them.

In Quebec, the population was not so well disposed towards the new rulers, and the militia appears to have been called upon to assist only with regard to statutory labour and the repair of roads and bridges. Murray appointed a military council of seven British army officers, as judges of the more important civil and criminal pleas. Two prominent French Canadians were appointed public procurators and legal commissaries before this council: Jacques Belcourt de Lafontaine, ex-member of the Sovereign Council of New France, for the country on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, and Joseph Étienne Cugnet, seigneur of St. Étienne, for that on the left side.

In Three Rivers arrangements almost identical with those of Quebec were made. The commissions in the militia were generally held by the seigneurs and other local gentry. To strengthen the hands of the militia officers, arms were issued them for free public distribution on loan during good behaviour, in order that the recipients might hunt, and "keep their hands in" against an emergency. In one case, there was a refusal to perform
public service in connection with the military transport, and Colonel Frederick Haldimand, who succeeded Burton as Governor of Three Rivers, instructed the militia captain immediately concerned to call in the arms loaned.

The Treaty of Paris, which concluded a peace between Britain and France and ceded Canada to Britain, was signed on February 10th, 1763, but was not proclaimed in Canada until the following May. On October 7th of the same year a Royal Proclamation was issued, providing for the permanent civil government of the new colony somewhat along the lines of the temporary military system, but only so far as it did not conflict with British laws. “All persons” were guaranteed “the enjoyment of the benefit of the laws of our Realm of England,” but failing the proclamation of new laws, many of the old French ones were, for the time being, continued in force, and many of the features of the military administration remained for some time subsequent to the proclamation of civil government. The French, but more particularly the seigneurs and gentry, who were in closest touch with the British colonial officers, rather favoured a continuation of military rule, as administered in Canada by the British, but it was irksome to the small British civilian population which had come to Canada since the Conquest. The Proclamation may be said to have established in Canada English criminal law, but to have recognized the “ancient customs” and civil laws of New France. For the interpretation of these, the administration continued to avail themselves of the services of some of the tribunals composed of militia officers.

In 1763 occurred Pontiac’s Conspiracy, which caused the first appeal by the British authorities to Canadian militia for active service. Pontiac, an Indian of singular sagacity and courage, was a war-chief of the powerful Ottawas. As an ally of the French, he had looked askance at the British as they took possession of the French forts; in their victory he saw his own downfall. By June, 1763, he had matured a bold and comprehensive plan for
the extinction of British rule in the hinterland by the capture of the extensive chain of forts, reaching from Lake Michigan to the Niagara, and in the Ohio valley. Nine forts were attacked almost simultaneously. The capture of Fort Michilimackinac, at the entrance to Lake Michigan, was entrusted to the Ojibway (Chippewa) and Sac (Sauk) Indians. At this post, on the birthday of King George III, June 4th, 1763, Minavavana, an Ojibway chief, invited the English to witness a game of lacrosse between his tribe and the Sacs. Unsuspicious of treachery, soldiers and traders gathered on the open space in front of the fort. The gates were left open, and when the play was at its height the Indians rushed in and seized and massacred the garrison, a few only escaping. Detroit, under Major Gladwyn, was attacked by Pontiac himself in May, but successfully beat off repeated vigorous assaults. The siege was nevertheless maintained by the Indians, with more than their usual constancy, for upward of fifteen months. Lieutenant Cuyler was sent in May with seventy-six men from Niagara to the beleaguered garrison. While encamped on Point Pelée, about thirty miles from the mouth of the Detroit river, he was suddenly attacked by a party of Wyandots (Hurons). Cuyler escaped; but forty of his men were captured and put to death. In June, he again took up sixty men with ample supplies, and this time succeeded in reaching the fort. In July, General Amherst despatched his favourite aide-de-camp, Captain Dalyell, with 260 men and twenty rangers under Major Rogers. Dalyell, on his arrival in Detroit, insisted upon making a night sortie; but Pontiac, who had been apprised of his design, was prepared, and Dalyell fell into an ambuscade at a little stream, since called Bloody Run, two miles from the fort. He and his party were routed. Rogers and his rangers, however, covered the retreat of the force to Detroit, which was reached only after Dalyell and seventy of his men had fallen victims to their temerity. The garrison was at length relieved by Colonel Bradstreet, but Pontiac meanwhile had retired
towards the Mississippi, still breathing vengeance against the English.

On hearing that Fort Pitt (now Pittsbug, formerly Fort Duquesne) was besieged by Delawares, Wyandots, and Shawnees, General Amherst despatched Colonel Henry Bouquet from Philadelphia to its relief. As Bouquet advanced, the Indians watched his movements, and, temporarily raising the siege of Fort Pitt, planned the annihilation of his force as he passed through a defile near Bushy Creek, a small stream about ten miles from Fort Pitt, where they had laid an ambuscade for him. Bouquet, however, was on the alert and ready for any emergency. As his advance guard emerged from the pass, the terrible war-whoop of the savages resounded through the forest. His men instantly formed, and for seven hours the battle raged, until night fell upon the combatants. At grey dawn the infuriated Indians renewed the attack, but Bouquet, after several hours of grilling battle, posted some of his men in ambush, and feigned a retreat. The Indians rushed forward, only to be attacked with deadly effect on every side. They fled in consternation, and Bouquet’s heroic men, gathering up their dead and wounded, marched in triumph from the battlefield of Bushy Run, or Edge Hill, to the relief of the besieged garrison. Pontiac at Detroit felt the force of the blow; and his hosts gradually melted away or sued for peace, leaving him but a handful of warriors with which to continue the siege.

In order to force a binding peace on the Delawares and the remote tribes who had conspired with Pontiac, two expeditions were sent against them in 1764. One was entrusted to Colonel Bradstreet, but he mismanaged it to such an extent as to jeopardize British rule in the Great Lake region. The other was entrusted to Colonel Bouquet, and accomplished its object. With 1,500 men Bouquet cautiously advanced through the trackless wilderness into the very heart of the Ohio country. On his approach the Indians hastened to send friendly messages, but Bouquet declined to treat with them, unless, as a pre-
liminary condition, they would, within twelve days, deliver up to him every French and English prisoner in their hands—men, women, and children—and furnish them with food, clothing, and horses to convey them to Fort Pitt. So sternly did Bouquet insist upon these conditions, that in a few days he received no fewer than 200 captives, taken by the Indians from English and French settlements in Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, and Canada. The Delawares meekly agreed to all his terms and in the main lived up to their promises.

Pontiac, however, was still on the war path, and it became necessary to despatch troops from Canada to help wind up the war. The British authorities, recalling the splendid service the Canadians had rendered the French armies as bush-fighters and voyageurs, determined to enrol a Canadian detachment. Moreover, such a force in the field would have a disheartening effect upon the Indians, who had professedly taken up arms in the interest of their allies the French. On March 5th, 1764, General James Murray wrote to Lord Halifax that he had made a requisition for 300 Canadians to serve in the approaching campaign. He was strongly of opinion that the whole number should, and could, be raised by voluntary enlistment, and hoped to be able to prevent the Lieutenant-Governors of Montreal and Three Rivers from putting the draft into force. Proclamations were prepared setting forth the terms of service, and expressing a wish that all the men should be raised according to them. One of these proclamations issued by Governor Haldimand at Three Rivers, and addressed to "All the Captains of Militia," explained that the Government had resolved upon adding five companies of Canadians to the troops to be engaged in the campaign against the Indians, these companies to comprise sixty men each. Two were to be raised in the Government of Quebec, two in that of Montreal, and one in that of Three Rivers, and all five were to be under the command of Canadian officers. Only those who, of their own free will, were determined to become subjects of
His Majesty would be enrolled in these companies. The volunteers would each be given twelve dollars in money, one coat, two pairs of Indian moccasins and a pair of mitts, and furnished with arms, munitions, and supplies during the whole of the campaign. The pay for each man would be six English pence per day, and the force would be accompanied by a priest. The service of these volunteers would end with the campaign, when all would be at liberty to return home.

This pioneer militia corps of Canada under British rule was raised and equipped in fourteen days, and left Montreal for Oswego on April 6th. It was commanded by one of the most capable officers of the old French militia service in Canada, Jean Baptiste Marie des Bergères de Rigauville, who received the temporary commission of major. This officer, who was born at Berthier-en-Bas, October 28th, 1726, was, as a reward for service in the militia, given a commission in the Colony Troops, and, as one of the senior officers of that service, participated with distinction in the battle of Ste. Foy. The other officers were all men who had distinguished themselves during the French régime as officers of either the Colony Troops or the militia; among them were such men as Antoine Juchereau Duchesnay, Saint Ange de Bellerive, and Godefroy Baby. This force, although not brought into actual conflict with the Indians, did excellent service and remained in the field until Pontiac made his submission to Sir William Johnson at Oswego on July 23rd, 1766.

In September, 1766, General Sir Guy Carleton, another of Wolfe's officers, whose name is intimately associated with the military history of Canada, became acting Governor\(^1\) of the Province of Quebec.\(^2\) Carleton was deeply impressed by the defenceless condition of the colony, and addressed a communication to Lord Shel-

\(^1\) Carleton became Governor October 26th, 1768.

\(^2\) For the boundaries of the Province of Quebec see the appendix at the end of this chapter.
burne, on November 25th, 1767, setting forth in detail the actual state of affairs. After commenting on the wretched condition of the defences of Montreal and Quebec, he proceeded: "The King's forces in the Province, supposing them complete to the allowance, and all in perfect health, rank and file, would amount to 1,627 men; the King's old subjects (of British or British Colonial birth), supposing them all willing, might furnish about 500 men able to carry arms. Supposing all the King's troops and old subjects collected in Quebec, with two months' hard labour, they might put the works in a tolerable state of repair, and they would amount to about one third of the forces necessary for its defence. The new subjects could send into the field about 18,000 men, well able to carry arms."

Carleton advised that some steps be taken to give military employment to the French-Canadian gentry, as a measure of relief to them, as a means of securing their interest in the new régime, and to secure a valuable addition to the forces of the Crown. He proposed the raising of a regiment officered by French Canadians, and suggested that in some cases commissions in the regular army might be granted. But he was informed that under the laws of England, the French Canadians, being Roman Catholics, could not hold commissions in the army.

Meanwhile the British colonies south of Canada were rapidly drifting towards rebellion. The whole patchwork fabric of British Colonies in North America appeared ready to fall to pieces. If rebellion did break out it would be essential to have the French Canadians friendly, and so, partly in the hope of conciliating them, the British Parliament in 1774 passed the Quebec Act, which extended the boundaries of "the Province of Quebec" from Labrador to the Mississippi and from the Ohio to the watershed of the Hudson Bay, abolished Roman Catholic disability, confirmed the tithes to the Catholic clergy, but exempted Protestants from payment, re-established the French civil code and seigniorial tenure, confirmed the English
criminal code, and vested authority in a governor and appointed council. This act had not the effect expected. It did, it is true, please the French-Canadian seigneurs and clergy, but it greatly displeased the few English-speaking colonists in Canada, and was viewed with suspicion by the mass of the French Canadians. At the same time the older English colonies were angered—Pennsylvania and Virginia by the extension of the Province of Quebec to what they regarded as their own hinterland, Puritan New England by the religious liberties granted to the people of Quebec—and the Quebec Act was made one of the reasons for the rebellion.

The first blood was shed in the Revolutionary War at Lexington and Concord in April, 1775, and a few days later, an American force obtained the mastery of Lake Champlain without any loss of men. The invasion of Canada speedily followed. A detachment of revolutionary troops under Benedict Arnold was despatched from Crown Point down the old route of invasion—the Richelieu River—and, on June 9th, St. Johns, garrisoned by a sergeant and ten men, fell an easy prize. But Arnold immediately withdrew to his base, and, on the day following, this important fortress was re-occupied by M. de Belêtre, or Belestre, at the head of eighty Canadian volunteer militia, raised in or near Montreal.

Carleton had to face a critical situation. The British regulars in Canada, owing to the exactions of the wars in Europe, had been reduced to an insignificant force. The whole population consisted of 90,000 souls, of whom perhaps 1,000 were English-speaking. The population of the revolting colonies was 3,000,000. The Governor, realizing the objections to enforcing the Militia Act and indeed to any form of compulsion, decided to try first what could be done with voluntary enlistment, and he held out tempting offers. Unmarried privates were promised grants of 200 acres of land each; married ones, 250 acres, with fifty more for each child, the land to be free for twenty years of all forms of taxation. But apart
from the corps organized in the centres of population, the number of recruits was very small, the few who did join being principally French gentry and retired British soldiers. The need being urgent, on June 9th, 1775, Carleton put the Province under martial law; and at the same time called upon the seigneurs to muster their tenants. The peasants vigorously protested. They saw in this action a revival of those powers of Crown and noble which had been their scourge under the French régime.

The seigneur of Terrebonne, M. La Corne, was instructed by General Carleton to enrol his tenants. La Corne told the habitants that, by the tenure of their lands, he had a right to command their military services, to which they replied that they had now become subjects of England, and did not look upon themselves as Frenchmen in any respect whatever. M. La Corne struck some of the more outspoken; this maddened the people, who vigorously attacked him, and he fled to Montreal, threatening to bring back 200 soldiers. The people armed themselves for resistance, but the prudence of Carleton soothed them. He sent an English officer, Captain Hamilton, to Terrebonne with La Corne. To Hamilton the habitants declared that if General Carleton needed their services, they were ready to serve under English officers, but not under the Seigneur. They refused to disperse until Hamilton promised them that La Corne should have no military authority over them.

This incident, one of many of a like kind, will serve to illustrate the difficulties confronting Carleton. But it was not the peasants only to whom the Quebec Act was in some respects a menace and a grievance. The men of the towns held the measure in detestation. In Montreal, the captain of the French-Canadian militia declared to Carleton that “his compatriots would not take up arms unless His Excellency would assure them, on his honour, that he would use his utmost endeavours to get the Quebec Act repealed.” The Governor thereupon gave the promise.
In 1775, Monseigneur Briand, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Quebec, issued, at the instance of the Government, an encyclical letter to the French-Canadian people. He exhorted them to take up arms for the Crown against the Continental invaders. For those who obeyed, he promised indulgences; over the heads of those who should refuse, he suspended the thunders of excommunication. The people turned deaf ears to their Bishop, and even declared his action unbecoming a Christian prelate, who ought to have no concern in anything that involved the shedding of blood. However, when the life of the Province was seriously threatened, there was a considerable enlistment, and about 600 Canadians fought under Carleton in the defence of Quebec. At the same time it must not be forgotten that not a few joined the Continental army.

On September 25th, an attempt was made by Colonel Ethan Allen and Major Brown to take Montreal by surprise. Allen with 110 men crossed to the island of Montreal and was assured of assistance from sympathizers in the city, but was defeated and captured with his force near Longue Pointe by a body of sixty regulars and 300 of the city militia commanded by Major Carden, who was mortally wounded in the fight.

At this time, Montreal, a small place of 7,000 or 8,000 population, was protected by a decidedly dilapidated wall. Rusty guns were mounted in the little citadel, but their carriages were rotting away, and there were but few gunners to man them. There were barely enough regular soldiers for the guard, and only a portion of the militia could be depended upon. The English-speaking merchants were generally dissatisfied, especially some of the leading ones, who had come from the older English colonies.

Two Continental armies had been detailed to co-operate in the capture of Quebec. One army from Boston, under Benedict Arnold, was despatched by way of the Kennebec River and the Chaudière; the other, under General
Montgomery\textsuperscript{1} was to reduce the forts on Lake Champlain and the Richelieu river, seize Montreal and then proceed to Quebec and join forces with Arnold. On November 12th, 1775, Montgomery’s army, having captured the Lake Champlain and Richelieu forts, crossed the St. Lawrence to the island of Montreal. The energetic Carleton made his escape by night in an open boat, and Montgomery, unopposed, marched his men into the defenceless city. Carleton, guided by a Canadian, Captain Bouchette, safely reached Quebec and made ready to hold the citadel against the invaders. On December 22nd, he ordered all who would not join in the defence to leave within four days. He now found himself with 300 regulars, 330 Anglo-Canadian militia, 543 seamen and marines, 120 artificers capable of bearing arms, and about 600 French Canadians.

The fate of the country seemed to depend upon Quebec. Arnold, reaching the St. Lawrence and crossing to the Quebec shore, made an unsuccessful attack from the Plains of Abraham and retired to await General Montgomery. On the latter’s arrival, the combined force invested the city but postponed an attack until a favourable opportunity presented itself. This occurred on the 31st of December, 1775. Montgomery’s attack was repulsed by a small force of fifty men, more than half of whom were French Canadians under Captain Chabot and Lieutenant Picard. Four small cannon and sharp musketry-fire swept Montgomery’s column, as it stole, through the darkness and a blinding snowstorm, round the base of the cliff on which stood the citadel, and laid the general himself low. A handful of Canadians obstinately opposed Arnold’s column as it marched through St. Roch’s suburb. When the Continentals planted a scaling ladder against the inner barricade on St. James Street, a militiaman named Charland, a French-Canadian giant, advanced

\textsuperscript{1} Major-General Philip John Schuyler was associated with Montgomery in this command, but his health broke down and he retired before St. Johns was reached.
amidst a shower of bullets, seized the ladder and drew it inside the barricade. This post was held by Captain Dumas’ militia company, and its relief was finally effected by Captain Marcoux’s company reinforced by a few regulars. It is interesting to note that Joseph Papineau, the father of the tribune of Lower Canada, served as a volunteer in Captain Marcoux’s company.

General Montgomery being killed, Colonel Arnold wounded, and many of the rank and file killed, wounded, or prisoners, the Continentals abandoned the assault. They invested Quebec until spring, but disease and privation wrought havoc in their ranks, and in May, 1776, the siege was raised. The invaders retreated to Three Rivers, but were vigorously followed by Carleton, who had received reinforcements. He pressed them so closely that he captured their artillery and stores, and changed their retreat into a rout. Some of them took refuge at Sorel, but that post, held by the Continentals under Major Butterfield, was obliged to surrender, together with a detachment sent to its relief.

In June, 1776, Congress despatched to Canada further reinforcements under General Sullivan, but about the only work Sullivan did was to issue, in the name of his Government, an animated and characteristic address to the Canadian people. Three special commissioners—Benjamin Franklin, Charles Caroll, of Carollton (who was accompanied by his brother, afterwards Archbishop Caroll of Baltimore), and Samuel Chase—were sent as delegates to the Canadians. Their embassy signally failed; for the inhabitants had by this time learned by experience to regard the Continentals as enemies rather than as friends.

The failures of the Continentals and the energy of the British had a depressing effect upon the disloyal, and encouraged the French-Canadian clergy and gentry to redouble their efforts to wean the mass of the people from their indifference or worse. The merchants of Montreal and the Canadian habitants found the ill-provided, half-
starved, and generally mutinous Continentals very different from the well-found, and thoroughly disciplined troops of the British. The Continentals, for want of money, seized goods on promises to pay, and the promises were never redeemed. The British paid good yellow gold for all the goods the merchants could spare, and all the produce the farms could supply. The Continental soldiers performed all kinds of arbitrary and illegal acts, and their officers would not, dared not, bring them to book; while the habitants remembered that British soldiers charged with offences against even the local French colonial ordinances had been promptly arrested and even handed over for trial to courts of which the French-Canadian militia officers acted as judges. As a result, French Canadians in several districts, hitherto neutral or disaffected, took the field against the Continentals.

Oswegatchie (Ogdensburg) was held by a strong force of British regulars, and Arnold feared that the commander, after drawing reinforcements from the upper posts, might try a sudden dash upon Montreal. To guard against such a contingency, he posted a considerable body of men in a fort at the Cedar Rapids, where any force descending the St. Lawrence would have to make a portage. Captain Forster of H.M. 8th Regiment commanded at Oswegatchie, and, five days after the siege of Quebec was raised, he left his post with forty of his regiment, ten Canadian volunteers, and 200 Indians. On May 18th, he attacked the Cedar Rapids post, and, on the 19th, it surrendered with its garrison of 350 officers and men. The following day Forster's men ambushed and captured another Continental force of eighty men sent from Montreal to relieve the fort at the Cedars. On the way to Montreal, Forster's force was attacked at Vaudreuil by Colonel Arnold with yet another party from Montreal, but drove them off. These reverses caused consternation in the Montreal garrison. With Carleton advancing from Quebec, and Forster, now joined by many Canadians, sweeping down the St. Lawrence, the Revolutionists realized
that they could not retain their hold upon Montreal. An immediate retirement to the Richelieu was therefore ordered, and by June 16th the last Continental soldier had left the island. The advance guard of the British force from Quebec marched into the city and the Union Jack was once more raised.

Early in 1776 about 8,000 British and mercenary Hessian troops arrived in Canada to reinforce General Carleton. The campaign was once more vigorously resumed; and the Continentals were soon driven out of the whole of Canada. The British and Hessian troops were then to be used in the general operation against the Revolutionary forces, and to clear the way for an attack on the rear of the Continental main army it was necessary to get control of Lake Champlain. With this in view, Carleton set about the creation of a strong flotilla for the Lake Champlain service. Three armed vessels, the parts of which were sent from England, were put together, and twenty gun-boats and other small craft were collected or built, the whole fleet being under command of Captain Pringle of the Royal Navy. The British ships included the Inflexible, flagship, a vessel of 300 tons and eighteen guns; the schooner Marie, of fourteen guns; the schooner Carleton, of twelve guns; the floating battery Thunderer, of eighteen guns; a row galley of seven guns; and twenty gun-boats of one gun each. A large proportion of the crews were drafted from the British men-of-war at Quebec, the remainder consisting of Canadians, chiefly officers and men of the Provincial Marine. The Continentals, on their part, armed two corvettes, two brigantines, and a dozen smaller vessels, which were put in charge of Benedict Arnold, with directions to obtain control of the lake if he could. The two flotillas met on October 11th, 1776, Arnold losing two vessels. Being then inferior to the British, he decided to take shelter under the guns of Crown Point. But, on his way there two days afterwards, he was intercepted by the British flotilla, and a second action took place, when he was completely de-
feated and all his vessels but four taken or destroyed. The Continental land force, being thus unprotected at Crown Point, blew up the fort and retreated up the lake. This left the way clear for Burgoyne’s campaign in 1777 down Lake Champlain, a campaign which was to end at Saratoga in humiliating surrender on October 17th.

For some months after the invaders had been expelled Carleton’s time was largely taken up providing for the British regulars and Hessians. But he endeavoured to place the Canadian militia on a sound footing, and, up to 1783, he and his successor, Haldimand, maintained on a war footing, three companies of Canadian militia, raised by voluntary enlistment, and detailed a certain number of non-commissioned officers from these companies and from the regular regiments to act as instructors of the sedentary militia, who had been enrolled after the old French method. But he realized that it was necessary to have passed as quickly as possible a militia ordinance, clearly defining the authority of the Government and the duties to be imposed upon the people. The Legislative Council, in 1777, passed sixteen ordinances, one of which, prepared at the suggestion of Carleton, provided for the regulation of the militia along the lines which prevailed, or were supposed to have prevailed, during the French régime. Critics of the measure declared that the Council was misled by the over-zealous seigneurs who had seats at the Board, and charged that the new ordinance established, as a common rule, obligations which were in New France imposed on the militia only under extraordinary circumstances. As a matter of fact, the new ordinance subjected the inhabitants to rigorous military service, such as to bear arms beyond Canada for an indefinite time, to do agricultural labour for absentees serving in the army, etc; such service to be gratuitously performed, under heavy penalties for refusal or neglect. Provision was also made for calling out the militia for corvée, or statute labour, a very important duty, particularly with the need of making and keeping in repair the
roads from Montreal to the scene of active operations on Lakes Champlain and George and the Upper Hudson.

Thanks to the military posts at Crown Point, Oswego, Niagara, and Detroit, and to the fresh-water fleets which maintained British supremacy on Lakes Champlain and Ontario during the last years of the Revolutionary War, Canada, after 1777, was spared from invasion by the Continentals. In the revolting colonies thousands of Loyalists had adhered to the royal cause. These had their property confiscated, and were themselves proscribed and compelled to seek protection under the British flag in England, the West Indies, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. As the object of the Revolutionists was to destroy the unity of the British Empire, so the object of the Loyalists was to preserve it. Hence they took the name of United Empire Loyalists. During the war of the Revolution, they were by no means passive spectators of the course of events. Stung by the persecutions of their "rebel countrymen," they sought protection within the British lines. Here many of them enlisted in one or other of the Loyalist corps, commonly known as the British-American regiments. At least fifty different Loyalist corps were organized in the old colonies, many of which served with marked distinction and won laurels on hard-fought fields. In addition, there were about ten military organizations of Loyalists under General Haldimand in Canada at the close of the war. The fifty corps that served in the old colonies comprised about 300 companies, including forty-seven troops of cavalry. At the time of their maximum enrolment, the British-American regiments numbered over 15,000 men—all ranks included. This, however, by no means represents the total number of Loyalists in arms during the war, for the personnel of the various regiments kept changing as the war progressed. The 20,000 or so United Empire Loyalists who came to Canada during the war and at its close in 1783 formed an important addition to the loyal population and to the military strength of the country.
Sir Guy Carleton, who as Lord Dorchester returned to Canada in 1786 as Governor-in-Chief, added two battalions, raised in Canada, to the 60th Royal Americans, now the 60th Royal Rifles. The two new battalions, according to Mr. Benjamin Sulte, were placed under the command of Colonel Louis Joseph Fleury Deschambault, an officer in H.M. 109th Regiment, whose father had been the richest and one of the most patriotic men in New France before the change of flags. The two battalions so raised served not only in Canada, but in the Antilles, Jersey, Guernsey, and elsewhere, but the officers finding that they were considered, for the purpose of promotion, etc., to be without the pale of the regular army, finally asked for and were accorded disbandment.

In 1791, the Constitutional Act was passed, dividing Quebec into two provinces, Upper and Lower Canada, and from that time until the passage of the Act of Union in 1841, Upper and Lower Canada had distinct militia forces, under separate staffs and with separate laws.

There was a war scare in Canada in 1796. Emissaries of the French Government were busy in Canada attempting to stir up the French Canadians against British rule, others were at Washington trying to make trouble between the United States and Britain. As a result, the "Royal Canadian Volunteer Regiment" was raised in the summer of 1796, at the suggestion of Lord Dorchester. This regiment consisted of two battalions, one composed of French Canadians, recruited in Quebec City; the other largely of English-speaking men, in the Montreal district and Upper Canada. The regiment was raised, equipped, and administered as a regular regiment, and the officers and men under their terms of enlistment were liable for military service anywhere in the colony. The uniform was of the regular infantry cut, with scarlet coat, and blue facings. The regimental motto, duly emblazoned on its colours, was "Try Us." The signing of the Treaty of Amiens, October 1st, 1801, restored peace between Eng-
land and France, and the Royal Canadian Volunteers were disbanded in August and September, 1802.

After the Revolutionary War there had been much unpleasantness between Canadians and Americans, and this grew more marked as the relations between Britain and the United States became more and more strained over the Orders-in-Council issued in reply to Napoleon's blockade decrees, and the insistence of the British Government on the right to search for naval deserters in vessels sailing under the American flag. Many leading Americans also openly advocated war with Britain while she was straining her resources in the war with Napoleon, it being considered a favourable opportunity to conquer the Canadian provinces and annex them to the United States.

In order to demonstrate the loyal feeling of the French Canadians, Governor Dunn, in 1807, called out and organized the militia of Lower Canada. The call was promptly and cordially responded to, a strong military spirit was aroused in the provinces and a number of volunteer corps were formed at Montreal, Quebec, and elsewhere, so that any apprehension as to Canadian loyalty in case of war with the Americans was set at rest. Colonel (afterwards Sir Isaac Brock) acting Commander-in-Chief in Canada, also strengthened the defences of Quebec, but little real progress had been made with preparations for national defence when the United States declared war upon Britain, June 19th, 1812.
APPENDIX

In a Report to the King dated 8th June, 1763, the "Lords of Trade" make the following recommendation: "We should humbly propose to Your Majesty that the new Government of Canada should be restricted, so as to leave on the one hand, all the Lands lying about the great Lakes and beyond the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the River St. Lawrence from the North, to be thrown into the Indian Country, and on the other hand, all the Lands from Cape Roziere to Lake Champlain, along the Heights where the Sources of the Rivers rise, which fall into the Bay of Fundy and Atlantic Ocean, to be annexed to Nova Scotia and New England in such a manner as upon any future directions after particular Surveys have been made shall appear most proper. If this general Idea shall be approved the future Bounds of the new Colony of Canada will be as follows:

On the South East it will be bounded by the high Lands which range across the Continent from Cape Roziere in the Gulph of St. Laurence to that point of Lake Champlain above St. Johns which is in Latitude 45 Degrees North; which high Lands separate the heads of the Rivers which fall into the great River St. Lawrence from the head of those which fall into the Atlantick Ocean or Bay of Fundy. On the North West It will be bounded by a Line drawn South from the River St. Johns in Labrador by the heads of those Rivers which fall into the River St. Lawrence as far as the East end of Lake Nipissin upon the Ottowa River, and on the South West by a line drawn due West to the River St. Lawrence from that point on Lake Champlain which is directly opposite to where the South Line falls in and so cross the said River St. Lawrence and pursuing a North West Course along the Heights where the Rivers rise, that fall into the Ottowa River, to be continued to the East end of Nipissin Lake where the North Line terminates."

On 19th September of the same year the Earl of Halifax, Secretary of State, (Northern Department) advised the "Lords of Trade":—"And His Majesty thinks proper to direct that the Extent of the Commission, which Your Lordships are to prepare for the Honble. James Murray, shall be exactly such as marked out in your first Report of the 8th of June last, and in the Map thereto annexed, under the Denomination of Canada. That such Government be described in the Commission, as comprehending all such Part of Canada on the North Side of the River St. Lawrence, and all such Parts of His Majesty's antient Colonies of Nova Scotia, New England, and New York, on the South Side of the said River, as lie within the Limits above mentioned, and that It be called the Province of Quebec."
CHAPTER V

THE WAR OF 1812

EVER since the Constitutional Act of 1791 went into force there had been a determined agitation in the provinces of British North America, and especially in the Canadas, for a greater measure of responsible government, and, misled by this, the United States politicians in 1812 supposed that Canadians desired separation from Britain. No sooner, however, did news reach the Canadas that the United States had declared war than, in both provinces, the agitation ceased and French Canadian and British Canadian prepared to take the field against a common foe.

There was never any question of the attitude of the colonists of British stock, whether in Lower or Upper Canada, towards the impending war. Most of them were United Empire Loyalists; not a few had fought to keep the British flag flying over the old colonies in America and when that cause was lost had come to Canada to hew from the forest new homes for themselves under the Union Jack. Of the remainder, a goodly portion were discharged British soldiers or their descendants. But there was not the same certainty as to the attitude of the French Canadians. Blood is thicker than water, and, although the excesses of the French Revolution had sent a thrill of horror through the hearts of the God-fearing French-Canadian peasantry, news of the British reverses during the long years of the Napoleonic struggle in Europe were not always received with regret. Some French Canadians, it is true, had fought valiantly in the British Navy and Army against the mère patrie but strong pressure was needed to bring the two races in Canada together and create a true national sentiment. This pressure was supplied in the declaration of war by the United States.
The French Canadian preferred the English-speaking people of Britain to the English-speaking people of the United States. "Our Religion, Our Language, and Our Laws!" was, and still is, the rallying cry of the French Canadians. They knew that the enjoyment of these cherished privileges was guaranteed by Britain, and they knew that Britain would keep faith with them. But they placed no dependence on the good faith of the United States. They recalled the repudiation of the debts incurred by the Continental troops of Arnold and Montgomery during the invasions of 1775–76, and did not forget the harsh treatment given the United Empire Loyalists. As a result, in the contest extending over the years 1812, 1813, and 1814, Canadian fencibles and militia fought shoulder to shoulder with the seasoned veterans of the Royal Navy and the British regular army, and the blood of the French-Canadian noblesse and habitants mingled with that of their British fellow-subjects on many a glorious battlefield.

At the opening of hostilities, the prospect of conquering British North America certainly looked promising to the people of the United States. The population of British North America, exclusive of Newfoundland, was at the census of 1806, 250,000 in Lower Canada and 70,000 in Upper Canada, and 109,676 in the Maritime Provinces. At the outbreak of the war the total population was probably not more than 500,000. The threatened frontier of the two Canadas was 1,700 miles in length and there were only 4,450 regular troops, and 3,800 fencibles to defend it. The United States had a population of over 7,000,000, and, on paper, a regular army of 35,000; during the progress of the war the total militia enlistments were 456,463, but not 100,000 of these were to see fighting. Her manpower was so great that Canada was in an apparently defenseless condition, and Britain was fully occupied in Spain and in India. In the light of these facts, Henry

1 Corps raised for local defence or at a special crisis for a limited time, were called "fencibles."
Clay remarked: "We have the Canadas as much under our command as Great Britain has the ocean." And Thomas Jefferson declared: "The acquisition of Canada as far as Quebec will be a mere matter of marching."

The preliminary preparations in Canada for war were insignificant in relation to the extent of the danger. They included the strengthening of the fortifications of Quebec, St. Johns, Isle-aux-Noix, and Kingston; the hiring or purchase of a few lake vessels to serve as cruisers or transports; and the raising of a few military corps, some by voluntary enlistment, some by ballot from the sedentary militia. By May 28th, 1812, twenty-one days before the United States congress passed the Bill empowering the President to declare war against Great Britain, Sir George Prevost, Governor of Canada and Commander of the Forces in British North America, ordered the enrolment in Lower Canada of four Battalions of fencible light infantry, and a regiment of "voltigeurs, corps d'elite," the latter to be placed under the command of Major de Salaberry.

The Canadian voltigeurs, who, like their French prototypes, were light infantry or riflemen, were raised without any delay; in fact the strength of the regiment was reported complete in forty-eight hours. This historical regiment was composed exclusively of French Canadians, and it was to de Salaberry and the voltigeurs that the French Canadians owe the proudest laurels of the chaplet of glory earned during the War of 1812.

The "Canadian Fencible Infantry Regiment" of ten companies, already serving in Lower Canada when the voltigeur regiment was formed, was carried on the establishment of the regular army, and although largely recruited among the French Canadians, its officers were taken from the regulars.

1 Every able-bodied man in Canada between the ages of sixteen and sixty was enrolled in the sedentary militia.
2 Companies of "voltigeurs" were first enrolled for the French army in 1804, the idea being to secure the services of men of the smallest stature in the army.
The battalions of embodied militia\(^1\) raised at various times in Lower Canada during the war, were recruited by districts under militia officers, but were equipped from the magazines of the regular army and subsisted from the regular commissariat. These battalions were of considerable strength. The 3rd Battalion, for instance, raised by Lieut.-Col. James Cuthbert, in the Three Rivers District, had 880 rank and file. The uniform consisted of green jackets, blue trousers, caps decorated with feathers, rosettes, bugle badges, and moccasins. The sergeants carried pikes and wore sashes, like those of regular regiments. Occasionally they were hard put to it for uniforms. Lieut.-Col. Voyer, commanding the 4th Battalion "Select and Embodied Militia," writing from his regimental headquarters at Chateauguay on September 26th, 1814, complained that upwards of 500 men of his battalion had not been supplied with any clothing or shoes since June, 1813, and that a great many had only linen trousers.

Several levies of the sedentary militia of Lower Canada were made during the early months of the war to carry out military works at Isle-aux-Noix and other points along the exposed frontier. On August 16th, 1813, Major-General Sheaffe, however, was informed from headquarters that no more corvée or levying of the militia for manual labour alone was to be required.

Among the forces raised by voluntary enlistment in Lower Canada, was the Corps of Voyageurs, to whom was delegated the water transportation work between Montreal and Kingston, and, this corps being overtaxed, parties of men were drafted to its assistance from the various battalions of embodied militia in Lower Canada. Many of its officers were North-West traders, the commanding officer being William McGillivray, one of the influential bourgeois of the North-West Company.

Two provincial corps raised in Montreal early in 1813,

\(^1\) A force kept permanently on foot, but composed of successive drafts of six-months' men.
“His Majesty's Canadian Dragoons,” Captain Thomas Coleman commanding, and a provincial field-artillery corps, Captain John S. Sinclair commanding, went through the very thick of the fighting in the upper province. The cavalry corps not only served on the long, exposed lines of communication between Montreal and the Niagara frontier, but participated in some of the hardest fighting, including Procter's movements, the affairs at Forty-Mile Creek, Beaver Dams, St. Davids, the Cross Roads, Sandwich, etc.

The Glengarry Regiment was one of the most famous fencible corps raised in Upper Canada. A large proportion of the officers and men of the 2nd Battalion of the disbanded Royal Canadian Volunteer Regiment had been recruited from the Glengarry district, and early in 1812, when war with the United States appeared imminent, Sir George Prevost selected an officer of the 8th, or King's, Regiment, Captain George Macdonell, to recruit a small fencible battalion in Glengarry, which he would command with the rank of major. In case a larger body than a major's command could be collected, a lieutenant-colonel commandant was to be appointed. Captain Macdonell at once set to work, and, raising a complete battalion, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Sir George filled up the commissioned ranks of the new Glengarry corps with as many officers as he could from the line, with permanent rank, and availed himself of the services of a number of former army officers living in Canada.

During the session of the Upper Canada Legislature in the spring of 1812, provision was made, at General Brock's request, for the training of two companies, known as flank companies, of each militia battalion in the province. These were composed of specially drilled men, organized, as Brock said, to meet future exigencies, and to demonstrate, by practical experience, the degree of facility with which the militia might be trained to service. These flank companies were really regarded as the active part or first line of the militia; the bulk of each regiment, formed
into "service companies," being considered as a reserve only to be called out when absolutely necessary. Brock's system of extracting in this way from the Upper Canada militia a select or active force was early justified by the excellent work of this force at the capture of Detroit and the Battle of Queenston Heights.

Although the "service companies" of militia in Upper Canada did good work whenever called on, the efforts of the army officers during the war were, as regards the militia, largely devoted to perfecting the incorporated militia, or permanently embodied corps; and to attract volunteer recruits to these, bounties were offered.

General Brock, upon assuming command in Upper Canada, at once began to improve the Provincial Marine service on the Great Lakes. There was a dockyard at Kingston, and a few Government vessels on the lakes, commanded and manned by colonial officers and seamen. But, since the Revolutionary War, the Provincial Marine service had been regarded more as a means of military, and even civil, transport, than as a naval fighting force. Brock energetically set to work to bring it up to a standard that would give it control of the lakes. The War of 1812-14 abundantly justified his action and the early successes of the British were due to their having control of the Great Lakes. President Madison formally declared war with Great Britain on June 19th, 1812. But naval operations on the lakes antedated his Proclamation, for on June 5th, 1812, the schooner Lord Nelson was captured on its way from Niagara to Kingston by the United States vessel Oneida and condemned as a prize under the provisions of the United States Embargo Act. Two other schooners, the Ontario and the Niagara, were in the same month also taken by United States war vessels.

When the news of the declaration of war reached Ogdensburg, eight United States trading schooners lying there attempted to escape to the waters of Lake Ontario. A company of volunteers chased them in open boats, capturing and burning two. On July 20th, Commodore
Earle, with several small vessels, attempted to recapture the *Lord Nelson*, which was lying under charge of the United States war vessel *Oneida* in Sackett's Harbour. But the Canadian vessels were little more than transports, while the *Oneida* was a heavily armed man-of-war commanded by experienced officers and manned by a thoroughly trained crew, and the attempt was a failure.

The vessels of the Canadian Provincial Marine force at the outbreak of the war appear to have been; on Lake Ontario,—*Royal George*, twenty-two guns; *Prince Regent*, sixteen; *Earl of Moira*, fourteen; *Gloucester*, ten; *Seneca*, eight; *Simcoe*, eight; on Lake Erie,—*Queen Charlotte*, seventeen guns; *Lady Prevost*, thirteen; *Hunter*, ten; *Little Belt*, two; *Chippewa*, two.

Immediately preceding and following the declaration of war, the United States authorities took active measures to control Lake Ontario, sending naval officers and men and a large force of shipbuilders and riggers to Sackett's Harbour. Several of the captured merchant vessels were armed, others were purchased, and a good make-shift fighting fleet was soon in being. Meantime, the keels of regular war vessels were laid down. The British also began building war vessels on the lakes, but only in a half-hearted way. The Home authorities took little interest in Canada, and Prevost acted as if he believed that hostilities would be of short duration.

The military officers of the United States had their plans completed for the invasion of Canada long before the declaration of war. Their plan of campaign for 1812 comprised three separate operations. One force, under General Henry Dearborn, the Commander-in-Chief, was to be mobilized in the Lake Champlain district, and directed against Montreal; the second column, under General Stephen Van Rensselaer, was to be organized in Northern New York to operate against the Niagara frontier; while the third, under Brigadier-General William Hull, was to invade Upper Canada from Detroit.

The first column to advance was that of Hull, who,
before the declaration of war, had taken a force of 2,500 men from Ohio into the territory of Michigan. He arrived at Detroit on July 5th and on the night of July 11th crossed the Straits at Detroit with a strong force, and from Sandwich issued a proclamation dooming to death every white man fighting at the side of Indians, and threatening all who resisted with "the horrors and calamities of war." In this emergency, the United Empire Loyalists thronged to the colours, and the Indians remained firm in their allegiance.

Colonel St. George had under his command in and about Fort Malden at Amherstburg 100 regulars, 300 militia, and about 150 Indians. Brock despatched Colonel Henry A. Procter with a reinforcement of the 41st Regiment to take charge on the Detroit frontier. When he arrived, towards the end of July, he found his right threatened by Hull, but he sent Tecumseh, the great chief of the Shawnee Indians, across the Detroit river to the American shore, to intercept a convoy commanded by Major Van Horne. On August 4th, the convoy was skilfully ambushed, defeated, and scattered near Brownstown, about twenty miles south of Detroit; the supplies were captured, and also the mail containing the correspondence of the United States Army. On the 7th and 8th of the month, Hull, who had relied on the country for supplies and upon the people for reinforcements, realized his mistake and withdrew his army to Fort Detroit.

On August 8th, Hull sent Colonel James Miller from Detroit to re-open communications with Ohio, and, on the 9th, Procter detached Major Muir across the river to intercept Miller. Muir, with 75 regulars, 60 militia, and 125 Indians, finding himself at Maguaga, fourteen miles below Detroit, in front of an American force of about 700 men, was obliged to retire after exchanging a few volleys with the enemy. But from a stronger position Muir's men stubbornly resisted the American advance and in the end Miller was compelled to lead his beaten force back to Detroit.
Meantime a very important victory had been scored by the British at Mackinaw Island, at the northwest extremity of Lake Huron, where there was a fortified United States post. Fort St. Joseph, a British post established for the protection of the fur trade, was situated on an island at the debouchure of Lake Superior into the waters of Lake Huron, Captain Roberts, a brave and energetic officer, being in command. Brock had reinforced this post in the spring, and Roberts had received instructions to try to capture Mackinaw. With a force of 45 regulars, 400 Indians, 180 French-Canadian voyageurs—half of them armed with fowling-pieces and old muskets,—and two iron 6-pounders, Roberts embarked in a flotilla of boats and canoes, attended by a small brig laden with stores. On July 17th he landed on Mackinaw Island unmolested, got one of his guns into a menacing position for storming operations, and bade the Indians and half-breeds yell the war-whoop. The United States commander, who knew nothing of the outbreak of war and was quite unprepared for an attack, surrendered his post, with sixty-one men and a large quantity of stores and valuable furs. This well-executed stroke secured the adhesion of the Indians; disconcerted Hull, by exposing his rear; and Mackinaw was retained by the British until the end of the war.

Brock, taking advantage of the British control of Lakes Ontario and Erie, assumed the offensive against Hull at Detroit. Leaving York (Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada, on August 6th, he went by boat to Burlington Bay, thence overland to Long Point on Lake Erie; here he picked up forty of the 41st Regiment and 260 militiamen and went on by water to Amherstburg, which he reached on August 13th. Proceeding to Sandwich, opposite Detroit, on the 15th, he summoned Hull to surrender. Hull took two hours to consider the summons and declined it; Brock thereupon determined to cross the river and attack Fort Detroit. That night Tecumseh was sent in advance to the American shore with about 600
warriors and occupied the roads and woods below Detroit, intercepting the enemy's communications. The spot selected for landing was Springwell, four miles below the fort, on the only line of retreat for Hull's force, at a point where the river Detroit is about three-fourths of a mile wide. At daybreak on the 16th, the force under Brock, consisting of 330 regulars and 400 militia, with five light guns crossed the river and advanced against the fort. The invading force was flanked upon the left by the Indians in the woods, and on the right by a small vessel of the Provincial Marine, the Queen Charlotte. Brock advanced boldly, and the enemy abandoned an outpost, well placed, strongly picketed, and defended by two 24-pounders, and retreated into the main fort. Preparations were being made for an assault, when suddenly an officer bearing a flag of truce was seen to emerge from the woods. Brigadier-General Hull had concluded to capitulate. Articles were formulated then and there, and under them the whole of Michigan Territory, Fort Detroit, a ship-of-war, thirty-three guns, stores to correspond, the military chest, 2,500 troops, and one stand of colours were surrendered to the British.

After providing for the security of his conquest, Brock, on August 22nd, sailed for the Niagara frontier, but on the way learned that an armistice had been arranged between Sir George Prevost and General Dearborn. Word had reached America that, on June 23rd, the British Orders-in-Council had been revoked, and Prevost had received instructions to suspend operations pending a decision by the United States Government as to what action it would take. This armistice, in force from the 8th to the 29th of August, proved most useful to the enemy, and all but neutralized the effect of the victories achieved in the west. It gave him time to breathe, to think, to transport stores and reinforcements unmolested. During its continuance, nine fine vessels were removed from Ogdensburg, from under the very guns of Fort Wellington at Prescott, to Sackett's Harbour, and gave Commodore
Chauncey that ascendancy on Lake Ontario which enabled him later on to destroy York.

During the armistice the United States generals had assembled about 6,000 men between Buffalo and Fort Niagara on the Niagara frontier—a distance of thirty-six miles. On October 13th, General Van Rensselaer, commanding the force stationed between the Falls and Lake Ontario, made a disastrous attempt upon the British position at Queenston Heights. Before dawn an advance force of over 300 men, under the command of Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, a cousin of the general, crossed the swift river in boats and gained a footing on the Canadian shore. The troops stationed at Queenston consisted of two companies of the 49th and 200 of the York militia. One 18-pounder gun was in position on a spur of the heights, and a carronade raked the river from a point about a mile below. The United States force, covered by the fire of two 18-pounders, and two field-pieces from their own side, effected a landing with little loss, the gravest being the wounding of Van Rensselaer, who was compelled to return to the American shore. The British offered a desperate resistance to the landing, but when day broke fully 1,000 of the enemy had reached Canadian soil, where they were joined during the morning by possibly 500 more.

Shortly after daybreak Brock arrived. Awakened by the firing, and realizing the nature of the attack, he had galloped up from Fort George at breakneck speed. For the purpose of observation he ascended to the 18-pounder battery, dismounted, and was surveying the field, when fire was opened from the height above, which Captain Wool and a detachment of United States regulars had gained by an almost inaccessible path used by fishermen. The volley was promptly followed by a rush for the gun. Brock ordered the gun to be spiked, and with the twelve gunners of the battery retreated to the shelter of Queenston. He returned to the attack with a detachment of the 49th, 100 strong, charged up the hill and was so far successful as to recapture the spiked 18-pounder. But at
this moment Brock, conspicuous by his height, dress, and bearing, fell mortally wounded. His men, bearing the body of their beloved commander with them, retreated to the protection of the village. About two hours later Colonel John Macdonell, the Attorney-General of Upper Canada, with 200 men of the 49th and York militia, attempted to drive Wool from the heights. But after once more recapturing the gun and driving the Americans to the very edge of the precipice the British were forced to retreat to Queenston. In this attack Macdonell received a mortal wound. The Americans meanwhile believed themselves victorious and paused for reinforcements before finishing off the British.

General Sheaffe, who commanded at Fort George, had, under instructions from General Brock, got his men together on the first alarm, and hurried towards the scene of battle. He took the road from Newark to St. David's, which enabled him to reach the Heights about two miles west of Queenston. On the way, he was reinforced by a body of Indians under Chiefs Norton and Brant the younger, and about 200 militia from Chippawa, making the whole about 800 men. By about 3 p.m. the invaders were surrounded, their backs to the river, Queenston with its defenders on their right, and Sheaffe on their front and left flank. Gradually the semicircle of the British force shortened and thickened. Gradually the enemy were beaten back to the edge of the precipice, their ranks thinned by a murderous fire. Of the survivors, some scrambled down by the path they had ascended, many fell from the cliff and were dashed to pieces, and others were drowned in attempting to swim to the American shore. There was no course left but to yield, and Major-General Wadsworth, who was now in charge on the Canadian shore, surrendered unconditionally, with the force under his command. About 400 of the enemy were taken prisoners on the Heights, and about 600 at other points along the river, while their loss by bullet, bayonet, and drowning had been about 300 men.
The British force at first engaged consisted of two companies of the 49th, who had been ably assisted by Cameron's, Howard's, and Chisholm's companies of the York militia in the early morning attacks. Sheaffe brought to their support 380 of the 41st Foot, Crook's and McEwan's flank companies of the 1st Lincoln, Nelles and W. Crook's companies of the 5th Lincoln, Major Merritt's yeomanry corps, and a party of Swayze's militia artillery. Colonel Clark of the militia came up from Chippawa with Captain Derijizy's and Captain Bullock's companies of the 41st, Captain R. Hamilton and Stone's flank companies of the 2nd Lincoln and volunteer sedentary militia. Norton and Brant did good service with their fifty Mohawks, as did a company of negroes under Captain R. Runchey. The whole force at the close of the day did not exceed 1,000 rank and file, while the British losses amounted to only 16 killed and 69 wounded.

This disastrous repulse checked American activity for a short time, but, on November 28th, General Smyth, who had mobilized a force of 4,500 men at Black Rock, sent two parties of about 400 each to attack the British position between Fort Erie and Chippawa. Small outposts were temporarily overpowered in a confused battle which lasted till night; with morning British reinforcements arrived, the battle was renewed and the invaders were repulsed with much loss. Smyth then sent over a flag of truce, proposing the surrender of Fort Erie. The offer was spurned by Lieut.-Col. Bisshopp, the British commanding officer in this district, and on December 1st, after a vain effort to get his men to cross to the Canadian shore, Smyth broke up his command and sent the regulars into winter-quarters and the militia to their homes.

The eastern frontiers of Canada from the Atlantic to Lake Champlain were saved from attack by the attitude of New England, which from the beginning strongly opposed the war, the ships in Boston half-masting their flags when war was declared. But General Dearborn
was in the Lake Champlain district, preparing for an attack on Montreal. In anticipation of such a movement, a cordon was formed along the frontier of Lower Canada from the Yamaska to St. Regis, where the boundary line between the United States and Canada touches the St. Lawrence, the force employed consisting of British regular troops, Canadian voltigeurs, and part of the embodied militia. A light brigade of selected troops, regulars and militia, was formed at Blairfindie, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Young of the 8th Regiment, consisting of the flank companies of the 8th, 100th, and 103rd Regiments, with the Canadian fencibles, the flank companies of the 1st Battery of embodied militia, and a small brigade of the Royal Artillery with six field-pieces. On the frontier immediately south of Montreal, the road to the United States from L'Acadie through Burtonville and Odelltown was rendered impracticable by abattis.

St. Regis, an Indian village in Lower Canada, on the south shore of the St. Lawrence, opposite Cornwall, was surprised, on the morning of October 2nd, by a force of 400 men detailed from Plattsburg on Lake Champlain. The outpost or picket at this point consisted of twenty men and an officer of the Canadian Voyageurs. Lieut. Rototte, a sergeant, and six men were killed, and the remainder taken prisoners. This affair was swiftly avenged. On November 23rd, small parties of the 39th Regiment and Glengarry infantry, supported by about seventy men of the Cornwall and Glengarry militia, about 140 in all, under Lieut.-Col. McMillan, crossed the St. Lawrence and surprised the United States fort at Salmon River, a few miles southeast of St. Regis. The enemy took to a block-house, but were speedily forced to surrender. Captain Tilden, who had participated in the raid on St. Regis, 2 subalterns and 41 men were taken prisoners, and 4 bateaux and 57 stand of arms fell into the hands of the victors.

While these preliminary skirmishes were taking place, General Dearborn had assembled 10,000 men at, or near,
Plattsburg for his proposed attack upon Montreal. Moving his headquarters to Champlain, N.Y., he sent forward, on November 20th, a force of 1,200 men to make a reconnaissancé in force across the frontier. At Lacolle, a few miles north of the boundary, the column came into contact with the advanced posts of a picket of some 500 militia and Indians under Colonel McKay. McKay so handled his small force that the enemy, in the dark, fired upon their own people, killing several, and then, much disconcerted, retreated to Champlain.

The whole militia of Lower Canada was at once called out and the flank companies of the Montreal militia regiments and a troop of militia dragoons crossed the St. Lawrence to Longueuil and Laprairie. The Pointe Claire, Rivière du Chêne, Vaudreuil, and Longue Pointe Battalions were ordered from headquarters at Lachine to cross to Caughnawaga and march to L'Acadie; and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of Montreal militia were also sent to the front. Winter was coming on, and Dearborn, disconcerted by the affair at Lacolle, and by the spirit shown by the people of Quebec, retreated upon Plattsburg and Burlington and went into winter-quarters.

The first year's campaign had certainly ended disastrously for the United States. None of their expeditions had met with success, while the British had captured and held the enemy's two principal military posts in the west, Detroit and Mackinaw. But the outlook was not very bright for Canada, one of the principal reasons being the impending loss of the control of the lakes. England still postponed the despatch of the proper naval officers, seamen, and shipbuilders to Canada, vainly cherishing the hope that the United States Government, in view of the repeal of the obnoxious Orders-in-Council, would be willing to make peace. On the other hand, the armistice had enabled the United States naval officers on Lake Ontario to increase their fleet; the naval establishment at Sackett's Harbour was a busy hive of industry; and Commodore Chauncey was working might and main to establish the
ascendancy of his fleet. During the earlier stages of the war the heavily-armed and well-manned frigates of the United States had been successful in single combats with the smaller and more lightly armed frigates of the Royal Navy. The British Admiralty, stung into activity, had despatched to the coast of America vessels that forced the United States ships to take refuge in their harbours. The United States frigates being thus reduced to inactivity, and the mercantile marine practically destroyed, the Government had abundance of excellent material available to equip and man its fleets on the inland waters.

Britain, at war with both America and France, had her hands full on the ocean and could render but little assistance to the Provincial Marine. However, in March, 1813, a small naval detachment was forwarded overland from Halifax to Quebec and thence on to Kingston. It included Captains Barclay, Pring, and Finnis of the Royal Navy, with five lieutenants and a few seamen. Upon arrival in Kingston they energetically set to work fitting and equipping the little fleet there. In May, they were joined by Commodore Sir James L. Yeo—who had come to take over the command on Lake Ontario,—4 captains, 8 lieutenants, 24 midshipmen, and 450 British sailors.

Up to this time naval operations on the upper lakes had devolved wholly upon the Canadian Provincial Marine, which, as already pointed out, was really a species of permanently embodied naval militia, equipped and maintained by the army authorities rather for the military transport service than for naval warfare. Its work had perhaps not been very brilliant, but during the critical months of 1812 it had afforded fair security for the army's water transport, and probably saved Upper Canada. But now the Canadian Provincial Marine practically went out of existence. Officers of the Royal Navy assumed command of ships and shipyards, and naval petty-officers and seamen were assigned to most of the non-commissioned ratings and distributed through all the ships. The balance of the crews were made up from the
Provincial Marine, the officers of that force who cared to remain being generally assigned to such ratings as sailing-master, pilot, etc. Several, however, who had distinguished themselves or had had previous naval experience, were kept on duty as lieutenants.

The United States plan of campaign for 1813 was very similar to that of 1812. A force under General Wade Hampton was to mobilize in the Lake Champlain district and move against Montreal; another under General Dearborn was to co-operate from Sackett's Harbour with a force to be raised in Buffalo in an attack on York, Fort George, Fort Erie, and Kingston, uniting afterwards with that of General Hampton in the attempt to capture Montreal; a third under General William Henry Harrison, mobilized at Sandusky on Lake Erie, was to re-occupy that part of Michigan captured by the British in 1812, and to endeavour to capture Amherstburg on the Canadian side.

In 1813, the British again assumed the offensive unexpectedly with a very gallant exploit which resulted in the capture of the American post of Ogdensburg. During the winter, 500 of the enemy had been stationed at Ogdensburg under Major Benjamin Forsyth, and nocturnal raids had been made on unprotected villages such as Elizabethtown (Brockville) and Gananoque. To put a stop to these proceedings, and to facilitate the passage of stores up the river from Montreal, 210 regulars and 270 militia were despatched, under Major George Macdonell of the Glengarry Light Infantry (fencibles), from Fort Wellington (Prescott) against Ogdensburg. Crossing the St. Lawrence on the ice on February 22nd, 1813, the troops advanced in two columns through the deep snow.

Their task was not an easy one. The garrison was stationed on the high bank of the St. Lawrence on either side of the Oswegatchie, and the place was protected by strong batteries on both banks. Forsyth had under his command 500 men, seasoned by several months of discipline and raids. To minimize the effect of the enemy's
guns, the advance was made in extended order with wide intervals between the men. The flank company of the Glengarry Fencibles, seventy of the militia, and one gun were on the right; 120 men of the 8th Regiment, forty of the Newfoundland Regiment, 200 militia, and two guns on the left. Captain Jenkins led off with the right column, whose objective was the fort on the west bank of the Oswegatchie. While the enemy were thus occupied, Macdonell with the main column was to storm the village on the east bank.

The troops fearlessly advanced across the frozen river. For miles on their left and right and for a mile and a half in their front extended a broad, level, shining sheet of ice and snow. In the full light of that February morning they presented an easy target for the guns of Ogdensburg, and, as soon as the march began, artillery fire was opened upon the extended line. In brief time they were within musket distance, and now the shrill crackling of small arms joined with the bass of the opposing cannon. Nearing the United States shore, they were confronted with a new danger. Deep snow made their advance more difficult, but there was no thought of retreat.

The troops under Captain Jenkins were the first to approach the enemy's position. They aimed at taking the fort by assault; and despite the fire of the cannon, the sharp musketry fire, and the deep snow they courageously dashed forward. The bullets of the besieged found many a victim. Jenkins was one of the first to be struck. His left arm was shattered by a musket ball, but he continued bravely to lead his men. A moment later a case shot disabled his right arm. Even this did not end his efforts. He still heroically led the advance, urging on his men until he fell headlong in the snow, faint from loss of blood. Lieutenant McAuley took his place, and the attack continued. It was in vain; the deep snow and the heavy fire from a numerically superior body at this point, forced the right wing to withdraw for the time being.

All had gone well with Macdonell's division until the
deep snow at the river bank was reached. Here the guns stuck fast and delayed the advance. The cannon at this point and a heavy musketry fire thinned the ranks of the British, but by a skilful movement the shore was reached. The enemy became alarmed; their right flank was quickly turned, and when the guns were brought to land a couple of effective discharges demoralized them. Macdonell gave the command to fix bayonets. It was eagerly obeyed; and, scarcely waiting for the word, the British troops rushed on the wavering enemy. The sight of the cold steel and the confident shouts of Macdonell’s men were too much for the raiders of Gananoque and Elizabethtown. They turned their backs and fled from the village,—some to the forest, some to the houses near by, while others crossed the Oswegatchie and sought shelter in the fort. An annoying musketry fire was kept up from the houses, and on these Macdonell turned his guns and drove out the enemy. But the battery was not yet taken.

The march through the deep snow and the sharp fighting had almost exhausted Macdonell’s men. There was not much immediate danger, and their leader granted them a resting spell, while he sent a messenger to Forsyth, demanding an unconditional surrender. The United States commander had had a measure of success. He had repulsed the troops under Jenkins, and no doubt felt confident that he could hold out against Macdonell. He did not even deign to reply. Hostilities were at once renewed and the British guns played on the fort. Meanwhile the battery on the eastern bank of the Oswegatchie was captured and the guns turned on the fort. The end of the battle was now not far distant. Macdonell was convinced that all that was needed to rout the foe was a vigorous charge and ordered Captain Eustace, with a party of the 8th Regiment and a company of Glengarry Fencibles, to rush Forsyth’s last stronghold. To this final charge there was but a feeble resistance. The British troops entered by one door only to find that the defenders had fled by
another, and were hurrying to join their comrades in the depths of the sheltering forests.

Macdonell now proceeded to destroy the hive of these troublesome wasps, burning two barracks, two armed schooners, and two gunboats. As his force marched back to Fort Wellington, they had with them twelve American guns, 1,400 stand of arms with accoutrements, two stands of colours, 300 tents, much ammunition and camp equipage, and a large supply of food. Ogdensburg was thus made untenable, and before it could be again used as a base, it would have to be rebuilt and re-equipped. In this affair the British had 8 killed and 52 wounded; the Americans, 5 killed and 12 wounded, and Macdonell brought back to Fort Wellington 74 prisoners.

The capture of Ogdensburg was far-reaching in its effect. A few weeks later, when General Pike arrived at the place he could find no shelter for his troops and marched them to Sackett’s Harbour, where they were to become a part of Dearborn’s main army. If Ogdensburg had been available, it might have been used as a base of attack against Kingston, and British communications by the St. Lawrence could have been completely cut off. Mucklester’s fleet, that harried Wilkinson as he led his army down the St. Lawrence, would undoubtedly have had its passage blocked, and the army under Colonel Morrison might never have reached Chrystler’s Farm.

When navigation first opened in the spring of 1813, the United States fleet, consisting of six fine schooners and a ship ably manned and equipped with seventy-two guns, held undisputed command of Lake Ontario. Under these circumstances the United States Secretary of War, Armstrong, decided to resume hostilities by an attack on Kingston, and instructed General Dearborn, with a strong fleet under Chauncey, and an army of 5,000 men under Brigadier-General Pike, to proceed against that British stronghold; but Dearborn and Chauncey were timid about attacking so well-defended a position.
They saw an easier victim in York, an unprotected town of between 700 and 900 inhabitants, and the centre of the political life of Upper Canada. In reply to Armstrong's letter directing an attack on Kingston Dearborn wrote that "to attack or destroy the armed vessels at York will give us complete command of the lake. Commodore Chauncey could take with him 1,000 to 1,200 troops to be commanded by Pike; take York, thence proceed to Niagara and attack Fort George by land and water." Armstrong agreed to this, but required that Dearborn, who had so far shown a tendency to keep out of actual battle, and not Pike, should command the operations.

York was in a very weak condition. On the lake shore, two miles and a half west from the town, where the exhibition grounds now are, was an old French fort, known in the eighteenth century as Fort Rouillé, or Fort Toronto, and later the Old French Fort, a mere reminder of the French régime and the days of the fur traders. It was dismantled, and from this point little resistance could be made. About three-quarters of a mile east of this, at the western entrance to the harbour, was a block-house and fort surrounded by a ditch. In the fort were three old French 24-pounders, clumsily mounted on pine logs. The Duke of Gloucester, a 10-gun brig, was in port undergoing repairs. Some of the 6-pounders from this vessel were mounted beside the fort on temporary field-works. A ship-of-war was under construction on the stocks. Heavy carronades had been forwarded to York, and were ready to be placed on her decks as soon as she was completed, but no effort was made by Sheaffe to mount these very necessary guns. Between this fort and the river Don there was the Half Moon battery and a palisaded block-house.

Sir Roger Sheaffe, who had been knighted for his good work at the Battle of Queenston Heights and appointed Administrator of Upper Canada, was in command at York in person. The force under him was ridiculously weak. He had about 300 of the 3rd York militia, a com-
pany of the Glengarry Fencibles, part of a company of the Newfoundland Regiment, and a few men of the Royal Artillery; these, with the dockyard men and the gunners from the *Duke of Gloucester*, gave him a force of 420 men. Two companies of the 8th Regiment, 180 men, who were on their way from Kingston to Fort George to reinforce the garrison there, had halted at York and were retained to take part in the defence of the town. This gave Sheaffe an entire force of 600 men with which to resist an attack from 2,400.

The American fleet of fourteen vessels sailed from Sackett's Harbour on April 25th. They carried eighty-four guns and crews of over 700. The troops under Dearborn, with Pike as second in command, numbered between 1,600 and 1,700. They were composed of Forsyth's riflemen, Colonel McClure's volunteers, four regiments of the United States Infantry and numerous artillery. On the evening of April 26th, the sentries posted on Scarboro Heights, a few miles east of the town, reported to Sheaffe that a numerous fleet was sweeping up the lake before a south-east breeze. On the morning of April 27th, the inhabitants of York saw, with gloomy forebodings, the American fleet lying off the harbour. It was evident that an immediate landing was to be attempted, and the old French fort was the place selected by Pike, who was in charge of the landing operations, but a fresh breeze was blowing, the ships were carried past that point, and the landing was made at Humber Bay.

The advance party consisted of 250 men under Major Forsyth. To protect the landing, the guns of the fleet opened fire on a small force of forty Indians under Major Givins, stationed in the forest skirting the lake shore. The Glengarry company had been sent by Sheaffe to aid the Indians, but it did not arrive on the scene until Major Givins' force had been beaten back and an additional regiment of infantry had been put ashore under Major King to reinforce Forsyth. More infantry and some artillery were now landed and the whole force, con-
siderably over 1,000 men, advanced eastward towards the town. They were to meet with sturdy opposition. The Newfoundland troops, the Glengarry Fencibles, 200 men of the 3rd Yorks, and the two companies of the 8th Regiment were posted in the forest to resist them. The British troops amounted to less than 500 men, but for a short time they checked the enemy's advance. Time and again they gallantly charged Pike's men, and on several occasions drove them back; but American reinforcements were brought up and surrender or retreat was necessary. They retired to the shelter of the western battery, having lost in killed and wounded a quarter of their force. The men of the 8th Regiment had borne the brunt of the battle, suffering a loss of ninety-seven in killed, wounded, and missing. Among the killed was their brave commander, Captain McNeal.

When the troops were landed, the American fleet shifted its position to a point nearer the town and opened fire on the western battery. The guns there returned the fire of the vessels, doing considerable damage, but at this stage there occurred an unhappy accident which ended all hope of resistance on the part of the British. A gunner accidentally dropped a lighted match in the travelling magazine of the fort. A terrific explosion followed; the guns were dismounted and forty men killed or wounded.

Sheaffe now became convinced that further resistance was impossible, and decided to escape to Kingston with the regulars capable of enduring the march. Before deserting York he ordered the destruction of much of the military stores there, and set fire to the ship that was being constructed. Assembling his regulars, about 180, including some wounded, in a ravine east of the town, he sent for Lieut.-Col. Chewett and Major William Allan of the 3rd York militia and instructed them to make terms with Dearborn. They were to be assisted in their negotiations by the Rev. Dr. Strachan, the Anglican clergyman at York, and John Beverley Robinson, the Attorney-General of Upper Canada.
Meanwhile Pike had taken possession of the now unresisting fort. The greater part of his men remained without its walls near the powder magazine, which contained, it is said, 500 barrels of powder and a large store of balls and shell. Pike had sent forward Lieutenant Riddle to reconnoitre and report as to what further obstructions had to be overcome. The general was questioning a prisoner, a British sergeant, when suddenly, with a mighty roar, the magazine blew up. For acres about the fort the air was filled with flying beams, stones, shot, and shell. Pike was struck by a large mass of stone and mortally wounded. There was naturally a panic, the troops fleeing in all directions, and when the men were reassembled it was found that 260 of their comrades were killed or wounded. The cause of the explosion was, and still remains, a mystery.

All British resistance ended; a flag of truce was raised, the ships ceased bombarding the shore batteries, and negotiations for capitulation began. It was agreed that the regulars and militia, naval officers and seamen should be surrendered as prisoners of war; all public stores were to be given up, but all private property was to be respected. Under the terms of capitulation 265 officers and men of the militia, 21 officers and men of the Provincial Marine, and 6 British regulars were made captive. These with the men already captured during the morning battle amounted to 346. No detailed statement of the losses sustained by the militia in the defence of York is extant. The losses to the regulars were 154 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, fully half of their strength. The Americans lost 17 killed in the fleet and 300 in the land force.

While Dearborn was considering the terms of surrender, the American troops burned the Legislative Buildings, destroying the papers and records of the province, plundered the church of its plate, and the Legislative Library of its books. Private houses were entered and everything of value carried off. These cowardly acts of vandalism were not to go unpunished. The American nation
The War of 1812 was to suffer through the burning of Washington and the destruction of the Government buildings, largely as a retaliation for the depredations at York and Newark—and the chastisement was not undeserved.

Dearborn had won a notable victory, but he was not to benefit greatly by it. York was on the direct land route to Niagara, and yet he made no attempt to hold it. His expedition degenerated into an isolated raid conducted for the purpose of destruction and plunder. The troops remained in the captured town for only a couple of days. On May 1st, all were put on board the ships. However, strong westerly winds were blowing, and it was not until May 8th that sail was made for the Niagara frontier, where the troops went into camp at Four Mile Creek preparatory to a greater offensive movement.

Troops had been rushed forward from Sackett's Harbour to increase the American force at Niagara, and, on May 27th, Chauncey and Dearborn made a descent upon Fort George on the west side of the Niagara river, near its mouth, with a fleet of eleven war vessels manned by 900 seamen, and carrying a land force of some 6,000 men. The British force in garrison at Fort George and billeted in the nearby town of Newark was under command of Brigadier-General Vincent and amounted to 1,340 men. Vincent had eight field-guns, while four 24-pounders, captured from Hull at Detroit, were mounted on the bastions of Fort George, and a fifth had been placed in a redoubt between Newark and the lake shore. Vincent vigorously opposed the landing, but under cover of the ships' guns the enemy got ashore. The first brigade to land was repeatedly driven back to the beach at the point of the bayonet, and it was unable to advance until reinforced by two fresh brigades.

After some 4,000 enemy troops had been landed, with several pieces of artillery, they advanced in three columns, the British light troops being forced back, but the main body made a stand, and a most sanguinary combat ensued. Vincent, opposed by a force tenfold his strength and with
his positions exposed to a tremendous fire from ships and land batteries, at last decided on retiring. The guns of Fort George were spiked and the ammunition destroyed, and the British troops, weakened by the loss of 445 men killed or wounded, withdrew across the country on a line parallel to the Niagara river to a spot near Beaver Dams, a naturally strong defensive position beyond Queenston Heights, about sixteen miles from Fort George and covering the road to Burlington. Some reinforcements of regulars came up during the night, and the whole afterwards withdrew to Beaver Dams, where Vincent was joined by Colonel Bisshopp from Fort Erie and Major Ormsby from Chippawa, raising the strength of his force to 1,600 men. The enemy meantime took quiet possession of Fort George, making prisoners a small detachment of soldiers left behind to destroy the ammunition and stores.

General Vincent almost immediately retired to a position at Burlington Heights, with advanced pickets thrown out as far as Stoney Creek, five miles east of the site of Hamilton. On June 5th, an American force, under Generals Chandler and Winder, consisting of 3,500 men, including 250 cavalry and eight guns, arrived at Stoney Creek, and Vincent's outposts fell back. Chandler selected an admirable position for an encampment, and, as the baggage was being brought down the lake, between 800 and 1,000 men under Colonel Christie were sent to the mouth of the creek, two miles distant, to receive and secure it, leaving in camp a force of over 2,000 men.

As Chandler's advance guard were pressing forward, an effort was made by Captain Williams to check their progress with a British out-picket. This small force was driven back, and when Lieut.-Col. Harvey arrived on the scene with light companies of the 8th and 49th Regiments and a few dragoons, the skirmish had ended and the Americans were going into camp. Harvey made a careful reconnaissance. He found that the enemy's camp guard were few and negligent; that his line of encampment
was long and broken; that his artillery was feebly support-
ed; and that several of his corps were placed too far to
the rear to aid in repelling a blow which might be rapidly
struck in front.” On his return to camp at Burlington
Heights he urged Vincent to attack Chandler. Vincent
was in desperate straits. His force was inadequate, and
ill-supplied with ammunition. There was no alternative
but further humiliating retreat, with the probability of a
harassing attack from the rear, and, with the hope that
in the night a brilliant stroke might cover his little army
with glory, he consented to Harvey’s daring plan. Vincent
was to accompany the attacking force, but Harvey was
to have its entire management.

The enemy’s position was an excellent one for defence.
On the side towards Lake Ontario—their right flank—
their outposts were strung across the main road. On
their left was a lofty plateau where the main force was
encamped. The ascent to this was by a steep slope,
crowned by a number of the guns. Along the top of this
slope was a strong fence of logs and rails; on either side a
thick wood whose edge was skirted with a fringe of
brambles and briars. On the right flank there was a
swamp, soft and spongy from recent rains. A frontal
attack was the only one that could succeed, and on this,
from information gained from observation and from
prisoners and deserters, Harvey decided.

The Americans, footsore and hungry, were slow in
reaching their camp. They took a hurried meal and
rolled themselves in their rough blankets, little suspecting
that before daybreak they would experience an exciting
battle. After midnight General Chandler ordered the
fires on the height to be extinguished, but those at the
foot of the slope, where there were no troops excepting
sentinels, were kept burning. Half a mile in front, at a
small church built the previous year by the United
Empire Loyalists, he had posted the main guard. A ring
of sentries circled the entire camp; but they lacked disci-
pline and were neither courageous nor watchful. However,
Chandler feared a night attack and had his army prepared to spring to arms at a moment's notice.

At about 11:30 p.m. Harvey had his force of "704 firelocks" ready. It mustered 280 officers and men of the 8th Regiment under Major Ogilvie, and 424 of the 49th Regiment under Major Plenderleath. The troops had all smelt powder and they were led by courageous and experienced officers. Before midnight the British left their camp on their seven mile march. The roads were heavy with mud, but this deadened their foot-falls. The night was starless, thick clouds helping to conceal them. Soon the fires at the foot of the slope where the Americans were stationed were visible and the critical moment had arrived. It was to be a complete surprise; the bayonet was to do the work. For fear of an accidental shot that might alarm the foe, the force was halted when about a mile from the enemy's position, the muskets were carefully examined and "every flint was taken out and every charge drawn." The first American outpost was reached a little before 3 a.m. The advance guard stole upon the drowsy sentry and made him a prisoner, gaining from him valuable information. The main guard at the church suspected no danger, and the misty, chilly night in the open not being to their liking, they had entered the building to sleep till dawn. The church was stealthily surrounded and the guard captured.

Seeing the sentries moving in the light of the smouldering fires the British fully expected to find at least a portion of Chandler's army resting at the spot. Silently their advance guard stole upon the sentries and bayonet several of them in the "quietest manner," to use the words of Harvey. But the death cry of some of the sentries alarmed others and warning shots were fired and shouts were raised. As they were now discovered Harvey's men threw caution to the winds, and rushed into the line of watch-fires fully expecting to make short work of a considerable body of the enemy. To their chagrin they found that they were in an empty encamp-
ment. The entire army of the foe was at the top of the slope.

The command was given to deploy to the left. The movement was quickly performed and the force came into line of battle. There was now no doubt as to the position of the enemy. From the plateau above them troops could be heard assembling, and the men of the 8th and 49th began hurriedly loading their muskets and fixing their flints. Suddenly above them a burst of flame like a lightning flash illuminated the night, and under a storm of lead many a gallant fellow fell dead or wounded. The cannon roared forth and balls ploughed through their extended line. To many of the British the day seemed lost and there was grave danger of a panic. By the light of the captured watch-fires they were an easy target, while they could direct their own fire solely by the flashing volleys from the hilltop.

At this juncture Major Plenderleath, assisted by Sergeant-Major Alexander Fraser with some twenty or thirty brave fellows, saved the situation. With fixed bayonets they charged up the height for the guns. As they charged they ran crouching, and twice the cannon boomed above them and threatening balls shrieked immediately over their heads. The gunners were loading for a third time when Plenderleath's men burst upon them. Believing that they were attacked by a strong force the Americans turned and fled; one bolder than the rest stood his ground but was bayoneted while attempting to discharge his field-piece. As the gunners took flight the supporting companies fired one wild volley - and fled.

When the alarm was given, General Chandler mounted his horse and took command in person, sending General Winder to bring the infantry on the left to the brow of the hill. As his gunners took to flight Chandler arrived at the guns. A bullet struck his horse and he was thrown and stunned by his fall. When he regained consciousness he found the British in possession of the battery. Hoping
to escape he crawled under one of the guns, but at a later stage in the battle Sergeant-Major Fraser saw him and dragged him forth, compelling him to surrender his sword. Just as the flanks of the American force were being assailed by Harvey and Major Ogilvie, who had followed hard after Plenderleath, Winder arrived at the centre of action. Unaware of the reverse that the artillery and their support on the hill had sustained, he rode right into the midst of Plenderleath's men. Fraser was in luck; he rushed upon the American general, compelled him to dismount and took him prisoner. By this time the remainder of the 49th had won the height, and the main position of the enemy was in their possession.

On the left flank were the 5th and the 16th United States Infantry. Against these Major Ogilvie led five companies of the 8th Regiment and quickly put them to flight. They attempted to rally, but Harvey was on their right and with a rapid movement scattered them, taking many prisoners. In the darkness, the American dragoons struggled to retrieve the day. They formed for the charge, but only succeeded in riding into their own 16th Infantry.

A victory had been won, but Harvey knew that when the Americans realized how small was the force that had attacked them, they would rally and it might go hard with him. His troops had done well, but they were in a sadly disorganized condition. According to Cruickshanks: "Officers had lost their commands in the darkness and wandered blindly about the fields seeking them. General Vincent himself had disappeared and was supposed to be killed or taken prisoner. Companies had become separated from their battalions and sections from their companies." Destroy the American force Harvey knew he could not, and, seeing that his command was now reduced to 500 effective men, with the first glimmer of daylight he ordered a retreat.

An attempt was made to carry off the captured guns, but from scarcity of horses the British were able to remove
only a brass howitzer and an iron 6-pounder. In the confusion and darkness some fifty men of the 49th did not promptly obey the order to retreat, and, being surrounded by large bodies of Americans, were compelled to surrender.

The British had lost heavily; 23 were killed, 136 wounded, and 55 missing. This was due largely to their exposed position among the watch-fires at the foot of the American encampment and the necessity of charging up the hill against a steady musketry and cannon fire. Dennis, Ogilvie, Plenderleath, and a number of other officers were among the wounded. The American loss cannot be accurately ascertained. The prisoners taken by the British amounted to 126, and an American report gave 17 killed and 38 wounded, but as the 25th Regiment under Major Smith had 42 killed and wounded, according to Smith's own statement, their loss was clearly much greater. When the retreating British reached the encampment at Burlington Heights there was still no trace of General Vincent. William Hamilton Merritt was sent out in search of him and came back with two prisoners, taken single-handed, but with no tidings of the missing general. But the latter shortly afterwards arrived in camp, hatless and without his mount. Early in the fight he had been thrown from his horse and had lain concealed in a wood until an opportune moment arrived for rejoining his command.

The Americans had had enough of fighting. They returned, it is true, to the field of battle after the British had retreated, but stayed only long enough to destroy some ammunition, baggage, and provisions, and then hurriedly fled to Forty Mile Creek—the present Grimsby,—a disorganized mob, leaving some of their dead unburied. The British then advanced to Stoney Creek and the prisoners were sent to Kingston.

On May 27th, the very day that Chauncey and Dearborn captured Fort George, Sir James Yeo and Sir George Prevost left Kingston, with a combined naval and
military force to attack Sackett's Harbour while the United States fleet was absent at Fort George. The force consisted of five armed vessels, including the *Wolfe* and *Royal George* of twenty guns each, and carried a land force of 750 men. On the morning of the 29th, a landing at Horse Island was effected under a heavy fire by the troops under Colonel Baynes. A causeway connecting the island with the mainland was forced with great gallantry, and an American 6-pounder captured. The enemy occupied a thick wood; the British gun-boats fired into the wood; but their opponents, being secure behind large trees, were only to be dislodged with the bayonet. The spirited advance of a section of the invading force with fixed bayonets drove the enemy from the wood to their block-house and forts; at the same time, their naval storehouse in the vicinity of the fort was set on fire, as were also a frigate on the stocks, two ships-of-war in the harbour, and the stockaded barrack. With complete victory in sight Baynes and Prevost, having no artillery, refrained from attacking the fort, and ordered the withdrawal of the troops to the boats. The force then re-embarked, leaving several wounded officers and soldiers to fall into the hands of the enemy—an ending most disgraceful to the British commanders.

Early in June, part of the force which had been engaged at Sackett's Harbour embarked at Kingston, on board Sir James Yeo's squadron, to reinforce the British troops under Vincent. News of the evacuation of Fort George having arrived, Yeo received directions to land the men as near York as possible; but the fleet being detained at Kingston by contrary winds, Major Evans and Lieutenant Finch of the 8th Regiment travelled by land to York, which the enemy had evacuated. Evans, hearing of the gallant affair at Stoney Creek, returned to the fleet, and induced Sir James Yeo to attack the invaders' camp at Forty Mile Creek, while Finch proceeded by land to Burlington to apprise Vincent of the approach of the fleet and troops. A combined movement was arranged, and the enemy,
being thus menaced by water and by land, hastily fled to Fort George. The British pressed after them, captured several boats, and obtained possession of a great part of their supplies and baggage. Through the success at Stoney Creek and the arrival of Yeo's fleet with provisions, arms, ammunition, and reinforcements, the situation in the western peninsula was more hopeful towards the close of June than it had been since the capture of Fort George.

The American army was now concentrated between Queenston and Newark, all their troops on the Canadian side having been withdrawn from the Upper Niagara after the reverse at Stoney Creek. But British irregular forces, especially the Indian bands, again became very active, worrying the Americans, keeping their outposts in a constant state of alarm, and killing or capturing the unwary. General Boyd, at this time the only American general officer in the district, was roused by the complaints of his forces to attempt something to check these raids. A British detachment under Major De Haren was at Twelve Mile Creek, ten miles from Fort George, the site of the present St. Catharines, while Lieutenant FitzGibbon was stationed at the stone-built homestead of one De Ceu, a mile and a half beyond Beaver Dams and about eighteen miles from the American headquarters, with forty-seven men of the 49th. Lieut.-Col. Bisshopp, in command of these advanced posts, was at the site of the present village of Jordan, about seven miles from both De Haren and FitzGibbon.

With Dearborn's permission, Boyd decided to strike simultaneously at FitzGibbon and De Haren and to ensure secrecy the few males left between Newark and St. David's were arrested and brought to the American camp. This precautionary measure made the people suspicious, and when an American patrol visited the home of James Secord, a United Empire Loyalist, a chance boast revealed the intention to attack FitzGibbon's force at De Ceu's. Secord had been crippled at the battle of Queenston
Heights and was unable to carry a warning to FitzGibbon, but his wife Laura bravely undertook the task.

All through the day of June 23rd, and far into the night, this fearless woman tramped through the deep wood and over roads thick with mud, in danger of capture from American sentries, and of death from beasts of the forest. At length, faint and exhausted, she neared De Ceu's and fell in with a band of friendly Indians who led her to FitzGibbon. The news she brought, coming on the back of reports already received from Indian scouts, put FitzGibbon on the alert.

Meanwhile, Boyd had selected Lieut.-Col. Boerstler of the 14th United States Infantry to march against FitzGibbon with a force of nearly 600 men. It might be necessary to batter down the strong walls of the house sheltering the British, so a 12-pounder and a 6-pounder were attached to the party. The force that was to attack De Haren's position was to set out later in the day. However, it never started; no doubt Boyd changed his mind, due to the opposition Boerstler was meeting. Boerstler's march began on the night of the 23rd and at early dawn on the 24th he came in contact with some watchful Indians who opened fire on his troops, while Captain Kerr of the Mohawks sent messages to both FitzGibbon and De Haren. The message reached FitzGibbon about seven in the morning, confirming the reports that the Indians and Laura Secord had already brought in.

Captain Kerr, young John Brant, and Captain Ducharme, leaders of the Indian forces, were familiar with the ground along the Niagara frontier, and laid plans to ambush Boerstler's troops in one of the deep ravines that would have to be passed on the march to De Ceu's. Boerstler sent a few mounted riflemen in advance to prevent a surprise from the front. On each flank infantry soldiers guarded against ambush while the cavalry followed in the rear. The early morning skirmish, in which the Indians lost one killed and one wounded, had warned the Americans that FitzGibbon and his men
were not to be captured without a fight, and Boerstler, fearing that the Indians and militia would soon be out in force, and that Bisshopp and De Haren might bring up their companies to attack him, sent back to Fort George for reinforcements, but continued his forward march. Meanwhile the Indians, 250 in all, had been skilfully led through the forest to a deep ravine with heavily timbered sides that lay in the path of the Americans. Captain Kerr posted his men in the forest and along a fence that skirted the brow of a part of the ridge, and waited. Boerstler's advance guard of mounted men had entered the ravine and were ascending the western slope before fire was opened upon them. It was a short-range, well-directed fusillade, and, but for Boerstler's excellent control of his troops, a panic would have ensued. He turned his guns on the ridge and with grape and musketry beat back for the moment the opposing force. The road was too narrow for manoeuvring, but forward the column pressed, ever and anon attacked by the Indians who were completely hidden from view in the thick forest.

FitzGibbon had heard the first volleys and set out from De Ceu's to reconnoitre. He quickly recognized the excellent work the Indians were doing, and sent back for his men. Meanwhile, the continued skirmishing on his front caused Boerstler to believe that a very large force had gathered to oppose him. He attempted to retire, but suddenly in his rear appeared some white troops, how many he could not tell, and their presence checked his retreat. They were fifteen men of the 2nd Lincoln Regiment under Lieut.-Col. Thomas Clark, who had been attracted by the musketry and cannon fire.

Boerstler had lost heavily. Over fifty of his men had been killed or wounded. He himself was severely wounded and so were three of his officers. For nearly three hours a running fight had continued. Further advance was too hazardous, and at the house of a Mr. Miller, surrounded by an orchard and a wheatfield, he drew up his army at a comparatively safe distance from his concealed foe.
By this time the men of the 49th had arrived, and FitzGibbon, to impress the Americans with his strength, led them into view in open files, and took up a position threatening to cut off Boerstler's retreat. Firing had ceased and FitzGibbon, who had no desire to see it begun again, at present, decided to try what a demand for surrender would accomplish. With a white handkerchief on his sword he advanced and demanded, in the name of Major De Haren, who was known to be approaching, the surrender of Boerstler and his men. The desire to avoid bloodshed, the strength of his force, and his inability to control the Indians in case the Americans should fall into their hands were, he pointed out, the reasons for his generous proposal. His total force at this time was about one-half that of the enemy.

Boerstler was expecting reinforcements and desired delay. FitzGibbon feared that these might arrive before De Haren, and so, instead of giving until evening as Boerstler wished, he replied that the commanding officer could not control the Indians, and asked for an answer in five minutes.

Boerstler knew that a large body of Indians was opposed to him, and in his fear he exaggerated their number threefold. He had seen, too, the uniformed troops coming on the field; he had heard bugles sounding in different parts of the forest, intimating that he was surrounded by a considerable army. His men were exhausted and in a panic, and to save them from the Indians he agreed to FitzGibbon's terms. Meanwhile Captain Hall with twenty dragoons from Chippawa had joined FitzGibbon, but even then his little force all told did not amount to 300 men. While the negotiations were under way, Major De Haren fortunately arrived from Twelve Mile Creek with 200 men, and was able to sign the terms of surrender. The militia and volunteers were allowed to go to their homes on parole; the officers retained their arms, horses, and baggage; the non-commissioned officers and regular soldiers laid down their arms at the head of the British col-
umn, and became prisoners of war. According to some accounts but one man escaped; according to others, five or six. After the fight Colonel Bisshopp arrived with an additional force, and was able to report to the Commander-in-Chief the capture of over 500 Americans, two guns, two ammunition and supply wagons, and the colours of the 14th United States Regiment.

The fight had continued for over three hours, and during that time Boerstler lost fifty-six men killed and wounded. The entire loss of the British was among the Indians. Many were wounded, and one Delaware chief, one Chippewa chief, two Caughnawaga war chiefs, one Nipissing war chief, and five warriors from St. Regis were killed.

There has been a difference of opinion with regard to the details of the Battle of Beaver Dams, Captain Kerr claiming that none but Indians took part in the attack on the Americans. FitzGibbon also seems to have held this view, for he wrote to Kerr some years later: "Not a shot was fired on our side by any but the Indians. They beat the American detachment into a state of terror, and the only share I claim is taking advantage of the favourable moment to offer them protection from the tomahawk and scalping knife." However, there is good evidence that the fifteen men of the 2nd Lincoln militia under Lieut.-Col. Thomas Clark took an active part in the fight.

Shortly after the skirmish at Beaver Dams, Major-General Francis de Rottenburg succeeded Major-General Sheaffe as Administrator of Upper Canada, and also relieved Major-General Vincent of the command of the troops on the Niagara frontier. About the same time, General Boyd replaced General Dearborn in command of the United States army. During the remainder of the summer, what fighting there was in this theatre of war was of a desultory character. On December 10th, when the weather was unusually severe, the United States force under Brigadier-General McClure, abandoned Fort George and withdrew to Fort Niagara after burning the town of
Newark—which then contained about 200 houses—and brutally exposing the inhabitants, among whom were some 400 women and children, to cruel hardship.

General Sir Gordon Drummond assumed command in this section about this time, and, on December 19th, a British force was despatched across the Niagara river, and carried Fort Niagara by storm. The attacking party was under command of Colonel Murray, whose activities in the district had been largely responsible for McClure's retirement from Fort George. His force consisted of the flank companies of the 41st Regiment, a detachment from the 100th, and a detail from the Royal Artillery, without guns, but carrying scaling ladders. With unloaded muskets and fixed bayonets, he made a surprise attack upon the fort in two columns, and after a struggle of fifteen minutes, during which sixty-five Americans were killed, the remainder of the garrison, 300 in all, surrendered. The booty included twenty-seven pieces of artillery, 7,000 muskets, and magazines full of camp equipage, clothing, and provisions for a large army. And Fort Niagara remained in the possession of the British till the close of the war.

A campaign of retaliation for the unwarranted destruction of Newark was now entered upon. The day after the capture of Fort Niagara, the village of Lewiston was attacked by General Riall, and after the United States regular troops and Indians stationed there had been driven out, the place was committed to the flames. On the 29th, Riall again crossed the Niagara river, this time above the Falls, with less than 1,000 men, put to flight a United States force of about 2,000 under Major-General Amos Hall and destroyed Black Rock and Buffalo by fire. Four armed vessels and immense stores of supplies were included in the work of destruction. In this raid Riall took 130 prisoners and the American killed and wounded is variously estimated at from 200 to 400, Riall's own loss being insignificant. From Buffalo, a troop of the 19th Light Dragoons and the 1st Royals marched to Fort
Niagara along the United States side, destroying over 300 buildings on the route.

At the conclusion of the campaign of 1813, the force at Newark included the 1st, the 8th, the 41st, 49th, 89th and 100th regiments of the line; the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th regiments of Lincoln militia; 19th Light Dragoons, Provincial Dragoons and Artillery, and Indians from the various reserves in both Upper and Lower Canada, the Lower-Canadian Indians under the command of French-Canadian officers.

During the winter, a new fort (Mississauga) was built upon Mississauga Point, near the mouth of the Niagara river, which, with Fort George and Fort Niagara in British hands, placed the Niagara peninsula in a practically im pregnable position, so far as Lake Ontario was concerned.

After the fall of Detroit there was a lull of some months in the warfare in the Michigan and Ohio districts. In January, 1813, General Winchester was in command of a wing of the United States army on the Upper Miami, while Harrison had assembled another force on the Sandusky. It was the intention to unite these forces on the Miami Rapids, and from this point, when adequate preparations had been made, to march against Amherstburg and Detroit, and endeavour to recover the ground lost by Hull. Winchester moved first with a force of between 1,200 and 1,500 men and when Colonel Procter, at Amherstburg, learned of Winchester's presence at the Miami Rapids, he sent Major Reynolds of the Essex militia with a force of fifty white soldiers and 200 Indians to Frenchtown on the south bank of the river Raisin to watch the enemy. Hearing of this, Winchester at once despatched Colonel Lewis with a force of 550 men to seize Frenchtown, while an additional body of 110 men under Colonel Allen was sent to reinforce him. These 660 men were "the flower of Kentucky." On January 18th, they reached the river Raisin where Reynolds had selected a strong position behind a picketed enclosure, among the houses on the southern bank. At 3 p.m. the fight began. Reynolds
had with him a 3-pounder howitzer, and this gun was skilfully handled by Bombardier Kitson and some militia artillery. The Indians, too, fought well from cover, and until dusk the Americans could not cross the river. So hot was the fire that Lewis was forced for a time to leave the open ground and take to the shelter of the forest. But his superior numbers prevailed, and at nightfall Reynolds decided to retreat. In this skirmish the British lost one white man and three Indians killed; the Americans, twelve killed and fifty-five wounded.

Lewis had Frenchtown; but he was far from feeling comfortable. Reynolds was retreating towards Amherstburg, but it was not likely that Procter would accept the situation and Lewis was in no position to resist a well-organized attack. He was without guns, and he had on his hands a large number of severely wounded men. Had he been able, he would have retreated to the Miami Rapids, but before this could be done conveyances would have to be sent forward to carry his wounded. He therefore despatched a messenger to Winchester asking for reinforcements. The victory he had won had been greatly exaggerated, and, cheered by the news, the camp-weary men under Winchester wanted to fight. They pleaded to be sent forward to meet Procter should he attack Frenchtown. Winchester yielded and went to Lewis’ assistance. When he arrived in Frenchtown he had, including Lewis’ men, about 1,000 United States troops eager for fight, but, fortunately for the British, badly led and knowing but little of the game of war. The houses in the village were filled with wounded, and Winchester took up his headquarters in a house on the south bank of the river. Lewis’ corps was within the picketed enclosure which protected the village on two sides, and Colonel Wells, who came up on the evening of the 20th, was forced, on account of the limited space behind the palisades to station his regiment in the open to the right of the picket fence. Colonel Allen’s regiment was in a similar position.
Meanwhile, news had been brought to Procter of the capture of Frenchtown, and he at once decided to attack the American force there. On January 19th, he assembled a force of nearly 1,000 men, made up of the 41st Regiment, the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, parts of the 1st and 2nd militia, a number of seamen, and some 450 Indians under Roundhead, a Wyandot chief. He had, besides, three 3-pounders and a 5½-inch howitzer with their crews. With this force he began his march for the American camp on the morning of the 20th, and on the evening of the 21st had reached a point within five miles of Frenchtown. Procter planned his attack for daybreak the following morning, camp fires were built, and the hardy troops, wrapped in their greatcoats and blankets, slept by them under the clear January sky. They were roused two hours before dawn, and the final march on Winchester's position began.

The American general had been culpably negligent. He took it for granted that proper night patrols and night pickets would be posted, and left that to the commanders of the different regiments, who apparently failed to take these ordinary precautions against surprise. On the morning of the 21st, Winchester sent out a patrol who reported that they had gone as far as Brownstown opposite Amherstburg and that no enemy was in sight. This had lulled the fears of Winchester and his officers and though they expected attack they deemed that it was still some days distant.

As a result of their neglect Procter's force arrived at daybreak within musket-shot of Frenchtown and formed up behind an orchard and a stretch of hollow ground on the north side of the town before the drowsy camp was aware of their presence. Had Procter assaulted with the bayonet, he would probably have captured the entire army with but small loss of life; but, instead, he drew up his guns and regulars in the centre, posted the militia and Indians on his left and right, and began the battle with artillery fire.
The Americans, though taken by surprise, had, owing to Procter's mode of attack, ample time to prepare for defence. A strong force took up a position within the picket fence, and resting their weapons on the earthworks poured a heavy fire into the artillery. They were excellent marksmen, and the artillery and the 41st supporting the guns received severe punishment. For an hour this long range battle continued, and in that time the 41st alone lost fifteen killed and ninety-seven wounded.

Meanwhile the Indians and the militia on the left had been charging the American right, and had forced Colonel Well's regiment to give way before them; though Colonel Allen brought his men to the rescue, the entire American right was soon driven back. Across the frozen river they fled, a terrified mob pursued by a yelling horde of Indians. Colonel Allen, Colonel Wells, and Colonel Lewis were driven along with the crowd. Colonel Winchester, who apparently had never crossed the river, and his young son, a lad of sixteen, were caught in a mass of fleeing men and borne helplessly along. The Kentuckians, plunging through deep snow that made rapid or prolonged flight impossible, were given no quarter by the Indians, but were ruthlessly smitten down and scalped. Allen was killed, Winchester and his son and Colonel Lewis were captured. Fortunately Winchester fell into the hands of Roundhead, or he would probably have lost his life in the general massacre.

The American left wing was now likewise turned, and the entire force remaining on the north side took up a position behind the picket fence, where Major Madison encouraged them to make a last heroic stand. They expected no quarter from the Indians, and were going to ask for none. The guns were once more playing upon them, and they were suffering from concentrated musketry fire in their front, their left, and their right, but they returned this with interest, taking heavy toll from their foe. Meanwhile Winchester was brought to Procter; he saw that the day was lost, and that it was useless for his
men to continue the fight. The only hope of those left alive behind the pickets was in surrender. So he hurriedly scribbled a note and sent it to Major Madison, ordering him to cease firing and have his men lay down their arms. Madison obeyed the order, and soon all the American soldiers left alive were in the hands of the British.

The battle ended by 8 a.m. The British had lost 24 killed and 158 wounded, a total of 182, over one-third of their white troops. The Indians' loss was small, as they fought from cover, while the main fire of the defenders had been directed against the guns and their supporting companies of regulars. About 500 prisoners were taken, and the Americans lost 397 killed and 25 wounded. The slaughter had been brutal, attended by all the horrors of Indian warfare. From Frenchtown but few escaped. According to several reports only thirty reached Fort Meigs two days after the battle, but over 100 wounded and footsore men straggled into the American lines during the following week.

Procter hastened homeward with most of his prisoners, but a number of wounded were left behind under charge of Major Reynolds and a small guard. Unfortunately, word was brought that Harrison was advancing with a strong force to Frenchtown. A few of the guard deserted, and the Indians, intoxicated, it is said, and burning for revenge, returned and slaughtered thirty of the unfortunate wounded. For this Procter has been blamed, but he could hardly have foreseen the calamity.

Procter retreated to Amherstburg, quite expecting that Harrison would advance from the Miami to give him battle. Harrison was actually advancing to reinforce Winchester, but he was met by stragglers from the tragic field, and, having but a small force, retraced his steps; so on the evening of the Battle of Frenchtown both generals were running away from each other.

A notable victory had been won. It completely disorganized the American plan of invasion, and it was not until the Americans, as we shall see, had, through Perry's
victory, obtained control of Lake Erie and had organized and trained Johnson’s cavalry, that they dared attempt a second attack on the Detroit frontier.

Towards the close of April, Procter, now a brigadier-general, proceeded up the Miami river and attacked Fort Meigs, where Harrison was then stationed. He had with him 400 of the 41st Regiment, about 600 militia, and some 1,200 Indians under Tecumseh, attended by two gun-boats. After the siege had been in progress for four days, General Green Clay arrived with a reinforcement of 1,500 men. Clay detached about 800 men under Colonel Dudley to relieve Harrison, but these were skilfully defeated, between 400 and 500 being taken prisoners. But Fort Meigs still held out, and, sickness having broken out among his troops, the Indians, with the exception of Tecumseh and some twenty chiefs and warriors, having returned to their villages, and the militia being anxious to return to their farms, General Procter raised the siege on May 9th and returned to his base.

Late in July, at Tecumseh’s request, a second expedition was sent against Fort Meigs, but it came to nothing. The troops were diverted to Fort Stephenson, on the Sandusky river, whose defenders greatly outnumbered the attacking force. On August 1st, an attempt was made to carry that place, but without success, the troops returning to Amherstburg with a loss of 26 killed, 41 wounded, and 29 missing.

Brock’s work in the autumn of 1812 had won a vast province from the United States, and the struggle of 1813 in the west was really a battle for lost ground. General Harrison was eager to invade Canada, but the British still held control of Lake Erie, and Detroit, the first objective, could not be won while this condition lasted. But if the Americans could drive the British from Lake Erie, Detroit must be evacuated and Harrison could overrun the western part of Upper Canada. Never was the importance of Sea Power more in evidence than in the struggle which took place in September, 1813.
The rival commanders on the lake were Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry for the United States, and Captain Robert Heriot Barclay for the British. Barclay, although but thirty-two years of age, was a veteran in naval warfare. He had been with Nelson at Trafalgar, and in a subsequent battle with a French frigate had lost an arm, but his experience and courage were to avail him but little—the odds were too great. Commodore Perry, only twenty-seven years old, was equally brave and tenacious of purpose. He, too, was a veteran; he had spent fourteen years in the United States Navy, and had seen active service against the Barbary pirates.

On March 27th, Perry arrived at Presqu'isle. Here he found under construction two brigs and three schooners, which were launched before the end of May. But all their equipment—sails, guns, cordage, powder, and other stores—had to be brought 500 miles through the wilderness from Pittsburg. This small force of five vessels would, by itself, have availed him little, but fortunately for the Americans, it was to be augmented. At Black Rock were the brig Caledonia, captured from the British in the previous autumn, three small schooners, and a sloop. At first these vessels were not available, as the British had possession of Fort Erie, on the opposite shore, but on May 27th the Americans captured the fort, and early in June the five vessels loaded with stores were taken up the lake to Presqu'isle.

When Captain Barclay reached Amherstburg in June he found disheartening difficulties. His fleet was badly equipped, both in men and in armament. He hoped for much from the ship Detroit, then building, and meanwhile he blockaded Perry, whose new brigs, Lawrence and Niagara, were of too deep draught to be brought over the bar at Presqu'isle harbour's mouth with their equipment on board. He knew that these vessels each carried twenty guns and had crews superior to any he could muster, and that if they should once get into the open lake he would have a hard struggle to hold his own.
He determined to keep them from crossing the bar, so, with a few badly-manned vessels, he cruised in the vicinity of Presqu’isle night and day, giving the foe no chance to slip out. Unfortunately, in a moment of over-confidence, he personally left the scene of action. A storm arose, and Captain Finnis, whom he had left in charge, withdrew, evidently fearing that his vessels might be driven on the south shore. Before the British fleet could reassemble, the storm had subsided, and Perry by skilful seamanship had worked his brigs over the bar, and hurried guns and stores on board from lighters.

The tables were now turned. Barclay had to hasten to the protecting guns of Fort Malden, and remain inactive till such time as his fleet was sufficiently strong to risk battle with the nine vessels that were challenging him to come out and fight. As he hoped for great things from the Detroit he put all his energies into completing her, and succeeded in having her launched towards the beginning of September. But she still lacked masts and rigging, and some days were consumed in preparing her for her venturesome work.

In order to make the Detroit fit to meet Perry’s strong and well armed vessels, it was found necessary to dismantle Fort Malden. Long, heavy battering pieces were taken on board, but they were not sufficient; and, as the Detroit would have to bear the brunt of the engagement, some of the largest guns were transferred to her from the other vessels. Barclay still hoped for further help from Headquarters and, realizing his weakness, delayed leaving the harbour. Help was on its way, but owing to unpardonable delay, the guns intended for the Detroit reached Burlington from Kingston only after Barclay had been defeated and the Detroit was flying the American flag.

For Procter, it was fight, starve, or retreat across country, so at last Barclay was compelled to lead out a forlorn hope. The American vessels, so proudly cruising on the blue waters of Lake Erie, took away every chance of the British troops getting supplies by water, and as a
result stores began to run short. So scanty indeed were they that Barclay, in his report after the battle, declared that "there was not a day's flour in store," and that the squadron under his command was "on half allowance of many things." Control of the lake was necessary to save the situation, and, on the night of September 9th, he got his six wretchedly-equipped vessels ready to face the enemy. The men on the Detroit were largely soldiers from the 41st Regiment, raw militia, and a few Indians.

The Americans had their fleet in a sheltered position at Put-in-Bay, in the Bass islands, thirty miles distant from Amherstburg, and, as Barclay was anxious to meet the enemy, early on the following morning he took advantage of a favourable southwest wind, and sailed at night with the hope of reaching his destination at daybreak. The enemy, confident in their superior fleet, rejoiced when, on the following morning, they learned that the British squadron was advancing towards them under a favouring breeze. Anchors were weighed, decks cleared for action, all sail clapped on, and every effort made to reach the open lake before the British could prevent them from getting clear of the islands about Put-in-Bay.

The wind was in Barclay's favour and he tried to reach the Americans before they could free themselves from their cramped position among the islands and form into line of battle. But the wind failed, and continued so light that but little progress was made, so Barclay, to his chagrin, saw the United States fleet sweep clear of the islands and form into line. He still had the windward position and hoped that this would make up for his lack of strength. But in this, too, he was to be disappointed, for the wind changed to the northeast and the enemy were then able to select their point of attack. Nothing daunted, Barclay skilfully drew up his ships and awaited the foe, now slowly advancing, and confidently expecting to make short work of the British force. And well they
might; they had nine vessels to the British six, their ships were manned by numerically superior and better trained crews, and they had twice the weight of metal.

Perry had given careful instructions to his commanding officers "to engage each your designated enemy in close action at half cable length" (130 yards) and quoted the words of the world's greatest seaman, Nelson: "If you lay your enemy close alongside you cannot be out of your place." As an inspiration, he flew from the Lawrence, his flagship, a motto-flag on which were inscribed the dying words of Captain James Lawrence of the Chesapeake: "Don't give up the ship!" He had now a favouring northeast wind, and, accompanied by the Scorpion, Ariel, and Caledonia, led the Lawrence into action against the Detroit, which was supported by the Chippewa and Hunter. The Niagara selected as her foe the Queen Charlotte, while the Somers, Porcupine, Tigress, and Trippe prepared to do battle with the Lady Prevost and the Little Belt.

At fifteen minutes to twelve the long guns of the British fleet began to rain their iron storm on the van of the foe, and ten minutes later the United States commander sent back a vigorous answer. Barclay's guns were skilfully handled, and soon began to make havoc on the Lawrence. Shot after shot hurtled into her, line after line and brace after brace was cut away, while huge splinters flew from hull and masts. Perry saw he could not stand this long range warfare for any length of time, and possessing immense superiority in carronades he did his utmost to bring his van to close quarters with the British. After being severely pounded for half an hour, he succeeded in getting within cannister distance. Then for two hours one of the most stubborn and heroic contests in the history of naval warfare was waged. Both commanders seemed to think the victory would be to the one who should first conquer the flagship of the opposing fleet, and each fought with the utmost bravery and determination. The Detroit was a staunch craft and her heavy guns soon began to weaken the Lawrence, whose
guns were for the most part dismantled, whole gun crews slain, and decks slippery with blood. Her cockpit was above water, and the wounded sheltered there were in some instances struck again, while the surgeon and even some of the wounded had to go on deck on several occasions to help work the ship. Lieutenant Yarnall, the second in command, was struck three times, and every other officer save Perry was either dead or wounded. The *Detroit* was not in much better condition. The masts were shattered, the braces cut, and the side towards the foe had scarcely an inch left that was not splintered; but she bore up heroically, and the few skilled seamen and gunners Barclay had, gave him the most loyal support. The only skulkers on board were a few Indians who were terrified by this new and strange warfare. Garland, her first lieutenant, was killed; Barclay was wounded, but there was no thought of yielding. Like Sir Richard Grenville of old, Barclay set his teeth and cried, "Fight on!"

About two o'clock the plight of the *Lawrence* became desperate. More than half of the crew were dead or seriously wounded, all the guns on the engaged side were dismounted, and the vessel so racked as to be unmanageable. Perry meditated surrender, but a daring thought occurred to him, and without a moment's hesitation he put it into action. The *Niagara* was still practically unharmed, and he decided to leave Lieutenant Yarnall in charge of the *Lawrence* and make an effort to transfer his flag to the *Niagara*. He had a skiff lowered, and, with a crew of seven, among them his young brother, was rapidly rowed through water that was churned and lashed into foam by the unceasing cannonade of the rival fleets. It was a heroic deed that gave the Americans the ultimate victory. Through Perry's headlong attack on the British line his van had been smashed to pieces, and his only hope now lay in bringing the *Niagara* into action. As he gained that vessel's deck, the fight, which had been going decidedly in favour of the British, took a
sudden turn, and the final success of the Americans was inevitable.

While the *Detroit* was doing such effective work, the *Queen Charlotte* was not so successful. She had been attacked by the *Niagara* supported by two schooners. Captain Jesse Elliott, the American commander, had the advantage in long guns, so having the weather gage he took up his position at long range and rained heavy shot into his enemy without giving Captain Finnis an opportunity to return his fire. Finnis was daring and made every effort to bring his vessel to close quarters with the *Niagara*, but in the heat of the fight he was struck down by a round shot, and in his fall Barclay lost his main support. His first lieutenant, Stokoe, was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Irvine, a courageous but inexperienced officer, had to take charge. Such was the condition of this vessel when Perry succeeded in boarding the *Niagara*. He instantly realized the weak state of his foes, and determined to close down upon them and if possible end the fight.

Scarcely had Perry reached the deck of the *Niagara* when Lieutenant Yarnall was compelled to strike his flag. But the wind was too light for the *Detroit* to bear down and board the *Lawrence*, and, as every small boat had been smashed during the protracted struggle, Barclay could not take possession of his prize. The *Lady Prevost*, too, was in a sad plight. She had been badly cut up by the American schooners, which hammered her from long range with their heavy guns. Her commander, Lieutenant Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first lieutenant severely, wounded, and she was drifting helplessly to leeward.

When Perry got ready to lead the *Niagara* into action, he sent Elliott back to bring up the schooners for the purpose of making a concentrated attack in line abreast on the British. "At forty-five minutes past two," according to his report of the fight, "the signal was made for 'close action'; the *Niagara* being very little injured I
determined to pass through the enemy's lines; bore up, passed ahead of their two ships and a brig, giving a raking fire to them from the starboard guns, and to a large schooner and sloop, from the leeward side, at half-pistol-shot distance."

At the first discharge, Barclay was seriously wounded and compelled to leave the deck. Lieutenant Inglis now took command of the Detroit. The guns on the larboard side were disabled and he attempted to wear ship in order to bring the starboard guns to bear on the enemy. But just at the moment the Queen Charlotte was running up to leeward, and she was managed so unskilfully that the two vessels became entangled. Before they could separate, the Niagara, the Caledonia, and the American schooners were in position to rake them from stem to stern at half-pistol length. After receiving several terrific volleys from cannon and muskets, the Queen Charlotte struck her flag, and the Detroit and Lady Prevost followed her example. The Chippewa and Little Belt tried to escape, but after a hot chase were captured, and the whole British fleet was in the hands of the Americans.

The fight was a costly one for both forces. The British loss was 41 killed and 94 wounded, a total of 135, or practically one in every three men engaged. Among the killed were Captains Garden and Finnis, and among the wounded Captain Barclay and Lieutenants Stokoe, Garland, Buchan, Rolette, and Bagnall. The Americans had 27 killed and 96 wounded, nearly all on the Lawrence.

The defeat had been a serious one to Canada. General Harrison was now eager to seize Detroit and Amherstburg, and the only course really open to Procter was to retreat from his position on the Detroit river. To decide on this he called a council of officers, including Tecumseh and other distinguished chiefs. Procter advised immediate retreat, which Tecumseh vehemently opposed. However, Procter won his way by showing that a successful stand was impossible at Amherstburg or Detroit, and by
promising that, at an advantageous position along the Thames, he would make a stand against the invaders.

It was nearly two weeks before Commodore Perry and General Harrison were ready to transport the American army to the Canadian shore. Harrison had now an important addition to his force. In the spring, Richard M. Johnson had organized a regiment of rough riders—mounted troops armed with muskets, tomahawks, and knives—and for four months these troops had been operating in the wide region between Fort Wayne and the river Raisin. Harrison, knowing the weak state of Procter's army, expected that the British commander would retreat, and sent for Johnson to aid him in the pursuit. Johnson eagerly responded, and, on September 27th, while Harrison's troops were being transported across to Amherstburg in Perry's fleet, Johnson with 1,200 experienced cavalry marched overland to Detroit, from which the British garrison had been withdrawn, and then joined Harrison.

Procter, who had apparently wasted a fortnight, left Amherstburg on September 24th, and began his retreat from Sandwich on the 26th or 27th, but it was not until October 2nd that the pursuit began in earnest. Procter had a week's start, but he was encumbered with heavy baggage, whereas Harrison went light, moving most of his baggage and supplies up the Thames in three of Perry's gun-boats. He had with him about 4,000 men, including Johnson's mounted force, and nearly 300 Indians—Wyandots, Shawnees, and Senecas.

Procter did not adopt any systematic plan in his retreat. Between Sandwich and Moravian Town there were a number of small rivers and creeks to be crossed. In his flight he left the bridges standing, only on two occasions making any attempt to destroy them. On the first occasion Harrison succeeded in capturing a lieutenant and eleven dragoons; on the second, a body of Indians managed to destroy the bridge, and for a time held the Americans in check. But Harrison brought up three
6-pounders, and after a few discharges the Indians were compelled to retreat after losing thirteen killed, the Americans having nine killed or wounded.

When about two miles from Moravian Town, on the north bank of the Thames, a few miles east of the present city of Chatham, a naturally strong position tempted Procter to make a stand. His men were in bad shape; they had been fleeing in disorder, many were worn out with marching, many were sick, and all were disheartened. On this morning, October 5th, Procter still seemed unable to make up his mind. He ordered his troops to advance against the foe, but scarcely was the movement begun before they were commanded to halt. The old soldiers of the 41st were mutinous. They had no confidence in Procter, and no hope of victory—indeed they knew that they could make but a short fight. Their main supply of ammunition had been captured by the pursuing enemy, and all they had was in their pouches. For two hours before the fight they sat inactive in sulky silence by the roadside or in the wood that skirted it. No attempt was made to throw up intrenchments or make barricades, though there was ample time for such work. Dejected, hungry, hopeless, the men of the 41st thus awaited the Americans.

Five of the British guns were back at Moravian Town, having been taken there to guard a ford of the river. There was but one 6-pounder with the British, and that was posted in the road skirting the Thames. It stood there during the fight, grim and threatening, but there was no ammunition and it remained silent until captured by Johnson's men. Near it were stationed some twenty dragoons. Fewer than 400 British soldiers—367 was the number reported—were to take part in the battle. Half of these were strung across the road, in line with the gun; the remainder, concealed in the forest 200 yards in the rear, formed a second line of defence. Behind them Procter and his staff took up their position, apparently prepared for hurried flight. The right flank was pro-
tected by the Thames, the left by a cedar swamp. On the left were posted the Indians, now in greatly diminished numbers. Through their lack of confidence in Procter, and discouraged by the failing supplies of food, numbers of them deserted, but Tecumseh still had about 500 under his leadership. His position was admirably chosen. The swamp and the 41st protected his right, the swamp his front, and his men, concealed in a thick wood, were secured against any attack by mounted men.

Shortly after 2 p.m., the American army arrived. Harrison proposed to attack with his infantry, but Colonel Johnson urged a cavalry charge, pronouncing the wood in front, open and without underbrush, advantageous to his Kentucky rough riders. Harrison gave way and Johnson planned and won the fight. He divided his force into two parts; half of it he placed under the command of his brother, James Johnson, with directions to attack the silent gun and the British ranks in the wood in front, while he himself took charge of operations against the Indians on the British left flank.

With an impetuous rush the mounted men dashed forward. The 41st met them with a well-directed volley. For a moment the horsemen wavered and the charge was checked; but it was only for a moment. Putting spurs to their steeds, they broke through the first line despite a second volley, then turned back and attacked the British in the rear and caused the surrender of practically the whole force. Against the second line they sped, but the British here had no heart for fighting. Their comrades in front were beaten, and after a hurried volley they turned in wild flight, but the American horsemen broke through them and took many prisoners. Procter and his staff, seeing the day lost, fled in a panic with the enemy hard at their heels. To Procter's eternal disgrace he had remained during the battle at a safe distance in the rear, and neither by presence nor act encouraged his men. In about twenty minutes of actual fighting James Johnson had captured or scattered the entire 41st, Lieutenant
Bullock and fifty men alone succeeding in making their way to the Army of the Centre at Burlington.

Colonel Johnson was not having such an easy time of it on the left. No effective cavalry charge was possible, and, in the hope of drawing the Indians from cover, the horsemen dismounted. Johnson and twenty daring fellows advanced into the Indian line, but were beaten back. Tecumseh and his warriors boldly followed them into the open and gained a momentary success. Johnson was wounded in four places; Tecumseh saw his plight and dashing through his followers endeavoured to strike him down with his tomahawk. The American leader's pistol was in his hand, and as the blow was about to descend he pulled the trigger and the noblest of the red men, the truest ally of the British in North America, fell dead. With Tecumseh dead, the last chance of retrieving the day had gone. The British on the right had been captured or driven from the field, and the right of the Indians was now unprotected. A charge on that point rolled back their flank and drove them towards the left, where were stationed the Ohio and Kentucky infantry. A fierce fire met them and, after an hour's hard fighting, they were scattered in flight.

In the Battle of the Thames, or Moravian Town, as it is frequently called, the British lost 12 killed and 22 wounded, the Americans 15 killed and 30 wounded. The Indians, who had acquitted themselves so nobly, left 33 on the field. On this fatal 5th of October, 477 prisoners were taken. These included the wounded and 101 officers and men in hospital at Moravian Town, together with their attendants. In this retreat from Amherstburg, the British had sustained in killed, wounded, and prisoners a loss of 631 men. When the news reached Vincent he withdrew his outposts from Beaver Dams and other points and concentrated his whole force at Burlington Heights, naturally expecting to be attacked by the victorious United States Army. But he had no occasion for immediate alarm, for Harrison, after burning the
peaceful Indian village of Moravian Town, retreated with his prisoners and plunder to Detroit.

In the meantime, the Americans had set themselves with great zeal to the perfecting of their plans for capturing Montreal. At Sackett's Harbour, General Wilkinson concentrated an army of 10,000 men, which was to descend upon Montreal, via the St. Lawrence, while General Hampton was given command of a force mobilized on Lake Champlain at Burlington and Plattsburg, amounting to 5,000 regular troops and some 6,000 militia. To oppose this force of an aggregate strength of 21,000 men, Sir George Prevost had under his command some 5,000 regular soldiers, 2,000 of whom were in Upper Canada, and some 6,000 or 7,000 militia.

It was originally intended that General Wilkinson should cross Lake Ontario, and seize Kingston and Fort Wellington, before making his descent upon Montreal. Hampton was to concentrate his complete force at Plattsburg, and proceed overland to the shores of Lake St. Louis, and thence cross to the island of Montreal. Isle Perrot, at the mouth of the Ottawa river, near the head of the island of Montreal, was to be seized, fortified, and used as an advance base.

On September 29th, General Hampton, having effected the mobilization of his forces at Plattsburg, despatched a selected body of troops across the Canadian frontier to surprise the outlying picket at Odelltown. Colonel de Salaberry, who commanded the outposts along the Lower Canada frontier, had obstructed the various roads and pathways through the bush with abattis, and while the United States column was endeavouring to make its way over this difficult route, they were set upon by a party of militia light infantry, and a few Indians, who were reinforced by the flank companies of the 4th Battalion of embodied militia, and also by the Canadian voltigeurs, under command of de Salaberry himself: As a result the enemy advance guard was driven back, and Hampton abandoned his idea of attempting to proceed by way of
LIEUT.-COL. CHARLES DE SALABERRY
Odelltown, and directed his movement in a more westerly direction, via the valley of the Chateauguay river.

Prior to taking up this new route, Hampton withdrew his advance column into United States territory, where it was followed up by de Salaberry as far as the Four Corners, a place about five miles within the United States frontier. The gallant de Salaberry, at this point, made an attempt to surprise the United States camp, but the surprise failed through the accidental discharge of a musket. An attack, however, was delivered by fifty voltigeurs and a few Indians, with the result that a detachment of the enemy, consisting of some 800 men, was thrown back in confusion. After this, de Salaberry retreated with his small force along the Chateauguay river to a well selected position on the left, or north, bank, seven miles from Hampton's encampment, in a forest cut by deep ravines, which formed natural defences. Hampton sent out a party of scouts to reconnoitre, and a ford was discovered across the Chateauguay on de Salaberry's left flank. Hampton believed that he could capture the entire British force, and decided to send Colonel Purdy with a strong contingent across the Chateauguay by means of this ford; while this force attacked the British in the rear, he, with his main army, would fall on the enemy's front; retreat being effectually cut off by Purdy, there would be nothing for it but a British surrender.

De Salaberry was in a naturally strong position, which he had improved by fallen trees and abattis, but he had little hope of victory. With his mere handful, composed of a flank company of fencibles and four companies of voltigeurs, he could only hope to retard the enemy's advance for a brief period. But he expected reinforcements and to his delight they arrived on the eve of battle. Prevost, at Kingston, had received warning of Hampton's intended invasion, and had despatched Lieut.-Col. George Macdonell, with a force of 600 men, to de Salaberry's aid. Macdonell with his hardy company of voyageurs and woodsmen sped down the St. Lawrence and
reached de Salaberry just in time, having done 190 miles by water and land in sixty hours actual marching—a forced march unequalled during the war.

De Salaberry now had an army of a little over 900 men, including fifty Indians under Captain Lamothe. It is worthy of note that de Salaberry's force, with the exception of Lieut.-Col. Macdonell, Captain Ferguson, three or four others, and the Indians, was entirely composed of French Canadians—and gallantly they acquitted themselves.

On the night of October 25th, Hampton sent Purdy with over 1,500 men across the Chateauguay to the south side with instructions to proceed to the ford that had been located on de Salaberry's left flank. The water in the Chateauguay was low, and the river could easily be crossed. Hampton had instructed Purdy to attack at daybreak. He also instructed General Izard, an officer with experience in both European and American wars, to fall simultaneously on the British front with a force of about 3,000 men. Izard was to be in position to make his attack as soon as he heard firing. But the darkness that was to conceal Purdy's advance favoured the British. The American leader lost his way, and did not reach the ford until it was almost noon.

De Salaberry had drawn up his men in a thick wood, having on his left the Chateauguay river. The ford that Purdy was seeking was guarded by a strong breastwork. At this breastwork, to prevent the American troops taking the ford by surprise, there had been placed a picked body of Beauharnois militia. These men had had no experience in war and were without uniforms, but they were excellent shots, and being under cover could be trusted to give a good account of themselves.

After waiting for several hours for the sound of firing, General Izard became impatient and advanced to the attack along the left bank of the river. When his overwhelmingly large force neared the first line of defences the Canadian militia fired a few shots and then retired behind
the shelter of abattis. The United States soldiers believed that they had already won a victory, and advanced against de Salaberry's main position. The sharp fire and the large army intimidated the inexperienced voltigeurs, and they hastily retreated. But de Salaberry stood his ground, and, it is said, held his bugler in a firm grip, compelling the trembling lad to sound "the advance." The notes came as a cry of defiance to Izard's men, who were shouting vociferously at the easy beating they had given the voltigeurs. Lieut.-Col. Macdonell realized the meaning of "the advance," and sent forward two companies to his commander's support, while a number of his buglers sounded the advance over a wide front. The United States soldiers had not learned of Macdonell's arrival and thought that de Salaberry's 300 were all they would have to contend with at this point. They were astounded at the numerous bugle calls that apparently denoted a large army. The fifty Indians under Lamothe added to their alarm by blood-curdling cries. The Indians were ever a source of dread to the United States soldiers, and Izard paused to reconnoitre and await news of Purdy and his men. The voltigeurs had meanwhile taken heart and returned to their position, Macdonell with his 600 continued the warlike clamour, and the enemy, losing heart and fearing to lose their scalps, fled from the field. They were followed by an effective musketry fire from the companies under Captains Jean Baptiste Duchesnay and Juchereau Duchesnay.

Purdy had worn out his troops seeking the ford, and was too late in arriving at the scene of conflict. As he advanced along the south bank of the river he was attacked by Captain Bruyère, with some sixty Chateauguay chasseurs, but these he easily drove before him. Meanwhile Macdonell had sent a company under Captain Daly across the river to check Purdy's advance. As the United States' troops came into view this light company poured a well-aimed volley into them at close range. The British fire was answered by a terrific fusilade, but, in
firing, Daly's men had taken a kneeling position, and, for
the most part, the bullets of the enemy whistled over
their heads. None were killed, but Daly and several
others were wounded. In the thick forest on the left
bank of the river, a company of voltigeurs under Captain
Juchereau Duchesnay lay in ambush. At the opportune
moment they opened fire from a totally unexpected quar-
ter, and caused a panic in the enemy's ranks. At the
same moment Purdy's men heard the numerous bugle calls
pealing out the advance. They heard, too, with dismay
the wild war-whoops of the Indians. A panic seized them
and they also fled.

Some of Purdy's men swam the Chateauguay, and
reaching Hampton's headquarters gave the general such
an exaggerated account of the enemy's numbers that
Hampton was convinced that a powerful British force had
been brought against him, and immediately ordered a
general retreat. Another humiliating defeat was thus
experienced by the United States; a force of nearly 6,000
men with generals of high repute, well trained infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, ignominiously fled before a force of
900 men who were without either cavalry or guns, and
were for the most part French Canadians who had had
no experience in warfare.

In this fight the British loss was small. Five of the
rank and file were killed and two captains, one sergeant,
and thirteen rank and file wounded. The United States'
loss is not easy to estimate. If we are to believe their
historians it did not exceed fifty; but the British found,
on the right bank of the river where Purdy had been en-
gaged, more than ninety bodies and new made graves.
The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was undoubtedly
over 100. Along the line of retreat knapsacks, muskets,
and provisions were found in large quantities. For two
days de Salaberry's men boldly followed the fleeing army.
On September 28th, Captain Lamothe with his Indians
fell on Hampton's rear-guard, causing a loss of one killed,
and seven wounded. No attempt had been made to rally
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the fleeing army, and this last attack lent wings to the soldiers' feet.

While Hampton was preparing for his advance overland against Montreal, General Wilkinson was organizing his army for the movement against the same objective via the St. Lawrence river. Some 10,000 men were assembled and trained at and about Sackett's Harbour, and, under cover of Chauncey's fleet, were transported to Grenadier Island, at the foot of Lake Ontario, where they landed in expectation of a junction being formed there with the whole, or a portion, of Harrison's corps from the western sphere of operations. Wilkinson seemingly intended to attack Kingston as soon as circumstances warranted it, but these circumstances never developed.

The British were in doubt as to whether this American force was destined for Kingston or Montreal, but the leaders at Kingston concluded that it would be good tactics to take the offensive in any case. A portion of the American army under General Brown had moved down the St. Lawrence and were encamped at French Creek, near Clayton, on October 29th. An attack on this force was planned, but there was a difficulty in the way. The British fleet was bottled up in Kingston Harbour and Commodore Chauncey was maintaining a close blockade. But Chauncey learned that some of Sir James Yeo's vessels were coming down the lake from York with reinforcements for Kingston. He consequently raised the blockade for a couple of days in order to intercept these vessels, and Captain Mulcaster with two brigs, two schooners, and eight gun-boats stole out of the harbour and raced for French Creek. These vessels attacked Brown's contingent with a sharp fire and did not desist until Chauncey came to the rescue with an overwhelming force.

After this skirmish, Wilkinson's entire army assembled at French Creek and made final preparations for the descent of the St. Lawrence. They embarked in 300 boats and scows, and under the protection of twelve gun-
boats set out on what was to prove to be a futile and disastrous journey.

In pursuit of Wilkinson's large flotilla came Mulcaster with a skillfully managed fleet, attacking their rear and keeping the American army in a state of nervous tension. Along the north shore of the St. Lawrence a strong force of regulars and militia kept pace with the advancing enemy. At every narrow stretch among the Thousand Islands a sharp musketry fire was kept up on the passing American boats. Colonel Morrison was in command of the British troops and with him was Colonel Harvey, courageous and experienced. To harass the Americans more troops were needed, and at Prescott the British were joined by the greater part of the garrison of Fort Wellington. The two companies of the 49th Regiment, some fencibles and voltigeurs, a few Indians, and a 6-pounder gun with its crew brought the force to a little over 800.

The Americans dreaded the guns of Fort Wellington at Prescott, and before they reached Ogdensburg disembarked their troops, and, with only enough men to manage the boats, sent their fleet past the British fort in the night. The troops were hurriedly marched along shore and taken on board at the Red Mill, four miles below Ogdensburg, and the advance was then continued by water.

The musketry fire from the north bank of the St. Lawrence was most annoying, and to clear this part of the river a body of 1,200 men under Colonel Macomb and Lieut.-Col. Forsyth was landed on the Canadian side of the river at the head of the Gallops Rapids.

Already Wilkinson was beginning to have doubts as to the easy conquest of Canada by way of Montreal. His followers were even more doubtful. They were a strong force, but they were practically without leaders. General Wilkinson and his second in command, Major-General Morgan Lewis, were both ill and utterly unfit to handle the expedition. Before descending the Gallops a council of war was called, at which was given a very discouraging
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report brought by a spy. He had a detailed account of the number of men along the St. Lawrence and of a large army assembling at Montreal. Wilkinson even at this early stage doubted the advisability of continuing the advance. However, it was decided to go on as they knew "of no other alternative." While the army halted at this point Brown's brigade was landed on the north shore to reinforce Macomb.

Mulcaster had left his larger boats at Fort Wellington and the British troops were loaded on bateaux, landed at Point Iroquois on November 9th, and on the 10th got in touch with the American rear-guard. Meanwhile General Boyd's brigade had reached the Canadian side and was supposed to be protecting the rear of the American advance along the north shore. The Long Sault Rapids were now in sight, and to pass that stretch of turbulent water it was deemed necessary first to clear the bank of enemies.

A British force was known to be stationed near the foot of the Long Sault, and General Brown was ordered to hasten east and dislodge it. Captain Dennis, of the 49th Regiment, was at Cornwall in command of 300 Dundas and Glengarry militia and thirty Indians. He managed to retard Brown's advance by destroying the bridges, and by carefully scattering his men through the thick woods along Hop Pole Creek, whence they maintained a tantalizing fire. Dennis compelled Brown to fight his way, inflicting loss on him while suffering none. Meanwhile there was ample time given to remove the military stores and any property of value in Cornwall.

At 10:30 a.m. on November 11th, Wilkinson received word from Brown that the river was clear. It was getting late in the season; winter was approaching. If Montreal were to be reached before the ice formed there must be no delay, and so Wilkinson issued orders that the rapids should be run at once. This accomplished they would be in Lake St. Francis in a few hours and clear of the British gun-boats and the pursuing troops. But at this moment
General Boyd reported that the enemy had put on a bold front and were advancing in column.

A general engagement was imminent, and Boyd, the most incompetent officer in Wilkinson's army,—according to Winfield Scott "vacillating and imbecile beyond all endurance as a chief under high responsibilities"—was left with some 2,400 men and six field-pieces to repel the attack. The armies were now on the spot known as Chrystler's Farm, a place well-adapted for manoeuvring troops.

The British position was admirably chosen. Their right was on the river, protected by gun-boats; their left was covered by a thick pine wood; their entire front spread over nearly a half mile. On the right flank were three companies of the 89th with one 6-pounder, and a little to the front and left the flank companies of the 49th and the Canadian Fencibles with another 6-pounder. On the left, somewhat to the rear and extending to the pine wood, was the remainder of the 49th and 89th Regiments and a third gun. In the wood were the voltigeurs under Major Heriot and some Indians under Lieutenant Anderson. This body of the voltigeurs and Indians was detailed for skirmishing duty. It was they who began the engagement, and, being but a small force, they were easily driven in on the British left.

It was now 2:30 p.m. and the fight was on in earnest, the Americans confident in their superior numbers, the Canadians trusting for victory to their excellent leaders and well-chosen position. The aim of the American commander was to crush either flank of the British, roll them up and attack their rear. A mighty effort was put forth on the front and left by General Swartwout's brigade and an auxiliary force under Colonel Coles, but the companies of the 89th and 49th Regiments on this part of the field moved forward, firing steadily and showing such a confident front that the American force wavered, then broke and were pursued over fences and through the low ground separating the contending armies.
The American leader then turned his attention to the front and right. General Covington's brigade with four guns was sent against the troops posted near the St. Lawrence. The British did not wait for Covington's attack, but advanced to meet him, and, when within half musket-shot, formed into line. Covington's attack was met by a counter-attack that checked his advance. One of the American 6-pounders was a temptation to the men of the 49th. With a shout they tried to rush it, but at this moment the American cavalry swept down upon them. There was a critical instant; it looked as if the ranks of the 49th would be broken and a fatal attack made on their rear. The 89th on the extreme right saw the danger and dashed to the rescue. Captain Barnes, with three companies of this regiment and a 6-pounder gun, not only saved the 49th but captured the enemy's cannon. It was now 4:30 p.m. and the fight had been raging furiously for two hours. At this stage General Covington fell mortally wounded. His men, as news of his fall spread among them, lost heart, were seized with a panic, and retreated. Along their entire front the Americans ceased firing, and the troops fled in haste before the cheering British.

The victors started in pursuit, but a reinforcement of 600 fresh American troops under Lieut.-Col. Upham arriving on the scene, the pursuit was checked. The British therefore halted, content with occupying the ground from which they had driven their foes.

In the battle, the British loss was 22 killed, 146 wounded, and 12 missing, nearly a fourth of their entire force. On account of the thoroughly unreliable reports of Wilkinson the American loss is difficult to estimate. It was stated at 102 killed and 37 wounded, while 100 prisoners or more fell into British hands. After the battle the American artillery and dragoons hastened down the river bank to join Brown and Macomb near Cornwall. The infantry hurriedly embarked in their waiting boats, and at nightfall fled across the St. Lawrence. In the morning Wilkin-
son sent his entire force down the rapids to join the troops already collected at Barnhart's Island, near Cornwall.

While Wilkinson's army nursed their wounds a messenger arrived from Hampton. He brought the story of the battle of Chateauguay and of Hampton's complete failure and retreat. Wilkinson now gave up all idea of advancing on Montreal. He took his army, greatly lessened in numbers and weakened by wounds and exposure, to French Mills, where he constructed a fort—Covington,—six or seven miles up the Salmon river, and here, on United States territory, he went into winter-quarters.

The autumn of 1812 had ended with the capture of Detroit and the defeat of the Americans along the Niagara frontier. The autumn of 1813 likewise ended gloriously for the British. They had, it is true, suffered serious reverses, but through Chateauguay and Chrystler's Farm all danger of the invasion of Canada along the St. Lawrence was at an end.

During the interval which elapsed between the close of the campaign of 1813 and the opening of the campaign of 1814, Napoleon was driven out of Russia, and the British armies under Wellington were instrumental in expelling the French from Spain and Portugal. Britain now manifested a disposition to assume a firm offensive in America, and made ready to send reinforcements across the Atlantic. But the war party in the United States persevered in their war measures, and entered on the third campaign encouraged by the knowledge that their generals and troops had become efficient through experience.

Once more the capture of Montreal was to be attempted by way of the Lake Champlain route. For this purpose, 5,000 men were to be mobilized at Plattsburg, New York, and placed under the command of General Wilkinson. Another force, under General Brown, was to be made ready for operations along the Niagara frontier, and a third in Michigan for operations in the western area.

On February 9th, word reached military headquarters
in Canada that General Wilkinson's army had begun to leave their cantonments at Salmon river and Malone, General Brown with one division going to Sackett's Harbour, Wilkinson with the other proceeding to Plattsburg. On the 17th, Colonel Pearson was directed to despatch a force of about 500 regulars from Prescott to Salmon river and Malone to harass the enemy in his movements. The column reached Salmon river on February 19th, but the enemy had gone, and, after burning the deserted American barrack and the flotilla of boats which had carried Wilkinson's army down the St. Lawrence, they proceeded inland to Malone, only to find that the last detachment of the enemy had just decamped, leaving a considerable quantity of ammunition and supplies behind.

The United States leaders, realizing that heavy reinforcements were likely to reach Canada in the Spring, decided upon an early opening of their campaign against Montreal from the Lake Champlain district, hoping to get well across the frontier before proper dispositions had been made for the defence; but in this they were to be disappointed.

On March 28th, Wilkinson advanced with an army of 4,000 men from Plattsburg against the frontier. Light troops of the enemy entered Odelltown, followed by a squadron of cavalry, three brigades of infantry, and eleven guns. Driving in the British pickets, they attacked the post at Burtonville, but were so well received by the troops there, that they desisted in their attack and proceeded to the Lacolle river, near its junction with the Richelieu. Here, in a stone mill and block-house, were a detachment of the 13th Light Infantry and a small body of militia under the command of Major Hancock.

The garrison of the post was fewer than 200 men, but on the approach of the enemy, Hancock summoned reinforcements from several similar posts near at hand, and, while the battle was on, two companies of the 13th arrived. Two gun-boats and two sloops also came from
Isle-aux-Noix, and from the mouth of the Lacolle, a mile or so away, worried the enemy by their fire.

The investment of the Lacolle position was completed on March 31st. From the beginning of the siege, Hancock, although outnumbered fifteen to one, offered a stout resistance, even having his men make several sorties to attempt to capture the American guns. All through the day of the 30th the strong walls of the mill were pounded by gun-fire, and all day the little British force answered with muskets from loopholes and windows. Wilkinson on the 28th had written to Dearborn saying that “we shall visit Lacolle and take possession of that place.” He had expected an immediate surrender at his approach. The opposition he was meeting paralyzed his faculties, and towards evening he drew off his force and hastened back to Plattsburg, having lost 13 killed, 128 wounded, and 13 missing. The British loss was 11 killed, 43 wounded, and 4 missing, about one-sixth of the total force under Hancock in this heroic defence of his position.

On May 5th, Sir James Yeo’s squadron, with over 1,000 troops, attacked Oswego, routed the garrison and destroyed or captured the batteries and stores. A gun-boat, the Growler, which had, besides her own armament, a cargo of seven long guns, was among the spoils.

Napoleon, on whose success the war party in the United States had counted when they committed their nation to the war, had now been deposed, and Britain, with a veteran army, was left free to devote serious attention to the war in America. In due course, Sir George Prevost received word that strong reinforcements were being despatched from England, and he was instructed to assume the offensive with a view of obtaining “immediate security for His Majesty’s possessions in America.” Some 16,000 men, veterans of the Peninsular campaign, landed at Quebec in July and August. A few regiments were sent to the Niagara frontier, some to Kingston, but the larger
ATTACK ON FORT OSWEGO
number were stationed in the district between Montreal and Lake Champlain.

On July 3rd, General Brown with an army of between 4,000 and 5,000 men crossed over from Buffalo and Black Rock to Fort Erie and immediately invested the fort, which was held by 137 men of the 8th Regiment, under Major Buck. The fort was untenable and Buck surrendered, the garrison becoming prisoners of war.

Brown immediately advanced towards Chippawa, where General Riall had come up with 2,000 regulars and militia from Niagara, determined to make a stand on the south side of Chippawa Creek. On the 5th, the forces clashed in a desperate fight. Riall, finding he could not hold the ground in face of vastly superior numbers, retired in good order across the bridge which spanned the creek at this point, and, on July 8th, retreated towards Fort George. The losses on either side were from 400 to 500 killed and wounded. General Brown, flushed with his success, advanced to Newark and invested Fort George and Fort Mississauga, but did not once attempt to pass within range of the guns of the forts.

General Riall, in order to reach the open and operate on the flank and rear of the enemy, executed a brilliant strategic movement. With a select body of troops he marched in the waters of the river and lake around the left wing of the United States Army, a distance of two miles and a half, until he got past the enemy's outposts, and then took the lake road towards Burlington, which he reached without being discovered. He now collected all the force available at Burlington, and, joining them with his own, proceeded to harass the flank and rear of the enemy, as they lay idle for nearly two weeks before Fort George. On July 23rd, General Brown, fearing that Riall might cut his lines of communication, broke up his camp before Fort George and retired precipitately to the Falls.

News of the situation in the lower Niagara was at once sent to General Drummond, then at York, and he crossed the lake, but did not reach Riall before the latter had been
threatened by Brown's army and was again retiring towards Fort George. Drummond saw that a battle was inevitable and that the hill at Lundy's Lane would be the centre of action. He at once rushed to this spot, and, anticipating the Americans, seized the hill. The enemy were rapidly approaching from Chippawa. At 6 p.m. on the 25th, the famous Battle of Lundy's Lane began by the Americans delivering an attack upon the British line, composed of the 89th, the 1st Royal Scots, the 8th Kings, and some of the 41st. These troops, with two field-guns of the Royal Artillery, held the crest of the hill, which the enemy assailed repeatedly, and were as often driven back, leaving the ground strewn with dead and dying. At an anxious moment, Colonel Hercules Scott arrived with the 103rd and detachments of the 8th and 104th, together with about 300 of the sedentary militia and two 6-pounders. They had taken a wrong road, and had marched over twenty miles in a broiling sun, but were still eager for fight. The enemy, who also received reinforcements, showed great courage and discipline and charged up the fatal hill again and again, only to be driven back by the bullets and bayonets of the British. In one charge they bayoneted the British gunners in the act of loading, and momentarily gained possession of the guns. Night had fallen, pitch-dark night, but the storm of battle, the flashing of cannon and musketry, raged along the heights. The muzzles of the opposing cannon were within a few yards of each other, and the combatants were so mingled in close fight, that, in limbering up the guns, an American 6-pounder was put by mistake on a British limber, and a British 6-pounder on an American one.

Colonel Scott on his arrival had plunged at once into the thick of the fight. The enemy at that moment made their last and supreme effort. They massed their columns under Colonel Miller and threw them madly against the lines of the British; but in vain. Their generals—Brown, Ripley, and Scott—were all wounded and had been carried off the field. On the British side General Riall
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BATTLE OF LUNDY'S LANE
was wounded and a prisoner; General Drummond received a severe wound, but would not quit the field while the action was indecisive.

After four hours of hard fighting and the failure of their last effort, the enemy, just before midnight, retired from the field, the darkness favouring their retreat back to Chippawa. Next morning, after destroying much of their stores, they retreated to Fort Erie, which place they reached on the afternoon of the 26th.

The loss of the British in the battle of Lundy's Lane was 878 killed and wounded, out of 3,000 engaged; that of the enemy, according to their own statement, 854, but General Drummond estimated it at 1,500; it was probably over 1,000.

Drummond now advanced to Fort Erie and began its siege. On August 11th, a party of British sailors, under Captain Dodds, R.N., captured the armed schooners Ohio and Somers, which were assisting in the defence of the fort, and on August 12th a sortie of the garrison was repulsed. On August 15th, a foolhardy attempt to carry the fort by storm cost the British 905 men. During the afternoon of September 17th, the garrison sallied from their works and attacked the British posts with overwhelming numbers. The advanced posts suffered severely on this occasion, and the enemy gained some advantage; but were eventually driven back with great loss. On September 21st, the British troops withdrew from before the fort, and retired upon Chippawa, Fort George, and Burlington Heights.

In October, the British having obtained the ascendancy on Lake Ontario by the launching of a large vessel, the St. Lawrence, of 100 guns, Sir James Yeo landed reinforcements and supplies for General Drummond at Fort George, and, on November 5th, the enemy, after evacuating and destroying Fort Erie, crossed to their own side of the river. The invasion of the Niagara Peninsula was at an end.

Let us now turn to the spot where the first blow was
struck by the British in the War of 1812. The Americans planned the recapture of Mackinaw. With this in view a combined naval and military expedition of five vessels and over 1,000 men was despatched there in July, 1814. On July 20th, this force burned the fort and barrack at St. Joseph's Island, which had been abandoned by the garrison. On August 4th, the troops were landed at Mackinaw and at once attempted to carry the fort by storm, but were driven back with a loss of seventy men. As the capture of Mackinaw by assault seemed impossible, it was decided to blockade it, and the schooners Scorpion and Tigress, which had figured in Commodore Perry's victory on Lake Erie, were given this task. On September 3rd, when these vessels were some five leagues apart, the Tigress was boarded and captured by a party of seamen and sailors under command of Lieutenant Worsley of the Royal Navy and Lieutenant Bulger of the Newfoundland Regiment. On September 6th, the Tigress, under United States colours, was used to effect the capture of her sister ship. And so the blockade of Mackinaw was effectively raised.

Under instructions from England, Sir George Prevost, on September 1st, 1814, crossed from Lower Canada into United States territory at the head of 11,000 picked troops, many of them veterans of the Peninsular War. The object of the expedition was the capture of Plattsburg, garrisoned by some 4,000 United States troops. On September 6th, Prevost reached the river Saranac, near Plattsburg, and halted to erect batteries to oppose enemy guns covering the crossing of the river.

Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, the naval officer commanding the British flotilla on Lake Champlain, were to co-operate in the attack upon Plattsburg. Downie, should the wind permit, was to come up the lake from his station at Isle-aux-Noix, enter Plattsburg Bay, and open fire upon the United States squadron anchored there, and assist in the attack upon the shore defences. Downie had under his command sixteen
vessels with an aggregate broadside of 1,192 lbs. Awaiting the British fleet were fourteen vessels of an aggregate broadside of 1,198 lbs. under Captain Macdonough. It had been arranged that as soon as the fleets were engaged, Sir George Prevost's troops were to launch an assault upon the land defences. The main attack was to be delivered from across the Saranac, but a strong brigade was dispatched by a circuitous route to gain a ford higher up the river, with the object of delivering an attack on the reverse side of the shore defences.

The operation, however, came to a most inglorious end. Downie's squadron found itself committed to action before it was in fit condition for battle, and the vessels composing it, in working up to the entrance of Plattsburg Bay, failed to keep their stations. Some of them, in the shifting, baffling wind, ran aground, while others failed to get into action in time. The United States vessels were anchored in selected positions from which their guns could bring a concentric fire to bear upon the British craft as they rounded a point of land at the entrance to the harbour. Of the total British flotilla, only eight vessels, with an aggregate broadside of 765 lbs. actually got into the fighting line. Captain Downie was killed early in the day. His flagship had to strike her colours, and the British flotilla was decisively defeated in short order. Sir George Prevost, although there were indications that the garrison in Plattsburg was on the point of retreating, thereupon countermanded all his orders, dismantled his batteries, and retired into Canada.

No incident of the war has been the subject of more criticism than this Plattsburg campaign. Much had been expected of it, and its dismal failure caused the greatest dissatisfaction. Sir George Prevost's explanation was that, after the defeat of Downie's squadron, the capture of the place could have been effected only by heavy loss of life, and he did not consider that a successful issue would have warranted the price his army would have had to pay. The object of the expedition, his supporters point out,
was not to capture Plattsburg and hold it, but merely to destroy the barrack and military depot there. There is no doubt that had Sir George Prevost persisted in his attack and effected the capture of Plattsburg, he would have been placed in a very difficult position, with the command of Lake Champlain in the hands of the enemy flotilla. The highway forming the only line of communication by land with Canada ran close along the shore of the lake and was liable to be cut by landing parties from the United States fleet. Prevost was summoned to appear before a court-martial to answer charges based upon the failure of this expedition, but he died in England before trial, at the comparatively early age of forty-eight.

The unfortunate affair at Plattsburg practically terminated the operations of the war in defence of Canada, although the war against the United States was prosecuted elsewhere. British naval squadrons blockaded the United States coast; the city of Washington, the capital of the United States, was captured and destroyed in retaliation for the destruction of York; and a force of British troops even ascended the Mississippi with the object of inflicting similar punishment upon New Orleans, but was defeated with overwhelming loss.

The war formally ended by the signing of the Treaty of Ghent, December 24th, 1814, and, by this treaty, all captured places were restored to their former owners. In it there was no reference to the right of search or to any other of the questions which were raised by the war party in the United States in 1812 as an excuse for declaring war upon Britain. When the treaty was signed, not one United States soldier of the many thousands that had been sent into Canada during the war remained on Canadian soil, except as a prisoner of war, and at no spot in Canada did the Stars and Stripes fly in token of conquest. On the other hand, the British flag flew over Mackinaw, and British forces controlled a considerable part of the territory of Michigan. The British also held Fort Niagara and a considerable portion of the State of Maine.
CHAPTER VI

LOWER CANADIAN REBELLION, 1837-38

THE War of 1812-14 left its inevitable aftermath of trouble. Two neighbouring countries, particularly when closely allied by blood, language, political ideals, and habits of thought, cannot go through three years of conflict without experiencing lasting evil effects. Men of broad vision, large-minded, unselfish, may find it possible to transform yesterday’s enemy into to-day’s friend, but such men are rare. Most of us, we might as well admit it, are built on comparatively narrow and selfish lines. And the average American or Canadian of this period, particularly if a citizen of one of the border towns, and a non-combatant, found it difficult for several years to tolerate his neighbour across the boundary. Trivial plots and squabbles, charges and counter-charges, kept the pot a-boiling, and made work for the diplomatic representatives of the two countries.

Despite all this, however, a period of peaceful stagnation fell upon the Canadian militia. Like the mother-country, Canada has never shown much interest in her “thin red line of heroes” except when the “band begins to play.” Her militia has been treated much like the umbrella, highly prized when the clouds lower, thrust into a corner when the sun shines. One is not surprised to find, therefore, that between 1814 and 1837 the subject of the militia was rarely raised in the legislatures of Canada, either Lower or Upper, except as a convenient political football.

The legislative action in Lower Canada can be summed up in a very few words. In 1815 the Militia Act was amended by legalized substitution, that is to say, a man drawn for service might provide a substitute. Provision was made at the same time to indemnify officers of the
militia for loss sustained by reason of the sudden disbandment of the several corps on the announcement of peace, and for various annuities and pensions to wounded soldiers and widows of men killed in action. The same year a proclamation was issued, offering pardon to all deserters from the army who should return to their regiments before the 7th of July. An attempt was also made, about the same time, to settle discharged soldiers on waste lands in the province. In 1819, the dominant party in the Assembly introduced a provision designed to ensure the appointment of French Canadians as officers of rural corps, and prevent the nomination of half-pay officers of the army. In 1827, the Assembly, with the object of embarrassing the Government, refused to renew the Militia Act. Their action, however, proved somewhat of a boomerang, as the lapse of the militia law automatically brought the old ordinances of 1787 and 1789 again into force,¹ these ordinances having been held in suspension by a clause in the law which the Assembly had refused to pass. In 1828, the Governor-General issued an order doing away with the racial qualification for enrolment in the regiments then composed of men of British and French-Canadian origin, respectively. According to Kingsford, the distinction was revived again for a time in 1847, through the influence of Sir Étienne Taché, then Adjutant-General, but was subsequently abandoned, at least in theory.

The Assembly had come out rather second-best in 1827

¹The Ordinance of 1787 provided for the embodiment of detachments of militia for two years. Dorchester obtained leave from the Imperial Government to embody three battalions, two to consist of French Canadians and one of British Canadiens. The Imperial authorities provided the clothing, but the commanding officers served without pay. Otherwise the plan followed closely that of the militia in England. Dorchester expressed the hope that the Ordinance "would have the effect of curing the dangerous supineness produced by the disuse of all militia service to train up youth in discipline and obedience, and to teach the people that the defence of the country is their own immediate concern." Two years later the Council passed another Ordinance confirming and strengthening the regulations for the militia.
and 1828, and a violent agitation against the ordinances followed, led by Papineau, Neilson, Viger, and other popular leaders. Some of the militia officers went to such lengths that Dalhousie cancelled their commissions. In 1830, the Assembly passed a Militia Bill which among other things reinstated the officers whose commissions had been cancelled. The Legislative Council removed the objectionable clauses, and, as the Assembly refused to accept the amended Bill, it was dropped. The same year another Militia Act was passed, superseding the ordinances of 1787 and 1789 and establishing a property qualification for officers, designed, as in the 1819 Bill, to prevent officers of the Imperial army serving in the militia. This was the situation, so far as the militia was concerned, at a time when political and racial unrest in Lower Canada was rapidly ripening into rebellion.

Before attempting to describe the military events of 1837 and 1838 in Lower Canada, it may be well to say a few words as to the causes of the rebellion. The situation in the French province was somewhat more complicated than in Upper Canada. Both rebellions were products of the struggle for responsible government in Canada, a struggle, be it remembered, maintained by many responsible leaders in both provinces who were determined to win their cause by constitutional means, and who had little in common with either Papineau or Mackenzie. But behind the struggle for responsible government in Lower Canada there was a purely racial movement, permeating the whole province, and much more potent as an incentive to extreme measures. Stripped of all verbal wrappings, it was mainly the demand—French Canada for the French Canadians.

So far as the struggle for responsible government was concerned, however one may deprecate armed rebellion as a cure for political evils, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in both Lower and Upper Canada, some such violent remedy was needed to convince the dominant minority that the long-suffering majority was really de-
Lower Canadian Rebellion, 1837-38 199
termined to take a share in its own government. Oc-
casionally it happens that nothing will serve but a drastic
emetic. We have heard a good deal of what Charles
Buller called the "deplorable imbecility" of Downing
Street, and this has by no means been confined to the
Colonial Office. Wellington expressed the view of most
English statesmen, including those governing the colonies,
in 1836, when he said: "Local responsible government and
the sovereignty of Great Britain are completely incom-
patible." Constitutional agitation would, no doubt, have
won responsible government in time, but the forces of
entrenched privilege die hard. The Rebellions, although
an ugly expedient, brought forth Durham's Report, and
the Union of 1841, with all that that meant for the future
welfare of Canada.

The Rebellion in Lower Canada broke out a month or
two after Queen Victoria came to the throne. It seems
incredible that within the reign of the Queen whom we
lost such a few short years ago, men were actually fight-
ing and dying for the right of self-government. Papineau,
Wolfred Nelson, Girouard, O'Callaghan, LaFontaine,
and other leaders of the Patriots, spent the first months
of the young Queen's reign in making fiery speeches to
enthusiastic crowds of their fellow-countrymen, who
adopted numerous resolutions, based on one or other of
the famous Ninety-Two Resolutions of 1834. This led,
naturally enough, to counter demonstrations at Montreal
and Quebec, at which the Constitutional party denounced
Papineau and his followers in unmeasured terms. Fin-
ally, groups of the rival factions in Montreal came to
blows early in November, 1837, and the whole town was
immediately in an uproar. Warrants were issued for the
arrest of Papineau and several other leaders of the
popular party, including Dr. Davignon and Desmarais.
The two latter were captured at St. Jean d'Iberville, but,
on their way to Montreal, a number of sympathizers
overpowered the escort and released the prisoners.

After this initial success, the rebellious farmers along
the Richelieu, ignoring the warnings of their Bishops, rose in arms. Sir John Colborne took command of the situation, rapidly mobilized the troops at Montreal, and sent one detachment under Lieut.-Col. Wetherall to St. Charles, and another under Colonel Gore to St. Denis. Colonel Wetherall had with him four companies of his own regiment, the First Royals, a detachment of the 66th, about 300 men, and two field-pieces. Colonel Gore took two companies of the 24th, one of the 32nd, two guns and a howitzer of the Royal Artillery, and a party of the Montreal Volunteer Dragoons, altogether about 250 men. The 24th and 66th had been sent from Upper Canada by Sir Francis Head, and the 83rd and 85th had been ordered up from Nova Scotia. The sedentary militia of the
province was in a hopeless state of disorganization, but volunteer corps were quickly being enrolled at Montreal, Quebec, and in the Eastern Townships.

Colonel Gore took his force down the river by steamboat to Sorel, where he was joined by Lieut.-Col. Hughes of the 24th, with two companies of the 66th. From there he moved toward St. Denis over roads that were veritable seas of mud. The rebels were busily engaged destroying bridges, and altogether it took eleven and a half hours to cover the distance, not quite a mile and a half an hour. The rebels were found strongly entrenched at St. Denis, and after several fruitless attempts to carry their position, Gore returned to Sorel. He had lost several men, and had found it necessary to spike and abandon his howitzer. The first engagement thus ended in a victory for the insurgents.

Meanwhile Colonel Wetherall had marched his force from Chambly to St. Charles. About a mile from the village the rebels opened fire on his men from a barn on his front, and also from the opposite bank of the Richelieu. The barn was promptly carried and burnt. The main position of the rebels at St. Charles was found to be well fortified and held by a strong force, with two field-guns. After a brisk exchange of fire, breaches were made in the defences, and the enemy's position was carried at the point of the bayonet. Both the Royals and the Montreal cavalry distinguished themselves in the final assault. Wetherall had three men killed and eighteen wounded. The rebel casualties were much more severe. Out of a force estimated at 1,500 men they are said to have lost between 200 and 300 killed, besides a number taken prisoners. At St. Denis the rebels lost 100 men out of an estimated force of between 1,500 and 3,000. Wetherall returned to Chambly on November 28th, scattering a large body of the enemy at Point Olivier on his way, and bringing in twenty-five prisoners.

Colonel Gore returned to Montreal and was sent out again to St. Denis, where he arrived on December 2nd,
with one company of the 24th, four of the 32nd, two of the 66th, one of the 83rd, and three guns. The rebels having fled, Gore left a garrison at St. Denis, and marched to St. Charles and St. Hyacinthe. Finding no trace of Papineau or his men, he returned to Sorel on the 7th, bringing with him the howitzer abandoned on the previous expedition, and destroying an iron gun left behind by the rebels at St. Denis.

By this time 2,000 volunteers had been armed and equipped at Montreal, and many more were ready for service in other parts of the province, including a very efficient corps raised by Colonel Jones of Missisquoi, which was guarding the Vermont frontier. Word had been received that a large body of rebels and American sympathizers had crossed into Canada from Swanton, and Lieut.-Col. Hughes with ten companies was sent to attack them. The Missisquoi Volunteers, 250 strong, had, however, anticipated the regulars, having met the rebels near the frontier and completely routed them.

Sir John Colborne now had at his disposal a force amply sufficient to meet all emergencies. In addition to the regulars, and the numerous corps of militia and volunteers in the province, all the militia corps in the eastern part of Upper Canada had volunteered their services, including the Glengarry Highlanders, the Grenville Militia, the Leeds Regiment, and the Perth Volunteer Artillery. Some 2,000 men marched to the aid of Colborne, giving him a total effective force of over 8,000 men.

Having pretty well cleared up the situation south of the St. Lawrence, Sir John Colborne turned his attention to the country north of Montreal, where the rebels had become very aggressive. Before describing the operations in this district, a few words must be said as to an incident that did more than anything else to injure the cause of the rebels. On November 22nd, Lieutenant Weir, of the 32nd, had been sent with despatches from Montreal to Sorel. Colonel Gore having left Sorel, Weir
ATTACK ON ST. CHARLES, November 25th, 1837
followed him, took the wrong road, and was captured by the rebels at St. Denis. He was pinioned, put in a wagon, and sent under escort to St. Charles. On the way he seems to have been foolish enough to enter into a dispute with his guards. The latter flew into a passion, shot him down, and brutally mutilated him with their swords. His body was weighted with heavy stones and thrown into the Richelieu, but it was subsequently recovered and brought to Montreal for burial. The result was that the attitude of the troops, both regulars and militia, towards the rebels was transformed from one of more or less impersonal hostility to a savage thirst for revenge. Many an unfortunate habitant of the Grand Brulé had to suffer because of the brutality of his fellow-countrymen on the Richelieu. "Remember Jack Weir!" became the war-cry of the troops.

On the 13th of December the Commander-in-Chief himself led an expedition, consisting of all the available troops, about 2,000 men, from Montreal to St. Eustache, in the Lake of Two Mountains district. Here some 1,200 rebels were collected, under Scott, Girouard, Girod, Chenier, and other leaders. Sir John Colborne sent Major Townsend, with a portion of the 24th and the St. Andrew’s Volunteers, to St. Benoit, and moved on St. Eustache with two brigades of infantry, the Montreal Volunteer Cavalry, and six field-guns. The infantry included the Royal Regiment, 32nd, 83rd, Royal Montreal Rifles, and Globensky’s Volunteers. The rebels had occupied the church and other buildings in St. Eustache, which they defended with stubborn courage. Colborne methodically surrounded the town, battered the buildings with his artillery, and poured volleys of musketry into the houses. The church and presbytery were finally carried at the point of the bayonet, the rebels resisting to the last. The losses of the rebels were appalling, many falling a prey to the flames in the burning buildings, besides those killed in action. Girod tried to escape, but, being overtaken, shot himself; several of the other leaders were killed or
wounded; 118 prisoners were taken. Of the troops, two men were killed and seven or eight wounded.

The rebels of St. Benoit, judging discretion the better part of valour, surrendered to Major Townsend, and Sir John Colborne, having witnessed the closing scenes of the “melancholy drama of the Grand Brulé,” returned to Montreal. The militia who took part in the expedition did credit to their traditions. “Nothing,” says Sir Richard Bonnycastle, “could exceed the steadiness and good conduct of the Montreal Cavalry, the Montreal Rifles, and Globensky’s Volunteers.” So ended the campaign of 1837. The leaders, with Papineau well to the front, had fled to the United States; and their unfortunate followers, realizing at last the hopelessness of their position, were thankful to be permitted to return to their homes in peace, where any homes remained to which they might return. The exiled leaders, having failed lamentably in their attempt to upset the Government from within, were still to see what might be done from without, with the assistance of their American sympathisers.

The early part of 1838 passed uneventfully in Lower Canada. Durham landed at Quebec toward the end of May, and found himself immediately confronted with the exceedingly difficult and delicate problem of what to do with the leaders of the rebellion. The High Commissioner would have been saved a peck of trouble if Colborne had settled this question during his brief reign as Administrator, but the bluff old soldier was far too shrewd to meddle with such double-edged affairs of state. It was enough for him to suppress the rebellion; Durham could have the dubious privilege of deciding the fate of the rebels. The High Commissioner, after much anxious thought, pardoned the rank and file; outlawed Papineau, Cartier, Perrault, Brown, and about a dozen other leaders of the insurrection who had fled to the United States; and exiled to Bermuda, Wolfred Nelson, Bouchette, Viger, Girouard, and many others who had been captured and were awaiting sentence in the Montreal gaol. Remem-
THE FIGHT AT ST. EUSTACHE, 14th of December, 1837
bering the fate usually meted out to rebels, exile to Bermuda seems a distinctly mild form of punishment, yet Nelson and his companions were looked upon as martyrs in Lower Canada. Durham had acted wisely and in the best interests of peace and good government, but he had exceeded his authority, in granting a general amnesty to the Rebels and deporting the leaders to a sister Crown Colony, and the Imperial Government, surrendering weakly to the clamour of the Opposition in the Imperial Parliament, repudiated his action. Durham in disgust resigned his High Commissionership and sailed for England on November 1st, 1838, not, however, before he had got together the material for his invaluable Report. Eventually all the rebel leaders were permitted to return to their native province.

Hardly had Durham left the country, and Colborne resumed for a time the reins of government, than the outlaws began to make further trouble. As part of a general scheme of invasion, a party of rebels and sympathisers crossed the boundary near St. Johns, in the Eastern Townships, armed with American muskets and ammunition. Fortunately the Government had had ample warning, and the rebels were dispersed by detachments of the 15th Regiment and the Dragoon Guards, a number being captured. About the same time revolt broke out again in Beauharnois, on the Chateauguay, and up and down the Richelieu. The homes of loyal settlers along the boundary were burned, and some of them murdered in cold blood. A number of armed rebels even had the temerity to appear on the south bank of the St. Lawrence opposite Montreal, and near the village of the Caughnawagas. The loyal Indians went out after them, raised the war-whoop, and captured the entire party.

Trouble also broke out again for a time in the Lake of Two Mountains district, and the volunteers were once more called out in Montreal. Colborne proclaimed martial law and took energetic steps to stamp out the rebellion. The scene moves again to the boundary, where,
on November 7th, about 500 rebels attacked the old mill at Lacolle, near Lake Champlain. The post was defended by a party of volunteers under Major Schriver. The rebels were utterly defeated, eleven killed and eight taken prisoner, the rest escaping across the boundary. Two volunteers were killed and one wounded.

Two days later Robert Nelson with force of 1,000 men, armed partly with muskets and partly with pikes and swords, marched against Odelltown, which was defended by about two hundred volunteers. The volunteers were completely surrounded, but gave such a good account of themselves that Nelson retreated, leaving fifty dead on the field. Of the volunteers six were killed and ten wounded.

The main body of the insurgents had gathered at Napierville, some four thousand strong. On November 9th, Sir James Macdonell marched against them with a strong force of infantry and cavalry and twelve field-pieces. The insurgents did not wait to be attacked, but took to their heels. The same day another body of rebels at Beauharnois was attacked and dispersed by the Glen-garry Volunteers, 1,000 strong, with 120 men of the 71st and 22 of the Royal Sappers and Miners, the whole under Colonel Carmichael. With the exception of an incipient rising at Boucherville, quickly suppressed, the rebellion in Lower Canada had now ended. The Montreal gaol was again filled to overflowing with rebel prisoners; Colborne had taken decisive measures to check any further attempts on the part of Patriotes; and the army of American sympathisers had come to the reluctant conclusion that Canada was too hot a chestnut to pull out of the fire.
CHAPTER VII

UPPER CANADIAN REBELLION, 1837-38

The really remarkable feature of the Rebellion of 1837-38 in Upper Canada was not the ease with which it was suppressed, but the fact that it was suppressed at all. By all the laws of chance the rebels should have been successful, at least until Sir John Colborne could muster sufficient troops to march against them without leaving Lower Canada at the mercy of Papineau. They certainly could not complain that the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Francis Bond Head, did not offer them every opportunity to succeed. That curious mixture of cleverness and egotism outdid himself in his quite original method of discouraging insurrection. A little over a month before the rebellion actually broke out he wrote Colborne, who had asked him to send down to Lower Canada any regulars he could spare: "What I desire to do is completely to upset Mr. Papineau, so far as Upper Canada is concerned, by proving to the people in England that this province requires no troops at all, and consequently that it is perfectly tranquil. I consider that this evidence will be of immense importance, as it at once shows the conduct of Lower Canada to be factious." Head therefore begged Colborne to take the 24th and 66th Regiments out of Upper Canada, lock, stock, and barrel. Even the guards at Government House were to be withdrawn. "I have not the slightest occasion for them [the two regiments]," and he added, with curious solicitation, "I am afraid you may find difficulty in finding room for them in the lower province." He had a large quantity of arms and ammunition in Toronto, but would not allow a man to be kept there to guard it. "The arms," he writes, "I have put under the charge of the mayor!" Yet Toronto was seething with
discontent, and Mackenzie only waiting for a suitable opportunity to raise the standard of revolt and seize the city. Could fatuity go farther? It was indeed no fault of Head's that the flag of the rebels did not fly over Government House on the night of December 4th, 1837. The utter failure of the insurgents, both in 1837 and in 1838, was in fact partly due to their own lack of competent leaders, but mainly to the splendid spirit of the Canadian militia, who placed the integrity of their country before all other considerations, and under the most adverse circumstances made the citizen soldiery of Canada a force of which any country might be proud.

The military state of Canada in the autumn of 1837 reflected that of the mother-country, where the usual period of lethargy and neglect of the army had followed the last war. In Canada, says a military writer of the period, "all the fortifications had become the cankered remains of a long peace. The guns, the swords, the bayonets rusted in the ordnance stores; and to mount a battery for the field or for a garrison was about as difficult an experiment as an artillery or an engineer officer could have had to perform. Twenty-two years of profound peace had made sad havoc in harness, in wagons, in carriages, limbers, wheels, drag-ropes, and the munitions of war. The very powder was so-so, and as for blankets and bedding, the moths had long ago consigned them to the sale-shops. Not a ship, boat, sail, or oar was in the Dockyard at Kingston, which had become a grazing pasture; and the sole charge of that right arm of the military service, the royal engineer department, was limited to patching up barracks which time had sapped."

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the struggle for responsible government was at the bottom of the rebellions in both Upper Canada and Lower Canada. Upper Canada was nominally governed by a Lieutenant-Governor, an Executive Council, a Legislative Council,

1 Bonnycastle, Sir Richard II.: Canada, vol i, p. 216.
and a Legislative Assembly. The Lieutenant-Governor practically centred in himself all the powers of govern-
ment now possessed by the Cabinet, Senate, and House of
Commons of the Dominion. He appointed his own
Executive Councillors, they were responsible only to him,
and he consulted them when, and only when, he saw fit.
The members of the Assembly alone were elected by the
people; yet they had practically no voice in the govern-
ment of the province. Public offices were controlled by
a small group of very estimable gentlemen who formed a
clique known then and since as the Family Compact.

Is it to be wondered that a large section of the popula-
tion of Upper Canada called themselves Reformers, and
demanded the same right of self-government which
Englishmen enjoyed in the home land? Unquestionably
this movement would have steadily grown in strength,
because of the entire reasonableness of its objects; and as
unquestionably it must ultimately have prevailed, with-
out stepping outside the boundaries of constitutional
agitation. But the methods of the majority of the
Reformers were too slow for the radical wing of the
party which, under the leadership of William Lyon
Mackenzie, decided to follow the example of the
Fils de la Liberté of Lower Canada, and appeal to arms.¹

Mackenzie, in his narrative of the rebellion, says that
it had been the intention to assemble at Montgomery's
Tavern, three miles north of Toronto, on December 7th,
march into the city, where the insurgents expected to be
joined by a large number of sympathizers, seize the arms
which Head had placed in the City Hall, take the Gover-
nor and his chief advisers into custody, and set up a gov-
ernment of their own. Through some misunderstanding
between Mackenzie and the other leaders, the rising was
precipitated on the 4th with a few hundred half-armed
men, instead of the thousands that Mackenzie had con-
fidently expected to lead into the capital. Even as it was,

¹See Lindsey, Charles: William Lyon Mackenzie, "Makers of Canada"
Series.
had there been any leader available with sufficient resolution to seize the opportunity, or any sort of unanimity among the rank and file, the rebels might quite conceivably have marched into Toronto, as Mackenzie advised, on the night of the 4th without serious opposition, taken possession of the arms, and won to their support the numerous class of men who follow a winning cause. What actually happened was that the rebel leaders disagreed among themselves, and vacillated from day to day between one proposed course of action and another, while their men deserted.

Meanwhile the Lieutenant-Governor had been rudely awakened from his sleep on the night of the 4th by reports that the rebels were about to attack the city. Colonel Moodie, a veteran of the War of 1812, had been shot while attempting to ride through the rebel lines. Others, more successful, had brought word of the insurrection. The bells of the city were ringing furiously. Head hurried to the City Hall, and saw to the issue of arms to the citizens of all classes who rallied about him. All men were loyal when the rebels were outside, and were threatening the city. Word was sent to Colonel MacNab in Hamilton, to Bonnycastle in Kingston, and to other officers in various parts of the province. Colonel FitzGibbon had taken charge of the organization in Toronto.

Head, it will be remembered, had sent every available man of the regulars out of the province. Fortunately, in spite of official neglect, the spirit of the militia of Upper Canada was by no means dead, thanks to the zeal and enthusiasm of a few far-seeing men like James FitzGibbon. FitzGibbon for several years past had been devoting much of his time to the organization and drilling of rifle corps in Toronto. Bonnycastle says that the effective militia of Upper Canada in 1837 exceeded 36,000 rank and file, consisting of 72 regiments of infantry, 5 organized companies of artillery, and 18 squadrons of cavalry. He admits, however, that this force could not at that time be said to be efficient, as it lacked
arms, drill, and discipline; the artillery had no guns, and, with the exception of a few rifle companies, the infantry had no muskets. "Yet," he says, "they were a fine body of men, the cavalry were all well mounted and equipped, the artillery well exercised by the regular gunners, and the infantry from their woodland habits were generally used to and dexterous in the management of the firelock and rifle." And Sir James Alexander adds, "when afterwards embodied and drilled by regular officers in 1838, there was not a finer militia in the world."

The imminent and ugly menace of armed rebellion, and the folly of the insurgents in killing Moodie, brought to the surface the latent loyalty of thousands of men who had been anything but friendly to Head. They had demanded responsible government in the past, and they would demand it in the future, but for the present they were chiefly concerned with the fact that the peace and security of their country was threatened. The consequence was that, while the rebels hesitated, any chance of success they might have had disappeared. Every day brought an increasing stream of loyalists into Toronto, from Hamilton, Niagara, Oakville, Port Credit, and many other centres. The great majority were members of one or other of the various militia corps, and knew how to shoot, if they had not much knowledge of drill. But as the numbers increased it became apparent that it would be difficult to find accommodation for so many, and impossible to arm them all, so that a large number were necessarily sent back to their homes. The remainder were quickly organized into an effective force for the protection of the Capital.

On the evening of Tuesday, December 5th, a number of the rebels were led towards the city by Mackenzie and Lount. Meeting a militia picket, they exchanged shots with them; then, as Mackenzie himself says, "took to their heels with a speed and steadiness of purpose that would have baffled pursuit on foot." On Thursday morning the militia marched out against Mackenzie,
whose headquarters were still at Montgomery's Tavern. The force, consisting of about 1,000 men, was under the command of Colonel FitzGibbon. It was divided into three sections. The main body, about 600 strong with two field-guns, under Colonel MacNab, marched out Yonge Street. The right wing, under Colonel Jarvis, followed the skirts of the wood; and the left wing, under Colonel Chisholm, marched up College Avenue. Head accompanied the main body. The rebels attempted to hold the woods in the vicinity of the tavern, but were quickly overpowered, and took to flight. A number of prisoners were taken and brought before the Lieutenant-Governor, who lectured them on the evils of their ways and sent them home. Mackenzie made his escape as soon as it became apparent that his cause was lost, and after many adventures managed to reach the United States. His enemies maliciously asserted that he fled disguised in petticoats. At his headquarters were found letters and lists of names that proved awkward to a number of men not hitherto known to be supporters of the rebellion. Rewards were offered for the apprehension of Mackenzie, Lount, Gibson, and other leaders of the insurgents. Dr. Rolph, who had been secretly assisting Mackenzie, left the country.

The Governor's Proclamation offering rewards for the capture of the rebel leaders is an interesting document, if only because of the characteristic terms in which Sir Francis Head describes his unfortunate opponents:

"One Thousand Pounds Reward for the apprehension of W. Lyon Mackenzie. He is a short man, wears a sandy-coloured wig, has small twinkling eyes that can look no man in the face—he is about five feet four or five inches in height.

"Five Hundred Pounds Reward for David Gibson. He is about five feet nine or ten inches in height, red-faced, sandy hair and red whiskers, which curl rather closely—rather round-shouldered—speaks with a strong Scotch accent, age about thirty-five."
“Five Hundred Pounds Reward for Samuel Lount, a tall man, say six feet or rather more, long face, sallow complexion, black hair with some gray in it—very heavy dark eyebrows—speaks rather slowly.

“Five Hundred Pounds Reward for Silas Fletcher, he is about fifty years of age, hair has been black, but now mixed with gray—speaks in a peculiar and quick manner—very quick in his motions—black whiskers and rather sallow complexion—about six feet in height, and upright.

“Five Hundred Pounds Reward for Jesse Loyd, he is rather an old man, say about fifty-five years of age, long straight hair rather thin and turning gray—stoops very much in his gait, has scarcely any teeth left—one remarkably prominent, which is much observed when he speaks, very round-shouldered, and speaks with a strong Yankee accent, height about five feet ten or eleven inches; generally dresses in a drab or brown home-spun clothing.”

It is said that many years afterward, when both Mackenzie and Georges Étienne Cartier were in Parliament, the former twitted the latter with the fact that the Government of 1837 had shown its appreciation of the comparative values of their heads. Cartier had been out with Papineau, and the price placed upon his then youthful head had been only three hundred pounds.

While the Toronto district had been engaged in the excitement of this mimic warfare, Kingston was not idle. The old town, with its immense depot of ordnance stores, provisions, gunpowder, arms, camp equipage, etc., some of which was still serviceable, was within easy striking reach of the United States border, which was known to be infested with Mackenzie’s American sympathizers. And many on the Canadian side were only awaiting a favourable opportunity to take up the cause of the rebels. The regulars had been sent to Lower Canada, and the officers in charge of the fort and batteries were entirely dependent upon the militia. When word was received of the outbreak at Toronto, the militia of Kingston
were organized, and within twenty-four hours militia-men were pouring into the city from the surrounding districts.

Bonnycastle, who was stationed at Kingston in 1837, gives a most interesting account of the organization of the defences of Kingston, and is warm in his praises of the loyalty, zeal, and efficiency of the militia. As at Toronto, so many corps marched into Kingston anxious to take a share in its defence that accommodation could not be found for them all, and a number of regiments were sent back to their homes, on the understanding that they would be called out if they were needed.

In addition to garrisoning the fort and batteries, arrangements were made to patrol the lake front of Kingston as well as all the landward approaches. The Queen's Marine Artillery, who guarded the approaches to the lake front, built a snow breastwork on the ice connecting Point Frederick Battery with Mississagua Point Battery. This was picketed each night, with the thermometer anywhere down to 27° below zero. The Frontenac Light Dragoons, a smart and efficient troop, did outpost duty around the town at night, and took over a portion of the line of despatch between Montreal and Toronto.

It is not without interest to know what uniforms the Canadian militia wore in 1837. According to Bonnycastle, the infantry at Kingston, that is, the Frontenac and Addington regiments, were clothed by the Government in a red flannel shirt, gray trousers, light gray greatcoat, woollen gloves without fingers, strong boots with iron creepers, and fur caps. Presumably the Leeds and Lanark militia were equipped with the same uniform. The Frontenac Light Dragoons wore a blue uniform faced with buff, and a bearskin helmet, provided by themselves. The Queen's Marine Artillery had blue pilot-cloth frocks-reaching to the knees, blue trousers, and large fur caps. The non-commissioned officers were distinguished by white anchors on the arm. They are described as a "fine and most formidable body of men." With such
complete preparation for defence, the rebels made no attempt at this time to attack Kingston.

In the London district, Dr. Duncombe, one of Mackenzie's supporters, made a tentative effort to raise the standard of revolt. Colonel MacNab was sent against him with 500 militia and volunteers. Duncombe fled to the United States and his followers were scattered.

Mackenzie, having escaped to the United States, made his headquarters in Buffalo. Here he set to work with characteristic energy to enlist the support of American sympathizers and organize an "Army of Liberation" to invade Canada. Rensselaer Van Rensselaer, of Albany, was appointed Commander-in-Chief and the occupation of Navy Island in the Niagara river was decided upon as the first step in the campaign against Canada. As Navy Island was unoccupied, the invaders experienced no difficulty in taking possession, but, to Van Rensselaer's disgust, instead of the several hundred who had volunteered to follow him to the island as a nucleus of the future army, exactly twenty-four men appeared at the rendezvous on December 13th. During the following days a number of recruits from the American side and a few Canadians joined the force. Van Rensselaer also managed to obtain several pieces of artillery from one of the New York State arsenals, with which he opened fire on the Canadian shore, doing some slight damage.

As soon as word was received of the occupation of Navy Island, 2,000 militia under Colonel MacNab were rushed to Chippawa, opposite the island. Sir John Colborne sent a detachment of artillery with several guns, mortars and Congreve rockets, the latter a formidable projectile in those days, filled sometimes with combustible material, sometimes with small shrapnel. At the same time Sir Francis Bond Head sent a formal complaint to the Governor of the State of New York, and also through the British Embassy to the federal authorities in Washington. But as no effective steps were taken to check the raiders, Colonel MacNab determined to take
the matter into his own hands. A small steamboat called the *Caroline* was being used to carry men and munitions from the American shore to Navy Island. It was decided to capture and destroy the vessel. This was no light task. The work must be done at night, in order to effect a surprise, and at a point not far from the tempestuous rapids that lead down to the Falls of Niagara.

Captain Drew, R.N., was put in charge of the perilous venture, with a picked party of volunteers from the militia. Toward the end of December they set out in boats on a dark night, boarded the *Caroline* as she lay moored to a wharf on the American shore, overpowered the guards and put them ashore, set fire to the boat, cut her adrift, and sent her flaming down to the Falls. This exploit aroused a storm of indignation in the United States. Americans found it possible to look on with more or less complacency while citizens of their own country, equipped with guns and rifles taken from their State arsenals, invaded a neighbouring friendly nation; but they denounced the cutting-out of the *Caroline* as an unspeakable outrage. For some time, in fact, it was doubtful if the incident might not result in war between the two countries. It was actually kept alive until 1842, when it was included among the matters for which the United States claimed compensation, when the Ashburton Treaty was being negotiated.

Throughout the early part of January, 1838, Van Rensselaer's men kept up a desultory fire on the Canadian shore, which was returned by the Canadian batteries. Finally a 24-pounder was mounted on a scow, taken upstream, and the guns on the island silenced. A brisk cannonade was at the same time maintained by the guns and mortars of the Royal Artillery at Chippawa. Mackenzie and Van Rensselaer, finding the situation too hot for them, evacuated the island on the 14th of January. Most of their followers had before this deserted to the American shore. The invading force fluctuated from
day to day, but it appears from an official letter from the United States Marshal for the Northern District of New York to President Van Buren, dated December 28th, that at that time the army was about 1,000 strong and well supplied with arms and provisions. Toward the end supplies ran very low, and the remnant of the army was threatened with starvation. So ended what has been called the "farce of Navy Island."

About the same time another group of sympathizers, under General Thomas J. Sutherland, made a joint movement from Detroit and Cleveland on Bois Blanc Island, in the Detroit river, with the object of attacking Amherstburg and marching inland to London, where they hoped to be received with open arms. The enterprise had been heralded by a Proclamation to the citizens of the new Republic of Canada. The Commercial Advertiser of New York did not seem to entertain quite as high an opinion as some of its Michigan contemporaries of the raiders and their raid. "The whole," it said, "forms about as magnificent a piece of vagabond impudence as ever fell within our observation."

Sutherland's invading force also was armed with guns, muskets, and ammunition taken from the public arsenals of the United States. Sutherland had secured a schooner named the Anne, two steamboats, and a number of scows to transport his men, munitions, and supplies to Bois Blanc Island. With these he made a reconnaissance on January 8th, but did not remain any length of time on the island. The same night Colonel Prince, with 250 volunteers, crossed over from Amherstburg to the island and took possession, but, as the town was threatened, this force was almost immediately withdrawn for its defence. A number of the brigands therefore landed on the island and went in search of loot, but secured only the wearing apparel of Captain Hackett (the lighthouse-keeper) and of Mrs. Hackett, and a valuable gold ring.

The following day the Anne cruised up and down the river, firing grape and canister into Amherstburg, but
carefully keeping out of range of the muskets of the militia. At sunset she sailed down past the town, again using her guns, though with very little effect. As she had a number of Sutherland’s men on board, Colonel Radcliffe, who commanded the militia, sent as many as he could spare down the river to watch her movements. About 150 were left in the upper part of the town near the King’s Store to guard against a surprise attack “from the brigand scows and boats.”

As the Anne neared Elliot’s Point, below Amherstburg, she again opened fire with grape and round shot and musketry. The militia briskly replied, the helmsman was killed, and the boat ran ashore. Dr. Theller, who seems to have been in command, refusing to surrender, the militia gallantly plunged into the river and boarded the schooner. In the words of a contemporary narrative, “a jolly little man of the name of Lighton climbed up the mast and hauled down her colours.” With the Anne were captured Theller and twenty of his men, three cannon, upwards of 200 stand of arms, and a large quantity of ammunition, stores, and provisions. Sutherland and the remainder of the army, variously estimated at from 400 to 1,200 men, returned to Detroit to prepare proclamations for another invasion.

Anticipating further trouble from General Sutherland, the militia and volunteers along the boundary from Huron to Erie lost no time in organizing their defences. This western part of the province had to depend mainly upon its own resources, as the eastern districts had their hands full guarding other threatened points on the long frontier. The men of Sandwich, Windsor, Chatham, and the other border towns rose nobly to the occasion. A partial supply of rifles and ammunition was obtained from Kingston, and the rest was furnished by the people themselves. Men like Prince of Sandwich, Dougall of Windsor, and Hamilton, sheriff of the London district, used their own private credit to purchase provisions and supplies. Of the three guns captured with the Anne, two were mount-
ed on old Fort Malden, and the third placed on board a schooner fitted up by Captain Vidal, R.N., of Sarnia. Altogether some 3,500 militia and volunteers, including 650 picked men under "Tiger" Dunlop, a force of cavalry under Askin and Hamilton, and 200 warriors of the Six Nations under Colonel Clench, kept watch night and day along the western frontier.

On the 27th of January, the United States Government, awakened at last to a sense of its responsibilities, sent General Winfield Scott with 300 regulars to preserve the country's neutrality along the Michigan boundary. Finding themselves thus between two fires, Sutherland and his Army of Liberation returned to their civil occupations, if they had any.

Mackenzie was not at all discouraged. He had succeeded in arousing the interest of a large number of Americans, many of whom sincerely believed that by joining the invading armies they would be releasing from British tyranny the down-trodden people of Canada. So-called Hunter's Lodges were formed all over the Northern States, money was provided for arms, equipment, and supplies, and the leaders prepared an elaborate scheme of invasion by which Canada would be attacked simultaneously at so many scattered points that success seemed beyond reasonable question. It has already been seen how the attacks directed against the Lower Canadian border came to naught. The invasion of Upper Canada proved equally futile. As a matter of fact the "Patriots," though amply supplied with the sinews of war, lacked a brain to direct their movements and inspire them in attack. None of their leaders apparently possessed sufficient genius to weld their loose organization into a real fighting force, or to work out a plan of campaign that offered any prospect of ultimate success. It was fortunate enough for Canada that this was the case, as both in Upper and Lower Canada there were still numbers of disaffected who only awaited an initial success of the invaders to join their cause.
Late in February, Van Rensselaer, who had moved his headquarters to the village of French Creek, on the American side of the St. Lawrence, prepared to raid Kingston. The plan was to advance simultaneously from three different points. One division was to cross the St. Lawrence and attack Kingston on its weakest side, near where the penitentiary now stands; another was to approach from the east; and the third, consisting of rebels from the vicinity of Belleville and Napanee, was to attack from the rear. Sympathizers had been sent into the town on one pretext or another, and these were to distract the attention of the defenders by setting fire to the houses and blowing up the magazine at Fort Henry.

Something might perhaps have come of this, but for the fact that Bonnycastle had found means of keeping himself informed of every move of the "Patriots," and had ample time to deal with the situation. Several companies of militia were directed to watch the Napanee rebels; barricades were formed and holes cut in the ice on the roads the insurgents must follow in crossing over from the American shore; and the spies in Kingston and at Fort Henry were quietly arrested. The result was that the rebels, instead of surprising Kingston, were themselves surprised; and the invaders never got nearer than Hickory Island, where they were attacked by the militia from Gananoque, and fled almost without firing a shot, leaving behind them a quantity of stores and ammunition. It was afterward learned that the same procedure had been followed by the insurgents here as at Buffalo and Detroit. The Arsenal at Watertown, N.Y., had been broken open on the night of February 19th, and from six to eight hundred stand of arms taken from it, while five pieces of field-artillery had also been obtained.

Towards the end of February, another attempt was made on Amherstburg by a "Patriot" force from Detroit and Sandusky Bay, with Sutherland again in command. Fighting Island, in the Detroit River, was occupied; also Point Pelée Island in Lake Erie. The frontier was now
guarded, however, by a well organized force of militia, with the addition of six companies of regulars, and seven pieces of artillery. A force of regulars and militia, with a 9-pounder, advanced over the ice to Fighting Island, and tried to intercept the “Patriots” before they could beat a retreat. They were unsuccessful in this, as the invaders rapidly retired to the American shore, from which neutral ground they fired upon the Canadians, who had been ordered not to violate American territory. On the island were captured a field-piece, muskets, rifles, pistols, swords, and ammunition.

About the same time the “Patriots” on Pelée Island were attacked by Colonel Maitland with two guns, six companies of regulars and militia, and the Sandwich and St. Thomas Cavalry. An attempt was made here also to force the “Patriots” to fight, and with somewhat better success. Driven back into the woods, they fought there for some time, but finally managed to escape to the American shore, carrying about forty wounded in sleighs. A number were killed on both sides. The following day Colonel Prince had the satisfaction of capturing Sutherland and his aide-de-camp on the ice.

The summer of 1838 was spent by the “Patriots” in sporadic raids across the frontier, generally trivial in character, and effective only in so far as they kept the militia constantly on the qui vive. On the 19th of May, that picturesque pirate “Bill” Johnston, who styled himself Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces and Flotilla of the “Patriot” Army, surprised the steamboat Sir Robert Peel among the Thousand Islands, turned the passengers and crew adrift, and burnt the vessel.

There remains one incident in the campaign of 1838 to chronicle, before the curtain goes down finally on the Rebellion in Upper Canada. On the 12th of November, a strong body of “Patriots” embarked at Oswego and Sackett’s Harbour, with the object of attacking Prescott. Checked here, they crossed to Ogdensburg, and the following day managed to effect a landing at Windmill
Point, below Prescott, where they took possession of a lofty stone windmill, and threw up intrenchments. They were attacked during the morning by a force of militia with a small detachment of regulars. Armed steamboats joined in the assault from the river. The "Patriots" were surrounded and driven into the mill, which they defended with determination. The siege was maintained until the 15th, when two 18-pounders and a howitzer were brought down from Kingston. Even these could make no impression on the solid walls of the windmill, but the "Patriots" by this time realized the hopelessness of their position and hung out a white flag. Eighty-six prisoners were secured, with sixteen wounded. A few escaped but were later captured, including the commander of the raid, General Von Shoultz. During the three days' engagement 102 of the invaders were killed and 162 taken prisoners. The militia lost thirteen killed and a number wounded.

It would be difficult to overestimate the value of the services performed by the Canadian militia throughout the campaigns of 1837 and 1838 in Upper Canada, but particularly in the upper province in 1838. The protection of an extremely long and exposed frontier devolved almost entirely upon the militia, and nothing could exceed the unselfishness with which they sacrificed all private interests to the public welfare, or the pluck and resourcefulness they showed in meeting every emergency. Major Bonnycastle, who was probably as well qualified as anyone to speak on the military side of the events of 1837 and 1838, wrote: "I am proud of the Canadian militia. . . . England need not fear for the safety of her Canadian possessions whilst 80,000 equally loyal, equally ready, and equally steady soldiers, are the children of the Upper Canadian soil."
CHAPTER VIII

FENIAN AND OTHER RAIDS

THE Rebellion of 1837-38 being a thing of the past, except for the bitter feelings it had engendered, the people of Canada once more began to lose interest in their militia. The militia had done their work, and the sooner they exchanged rifles for spades the better for the country. With the Union of Upper and Lower Canada, however, the question of defence again came to the front. Hitherto the expense of defensive measures had been to a very large extent borne by the Home Government. It was now felt by many in the mother-country that as Canada had been conceded the right to govern herself, she should assume with the dignities some of the responsibilities of her new estate. The same idea was demanding attention in Canada, but the average Canadian received it with rather mixed feelings. On the one hand his growing feeling of responsibility and self-respect urged him to take from the shoulders of the mother-country the burden of his defence; on the other, he had been so long accustomed to the protection of Britain’s army, Britain’s fleet, Britain’s prestige, Britain’s long purse,—that he took it all rather as a matter of course. Also he was still struggling, and must for many years continue to struggle, with the gigantic problems involved in civilizing the wilderness, cutting down the forests and cultivating the soil, building homes and school-houses, roads and railways. These problems of peace absorbed not only a great deal of his energy, but also most of his income. It was difficult to see where he was to find money for a Canadian army, and the innumerable expenses involved in the question of national defence. With his pride urging him one way and his purse another, mere stress of circumstance forced
him to pocket his pride. Even as late as 1861 Britain was still paying over £413,000 a year for the support of her regular garrison in British North America. In 1839, she had seventeen battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry in the Canadas, besides artillery and other branches of the service.

At the time of the Union the sedentary militia of Upper Canada mustered on paper 248 battalions with 117,000 men, and in Lower Canada 178 battalions with 118,000 men. Theoretically at least every adult male between eighteen and sixty in Upper Canada, and sixteen and sixty in Lower Canada, was liable to be called out for military service. Men were expected to volunteer, and did volunteer, but the law provided that, if a sufficient number did not offer, corps could be raised to strength by means of the ballot. This was essentially conscription, that bugbear of so many worthy people of the present day. There seems, indeed, to be a curious lack of information on this subject, for as a matter of fact conscription has always been recognized as the underlying principle of the militia laws of Canada. It was so before the Union of 1841; it was so in the legislation following the Union; and it is so now, for the Militia Act that is in force to-day contains the same provision for compulsory enlistment by ballot, when voluntary enlistment fails to provide the number of men needed for the defence of the country.

With the Union of 1841, the question of defence, as we have seen, once more became a live issue. There was much discussion, and the consciousness of national growth made the subject one for serious consideration, but it remained more or less academic until the sharp menace of danger from without quickened public interest. This stimulus came in 1846, when the long-standing dispute over the Oregon Boundary culminated in the slogan of American demagogues, "Fifty-four-forty-or-Fight!" One wonders, parenthetically, if the temporary popularity of this political war-cry depended most upon
its appeal to mob passion, or its alluring alliteration. However, what we are concerned with at present is its effect on Canadian public opinion. Undoubtedly, it was largely responsible for the adoption of the important Militia Act of 1846. This act consolidated the old Acts of Upper and Lower Canada, and made provision for an Active Militia. In case of war or invasion all able-bodied men between eighteen and sixty might be called out. The old idea of the Sedentary Militia was gradually giving place to the new system of a regularly organized Active Militia force. For once, the Opposition joined the Government of the day in carrying the measure through Parliament. Popular interest did not, however, outlast the enthusiasm bred of American threats.

In 1854 the Crimean War was responsible for an important agreement between the Canadian and Imperial Governments. Canada agreed to establish and maintain for defensive purposes a small active force, which in case of war or invasion would act as an auxiliary to the regular troops. At the same time Canada took over all military works and lands except the posts at Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Niagara, and Sorel. This was the first step in the withdrawal of all the Imperial garrisons from Canada.

The Crimean War, or the military spirit aroused in Canada by that war, also brought about the passage of the Militia Act of 1855. By this measure the country was divided into military districts, and the militia divided into two classes, "Sedentary" and "Active;" the former consisting of all male inhabitants, with the usual exceptions, between eighteen and sixty; the latter, of an organized force to be trained and equipped at the expense of the country. The Active Militia was to consist of 16 troops of cavalry, 7 field batteries, 5 foot companies of artillery, and 50 companies of riflemen, with engineer and marine companies; about 5,000 of all ranks. In 1856, the full number of corps authorised were raised, in some cases the officers and men furnishing their own equipment.
The stimulating effect of outside events also revealed itself in 1858, when the famous 100th, or Prince of Wales' Royal Canadian Regiment, was raised in Canada, as a direct result of the outbreak of the Mutiny in India. The regiment was recruited entirely in Canada, the commanding officer being Baron de Rottenburg, then Adjutant-General of the Canadian militia, and most of the other officers being Canadians. It consisted of twelve companies of one hundred men each. The regiment was trained at Quebec, and later at Shorncliffe, where it was inspected by the Duke of Cambridge, and received its colours from the Prince of Wales, who referred to this "spontaneous offering of the loyal and spirited Canadian people" as an act "which proclaims and strengthens the unity of the various parts of this vast Empire, under the sway of our common sovereign." The 100th Regiment served at Gibraltar, in Malta, India, and Ireland, and was at Montreal during the Trent Affair in 1866.

By an Act passed in 1859 provision was made for consolidating the scattered companies of militia into battalions, of not less than six or more than ten companies. The first to be grouped under the new Act were the nine companies in Montreal, which became the First Battalion Volunteer Militia of Canada, now known as the Prince of Wales Fusiliers. The following year four rifle companies in Toronto, with the Barrie and Whitby companies, were constituted the Second Battalion Volunteer Militia Rifles of Canada, now the Queen's Own Rifles. These are the oldest of existing infantry corps in Canada. It may be noted, however, that the Governor-General's Body Guard dates back to 1822, when it was organized as the Queen's Light Dragoons. The original troop was raised by Captain George T. Denison, and it is an interesting fact in Canadian military annals that this corps has been commanded by three generations of Denisons, all bearing the same Christian names.  

1 Colonel George T. Denison, grandson of the founder of the corps, has given a very interesting account of the Body Guard in his Soldiering in Canada.
Toward the end of 1861 another war scare further impressed upon the minds of the people of Canada the importance of military preparedness. The British steams-hip Trent had been stopped on the high seas by the U.S.S. San Jacinto under Commodore Wilkes, and Messrs. Mason and Slidell, Commissioners of the Confederate Government to London and Paris, forcibly taken off. The Trent Affair, as it was called, brought Britain and the United States to the verge of war, and Canada would necessarily have been involved. Many new militia corps were organized, and the entire force was brought up to a state of at least comparative efficiency.

Another result of the Trent Affair was the creation in 1862 of a Royal Commission, to report upon a scheme for the effective reorganization of the militia. This commission consisted of four political members, Georges É. Cartier, John A. Macdonald, A. T. Galt, and Sir Allan MacNab; two representatives of the provincial forces, Colonel Campbell, C.B., and Colonel Cameron; and an Imperial officer, Colonel Daniel Lysons, C.B. They recommended an active force of 50,000 men, with a reserve of the same number, and that the former should have twenty-eight days' training each year. The annual expenditure was estimated at over a million dollars. John A. Macdonald introduced into Parliament a Bill embodying the recommendations of the Commission. The Bill was supported by Cartier, Galt, and other members of the Government, but strong opposition developed. It was defeated on the second reading, and the Government went with it. The fate of this progressive Militia Bill drew from British statesmen and newspapers very frank warnings that Britain could not be expected to undertake the defence of Canada if Canadians refused to shoulder even a moderate share of the cost.

A Militia Bill introduced in 1863 enjoyed a better fate. A Militia Department was established, to be presided over by a member of the Cabinet. The militia was divided into three classes: first class service men, second
class service men, and reserves. The first two classes were to have six days' drill each year, and to be paid fifty cents a day. Provision was also made for military schools for the training of officers, and the organization of drill associations and cadet corps.

At the same time a separate Act was passed relating to the volunteer militia, providing for a force of 35,000 men, exclusive of commissioned officers. The design seemed to be to develop a volunteer service distinct from the militia, following English precedent. Volunteer officers had to qualify for their commissions before a special board of examiners, and enjoyed seniority over corresponding ranks in the militia. Arms and uniforms were to be provided by the Government.

In 1864, the action of a number of irresponsible Confederates, who took advantage of their asylum in Canada to organize a raid on St. Albans, in Vermont, again produced strained relations between Canada and the United States, notwithstanding the fact that the Canadian authorities had taken prompt measures to arrest the culprits, and to prevent a recurrence of the raid. Canada was in a somewhat difficult position during the Civil War, as many of her people strongly sympathized with the South, while others fought with the North. It can be said to the credit of both the Government and people of Canada, however, that they never forgot their obligations as a neutral nation. The provisional battalions sent to patrol the border after the St. Albans raid were told by the Commander-in-Chief that their sole duty was to aid "the civil power in its efforts to prevent aggression on the territories of a friendly state, on the part of persons enjoying the right of asylum in Her Majesty's dominions, and to maintain as regards Canada complete neutrality with respect to the war existing in the United States, which Her Majesty has enjoined on all subjects."

Two years later Canadian territory was subjected to similar raids from the United States side; but before describing these attempts of the Fenian Brotherhood to
transform Canada into an Irish-American Republic it will be convenient to glance briefly at the history of the militia in the Maritime Provinces.

Up to the year 1862, the militia of Nova Scotia, while it had on many occasions done gallant service, was very imperfectly organized. The companies elected their own commissioned officers, but knowledge of military affairs was not made a condition of the granting of a commission; in fact there was no means of acquiring such knowledge. The spread of the volunteer movement, however, brought a keener interest in military training. Volunteer companies were more efficient than militia companies, and the training acquired by the former was gradually extended to the latter by the offer of commissions in the militia to men of the volunteers. In 1860, the eight companies of volunteers in Halifax were organized into a battalion known as the Halifax Volunteer Battalion, afterwards the 63rd. This regiment therefore ranks third in seniority in the Dominion, the Prince of Wales' Regiment being first and the Queen's Own second. Provision was made in 1862 for regular drill instruction. The men provided their own clothing and accoutrements, and as there was no regulation as to style and colour of uniform the effect was somewhat bizarre. In 1864 a committee of officers decided to recommend "rifle green" as the most suitable colour, and this was adopted by all the companies except the Scottish Rifles, which preferred a dark plaid. Two years later the Government issued overcoats to the men, and the muzzle-loading long Enfield was replaced by the short rifle and sword bayonet.

In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the militia consisted at first of all white male inhabitants from 16 to 60. The age of service was afterward changed to 18 to 60. The New Brunswick Militia Act of 1862 divided the force into two classes: Active Militia, 18 to 45; Sedentary, 45 to 60. The former was divided into three classes: "A", volunteers; "B", unmarried men and
widowers without children; “C”, married men and widowers with children. Class “A” drilled six days each year and was provided with ammunition. The other two classes were enrolled and mustered one day in each year. The Sedentary Militia was not enrolled.

Between the War of 1812 and Confederation, the militia of the Maritime Provinces were only called out on active service on two occasions—in connection with the so-called Aroostook War in 1839, and the threatened Fenian Invasion in 1866. The Aroostook War was probably so named in derision, as, apart from politics, it was nothing but a tempest in a teapot. Ill-feeling had been allowed to develop in Maine and New Brunswick, particularly along the frontier, on account of the vaguely defined international boundary. There was a considerable area of land in the Madawaska district claimed by both countries under the loose wording of the Treaty of 1783. The Governor and Legislature of Maine attempted to take possession of the disputed territory. Sir John Harvey, Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick, sent a company of the 43rd Regiment to Grand Falls and another to Woodstock to protect the boundary. Guns and ammunition were also sent forward to arm the militia if it should be found necessary to call them out. At the same time Harvey issued a proclamation warning the people to avoid taking any hostile steps against the Americans. The situation was very tense, and it would not have taken much to start a conflagration which might have brought about another war between the United States and the British Empire.

The Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick reported the circumstances to the British Minister at Washington, for presentation to the United States Government. The Governor of Maine also made representations to Washington, and the United States Government found itself more or less on the horns of a dilemma. While it was making up its mind, the people along the border took the matter into their own hands. A number of New Brunswick
timber cutters seized a Maine official in the disputed territory and carried him off to Fredericton. The Maine people promptly retaliated by arresting a New Brunswick warden and taking him prisoner to Bangor.

The Governor of Maine got authority from the Legislature to order out 8,000 militia, and a vote of $800,000 was passed. He had already sent 200 men to the Aroostook, and now sent 600 more. Harvey ordered the 11th Regiment and a corps of artillery to Madawaska, and 850 of the militia to Woodstock. The Legislature was ready to co-operate with him in taking all necessary steps to protect the province, and Nova Scotia promptly showed its sympathy by authorizing the Lieutenant-Governor to call out 8,000 of the militia, and voting £100,000 to assist in the defence of New Brunswick.

Fortunately, when the situation had reached this critical stage, the Government of the United States decided to restrain the enthusiasm of the Governor of Maine. General Winfield Scott was sent to take command of the troops of the State, and instructed to adopt a conciliatory attitude. He immediately got into communication with Harvey, and offered to withdraw all the military forces of the State from the disputed territory, leaving only a civil guard to maintain order. Harvey agreed to this, and the Aroostook War evaporated. A certain amount of irritation was indeed kept alive for a time, mainly because of the persistently unfriendly attitude of the Governor of Maine, but it fortunately did not get beyond words. The ground of the controversy was finally removed in 1842 by the Ashburton Treaty, which settled the boundary between New Brunswick and Maine.

The militia of British North America was not again called out for active service until 1865, when the American branch of the Fenian Brotherhood planned an invasion of Canada to revenge the failure of the rising in Ireland of that year. General Sweeny, who had been elected Secretary of War of the "Irish Republic," prepared an elaborate plan of campaign involving simultaneous expeditions
from Detroit and Rochester against Hamilton, Toronto, and points along the Niagara and Detroit rivers; from Ogdensburg and Plattsburg against Montreal and Quebec; from Cape Vincent against Kingston; and from Portland against Halifax and Fredericton. Ample funds were available, recruits were being obtained in every quarter of the United States, Fenian fleets were to be provided on the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Great Lakes, and it was confidently expected that one campaign would suffice to bring all the British provinces under the green flag.

As the Fenian leaders made no secret of their intentions, the Canadian Government thought it prudent to call out a number of volunteer corps to protect the frontier. In November, 1865, these were sent to Prescott, Niagara, Sarnia, Windsor, and Sandwich. At the same time the militia were called out in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The winter of 1865-66 passed without any particular incident, but early in March it became known that the Fenians were planning a raid for St. Patrick's Day. On the 7th of the month the Adjutant-General of the Canadian militia promptly issued a General Order calling out 10,000 men for active service. The following day 14,000 volunteers had assembled at their company or battalion headquarters. The force was kept on duty for several weeks, the men drilling with the utmost enthusiasm, but as no move was made by the enemy most of them were sent back to their homes on March 31st.

Early in April an isolated attempt was made by the Fenians to seize the island of Campobello, in the Bay of Fundy. A vessel was sent from New York loaded with arms and ammunition, and the Maine towns of Eastport and Calais were overflowing with Fenians. The filibusters had, however, bragged of their intentions, and the authorities on both sides were ready for them. The New Brunswick militia were posted along the boundary; a battalion of United States troops under General Meade arrived in Eastport with orders to prevent any infraction
of the neutrality laws; and a number of British and American war-vessels lay off the mouth of the St. Croix river. When the Fenian ship reached Eastport she was promptly seized by the United States authorities, and the disgusted Fenians abandoned their projected raid. Meanwhile large numbers of men, with arms and ammunition, had been quietly assembled at various points along the northern boundary of the United States, from St. Albans in the east to Detroit in the west. General Sweeney himself made his headquarters at Ogdensburg. By the end of May all preparations had been completed for the invasion. Yet, although the situation was much more serious than on the New Brunswick frontier, neither the Canadian nor American authorities had made any effective preparations to prevent the raid.

Early on the morning of June 1st, the Fenians crossed the Niagara river and landed about a mile below the village of Fort Erie. Their forces consisted of about 1,500 men, mostly veterans of the Civil War, under General John O'Neil. No Canadian troops were anywhere within reach of Fort Erie, and the village was occupied without opposition. O'Neil, after cutting the telegraph wires and tearing up part of the railway track, marched his men down to Frenchman's Creek, and intrenched. Mounted scouts distributed copies of a characteristically bombastic proclamation among the Niagara farmers. Large reinforcements had been expected from Buffalo, but these did not turn up, and O'Neil, learning that Canadian troops were marching against him, decided to move forward and attack them. Early on the morning of June 2nd, he halted his men on Limestone Ridge, near Ridgeway, in a position peculiarly favourable for defence, and here awaited the Canadians.

A few hours before the Fenians actually landed on Canadian soil, the Headquarters Staff at Ottawa telegraphed orders again calling out the militia. The men responded with, if possible, even more enthusiasm than on the previous occasion, and within twenty-four hours
practically every militia unit in Canada was far over strength. By June 3rd, over 20,000 men were under arms, without counting scores of companies of Home Guards. Lieut.-General Sir John Michel was given supreme command of the forces, with Major-General James Lindsay and Major-General G. Napier commanding the troops in Canada East and Canada West respectively, or Quebec and Ontario as they would be called to-day.

The plan of campaign in the Niagara peninsula, where, as already mentioned, the Fenians were making their first demonstration, hinged largely on the protection of the Welland Canal, which O'Neil would probably attempt to destroy. It was also important to protect the Welland Railway, paralleling the canal. Troops were therefore concentrated at St. Catharines and Port Colborne, from which places they could be moved rapidly to any point that might be threatened, and at which supplies could be quickly mobilized. Under Colonel George Peacocke at St. Catharines were 200 men of the 16th, three companies of the 47th (regulars), and the Gray Battery, R.A. These were afterward reinforced at Chippawa by the Tenth Royals, two more companies of the 47th, the 19th Lincoln Battalion, and Stoker's Battery of Garrison Artillery, altogether about 1,700 men. Lieut.-Col. A. Booker had at Port Colborne the Queen's Own of Toronto, mustering 480 men, the 13th of Hamilton, and the York and Caledonia Rifle Companies, altogether 850 men.

Peacocke, receiving information that the Fenians had landed and were marching on Chippawa, decided to intercept them there. Very early on the morning of June 1st his force reached Chippawa. Neither tents nor blankets had been provided, and the men had to spend the remainder of the night in the open fields. Nothing, in fact, could have been much worse than the commissariat. The entire force on the Niagara frontier was sent out without stores or equipment. The men had to wear heavy winter uniforms in June, and, as military boots had not been provided, marched in their ordinary shoes.
Both at Chippawa and Port Colborne they had to depend on the townsfolk for food, or go hungry.

At Chippawa Colonel Peacocke learned that the Fenians were still at Frenchman's Creek, and immediately saw the opportunity of joining his forces with those of Lieut.-Col. Booker and making a combined attack on O'Neil's position. He sent Captain C. S. Akers, R.E., to Port Colborne with orders to Booker to meet him with his command at the village of Stevensville. Booker was to leave Port Colborne at 5 a.m. on the 2nd, proceed by rail to Ridgeway, and march from there to Stevensville. Peacocke proposed to leave Chippawa at 6 a.m., and expected to join Booker at Stevensville at about 10 a.m.

Peacocke's plan of campaign was admirable if the premises on which it was based had remained constant. Unfortunately, as sometimes happens, the enemy did not play according to rule. Instead of remaining at Frenchman's Creek, O'Neil had marched out toward Ridgeway. He had got wind of the proposed concentration against him, and, like the experienced soldier that he was, decided to force the issue with one of the opposing bodies before the junction could be effected. Even then, if Peacocke had reached Stevensville at the hour planned, and got into touch with Booker, O'Neil would have been caught between two fires, and could hardly have escaped utter defeat. As it was, Peacocke was two hours late in leaving Chippawa, took the wrong road to Stevensville, and, by the time he got word from Booker, the latter had met O'Neil and suffered a disastrous defeat. Both Canadian commanders were handicapped by the lack of cavalry. Had they been sent out with an effective force of mounted men they could have kept in touch with each other and with the enemy. It is true the Headquarters Staff, apparently as an afterthought, sent Major Denison, with the Governor-General's Body Guard, on the morning of the 2nd, to join Peacocke's column, but it was then too late to avoid disaster at Ridgeway.
Booker reached Ridgeway about 7 a.m., and lost no time in getting his force in motion. He now learned for the first time that the Fenians, whom he had supposed to be at Frenchman’s Creek, held a strong position immediately in front of him. Between two and three miles out the Ridge Road the advance guard, No. 5 Company of the Queen’s Own Rifles, came under the enemy’s fire. Supported by other companies of the Queen’s Own they advanced in skirmishing order, gallantly returning the fire of the Fenian sharp-shooters, and forcing them back to their main position. The 13th and York Rifles were now brought up to the firing line to relieve the Queen’s Own, who were running out of ammunition. The movement was executed with such steadiness and determination that the Fenians became panicky and were about to abandon their position, as O’Neil afterwards admitted, when one of those trivial incidents occurred that so often turn the tide of battle. Two or three Fenian horsemen were seen coming around the edge of a small wood. A cry of “Cavalry” came back from the front, and Colonel Booker hastily gave the order! “Prepare for Cavalry!” The Queen’s Own promptly formed square on the road, and became exposed to a deadly fire from the enemy. Booker immediately discovering his error, ordered the battalion to “Reform Column,” and fall back, as they were too close to the skirmish line. The bugles sounded the “Retire.” The 13th, thinking a general retreat had been ordered, fell back hurriedly, and in a moment the whole line had broken into a panic. O’Neil, grasping the situation, ordered his men to advance. The Fenians poured volley after volley into the disorganized militia, and drove them down the road to Ridgeway. Having thus snatched victory out of defeat, O’Neil did not attempt to press his advantage. He dared not risk a battle with Peacocke with the men he had, and turned back to Fort Erie, hoping to find there reinforcements from Buffalo. Booker got his force together at Ridgeway Station, and retreated to Port Colborne. He had had
FENIAN RAID AND NORTH-WEST MEDALS
ten men killed in the skirmish, besides thirty-eight wounded. The Fenian casualties were comparatively slight.

Meanwhile Lieut.-Col. Stoughton Dennis had, on his own responsibility, organized an expedition from Port Colborne. Taking the Dunnville Naval Brigade and the Welland Canal Field Battery, without their guns, he proceeded in the steamer W. T. Robb to Fort Erie, where he landed his men and picked up a number of Fenian stragglers. Placing these on board the boat under guard, he ordered the Battery and Naval Brigade to remain on shore. The other officers remonstrated, as it was reported that the Fenians were marching back to Fort Erie in force, but Dennis scouted the idea and insisted on his orders being obeyed. He discovered his mistake, but too late to re-embark his men. They were surrounded by the Fenians. Dennis managed to make his escape, but the seventy-six men of the Naval Brigade and the Field Battery fought most gallantly against tremendous odds. Disputing every foot of ground, they retired doggedly through the village. Part of the Battery took possession of a frame building and resisted the furious attacks of the Fenians until their ammunition was exhausted. What remained of the Naval Brigade fought their way down the River Road, were finally picked up by the W. T. Robb, and triumphantly brought fifty-nine Fenian prisoners into Port Colborne.

Col. Peacocke, learning of the disastrous fight at Ridge-way, and of the retreat of O’Neil to Fort Erie, marched his force toward that village, where he arrived on the morning of June 3rd. To his mortification the bulk of the Fenian army had made its escape across the river, but a number of stragglers were picked up on the Canadian side. The U.S.S. Michigan had also gathered in some 600 or 700 Fenians on their way from Fort Erie to Buffalo.

An incident worth remembering, in view of his close connection with another of Canada’s little wars, was the presence of Colonel Garnet Wolseley throughout the
closing events of the Fort Erie raid, as Assistant Quartermaster-General on Sir John Michel's staff. But a more memorable fact was the patriotism displayed by scores of Canadians in returning from the United States to take their places in the ranks of the militia.

The Fenian Commander-in-Chief evidently intended the demonstration at Fort Erie to be part of a concerted attack at a number of points along the International Boundary, but his plans woefully miscarried. Not only did Ridgeway give him his one and only triumph, and that a very temporary triumph, but it was the only occasion on which at any point along the long boundary he was able to gain even a momentary foothold on Canadian soil. At every point that appeared to be seriously threatened—Kingston, Brockville, Prescott, Cornwall, the Eastern Townships, and the Western frontier from Sarnia to Amherstburg—the regulars and militia were waiting eagerly for the first move on the part of the Fenians. Special interest centred in the situation at Cornwall, as Sweeny himself was known to be directing the preparations on the other side of the river for an attack on the town and canals. It was therefore thought necessary to concentrate a strong force at this point, and Colonel Pakenham of the 30th Regiment (regulars) had under his command a portion of his own regiment with the King's Own Borderers, the 14th Battalion of Kingston, the 11th Argenteuil Rangers, the 6th Hochelaga Light Infantry, two companies of the Ottawa Rifles, two Cornwall Companies, and a portion of the Ottawa Field Battery, making altogether a force of over 2,000 men.

A small but effective naval force was also provided on the Great Lakes. The W. T. Robb with the Dunnville Naval Brigade and a detachment of the St. Catharines Garrison Battery, as already mentioned, was employed patrolling the Niagara river and the lower end of Lake Erie. The Toronto Naval Brigade, on the Rescue, did equally efficient work on the upper portion of Lake Erie and the Detroit river. The ferry steamer Michigan
was also taken into commission for service along the western frontier, and was manned with British sailors from H.M.S. Aurora, then at Quebec. Shortly afterwards the Toronto Naval Brigade was transferred to the Magnet for service on Lake Ontario, and another detachment from the Aurora took its place on the Rescue. Each of these boats was protected with boiler plates and heavy planking, and equipped with Armstrong ship-guns, 9- and 12-pounders. The Wabuno was also armed for patrol duty on Georgian Bay; the St. Andrew and Watertown on the Upper St. Lawrence. The gun-boat Royal was fitted out at Montreal and sent up through the St. Lawrence canals. There were also at Montreal H.M.S. Rosario and the gun-boats Canada and Hercules. Altogether, whether on land or water, Canada was so well prepared for the Fenians that for the most part they had to content themselves with idle threats.

One slight episode on the Eastern Townships border calls for brief consideration. On the 2nd of June about 1,800 Fenians, under General Spier, had collected at St. Albans, Vermont. A day or two later 400 more arrived. These were all from New England, and formed a part of the "Right Wing of the Irish Republican Army." Spier had been promised 13,000 troops, with an ample supply of arms and ammunition. Only 2,200 turned up, and many of these were without arms, but he had to do something to keep his men together. On the 4th, therefore, he led a force of 1,000 men over the boundary into Missisquoi County, and planted the green flag of the Brotherhood on the summit of Pigeon Hill.

When the Fenians crossed the border, Captain W. Carter, of the 16th Regiment, with about 100 volunteers, was in the neighbourhood of Pigeon Hill. As he was far outnumbered by the enemy, Carter decided to withdraw his men and await reinforcements. For this action he was subsequently officially reprimanded, and it is said that his troops "never forgave him for what they considered an exhibition of cowardice." It was more prob-
ably due to Carter's lack of confidence in the steadiness of his raw volunteers against such odds.

General Spier waited at Pigeon Hill for several days for the reinforcements and arms promised by General Sweeny, but as the former did not arrive and the latter were promptly seized by the United States authorities, he decided that there was nothing for it but to return the way he had come. Probably he was helped to this humiliating decision by the fact that his small army was rapidly disintegrating, and that if he did not promptly lead the remnant back across the border, they would leave him to defend Pigeon Hill alone. Finally, to heap insult upon injury, the Fenian general and his staff were promptly arrested by an officer of the United States Army as they re-entered Vermont.

The only actual encounter between the Fenians and Canadian troops during the course of this extraordinary invasion, occurred a few miles from Pigeon Hill, where a party of forty Montreal Guides attacked a body of Fenians, killed several, and carried sixteen prisoners to Montreal, without a single casualty on their own side. Toward the end of June a remnant of Spier's army, which had remained behind when the rest scattered to their homes, made a little raid of their own on Pigeon Hill, then defended by a detachment of the Richelieu Light Infantry. After exchanging a few shots, the British force attempted to cut off the retreat of the Fenians and capture the entire party, but without success. There were no casualties on either side.

At Ogdensburg, Watertown, Malone, and Potsdam, on the St. Lawrence, the main body of the Irish Republican Army gathered under General Sweeny for an invasion in force, which would lead, as they hoped, to the capture of all the frontier towns from Kingston to Cornwall, and ultimately of Ottawa and Montreal. They found, however, that the Canadians were fully prepared for them in front; and General Meade, of the United States Army, was behind them, determined to prevent a
breach of neutrality. They were between the devil and the deep sea, and could do absolutely nothing. General Meade ordered the seizure of all arms and ammunition intended for use by the Fenians, and sternly warned them that he would enforce the law at all hazards. Within a few days General Sweeny and several other leaders were arrested; and, finally, Colonel Roberts, President of the Irish Republic, had to submit to the indignity of imprisonment in a common jail. Nothing remained for the Irish Republican Army but to disband and postpone to another day the capture of Canada.

In relieving the militia from active service the Commander-in-Chief warned them that they should lose no opportunity of perfecting themselves in drill and discipline, and should hold themselves in readiness for another call to arms at any time, as the Fenians had made no secret of their determination to renew the attempt to invade Canada at the first possible opportunity. This opportunity did not come, or at any rate was not used, until the spring of 1870. General O’Neil, who had led the invading army at Ridgeway, was now President of the Fenian Brotherhood, and, for reasons best known to himself, decided that the time was ripe for another attempt to drive the hated English out of Canada. Warned by the experience gained at such cost in 1866, the Fenians exercised the utmost caution in transporting munitions to the frontier and storing them where they would be safe from the prying eyes of the United States officials. They actually succeeded in secreting at various places from Ogdensburg to St. Albans, 15,000 stand of arms and 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

At this time the militia of Canada were in better shape to meet a Fenian invasion than they had been in 1866. During the intervening years the military spirit of the country had been kept alive by recurring threats of impending raids. Confederation, too, by consolidating the scattered provinces of British North America had given the Canadian people a sense of growing power and at the
same time a sense of growing responsibility. This feeling was made tangible in the Militia Act of 1868, which in many respects represented a long step forward in the development of an effective defensive force. With a few subsequent amendments this is still the military law of the Dominion. The militia consisted of all the male inhabitants of Canada between eighteen and sixty, not exempted or disqualified by law, and being British subjects by birth or naturalization. In case of need the Crown was given authority to call out all male inhabitants capable of bearing arms. The militia was divided into Active and Reserve. The former consisted of three classes; Volunteer, Regular, and Marine. The first embraced corps raised entirely by voluntary enlistment; the second, volunteers, supplemented when necessary by men ballotted to serve; the third, seamen. The Reserve included all men not serving at the time in the Active Militia. The four original provinces were divided into nine military districts, and these subdivided into twenty-two brigade divisions, and again into regimental divisions; provision was also made for a Headquarters Staff. Annual pay-drill was provided for 40,000 men, for not less than eight or more than sixteen days annually. The militia could be called out in aid of the civil power. At the end of the year 1868 the nominal strength of the Active Militia was 37,170 of all ranks, divided as follows: Ontario, 21,816, Quebec, 12,637, Nova Scotia, 928, New Brunswick, 1,789.

To return to the Raid of 1870, nothing could have been better than O'Neil's preliminary arrangements. He had arms and ammunition for 15,000 men, and all that remained was to smuggle them quietly to the boundary, slip across before either the United States or Canadian Governments could get wind of his intentions, and seize strategical points in Canada. But there are spies and traitors in every camp, and the Fenian Brotherhood proved no exception to the rule. The Canadian authorities, instead of being caught napping, were kept
informed of every move of the enemy, and had ample leisure to prepare a warm reception. Early in April, some 5,000 men were called out for service along the Quebec frontier and stationed at Frelighsburg, Huntingdon, and Beauharnois, while a portion of the force was held in reserve at Montreal. On April 12th, further troops were called out to guard the western frontier at Sarnia and Windsor. The Fenians made no move, however, and before the end of the month all the troops were withdrawn.

Finally, the 24th of May was decided upon in the Fenian councils as the day for the great adventure, and the Eastern Townships were to be the scene of the first attack. O'Neil made his headquarters at Franklin, Vermont, where several thousand men had been directed to concentrate on that day. The Fenian general waited impatiently until the morning of the 25th, but at that time only 800 men had reported. The United States Government had now become fully aware of the Fenian plans, and on the 24th President Grant had issued a proclamation forbidding any breach of neutrality. O'Neil knew that to wait any longer would invite certain disaster, as he would be caught between Canadian troops on one side and those of the United States on the other. General Foster, on behalf of the United States Government, had already warned him that he would be held responsible for any infraction of the law. He therefore determined to lead what men he had across the border, and endeavour to establish himself on Canadian soil until reinforcements could be sent over.

Just across the boundary was a strong natural position known as Eccles Hill. This had been occupied on the night of the 24th by some thirty Canadian farmers organized as a Home Guard. This gallant little band of sharp-shooters were determined to hold the Fenians in check until relieved by the militia. Had the Fenians carried out their original plan, and crossed the boundary on the 24th, they would have found none to oppose them
but this handful of men. That night, however, Colonel Brown Chamberlin reached Stanbridge, and sent reinforcements to Eccles Hill. All that he had available was a single company of the 60th, and with these and the Home Guard, altogether two officers and seventy-one men, he prepared on the morning of the 25th to hold the frontier against the Army of the Irish Republic.

Shortly after noon the enemy appeared, crossed the boundary at the double, and attacked Eccles Hill. They were met with such a determined and well-directed fire that they immediately broke and sought cover behind buildings and stone fences and in a neighbouring wood. One of the Fenian advance guard was killed in the first volley and several wounded. For some time fire was kept up on both sides. The Canadians were determined to hold their position at all cost, and the Fenians, despite their overwhelming superiority, apparently lacked the courage to make a serious attack on the hill.

Some time after the first assault of the Fenians, Colonel Osborne Smith reached Eccles Hill, and, about half-past two, the defending force was reinforced by a company of the Victoria Rifles and twenty additional men of the 60th. Toward evening the Fenians brought up a field-gun and were about to open fire, when Colonel Smith ordered the advance. The little Canadian force moved forward with such resolution and steadiness that the enemy broke in all directions and were soon in full flight back across the boundary. They lost altogether four or five men killed and about eighteen wounded. Throughout the engagement not a single Canadian was even wounded. As he reached the boundary, O'Neil was arrested and sent to St. Albans. The following day large reinforcements of Fenians arrived at Franklin, but too late to retrieve the situation. The Canadian side was now guarded by a strong force of militia; American troops were on the other side determined to maintain order; the Fenian general had been arrested, and the Army of the Irish Republic melted away.
Fenian attacks had also been projected along the St. Lawrence, Niagara, and St. Clair frontiers, but here the militia were fully prepared for them, and the United States authorities took vigorous measures to prevent any repetition of the raid. Most of the Fenian leaders were arrested, and their followers, bitterly denouncing an unsympathetic Government, scattered to their homes.

The irrepressible O'Neil made one final attempt to invade Canada. In October, 1871, taking advantage of the unrest in Manitoba following the suppression of the Riel Rebellion, and counting on the enthusiastic support of the half-breeds, he organized a raid from Pembina, on the Minnesota frontier. A Canadian force of approximately 1,150 men was about to march out from Winnipeg to attack O'Neil. Part of this force, 215 men, had just arrived from the east by the route followed by Wolseley the previous year. The action of the Canadian troops, however, was anticipated by the United States authorities. Under arrangements with the Canadian authorities, Lieut.-Col. Lloyd Wheaton, who was in command of the American troops at Fort Pembina, was instructed by the United States Federal Government to see that the neutrality laws were preserved. When the Fenians crossed the boundary he immediately followed them into British territory and promptly arrested the whole expedition. So ended the last attempt of the Fenian Brotherhood to strike at the ancient British enemy through Canada.
CHAPTER IX

RED RIVER REBELLION, 1869-70

FEW spots in Canada have had a more dramatic history than that where the very modern and practical city of Winnipeg stands to-day. La Vérendrye, the intrepid Canadian explorer, reached this spot in 1738, in his romantic search for the Western Sea. Here he built Fort Rouge, first of many trading posts about the forks of the Assiniboine and the Red. Up these waters came the enterprising fur-traders of the North-West Company, and their rivals of the Hudson’s Bay Company, bartering trinkets for furs with Cree and Assiniboine. Here Selkirk established his famous settlement; and here, also, in 1816, the bad blood between the two companies culminated in the tragic incident of Seven Oaks. In the village of St. Boniface, across the river from Winnipeg, was born in 1844 one Louis Riel, destined to emulate Papineau and Mackenzie in an even more futile attempt at insurrection.

Riel was a Métis, or French half-breed. He was educated for the priesthood at St. Boniface and the Seminary of Montreal, but his restlessness and ill-balanced mind made such a career impossible. His father had been a popular leader of the half-breeds in the Red River Colony, and the son aspired to follow in his footsteps. Such an ambition was readily gratified. His education, while it could not transform a mind essentially narrow, gave him a distinct advantage over his fellow-countrymen. The cheap arts and eloquence of a demagogue, which were his principal assets, carried him far with the simple-minded Métis of the Red River. The times also were propitious; for the West was on the threshold of a new era, and the régime of the fur-trader was drawing to its close. The Métis was losing his grip on the life
that he knew. The buffalo, his staff of life, was vanishing; and the old Company, whose paternal rule had been familiar to himself, his father, and his father's father, was, as a fur-trading company, rapidly falling into decay. The air was full of disquieting rumours of change; the Métis was worried and suspicious, and he was glad to put his trust in one of his own people, one who had been out into the world and could put into fiery words his own voiceless protest against the breaking up of his little kingdom.

This was the inflammable material to which Riel put the torch in 1869. Much has been written about the causes of the Rebellion, and probably no two writers are quite in agreement in fixing the responsibility. The difficulty has been increased because of the racial and religious passions aroused as an aftermath of the Rebellion, passions that have influenced more or less nearly everything written on the subject. The fact seems to be that the Rebellion was largely the result of obtuseness on the part of the Canadian Government and its officers. They had to deal with a community of simple-minded and ignorant half-breeds, jealous of their privileges and suspicious of outside interference. Had the situation been handled tactfully, it is more than probable that it would never have got beyond control. Riel was a firebrand, but he would have been powerless to start a conflagration if the Canadian Government had not played into his hand.

Here are the essential facts. After prolonged negotiations, an agreement had been reached, between the Imperial and Canadian Governments and the Hudson's Bay Company, for the transfer to Canada of the immense territories claimed by the Company under its charter. The negotiations had been carried on and brought to completion without either the Red River settlers or the officers of the Company in the West having been consulted. Both naturally resented the cavalier way in which they had been treated. Added to this,
the Canadian Government, without waiting for the Imperial Order-in-Council transferring the territory to the Dominion, sent out surveying parties early in 1869 to build a highway between the Lake of the Woods and the Red River, and to survey the country. The settlers, who held their land from the Hudson's Bay Company, had been given farms laid out in narrow strips, each with a frontage on the Red or Assiniboine Rivers, on much the same system as that which prevails in the province of Quebec. The Dominion surveyors proceeded to run their lines through these farms, with the object of dividing the country into square blocks of 640 acres. A little patience and common-sense would have paved the way to a satisfactory arrangement, but, unfortunately, both were lacking. The half-breeds became alarmed, feeling that they were to be despoiled of their farms. Riel saw his opportunity, mustered his followers, intercepted the surveyors, and ordered them out of the country. This was the first act in the drama. The Canadian Government had accomplished nothing. Its authority had been weakened. And Riel had scored his first triumph.

The leader of the Métis now turned his attention to bigger game. William McDougall had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the new Territory, and had been sent out to organize the Government. He reached Pembina, by way of St. Paul, late in October, 1869, and was there handed the following communication:

"A Monsieur W. McDougall,—

"Monsieur,—Le comité national des Métis de la "Rivière Rouge intime à Monsieur W. McDougall l'ordre "de ne pas entrer sur le territoire du nordouest, sans une "permission speciale de ce comité.

"Par l'ordre du President, John Bruce,

"Louis Riel, Secretary.

"Daté à St. Norbert, Rivière Rouge

"ce 21e jour d'Octobre, 1869."
Some little time before, Riel had called the Métis together and organized a Provisional Government, with a half-breed named John Bruce as the nominal head, but with himself as the man behind the throne. This arrangement not proving convenient, Riel subsequently assumed the presidency himself.

Here, then, was a pretty situation for a man anxious to assume the dignity and importance of a governor of a new province. McDougall had reached the frontier of his province, but the people would have none of him. Indignantly he ignored Riel's message, crossed the boundary, and advanced a mile or two beyond. There, however, he found the road barricaded and held by an armed party of Métis, who threatened to drive him over the boundary by force if he offered any resistance. Feeling that discretion was the better part of valour, he returned to Pembina.

His position was extremely awkward and humiliating. He could neither advance nor retreat. Riel barred his way; his appeals to the officers of the Hudson's Bay Company and the loyal settlers at Red River were coldly received; and, on the other hand, the Government would not sanction his return to Ottawa. Sir John Macdonald wrote him: "I hope no consideration will induce you to leave your post—that is, to return to Canada just now. Such a course would cover yourself and your party with ridicule, which would extend to the whole Dominion." There was nothing for it but to accommodate his dignity to the uncongenial surroundings of Pembina, and await the course of events.

Riel now felt that the situation was ripe for another move. He needed the sinews of war, and there was just one source from which they could be obtained,—the Hudson's Bay Company. Governor McTavish was seriously ill, and there was no other officer of the Company with sufficient resolution to oppose the leader of the half-breeds. Riel marched one hundred of his men from the River Sale, where he had humbled the repre-
sentative of the Canadian Government, to Fort Garry, and treated with scant courtesy the representative of the once all-powerful Hudson's Bay Company. Once intrenched in the fort, his position was secure. He controlled unlimited supplies of provisions and other stores, and, most important of all, arms and ammunition for his men, together with several cannon. The loyal settlers were now entirely at his mercy, as they could muster but a handful of armed men and had very little ammunition. Riel detailed a garrison for the fort, paying his men with orders on the Company's stores. And, as if to fill the Lieutenant-Governor's cup of humiliation to the brim, he seized the luxurious furniture which that misguided official had sent ahead of him to Fort Garry, and appropriated it to his own use.

Meanwhile, McDougall was busily engaged writing acrimonious letters to McTavish, and keeping in communication, through the agency of Colonel Stoughton Dennis, with members of the small but aggressive Canadian party in the disturbed district, who urged upon him one mad scheme after another. Before he left Ottawa, there had been some kind of an understanding that the Queen was formally to sanction the transfer of the territory on December 1st, 1869. The end of November approached, but he had had no official confirmation. He "gathered from the newspapers," as he wrote Joseph Howe, the Secretary of State, that the Imperial Order-in-Council had been passed, but, as a matter of fact, the transfer was not finally authorized until the 23rd of the following June. McDougall, however, prepared and issued a proclamation in the Queen's name, announcing that the Hudson's Bay Company had surrendered the territory, that Her Majesty had accepted it, and that it had been transferred to Canada as of date December 1st, 1869. Not content with this singular act of folly, the Lieutenant-Governor issued two other proclamations, one, officially decapitating his poor old rival, McTavish, and the other appointing Colonel
Dennis his "Conservator of the Peace," with power to "raise, organize, arm, equip, and provision" a sufficient force to "attack, arrest, disarm, or disperse" Riel and his followers. As Riel had cornered most of the arms, equipment, and provisions in the settlement, the terms of the proclamations must have afforded him a good deal of quiet amusement. How the antics of their official representative appealed to the Dominion Cabinet may be gathered from the following letter from Sir John Macdonald to the Hon. John Rose:

"McDougall has made a most inglorious fiasco at Red River. When he left here he fully understood that he was to go as a private individual to report on the state of affairs at Red River, but to assume no authority until officially notified from here that Rupert's Land was united to Canada. Notwithstanding this, from mere impatience at his uncomfortable position at Pembina, and before he could possibly have received instructions in answer to his report of being stopped on the way, he chose to assume that on the first of December the surrender was made by the Company and the Order-in-Council passed by the Queen, and that the Order-in-Council was to appoint the day of its issue as the day of Union. He issued a Proclamation under the Great Seal of the new Province, formally adding it to the Dominion. . . . He has ingeniously contrived to humiliate himself and Canada, to arouse the hopes and pretentions of the insurgents, and to leave them in undisputed possession until next spring."

The bogus proclamations had the effect that might be expected. While they were believed to be authentic, they heartened the loyal party in the settlement, and put a temporary check on Riel. When it was discovered that they were entirely unauthorized, they, of course, acted as a boomerang to discredit both the Lieutenant-Governor and the loyalists' party, and to strengthen to a corresponding degree the hands of Riel.

Colonel Dennis had lost no time in carrying out the
instructions of the Lieutenant-Governor, but he found little enthusiasm among the English settlers. Some of the more hot-headed were eager to attack Riel, but the majority held back. Riel had some time previously invited the English settlers to meet the French in convention to draw up a List of Rights, and there seemed hope that a peaceable way might be found out of the difficulty. To attempt to force the issue at that time might do more harm than good. Finally, however, Major Boulton and some of the other leaders of the English settlers were reluctantly brought over to support Dennis' scheme. With their assistance, a force was organized and provided with such arms and equipment as could be got together. The whole plan, however, was wretchedly mismanaged, and the final outcome was that Riel, without firing a shot, captured a large number of the men, and locked them up in Fort Garry.

If proof were needed of Dennis' utter incapacity to handle such a delicate situation, it is to be found in his attempt to enlist the services of some of the Indians. Knowing the close relations between the half-breeds and the Indians, and the horrible possibilities of an Indian uprising, his action seems little short of criminal madness. Dennis finally abandoned in disgust his duties as a recruiting officer, and returned to Pembina to report to McDougall. The latter, having done all that was humanly possible to make the situation in the Red River Settlement hopeless, toward the end of December packed up his baggage and returned to Ottawa. A bitter controversy followed between McDougall and Joseph Howe, as to the responsibility for the grotesque mismanagement of the Red River situation. The net result so far was that the authority of the Dominion Government had been thoroughly discredited; many of the leaders of the loyal party were imprisoned in Fort Garry; the Hudson's Bay Company's officers were powerless; the efforts of the saner element among the settlers to unite all parties in a constitutional movement had been
destroyed by the folly of McDougall and Dennis; and Riel, intoxicated with success, was about to throw off all pretense of legal agitation.

The Dominion Government, meanwhile, found itself in a quandary. Obviously, the situation on the Red river was serious, and was rapidly becoming worse. Until the Imperial Government should transfer the territory to Canada, the Dominion Government was without authority in the region. And even if the transfer had been completed, there was no present means of enforcing its authority. The Government at Ottawa could not even keep itself informed as to what was going on in Winnipeg, except in a very roundabout and imperfect way. It was of the utmost importance that it should have someone on the spot who could watch the course of events, and, if possible, bring the Métis to their senses. McDougall had been tried, and had only succeeded in setting a smouldering fire ablaze. Someone blessed with more tact and less egotism was badly needed. The ideal peacemaker was Bishop Taché, who had spent many years in the North-West, and had probably more influence over the half-breeds than any one else. Bishop Taché, however, was in Rome, and Rome was a long way from Winnipeg. Another venerable missionary proved to be available in the person of Grand Vicar Thibault, who had spent thirty-seven years in the Red River District. He and Colonel de Salaberry, a son of the hero of Chateauguay, accepted the difficult task, and left Ottawa early in December for the Red river. The Government then had the inspiration of sending Donald A. Smith (afterwards Lord Strathcona), of the Hudson's Bay Company, as a special commissioner. The cool judgment of Donald A. Smith was to do more than any other agency to bring peace to the troubled settlement. With him went Dr. Tupper, on a private visit to Winnipeg.¹

So far as Thibault and de Salaberry are concerned, it may be said at once that they achieved absolutely nothing. Riel, having examined their credentials and found that they were vested with no authority, ignored them completely. But Riel was too shrewd a man to ignore Donald A. Smith. He knew that here he had found a man who was more than a match for him. Indeed the battle of wits between these two men, as revealed in the official records, furnishes one of the most interesting incidents of the Rebellion. Smith was careful to leave his papers in safe hands, on the American side of the boundary, before he set out for Fort Garry. He let it be understood that he was in the West on business of the Hudson's Bay Company. To Riel he was at first polite but uncommunicative. Riel kept him in the fort, but could not very well prevent the English and French leaders of the settlement from visiting him. Smith rapidly became seized of the situation. Riel had been playing all along for the support of the English-speaking settlers; urging them to join the French in the Provisional Government, in which they would have equal representation; assuring them of his loyalty, and that all he desired was the protection of the rights of the people. Here was Smith's opportunity. He won the responsible men, both French and English, to his side, by convincing them of the good intentions of the Canadian Government. He then freely discussed his mission with Riel, and suggested that a general meeting of the settlers be called, at which he would present his credentials and explain the situation. Riel offered to send a trusty messenger for the papers, but Smith preferred to send his brother-in-law and secretary, Richard Hardisty. Riel countered by appointing a guard to protect Hardisty on the way—and incidentally to seize the papers. Unfortunately for the success of his plans, a party of settlers who were in Smith's confidence set off quietly toward Pembina, and escorted Hardisty back to Fort Garry with the papers. The outcome was that a convention
was called in January, 1870, at which Smith read his credentials, and carefully explained the intentions of the Government. A List of Rights was drawn up, and submitted to the commissioner for his answers on behalf of the Dominion Government. Smith was able to convince the majority that all their rights and privileges would be respected. Finally he captured the delegates by inviting them, on behalf of the Dominion Government, to send a delegation to Ottawa to meet and confer with the members of the Cabinet.

What Smith had accomplished seriously conflicted with Riel's plans, but, for the moment, he had to bow to the inevitable. A number of the English-speaking settlers were still prisoners in Fort Garry, and he promised to have them released. He set a few at liberty, but held the rest. A rescue was planned, but miscarried; and the old bitter feeling between French and English was revived. Riel again carried things with a high hand, and finally, with some mad idea that he might thereby commit his own followers to a reckless course and put terror into the hearts of the loyal party, ordered the execution of one of the prisoners, Thomas Scott, a man of quarrelsome disposition who had treated Riel with contempt and had been a source of great trouble to his guards.

When news of the cold-blooded murder of Scott reached Ontario, a wave of indignation swept over the province, and indeed over the country. The people insisted that the time for peaceful negotiations had gone by; that an expeditionary force must be sent out to the Red river to restore law and order. The Federal Government had already been in communication with the Imperial authorities, and it was finally arranged that a combined force of regulars and Canadian militia should be sent out, under the command of Colonel (afterwards Viscount) Wolseley.

No time was lost. Two battalions of militia were quickly recruited, one in Ontario and the other in Quebec,
350 men each. The regulars consisted of 350 men of the 60th Rifles, with 20 men of the Royal Artillery and four seven-pounder guns, 20 men of the Royal Engineers, and a party from the Hospital Corps and Army Service Corps. Difficulty was experienced, as in all Canadian expeditions, in organizing the commissariat, and it was accentuated in this case by the fact that the Expeditionary Force had to be transported through a trackless wilderness. Finally, however, all arrangements were completed, and Wolseley got his force in motion from Toronto in May, 1870.

At Collingwood two steamers had been provided, the Algoma and Chicora, and by means of these the troops, stores, wagons, horses, etc., were carried to Sault Ste. Marie. The United States authorities refused permission to take the troops, or even the stores, through their canal. Urgent representations were made to Washington, and finally orders were issued to allow the stores to go through. The Algoma passed up into Lake Superior, and was used to transport the expedition to the upper end of the lake, where a camping ground had been selected, which Wolseley named Prince Arthur's Landing,¹ in honour of the Queen's third son, the future Duke of Connaught, then in Canada.

The commander of the expedition had had serious trouble in getting men and supplies thus far, but they were nothing to what was in store. Before him lay many miles of exceedingly difficult country, steep hills and swampy valleys, rock-strewn rivers, tangled forests, and treacherous muskeg. Through this he had to transport an expedition numbering altogether over 1,400 men, including voyageurs and guides, with boats and all the necessary supplies. The transport of food alone for such a number was a most serious problem, as a sufficient supply for the entire trip had to be carried, the country affording nothing whatever in the way of provisions.

¹Now Port Arthur.
It had been anticipated that by the time the expedition reached Prince Arthur's Landing, a practicable road would be completed from there to Lake Shebandowan, where navigation would begin for the boats. A force of men under a Government engineer, S. J. Dawson, had been working hard on the road for weeks past, but they had been seriously hampered by bad weather and forest fires, and, after waiting impatiently for several weeks, Wolseley decided to try the Kaministikwia river. The task of transporting heavy supplies by such a route was stupendous; but nothing could daunt the courage of the men of the Expeditionary Force, and finally everything was brought up to Shebandowan. Wolseley in his farewell to the troops at Fort Garry referred to this journey as a "service that for its arduous nature can bear comparison with any previous military expedition." It involved the "unparalleled exertion of carrying the boats, guns, ammunition, stores, and provisions" over forty-seven portages.

The worst part of the route was now surmounted, and on July 16th the brigades of boats, laden with men and stores, started off on their long journey to Fort Garry, by way of an intricate chain of lakes and rivers to Rainy Lake, thence down Rainy river to the Lake of the Woods, down Winnipeg river to the lake of the same name, and up the Red river to their destination.

Meanwhile Captain W. F. Butler had been sent from Montreal to make his way in to Fort Garry by way of St. Paul, ascertain the situation there, and meet Wolseley somewhere on his route. Butler reached Fort Garry, had an interview with Riel, and started in a canoe, with a crew of half-breeds, to meet Wolseley. His way lay up the Winnipeg river, across the Lake of the Woods, and up Rainy river. He reached Fort Frances early in August, where he learned that Wolseley was expected at any moment. Butler and his men carried the canoe above the falls, paddled up stream a few miles, and landed on a rocky point at the outlet of Rainy Lake. His mind was
filled with thoughts of the gallant little expedition and its resourceful leader, who were making history in this remote corner of the Empire. Had he known it, the spot on which he stood was already historic ground. Here de Noyon, the first white man to traverse these waters, had landed in 1688; and within a stone's-throw from where he stood La Jemeraye, the nephew of La Vérendrye, had built Fort St. Pierre in 1731, to mark the first stage in the romantic search for the Western Sea.

Butler stood for some time gazing eagerly out over the waters of the lake. At last he caught the glint of something moving. Rapidly it drew nearer, and resolved itself into a large North-West canoe, sweeping along to the swing of eight paddles, "its Iroquois paddlers timing their strokes to an old French chant as they shot down towards the river's source." Other canoes and boats came into view, and out to the horizon presently stretched a continuous line, bearing the first brigades of the Expeditionary Force. Butler pushed off into the stream, and paddled out to meet the leading canoe. In the centre sat a familiar figure in uniform. Here, at last, was Wolseley. "Where on earth have you dropped from?" cheerily cried the leader. "Fort Garry, twelve days out, sir," replied Butler.¹

One can imagine the feelings of Wolseley and his men, as, after long weeks of heart-breaking struggle through a barren and inhospitable region, inhabited chiefly by mosquitoes and black flies, they found themselves transferred as if by magic into an earthly paradise. Even today, despite the efforts of man to mar its beauty, Rainy river is one of the most lovely waterways in Canada; and we can form some idea from the enthusiastic accounts of explorers and fur-traders how altogether captivating it must have been in a state of nature. But perhaps to the officers who shared with Wolseley the hospitality of McKenzie, the Hudson's Bay Company's agent at Fort Frances, even more appealing than scenery was the sight

¹Butler, W. F.: The Great Lone Land.
of the worthy trader’s vegetable garden, after a monotonous diet of salt pork. Captain Huyshe, a member of Wolseley’s staff, feelingly records their gratitude to McKenzie for “allowing us to have the run of our teeth in his garden, so that during our stay of five days we revelled in green peas, young potatoes, and cabbages.”

Some time before there had been a formal pow-wow with Crooked Neck, principal chief of the Chippewas, when captivating presents of red shirts, coats, and caps had been offered him on behalf of the Government. Crooked Neck, however, suspected an ulterior motive, and indignantly refused the gift. “Am I a pike,” he cried, “to be caught with such a bait as that? Shall I sell my land for a bit of red cloth? We will let the palefaces pass through our country, but we will sell them none of our land, nor have any of them to live amongst us.” At a later conference with Wolseley himself, the wily old chief bethought him that he might spoil the Egyptians, and demanded an annual subsidy of ten dollars a head for the right of way through Chippewa territory and the use of wood and water. But the Egyptians being hard-hearted, Crooked Neck compromised on a small present of flour and pork.

All necessary repairs having been made to the boats and equipment, the expedition started down Rainy river early in August. Never before had that picturesque stream carried such an imposing fleet, as brigade after brigade swept down its current. Many an Indian along its banks must have repeated the sage remark of the old chief at Prince Arthur’s Landing, who had watched the endless stream of soldiers landing from the Clematis: “What a lot of white people there must be in the world!”

Wolseley led the way in his bark canoe manned by expert Iroquois. They ran the Manitou and the Long Sault, and, drifting down stream all night to save time, reached the desolate little trading post known as Hungry Hall, near the mouth of the river, in time for breakfast. Here letters reached the commander from Rat Portage an-
nouncing the arrival there of the boats sent by the loyal settlers of the Red River. Wolseley had been urged to cross the Lake of the Woods to the North-West Angle, from which a road had been partially built across country to Fort Garry, but as it appeared that thirty-five miles of the proposed route lay through muskeg, and as he had already had had bitter experience of that kind of country, he decided not to risk the experiment.

Convinced by Butler's report of the urgency of the situation at Fort Garry, and anxious to lose no time in getting the expedition through the perilous navigation of Winnipeg river, Wolseley started ahead to Rat Portage, to see to the necessary arrangements. A gale was blowing on the Lake of the Woods, and the canoe was out of the question. With strange lack of foresight he left his trusty Indians behind, and went on in the gig, with its soldier crew, good oarsmen but poor guides. All night they rowed and sailed through the labyrinth of islands, by the light of a full moon, and all the next day. Bivouacking on an island, they were off again at 4 a.m. They knew they could not be far from Rat Portage, but after wandering about for hours they were forced to the uncomfortable conclusion that they had lost their way. Fortunately an Indian encampment was picked up, and by dint of signs the Chippewa were made to understand their predicament. Finally at 8 p.m., tired and hungry, Wolseley reached his destination.

He at once sent Butler down the Winnipeg to Fort Alexander to bring up as many men familiar with the dangerous rapids of the river as he could get together. As soon as arrangements had been completed at Rat Portage for bringing down the brigades with the least possible delay, he himself followed in a light canoe. Fortunately the whole expedition managed to get through the many perils of this famous stream without misadventure. Several days later Wolseley reached Fort Alexander where he was welcomed by Donald A. Smith on behalf of the Hudson's Bay Company.
The latest news from Fort Garry was that Riel had made a final desperate attempt to organize his followers to oppose the Expeditionary Force, the strength of which he probably largely underestimated. The Métis, however, had no stomach for a meeting with disciplined troops. There seemed no probability, therefore, of opposition; but Wolseley was too good a soldier to take any chances. The fleet of boats crossed the foot of Lake Winnipeg, and made its way up the Red river, camping some miles below Fort Garry. In the morning (August 24), the boats continued their way up stream, a guard being sent ahead by land to prevent surprise.

At Point Douglas, two miles below Winnipeg, the troops disembarked and marched to Fort Garry. The final act of the drama cannot better be told than in the words of Captain Huyshe: "Passing round the flank of the village, the fort appeared in sight about 700 yards off, across the open prairie. A few stray inhabitants in the village declared that Riel and his party still held possession of the fort and meant to fight. The gates were shut, no flag was flying from the flagstaff, and guns were visible, mounted in the bastions and over the gateway that commanded the approach from the village and the prairie over which the troops were advancing. It certainly looked as if our labours were not to be altogether in vain. 'Riel is going to fight!' ran along the line, and the men quickened their pace and strode cheerily forward, regardless of the mud and rain. M. Riel rose in their estimation immensely. The gun over the gateway was expected every moment to open fire, but we got nearer and nearer and still no sign; at last we could see that there were no men standing to the guns, and, unless it were a trap to get us close up before they opened fire, it was evident that there would be no fight after all. 'By God! he's bolted!' was the cry. Colonel Wolseley sent forward some of his staff to see if the south gate were also shut; they galloped all round the fort, and brought back word that the gate opening on to the bridge over the Assini-
boine river was wide open, and men bolting away over the bridge. The troops then marched in by this gateway, and took possession of Fort Garry after a bloodless victory. The Union Jack was hoisted, a royal salute fired, and three cheers given for the Queen, which were caught up and heartily re-echoed by a few of the inhabitants who had followed the troops from the village." Everything was in confusion about the fort, the breakfast things on the ex-President's table not yet cleared away, documents of all kinds, including his private papers, lying about, betokening a very hasty retreat. So ended ingloriously the Rebellion of 1870. But it had been an expensive affair for the young Dominion, Wolseley's Expeditionary Force alone costing $500,000. To guard against further trouble a Provisional Force was maintained in Manitoba from 1870 to 1877, when it was disbanded. It consisted of a battalion of rifles (300 officers and men) and a demi-battery of artillery, and proved very serviceable.

Many years afterward, when he could look back upon a lifetime of most distinguished service, Wolseley had not forgotten the little campaign of 1870, or the men whom he led through the wilderness to Fort Garry. In his *Story of a Soldier's Life* he says:

"I can draw no distinction between the relative merits or the military value of the regular soldier and the Canadian militiaman who went with me to Red River; each had arrived at Prince Arthur's Landing with special attributes peculiarly their own, but by the time Fort Garry had been occupied each had acquired the military virtues of the other. What it is that a large army of such men under some great leader could not achieve, I, for one, know not."
CHAPTER X

THE SASKATCHEWAN REBELLION, 1885

IMMEDIATELY after the suppression of the Red River insurrection the regular forces, excepting the garrison at Halifax, were withdrawn from Canada. The country had recently been threatened by foreign invasion and had had a rebellion encouraged by a part of the people and an influential section of the Press of a neighbouring nation, but the Government made little effort to strengthen its defensive forces. Between 1868, when the Militia Act was adopted, and 1885, the time of the outbreak of the Saskatchewan Rebellion, the only material development that took place in connection with the military forces of the country was the authorization in 1871 of small permanent corps, consisting of two troops of cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and a regiment of infantry, to be used mainly as centres of military instruction. The batteries were raised the same year, but the cavalry and infantry corps were not established until twelve years later. It may also be noted that in 1873 the North-West Mounted Police Force was organized, with an initial strength of three hundred men, and that in 1876 the Royal Military College of Canada was established at Kingston, Ontario.¹

In 1884 the Dominion was to play a part in one of Britain’s little wars, which, while not properly a part of Canada’s military history, is of too much importance to be passed over without record. In the War of 1812, effective use had been made of a corps of voyageurs, French-Canadian boatmen who were employed in connection with the transportation of troops and supplies on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Kingston. These

¹ A full account of this institution will be given in a later volume of this series.

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men were for the most part employés of the North-West Company, and had gained the experience in navigating difficult waterways that made them so valuable on the network of western streams that were the highways of the fur trade. Their officers were members of the same famous company, McGillivray, Shaw, McLeod, McKenzie, Rocheblave, Hughes, McKay, McDonnell, and perhaps a dozen more—names familiar to everyone who has studied the history of the western fur trade.

Nearly three-quarters of a century later a similar corps of Canadian Voyageurs was organized for a similar service, but the great river which was to be the scene of their labours was not now the St. Lawrence. Lord Wolseley was leading a military expedition to the Soudan for the relief of General Gordon, and needed expert boatmen to navigate the dangerous waters of the Nile. He had not forgotten the men who had been with him in 1870. He admired their skill and resourcefulness, their intimate knowledge of the ways of rivers, their stamina and unconquerable cheerfulness. They were just the men he needed on the Nile. On August 26th, 1884, he telegraphed the Governor-General of Canada asking for a picked force of Canadian Voyageurs. He asked that one of the Canadian officers who had accompanied him to Fort Garry should be given the command, preferably Lieut.-Col. F. C. Denison.

The Voyageurs were quickly organized, Colonel Denison accepted the command, and within a comparatively short time 378 Canadian boatmen were on their way to Egypt. They served throughout the campaign, to the entire satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief, and returned to Canada within a year from the date of their departure. In April, 1885, Lord Wolseley wrote to the Marquess of Lansdowne from Cairo expressing his high sense of the services performed by the Canadian Voyageurs. “They have undergone,” he said, “the hardships of this arduous campaign without the slightest grumbling or discontent; and they have, on many occasions, shown
not only great skill but also great courage in navigating their boats through difficult and dangerous water." He added that it was a source of much satisfaction to the officers and men of the Expeditionary Force to find Canadians represented on the expedition, and sharing with them their privations and risks. "At a time when English, Scottish and Irish soldiers were employed, the presence with them of the Canadians shows in a marked manner the bonds which unite all points of our great Empire."

While the Voyageurs were still in Egypt a serious situation had developed in the Canadian North-West. Politically, there was a marked similarity between the Red River Rebellion of 1869–70 and the Saskatchewan Rebellion of 1885. The grievances, real or assumed, of the Métis were much the same in both cases. The Canadian Government's policy of masterly and very expensive inactivity remained unchanged. The ultimate political consequences were practically identical—the belated concession of substantially all that the half-breeds had demanded. The leader of the Métis in 1885 was the same Louis Riel who had planned the uprising of 1870; that "vain, rash and passionate adventurer, about whose figure centres more of sorrow, of tragedy, and of conflict than around any other in the annals of confederated Canada."  

But there the similarity ends. From a military point of view the conditions were decidedly different. Riel was a political schemer. He could incite other men to fight, but was no fighter himself. Still less had he any talent for the art of war, or any knowledge of its principles. His military lieutenant in 1870 was Ambroise Lepine, a sturdy bully, but less qualified, if possible, than Riel to lead a successful insurrection. In 1885, on the other hand, Riel's lieutenant was Gabriel Dumont, a brave and resourceful leader, skilled in all the arts of Indian warfare, and with a good deal of natural talent for generalship. The result was that while the rebels of 1870 fled ignominiously at the first appearance of Wolseley and his men,
those of 1885 gave a very good account of themselves, when all the conditions are taken into consideration.

Another point of difference that cannot be overlooked is the fact that, while the serious menace of an Indian uprising was always present in 1869–70, in 1885 some of the tribes actually took part in the conflict. It was, indeed, this feature of the Rebellion of 1885 that caused most apprehension. So far as the Métis were concerned, they could at the most do nothing more than create a temporary disturbance. But when Poundmaker and Big Bear joined the rebels a very different situation was created. If a general uprising of the Western tribes should follow, as seemed at one time probable enough, it would almost certainly result in the massacre of hundreds of white settlers, men, women, and children; and set back development of Western Canada perhaps fifty years. Fortunately, the Indian trouble did not spread beyond a few isolated bands. But this is anticipating.

The summer of 1884 found the half-breeds of the Saskatchewan country in a state of dangerous unrest. For months past the mutterings of discontent had been growing ever more ominous. Time and again the North-West Council, the western missionaries, and influential settlers familiar with the situation had urged the Dominion Government to meet the demands of the Métis before it was too late. Substantially all that the latter asked was that they be given a legal title to the lands they occupied on the Saskatchewan. The Government admitted that the request was reasonable; that it was only asking what had some years before been granted to the Métis of Manitoba; that it would be politic as well as just to extend the same privilege to the people of the Saskatchewan country; that loyal and contented Métis there would do much to safeguard the country against the possibility of an Indian uprising. Yet, with that curious spirit of procrastination that seems inevitable in governments, the administration was prodigal of promises, but niggardly in performance.

The Métis finally sent four of their number—James
Isbister, Gabriel Dumont, Moise Ouellette, and Michel Dumas—to Riel, who had been outlawed after the 1870 Rebellion and was living in Montana, asking him to come over and help them. It does not appear that in taking this step the half-breeds contemplated anything more than a constitutional agitation, but they might have known they were playing with fire when they invited Louis Riel to lead them. Riel confined himself for a time to such harmless activities as the drawing up of a Bill of Rights, along much the same lines as that of 1870, but the evidence all points to the conclusion that he had determined to make another attempt to set up a little government of his own in the West.

The winter of 1884–85 passed without incident, and it was not until the end of March that Riel finally showed his hand. A quantity of provisions and forage was stored at Duck Lake, a small settlement near Fort Carlton and about forty miles from Prince Albert. Riel had determined to seize these provisions. Major Crozier, who commanded the Mounted Police at Fort Carlton, was equally determined that he should not have them, and on March 26th sent a small detachment under Sergt. Stewart to remove them to the fort. Gabriel Dumont with a party of half-breeds met the detachment and turned it back. Stewart sent a message to Fort Carlton asking for support; Crozier then set out with a force of about 100 men to help him and found Dumont waiting for him at Duck Lake. Crozier was compelled to retire, after having twelve men killed and about twenty-five wounded. Fort Carlton, being incapable of defence, was evacuated on March 29th, and on April 3rd Riel took possession.

A few days before these events, the Government at Ottawa had at last awakened to the seriousness of the situation. General Middleton was sent to Winnipeg to look into the matter, and, if necessary, to take the field against the rebels. He reached Winnipeg on March 27th, and then learned of the fight at Duck Lake. All the available forces in Winnipeg were already mobilized.
Middleton appointed Captain Bedson of Winnipeg as Chief Transport Officer, telegraphed to Ottawa for additional troops, and started the same day by rail for Qu'Appelle, taking with him the 90th Rifles of Winnipeg, 314 strong, and a battery of artillery with two 9-pounders. At Qu'Appelle he was joined by Captain John French with a small but very efficient body of Mounted Scouts, armed with repeating Winchesters. Here also he had an opportunity of conferring with Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney of the North-West Territories.

Making Qu'Appelle his base, he determined to march on Batoche, 243 miles to the north, where Riel had established his headquarters. The Queen's Own and the Royal Grenadiers, each about 250 strong; "C" Company of the Infantry School Corps, 90 men; and "A" and "B" Batteries of the Royal Canadian Artillery, 4 guns and 226 of all ranks, were already on their way to the West, and other corps were rapidly being mobilized. Lord Melgund (afterwards Earl of Minto), then Military Secretary to the Governor-General, Lord Lansdowne, had been appointed Chief of Staff, and joined the force on April 1st.

The problem of transporting an expeditionary force from the East had fortunately been simplified by the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway; yet, while the conditions were very different from those of 1870, they were by no means free from hardship. The railway was completed between Toronto and Qu'Appelle excepting for three main gaps—one of forty-two miles and two of fifteen each—and several minor ones along the north shore of Lake Superior; and men and supplies, horses and guns, must be moved over the gaps, a difficult task in the winter of that region. Here is what Lieut.-Col. Montizambert, who commanded the Artillery, has to say of it:

"About 400 miles between the west end of the track and Red Rock or Nepigon—sixty-six miles from Port Arthur—had to be passed by a constantly varying process of embarking and disembarking guns and stores from flat cars to country team sleighs, and vice versa. There
were sixteen operations of this nature, in cold weather and deep snow. On starting from the west end of the track on the night of the 30th March, the roads were found so bad that it took the guns seventeen hours to do the distance (thirty miles) to Magpie Camp. On from there to the east end of the track by team sleighs and marching twenty-three miles farther on; flat cars (uncovered and open) eighty miles, with the thermometer at 50 degrees below zero. Heron Bay, Port Munro, McKellar's Bay, Jackfish, Isbister, McKay's Harbour, were passed by alternate flat cars on construction tracks and teaming in fearful weather round the north shore of Lake Superior; Nepigon, or Red Rock, was reached on the evening of the 3rd of April. The men had had no sleep for four nights.”

General Middleton, while awaiting the arrival of the eastern troops at Qu'Appelle, saw to the organization of the transport, commissariat, and medical services, and arranged his plan of campaign. This latter was no light task. Between Winnipeg and the mountains were a number of widely-scattered settlements which must be protected; the strength of the enemy was practically un-
known; Riel was doing his utmost to arouse the tribes, and if he succeeded the difficulties of the campaign would be immeasurably increased. Middleton had to distribute his forces to meet all emergencies in an immense field of operations. He decided, therefore, to divide his men into three columns. The principal column, under his own immediate command, would march on Batoche. The second, under Lieut.-Col. Otter, was to proceed by rail to Swift Current, about 150 miles west of Qu'Appelle, and thence march down the west side of the South Saskatchewan to Clark's Crossing, where it would form a junction with the main column. The third, under Major-General Strange, organized at Calgary, was to move north to Edmonton. The first and second columns were to attack Riel at Batoche, and then proceed separately to Prince Albert and Battleford. Having cleared the enemy out of this portion of the country, they would march west, form junction with the third column, and dispose of the Indians. Alarming reports from Battleford, however, necessitated a change in the programme, and Colonel Otter was consequently directed to march from Swift Current direct to Battleford.

It will be convenient to follow the fortunes of the three columns in the order mentioned. Middleton moved up from Qu'Appelle Station to Fort Qu'Appelle on April 2nd, and four days later the actual march began. Captain Bedson had organized an efficient transport service. Lord Melgund, 1 in his account of the expedition 2 says that "towards the end of the campaign we had in General Middleton's line of communications 745 teams, working in perfect order, in connection with a system of depots." The march to Clark's Crossing was made without incident. Here the force was joined by Boulton's Mounted Infantry, a corps of some seventy men, well mounted and armed, recruited from the Manitoba settlers by the same Major Boulton who had been out in 1870,

1See ante p. 268.
2Nineteenth Century (August, 1885).
Middleton's force was now about 820 strong. He decided to send half of it across the South Saskatchewan under Lieut.-Col. Montizambert and advance along both banks to Batoche. About twenty-four miles up stream the trail followed by the main body under the Commander-in-Chief crossed a deep ravine, through which ran a small stream known as Fish Creek. Here Gabriel Dumont had prepared an ambush, adding to the natural strength of the position by means of skilfully situated rifle pits. The rebel leader evidently hoped to catch the troops in close formation, but as they were protected by mounted scouts and an advance guard, he retreated to the shelter of his rifle pits in the coulee, from which he brought a very effective fire on the advancing force. The loss of several men quickly taught the militia to take advantage of any cover the ground afforded. The rebel fire was murderous, but in spite of it the troops crept steadily up to the edge of the ravine. Dumont, having set fire to the prairie, attempted an encircling movement under cover of a cloud of smoke, but was compelled to abandon the attempt and go back to his rifle pits. With great gallantry "A" Battery brought its guns up to an angle of the ravine, and, in spite of severe losses, managed to clear a portion of the enemy's position. A detachment of infantry then crossed the coulee and caught the rebels between two fires; finally one of the guns was taken over to shell the enemy's stronghold. Unfortunately there was abundance of thick cover in the bottom of the ravine, and the half-breeds were able to keep out of sight, while they picked off any of their opponents who exposed themselves.

Dumont, some time before, had retreated up the ravine with a number of his men, under a hot fire, and galloped off to Batoche for reinforcements. Another party of half-breeds had been driven down the ravine, and were practically out of the fight. There remained the centre group, whose escape was cut off, but who were so well
protected that it was exceedingly difficult to dislodge them. This is what Boulton calls the "hornet's nest."  

Meanwhile, the troops under Montizambert had succeeded, after desperate exertions, in getting across the river; even bringing their guns with them. It was no fault of theirs that the fight was practically over when they arrived. Both the Grenadiers and the Winnipeg Rifles begged Middleton to let them charge down the ravine and clean out the "hornet's nest," but the Commander-in-Chief felt that the enterprise would cost more in lives than it would be worth. The small remnant of the enemy that remained in the coulee could safely be left to their own devices. As a matter of fact, they stole away to Batoche during the night. The troops camped a few hundred yards from the ravine. The casualties had been heavy; ten killed and over forty wounded. The rebels lost thirteen men killed and eighteen wounded.

It is worth remembering that this was the first battle, and the first campaign in the history of Canada, in which the troops consisted entirely of Canadian militia. Counting those brought over the river by Montizambert, the force at Fish Creek included the Winnipeg Rifles under Major McKeand; the Grenadiers, under Lieut.-Col. Grasett; the Infantry School Corps, under Major Smith; Boulton's Mounted Infantry; "A" Battery R.C.A., under Captain Peters; and the Winnipeg Battery, under Major Jarvis, each with two guns. A company of the Grenadiers and French's Scouts remained on the opposite side of the river, to guard the baggage and supplies.

The forces actually engaged were approximately equal, about three hundred on each side. The militia might claim some advantage over the half-breeds on the score of discipline, although it must be remembered that the great majority were under fire for the first time. They were also better equipped, and had the benefit of artillery. On the other hand, they were fighting in the open, while

1 Reminiscences of the Northwest Rebellions.
the rebels were under cover; and the latter were unquestionably the better marksmen. As to the commanders, it would perhaps be invidious to compare a half-savage leader with a distinguished British general. Nevertheless, at Fish Creek, and later at Batoche, Dumont showed both skill and daring in the disposition and handling of his men.

Several days were spent at Fish Creek, resting the men, sending the wounded back to Saskatoon for treatment, and making a reconnaissance toward Batoche. During the interval the steamer Northcote came up the river, with two companies of the Midland Battalion, under Lieut.-Col. Williams, and a Gatling gun under charge of Captain Howard, late U.S. Army. Lieut.-Col. Van Straubenzie also arrived by the same boat, and was appointed brigadier of the infantry.

On May 7th the column started for Batoche. The Northcote had been made bullet proof as far as possible, and was to ascend the river and co-operate with the troops in the attack on Batoche. She carried about thirty men of the I.S.C., under Major Smith, but through a series of misadventures they were unable to take any effective part in the battle. The column marched to Gabriel Dumont’s Crossing, about six miles from Batoche, and camped there for the night. On the following day the force was moved to a more advantageous position on the main trail leading directly from Humboldt to Batoche. At daybreak on the 9th the camp was astir and at six o’clock the troops were moving towards the rebel headquarters. As they approached the village the guns and Howard’s Gatling were brought forward, while Boulton’s Scouts advanced in skirmishing order, followed by the Grenadiers. They were met by a hot fire from concealed rifle-pits, and it became evident that the enemy’s position was a very strong one. The rebels had taken full advantage of the bush surrounding the village, and had protected their position by an ingenious system of rifle-pits and intrenchments.
Early in the engagement an attempt was made by the enemy to creep through the bush and seize the guns which were shelling their position, but they were driven off by the Gatling. The action now became general, but, although the troops held their own, it was apparent that they could not, for the present at least, dislodge the enemy from their intrenchments. Dumont evidently had a strong force, and was determined to maintain his position at all costs. Night was approaching, and the Commander-in-Chief decided not to risk an advance through the thick cover surrounding the village. He ordered up reinforcements, and moved his camp to an open space not far from the enemy's lines. He was resolved to hold his ground until the rebels had been driven out of Batoche.

The enemy made no attempt to attack the camp beyond keeping up a desultory fire. They did, however, take advantage of the darkness to push forward their lines, and the following day was spent in skirmishing, without material damage to either side. During the afternoon Captain Dennis arrived with fifty Mounted Scouts, and on the third day, May 11th, Middleton ordered out Boulton's and French's men, with the Gatling, and made a reconnaissance on the plain north of Batoche, the troops gaining in this way valuable experience in the species of warfare practised by their adversaries. Dick Hardisty, son of the Hudson's Bay officer who had acted as secretary to Donald A. Smith in 1869, was mortally wounded in this day's engagement.

As a result of the reconnaissance, Middleton decided to make a general attack on Riel's forces on the following day. His plan was to draw the enemy from the strong position they occupied by a feint from the plain north of the village, all the mounted men, with one of the guns and the Gatling, being engaged in this flank movement, which Middleton himself would command. Van Straubenzie would remain in command of the infantry, and as soon as firing was heard from the north, he was to engage the enemy with all his troops. The flank attack was
carried out as planned, but, through some misunderstanding, Van Straubenzie failed to order the general advance, much to the chagrin of Middleton.

During the morning Riel sent messengers to Middleton telling him that if the women and children were killed by shell-fire he would shoot the prisoners. He was told that if the women and children were placed together in one clearly-defined spot, no shot would be fired in that direction. After the battle they were found in a gully near the river, safe but panic-stricken.

Early in the afternoon, the Grenadiers and the Midland Battalion were ordered out to skirmish as on the previous days. A feeling of irritation had been growing among officers and men as, day after day, they were marched out, kept under a galling fire, and then marched back to camp, without achieving anything. This feeling was intensified by rumours that were afloat, possibly without foundation, that the General lacked confidence in their steadiness and had asked for regulars. However this may have been, the Midlanders and Grenadiers no sooner got into touch with the enemy than the skirmish was suddenly transformed into a general attack. With wild cheers they charged the rifle pits, driving the enemy before them.

As soon as the General discovered the state of affairs, he ordered up the Winnipeg Rifles in support. The guns then thundered by at full gallop with the little Gatling in their midst, and opened fire on the village to clear the way for the infantry. The three mounted corps followed, dismounted, and fell in on the right of the 90th. The line now stretched fully a mile from the river bank, on which the left flank rested. With ringing cheers the men advanced on the run, cleared the bush, charged across the open space beyond, and into the village. Fierce fighting followed from house to house, but finally the enemy were driven out and fled in disorder to the river. Batoche, the rebel headquarters, was taken, and the backbone of the rebellion was broken.

A number of white prisoners were found in a cellar and
released while in the rebel council chamber was discovered a quantity of incriminating documents. Riel had fled in a panic as soon as he realized that his cause was lost, leaving everything behind him. A few days later he was captured, and sent down to Regina to await his trial for high treason. Gabriel Dumont escaped to the United States. The casualties in the four days' fighting amounted to about 12 killed, and 85 wounded. The rebels lost 51 killed and 173 wounded, of whom 47 were killed and 163 wounded on the last day.

It will now be necessary to go back a month and follow the fortunes of the Battleford Column, under Colonel Otter. Otter left Swift Current on the 13th of April with the following troops: the Queen's Own Rifles, under Lieut.-Col. Millar, 274 men; a company of sharpshooters from the Governor-General's Foot Guards, under Captain Todd, 51 men; one-half "C" Company, I.S.C., Lieut. Wadmore; "B" Battery, R.C.A., Major Short, 2 guns, 113 men; 50 men of the North-West Mounted Police with 1 gun, under Lieut.-Col. Herchmer; and 6 Scouts. The column reached Battleford on the evening of the 23rd and Otter added to his force the little garrison, consisting of 43 men of the Mounted Police; the Battleford Rifle Company, Captain Nash, 45 men; and the Home Guards, Captains Wild and Scott, 134 men. A Gatling gun had been added to "B" Battery at Saskatchewan Landing.

Since the Duck Lake affair, Poundmaker and his Indians had been on the war-path in the neighbourhood of Battleford. They had murdered several settlers and destroyed much property, and there was reason to believe that a junction of the forces of Poundmaker and Big Bear was contemplated with the object of their joining Riel. Indeed, Indian "runners" from Big Bear were at this time in Poundmaker's camp. Otter determined to teach them a lesson. Poundmaker was known to be encamped at Cut Knife Hill, about thirty-eight miles from Battleford. Taking with him a mixed force of some 325 men
with two 7-pounders and the Gatling, Otter reached the Indian camp at daybreak on May 2nd.

Poundmaker had selected for his camp a position of great natural strength; his men outnumbered Otter's force; and had it not been that they were taken by surprise the Indians would probably have caught the militia in a trap and annihilated them. As it was, after several hours' fighting, the Indians almost succeeded in surrounding the force, and it was only by skilful handling on Otter's part and because of the coolness and resourcefulness of his men, that he succeeded in extricating them from their dangerous position. But this was only accomplished with the loss of eight men killed and thirteen wounded. Poundmaker had won an advantage, but fortunately failed to follow it up, and the force was able to make its way back to Battleford. Early in the fight Big Bear's "runners" had returned to their own camp in a state of much excitement, declaring that the soldiers "fought like devils, rushing up the hill in the face of the deadliest fire, with additional sensational reports as to the execution wrought by artillery shells." The report of this news caused a delay of some days in the contemplated action of Big Bear and in the meantime other matters engaged his attention. According to Mr. Maclean, the Hudson Bay agent at Fort Pitt, who was a prisoner in Big Bear's camp, Colonel Otter's attack on Poundmaker "was positively providential, for being delivered at the time and in the manner it was, it certainly prevented a union between Big Bear and Poundmaker and the movement of their united forces to Batoche." No further action was taken by the column beyond patrolling the country around Battleford and keeping communications open.

There remains the third column, known as the Alberta Field Force. General Strange had organized at Calgary a force consisting of the 65th Battalion, 350 strong, under Colonel Ouimet; 77 Mounted Police, under Major Steele; the Winnipeg Light Infantry, 300 strong, Colonel Osborne Smith; the Alberta Mounted Rifles, 88 Scouts and one
gun. On April 20th General Strange started for Edmonton, with a portion of his force, the remainder following a few days later. From there detachments were sent out to Fort Saskatchewan, Battle River, and Fort Pitt.

Early in April Big Bear and his braves, on receiving news of the Duck Lake fight, had gone on the war-path. Evidently this was part of a concerted plan, as both Poundmaker and Big Bear seem to have taken the first success of the half-breeds as the signal to join the insurrection. Big Bear opened his campaign by a massacre at Frog Lake, an isolated post of the Hudson's Bay Company, which was also an Indian agency and a Roman Catholic mission, thirty miles from Fort Pitt. Without warning the Indians surrounded the post and in cold blood shot down Quinn, the Indian agent, Fathers Farfard and Marchand, and a number of others. They carried off two white women and several half-breeds.

Big Bear's next move was to attack Fort Pitt. The post was incapable of defence against such a force as Big Bear brought against it, and on April 15th, Maclean, the Hudson's Bay agent, surrendered it, and with his family and the other traders became prisoners in the Indian camp. Inspector Dickens, a son of the novelist, with a small party of Mounted Police, escaped from the fort and floated down the Saskatchewan to Battleford in a leaky scow. But Big Bear had no use for forts, and after looting the place he and his band wandered about from camp to camp, dragging their prisoners with them.

This was the situation when General Strange took the field. His task was to round up Big Bear and his Indians. Big Bear, however, proved to be a most elusive antagonist, and beyond an inconclusive engagement at Frenchman's Butte, at the junction of the Red Deer and Little Red Deer rivers, on April 28th, it was found impossible to get near enough to his band to attempt a decisive blow. But the Indians were given no rest, many warriors deserted, and Big Bear was finally convinced that he had made a very grave mistake in going on the war-path.
THE SURRENDER OF POUNDMAKER
Meanwhile, General Middleton had marched from Batoche to Prince Albert, where he arrived on May 17th, and then pushed on to Battleford, where he joined Otter. Here Poundmaker and his braves came in and surrendered. After an impressive pow-wow, Poundmaker and several other chiefs were sent prisoners to Regina, and the rest released with a warning. From Battleford, the Expeditionary Force continued west to Fort Pitt, the infantry being carried by steamers up the Saskatchewan, and the mounted men marching by the south trail. About the middle of June, Big Bear's prisoners, who had succeeded in escaping, arrived at Fort Pitt. Finally Big Bear, deserted by most of his braves, gave himself up to an officer of the Mounted Police. With his surrender expired the last vestiges of the insurrection of 1885. Altogether some 5,885 men, of whom 5,330 were militia and 555 Mounted Police, had seen military service in one capacity or another in connection with the suppression of the Rebellion. Of the militia 4,380 were infantry, 650 cavalry, and 300 artillery. In addition, 2,500 men were employed in connection with the transport, commissariat, and other non-combatant branches of the service. The expedition cost Canada $5,000,000—the price of procrastination.
CHAPTER XI
THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

THE Saskatchewan Rebellion had been put down at much labour and cost, and it might have been expected that the Dominion Government would pay increased attention to its militia. But the "Dead Period" of the seventies was to continue through the eighties, and there was to be no speeding up of military preparation until the close of the last decade of the century. The farmers and merchants of Canada seemed to think that their skins were safe so long as they had the British Navy and the Monroe Doctrine to keep foreign invasion from their doors.

The main work done by the Department of Militia and Defence for the next ten years was in connection with the Royal Schools of Instruction. In 1885, the Mounted Infantry School was established at Winnipeg. This was later amalgamated with the Cavalry School Corps, or, as it is now called, the Royal Canadian Dragoons. An additional Infantry School was established in London in 1887. In 1893, the Cavalry School established at Quebec in 1883 was transferred to Toronto.

In 1887, the Permanent Force, used mainly for purposes of instruction, numbered about 1,000 volunteers attested for three years service. This Permanent Force was the heart of the Canadian Militia System. Through it the officers and men of the Active Militia received their training. But there was little thoroughness in the military education given at the schools, and "short course" men might leave the institutions with certificates without ever having fired a rifle, or engaged in, or witnessed, the construction of a trench—and Batoche had taught that nothing was more essential than rifle-fire and trench work. At this time the Active Militia

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amounted to about 37,000, but the number varied slightly from year to year. Men were enrolled for three years’ service, but, as a matter of fact, a large percentage each year were raw recruits. As a result, the instruction given was of the most elementary character—squad and company drill with an occasional parade. In some centres, such as Toronto and Halifax, the city corps were mobilized once a year, and went through manoeuvres, similar to what they might expect under Service conditions. But the officers, on the whole, had had no higher instruction and were utterly at a loss if called upon to command a mixed force and to act on their own judgment.

The militia, too, were badly equipped for service. At the time of the rebellion of 1885, the grooves of the Snider rifles were worn out and yet this rifle was to continue to be the arm of the militia for ten years longer. Some 10,000 Martini-Henry and 1,000 Martini-Medford rifles were purchased just as they were becoming obsolete. The Venezuela affair of 1895 had a good effect. It taught the Government that it might have to put its faith in new weapons rather than in the Monroe Doctrine, and it taught Canadians that the Doctrine instead of being a source of safety was to them a real menace. Some 40,000 Lee-Enfields and fifteen Maxims were purchased and steps were taken for the gradual re-arming of the field-batteries with 12-pounder breach-loaders instead of the obsolete muzzle-loaders in use. This was something. But the number of rifles purchased was wholly inadequate for the defence of Canada. It would give about a rifle per man on a peace footing, but the war strength was ninety battalions of 1,000 men each. Half of the men, therefore, in time of war would have to go unarmed or resort to the Snider “gas-pipes.”

An upward trend was given to military affairs by Major-General Herbert, an Imperial officer, in command of the Canadian militia between 1890 and 1895. General Herbert modernized the training and had officers and non-commissioned officers sent to England for instruction.
He likewise effected changes in the Headquarters Staff, obtaining the appointment of a quartermaster-general and an assistant adjutant-general, and making changes in the territorial districts for mobilization purposes.

About 1897, the “Dead Period” ended. The Government found itself with an overflowing treasury, and the militia, now under the command of Major-General Gascoigne, took on new life. All regiments were to be drilled each year, thus increasing the number of trained men from less than 20,000 to about 30,000. At the same time there was marked improvement in the provision of stores, equipment, and armament. The annual military budget had been from $1,000,000 to $1,600,000; in 1898 the budget had increased to $2,500,000, and steadily grew until in 1911–12 it was $7,580,000.

In 1898, Major-General Hutton took over the command of the Canadian forces, and it was largely due to him that the “Canadian Army” was in a position to play a creditable part in the South African War. He held command until 1900, when he went to South Africa to take command of a brigade of mounted troops. General Hutton insisted on the necessity of unifying the Canadian militia into what he was fond of calling a “self-contained” army. He was a strong advocate of the system of higher formations; of the establishment of administrative departments—the Army Medical Corps, Army Service Corps, Army Veterinary Corps, Ordnance Corps, Pay Corps, Corps of Musketery Staff Clerks, and Corps of Engineers. While he was still in office three of these improvements had been inaugurated, namely, the equipment of a couple of field companies of engineers, the nucleus of the Army Medical Corps, and the organization of Army Service Corps. It was fortunate that this work was taken in hand. There was to be a sudden and unexpected call for Canada to take her place in a great war overseas, and, although her militia was still in a crude state, something of real value had been done and the Permanent Force was in a position to serve as a
stiffening for the militia, just as the British regulars did in the War of 1812. And the Canadian troops were to be tested under their new organization not on the familiar soil of Canada but in distant Africa.

On October 9th, 1899, the ultimatum of the South African Republic (the Transvaal) to Great Britain startled the world. That this little republic, a petty state with a white population about half that of the city of Toronto, should throw down the gage of battle to the greatest among the Great Powers seemed suicidal. The ultimatum demanded that "all troops on the borders of the republic should be immediately withdrawn"; that "all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since June 1st, 1899, should be removed from South Africa"; and that "Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas, should not be landed in any part of South Africa." Unless an affirmative answer were given to these astounding demands within forty-eight hours the Government of the South African Republic would regard the action of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war. As preposterous an ultimatum as Austria-Hungary was to launch against Serbia in 1914, and it would never have been launched in its extravagant form had not President Kruger depended on the support of Germany. Great Britain had but one course to follow—to take up arms. Within twelve hours after the receipt of the ultimatum a message flashed back from London to South Africa—a message that Kruger and his advisers expected: "The conditions demanded by the South African Republic are such as Her Majesty's Government deem it impossible to discuss."

It is unnecessary here to give the causes leading to the outbreak of the war. However, one fact is of importance as it has a direct bearing on the Great World War. Kruger had for some time been seeking an alliance with Britain's greatest commercial rival, Germany. Even before the Jameson Raid, the Hollander-German clique, headed by Dr. Leyds, had made an attempt to get per-
mission for the sending of a body of German marines from Delagoa Bay through Portuguese territory to Pretoria. At a banquet given in honour of the German Emperor in 1895, Kruger said: "I shall ever promote the interests of Germany, though it be but with the resources of a child, such as my land is considered. This child is now being trodden on by one Great Power, and the natural consequence is that it seeks protection from another. The time has come to knit ties of closest friendship between Germany and the South African Republic—ties such as are natural between father and child." His Government made secret arrangements favouring German commerce, and Germans came to the country in large numbers, among them many military experts who had been engaged to aid the burghers in creating an efficient artillery force and to design forts. Immediately after the Jameson Raid came the famous telegram of the German Emperor to President Kruger: "I express to you my sincere congratulations that, without appealing to the help of friendly powers, you and your people have succeeded in expelling with your own forces the armed bands which have broken into your country and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression." He was evidently ready to aid the South African Republic against what he insultingly insinuated was the aggression of Britain. The British Empire was aflame with indignation at this telegram, and the British Government in answer to it sent a flying squadron to sea under sealed orders. It needed but a word to start a European war. But Germany did not say that word. She was not prepared for a great conflict. She had yet to create her Zeppelins and submarines, her monster siege guns and her asphyxiating bombs. She knew Britain could sweep her commerce from the high seas. She was at Britain's mercy for the present; but she set herself in that year to speed up her preparations for "the Day" when she might give battle for world dominance.

Meanwhile the Boers under the leadership of Kruger
made preparations for war. Vast sums were expended for secret service purposes—sums collected from the Uitlanders whose cause Britain had espoused—and in Germany, France, America, and elsewhere newspapers were subsidized for the express purpose of attacking Britain. Foreign mercenaries—principally Hollanders, Germans, and Irish-Americans—flocked to the republic and the Boers were being trained by a staff of German artillerists under Colonel Schiel. Supplies were collected in vast quantities and the forts of Pretoria and the forts dominating Johannesburg were strengthened.

In the summer of 1899 the situation became critical; war seemed inevitable, and the British colonies made ready to assist the mother-land in the coming conflict. Britain was ringed about by jealous enemies, chief among them Germany, and the oversea dominions let the world know that the war would not be Britain's alone, but one in which the whole Empire would play a part. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the prime minister of Canada, on July 31st, most astutely paved the way for the entrance of Canada into the impending struggle. On that day he moved resolutions in the House of Commons which committed the Dominion to the war.

"Some 80,000 of her Majesty's subjects," he said, "have been allowed to become residents of that country [the Transvaal], to purchase lands there, to open mines, to develop trade, to establish industries and to build up cities, yet are denied almost every kind of participation in its administration. They are subject to discriminating and heavy taxation, and yet are denied any kind of representation, and although forced to bear their full share of citizenship are denied the rights, privileges, and liberties of citizens." His object was, he added, "to assure the Imperial authorities, who have taken up the cause of the Uitlanders, that on that question we are at one with them, and that they also are in the right." He moved:

"That this House has viewed with regret the complica-
tions which have arisen in the Transvaal Republic, of which Her Majesty is suzerain, from the refusal to accord to Her Majesty's subjects now settled in that region any adequate participation in the Government:

"That this House has learned with still greater regret that the condition of things there existing has resulted in intolerable repression, and has produced great and dangerous excitement among several classes of Her Majesty's subjects in her South African possessions:

"That this House, representing a people which has largely succeeded by the adoption of the principle of conceeding equal rights to every portion of the population, in harmonizing estrangements and in producing general content with the existing system of government, desires to express its sympathy with the efforts of Her Majesty's Imperial authorities to obtain for the subjects of Her Majesty who have taken up their abode in the Transvaal such measures of justice and political recognition as may be found necessary to secure them in the full possession of their rights and liberties."

These resolutions were to have been seconded by Sir Charles Tupper, the leader of the Opposition, but that ardent Imperialist was unable to attend the House. However, he sent a note to Sir Wilfrid saying: "I think we are bound to give all the aid in our power to Her Majesty's Government in the present crisis." The resolutions were seconded by the Hon. George E. (afterwards Sir George) Foster. "These men," he said, "may be Outlanders so far as the Dutch Republic is concerned; but we extend to them to-day, as has been done from every quarter of the British world, that hand grasp which will make the 80,000 British subjects there feel that though Outlanders so far as the Transvaal Republic is concerned, they are Inlanders taken to the great heart of the British Empire." The resolutions were warmly approved by the entire Press of Canada, and by them the Government and Opposition alike were committed to action should war break out.
But, at the time these resolutions were moved, few in Canada thought that there would be war. Sir Alfred Milner kept declaring that there would be no war, and even Cecil Rhodes, who was on the ground and in touch with all the leading South Africans, maintained an optimistic attitude. But Kruger was organizing his forces. Every Boer farmer had been supplied with arms and ammunition, and the Transvaal commandos could be mobilized at a moment’s notice. The country was well stocked with provisions, and several hundred of the finest guns ever used in war, Krupps and Creusots, vastly superior to any British guns in South Africa, were at points of advantage in the Transvaal. Kruger had won or bought the goodwill of a large part of Europe and hoped that on his declaration of war a European conflagration would follow. The Orange Free State was pledged to join forces with the Transvaal. Moreover, a wholly inadequate body of British troops guarded the frontiers of Natal, Cape Colony, and Bechuanaland, and Kruger believed that a few initial successes would cause an uprising of the large Dutch population in British South Africa. There were, too, in England a number of agitators, Little Englanders, declaiming against interference in the Transvaal as Gladstone had declaimed against it in 1880. In his reckoning Kruger failed to take into account the feeling left in the hearts of Britishers in general and British troops in particular regarding the humiliating campaign of 1881 and especially the disgrace of Majuba Hill. He failed, too, to take into account Britain’s colonies; Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, each wealthier and more populous than the Transvaal, were ready to spring to arms in defence of the Empire. He miscalculated, too, the assistance he was to receive from the Dutch of Natal and Cape Colony. But he was confident of success and only waited the psychological moment to declare war. He depended on the mobility of the forces of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State for swift victory. He had approximately 60,000 troops,
counting the dependable rebels in the adjoining British colonies, and as these were practically all mounted men, they were equivalent to double their number of foot soldiers. Opposed to him in South Africa there were 22,000 British regulars, and about 10,000 colonial militia. But these troops had an immense frontier to guard. The most critical point was the Natal border along which the Boers were concentrating, but only 12,000 troops could be detached for its defence.

Kruger had decided on war, but success depended on the condition of the veldt, and it was not until the grass necessary for the mounts of his troops was well advanced that he determined to strike. Everything was ready by October 9th, and even before his ultimatum was despatched to England the burghers of both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were called out. On the instant each man had provided himself with rifle and ammunition, some strips of biltong, a supply of mealies, and a blanket, and mounting his horse sped to the point of concentration.

Great Britain promptly took up the gage of battle thrown down in the ultimatum and on October 11th war broke out. On the 12th the Boers shelled and captured an armoured train at Kraaipan, forty miles south of Mafeking. The Empire was now at war and Canada as a part of the Empire was at war. In July, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, when moving his resolutions of sympathy with the Uitlanders in the Transvaal and loyalty to Britain, had done it largely with the hope that his act might have some influence in causing "wiser and more humane councils to prevail in the Transvaal and possibly avert the awful arbitrament of war." By his resolutions he had closed the doors on retreat for his Government should war break out.

During the summer of 1899 individual Canadians had offered their services in a military capacity to Britain. Lieut.-Col. (afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Sam) Hughes, an enthusiastic militia officer, impetuous and energetic,
had gone so far as to start recruiting men for service in South Africa; but the raising of troops in Canada could only be done under authority of the Dominion Government, and Colonel Hughes was promptly ordered to desist from his self-imposed task.

On October 3rd a telegram was sent by Chamberlain to Lord Minto, the Governor-General of Canada, which made it clear that the British War Office considered war in South Africa inevitable. Evidently the British Government was getting ready to send an ultimatum to President Kruger or expected that one would shortly arrive from the Transvaal. In this telegram high appreciation was expressed of the "signal exhibition of patriotic spirit of the people of Canada shown by the offers to serve in South Africa." The War Office, it was stated, "would gladly accept four units of about 125 men each." These troops were to leave Canada not later than October 31st, and were to proceed direct to Cape Town for orders. The British Government no longer thought that Kruger would "climb down." This telegram was still under consideration by the Canadian Government when Kruger's ultimatum appeared.

The Government at once decided to act. The only question was, should Parliament be called to sanction the sending of troops out of the country? A small but vigorous party, mainly Quebec Nationalists, maintained that any other course would be unconstitutional. But the people of the Dominion as a whole urged on the Government immediate action and, on October 13th, Sir Wilfrid Laurier had his Cabinet summoned to make arrangements for the despatch of a contingent. After brief discussion the Cabinet concluded to send, not four units as the British Government had requested, but eight units, over 1,000 men in all; and "in view of the well-known desire of a great many Canadians who are ready to take service... the moderate expenditure which would thus be involved for the equipment and transportation of such volunteers may readily be under-
taken without the summoning of Parliament." The troops were to serve for six months, or one year if required, and were to be paid at the rate fixed for the Permanent Corps of Canada until landed in South Africa. After disembarkation they were to serve in Her Majesty's regular force at the rate fixed by the Royal Warrant for the pay of the British Army. But while the contingent was in South Africa the Canadian Government agreed to pay the men the difference between the Imperial rates of pay and those of the Permanent Corps of Canada. In some quarters indignation was expressed that the Dominion had not agreed to provide for her soldiers during their entire term of enlistment. But the Government acted on the advice of the Home Government, as Australia and New Zealand had already done.

No time was lost. On October 14th orders were issued for the enrolment of 1,000 men in eight companies of infantry. So great was the enthusiasm for the war that it would have been possible to recruit the entire contingent in a few hours in any one of the chief cities of Canada; but the Government desired that every part of the Dominion should be represented, and the leading cities of each province were made recruiting centres. "A" Company was recruited in Victoria, Vancouver, and Winnipeg; "B" in London, "C" in Toronto, "D" in Ottawa and Kingston, "E" in Montreal, "F" in Quebec, "G" in St. John and Charlottetown, and "H" in Halifax. So many men offered themselves that the difficulty was mainly one of selection. The contingent was organized round a nucleus of officers, non-commisioned officers, and men from the Permanent Corps. The outfitting of the contingent was a more difficult matter than recruiting. With the exception of arms, ammunition, and Oliver equipment, there was little in Store Charge to meet the requirements of such a force. Even the brown serge for the uniforms had to be manufactured. But in fourteen days after the recruiting order was issued the equipment for the contingent was ready.
The steamship *Sardinian* had been engaged to transport the Canadians to South Africa, and while she was being fitted out as a troop-ship the companies began to arrive at Quebec. On the 23rd of the month the concentration began, and by the 29th all the units had reached the ancient capital of Canada. The British Government had requested that units be sent, but the Canadian Government asked the War Office to sanction the formation of a regiment, and on October 27th the regiment designated the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, was formed and the officers gazetted.

The command was given to Lieut.-Col. (afterwards Major-General Sir William) Otter. For nearly forty years he had been active in the military life of Canada and had served in the field at the time of the Fenian Raids and in the North-West Rebellion of 1885.1 His senior major was Lieut.-Col. Buchan, who, like his commanding officer, had served through the North-West Rebellion. Shortly after the Rebellion was suppressed, both officers had gone to England and taken instruction in the three arms of the service—cavalry, infantry, and artillery. Their experiences in the Canadian North-West were to be of the greatest value to them in the South African War. The Boers of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were in their tactics not unlike the Métis and the Indians of Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and when these Canadian soldiers reached South Africa they found they had to battle with a people who were better shots and even more alert at taking cover and evading capture than the men they had encountered along the Saskatchewan river.

While the regiment was being mobilized, the war news from South Africa was watched with the keenest interest. Mafeking had been surrounded and in six days after the outbreak of hostilities was in a state of siege. On October 20th the Boers under Lucas Meyer had clashed with the British under General Sir W. Penn Symons, and suffered

1See ante p. 270 et seq.
a reverse in the Battle of Talana Hill or Dundee. The British were victorious in this first battle of the war, but the victory was a costly one, and among the mortally wounded was Penn Symons. On the following day another engagement took place at Elandslaagte. General (now Field-Marshall Viscount) French directed this battle, and after shelling the Boer position ordered his troops to fix bayonets. While Mauser bullets rained about them the British soldiers gallantly charged up the steep hillside and drove back the Boers. On the 24th there was still another fight; and this time, at Rietfontein, General Sir George White successfully attacked a large force of the enemy who were threatening the British lines. It was clear the Boers were not going to have the easy time they had had in the first Boer war; and it was just as evident that the British were in for a hard struggle. These battles, which took place in the wedge-shaped portion of Natal north of Ladysmith, had been fought largely to enable the British forces engaged to retreat to Ladysmith, and the victories had been won at great cost of men and officers, particularly the latter. It was found, too, in this first week of battle, that the British had much to learn. They had won hard fought engagements in the field, but the Boers left few prisoners in the hands of their enemies and had escaped with their guns. It was also evident that for a successful campaign new and more modern artillery would have to be hurried to the front. The British guns were completely outranged and the outlook for a successful resistance to the energetic Boer invasion of Natal was most gloomy. The fatality among the officers had been out of all proportion; conspicuous by garb, arms, and the positions they occupied in the direction of their troops, they made easy targets for the expert marksmen of the veldt. Those among the Canadians who looked on the journey to South Africa as a pleasure excursion saw clearly, by the time they arrived at Quebec, that the war was likely to be a long one and costly in lives.
All was ready for embarkation on October 29th, and on the morning of the 30th the troops marched on board the Sardinian. At 3.30 p.m. the lines were cast off, and, amid the enthusiastic cheers of the thousands who had gathered to say farewell to the contingent, the vessel with its freight of sturdy manhood steamed seaward.

For the first four days after leaving Quebec autumn gales swept the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Atlantic. Although drills were attempted, it was impossible to manoeuvre men when the ship was heaving and dipping over mountain waves, when the decks were awash, and the wind shrieking in the rigging. As the vessel forged southward she drew into calmer waters and the officers had an opportunity to take stock of their command. There were in all 1,061 men and officers on board; 1,039 belonging to the contingent proper, 11 officers attached for instructional purposes, 4 nurses, 4 special correspondents, and 1 Y.M.C.A. representative. Lieut.-Col. Sam Hughes accompanied it as a free lance and was to do effective work as an intelligence officer in western Cape Colony. On board the Sardinian, too, was Captain Todd, going to join his regiment, the Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

The officers were provided with state-rooms and the men with bunks and hammocks, but the vessel was badly fitted out for transport purposes. It had accommodation for scarcely 1,000 men, and was now much overcrowded. Canada had the whole art of war to learn from the beginning. No proper troop-ship was available at this crisis in her history, and the authorities failed to see to it that a proper transport officer was on the Sardinian. The sanitary arrangements were particularly bad, and the ship was soon in a filthy condition. Captain Todd had had experience transporting troops by sea, so Colonel Otter gave him charge of the vessel as ship's quartermaster, and under his direction a radical change was worked.

Colonel Otter now had a chance to get acquainted with his officers and men. Fortunately, a few were
experienced soldiers, but the great majority were utterly lacking in knowledge of the first principles of drill, and, what was worse, many had never fired a rifle. The most difficult question was that of discipline. The Royal Canadian Regiment was a body of citizen soldiers. Many in the ranks were personal friends of the officers commanding them, and many were of equal social standing with their commanders. They resented exacting discipline, a thing very necessary in such a raw regiment. It took some time before officers and men got to know each other; but as the vessel forged ahead on her 8,000 mile voyage, the contingent became one family.

There was little on the trip to break the monotony of green seas and blue skies. Southeastward the vessel sped, each day bringing the Canadians nearer their goal. They glimpsed Cape Verde Islands on November 12th, and passed a number of British transports a day or two later; but nothing save such incidents as the sighting of an occasional whale or shark or a school of porpoises broke the tedium of the journey. The most important event on the voyage was meeting, on the 16th, the Rangatira, a tramp steamer bound from Cape Town for Southampton. It enabled the Canadian soldiers to send mail to their friends, and a copy of the Cape Times, almost two weeks old, that now fell into their hands, gave them news that was at once alarming and inspiring.

The battles of Talana Hill, Elandslaagte, and Rietfontein had indeed been hollow victories. General Yule’s column had succeeded in getting to Ladysmith, but, on October 30th, the Boers had begun to drop shells on the town from their “Long Toms.” They were driven back for the time being in the battle of Ladysmith; but on that same day at Nicholson’s Nek a British force of over 1,000 men under Lieut.-Col. Carleton had been surrounded and, after a gallant struggle, had been compelled to surrender. This “Mournful Monday” resulted in isolating Ladysmith, and for nearly four months the town was to be a storm centre of battle. Mafeking,
Kimberley, and Ladysmith were all now in a state of siege. This war was evidently no child's play, and the Canadians longed to be ashore and in it. However, they had to undergo months of much-needed training before they would be in condition to play their part, side by side with the veteran regiments of Britain.

The Sardinian took on a more warlike aspect as she neared South Africa. Squad drill—there was no room for anything else—was practised daily. The Maxim gun crew was given frequent practice, and at the two miniature rifle ranges and the two revolver ranges the soldiers of the contingent were instructed in shooting. The four nurses were busy making bandages, and, in contrast, the grindstones hummed as bayonets were sharpened. During the greater part of the voyage the heat had been most trying, and with a feeling of relief the contingent welcomed the stormy seas and hovering mists that haunt the Cape of Good Hope. The Sardinian was scheduled to reach Cape Town on November 26th, but it was not until the 29th, that the welcome cry, "Land Ahead!" was heard. All eyes were turned in the direction indicated and gradually man after man saw, looming up on the horizon, Table Mountain, which looked to them, as it had looked to George Steevens, "like a gigantic coffin."

The end of the voyage had come, and not a day too soon; the coal-bunkers were almost empty, the supply of water was running short, so much so that during the last days of the voyage a guard was posted over the tanks. But they were within sight of land and approaching a country where adventure and glory, the pursuit of the young, awaited them—all save one. On the fourth day out from Quebec, Private E. Deslauriers had died of heart failure—the first break in the contingent.

The Sardinian cast anchor in Table Bay at noon on November 29th. The scene that now presented itself to the eyes of the Canadians was an unfamiliar one. At the docks and straining at their anchors were ships from
every part of the widely scattered Empire; transports from Australia and New Zealand and Britain; tramp steamers, liners turned into cargo boats, with munitions and food; and among these transports and supply-ships were men-of-war with their frowning black-lipped guns—the strength of Britain, but a strength that, excepting as a deterrent to other Powers to interfere, was to be of little service in this war. The republic had no warships to attack and no cargo boats to seize. Situated entirely inland they were like the "kernel of a nut," but a hard kernel to get at, the shell protecting it being difficult mountain ranges, desert stretches, kopjes that served as natural fortresses, and dongas and spruits that gave a defending force natural trenches.

When the Sardinian cast anchor she was immediately visited by Sir Alfred Milner's aide-de-camp. With him was Lieutenant Duffus, a Canadian in the Imperial Service, a graduate of the Royal Military College of Kingston, Ontario, one of a hundred-odd professional Canadian soldiers in the British Army. Kimberley had been made impregnable against Boer assault by McInnes; Morris was in Ladysmith; Wood, Osborne, and Hensley in the eastern and western theatres of this war were to give their lives fighting valiantly. While this contingent was the first body of soldiers to be raised and equipped by the Dominion for oversea service, for many years Canadians had given to the British army trained officers, who had played a gallant part in India, Egypt, and indeed in all Britain's little wars of recent years.

Although the Sardinian docked at 6 p.m. on the day of her arrival, the troops were not landed until the following morning. At 8.30 a.m. on the 30th they disembarked and were marched to Green Point Common, about two miles from the centre of the city of Cape Town,—a cool camping ground fronting the ocean and shaded by the surrounding hills. On the march they were made to realize that they were at the meeting place of two worlds, the great East and the great West. British subjects
from the four corners of the earth cheered them as they tramped through the crowded streets, and all along their route they caught glimpses of Hindus, Kaffirs, and Malays.

When the Royal Canadian Regiment reached Green Point Common, tents were pitched and for a brief day the soldiers enjoyed a much-needed change in the open after the cramped quarters of the Sardinian. While here, they learned that they were to be sent at once to the line of communication on the road to Kimberley.

During the last few days there had been severe fighting in the western arena. Kimberley, 647 miles from Cape Town, was closely besieged and a determined effort was being made to relieve it. The Boers had strongly intrenched themselves along the line of railway which runs from Cape Town to Kimberley through Bechuanaland just outside the Orange Free State border, and, while Kimberley, and Mafeking, 223 miles farther north, were bravely holding out, they would be starved into surrender unless relief was brought them. So General Methuen was sweeping northward, hammering at the Boer positions, beating their forces back and back, but himself suffering great loss. On November 23rd he won the battle of Belmont, and, in the battle of Willow Grange, forced a strong body of Boers to retire from Beacon Hill. Two days later, at Graspan (Enslin), he once more came into contact with a powerful force of the enemy, shelled their position with shrapnel, and then sent his men against them with the bayonet. For a time they offered a stubborn resistance, but in the end turned and fled. On the 28th he came into touch with the foe. They were 11,000 strong and skilfully intrenched along the Modder river. A long, fierce struggle took place, but at length victory rested with the British. In five days three battles had been fought, each fiercer than the last. The casualties among the British had been severe, and the enemy, though beaten and compelled to give ground, had lost few prisoners and had succeeded in saving their guns. But
Methuen had reached a point within forty miles of Kimberley, and it was thought that in a few days he would drive away or capture the commandos that were without its gates. But the relief of Kimberley was still remote; it was to take nearly three months to pass those forty miles, and the Royal Canadian Regiment was to play its part in scattering and capturing the besieging forces.

On the evening of November 30th, Colonel Otter received orders that his regiment was immediately to proceed to the front. Next morning tents were struck and preparations made to leave the cool retreat of Green Point Common. The parade state now showed forty officers and 933 men. A number of the Canadian soldiers had been pronounced unfit for the campaign upon which the regiment was about to enter and, on account of injuries and sickness, several others were unable to accompany it. When the regiment reached the railway station it was met by Sir Alfred Milner, who had come to wish it God-speed as it entered on its arduous duties. Its destination was De Aar, a supply depot in northern Cape Colony on the Cape Town-Mafeking line about 500 miles from Cape Town. Between 2 and 3 p.m. the trains bearing the Canadians to the front puffed out of Cape Town on a forty-hours' journey to the regiment's first halting place. Slowly the trains panted up the steep grades, past dried spruits and stretches of yellow, brown, and red desert, sprinkled here and there with tufts of wild sage; past ominous, bald, rock-strewn kopjes. How different from Canada; no reaches of green prairie, no shady forests or groves, no rippling streams or cooling lakes. In the heat and grime up this "dusty stairway" to the interior of Africa they toiled all Friday and Saturday, and it was not until 3 a.m. on Sunday that they detrained at De Aar, an important railway junction, which was guarded by the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry and a company of the Royal Engineers. The journey up the Great Karroo had been most fatiguing, and the weary troops were allowed to snatch a brief sleep
in the cool of the morning before beginning the work of the day. And soundly they slept on the yellow sand until reveille roused them.

After a breakfast of coffee and biscuits the men started to pitch their tents; but scarcely had they begun their work when they were to have their first real taste of South African weather. A light, hot breeze swept over the desert, and in its track little puffs of dust eddied across the plains. Gradually the wind increased in strength and the eddies became great whirls of sand, and a blizzard of blinding dust swept their camp ground. All day the storm raged and all work or comfort was at end. Every man sought, as best he could, protection from the hot, blinding blizzard. But there was no escape; it had to be endured, and served as an initiation to a campaign crowded with much greater hardships. For four days the Royal Canadians sweltered at De Aar doing camp duties and parades, and grumbling a bit at being left at this God-forsaken supply camp while fighting was going on only a few miles in their front. Totally unprepared as they were for battle, all were eager to get at the Boers at once; but they were to be held back on the line of communications until they were wise in the art of South African war.

On December 6th the regiment was ordered to advance a step towards Kimberley. The next important station to the north was Orange River on the boundary of Bechuanaland West and Cape Colony. Early next morning the Canadians entrained, and in a few hours saw the cluster of houses about the station, and the gleaming tents of the Gordon Highlanders, Shropshire Light Infantry, Cape Artillery, and Royal Horse Artillery. They were now in a large camp, composed mainly of regular troops. But it was another "dustbin of creation." As they viewed the stretch of desert, with here and there a green patch by some water-mill, or a flock of sheep or goats nibbling the dry grasses among the brown patches in the sands and along the kopjes, they longed for Canada
with its snow-laden fields and frozen streams and lakes. The world for them was turned upside down; sweltering, thirsty summer was with them at a time when they had been accustomed to the tonic atmosphere of the Canadian winter.

The regiment's sojourn at Orange River was to be a brief one, but not without its excitement. Although it reached its destination at noon, the tents did not arrive until 6 p.m. and the men had a brief period for rest. As soon as the tents came, a rush was made to pitch them, but scarcely had the men begun driving the pegs when black clouds gathered over the distant kopjes. Nearer they came and in advance of them the "dust devils" that had welcomed them to De Aar swept over their camping ground. But only for a moment; the whirls of dust suddenly changed to great drops of rain, and in an instant all work was stopped as the clouds burst upon them, deluging them and soaking tents and bedding and provisions. When the storm had spent itself, the soldiers, wet and shivering under the chill of an African night, went energetically to work and soon the tents were ready. It had been learned, however, that Methuen's line of communication had been broken between Belmont and Orange River, and that the Boers were hovering about in force and might in the darkness attempt to rush the Orange River encampment. Pickets were therefore sent out in unusually large numbers, a close watch was kept, and the soldiers were ordered to sleep in their clothes with their rifles and accoutrements beside them.

Next morning the Canadians had a chance to look about them. The surrounding country showed evidence of war. Every kopje was fortified and a strong fort, Fort Munster, had been erected near the camp. The regiment was now to be fully occupied. Many of its members were detailed for fatigue duty and two hundred men of "C" Company were set to work to put in a siding and build a platform at the railway station. As the task was completed a train drew into
the station and a lithe, active officer leaped off to glance at the engineering task just performed by the Canadian infantry. The officer was Lieut.-Col. Percy Girouard, a Canadian, the ablest military railway engineer in the Empire—the man who had made Kitchener's march to Khartum possible, and who had now been called to South Africa to reconstruct bridges and tracks destroyed by retreating Boer commandos. He was on his way to repair the break made in the railway behind Methuen, but he paused long enough to greet the men from his own home land, and to give a word of praise for the work they had just accomplished. On the following night 200 men and six officers of the Royal Canadian Regiment did outpost duty, learning the essential work of war, and being brought nearer the great centre of activities by watching the flash-lights of Kimberley, which was still holding out though surrounded by a host of enemies eager to get possession of this rich diamond town, and still more eager to get at Cecil Rhodes, who was with the besieged, and whom they had vowed to carry in triumph in a cage to Pretoria. The fortifications and the duties told the Canadians how near they were to war; but what brought battle most vividly to their minds was the Orange River hospital with its 150 British soldiers and 75 Boers under treatment for wounds and fever. But Orange River with its monotonous duties and its discomforts was as distasteful to the Canadians as De Aar had been, and they rejoiced when, on the evening of December 8th, they received word that Methuen's lines of communications had been restored, and that the regiment was to be pushed on to Belmont, a stage nearer the front, a spot over which the storm of war had already passed. Battle was in the air. Belmont, Enslin, and the Modder River fights had been but preliminary contests before the crowning struggle that was to relieve Kimberley. The Boers had gathered in ever-increasing numbers to check the progress of the British, but Methuen, with his successes still fresh in mind, was confident that he could
brush all opposition aside, and the Canadian regiment hoped to be in the first great battle of the war.

On the morning of December 9th the Headquarters and the right-half battalion entrained and moved to Belmont, thirty odd miles away, and on the 10th the left-half moved north to join them. They were now a day's march nearer the battle line, but here they were to remain for two weary, monotonous months—a waiting time that hardened them into veterans. They were now in a permanent camp, and although outpost duty took much of the time of the regiment, the commanding officer drilled it in the tactics required in the field.

At Orange River the Canadians had been forcibly taught what war was by the sight of the wounded in the hospital; at Belmont they were to learn its horrors even more forcibly while engaged in outpost duty. Belmont had been one of the first battlefields of the war. Here the Scots Guards, the Grenadiers, the Northampton-shires, the Northumberland Fusiliers, the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and the Coldstream Guards had driven the Boers from their intrenched positions. All over the field of battle were unexploded shells and fragments of shells, empty cartridge cases, broken bayonets, and smashed rifles. Here and there as the soldiers tramped on their monotonous rounds under the clear South African moon they came upon the carcases of mules and horses from which at their approach flocks of vultures—aasvogels—wheeled heavily away. Sometimes, too, they came upon piles of stones, the burial places of some of the Boers, the sight of a protruding foot or hand chilling them to the marrow.

The regiment eagerly awaited news from the front. Methuen was about to come to grips with the main body of the foe investing Kimberley. When he had smashed them, forward once more would be the order. But the order was to be long delayed. On the 12th came news that Methuen on the previous day had met the enemy among the Magersfontein hills. He had entirely failed
to grasp the situation. The Boers were ready for him, and his scouts, if he had any, had given him false information regarding the enemy's position. Just before dawn he had sent the Highland Brigade under General Wauchope against the Boer intrenchments; but as the British stole forward in the darkness in close order search-lights suddenly flashed upon them, and when they charged they found themselves entrapped in a wire entanglement. A fierce fire struck their ranks and hundreds fell dead and wounded. The work of Belmont, Enslin, and Modder River was in an instant undone. The British had to beat a humiliating retreat and the progress of the war was checked for weeks.

On the day after the news of this disastrous reverse reached the Canadians the first break in the regiment since its arrival in South Africa occurred. On that day died Private N. C. Chapell, and, while trains loaded with wounded men swept past their camp on their way to De Aar and Cape Town, the Royal Canadians buried their comrade on the battlefield of Belmont.

In the eastern theatre of war Sir Redvers Buller was meeting with crushing reverses. He had tried to force the Tugela on his way to Ladysmith, but in the Battle of Colenso failed hopelessly, losing heavily in men and being forced to abandon ten guns. Magersfontein and Colenso awoke the War Office from its apathy and over-confidence. This was a war that demanded the exercise of the country's greatest military genius, and so, on December 17th, Lord Roberts, the hero of the march from Cabul to Kandahar, was appointed Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, and Lord Kitchener, the hero of Khartum, was chosen as his Chief-of-Staff. Five days later these two brilliant soldiers sailed for Cape Town, and the Empire breathed more easily.

Meanwhile the Canadians in their camp drilled and made ready for the field. The manner of their drill was admirably given in one of the letters of Mr. C. F. Hamilton, war correspondent for the Toronto Globe.
"The officers and non-coms. now get into the ranks and
the word is passed along in lieu of the signals which make
the leader so conspicuous in the deadly clearness of vision
given to the battlefield by the devilish smokeless powder.
And so our men daily skirmish up the kopjes in long ex-
tended lines, officers and sergeants in the lines, to be distin-
tinguished only by the neater fit of their uniforms and
the coaching which they give their men. A succession of
thinly extended lines advance upon the enemy, one line
behind another each so extended as to present the mini-
mum target. As the objective point is reached the rear
'waves' come up to join the wave in front, thus feeding
the firing line and developing its fire with gradually in-
creasing intensity. . . . The rear rank supports the front
rank at a distance of thirty paces, the men in each rank
at intervals of not less than five paces, the companies in
rear following in the same formation at a distance from
each other of from eighty to one hundred paces. Thus a
half battalion of four companies advancing on the enemy
would present eight waves of thinly-scattered men."

While drill was kept up, rifle practice was not forgotten,
and the experience in this regard gained at Belmont fitted
the regiment for the effective work it was to do in the
trying days of the crucial battle of Paardeberg. Christ-
mas passed—Christmas at one hundred in the shade,—
the New Year was at hand, and contact with the enemy
still seemed remote. But on New Year's Day one of the
companies of the Royal Canadian Regiment was to have
its chance.

To the northwest of Belmont, near the town of Douglas,
a band of rebels of the worst type had fortified themselves
among the kopjes. Sunnyside Kopje was their main
stronghold, and from it they raided the surrounding
country, looting the homes of the loyal inhabitants.
Colonel Pilcher, who was in command of the Belmont
camp, decided to break up this nest of hornets. He
selected from the camp two companies of Queensland
Mounted Infantry, two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery,
a part of the Royal Munster Mounted Infantry, and one hundred men and four officers of "C" Company of the Royal Canadian Regiment, as well as the regiment's Maxim gun section. On the last day of the year this force set out for Belmont. Towards noon on January 1st, after a trying night march, the British troops under Pilcher came within sight of the tents of the Boers on Sunnyside Kopje. So secretly had the advance been made that the enemy were taken completely by surprise. Immediately their encampment was sighted the Royal Horse Artillery got into position, and the thunder of the guns, and the shells dropping in their midst was the first information that the rebels had of the presence of the British. While the guns were locating the enemy and driving them to cover, the Canadians impatiently waited for the command to advance on the height. At length came an order to Captain Barker to bring up his men at the double quick. The company leaped to its feet and sections two and three advanced to a series of kopjes 1,200 yards from the enemy's position, while section one acted as support 200 yards in the rear and section four as an escort to the guns. The Boers had been giving their attention to the artillery, but the infantry advancing to the sheltering kopjes now caught their eye and the ping of bullets sang about the ears of the Canadians. But they gained their objective point without a man being hit. The men from Toronto opened fire on the enemy, and so effective was their shooting that the rebel fire speedily died down. Once more a part of the company advanced, and once more the men reached a line of protecting kopjes without any casualties. Again they stole forward and were soon within close range and waited for the command to fix bayonets. Meanwhile the Royal Munsters had galloped to the north and cut off the escape of the Boers in that direction, and on the left the Queenslanders were creeping around to flank the foe. The infantry, the mounted infantry, the artillery, and the Canadian Maxim gun now had the rebels completely surrounded. For
four hours a long range fight continued, but at length the Australians and Canadians were ordered to fix bayonets and swept forward at the double. The sight of the cold steel took the heart out of the Boers. Up went the white flag and into the laager dashed the colonials bringing the frightened rebels to their knees at the bayonet point. A few had escaped early in the battle, but the victory was complete; the rebel camp was broken up, 6 were killed, 12 wounded, and 35 taken prisoners. The British loss was but 2 killed and 3 wounded; and so well had the Canadians availed themselves of cover that they sustained no casualties. The force now advanced to Douglas, expecting opposition, but the 300 rebels who were garrisoning the town had fled. However, the Boers were known to be gathering in overwhelming numbers, and the little band, accompanied by many of the loyal inhabitants of Douglas, made a forced march of forty-six miles back to Belmont, arriving there on January 4th.

For five weeks longer the impatient Canadians were to swelter at Belmont, four of the companies—"A," "B," "G," and "H,"—getting experience with flying columns but without coming under fire.

Roberts and Kitchener arrived in Cape Town on January 10th. Surely there would soon be something doing, but for a month both officers seemed to drop out of sight. They saw on their arrival in South Africa the difficulties they had to contend with and the total unpreparedness of the British force in the field, and settled themselves to study the situation and to organize their forces. Not until February 8th did the Canadians get a glimpse of these distinguished soldiers, who on that day paused at Belmont while on a journey to Modder River. Their plans were now well matured, and they were about to strike a crushing blow at the enemy.

On this day two of the Canadian companies were moved to Graspan, a few miles farther north, but were almost immediately sent back to Belmont. On the 10th orders came for the whole regiment to proceed to
Graspan, where it was to become a part of the 19th Brigade, made up of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the King's Own Shropshire Light Infantry, the Gordon Highlanders, and the Royal Canadian Regiment, the whole being commanded by Major-General Smith-Dorrien. An important movement was on foot, a movement that necessitated marching light, so the Royal Canadians entrained on the 12th, leaving behind them their tents. That night they bivouacked in the open, and on the morrow, as a part of a large force, began a march that was to rank high among the brilliant achievements of the British army.

By February 12th, 1900, everything was ready for carrying out a far-reaching military movement Lord Roberts had planned. He had now on the western frontier of the Orange Free State some 35,000 troops ready to throw into the field. So far the British forces had stuck to the railway, but Roberts determined to leave the railway behind, dash across the veldt, relieve Kimberley, crush Cronje's command, and advance triumphantly on the Orange Free State capital, Bloemfontein. For his great task he had assembled a cavalry division under Major-General French, two brigade divisions of artillery under Major-General Marshall, three divisions of infantry—the 6th, the 7th, and the 9th—under Major-General Kelly-Kenny, Major-General Tucker, and Lieutenant-General Colvile, respectively, and a howitzer battery, a naval contingent of four 4.7 guns, and four 12-pounders under Captain Bancroft of the Philomel. Besides this fighting force there had been brought together for the needs of this large army 700 transport wagons with about 500 native drivers and over 11,000 mules and oxen. The advance was to be through a desert country where there was little food and water, and everything had therefore to be borne along in the wake of the army.

The first move in this great war game was the advance of General French to the relief of Kimberley. On the
12th his cavalry seized Dekiel's Drift on the Riet river, and on the 13th marched twenty-five miles to the Modder river, seized Klip Drift and occupied the hills on the north side, capturing three of the enemy's laagers with their supplies. French then dashed around Cronje's left flank, brushed aside all opposition, and like a destroying whirlwind sped for Kimberley. On the 15th the eager watchers of that beleaguered town, looking southward, saw a vast dust cloud sweeping towards them. Soon out of the dust horsemen appeared—British horsemen spurring furiously their jaded steeds. The Boers in front of Kimberley likewise saw them coming, and withdrew so hastily that they left behind them their supplies and much of their ammunition. Thus, after four months of weary waiting, Kimberley was relieved.

On the same day Cronje saw that he was in a dangerous position. Roberts had left Methuen in front of his lines to keep him in check, but the wily Boer leader withdrew from his trenches at Magersfontein and Spytfontein and made a dash for Koodoosrand Drift, hoping to break through and to gain the road to Bloemfontein. But he was a day too late; the infantry divisions and the artillery were hard after him, holding the ground won by French.

The Canadians were part of the 9th Division. This division started in pursuit of Cronje on the 13th; the Highland Brigade, under General Hector S. Macdonald, leaving Enslin on that date, while simultaneously the 19th Brigade, under General Smith-Dorrien, left Graspan. The Canadians had 31 officers and 850 non-commissioned officers and men when they broke camp, but so trying was the first day's march that fifty stragglers fell behind in the twelve mile tramp to Ram-Dam. The heat was killing and the thirst torturing. On the following day twelve miles were covered and at Waterval ten more men were unable to go forward with the regiment. Here the Canadians assisted the naval guns across the Riet. On the following morning a disaster occurred which almost brought to naught all Roberts' carefully laid plans.
Shortly after the army had moved forward from Waterval Drift, the transport wagons came creaking slowly along. During the night Christian De Wet, with a band of 350 Boers, had taken up a position among the kopjes near the drift. He allowed the main army to pass unmolested, but when the transports approached at a snail's pace he got ready to attack them. The drift was held by a weak guard, and as the oxen and mules toiled up the slope from the Riet river a deadly fusilade was opened upon them and the draft animals were quickly shot down. The guards prevented the Boers from rushing the wagons, but could not beat down their fire. Reinforcements were brought up, and it looked as though the convoy would yet be saved; but to do this the whole advance would have to be checked, and Cronje, who, with the assistance of a German artillerist, Major Albrecht, was putting up a magnificent rear-guard fight, would escape. Cronje was the big game. Let the Boers have the transports; the men of Roberts' army could advance on half rations, quarter rations if necessary. And so Lord Roberts ordered the abandonment of the convoy. Two hundred wagons with their supplies fell into the hands of the Boers, and for four weeks the men of the force pursuing Cronje went hungry.

Meanwhile the British had captured Jacobsdal, and on the 15th the Canadians bivouacked on the outskirts of this town. They rested here until the evening of the 16th, when they set out for Klip Drift on the Modder river, covering sixteen miles during the night march. On the night of the 17th, they again advanced, covering twenty-three miles, and at 6 a.m., weary, hungry, and footsore, reached Paardeberg Drift. They were now close on the heels of Cronje. He had been run to earth, but was making a determined stand on the banks of the Modder river, a mile or two in their front. He was completely surrounded, but was game to the last, and was getting ready for a vigorous resistance, vainly hoping that a relieving force might come to his aid.
Immediately on their arrival at Klip Drift the Canadians made preparations for an early breakfast, but almost simultaneously came orders to be ready to parade at 7 a.m., and at 7.20 a.m. the battalion marched out to the support of the artillery, about a mile eastward. It had gone but a short distance when it was ordered back to the ford to cross the river and advance against the Boer intrenchments. The men were footsore and hungry, but the excitement of approaching battle, for which they had waited and drilled for so many weary weeks, buoyed them up. The Modder was in flood. The water was over four feet deep and rushed westward with the speed of a mill-race.

Two crossings were used. A rope was strung across at one ford, and, with the assistance of this, part of the battalion reached the northern bank. At another ford the men linked arms, and four-deep crossed the stream in danger of being swept away by the turbulent flood. As the companies landed they formed up on the banks and waited the order to advance. At 10 a.m. "A" and "C" Companies reached the firing line about 1,800 yards from the Boers' trenches. "D" and "E" Companies formed the support and "B," "F," "G," and "H," the reserve. The Cornwalls and the Highland Brigade were on the south of the river on the right and the Shropshires and Gordons on the left. The Boers had the positions marked and began firing at long range, but the Canadians valiantly advanced across the open plain towards their invisible foe until their right was within 400 yards from the enemy and their left 800. The day was intensely hot. There was no shelter from the sun and little from the enemy's bullets, but the men were quick to seize the depressions in the land or friendly ant hills for cover, and kept up a steady fire at the bursts of smoke and flame that told where the enemy's sharpshooters were stationed. Over them the Mauser bullets swished; continually about them the hot sand puffed in their faces as bullets buried themselves in it, and occa-
CANADIANS AT FAARDEBERG, 1ST ENGAGEMENT, 18TH FEBRUARY, 1900

From Appendix to Col. Otter's Report
sionally a cry of pain told that some comrade was hit. One of the first to receive a mortal wound was gallant Captain Arnold, and three of the stretcher-bearers were wounded in carrying him from the firing line. He was borne to the rear only by the assistance of Surgeon-Captain Fiset, who dressed his wounds under fire. Even the reserves were not safe from the Boer marksmen, and four of "H" Company were wounded 1,600 yards away from the Boer position. Early in the afternoon "D" and "E" Companies and part of "B" Company were brought forward to reinforce the firing line. One Canadian Maxim gun had been brought across the river and had taken up a position 1,000 yards on the left, and helped to keep down the Boer fire.

At four in the afternoon three companies of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry under Colonel Aldworth joined the Canadians, and Colonel Otter was told by the Cornwalls' commander that "he had been sent to finish this business, and proposed doing it with the bayonet." As the Cornwalls entered the firing line they were met by a savage fusilade from the enemy. At 5.15 p.m. all the Canadians except a part of "G" and "H" Companies were in the firing line, and at this moment Aldworth ordered a general advance. There was a wild rush for the enemy's trenches, a mad rush against a hidden foe; but after advancing 200 yards the rush was stopped by a murderous fire. The plain was strewn with dead and dying, among whom was Aldworth, whose ill-advised order had cost the attacking forces so dearly. However, the ground gained was held until darkness fell on the scene of battle. Orders were then given to collect dead and wounded and to retire to the drift. Even this was hazardous work, for in the dongas on the left the Boer marksmen were still watching the field and until 10 p.m. continued to snipe the men engaged in this work of mercy.

It had been a costly day for the British army, and as costly for the Canadians as for any of the regular forces—18 of them were killed, 63 wounded, and 2 missing. And
the sad part of it all was that this battle should never have been fought. Cronje was surrounded; the number of his force and the strength of his position were unknown. He could have been held in check by Roberts' enveloping army, searched by the artillery, and, all avenues of escape being cut off by the cavalry, either forced to surrender or starved out. But the experience of February 18th was invaluable to the Canadians. They had been tried and were not found wanting; from their commanding officer to their buglers all had acquitted themselves admirably, and although over ten per cent of those who had gone into battle had fallen, the rest were as eager as ever for the fray.

The day following the battle was one of comparative rest for the Canadians. They needed it. On the previous day they had snatched a hasty meal at 6 a.m. and had then crossed a turbulent stream, fought in the exhausting heat until night fell, worked until nearly midnight searching the scene of battle for dead and wounded, and not until 10 p.m. were they able to break their fast. Then they slept in the open. The night was bitterly cold, and, for the most part, they were without blankets. In the morning they awoke stiff from exposure and nerve-racked from the previous day's experience. There was quiet on their front. Cronje had retreated three or four miles farther up the river to a still stronger position, Wolveskraal. His force now occupied about two miles of the river, which was here a ditch about 150 yards wide and about fifty deep. Its banks were deeply wooded and afforded admirable natural shelter. Cronje was at bay, but he had dug himself in and could not be dragged out without his hunters suffering severe loss. But cavalry, artillery, and infantry were bearing down upon him from all sides, and, while he hoped for a relieving force, he must have known that in the end he would have to surrender.

During the afternoon of the 19th, the Canadians advanced to within 3,500 yards of the Boer position, and, as
outposts, were on the alert to prevent any of Cronje's men from breaking through the enveloping lines. On the 20th, the battle, or rather siege, was renewed in earnest. The Canadians, with the Shropshires on their right and the Gordons on their left, moved to within 1,000 yards of the trenches in front of the Boer laager. All day they lay on the open plain protected only by hollows in the veldt or ant hills; and all day they kept up an incessant fire on the enemy. While the infantry regiments searched Cronje's position with rifle-fire, howitzers and naval guns hurled shrapnel and lyddite shells into Wolveskraal, causing the destruction of stores, munitions, horses, and cattle; but so well had the Boer farmers, under the direction of Albrecht, intrenched themselves that they suffered but few casualties. Nor were the Boers idle; from cover they swept the lines of their foes with rifle-fire, and at intervals a Vickers-Maxim gun rained shells on the Canadians. At 6 p.m. the bugle recalled the regiment to its bivouac. On this day the firing line had sustained no casualties, but four men in the reserves were wounded 1,700 yards from the Boer trenches.

On the 22nd the 19th Brigade was detailed for outpost duty on a line of kopjes west of Artillery Hill. It was reported that a large force was coming to the relief of Cronje, but the Canadians saw no enemy. For two days they were free from rifle-fire, but suffered from continuous rains. They were glad when, on the evening of the 24th, they were ordered back to their old quarters at Paardeberg Drift. But the rain continued, their encampment was a mud-hole, and they found no escape from the wet. On the morrow they realized that the Boers were suffering even greater hardships. The rains had swollen the Modder to unusual proportions and down its course swept carcases of horses and cattle and a few bodies of men. So many dead cattle were swept along by the Modder from the Boer camp that for a time they threatened to dam the river. During twenty-four hours over 700 carcases passed the Canadian camp, in many
cases stranding on the shore and having to be pushed into deeper water. The Modder was the army's only source of water supply, and the contamination of it by these dead bodies was to cost the British heavier loss than did the Boer rifles. As a result of drinking poisoned water no fewer than 350 cases of enteric fever developed in the Canadian regiment alone.

The Canadians were beginning to have admiration for Cronje. With him there were some 3,500 men and a few women and children and about him were 35,000 British troops. He had endured as much in his dash from Magersfontein as had the British in their pursuit of him. He was suffering from heat and cold and rain, and lack of the ordinary necessaries of life; and, besides, continually into his position shells were being hurled. Each hour lessened the chance of a relieving force coming to his rescue, and so tightly were the lines drawn about him that he saw no opportunity of breaking through. On the 26th they were to be drawn still tighter. On this day the Canadians occupied a line of trenches 600 yards from the enemy, and all day long kept up a steady fire from this close range. But this was only preliminary to a greater and more far-reaching movement.

The morrow would be the anniversary of Majuba Day, and the pleading of such officers as Major-General Hector S. Macdonald, who had fought gallantly in the disastrous battle of Majuba Hill nineteen years before, and the hope of winning a victory on the anniversary of one of the saddest days in the history of the British army tempted Roberts to consent to an effort being made to storm the Boer position. He chose the Canadians for the crucial act in the drama. They were to leave their trenches at 2 a.m. on the 27th. To Colonel Otter was left the disposition of his men, and in a main trench running north and south from the river he stationed, from left to right, "C," "D," "E," "F," "G," and "H" Companies, numbering in all 500 officers and men. "A" Company was on the south side of the river, opposite the main line
of trenches, and "B" Company was in reserve at the bivouac. Immediately to the left of the intrenched Canadians, the Gordons were stationed, and 1,500 yards still farther to the left were the Shropshires.

At the appointed hour the six companies of Canadians left their trenches and advanced cautiously through the darkness; the front rank of each company with fixed bayonets, and the rear rank men carrying shovels and picks with which to intrench. On the right rear were a party of Royal Engineers under Colonel Kincaid. A distance of fifteen paces was to be maintained between the ranks, and an interval of one pace between the men in line. As the Canadians left their trenches the Gordons occupied them to act as a support. The night was moonless. The advancing lines hoped to reach the height overlooking the Boer laager and intrench there before they were detected. Slowly, steadily, they stole forward, the soft sand of the veldt muffling the sound of their advance. Not a word was spoken; not a command given. At length their objective was almost reached. It was about time for the rear rank and the engineers to begin their work of intrenching. Suddenly a soldier stumbled over a concealed wire. There was a rattle of meat tins, which the Boers had strung on wires in front of their trenches, and a premature discharge of several Boer rifles; then a crashing volley lit up the night and a hail of bullets struck the advancing lines. Down on the plain the Canadians threw themselves, while over them the bullets sang and about them thudded in the earth. For some minutes they lay enduring this fire and listening to the agonizing groans of wounded comrades. Suddenly someone exclaimed: "Retire and bring back your wounded." The word passed from company to company on the left, and the men of "C," "D," "E," and "F," Companies turned their backs on their foe and fled in disorder for their trenches, followed by the death-dealing bullets, which, fortunately, the darkness prevented from causing many casualties. "H" and "G" Companies on the extreme
THE CANADIANS ON MAJUBA DAY

From Appendix to Col. Otter's Report
right did not hear the order. They stood their ground and with the help of the engineers were soon intrenched. "G" Company had been badly cut up, having four killed and twelve wounded, but "H" Company, due to a protecting wood near the edge of the river, was intact. These two companies under the command of Captain Stairs and Lieutenant Macdonell maintained until daybreak a steady fire into the Boer laager, and the Shropshires, a mile away on the left, poured in volley after volley, thus helping to keep down the Boer fire. When day dawned, the Canadians saw that they were enfilading the Boer position; and the Boers saw it too, and recognized that the end to their resistance had come. This force, so advantageously situated, could keep down their fire while the remainder of the British army circled round them to within striking distance. It was useless to resist longer, and so at 5.15 a.m. the Boers in the advanced trenches raised a white flag in token of surrender. But the Canadians were taking no chances; it might be a ruse to permit the bulk of the Boer force to withdraw to safer quarters, and so for nearly an hour longer the men of "H" and "G" Companies kept up a steady and effective fire. At 6 a.m. a Boer came into the open bearing a white flag. It was clear now that Cronje had decided to yield to the inevitable.

The "cease fire" was sounded, and the Boers, haggard, gaunt, unkempt, began to tumble out of their burrows and to advance to the British lines. Cronje, the Lion of the Veldt, the ablest fighting general in the Boer host, was vanquished, and the honour of forcing him to surrender on Majuba Day fell to the men from the Maritime Provinces of Canada. Cronje was conquered; but his valiant resistance, his dogged endurance, had made almost a hero of him in the eyes of the attacking force, and no one among the British appreciated his courage and generalship more than did Lord Roberts. When the Commander-in-Chief of the British army met his defeated foe, he saluted him respectfully, and added: "You
made a gallant defence, sir.” And every man in the army surrounding Wolvskraal thought likewise. After all, there was little cause for self-congratulation in this victory won by 35,000 men who had run to earth and rounded up 3,500 of their foes; but the significance of it was tremendous. It was the first decisive British victory of the war. It broke the backbone of the Boer offensive, and went far towards keeping the disloyal Dutch of Natal and Cape Colony from taking up arms. It meant, too, that in a few days Bloemfontein, the capital of one of the enemy republics, would be in the hands of the British. War there was still to be, and plenty of it, but it was to be largely of the nature of guerrilla warfare. Cronje, however, had not resisted in vain. He had greatly prolonged the war, and by his stubborn stand had enabled the other Boer leaders to withdraw their men from dangerous positions and to lay plans for the future. He had, too, worn out Roberts’ large army. It would have to rest and recuperate before it could again take the offensive; and in his nine days of battle he had inflicted about 2,000 casualties on his enemies, more than half the number of men he had under his command. Of all this the British were well aware, but so highly esteemed is valour by valiant men that the soldiers of Lord Roberts’ army had genuine admiration for this uncouth farmer, one of the Boer heroes of the first Boer war, the conqueror of Jameson and his men at Doornkop, the smasher of Methuen’s plans, and the destroyer of Wauchope’s force—a bitter hater of the British, who, had he had his way, would have hanged Jameson and his officers and the insurgents of Johannesburg.

The Canadians had played the most spectacular part in this last act of the drama of Paardeberg; but they had paid a heavy price for the honour, and on the morning of Majuba Day and in the hour of victory had lost seven killed and thirty wounded. In the nine days about Paardeberg they had lost in all twenty killed and over ninety wounded.
Cronje was out of the way; but Joubert, the Boer Commander-in-Chief, De Wet, Delarey, Botha, Blake, and other resourceful Boer leaders were still at large. An examination of the trenches the Boers had just left showed the victors that the defenders of Wolveskraal were evidently experts at the military game. They were no longer merely skilful marksmen and adroit horsemen; under the direction of German instructors they had become superior military engineers. In the trenches they had dug, they had been comparatively safe from the iron storm which had been breaking over them for nine days from sixty guns and 10,000 rifles. The ground of the laager was rent and torn by shells; the trees along the river bank were mowed down as if by a gigantic scythe; the putrifying carcases of horses and oxen lay everywhere; and the lumbering veldt wagons and ammunition carts were smashed into unrecognizable heaps. They had had but six guns in their stronghold; their pom-pom had been wrecked by a shell, and a Maxim and four Krupp guns all showed that they had been hit. No doubt the greater part of the casualties had occurred among the men in charge of these guns. But the casualties were incredibly few. Only between 150 and 200 wounded crawled, or were borne, out of their burrows when the British entered the laager, and the killed must have been far fewer in number. The 19th Brigade, in the fight of February 18th alone, suffered double the loss of the Boers during the nine days they were under fire.

On the night of the 27th, the Royal Canadian Regiment bivouacked on the north side of the river, close to the ruins of Cronje's laager. This was an unhealthy spot; for pestilence was in the air, the ground about their camp and the river abounded in the dead bodies of animals, and swarms of flies and flocks of vultures hovered over the carrion. On March 1st, the regiment moved a mile or so farther up the Modder, and here at Osfontein they rested for nearly a week. It was the season of violent thunderstorms and pelting rains, and for the greater part of their
stay at this place their camp was a vast muddy pool. They longed to be on the road for Bloemfontein, their next objective; but the whole force had to rest, and the men of Roberts' army lay in their bivouacs or did outpost duty between Wolveskraal and Koodooosrand Drift, five or six miles away, until they had recovered sufficient strength for a forward movement.

Meanwhile, the Boers had been gathering in large numbers to bar the advance of the British, and General De Wet and Delarey had been hovering about to make a diversion in the line of attack on Cronje, with the hope that the beleagured force would be able to break through and escape. They had failed; but they had now returned to the attack in still greater numbers, having been joined by commandos from the southern and eastern sections of the Orange Free State, and had taken up a position all along the line of kopjes on both sides of the river. To gain Bloemfontein, the British would have to force their position, which the Boers had fortified at points of vantage with powerful Creusot and Krupp guns. Much depended on checking the British advance; and to give confidence to the burghers President Kruger, of the Transvaal, and President Steyn, of the Orange Free State, were present at these defensive operations.

On March 6th, the Canadians moved out of Osfontein and advanced to Koodooosrand Drift. The scouts of the army had brought information regarding the Boer forces and position, and Roberts was now ready for an attack. The Boers were near a farm called Poplar Grove, and occupied a stretch of country north and south of the river, with an extent of from ten to twelve miles. The right of the forces rested on a big hill called Leeuw Kopje, and the left on a cluster of hills called the Seven Kopjes. Between these two positions there were kopjes of various sizes, and in the centre was a large flat-topped hill called Table Mountain. It was an admirable place for a defensive battle, and not only were powerful guns in position on the hills, but it had been made strong
by means of wire entanglements, rifle pits, and trenches. Had the British tried to rush the Boer lines with a frontal attack, it would have ended in disaster. But Roberts had planned to go around the ends, roll up the flanks, and try to capture the entire force. He was war-wise; but so were his foes.

On March 7th, the advance against the Poplar Grove line began. The Canadians were the rear regiment of the 19th Brigade, and were halted when between 4,000 and 5,000 yards from the threatening kopjes. While the infantry on this day were to do much marching, the actual fighting was to be left to the cavalry and the artillery.

At 11 a.m., while French was endeavouring to circle around the left flank of the enemy, the Boers on Leeuw Kopje began firing at the naval guns on their right. The shells fell with deadly accuracy about the British guns, but fortunately they did not burst. The naval guns, on the other hand, were effective, and for a time, the Krupp guns on the kopje failed to reply. But better shells had evidently been found for the Boer weapons, which began storming the British artillery with a deadly, accurate fire. The British weapons were in reality outranged and out-classed; one of the guns was put out of action, and, to save the others, all had to be retired. The Canadians were detailed as escorts for the guns, and later were sent to work their way up a line of kopjes that were supposed to be sheltering Boers; but when they reached the top, they found none of the enemy, but saw a large force rapidly retreating across the veldt. Indeed, the whole of the Boer army was now in retreat. De Wet and Delarey had seen the cavalry movement and realized what it meant. Unless they made a speedy retirement, they would share the fate of Cronje. They were able, by means of their superior artillery, to keep the attacking British force, for the most part, at a distance of 4,000 yards, and as evening approached withdrew their entire force, fighting an admirable rear-guard action, and suffering the loss of only one 9-pounder Krupp gun. In
this action, the British sustained between fifty and sixty casualties, and the Boers probably not more than a score. But Roberts won an important, if not altogether satisfactory, victory in this battle of Poplar Grove. He had advanced fifteen miles on his way to Bloemfontein and had the Boers on the run. That night the army camped about the kopjes from which they had driven the foe.

During the 8th the Canadians rested, and on the following day crossed to the south side of the Modder. News had arrived that the enemy were in a strongly intrenched position at Abraham’s Kraal, some eighteen miles away. On the afternoon of the 10th, as the 19th Brigade marched over the veldt with the Canadians in the lead, the music of war was heard in their front. They quickened their pace to get into the fight; but the cavalry were scattering the Boers, and while the Canadians were still 700 or 800 yards from the firing line, the Welsh and Essex regiments, who had almost fallen into an ambuscade, cleared the main force from the kopjes with the bayonet—one of the few occasions on which the bayonet was of service during the South African War. The Boers once more saw that they were in danger of being out-flanked by the cavalry, and turned and fled. In this battle of Driefontein the British had over 400 casualties. The Boers, too, had suffered great loss, for over 100 of them were left dead on the field. They had lost, likewise, four guns and a number of prisoners. They had had enough of fighting and had not the courage to face Roberts’ army again in comparatively open ground, so the way to Bloemfontein was left clear.

For three more weary days the soldiers of the British Army dragged themselves along the road to the Orange Free State Capital, buoyed up by the hope of rest in the cool shades of that picturesque city. On the day after the battle of Driefontein, in a short ten mile march, 100 of the Canadians fell out of the ranks; but these turned up later at the bivouac. For two more days the regiment stumbled on. The men were in rags. What was left of
their uniforms was bleached almost white by the action of the sun and rain. Their boots were broken; many of them were almost barefooted, and some had bound their puttees about their swollen and bruised feet, while others had rolled them up in sheepskin. They were hungry, too, having had, since leaving Waterval, the coarsest of food, and scanty rations at that. But they toiled along hopefully in the wake of Roberts' army, their line of march marked with the carcases of horses, mules, oxen, and broken wagons.

At length the end came. A little after noon on Tuesday, March 13th, Lord Roberts, at the head of his troops, entered Bloemfontein without an opposing shot being fired. Indeed, his entry was a triumph. Half of the people in the capital were British or of British descent and eagerly hailed the conqueror; and everywhere on houses, stores, and public buildings floated British flags. The Canadians were not present at these scenes. They were still staggering on in the last lap of their race for rest and food. It was not until late in the afternoon that they arrived at Ferreira Siding, seven miles to the south of Bloemfontein, and here, as they went into quarters, they learned that the cavalry force had entered the capital of the Orange Free State, that the republic, henceforth to be known as the Orange River Colony, had been formally annexed by the British, and that President Steyn had moved his capital northward.

The spot allotted to the Canadian Regiment was a paradise compared to Paardeberg Drift and Osfontein, or even Orange River and Belmont. The camp was on an open, grassy plain, and, although the soldiers had to bivouac in the open, life was bearable. It was three weeks before the transports arrived and the men were able to get under canvas; but in the meantime they had better food, and some luxuries, for which, however, they had to pay war prices. By the time they reached Bloemfontein the force was reduced to 28 officers and 712 men—a third of the regiment had vanished in the last four weeks.
For nearly three weeks the Canadians at Bloemfontein rested in a state of extreme anxiety. Enteric fever had broken out in the regiment and soon 100 cases were in hospital, each man wondering if he would be the next victim. Every public building and some of the hotels were turned into hospitals, and here and there in the cool suburbs white hospital tents gleamed. There were not doctors enough to attend to the sick, and nurses and orderlies were sadly lacking, while the latter were often careless and inefficient. As a result, many of the soldiers, with constitutions worn down by hardships, whose lives might have been saved under proper treatment, succumbed to the disease.

Until the close of March, the Boer leaders were remarkably inactive, but they were waiting for a chance to strike. De Wet had his chance on March 31st. On that day he smashed a force under General Broadwood at Koorn Spruit, or Sanna’s Post, and seized the water-works, cutting off the Bloemfontein water supply, besides capturing seven guns and the whole of the convoy. Broadwood saw that he was in a tight corner and asked Lord Roberts for reinforcements, and early on April 1st, General Colville was sent out with the 9th Division. On this occasion, the Canadian Regiment saw no fighting, and on the 3rd returned to Bloemfontein. On the 4th, it was once more on the march. This time Colville's Division was accompanied by three batteries of field artillery and some cavalry. A mobile force of raiders was scouring the southeast corner of the Free State and it was necessary to clear them out before the next great step, the advance on Pretoria, could be begun. But not an enemy was seen; the Boers had slipped away to other pastures. The Canadian Regiment returned to Bloemfontein, and, to their delight, found that their tents had arrived. For fifty-three days the soldiers from Canada had slept in the open, enduring the chill of the night after the scorching heat of the South African day. They had often slept on sodden ground, with rain pelting upon them, and the
strongest among them had felt the strain. The tents were a luxury, and it looked as though they might be privileged to enjoy them for some weeks. Roberts' lines of communication were threatened. Pretoria was still remote, and a greatly increased force, a more mobile army, would have to be brought into the field before an effective forward movement could be commenced. But the rest was to be a short one. On April 21st, the 19th Brigade—"the Fighting 19th," as it was now called—was once more sent out eastward to endeavour to scatter bands of troublesome Boers. When it marched out on this day it had but twenty-seven officers and 584 non-commissioned officers and men; three officers and 150 men having been left behind in the hospitals. For four days the column under General Ian Hamilton, to which the Canadians were attached, pursued the elusive enemy; but it was not until near noon of April 25th that it got into contact with any considerable force. On this day, as the British soldiers toiled across the burning veldt, they heard firing on their front. The mounted infantry were engaged, and the infantry column, with the Canadians leading, was halted while the guns were rushed forward to open fire.

Early in the afternoon Colonel Otter received orders to move his battalion forward with an extended front of about 1,200 yards. Immediately in advance of the Canadians was a high bald kopje and on either side of it the sloping sides of two other kopjes. This spot was the objective point. But the Boers held it in force and Otter's task was to drive them out. While the Royal Canadians were detailed for this hazardous task, the mounted infantry and the rest of the 19th Brigade was to make a long detour to the left to threaten the flank of the enemy, who held all the kopjes in their neighbourhood. Colonel Otter formed his regiment into four companies in extended order, with intervals of twelve paces between the men and 150 yards distance between the double companies. In this order the battalion advanced for about a mile,
with occasional Mauser bullets puffing the earth between the extended ranks. The firing line at length reached a wire fence about 600 yards from the Boer trenches. This position was evidently marked, and the enemy, who had been holding their fire, now began a murderous fusilade. It seemed for the moment that the experiences of the 18th of February were to be repeated; but the men of the regiment were now veterans in this kind of warfare and quickly seized every available cover. A ditch running for a short distance along the fence gave excellent protection and into it the greater part of the firing line tumbled. Colonel Otter, who was with Major Pelletier with the first line, was directing the movements of the entire battalion. At this critical moment, he fearlessly exposed himself to direct his men and his commanding figure made an excellent mark for the Boer sharp-shooters. Their bullets found him; one striking him in the chin and neck, another penetrating the badge on his right shoulder. At about the same moment Private Defoe was killed and Lance-Corporal Burns and Private Culver wounded. For nearly an hour the battalion lay in the ditch and on the veldt, replying to the enemy sharp-shooters with vigour. The Boer fire slackened, and Otter, who despite his wound had remained with his regiment, hearing the remainder of the brigade engaged on the left, decided to attempt to capture the kopje on his front before nightfall. He therefore ordered the advance to be sounded, and the regiment, leaving its shelter, pushed forward under a weak and irregular fire. Bayonets were fixed as the enemy's position was neared, and the sight of the cold steel took the courage out of the Boers who were left. They turned and fled precipitately, and the Canadians ascended to the top of the kopje and bivouacked that night in the Boer position. This battle of Israel's Poort was a creditable affair to the regiment, which received compliments from both Smith-Dorrien and Ian Hamilton. It was, however, to lose for a month the presence of its commander. His wound proved to be so severe that he
was forced to return to Bloemfontein, and it was not until May 12th that he could set out to join his regiment, which, under the command of Colonel Buchan, was then well on the way to Pretoria.

For the next four days the Canadians operated in the vicinity of the village of Thabanchu, east of Bloemfontein, into which they marched and over which they raised the British flag. On Monday, April 30th, the regiment left Thabanchu and advanced northward toward Hout Nek. The cavalry was in advance, and as it approached the lines of tall kopjes about Hout Nek, it was checked by a strong artillery fire. The enemy were extended over a four mile front, and on Thaba Mountain were collected in large numbers. It was the aim of the British to drive them from this height, but its approaches were guarded by long range guns. About 10 a.m. the 19th Brigade came into action, with the Shropshires leading. The Canadians, or rather three companies of them, were sent direct to the mountain. The Boer guns had been concentrating their fire against the mounted infantry, but as the gunners saw the Canadians in widely extended order creeping towards them, they turned on them two of their "Long Toms." The artillerists had the range and the big shells were soon dropping into the advancing ranks. The Boers, fortunately, were not using smokeless powder, and this gave the Canadians an advantage. Captain Rogers, who was directing the firing line, watched for the puffs of smoke on the distant mountain side, and as he saw them ordered his men to rush forward at the double. These tactics kept the Boer gunners guessing, but while many of the shells passed over the Canadians, an occasional one burst in their midst. Fortunately, the soft ground prevented the majority of the shells from exploding, but the Canadians were at times deluged with dust and some of them were knocked down. Only one man was killed—Private Harry Cotton, son of Lieut.-Col. Cotton, of the Headquarters Staff at Ottawa. At length the Canadians came within rifle range, and despite shell-
fire and rifle-fire they succeeded in getting to sheltered ground at the base of the mountain. Darkness was falling, and so they hastily threw up stone shelters and were soon comparatively safe from the Boers, who continued to fire on them during the night. Here they lay, hungry and freezing, waiting for the morrow and the renewal of the battle.

With daylight the fight began once more; Thaba Mountain had to be won. Worn out by cold, loss of sleep, and the work of the previous day the Canadians still went at their task with energy. Slowly they crept up the mountain side from cover to cover, advancing and firing, and keeping themselves out of sight of the Boer riflemen. At length they were discovered and were compelled to retreat to a sheltering valley. A bit of rising ground was observed close at hand, which, if they could gain it, would enable them to sweep the top of the mountain with rifle-fire. They succeeded, and from this safe spot poured volley after volley into the Boer ranks.

So far the British guns had been completely outranged by the Creusots and Krupps of the enemy. Meanwhile British naval guns had come up. These now opened fire and their shells began exploding in the Boer trenches. The rifle-fire of the enemy slackened; their guns became silent; and towards evening the whole British force moved forward, and the mountain top was gained. In these two days of fighting, so wise were the Canadians in the matter of taking cover, only one man was killed and six wounded, and this in the most severe fighting they endured in South Africa, with the exception of the Sunday battle at Paardeberg. The British captured a few Boers, men who had remained to fight a rear-guard action, but the great body of the enemy had trekked northward, taking with them all their guns.

The region east of Bloemfontein was now well cleared of the foe. The Canadians had expected that when this work was done they would be marched back to the Orange Free State Capital; but this was not to be. On May Day,
Roberts had begun a great forward movement towards Pretoria, and the 19th Brigade was to become a part of that famous march.

We can now leave the Royal Canadian Regiment for a time while we consider the operations of the Canadian Second Contingent—the mounted troops and artillery, who had by this time arrived in South Africa and were a part of Roberts' army.

Scarcely was the Sardinian out of sight of land on her voyage to the seat of war before the Dominion Government offered the Imperial authorities a second contingent. On November 2nd, 1899, the Governor-General of Canada sent the following cablegram to Mr. Chamberlain: "Deep emotion had been caused in Canada by reports of reverses in South Africa, but strong hope is felt everywhere that no cause exists for alarm. My Ministers are, however, prepared to act on your previous despatch and send another contingent at once, if Her Majesty's Government deem it advisable." But the War Office required Magersfontein and the reverses of the Tugela to wake it from its lethargy, and it was not until December 16th that a cable was sent to Canada accepting the offer of November 2nd. On December 18th, the Canadian Cabinet met and finally decided to give further aid in men in the South African War. Instructions were given to the Department of Militia and Defence to prepare a second contingent to go forward at the earliest possible moment. The new force was to consist of three squadrons of mounted infantry and three battalions of artillery. On December 27th, the list of officers was published, together with the fact that the Government had decided to add a fourth squadron of mounted rifles.

Lieut.-Col. François Louis Lessard was to command the 1st Battalion, "A" and "B" squadrons. Col. Lessard

1 The Royal Canadian Dragoons formed the nucleus for the 1st Battalion. On August 21st, 1900, the following appeared in Army Orders: "The 1st Battalion Canadian Mounted Rifles . . . will
MAJOR-GENERAL F. L. LESSARD, C.B.
had had twenty years military experience, having entered the Quebec Garrison Artillery as a second-lieutenant in 1880, from which time he had devoted his entire life to military affairs. Commissioner L. W. Herchmer of the North-West Mounted Police was given charge of the 2nd Battalion, "C" and "D" Squadrons. Since boyhood Commissioner Herchmer had been a soldier, having been gazetted in Her Majesty's 46th Foot, in 1858, when but eighteen years old. He had served in India, and on leaving the Imperial Army had gone to Canada. From his arrival in Canada until he took command of the 2nd Battalion his life had been continuously spent on the western plains. Of the 325 officers and men under him, 130 were Mounted Policemen or ex-Policemen, and the rest, ranchers from the territories. Lieut-Col. C. W. Drury, who was already in South Africa, was named to command the artillery, while under him were Major J. A. G. Hudon in charge of "C" Battery, Major W. D. Hurdman of "D," and Major G. H. Ogilvie of "E."

Assembling the troops, equipping them, giving them preliminary training, and securing transports delayed the sending of the Second Contingent overseas until after the new year. On January 21st, 1900, the Laurentian sailed from Halifax for Cape Town with "D" and "E" Batteries and 12 men of the Canadian Mounted Rifles—in all 22 officers and 343 other ranks; on the 27th, the Pomeranian sailed from the same port with the Canadian Mounted Rifles—18 officers and 304 other ranks; and on February 21st, the Milwaukee with the Royal Canadian Dragoons, "C" Battery, 23 artificers, and 6 officers for instructional or other purposes—in all 28 officers and 605 other ranks. The total of the Second Contingent was thus 68 officers and 1,252 other ranks. Besides the men, guns, and equipment, the three vessels carried with them 1,172 horses, 75 of which died on the voyage.

in future be designated the 'Royal Canadian Dragoons.'" For convenience, the 1st Battalion will, in this sketch, be designated the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the 2nd Battalion the Canadian Mounted Rifles.
While the Second Contingent was being made ready, Lord Strathcona, Canadian High Commissioner at London, offered the Imperial Government a regiment of scouts to be raised in the Canadian Great West, and to be equipped and supported at his expense. The offer was immediately accepted, and Lieut.-Col. S. B. Steele of the North-West Mounted Police, who was at this time second-in-command of the C.M.R., was given charge of this special regiment—"Lord Strathcona's Horse." On March 17th, the Monterey left Halifax with the regiment, and 100 men as reinforcements for the First Contingent—34 officers and 1,613 other ranks. On the voyage to Cape Town, which was reached on April 11th, 176 horses out of 599 died, and so many were sick that the men of the regiment jocularly called themselves "Strathcona's Foot."

The Laurentian arrived at Cape Town on February 6th, and on the 17th went into camp at Green Point Common. On March 4th, four guns and the wagons of "D" Battery were ordered to entrain for the front, destination not given. On March 10th the remainder of "D" and the whole of "E" was entrained for De Aar. They were stopped at Victoria West Road Station, where they found the four guns of "D," "D" and "E" Batteries were now the artillery force of a column to march on Kenhart via Carnarvon, Sir Charles Parsons in command. At Carnarvon the force was joined by the C.M.R. which had been in Cape Town since February 28th.

The entire region from Belmont Station to Victoria West Road Station and far into the karoo was a hotbed of rebellion. The rebels, the worst class the British had to contend with, many of them half-breeds, had driven the loyal inhabitants out of the districts of Britstown, Prieska, and Kenhart, bordering on Carnarvon, looting and destroying property. Reports of recent successes had intimidated the more intelligent, and they had returned to their homes, but, scattered throughout this
wide region, there were still hundreds in arms. They felt safe in their remote wilderness; the wide stretches of alkali desert leading them to believe that it would be impossible for a considerable force to march against them.

The column under Sir Charles Parsons consisted of about 1,200 men. It was made up of New Zealanders, West Australians, Canadians, and Imperial Yeomanry. The Canadians constituted more than half of the column, besides contributing the 12-pounder guns and two Vickers-Maxims. As the column advanced in sections over the dusty roads between Victoria West and Carnarvon, the rebels vanished and the British flag was much in evidence. Each day brought tidings of the concentration of rebel forces, but, on the whole march of over a month, the column never came under fire. The march was the hardest endured by the batteries and the C.M.R. in South Africa. The hardy gunners and troopers stood it well, but the horses, short of forage, thirstily tramped through the alkali desert over roads clouded with dust, tugged the guns over roads that were running rivers of mud, at times floundering through swollen ditches and streams. Their suffering was extreme, and the line of march from Victoria West to Carnarvon, to Van Wyks Vlie, and to Kenhart, hence back to Carnarvon then to Vosburg, Britstown, and De Aar, which was reached on April 13th and 14th, was marked by the carcases of horses. In all nearly 700 miles had been covered "under conditions of food, forage, and weather, far more severe than any subsequently met with during the campaign."

From De Aar, the C.M.R., now under command of Major Howe—Lieut.-Col. Herchmer having been invalidated on March 30th—proceeded by rail to Norval's Pont, and thence by route march to Bloemfontein, reaching that place on April 29th, when it was embodied in the 1st Mounted Infantry Corps of the 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade, under command of Major-Gen. Hutton. "D" and "E" Batteries were now separated; "D" being
ordered to guard the lines of communication, while “E” was sent to join Sir Charles Warren in Griqualand.

Meanwhile, on March 21st, the *Milwaukee* with the R.C.D. had arrived at Cape Town, but stormy weather prevented the disembarkation of the regiment until the 26th. It was to remain at Green Point Common and Stellenbosch, a remount station thirty-three miles from Cape Town, until April 18th, when it was sent forward to Bloemfontein, “B” squadron on the 8th, “A” on the 9th, and the details of the regiment on the 10th. Until the 30th the squadrons were separated, escorting ammunition columns, convoys, mules and horses, and infantry corps. “B” squadron was the first to reach Bloemfontein, April 21st, and was immediately sent into action on the east of the city. For three days, April 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, it was under fire, but the only casualties were among the horses. It then went into camp at Fischer’s Farm, a cool retreat about six miles from Bloemfontein, where “A” squadron was already resting. On May 1st, the regiment, now complete, marched out of Fischer’s farm with the 1st Mounted Infantry Corps under Lieut.-Col. E. R. H. Alderson.

And now, before accompanying the mounted troops and the Royal Canadian Regiment on their march to Pretoria, it will be well to take up the work of “C” Battery. After this battery disembarked at Cape Town from the *Milwaukee*, it remained in camp at first at Green Point Common and later at Stellenbosch. On April 12th, while at the latter place, it received orders to hold itself in readiness for immediate service. On the 14th, it was back in Cape Town and on board the *Columbian* on its way to Beira, in Portuguese East Africa. Roberts had planned the swift relief of Mafeking, which had been amazing the world by its resistance since the opening days of the war. Colonel Plumer had long been endeavours to reach the heroic little garrison, and now Col. Mahon was speeding northward from Fourteen Streams on the same mission. Mahon’s force and “C”
Battery were to join hands with Plumer and make a concerted attack on the Boer besieging force. "C" Battery, now part of the Rhodesian Field Force, under General Sir Frederick Carrington, reached Beira on April 21st, and here entrained on a narrow gauge railway for Bamboo Creek, where they shifted to a broad gauge line which was to bear them to Marandellas, 351 miles from the coast. On this journey the battery passed through fever mists and clouds of locusts, their trains in continuous danger of being blown up from the showers of sparks emitted by the engines. For forty-eight hours the men were practically without sleep, but the horses suffered most and at Marandellas had to be left behind and mules substituted. From Marandellas to Buluwayo, the distance is about 200 miles. The force was working on schedule time, and this distance had to be covered in eight days. General Carrington had made the most complete arrangements to have the battery and the 100 Queenslanders who acted as an escort coached across the fever-haunted region between Marandellas and Buluwayo. Two guns were left behind with the transports, while the remaining four were to hasten along with the coaches. At Buluwayo, which was reached after six days—about fifty miles a day, and this over roads at times almost impassable—the force was delayed almost twenty-four hours. On May 8th, it entrained for Ootsi, 429 miles in the direction of Mafeking, and this distance was covered in less than two days.

On the 13th, the force was in touch with Plumer's camp at Sefetali into which it trekked next morning, welcomed enthusiastically by 800 men—300 of whom were on the sick list. Ragged, hungry, and dirty, they had for long weeks been harassing the Boers, fighting gallantly from their well-intrenched base, but, as they had only one 12-pounder breech-loader, and three 7-pounder muzzle-loaders, they were unable to give effective relief to Mafeking. At 2 p.m. on the 14th, the column commenced its march toward the beleaguered town.
Molopo, thirty miles away, on the morning of the 15th, it formed a junction with the southern column, under Colonel Mahon. On the 16th, the combined columns moved towards Mafeking. At Sanie Station scouts brought word of the presence of the enemy. Soon the advance guard was in action, and Major Hudon received word to take position. The guns were rushed by hand into a mealie field and the battery got its first taste of real war by a shell bursting immediately in front of it. The Canadian guns began action at 2.30 p.m. with percussion shrapnel, at a bush on the right of a white house, at a range of 5,000 yards. Two other ranges were tried, but it was hard to locate the enemy’s guns, whose shells fell dangerously close to the battery, and Major Hudon changed position and rushed his battery to a ridge about 1,000 yards east of the first position. While this was being done the gunners were subjected to an enfilading fire from guns, pom-poms, and rifles, but suffered no casualties. The battery soon located the Boer guns and the gunners had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy fleeing from their position. It now found itself exposed to a heavy fire from the right. Thereupon the right section changed front and was immediately assisted by the left section, and the enemy was again dislodged. This interesting battle continued until 5.40 when the Boers were forced from their positions, and fled in great disorder. At this time the general action ceased and the battery rejoined the remainder of the column. A complete victory had been won. The front was now clear, and in the darkness the men from Canada advanced with the rest of the column to Mafeking, arriving there at 4 a.m. on the 17th. At 7 a.m. it was sent to the outskirts of the town to shell the Boer laager at Game Tree Fort, and so effective was its fire that in fifteen minutes the Boers were in hurried flight. The battery had done “essential work” in the relief of Mafeking, had done it after a march of “incredible rapidity,” to use the words of Lord Roberts. This victory was worth the journey of
10,000 miles it had taken by land and sea. The brilliant forced march and the skilful management of the guns were due largely to two French Canadians, the commander of the battery, Major J. A. G. Hudon, and his able second-in-command, Captain H. A. Panet. It was a source of great pride to both these men, as well as to the entire battery, that on their first night in Mafeking "Canada" was announced as the password, out of compliment to their work in the relief of the beleaguered town.

By May 1st, all was ready for an advance on Pretoria, and on that day Roberts' army began to move northward. On May 3rd, the main army had reached Karee, twenty miles from Bloemfontein. The armed host was now advancing with a front of fully forty miles. On the extreme right was the Winburg column, under General Ian Hamilton, and on the extreme left General Hutton's 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade. The Royal Canadian Regiment was with Hamilton and the C.M.R. and R.C.D., as part of the 1st Infantry Corps, under Lieut.-Col. Alderson, were with Hutton. "D" Squadron was absent, but on May 3rd it caught up with its regiment and the command of the C.M.R. was taken over by Lieut.-Col. T. D. B. Evans.

Slowly the ponderous drag-net of 40,000 men swept northward, the Boers retreating before it, but at times putting up stubborn rear-guard actions. The first serious resistance was encountered as the British approached the little town of Brandfort, but the mounted infantry brushed this opposition aside and the British entered the town unopposed, while the Boers fled in haste to get across the Vet river. Constantly in this advance the C.M.R. and R.C.D. had to move against positions where Boers were supposed to be, to draw their fire and thus locate them for the artillery. In this work they were frequently under fire from artillery, machine guns, and rifles, but so skilfully were they handled that casualties among them were practically unknown. At the Vet river occurred a fight that well illustrates the character of their work.
The Boers were in force on the kopjes to the north and were also strongly intrenched along the river bank, but they held their fire hoping to draw the British into a trap. It was the duty of the Canadians to locate them. In a thinly-extended line they moved forward until the enemy's guns began to drop shells among them. A brisk battle followed, in the course of which a call was made for volunteers to cross the river and seize a bit of high ground that would dominate the enemy. All the R.C.D.'s were ready to go, but Lieutenants Turner and Borden and five troopers were chosen from among the volunteers. They began to ford the river, but were soon beyond their depth and had to swim for it. Holding their rifles above their heads, with Mauser bullets splashing the water about them, all succeeded in crossing, one trooper alone losing his rifle. They found the Boers in excellent shelter in a stone laager and outnumbering them ten to one, but they kept up a steady fire on their enemy, thus enabling a detachment of the R.C.D. to cross the ford and gain the northern bank, and in short order the Boers were scattered in flight.

The next strong resistance was on March 10th at the Zand river. In the battle to force the passage of this river the much-tried 19th Brigade was to play an essential part. The Royal Canadian Regiment, or rather what was left of it, had the place of honour in the attack, and 100 of its members in the firing line kept at least 800 Boers at bay. The attack began in the early morning and not until the afternoon did the enemy's firing begin to slacken. While the infantry were holding them in the river bed, the mounted infantry were threatening their flanks and so they hurriedly fled for Kroonstad. But their stay there was brief. Kroonstad was soon occupied, and the tide of British soldiers flowed after them until Doornkop, the scene of the Jameson Raid, was reached. Here the Boers were located in force in the Klipriversberg hills, determined to keep back Roberts' army from Johannesburg. But after a two days' fight
Line of March Followed by R.C.D. South Africa 1900

Distance 1780 miles

List of Engagements.

1900

April 22°-23° 24° Leeuw Kop (Matangares)

May

- 3° Brandfort...
  4° Constantia...
  5° Vett River...
  7° Virginia Siding...
  10° Verdriss Verdrac...
  25° Viljoen's Drift...
  27°-28° Klip Riverburg...
  30° near Driefontein

June

- 3° Kalk Hennel...
  11°-12° Diamond Hills...
  18° Zoutsdrift Drift...

July

- 6° Rietfontein...
  7° Olphangfontein...
  9°-10° Rietfontein...
  12° Witpoort Koffyspruit...
  16° Witpoort Dooestfontein...
  23° Boschfontein...
  27° Bankfontein

Aug

- 1° Buffelspruit
  3° Dorkop

- 25°-26°-27° Belfast Bergandals

Oct

- 5° Weltreffeden

Nov

- 2° Witkloof
  6° Van Wyksvlei Uisfontein...
  13°-14°-15° Witpoort
  16°-17° Dulsstrom

With the Compliments of

Col. F.L. Berckoff, C.B.A.D.C.

Commanding Royal Canadian Dragoons (Special Service Force)
they were scattered, and Roberts entered the Gold City. In the Doornkop battle new honours were won by both the Canadian mounted troops and the Royal Canadian Regiment. The latter was now once more under the leadership of Colonel Otter, who, on May 26th, shortly after the Vaal river was crossed, had rejoined his regiment. It was the work of the infantry to break the Boer lines, and to do this they had to cross a veldt blackened and burning, the final dash being actually through flames. On the 5th of June Pretoria was entered, and in the triumphal march past the saluting point the Royal Canadian Regiment lead the 19th Brigade. But they were a poor remnant of the sturdy force that had left Quebec eight months before. A draft of 100 men had been added to the regiment, but on this day only 27 officers and 411 men were on its strength.

On the following day the Canadian mounted troops marched through Pretoria to Koudoespoort, where they were to enjoy a much-needed two days' rest.

From the day the Royal Canadian Regiment entered Pretoria, until the end of October, when it entrained for Cape Town on its homeward journey, it had seen much service, but its great work was finished when Pretoria was entered. Its work had been done well and the regiment was deserving of General Smith-Dorrien's words:—"I never yet asked Otter and his Canadians to do anything that was not satisfactorily performed." The Royal Canadian Regiment had won renown, but it had paid a heavy price; of its numbers, 29 had died of disease or were accidentally killed, 39 were killed in action or died from wounds, and 123 were wounded.

It was thought that with the fall of Pretoria the Boer forces still in the field would be speedily rounded up. But there was to be nearly two years of trying warfare before the Boer leaders could be brought to accept the British terms. For almost six months longer the C.M.R. and R.C.D. were to be engaged in the field. Both forces were for weeks employed escorting convoys,
guarding lines of communication, and operating with flying columns. Their most exciting experience was in the region of Belfast, where they took part in the battle of Belfast and in the rear-guard action of Lilliefontein. In the latter fight, one of the best conducted engagements during the whole course of the South African War, two guns of "D" Battery, under Lieut. (now Brig.-Gen.) E. W. B. Morrison played a most conspicuous part. The handling of the Canadian forces by Col. Lessard on this day called forth the highest praise from the British officers. Of his work, Sir Conan Doyle in his The Great Boer War wrote:—"The most difficult of military operations, the covering of a detachment from a numerous and aggressive enemy, was admirably carried out by the Canadian gunners and dragoons under the command of Col. Lessard."

The R.C.D. and C.M.R. left South Africa for Canada in December, the former having fought in forty engagements and having had 7 killed, 27 wounded, and 18 died from disease; the latter having taken part in 28 engagements and having had 5 killed, 22 wounded, and 7 died from disease. When the number of engagements and the trying character of their entire work are taken into consideration, the list of casualties is remarkably light.

While the Canadian infantry and mounted infantry were sweeping northward with the great advance, "D" and "E" Batteries were out of this main movement of the war. On May 9th, "E" was marched out of De Aar for Belmont and on the 13th joined Sir Charles Warren's column, and for the next four months was to operate in Griqualand West. The battery came into action for the first time on May 20th; twice on that day, by excellent gun-fire, scattering bands of rebels.

But its one important engagement was at Faber's Putts on May 30th. On the morning of this day, just as dawn was breaking, the men of "E" Battery were roused from sleep by a savage fire at close range. The enemy by a skilfully-conducted night advance had crept
within striking distance of the British camp, and as morning broke some of them were within 100 yards of "E" Battery. The guns were quickly manned and the drivers, under a galling close-range fire, led their horses to a place of safety. Quickly the battery was ordered into action, and after a few well-directed rounds the Boers scattered in disordered flight. Veterans never acted with greater steadiness, and "E" Battery undoubtedly saved the British force on this occasion. How hot was the engagement can be gathered from the fact that on No. 1 gun alone, out of seven men, one (Bombardier Latimer) was killed and five wounded. In this fight the battery's total casualties were one killed and eight wounded.

"E" Battery remained in Griqualand West helping to settle the district until September 19th, when it became a part of the Vryburg Column, 3,200 strong, and assisted in the relief of Switz Reneke, in the Transvaal, and Hoopstad, in the Orange River Colony. With this column it also took part in the engagements of Elizabeth Rust and Wegdrie. Finally, early in December, it was moved to Pretoria, and entrained for Cape Town on its return voyage to Canada. The battery had done its work well and, although its tasks were largely of the nature of police duty, it had been in seven engagements and had marched, in nine months, about 2,000 miles. Its casualty roll was but one killed, three deaths from enteric, one accidentally shot, and eight wounded.

Until the early part of July "D" Battery was together as a unit only on one or two occasions, the different sections doing communication duty at such places as Victoria Road, De Aar, Orange River, and Sanna's Post. On July 10th, it entrained at Bloemfontein for Pretoria, arriving there on the 13th. On the 21st, it came into action for the first time at Dewagen Drift. It was long in getting experience in battle, but it was now to have its full share. In the action at Dewagen Drift, which lasted only half an hour, the battery expended a total of
ninety-six rounds, "officers and men doing excellently under very trying circumstances"—to use the words of their Commanding Officer, Major Hurdman. For nearly four months the guns of "D" Battery were to play an important part in the South African War, but rarely together, the different sections being assigned individual work. In every instance officers and men won the encomiums of the brigade officers under whom they served. In many actions, particularly in the rear-guard action at Lilliefontein, already referred to, the honours of the day rested with the gunners from Canada.

On December 3rd, the battery entrained at Elandsfontein for Cape Town, halting at Worcester for several days. Here, too, came "C" and "D" Batteries and, for the first time since the Canadian artillery arrived in South Africa, Col. Drury had his complete command together. On the 11th, the battery reached Cape Town and on the 13th embarked for home. The battery, between July 13th and November 17th, had been in thirty-two actions, as well as several smaller affairs, and at times was under fire from long range guns to which it was unable to reply, but it had no man killed and only one wounded. It had, it is true, in the days between the great Karoo march and the advance on Pretoria, suffered much from fever, but so sturdy were the gunners of the battery that only three deaths occurred from disease.

On May 19th, "C" Battery left Mafeking with Plumer's force, and until November 21st, when it entered Pretoria preparatory to returning to Canada, it endured much marching through disturbed districts, but only occasionally came into action with armed forces of the Boers. On December 3rd, Major Hudon's men entrained for Cape Town and on the 13th, sailed for Halifax. While enduring much marching, they were under fire on more than a dozen occasions, but in seven months of war the battery lost not a single man killed in battle or died from disease and had only two men wounded.
Lord Strathcona's Horse were held in the vicinity of Cape Town for six tiresome weeks after their arrival in South Africa, but on May 22nd, Colonel Steele received orders to embark "A" and "C" Squadrons for Durban. On May 29th, "B" Squadron was speeding northward for Kosi Bay, fifty miles south of Delagoa Bay. To the Strathcona's was given the task of cutting the railway line between Delagoa Bay and Pretoria, by blowing up the bridge at Komati Poort. The Boers, however, had learned of their intentions and were out 1,500 strong on the Swaziland border. The attempt had, therefore, to be abandoned. The regiment was shortly afterwards sent from Durban to Newcastle and from there rushed forward with all possible speed to Zand Spruit, where it became attached to Lord Dundonald's Brigade in General Buller's army.

Fighting began for the Strathcona's on July 1st, and from that time until January 8th, 1901, twelve days before their departure from Cape Town for England, details of the regiment were almost daily under fire. As scouts, as guards, and as escorts to convoys, they saw continuous and trying service. So well did they do the work allotted to them, that on his return to England Sir Redvers Buller said:—"I have never been served by a nobler, braver, or more serviceable body of men." Considering the character of their tasks, their losses were not heavy—12 killed in action or died of wounds, 13 died of disease, one accidently shot, and 24 wounded.

If we include Lord Strathcona's Horse, for which the Dominion merely acted as the agent for Lord Strathcona, Canada sent to South Africa 160 officers and 2,932 non-commissioned officers and men. In addition to this she placed at the disposal of the mother-country the 3rd (Special Service) Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment to temporarily relieve the 1st Battalion Prince of Wales Leinster Regiment, Royal Canadians, at Halifax, thus aiding Britain, by relieving this regiment, with 29 officers and 979 men, so that the Dominion's total contribution
was 189 officers and 3,907 men at a total cost of $2,830,965.07. And in addition to this the Dominion acted as the agent of the Imperial Government in recruiting the South African Constabulary, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Regiments C.M.R. and the 10th Canadian Field Hospital, making the total of officers and men contributed by Canada to the South African War and the guerrilla war which immediately followed it, 8,372.

There is still to be considered what may be called the humane side of the war. The nursing sisters with the First and Second Contingents did noble, self-sacrificing work. The medical officers—Wilson, Fiset, Duff, Ross, Devine, Worthington, Vaux, and Keenan—laboured incessantly in the hospitals and in the field with the sick and wounded. The Canadian branch of the Red Cross Society under the direction of the Commissioner to South Africa, Lieut.-Col. Dr. G. Sterling Ryerson, who acted in conjunction with the Army Medical Staff and the British Red Cross in South Africa, distributed thousands of dollars worth of supplies to the Canadian sick and wounded.
CHAPTER XII

A PERIOD OF MILITARY GROWTH

THE South African War caused the recognition of the Colonial forces as part and parcel of the military establishment of the Empire. There was an attendant quickening of military spirit in Canada, and the militia began to emerge from the experimental stage.

In 1902 Lord Dundonald, the saviour of Ladysmith, succeeded to the command of the Canadian forces. By the following year he had devised a new plan of military organization for the Dominion. The general scheme was to provide the skeleton of an army, a skeleton of highly-trained units, whose personnel should in times of peace consist of officers and non-commissioned officers, and a certain number of privates; in time of war to be filled up from a large reserve of partly trained citizens, who had learned to drill and to shoot with the minimum of detriment to the routine of their daily vocations.

The key to the scheme was decentralization. The districts already existing were to be grouped into five "higher commands," viz.:

1. Maritime Provinces
2. Quebec
3. Eastern Ontario
4. Western Ontario
5. The West generally.

The officers commanding these districts would thus be given greater powers, and afforded the experience of acting on a wider scale than was possible under the old arrangement. There would follow, of course, a decentralization of stores and equipment, and the total force

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1 The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Lieut.-Col. C. F. Hamilton for valuable information and advice in the preparation of this chapter.

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A PERIOD OF MILITARY GROWTH

so raised—called by its originator the first line of defence—was to amount to about 100,000 men of all arms, including departmental corps and other details.

In addition to this Lord Dundonald advocated the establishment of a "central training camp," and most of his scheme was afterwards adopted and carried out by his successor, Sir Percy Lake.

A breach between Lord Dundonald and the Government took place in June, 1904, the direct result of a speech delivered by him at a military banquet at the Windsor Hotel in Montreal, in the course of which he complained bitterly of political interference, and attacked specifically the Minister of Agriculture, who was at the time acting Minister of Militia, for striking the name of an officer off a list which had been officially approved by the General Officer Commanding. Previous to this the stores branch had been transferred from the civilian to the military side, the ordnance and medical departments organized and an intelligence branch established. Special attention was also devoted to the simplification of training by the preparing of special drill books, the institution of lecturing in drill halls, and the employment of paid permanent instructors. Finally Lord Dundonald induced the Government to spend $1,300,000 a year on munitions of war, in which the country hitherto had been starved to a degree that was almost unbelievable.

In 1904, Sir Frederick Borden, then Minister of Militia, introduced the Militia Act under which the Canadian military system of to-day legally exists. Briefly, it provides as follows: The Commander-in-Chief is His Majesty the King by his representative the Governor-General. The administration is in the hands of the Minister of Militia and Defence, assisted by a Parliamentary Under-Secretary and a Militia Council composed of four military members,—the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and the

1 This office was created in 1916 by Order-in-Council under the authority of the War Measures Act.
Master-General of the Ordnance, and two civil members—the Deputy Minister and the Accountant-and-Paymaster-General. There is also an Inspector-General whose special duty is to report upon the quality and the training of the troops, this officer being outside the Militia Council. The country is divided into thirteen military districts, each under a general officer or a colonel whose official designation is District Officer Commanding, and all the male inhabitants between the ages of eighteen and sixty are liable for military service. In cases of great emergency a levée en masse may be ordered, when all men capable of bearing arms may be summoned. There are four classes of these liable for military service, grouped as follows:

1. Those of 18 years of age to 30, unmarried, or widowers without children.
2. Those of 30 to 45, unmarried or widowers without children.
3. 18 to 45 married, or widowers with children.
4. 45 to 60.

The principle of substitution is recognized, and compulsory service in the field is for one year, or, under certain circumstances, eighteen months.

The militia may be sent on active service "anywhere in Canada, and also beyond Canada for the defence thereof." When the militia is called out for active service to serve conjointly with his Majesty's regular forces, His Majesty may place in command thereof a senior general officer of the regular army.

The general principle was to fit Dominion organization into the general military system of the Empire so that by standardization the parts might be interchangeable.

A concerted effort to bring about a homogeneous organization that should be Imperial in the modern sense of the term was a further direct result of the South African War. Minor efforts in this direction had been made in 1885 by the establishment of a joint committee of the War Office and of the Colonial Office under the name of the Colonial Defence Committee, which was re-
tained later on as a sub-committee of the Imperial Defence Committee. The colonial conference of 1887 merely solved the terms under which the Colonies might use Imperial officers. The colonial conference of 1902 was marked by the rejection of the scheme founded by the War Office on the tentative resolution offered by New Zealand, that an Imperial Reserve Force expressly available for overseas use in Imperial wars should be formed in all the Colonies. That of 1907 saw the inception of an Imperial General Staff, and at it General Sir Neville Lyttleton read a paper on the strategical conditions of the Empire from a military point of view, devoting special attention to the duty of arranging for mutual assistance upon definite lines in case of need, and the possibility of co-ordinating war organization throughout the Empire.

In a second paper Sir Neville made five proposals:

(a) That the same military terms be used throughout the Empire. Hitherto, for instance, in Canada, the term “regiment” had been synonymous with “battalion” throughout the rest of the Empire.

(b) That any unit in a possible future contingent sent to an Imperial war should be composed of the numbers prescribed by British War Establishments.

(c) That if a number of units were sent they should be grouped in the same standard manner.

(d) That the requisite number of administrative field units should be entirely provided by the United Kingdom.

(e) That administrative units on the lines of communication should be provided entirely by the United Kingdom.

These suggestions were tentatively accepted by the conference.

In 1909 Sir William Nicholson, the head of the General Staff at the British War Office, urged better training and better organization in the Dominions generally, with a
view to placing them in a position to give mutual aid in time of war.

It was then agreed that the war establishment of the Home regular army should be accepted as the basis on which the organization of units of the forces belonging to the Dominions should, so far as possible, be modelled. Additional similar details were particularized, including the adoption by the Dominions of Imperial patterns of arms, equipment, and stores, and it was recommended that officers performing general staff duties throughout the Empire should (1) be responsible to and under the control of their own governments, (2) be members of one body, the Imperial General Staff.

In the following year Sir John French (afterwards Field-Marshal Viscount French), the Imperial Inspector-General, was invited to visit Canada and to investigate the practical workings of the system at that time in use. Lord Kitchener had been performing a similar service in Australia, where he was given practically a free hand.

Sir John French’s criticisms were somewhat severe. Declining to commit himself upon the subject of universal military service, he claimed that the voluntary system had not received a fair trial in Canada, and that “the full measure of service and obligation which a volunteer, whether officer or private, takes upon himself” had not been exacted. He complained that the organization was insufficiently developed; that there was insufficient knowledge in the higher commands—that is, in the art of leading large bodies of troops; that the test qualifications for officers and non-commissioned officers of the Active Militia laid down in regulations were not strictly enforced; and that the rank and file were not being compelled to fulfil their obligations.

The proportion between the various arms of the service was not correctly adjusted; the annual camp training he stigmatized as “only a large collection of troops without any organization in the formation of all arms.”

In 1913 appeared the report of General Sir Ian Hamil-
ton, Inspector-General of the Overseas Forces, who had spent three years inspecting and taking stock of Imperial fortresses and territories, reporting upon the local troops raised by the various Crown colonies and dependencies, and reviewing the efficiency of the military forces and seaward defences of the Union of South Africa.

He begins by setting out the war organization of the Canadian Army at that time as follows:

Field Army:—
7 Mounted Brigades.
6 Divisions.
3 Mixed Brigades.
Lines of Communication Units.

Garrison Troops:—
Required for Halifax, Quebec, and Esquimalt.

Under the heading "Units Deficient" he mentions as the most important units lacking:
48 Batteries of Artillery.
34 Ammunition columns.
8 Field troops and companies, Engineers.
2 Infantry battalions (one in 5th, one in 6th Division).
11 Telegraph and wireless detachments.
15 Companies Army Service Corps.
7 Field Ambulances.

The numbers required—given in detail in an appendix to the report—were roughly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Army</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>143,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrison Troops</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,900</strong></td>
<td><strong>153,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as against numbers available:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Force</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Militia</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td>40,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>43,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

leaving a shortage of 2,100 officers and 110,000 other rank
to be obtained from sources outside the militia forces of the country in order to complete the field army and garrison troops up to the war establishment duly sanctioned by Parliament if mobilization had been ordered.

Further, he reported that the army possessed no depot cadres and no feeding organization for its maintenance in the field. Calculating a depot organization at a minimum of fifty per cent. of the field army, this implied an additional deficit of 2,800 officers and over 70,000 of other ranks. Mobilization therefore would entail bringing in from outside sources a total of 4,900 officers and over 180,000 other ranks.

The most serious deficiencies in arms, ammunition, clothing, stores, etc., make a formidable list, as follows:

284 Guns and howitzers for the field army; 60 under order; ammunition for the same.
287 machine guns; 50 under order.
97,000 rifles; 13,500 under order.
140,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.
150,000 suits of service dress.
100,000 sets of web equipment.
150,000 intrenching implements.

A large amount of harness (of regular pattern), as well as saddlery, for use with guns, and technical vehicles.

The experience of the South African War had led the British Government to lay out many millions of pounds in creating an adequate reserve of military armaments and stores, and an irreducible minimum was fixed by Parliament below which these resources were not to be allowed to fall.

The training of the Permanent Force was carried out continuously throughout the year. In the Active Militia, officers and men of city corps were entitled to draw pay for sixteen days annually, four days at least to be spent in camp. In rural corps the whole training of the year, including musketry, was carried out during twelve days in camp. The training for all artillery units was a matter of sixteen days.
The question of liability for service appears to be somewhat clouded and open to discussion. Sir Ian's interpretation of the clause in the Militia Act is that the liability of the Canadian military forces is strictly territorial. While insisting that the first duty of the Canadian forces is home defence, the Inspector-General holds that Canada, like every other state in the Empire, is bound in honour, after looking to its own immediate safety, to consider how it may best take its share in the general burden of responsibility, but he also holds that like the other Dominions, she had been negligent in regard to the necessary organization, during peace, for effectively carrying out what certainly would be the will of her people in time of war.

Under the law existing in 1913 all male subjects between 18 and 60—actually some 1,000,000 effectives—were supposed to be available by enrolment and ballot for the defence of the country. Clauses such as this or the corresponding ballot clauses of the British Militia Act, Sir Ian stigmatizes as curses in disguise. He would prefer a clause applicable to one-half of the manhood of Canada, if that one-half were duly entered on muster rolls and warned of their liabilities. There was, however, no change necessary in the existing law. All that need be done was to revive the old British and French custom of preparing in peace military muster rolls of the men actually liable. The defence of the country rests, in the final extremity, with the nation itself, and practical recognition of the principle that every citizen's services should be placed at his country's disposal in war does not necessarily entail a system of universal manhood training in time of peace.

The first line of defence in time of war is supplied by the Active Militia, which also serves as a training school for the nation in time of peace. The training is necessarily progressive, beginning with that of the individual recruit and culminating in that of the highest war formation, such as the army corps, or the army. Recruit, squadron, and company training of the city corps is more
or less continuous throughout the year, so that, however short the time in camp may be, the best part of it can usually be devoted to field work. The sixteen days training, officially recognized, is held by Sir Ian to be a bare minimum for the requirements that may prove necessary in time of war. After reviewing briefly the special merits and demerits of the cavalry and artillery he devotes somewhat more space to the problem of the rural infantry. For them the whole training has to be carried out in the short period of the annual camp. They have no drill halls, rifle-ranges (service or miniature), instructors, or sites for instruction or week-end camps. The duration of the annual camps is only twelve days—or deducting Sunday, and the days of arrival and departure, nine days of actual training work.

Not only is the time of training insufficient, but the attendance is lamentably deficient; battalions arriving in camp with barely the establishment of a company; not by any means all of the men remaining for the full time, and some of the special instruction and training being necessarily devoted to work for which the rank and file are quite unprepared. There is neither time nor ammunition for adequate musketry practice, although the work and energy of the instructors is, as a rule, very highly commendable. Discipline necessarily suffers, and some of the more obvious and direct consequences of this may be seen on the line of march, when, however good their individual physical condition, the men, through lack of cohesion which only training can supply, straggle at will, fall out, occupy both sides of the road and block traffic. On the other hand the rural corps are quite at home in bivouac, and in many of the essentials are born campaigners, while they are not "cursed with nerves."

The remedy suggested was simple; four days extra pay for four days' instruction to the men in the neighbourhood of their homes by an instructional agency similar to that recommended in the case of the city corps of the Active Militia. This, Sir Ian claims, falls short both in the
A PERIOD OF MILITARY GROWTH

quality of instruction and in the quality of instructors. The remedy he suggests is decentralization, the appointment of a professional brigade-major for each cavalry and infantry brigade, and non-commissioned officers at the rate of one for each city corps, and at least one per two rural corps. The remuneration of a brigade-major should be sufficient to attract the best officers, whether of the permanent, regular, or militia forces.

The general staff officers of divisions and the brigade majors of brigades would periodically set up schools at places convenient to prospective pupils, and the actual schools of instruction instituted for the purpose of qualifying officers for promotion would no longer be required. The question of obtaining capable instructors could be met by tapping the almost unlimited supply of non-commissioned officers and men of the Regular Army who are every year leaving the Colours. At the date of the report the war establishment of the Active Militia was about two and a half times its peace establishment and three and a half times its peace strength.¹ This the Inspector-General held was far too great a disproportion, the aim of the authorities in other countries being always to make peace establishments and peace strength coincide. A minimum strength should be fixed for all units, and corps falling below it should be amalgamated with some other corps.

The question of deficiencies in ammunition and stores was very serious indeed. "Not to put too fine a point upon it," says the report, "there are no equipment, clothing, or reserve stores for issue on the outbreak of war." The questions of storehouses, of ordnance personnel, and of the turnover of stores had to be faced fairly and squarely.

The combined Naval and Military expenditure for the year preceding the report (1911-12) worked out per head

¹ The "Establishment" of a unit is the number authorized by law. Its "Strength" is the number actually serving at a given moment.
of the white population of the great self-governing nations in the Empire as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$7.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reasons for the existence of the Permanent Force are as follows:

(a) In war the defence of Canada, whose fortresses may have to be manned at a few hours' notice.

(b) In peace the preservation of the armament, search lights, works and material of the fortresses.

(c) The upkeep of units whence an instructional staff for the Active Militia can be drawn and wherein this personnel can be periodically kept up to date by means of "refresher" courses.

(d) The maintenance of these same units at a high level of efficiency so that they may serve as standards for the Active Militia.

With regard to the future of the Permanent Force, Sir Ian held that the time had arrived when Canada had to choose between two alternatives. She might retain her permanent units as effective instruments for war and as models for the Active Militia, or she might treat their internal efficiency as altogether secondary to the interests of the Active Militia. The first is a policy of concentration; the second, one of dispersion. While disclaiming any brief for either case, he stressed the general principle that concentration makes for efficiency while dispersion destroys it. This every military man knows. Small detachments are synonyms for waste and slackness; discipline suffers and keenness is killed. By bringing instruction and education close to the militiaman along the lines already indicated it would be possible to do without the small existing schools and to concentrate the Permanent Force in a few stations—the fewer the better.

Sir Ian recorded that great progress in many directions
had been made since Sir John French's report in 1910. Organization was markedly more thorough; training had been levelled up in some respects; and, under the supervision of the General Staff, the education of all ranks, and especially of the highest ranks, had been improved. But he insisted that there was no room for relaxation of effort. His chief recommendations, as summarized in the following table, were:

1. Increase in Instructional Staff of the Active Militia.
2. Localization of instruction in divisional areas by means of provisional schools.
3. [Dependent on (2)] Abolition of central schools for cavalry and infantry.
4. Increase in the remuneration of officer instructors.
5. Direct engagement from outside sources of some of the sergeant instructors.
6. Increase in the peace establishment of the Active Militia.
7. Institution of a minimum strength for units of the Active Militia.
8. Amalgamation of weak units.
9. Sixteen days paid training for rural corps as well as for city corps.
10. Training of rural corps at other times than during camping period.
11. Consideration of alternative policies affecting the Permanent Force:
    (a) A wider dispersion of Permanent Force Units as the Active Militia increased; or
    (b) Concentration of Permanent Force Units and their employment as units.
12. Assimilation of Permanent Force Units, if concentrated, to the Regular model.
13. Interchange of Permanent Force and Regular Units.
14. Creation of adequate war reserves of arms, ammunition, clothing, equipment, and stores.
16. Institution of a National Reserve.
17. Preparation of classified muster-rolls of men liable and fit for service.

In 1912 the total war establishment in Canada was computed at about 150,000 of all ranks; that is, a mobile field army of 125,000, and 25,000 allotted to garrison duty and lines of communication. To maintain this army at full strength and efficiency in time of war it would be necessary to raise, train and equip another 100,000 at least, the wastage of a field army for the first year being calculated at about seventy per cent.

The permanent force comprised: two regiments (each of two squadrons) of cavalry, the Royal Canadian Dragoons and Lord Strathcona's Horse; a horse artillery brigade of two batteries, one heavy battery of artillery and four garrison companies of artillery; one field company and two fortress companies of engineers; and one battalion of ten companies of infantry. There were also various detachments of the Permanent Army Service Corps, Permanent Army Medical Corps, Permanent Army Veterinary Corps, Ordnance Corps, Pay Corps, and Corps of Military Staff clerks. The total number amounted to about three thousand.

It was intended that on general mobilization the batteries of horse and heavy artillery should be employed as field units; the garrison artillery, fortress engineers, and a proportion of the infantry would be allotted for coast defence, the remaining personnel being variously employed.

At that date the Active Militia was composed as follows:

Cavalry squadrons ...................... 140

Artillery:

13-pounder batteries ..................... 4
18-pounder batteries .................... 31
Ammunition columns for these .......... 12
5-inch howitzer batteries ................ 2
Ammunition columns for these .......... 1
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Heavy batteries......................... 5
Ammunition columns for these........ 5
Garrison companies..................... 13
Siege companies....................... 2

Engineers:
Field Troops............................ 4
Field Companies....................... 9
Infantry battalions..................... 99
Army Service Corps, companies....... 18

Army Medical Corps:
General hospitals..................... 2
Cavalry field ambulance.............. 7
Field ambulance....................... 14

Besides these were detachments such as the Corps of Guides, Signalling Corps, Army Veterinary Corps, Postal Corps and Ordnance Corps (non-permanent). On a war footing the numbers of the personnel indicated by the above units work out as follows:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>21,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Horse, field, and heavy artillery</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege and garrison artillery</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Medical Services</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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or a total of ....................... 139,500

as against a corresponding total of 101,400 in 1902.

This increase in numerical strength was largely due to the formation of new corps in the West; and it is to be noted that the relative proportion of the fighting arms was better adjusted than was formerly the case.

Of infantry brigades there were twenty, most of them having four battalions, besides which there were many unbrigaded battalions, mostly from the West, where the distances are too great to admit of association. There were also seven cavalry brigades in addition to regiments intended for use as divisional cavalry. The old term "higher command" was replaced at the suggestion of Sir John French by the name "divisional areas," since changed to "military districts."
The improvement in the supply of arms, ammunition, clothing and other equipment had not been commensurate with the increased demand created by the additions to the personnel. To outfit new regiments it was necessary to strip the stores intended for use in mobilization of older units. There were only about 200 modern guns of the sorts used by a field army instead of at least double that number. There were about 100,000 (more or less) serviceable .303 rifles in the country, and the Ross rifle factory was turning out a maximum of 3,000 a month. The supply of rifle ammunition was better, but still inadequate, the artillery ammunition supply fairly satisfactory.

Of stores and equipment other than arms and ammunition the supply was pitifully inadequate. The clothing on hand was not enough to supply the 60,000 men on the peace establishment of the Active Militia, and a large proportion of it was old and obsolete. If the necessary supplements were called up for mobilization it would have been impossible to supply the men with even a single article of clothing apiece, let alone an entire uniform. Articles of regimental equipment were equally deficient, food would have had to be eaten raw from lack of kitchen utensils, and horses ridden bareback for want of saddles. For the 100,000 men who would have been needed as reinforcements and for the maintenance of the forces already in the field there was absolutely no provision.

The actual peace strength at the time numbered 63,500, of whom 3,500 were Permanent and 60,000 Active Militia. Of the Active Militia who presented themselves annually for training there were never more than 45,000 and sometimes less than 40,000. There were 3,000 or 4,000 reservists of the British Army living in Canada in the year 1912, but these, of course, were under an obligation to return to their mother-country when called on. The shortage in additional officers amounted to nearly fifty per cent., there only being 3,000 or 4,000 on the list against some 6,000 or more needed in mobilization.

There had been an improvement in musketry, although
the shooting average was still low when compared with that of regular armies. The training of officers still fell short of the proper standard, and the non-commissioned officers were probably the weakest feature of the whole system. The best approach to the solution of the training problem has probably been made in the organization of the cadet system. A special officer in the Headquarters Staff was appointed to take charge; and in 1912 there were some 700 cadet companies and squadrons, and about 27,000 cadets. An attempt was made in some cases to provide training in local camps under military conditions, and special encouragement was given to schoolmasters who were willing to interest themselves in the movement.

Up to the time of the South African War the general idea of the Canadian military organization was that it was intended to be directed against a possible foe to the south. The memories of 1812 and of sundry later "unpleasant incidents" had not yet been obliterated. The possibility of Canada taking an active part in a European war was regarded as a fantastic dream; an interesting topic, perhaps for visionaries who cared to speculate about the future of generations yet unborn, who compiled pamphlets, and waxed eloquent on the platform concerning the rapidly approaching time when Canada would have a population of 100,000,000, or be the Predominant Partner in the Empire. Canada's "opposite number," in naval parlance, was the United States, and so long as the United States made a boast of their unpreparedness, derided "entangling alliances," and "pontified" about pacifism, there was no need for the Dominion to do more than follow their example—at a respectful distance. The fighting instinct was latent, of course, the real essential factor in human nature which will have to be bred out before we see "the golden years when wars and wounds shall cease." But the sudden gust of loyalty at the moment of the mother-country's splendid isolation stirred the smouldering embers into flame. Thereafter the fighting men of the Empire began to prepare them-
selves for the war which they knew was inevitable, and which they feared was imminent. Being fighting men they were largely inarticulate—such of them as had the gift of tongues met the usual fate of Cassandras, they were scoffed at, they were vilified, they were accused of being actuated by the basest motives. But they went ahead with what they knew was their duty. The enemy now was to be looked for elsewhere, and while the United Kingdom prepared tardily and inadequately to meet the first shock of conflict, the other Four Nations altered and adapted their component parts so as to fit into one general military system when the necessity arose. Here in Canada, plans were made, and steps were taken for: (1) Common establishment (it was understood, for example, that if Canada raised a division for war service, it would be identical as to number of battalions, proportion of artillery, details of staff, etc., with the divisions of the British Army); (2) A considerable amount of staff work, in the shape of mobilization arrangements, plans of organization, etc.; (3) The provision of arms, stores, equipment, etc., for a force such as Canada might reasonably be expected to raise.

After the reports by Sir John French and Sir Ian Hamilton, the nominal strength of the Canadian forces was raised to a first line 125,000 strong, and a second line, also 125,000 strong, of reinforcing units. In theory the enemy still was to the south of us; in actual fact the eyes of the men who knew were straining across the Atlantic.

The authorized establishment of the Permanent Force in 1914 was 5,000 and the actual strength about 3,000. The organizations included: cavalry, 4 squadrons; horse artillery, 2 batteries; garrison artillery, 5 companies; engineers, 3 companies; infantry, 1 battalion; and also army service corps, army medical corps, army veterinary corps, ordnance corps, army pay corps, military staff clerks, etc.

The Active Militia in 1914 comprised: cavalry, 130 squadrons; field artillery, 38 battalions; heavy artillery,
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5 batteries; siege artillery, 2 battalions; garrison artillery, 13 companies; engineers, 4 field troops, 9 field companies, 9 telegraph detachments, 1 wireless telegraph detachment; infantry, 104 battalions; signal corps, 4 companies and 3 independent sections; army service corps, 18 companies; army medical corps, 21 field ambulances; and sundry auxiliary services. The war establishments of these units would amount approximately to 125,000.

There was still an excess of infantry, and a deficiency in certain other arms, particularly in artillery. The provision of special troops for the auxiliary services (Army Medical Corps,1 Army Service Corps, etc.) received special attention for almost the first time. In spite of many difficulties and much inertia the trained men in the Active Militia had been raised from less than 20,000 prior to the South African War to 60,000 in 1914.

Training establishments had also been increased in the interval between the South African War and the Great War in 1914. Of these the oldest, of course, is the Royal Military College at Kingston, to be dealt with later.2 The schools of artillery, cavalry and infantry were increased in number, and instructors were detached from the permanent corps to conduct temporary courses at various headquarters of militia units. A school of musketry on the model of Hythe was established at Rockcliffe, near Ottawa, and every encouragement possible was given to the foundation and improvement of rifle clubs, both military and civilian. A condition attaching to membership of civilian rifle clubs was that members enrolling themselves therein should "in case of emergency" at once become members of the Active Militia. Annual grants, a limited number of rifles, and a proportion of free ammunition were supplied by the Government. In 1914 there were 167 military and 433 civilian clubs, having a

1 The Canadian Army Service Corps dates back to 1903. This corps, perhaps, more nearly approached the standard of Army efficiency than any other. This was probably due to the business training and experience of the members composing it.

2 In volume five of this series,
total membership of some 52,000. Active encouragement was given also to rifle practice by members of the militia, both Dominion and Provincial Governments giving monetary grants to the Dominion and Provincial rifle associations.

The growth of the cadet movement is startling and gratifying. It began in 1908; in 1911 there were 492 companies and 19,250 cadets; in the first half of 1916 there were 1428 companies and 57,000 cadets. Of these units 76 were affiliated or attached to militia organizations; 26,000 cadets were drawn from secondary schools, 25,500 from primary schools, and 500 were in corps fostered by municipalities or government institutions. Cadet camps were formed in 1912. These were attended by some 12,000 to 20,000 boys, who were given thorough instruction in rifle shooting.

With a view to the increased provision of arms, the Ross rifle factory was started in Quebec in 1904. This weapon differed in many respects from the Lee-Enfield, which is the type used elsewhere in the British Dominions, although it took the same ammunition. The capacity of the factory before the war was about 1,000 rifles a month, and there were about 70,000 rifles in the country in August, 1914. The Quebec factory has been greatly enlarged and orders have been issued to adapt it for the production of the Lee-Enfield.

In 1914 there was a small arsenal at Quebec, capable of turning out some millions of rounds of rifle ammunition per annum, and also of making 18-pounder shells. At the beginning of the war the Government had provided about 100 guns, mostly 13- and 18-pounder horse and field quick-firing guns, but also including a few heavy guns, 4·7-inch and 60-pounders. The supply of machine-guns was deficient and the type obsolete. Something also had been done to increase the provision of mobilization stores, i.e., clothing and other necessary equipment for the new men who would be added to various units when these were brought to their war strength.
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As a result of the change in purview which had come into existence since the South African War, the plans framed by the military authorities included confidential schemes for the despatch abroad, in the event of a war in Europe, of an expeditionary force comprising a division (i.e., twelve battalions of infantry, with the necessary complement of artillery and other troops, in all about 18,000 men), and a mounted brigade (about 2,000 mounted rifles). The detailed plans for the enlistment and mobilization of these forces had been carefully elaborated; the main idea being that the troops should be specially enlisted and that the existing militia organization should be employed for this purpose. No attempt was made to employ the Active Militia as such, or to enforce the theoretical liability of the militia to serve abroad. The Canadian Expeditionary Force was a New Force, raised, organized and outfitted by the machinery of the Active Militia and very largely officered and manned by the same body. The precise status of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, indeed, seems to be a little vague, and it is in a sense quite outside the Active Militia, although largely based upon that force.
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